Sukhdev Singh Vs Sukhbir Kaur on 12 Feb 2025

A full bench of Supreme Court passed this order to a reference from a division bench.

From Para 6,

6. The following questions arise for our consideration:
(i)Whether a spouse of a marriage declared as void by a competent Court under Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to claim permanent alimony and maintenance under Section 25 of the 1955 Act?
(ii)Whether in a petition filed seeking a declaration under Section 11 of the 1955 Act, a spouse is entitled to seek maintenance pendente lite under Section 24 of the 1955 Act?

From Para 26,

26. An apprehension is the expression by the learned counsel for the appellant that if it is held that Section 25 of the 1955 Act also applies to void marriages, it will lead to a ridiculous result. He gave an example of a wife whose first marriage is subsisting, inducing another man to marry her. He also gave an example of a daughter getting married to her father. We must note that Sub-Section 1 of Section 25 uses the word “may”. A grant of a decree under Section 25 of the 1955 Act is discretionary. If the conduct of the spouse who applies for maintenance is such that the said spouse is not entitled to discretionary relief, the Court can always turn down the prayer for the grant of permanent alimony under Section 25 of the 1955 Act. Equitable considerations do apply when the Court considers the prayer for maintenance under Section 25. The reason is that Section 25 lays down that while considering the prayer for granting relief under Section 25, the conduct of the parties must be considered.

From Paras 27 and 28,

27. Section 24 confers a power on a matrimonial Court to grant interim maintenance in pending proceedings seeking a decree contemplated under the 1955 Act. The power is to be exercised pending the proceedings for a grant of a decree under Sections 9 to 13 of the 1955 Act. The conditions for applicability of Section 24 are:
(i) There must be a proceeding under the 1955 Act pending and
(ii) the court must come to a conclusion that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding.
26. Even if, prima facie, the matrimonial court finds the marriage between the parties is void or voidable, the court is not precluded from granting maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions mentioned above are satisfied. The grant of relief under Section 24 is discretionary as the Section uses the word ‘may’. While deciding the prayer for interim relief under Section 24, the Court will always consider the conduct of the party seeking the relief. It provides for issuing a direction to pay a reasonable amount.

Final conclusions:

29. Accordingly, we answer the questions as follows:
a. A spouse whose marriage has been declared void under Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to seek permanent alimony or maintenance from the other spouse by invoking Section 25 of the 1955 Act. Whether such a relief of permanent alimony can be granted or not always depends on the facts of each case and the conduct of the parties. The grant of relief under Section 25 is always discretionary; and
b. Even if a court comes to a prima facie conclusion that the marriage between the parties is void or voidable, pending the final disposal of the proceeding under the 1955 Act, the court is not precluded from granting maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions mentioned in Section 24 are satisfied. While deciding the prayer for interim relief under Section 24, the Court will always take into consideration the conduct of the party seeking the relief, as the grant of relief under Section 24 is always discretionary.

Sukhdev Singh Vs Sukhbir Kaur on 12 Feb 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 197]

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/permanent-alimony-interim-maintenance-can-be-granted-even-when-marriage-is-void-under-hindu-marriage-act-supreme-court-283751

https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/spouse-of-void-marriage-under-hindu-marriage-act-entitled-to-permanent-alimonymaintenance-supreme-court

https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=18508

https://lawtrend.in/hindu-marriage-act-alimony-and-maintenance-granted-even-if-marriage-is-void-supreme-court/

Index of Maintenance Judgements under HMA here.

Kunal Choudhary Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 05 Dec 2023

Posted on May 4, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division of the Apex Court set aside a weird condition in an Anticipatory Bail petition in a Sec 498A IPC case.

From Para 5,

5. The High Court vide the impugned order has dismissed the Cr.M.P. No.2419 of 2021 filed by the appellant observing that in view of the adamant attitude of the appellant in not resuming the conjugal life with the opposite party No.2 in the house of the appellant, where the opposite party No.2 was staying, his petition could not be considered. In our opinion, neither such condition should have been imposed by the High Court while granting an anticipatory bail, nor such could be a ground for rejection of the petition filed by the appellant.

Kunal Choudhary Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 05 Dec 2023

Modification on the following order was dismissed.

Kunal Choudhary Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 17 Jun 2022

Anticipatory Bail was granted with this condition…

Considering the submissions of learned counsels and the facts and circumstances stated above, I am inclined to grant privileges of anticipatory bail to the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner is directed to surrender in the Court within six weeks from today and in the event of his arrest or surrendering, he will be enlarged on bail on satisfying the trial court that the petitioner has taken the opposite party no.2 to his house at Pandra locality of Ranchi and keeping and maintaining her with full dignity and honour as his lawful wife and on furnishing bail bond of Rs.25,000/- (Twenty five thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned CJM, Ranchi in connection with Complain Case No. 3004 of 2018 with the condition that he will co-operate with the trial of the case with condition that he will take the opposite party no.2 to his house at Pandra in the locality of Ranchi and keeping and maintaining her with full dignity and honour as his lawful wife and subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Kunal Choudhary Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 10 Aug 2021

Index of Anticipatory Bail Judgments is here.

Y.G. Rajesh Vs M Ramya and Anr on 08 Feb 2024

Posted on April 10, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka High Court held as follows,

From Para 6-10,

6. Upon considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner/husband, though there is savings of exorbitant quantum of amount made deductible just to negate giving maintenance to the wife and child, what are the compulsorily amounts to be deducted are income tax and professional tax. But considering deductions from the salary of petitioner/husband, those are provident fund contribution, house rent recovery, furniture recovery, towards loan obtained by the petitioner/husband, LIC premium and festival advance, these are all deductions accruing to the benefit of petitioner only. These amounts cannot be made deductible while considering for assessment of maintenance amount.
7. While appreciating salary/income of the husband above stated deductions cannot be considered while calculating salary of husband. If this is allowed, then in every case of petition filed under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. there would be tendency by the husband to create artificial deductions making an attempt to show lesser take home salary with an intention to mislead the Courts in order to negate to give maintenance or an attempt to award to make lesser amount of maintenance. Therefore, if the Court finds that the deductions are artificial deductions in the manner above discussed, then the Court has to consider the entire evidence on record on all its preponderance of probabilities while awarding quantum of maintenance amount. The deductions as above stated will ultimately enure to the benefit of the husband only. Suppose if the husband raises loan for purchase of site, house or car and the deduction is made from the salary and shown in his salary certificate, ultimately that raising of loan is for the benefit of husband only and just because deductions are made in this regard, it is not the ground to award lesser quantum of maintenance.
8. In the present case, the deductions is more than 50%, hence, it is proved that the husband has made an arrangement to show more deductions with an intention to pay lesser amount of maintenance. Therefore, the said deductions above discussed cannot be the factor to award lesser quantum of maintenance to the wife. In the present case, it is admitted that the petitioner/husband is a Branch Manager working in State Bank of India receiving salary of more than Rs.1,00,000/- per month. Then the Family Court is correct in awarding maintenance award of Rs.15,000/- per month to the wife and Rs.10,000/- per month to the child/daughter, which needs no interference by this Court.
9. Therefore, it is proved that the respondents have become destitute at the hands of the petitioner and the petitioner is working as Manager in State Bank of India and receiving a lucrative salary per month and thus upon considering all these facts and circumstances, it is proved that the petitioner is financially capable person to maintain his wife and daughter. Thus, order passed by the Family Court need not be interfered with and as such, the petition is dismissed being devoid of merits with cost of Rs.15,000/- payable to the respondents by the petitioner herein.

Y.G. Rajesh Vs M Ramya and Anr on 08 Feb 2024

Index of Maintenance cases u/s 125 CrPC are here.

Anupati Rajesh Vs Peruboina Anusha Sai on 05 Feb 2024

Posted on February 19, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A perverse order passed by the AP High Court, totally bypassing the intent of the Apex Court is prescribing the guidelines in Rajnesh Vs Neha decision here.

From Paras 6-7,

6. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the court below erred in allowing the petition even without filing the statement of assets and liabilities and further that the respondent herself deserted the petitioner and yet, sought maintenance, and therefore, she is not entitled to claim any interim maintenance. It is also submitted by him that without there being any evidence of income of the petitioner, the Court below granted interim maintenance of exorbitant amount, which is unsustainable. In support of his contentions, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajnesh Vs. Neha and others1, wherein at paragraph No.99, it was held as follows:
“99. The Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities annexed as Enclosures I, II and III of this judgment, as may be applicable, shall be filed by both parties in all maintenance proceedings, including pending proceedings before the concerned Family Court/District Court/Magistrates Court, as the case may be, throughout the country.”
7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the petitioner has not raised any objection before the trial Court about the statement to be filed nor did he file any such statement. He further submitted that the petitioner herein did not dispute his income in the counter filed by him and further, after considering the facts and allegations submitted on both sides, the impugned order was passed by the Court below, and therefore, the same does not require any interference.

From Paras 9-11,

9. The petitioner herein has not raised any objection that the interim order cannot be granted in view of non-filing of such a statement by the respondent herein. As such, the trial Court had no opportunity to decide on that aspect. Hence, the petitioner cannot contend that the impugned order is illegal on that ground.
10. As rightly contended, the petitioner herein in his counter did not specifically deny his earnings and he merely stated that the respondent/wife did not file any proof in support of the income stated in the petition. Therefore, the trial Court has rightly taken the earning capacity of the revision petitioner into consideration while fixing the quantum of maintenance.
11. Insofar as the question of desertion by the respondent herein is concerned, it is a matter of enquiry after full-fledged trial and prima facie there is no material on record to support the contention of the petitioner herein that the respondent herself deserted the petitioner as contended.

Anupati Rajesh Vs Peruboina Anusha Sai on 05 Feb 2024

Index of all maintenance cases is here.

Priya Indoria Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 20 Nov 2023

Posted on November 23, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court passed this Judgment around filing of anticipatory bail petition u/s 438 Cr.P.C.

From Paras 40-41, 44-47, (Regd grant of limited Anticipatory bail in HC/Sessions Court in accused’s local State, outside the State in which FIR is registered)

40. We are conscious that this may also lead the accused to choose the Court of his choice for seeking anticipatory bail. Forum shopping may become the order of the day as the accused would choose the most convenient Court for seeking anticipatory bail. This would also make the concept of territorial jurisdiction which is of importance under the CrPC pale into insignificance. Therefore, in order to avoid the abuse of the process of the Court as well as the law by the accused, it is necessary for the Court before which the plea for anticipatory bail is made, to ascertain the territorial connection or proximity between the accused and the territorial jurisdiction of the Court which is approached for seeking such a relief. Such a link with the territorial jurisdiction of the Court could be by way of place of residence or occupation/work/profession. By this, we imply that the accused cannot travel to any other State only for the purpose of seeking anticipatory bail. The reason as to why he is seeking such bail from a Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the FIR has not been filed must be made clear and explicit to such a Court. Also there must be a reason to believe or an imminent apprehension of arrest for a non-bailable offence made out by the accused for approaching the Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the FIR is not lodged or the inability to approach the Court where the FIR is lodged immediately.
41. Having regard to the vastness of our country and the length and breadth of it and bearing in mind the complex nature of life of the citizens, if an offence has been committed by a person in a particular State and if the FIR is filed in another State and the accused is a resident in a third State, bearing in mind access to justice, the accused who is residing in the third State or who is present there for a legitimate purpose should be enabled to seek the relief of limited anticipatory bail of transitory nature in the third State.
44. Further, on a reading of Section 438 of CrPC, we do not find that the expression “the High Court” or “the Court of Session” is restricted vis-à-vis the local limits or any particular territorial jurisdiction. However, this does not mean that if an FIR is lodged in one State then the accused can approach the Court in another State for seeking anticipatory bail. He can do so, if at the time of lodging of the FIR in any State, he is residing or is present there for a legitimate purpose in any other State. In fact, on a reading of Section 438 of CrPC, it does not emerge that the expression “the High Court” or “the Court of Session” must have reference only to the place or territorial jurisdiction within which the FIR is lodged. If that was the implication, the same would have been expressly evident in the Section itself or by a necessary implication. Further use of the word “the” before the words “High Court” and “Court of Session” also does not mean that only the High Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, within whose jurisdiction the FIR is filed, is competent to exercise jurisdiction for the grant of transit anticipatory bail.
45. At the same time, we are also mindful of the fact that the accused cannot seek full-fledged anticipatory bail in a State where he is a resident when the FIR has been registered in a different State. However, in view of what we have discussed above, he would be entitled to seek a transit anticipatory bail from the Court of Session or High Court in the State where he is a resident which necessarily has to be of a limited duration so as to seek regular anticipatory bail from the Court of competent jurisdiction. The need for such a provision is to secure the liberty of the individual concerned. Since anticipatory bail as well as transit anticipatory bail are intrinsically linked to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and since we have extended the concept of access to justice to such a situation and bearing in mind Article 14 thereof it would be necessary to give a constitutional imprimatur to the evolving provision of transit anticipatory bail. Otherwise, in a deserving case, there is likelihood of denial of personal liberty as well as access to justice for, by the time the person concerned approaches the Court of competent jurisdiction to seek anticipatory bail, it may well be too late as he may be arrested. Needless to say, the Court granting transit anticipatory bail would obviously examine the degree and seriousness of the apprehension expressed by the person who seeks transit anticipatory bail; while the object underlying exercise of such jurisdiction is to thwart arbitrary police action and to protect personal liberty besides providing immediate access to justice though within a limited conspectus.
46. If a rejection of the plea for limited/transitory anticipatory bail is made solely with reference to the concept of territorial jurisdiction it would be adding a restriction to the exercise of powers under Section 438. This, in our view, would result in miscarriage and travesty of justice, aggravating the adversity of the accused who is apprehending arrest. It would also be against the principles of access to justice. We say so for the reason that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt and in accordance with law. In the circumstances, we hold that the Court of Session or the High Court, as the case may be, can exercise jurisdiction and entertain a plea for limited anticipatory bail even if the FIR has not been filed within its territorial jurisdiction and depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, if the accused apprehending arrest makes out a case for grant of anticipatory bail but having regard to the fact that the FIR has not been registered within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court or Court of Session, as the case may, at the least consider the case of the accused for grant of transit anticipatory bail which is an interim protection of limited duration till such accused approaches the competent Sessions Court or the High Court, as the case may be, for seeking full-fledged anticipatory bail.
47. There can also be a case where the accused is facing multiple FIRs for the same offence in several States. He may seek an interim protection from a particular Sessions Court or the High Court in a State. Does he have to move from State to State for the purpose of seeking anticipatory bail or seek multiple pre-arrest bails? We would not attempt to give an answer to such a situation as the facts of the present case do not involve such a situation.

From Para 48, (Regd diluting the jurisdiction of Court to try the Sec 498a IPC cases, by going against many earlier judgments)

48. Another issue that calls for reiteration is, whether, the ordinary place of inquiry and trial would include the place where the complainant-wife resides after being separated from her husband. The position of law regarding the ordinary place of investigation and trial as per Section 177 of the CrPC, especially in matrimonial cases alleging cruelty and domestic violence, alleged by the wife, has advanced from the view held in the case of State of Bihar vs. Deokaran Nenshi, (1972) 2 SCC 890; Sujata Mukherjee (Smt.) vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, (1997) 5 SCC 30; Y. Abraham Ajith vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai, (2004) 8 SCC 100, Ramesh vs. State of T.N. (2005) 3 SCC 507; Manish Ratan vs. State of M.P., (2007) 1 SCC 262 that if none of the ingredients constituting the offence can be said to have occurred within the local jurisdiction, that jurisdiction cannot be the ordinary place of investigation and trial of a matrimonial offence. A three judge Bench of this Court has however clarified in Rupali Devi vs. State of U.P., (2019) 5 SCC 384 (Rupali Devi) that adverse effects on mental health of the wife even while residing in her parental home on account of the acts committed in the matrimonial home would amount to commission of cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A at the parental home. It was held that the Courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving or being driven away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would, depending on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498-A of the IPC.

Priya Indoria Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 20 Nov 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Sumeet Vs Himani Sumeet Ninave Nee on 29 Mar 2023

Posted on September 15, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge from Nagpur bench of Bombay High Court held as follows,

From Para 9,

9. In order to appreciate the rival submissions, I have gone through the record and proceedings. I have also gone through the judgments relied upon by both the parties. It is true that as per Section 1 of the D.V. Act, the D.V. Act extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It does not extend beyond the limits of India. The question therefore, is whether for the domestic violence caused to the aggrieved person on the foreign soil can be taken cognizance of by the Court of Magistrate in India at any of the places provided in clause (a) to (c) of Section 27. It is to be noted that subsection 1 and Section 27 of the D.V. Act will have to be harmoniously construed. The D.V. Act is a social beneficial legislation. The object and intention of the legislature behind this enactment is writ large from the statement of the object and reasons of the Act. Section 27 of the Act provides for the jurisdiction of a Court of Magistrate of First Class or Metropolitan Magistrate to entertain the application under this Act. The provisions of Section 27(1) (a) and (b) are applicable irrespective of the place of cause of action. It is to be noted that clause (a) and (b) of Section 27 (1) of the D.V. Act has, therefore, no direct nexus or co-relation with the place where the domestic violence was actually caused. In my view, these two clauses namely (a) and (b) of sub section (1) of Section 27 have to be harmoniously construed with sub section 1 of Section 27 of the Act. If it is so done then it would show that the law makers were mindful of such a situation and therefore, Section 27 have been worded in this form. It therefore goes without saying that though the Domestic Violence Act extend to the whole of India as provided under Section 1 of the D.V. Act, the domestic violence caused on the foreign soil could also be taken cognizance by invoking Section 27 (1) (a) and (b).

From Para 13, (Dumb interpretation)

13. The Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that sufferings of the wife at parental home though may not be directly attributable to commission of acts of cruelty by the husband at matrimonial home but the same would undoubtedly be the consequences of the acts committed at the matrimonial home. It is observed that such consequences, by itself, would amount to distinct offences committed at parental home where she has taken shelter. It is further observed that adverse effects on the mental health in the parental home though on account of acts committed in the matrimonial home would amount to commission of cruelty.

Not sure, which of the 6 reliefs, if/when passed by Magistrate Courts in India, will be executed outside India and how?

Sumeet Vs Himani Sumeet Ninave Nee on 29 Mar 2023 (S Vs H)

Index of DV Judgments is here.

Ali Hamid Daruwala Vs Nahida Rishad Cooper and Anr on 28 Feb 2023

Posted on August 20, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

With a Revision challenging decision of the District Court here, the single judge bench of Bombay High Court relying on Prabha Tyagi case here, held that removal of Respondents from DV case is unsustainable for lack of shared household requirement.

From Para 16, (such a blatant misinterpretation; only breach of Sec 18 Order is a punishable crime; nothing else)

16. The Apex Court, in the case of Kunapareddy Alias Nookala Shanka Balaji vs. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari And Another5, has observed that the proceedings under D.V. Act are predominantly of civil nature. It is only when there is a breach of order passed under any of the Section from 18 to 23. Such breach is punishable offence.

From Para 22,

In view of the judgment of Hon’be Apex Court in case of Prabha Tyagi (supra), the contention of learned Advocate that the Applicant had never lived in a shared household or was never in domestic relationship with the complainant and, therefore, the application was not maintainable, is not sustainable in law. Moreover, such a question would only be decided on full fledged hearing of the matter, i.e. after parties adduce evidence in support of their respective case.

Ali Hamid Daruwala Vs Nahida Rishad Cooper and Anr on 28 Feb 2023

Citation:

Other Sources:

Index of DV Cases here.

Abhishek Singh Vs State of M.P. on 26 Dec 2022

Posted on January 7, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of MP High Court held as follows, relying on Reema Aggarwal decision here

From Para 9,

9. Though it is an admitted position that complainant/respondent No.4 was already married and had a living spouse, when she contracted the second marriage with petitioner, however, there is no indication of word ‘valid marriage’ in Section 498-A of I.P.C. The language used therein is ‘husband or relative of husband’. These words not only rope in those who are validly married but also anyone who has undergone some or other form of marriage and thereby assumed for himself the position of husband.

Abhishek Singh Vs State of M.P. on 26 Dec 2022

Nahida Rishad Cooper Vs Ali Daruwala and Ors on 25 Feb 2022

Posted on September 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of a Sessions Court in Mumbai held as follows:

From Para 5,

5] Perusal of the application under Section 12 of the D. V. Act filed by the applicant has several references to the alleged domestic violence committed by the respondent No. 1. It is not in dispute that he resides separately and not with the appellant or the respondent No. 1. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate in his impugned order has observed that since the respondent No. 1 never resided with the appellant in any shared household he cannot be considered to be the respondent as defined by Section 2 (q) of the D. V. Act. He, therefore, omitted him from the array of the respondents in the main application.

From Para 6,

6] Such an observation of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate however, is wholly misplaced. It is for the simple reason that the proviso to Section 2 (q) of the D. V. Act makes it very clear that an aggrieved wife can also file a complaint against a relative of the husband. The Act nowhere mandates that an aggrieved person can seek relief only against the persons who have shared household with her. Had that been so, it would have been very convenient to cause violence or any other trouble to the aggrieved person through the relatives not sharing the same household and yet remained out of the clutches of the D. V. Act. Rather, holding that any relative of the husband if not sharing or shared the same household cannot be a respondent would amount to giving licence to those relatives to commit violence to the aggrieved person and thereby rendering the very Act meaningless. That just cannot be and certainly was not the intention while enacting the said statute. As observed earlier, there are sufficient references to show that the respondent No. 1 was also a party to the domestic violence committed to the appellant. As such, the proceedings against him was certainly tenable. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate was obviously wrong in holding that the respondent No. 1 since not shared the household with the appellant could not be a respondent as defined by Section 2 (q) of the D. V. Act. Consequently, the impugned order cannot sustain.

Nahida Rishad Cooper Vs Ali Daruwala and Ors on 25 Feb 2022

A Revision was dismissed by the Bombay High Court here.

Index of DV Cases here.

Arshad Ahmad and Ors Vs State NCT of Delhi and Anr on 02 Jun 2022

Posted on July 22, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Arshad Ahmad and Ors Vs State NCT of Delhi and Anr on 02 Jun 2022

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Misinterpretation of Earlier Judgment or Settle Principle of Law or Per Incuriam

Sukhdev Singh Vs Sukhbir Kaur on 12 Feb 2025

Kunal Choudhary Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 05 Dec 2023

Y.G. Rajesh Vs M Ramya and Anr on 08 Feb 2024

Anupati Rajesh Vs Peruboina Anusha Sai on 05 Feb 2024

Priya Indoria Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 20 Nov 2023

Sumeet Vs Himani Sumeet Ninave Nee on 29 Mar 2023

Ali Hamid Daruwala Vs Nahida Rishad Cooper and Anr on 28 Feb 2023

Abhishek Singh Vs State of M.P. on 26 Dec 2022

Nahida Rishad Cooper Vs Ali Daruwala and Ors on 25 Feb 2022

Arshad Ahmad and Ors Vs State NCT of Delhi and Anr on 02 Jun 2022