Yogesh Chhibbar Vs State of U.P. on 6 Dec 1999

Single judge bench of Allahabad High Court made pertinent comments on how not to interpret a provision of law.

From Para 6,

6. It is not disputed that the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance on the complaint filed by Dowry Prohibition Officer. Section 7(1)(b) of Dowry Prohibition Act bars taking cognizance of an offence under this Act except upon a complaint by the person aggrieved by the offence or a parent or other relative of such person, or by any recognized welfare institution or organisation. In this case undisputedly, the complaint was not filed by opposite party No. 2, or her parents or other relatives. Dowry Prohibition Officer has not been authorised by above section to file complaint. No doubt, Section 8B of Dowry Prohibition Act says that the State Government may appoint as many Dowry Prohibition Officer as it thinks fit and specified area in respect of which they shall exercise their jurisdiction and powers under this Act.

From Paras 8-11,

8. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has observed that though the Dowry Prohibition Officer was not authorised to file complaint, but he had power to collect evidence as may be necessary for the prosecution of persons committing offence under the Act and it appears that it was the intention of the Legislature to empower the District Dowry Prohibition Officer to move to the Court for prosecution of the person, who is found guilty of taking or demanding dowry. He further observed that if he was not empowered to file complaint for prosecution of guilty person, he cannot prevent the taking of dowry and his act of collecting evidence will go waste. In these circumstances, the Dowry Prohibition Officer has got power to collect evidence and also got powers to file complaint. The above observation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge shows that he acted beyond the scope of Section 7(1)(b) of the Act. If the Legislature actually intended to confer power of filing complaint on Dowry Prohibition Officer, it ought to have been mentioned in Section 7(1)(b) of the Act itself.

9. The power to file complaint, therefore, cannot be inferred from the analogy of the powers of Dowry Prohibition Officer enumerated in Section 8B. Anything which is not in the Act cannot be inserted by Courts. The Court does not possess law-making power. The Courts may interpret the law contained in the Act and not insert any fresh provision, which has deliberately not been incorporated by the Legislature. Therefore, the above observation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that Dowry Prohibition Officer has got power to file the complaint is against the provisions of law.

10. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has further observed that Section 7(1)(b)(ii) and the Explanation to said section says that Court shall take cognizance of a complaint filed by a recognised welfare institution or organisation. The Harijan Welfare Department of the State of U.P. is a welfare institution and if its officer has filed complaint under the provisions of Dowry Prohibition Act, the Magistrate will take cognizance over it under Section 7(1)(b)(ii). This observation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is also against the provisions of law. The complaint was not filed by Harijan Welfare Department allegedly a recognised welfare institution, but by Dowry Prohibition Officer. If the law requires that complaint should be filed by an institution, then it must be filed by institution and not by other Authority. It may be true that Dowry Prohibition Officer was appointed by Harijan Welfare Department, but that officer did not become the Department itself and no action has been taken by the Department, as there is no such indication in the complaint that it was filed by Harijan Welfare Department through Dowry Prohibition Officer. Therefore, above observations of the learned Additional Sessions Judge are against the provisions of law and cannot be accepted.

11. In the result it is clear that complaint was not filed by person enumerated in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of Dowry Prohibition Act and, therefore it was without authority. Therefore, the cognizance against the applicants on the complaint filed by unauthorised person could not have been taken. Therefore, there was legal bar for taking cognizance against the applicants and cognizance was wrongly taken. The prosecution of applicants on the complaint of unauthorised and incompetent person was nothing but abuse of process of law and on this ground the cognizance as well as proceedings arising out of it are liable to be quashed under the exercise of powers conferred under Section 482, Cr.P.C. Thus, the application succeeds.

Indian kanoon version:

Yogesh Chhibbar Vs State of U.P. on 6 Dec 1999 (IK Ver)

Casemine Version:

Yogesh Chhibbar Vs State of U.P. on 6 Dec 1999 (CM Ver)

Citations : [2000 ACR 1 65], [2000 ALLCC 40 459], [2000 RCR CRIMINAL 3 206], [2000 DMC 2 537], [2000 JIC 2 575], [1999 SCC ONLINE ALL 1527], [2000 ALL LJ 1053], [2000 CRI LJ 2849], [2001 HLR 1 676]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/553049/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5767b12de691cb22da6d5ab0

Ajita David Vs State on 29 Jun 2009

Posted on July 17 by ShadesOfKnife

Inherent bias towards women can lead to incorrect judgments… This judgment totally fails to consider a question (may be not posed to the Court by the Counsels on both sides) isn’t this interpretation violative of Articles 14 and 21, Principles of Natural Justice and many more… More so, since the person aggrieved by the offence is not defined in the Act, every tom, dick and harry are given any interpretation to the provisions of this law.

From Paras 5-9,

5. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner would vehemently contend that the Trial Court failed to appreciate the ambit of section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 which proposed to punish not only the receiver of dowry but also the giver of dowry. Referring to section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Act, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner would submit that though protection is provided from charging a person who is aggrieved by the offence under section 7(1)(b)(ii), the parents of the aggrieved wife do not fall under the category of person aggrieved by the offence. Therefore, the exemption contemplated under section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 does not apply to the father of the de facto complainant, who purportedly gave dowry. It is his further submission that even before the case reaches the stage of trial, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, while taking cognizance of the case as per section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is duty bound to array all the persons against whom offences have been made out. Therefore, it is his submission that when the giver of the dowry is also punishable under section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, he cannot claim any exemption under section 7(3) of the said Act. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is bound to act under section 190 and take cognizance as against the father of the de facto complainant also, it is contended.

6. There was no representation for the intervenor. Learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) appearing for the State would submit that the object of the amendment introduced by Act 43/1986 to exclude the person aggrieved from prosecution under Dowry Prohibition Act will have to be considered by this court before approaching the ambit of section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Referring to section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, he would further submit that a clear exemption is contemplated from prosecuting a person aggrieved by any offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act. Further, he would submit that the petition seeking to array the father of the de facto complainant is totally misconceived, inappropriate and premature.

7. The statement of objects and reasons for the enactment of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 would reflect that the Act is enacted to prohibit the evil practice of giving and taking dowry. But, while dealing with the salient features of the Act 43/1986 which introduced the amendment, it has been stated that the statement made by the person aggrieved by the offence shall not subject him to prosecution under the Act.

8. In terms of the statement of objects and reasons of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, provision under section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was enacted to punish not only the receiver but also the giver of the dowry. Section 7(1)(b)(ii) would read that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, no court shall take cognizance of the offence under this Act except upon a complaint by the person aggrieved by the offence or a parent or other relative of such person or by any recognised welfare institution or organisation. Section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act would provide that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, a statement made by the person aggrieved by the offence shall not subject him to prosecution under the Act.

9. In order to provide more clarity to the provision under section 7(1)(b)(ii), the legislature has thought it fit to clarify that a parent or other relative of such a person also is entitled to lodge a complaint apart from the person aggrieved by the offence. Firstly, it is found that Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 does not define the person aggrieved by the offence. The aforesaid provision made to provide more clarity cannot be interpreted that the word ‘parent’ does not fall within the category of an aggrieved person by the offence provided under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The parent of the victim girl is definitely a person aggrieved by the offence. By no stretch of imagination, the legislature would have thought of excluding the parent from the purview of the person aggrieved by the offence while drafting section 7(3) of the Act to exempt from prosecution the person aggrieved by the offence for the statement made by him. At any rate, the phrase “person aggrieved by the offence” employed in sub-section 3 of section 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 cannot be construed that it only refers to the victim girl who was deprived of the marital bliss on account of the harassment meted out to her demanding dowry. In the considered opinion of this court, parents and other relatives of the victim girl can safely be classified as person aggrieved by the offence as contemplated under section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

From Para 12,

12. Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is subject to section 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on account of the non-obstante clause found under the above Act. When the provision under section 7(3) of the Special Act prohibits taking cognizance as against a person aggrieved by the offence for the incriminating statement made by him, the Judicial Magistrate cannot invoke the provision under section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and include a person exempted under the Special Act as one of the accused. On account of the introduction of the provision to the Special Act to exclude certain persons from prosecution, the powers of the Judicial Magistrate under section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure referred to in the above ratio cannot be exercised.

Ajita David Vs State on 29 Jun 2009

Citations : [2009 MLJ CRL 3 728]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1269967/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609039fe4b014971115c0a5

Jamaluddin Ansari Azad Vs State and Anr on 29 Jul 2013

Posted on July 17 by ShadesOfKnife

See the interpretation of a single judge from Delhi High Court.

From Paras 11 and 12,

11. In Pooja Saxena (supra) it was observed that the observations made in Neera Singh’s case were obiter and does not constitute a binding precedent for the reason that the provision of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 were not the subject matter of the dispute before the Court in the petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C in that case. Moreover in that case, the Court has not taken into account the protection given to a victim of offence of dowry demand as provided u/s 7(3) of The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In Pooja Saxena (supra), the allegations in the complaint were regarding demand of dowry by the father of respondent no.2 at the time of engagement ceremony of the petitioner, failing which he would call off the marriage. It was observed that the petitioner and her parents were confronted with the unenviable situation either to concede to the demand or face loss of honour of their family in the society and if under that fear the petitioner and her parents conceded to the demand for dowry, they cannot be faulted as they were victims of circumstances. As such, Section 7(3) comes to the rescue of the petitioner and she could not be subjected to prosecution for the offence u/s 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
12. A perusal of the complaint u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C filed by respondent no.2 goes to show that he was invoking Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act only on the basis of allegations made in the complaint by Noor Jahan whereas in para 7 of the complaint he did not admit to the contents of the FIR. Merely on the basis of allegations which were not admitted by respondent no.2, the petitioner could not have been booked for offence u/s 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Moreover as held in Pooja Saxena(supra) and Ram Gopal Shah v. State of Jharkhand, II 2009 DMC 848, the petitioner being father of the complainant is an aggrieved person from whom the dowry was being demanded. Such aggrieved person is protected u/s 7(3) from prosecution under the Act.

Jamaluddin Ansari Azad Vs State and Anr on 29 Jul 2013

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71564569/

Latha.P.C and Ors Vs State of Kerala and Ors on 15 Sep 2020

Posted on April 3 by ShadesOfKnife

A single-judge bench of Kerala High Court, while denying to invoke 482 CrPC to quash a DV case based on the landmark judgment here, held as follows. But Supreme Court had taken a different view in the landmark judgment here just a month later.

From Para 8,

8. The Act is a welfare legislation enacted to provide a remedy in civil law for protection of women from domestic violence. The proceedings under the Act are, therefore, essentially civil in nature except in so far as it relate to Section 31 dealing with the breach of protection order issued under the Act
and Section 33 dealing with failure or refusal by Protection Offices in discharging their duties in terms of the orders issued by the Court. As such, in Vijayalekshmi Amma v. Bindu, 2010 (1) KLT 79, this Court held that a party against whom a proceedings is initiated under Section 12 of the Act cannot approach this court for quashing the proceedings, invoking the power of this Court under Section 482 of the Code, and that the power of this Court under Section 482 can be exercised only in appropriate cases either to give effect to any order passed under the Act or to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice, when cognizance is taken by the Magistrate for an offence under subsection (1) of Section 31 or Section 33 of the Act.

…

As evident from the extracted paragraphs of the judgement, this Court has held in the said case that a person to whom notice is issued by the Magistrate in an application under Section 12 of the Act can appear before the Magistrate and contend that the proceedings is not maintainable against him, on the ground either that the person who filed the application is not an ‘aggrieved person’ as defined in Section 2(a) of the Act, or that he would not fall within the definition of the ‘respondent’ in Section 2(q) of the Act, or that the allegations do not make out a case of ‘domestic violence’ as defined in Section 2(g) of the Act or that the reliefs sought are not reliefs provided for in the Act. It was also held by this Court in the said case that such contentions as regards the maintainability of the application, if raised, shall be decided by the Magistrate. It was further held by this Court in the said case that so long as the respondent is not an accused in a proceedings initiated under the Act, he is not even obliged to apply for bail in respect of such proceedings and his personal presence is not mandatory for hearing and disposing of an application under Section 12. In the light of the decision of this Court in Vijayalekshmi, according to me, the Criminal M.C. is not maintainable.

Misuse of Social Welfare (Gender-biased) Laws in India:

From Para 9,

9. Despite the findings aforesaid, it is necessary to mention that in so far as the proceedings under the Act are to be dealt with by criminal courts in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Code, it has become a common practice now to rope in the relatives, at times even distant relatives of the person from whom relief is essentially intended, as respondents in the applications instituted under the Act without any bonafides and with oblique motives, on omnibus and vague allegations, despite various judgements of the Apex Court deprecating that practice. In Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667, the Apex Court has taken note of the said fact and observed that majority of such complaints are filed either on the advice of the lawyers or with their concurrence. Be that as it may. It is also observed that notice is invariably issued to all the respondents in such applications without application of mind as to whether the aggrieved person has made out a case of domestic violence against all of them, as a result of which, it is noticed that some of the proceedings under the Act, where parties are arrayed as respondents without making out a case of domestic violence against them, have become a tool of harassment at the hands of the aggrieved persons to obtain reliefs which they are not entitled to. The statute being a remedial one to protect the women from domestic violence, it has to be enforced having regard to the realities of life. As such, even while taking all endeavours possible to protect the aggrieved persons from domestic violence, the courts have to be extremely cautious and careful to ensure that its powers are not being abused. One of the important steps to be taken towards that direction is to scrutinize the applications meticulously and satisfy that a case of domestic violence as defined in the Act is made out against all the respondents and no one is arrayed as a party to the proceedings on omnibus and vague allegations, so that the court can refrain from issuing notice to them. The provisions in the statute especially Section 28, conferring power on the Magistrate to lay down its own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 or under subsection (2) of Section 23 would indicate that the scheme of the statute is that the approach of the courts shall be to enforce the provisions of the Act, keeping in mind the fact that the parties who are close relatives in most of the cases, would at some point of time reconcile their differences and lead a life in harmony and the opportunity for the parties to bring about a settlement of their differences is not lost on account of the steps taken in the proceedings. If proceedings under the Act are permitted to be used as tools of harassment, I have no doubt that the possibility of the parties settling their disputes amicably and leading a life in harmony would be bleak.

Latha.P.C and Ors Vs State of Kerala and Ors on 15 Sep 2020

Citations: [2020 SCC ONLINE KER 4238]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/126633191/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5f80abd89fca190ae54bcb50

Chitranjan Dev Goel and Ors Vs State (Nct of Delhi) and Ors on 21 March 2016

Posted on June 15, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Basing on the Pooja Saxena case here, Parents of women who were alleged to have committed the crime of giving dowry were let free.

Chitranjan Dev Goel and Ors Vs State (Nct of Delhi) and Ors on 21 March 2016

Citations: [2016 SCC ONLINE DEL 2130], [2016 DLT CN B 229 30]

Malreddy Ramachandra Reddy Vs C. Vanaja Reddy and Ors on 16 April 2003

Posted on June 15, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice K C Bhanu from AP High Court has held as follows:

From Para 2,

2. Petitioner is an accused in C.C. No. 224/1995. Chinna Chowk Police laid a charge-sheet against him, his parents and three sisters for an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and for offences punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, for short, hereinafter to be referred to as “the Act”. A single charge under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act was framed against petitioner and A-2. After conclusion of trial and before judgment, the learned Magistrate framed separate charges under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act against petitioner and A-2 and recalled P.Ws. 1 to 3 and cross-examination them. During their cross-examination, P.Ws. 1 to 3 admitted that they had given Rs. 1 lakh as dowry and presented gold jewels worth Rs. 50,000/- to the petitioner and his father. At that stage, petitioner filed Crl. M.P. No. 4073/1998 before the Trial Court under Section 319, Cr.P.C, to implead P.Ws. 1 to 4 as accused for the offence under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, to be tried along with the other accused in the case, since both the giver and taker of dowry are equally liable for punishment under the Act. The learned Magistrate dismissed that application against which petitioner filed Crl. R.P. No. 15/1999 before the Sessions Court. The learned Sessions Judge has dismissed the revision holding that P.Ws. 1 to 4 cannot be tried as accused in the same trial as they are protected under Section 7(3) of the Act. It is as against the order of dismissal of the revision, A-1 filed the present petitioner to quash the said order.

From Para 7,

7. A plain reading of the above provision would go to show that giving or taking of dowry as well as abetment of giving or taking of dowry is an offence punishable under the Act. On the basis of the statements made before the Court by P.Ws. 1 to 3 admitting that they gave dowry, can they be tried as accused in the same trial, is the question.

From Para 10,

10. If P.Ws. 1 to 4, who were examined as witnesses, are added as accused and arrayed in the list, of the accused persons, the proceedings in respect of them shall have to be commenced afresh and thewitnesses reheard. It means they have to give evidence against themselves, which is not permissible under law. Clause (3) of Article 20 of the Constitution provides that no person accused of any offenceshall be compelled to be a witness against himself. This protection is available to the person accused ofan offence not merely with respect to the evidence to be given in the Court-room in the course of trial butis also available to him at the previous stages, if an accusation has been made against him which might, in the normal course, result in his prosecution. It follows that the protection is available to a person againstwhom the formal accusation has been made though the actual trial may not have commenced as yet andif such an accusation relates to the commission of an offence which in the normal course may result in prosecution. In view of the above provisions, the witnesses cannot be compelled to give evidence against themselves. Therefore, P.Ws. 1 to 4, cannot be arrayed as accused along with petitioner and others in the same proceedings. If the Court wants to proceed against the persons of giving dowry, then it has to resort to the provision under Section 7 of the Act. Section 7(1)(b) of the Act provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence under this Act except upon its own knowledge, or a police report of the facts which constitute such offence, or a complaint by the person aggrieved by the offence or other relative of such person or by any recognized welfare institution or organization.

Further Section 7(3) of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the timebeing in force, a statement made by the person aggrieved by the offence shall not subject such person to a prosecution under this Act.

Fundamental mistake in this case is, why police are NOT booking the Dowry givers asmushas Dowry takers in the FIR? Because in some States, Police circulars were issues precluding the Dowry givers from prosecution. So Police themselves decided that Dowry givers are not to be booked, which is totally contrary to what is said in Section 3(1).

Malreddy Ramachandra Reddy Vs C. Vanaja Reddy and Ors on 16 April 2003

Citations: [2004 DMC 2 49], [2003 ALD 2 91], [2003 ALT CRI 2 253]

Yashpal Kumar Vs Bhola Nath Khanna and Anr on 1 March 2012

Posted on June 14, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

This is a Delhi High Court judgment where a certain conclusion is made without basis. Just an earlier judgment is cited as support even that one lacks justification. Funny.

From Para 8,

8. It is thus evident that Section 7 (3) is a non obstante clause and will thus prevail on any other law for the time being in force and a statement made by a person aggrieved by the offence under this Act shall not subject him to prosecution under this Act. Thus the decision of this Court in Neera Singh (supra) is an obiter and does not constitute a binding precedent for the reasons that the provisions of DP Act 1961 were not subject matter of the dispute before the Court in the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Neera Singh’s case and thus, this Court did not take into consideration the provisions under Section 7 (3) of the DP Act.

From Para 9,

9. Further there is no merit in the contention of learned counsel for the Respondent that the Petitioner being the father of the victim girl was not an
“aggrieved person”. Section 7(3) of the DP Act bars cognizance of a complaint against the person aggrieved by the offence. It cannot be said that only “aggrieved person” would be the victim girl. Even the father of the victim girl, who was made to give dowry, would be an aggrieved person. Similar view has been taken in Ram Gopal Sah v. State of Jharkhand, II (2009) DMC 844.

No one explains how/why should the Dowry giving criminals (as per Sec 3(1) should be protected from prosecution along with their daughter, who can be considered an aggrieved person!!!

Yashpal Kumar Vs Bhola Nath Khanna and Anr on 1 March 2012

Citations: [2012 AD DEL 3 186], [2012 DMC 2 134], [2012 SCC ONLINE DEL 1261]

Pooja Saxena vs State and Anr on 20 October 2010

Posted on June 14, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Read through the Para 11 of this Delhi High Judgment to learn how NOT to draw conclusions from thin air u/s 482 CrPC proceedings.

11. The above observation of this Court obviously is an obiter and does not constitute a binding precedent for the reason that the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 were not the subject-matter of the dispute before the court in the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Neera Singh’s case. Moreover, in the aforesaid judgment, the Court has not taken into account the protection given to a victim of offence of dowry demand as provided under Section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961. Thus, in my view the above referred judgment is of no avail to respondent No.2. Further, on perusal of FIR No.232/2009, it transpires that as per the allegations in the complaint made by the petitioner, the demand for dowry was made by the father of respondent No.2 at the time of engagement ceremony of the petitioner when he allegedly asked the father of the petitioner to concede to his demand for dowry, failing which he would call off the marriage. From the aforesaid facts, it is obvious that the petitioner and her parents were confronted with the unenviable situation either to concede to the demand or face the loss of honour of their family in the society, and if under that fear, the petitioner and her parents conceded to the demand for dowry, they cannot be faulted as they were victims of the circumstances. Given the aforesaid facts, Section 7(3) comes to the rescue of the petitioner and in terms of the aforesaid provision, she cannot be subjected to prosecution for the offence under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

Crux of the failed justice: Clearly from the highlighted portion of the judgment itself, one can understand the conclusion arrived by the Judge is based on the unproved allegations in the complaint which got carried as-is to the FIR. This also goes to show that the Judge has pre-judged that the allegations were true despite the fact that said allegation of demand for dowry is to be punished under Section 4 of DP Act 1961 and this being a Criminal Statute required such allegations to be proven in a Criminal Court trial with evidence. This was given a total bypass possibly in an successful attempt of harmonious interpretation but alas totally contrary to the legislature intent which being that Dowry givers are to be punished. Despite writing that Sec 7(3) gives protection only to the aggrieved person (who made the complaint) her parents are also extended protection from prosecution, which is squarely ultravires to provision, statute and legislature intent and most importantly to Principles of natural justice. Precluding the criminal who allegedly committed the crime of giving dowry even before such fact is proved in a Court trial is travesty of justice.

Pooja Saxena vs State and Anr on 20 October 2010

Citations: [2011 CRIMES 1 378], [2010 JCC 4 2780], [2011 AD DEL 1 359], [2010 SCC ONLINE DEL 3652]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/61656909/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090d12e4b0149711178c8d

Further story here.

Inder Singh Vs Sumitra on 05 August, 2019

Posted on August 7, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Do you know how to misinterpret laws? Don’t know? Learn from this judgment from Delhi High Court.

From Paras 12-16,

12. Second proviso to sub section (1) to Section 125 Cr.P.C. stipulates grant of interim maintenance. Reading of second proviso does not in any manner indicate that making of an application seeking interim maintenance is a pre-condition for grant of interim maintenance.

13. The Third proviso to sub section (1) to Section 125 Cr.P.C. stipulates disposal of an application for grant of interim maintenance within a time bound manner.

14. If the second and third proviso to sub section (1) to Section 125 Cr.P.C are read keeping in view the very object of the statute, it shows that there is no requirement stipulated by the statute for making an application for grant of interim maintenance pending consideration of the petition under section 125 Cr.P.C. and the Court would be empowered to pass an order assessing interim maintenance even in a case where no such application has been filed by the person claiming maintenance. However, where such an application is made, the same would have to be disposed of by the Trial Court within the time stipulated therein.

15. If a narrower interpretation were to be given to the provision i.e. that an application is a pre-condition for grant of interim maintenance, the same would militate against the very object of the scheme of providing maintenance to a dependant, who is unable to maintain himself/herself, where the person who has sufficient means has refused or neglected to maintain the dependant. (Author: How?)

16. Keeping in view the beneficial object of the statute, it is held that the filing of an application seeking interim maintenance would not be a precondition for grant of interim maintenance pending consideration of the petition seeking maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C.. It would be open to the trial court to grant interim maintenance, in the facts and circumstances of the case, pending consideration of the application for grant of maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C.

Have you ever heard the words: misinterpreting, idiotic, biased, pre-judged, cunning? Sounds applicable to this judgment?

Inder Singh Vs Sumitra on 05 August, 2019

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

State of Maharashtra Vs Rajesh Laxman Kedar on 10 September, 2018

Posted on April 9, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

A judgment from a magistrate from Dhule, in Maharastra. See the bullshitting of this judge,

From Para 13,

It is the defence of accused persons that there are contradictions and omissions in the evidence of witnesses. Whatever these witnesses have stated is on the information gathered from the informant. It is very natural considering the nature of the charge. In the circumstances, the evidence of the informant is pivotal and the evidence of relative witnesses which has corroborative value always revolves around her evidence. Hence, evidence of such relative witnesses cannot be discarded by branding them as hearsay. Aftermath I have no hesitation to conclude that there is reliable corroboration from these so called interested witnesses.

From Para 14,

Learned advocate for accused persons urged that no independent witness is examined by prosecution and the investigation officer is also not examined. The offence of cruelty generally occurs within the four boundaries of the house. Under these circumstances, non examination of any independent witness can certainly be spared.

Para 17 will give you vomiting,

In the case in hand, informant was ousted from her matrimonial house on 11-02-2009 and she has lodged complaint on 14-02-2009. But she has mentioned in her evidence that, after accused persons had ousted her, she went to railway station and waited their for whole night, in the morning, she went at her elder son’s school to meet him but as her husband and her mother-in-law had prevented her from meeting her son she came back at her parent’s house. Her matrimonial house is at Mumbai and her maternal house is at Dhule, she has lodged report against accused persons at Dhule City Police Station. In view of all the above explanation, in my opinion delay is satisfactorily explained by informant.

Never mind the jurisdiction. Supreme Court’s Yours truly has already destroyed the jurisdiction with weird illogic here.

From Para 18, more vomiting,

With due respect to Hon’ble High Court, in the present case in hand, the alleged ill-treatment was occurred to informant till year 2009 and witnesses deposed during the trial in year 2013 to 2017, it would be too pedantic to state the exact dates. Hence, in my opinion, non disclosure of such dates would not be that material in the peculiar circumstances of the case as witnesses have correctly mentioned all the incidents of physical and mental cruelty. As well as in respect of the earlier discussion, offences under Section 498A occurs within four corners of the house, hence it is not expected from any neighbour to narrate the ill treatment suffered by informant by her husband and in laws. . And if for the sake of argument we accept that, her neighbours knew about the ill treatment to her by her husband and in laws, but a prudent man can conclude that a neighbor will not come and give evidence against his neighbors for the lady who is not living with his neighbour from years together.

Here goes 212 CrPC down the drain… Ahh this is womenland…

From Para 19,

With due respect to Hon’ble High Court, the above mentioned case laws are not applicable to the case in hand. In present case, informant and her witnesses have specifically deposed about the physical and mental torture as well as unlawful demand of money by accused persons and furthermore her torture on non fulfilling the unlawful demands by accused persons with corroboration. Not a single witness has deposed contrary to prosecution story regarding it. Hence, it constrains me to believe the version of informant and her witnesses

More diarrhea in Para 20,

It is also the defence of accused persons that, she herself has left company of accused no.1. She has filed divorce petition in the Court. The informant also accepted the contention of divorce in her cross examination. But while considering the situation in the Indian culture, when a marriage was performed with zeal and enthusiasm and a bride had left her parental house, it would be difficult to believe that she would leave company of her husband without any reason. Even in todays so called modern society, thereturn of daughter from matrimonial house is treated as a stigma. Considering these general factors, whenever the allegations of cruelty is made, the conduct of the parties, motive intention and other circumstances of the case etc. always needs to be kept in mind because, what amounts of cruelty is nowhere defined. It needs to be waited considering the facts of each and every case differently. However, once the unlawful demands are proved, it materially strengthens the prosecution story. Merely by saying that the informant left company of her husband on her own would not give probability to the defence of husband. He has to offer some plausible explanation on this point. Moreover, when it has emerged on record that even after partying ways with accused no.1, the informant from last 9 years or so is still residing at her parental house. There appears no other reason for her to leave her matrimonial life only because she doesn’t want to cohabit with accused no.1. It is pertinent to note that her elder son was with accused persons and one daughter is with her at the time she left her matrimonial house. Having regard to the Indian culture again a mother cannot leave her son without any strong reason. Only filing petition for divorce in the court will not mean that she was not ill treated by accused persons. Therefore, in my view, additional onus lies on the shoulder of the husband who is accountable to certain extent when his wife leaves his company by contending alleged ill-treatment.

From Para 25, vomiting about 406 IPC (No entrustment, No list of jewelry, To whom, When)

It is pertinent to note that there is no bar of filing criminal case for embezzlement of her jewelery. It is the admitted position of law that the jewelery and ornaments wore by bride at the time if her marriage are her Stridhana. It is nowhere come on record that accused no.1 had returned the jewelery to informant during the pendency of this case. Hence, I came to the conclusion that prosecution has proved section 406 of Indian Penal Code, which accused no.1 cannot rebute.

And some liberal diarrhea gyan delivery from Para 30,

The incidents of cruelty to wives is increasing day by day all over the country. The greed of her husband and relatives is unending and due to this many women has to suffer a lot, many times the greed of her husband and in laws is satisfied at the cost of her life. It is necessary to eradicate such tendency of unlawful demand of money and cruelty to a married woman. Hence, deterrence is must to curb such tendency of society. Therefore, I am not inclined to extend the provision of Probation of Offenders Act, 1884 to him.

You can read the rest of junk below.

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Shades of Knife

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