Post Views: 7
Antics of Police Personnel in India
A ‘small’ list of cases where police personnel has crossed their limits and performed acts outside their duty.
From 2011 – 2020:
- Raghuvansh Dewanchand Bhasin Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 9 September 2011 [SC: Police issued NBW against advocate]
Application for Closure of Prosecution Evidence – Format, Procedure & Sample Draft
A practical legal remedy to request the criminal court to close the prosecution evidence when the prosecution has failed to produce its witnesses or evidence despite sufficient opportunities.
In criminal trials, the prosecution must lead evidence to establish the charges against the accused. However, prosecution evidence cannot remain open indefinitely. When the prosecution repeatedly fails to produce witnesses, ignores court directions, or seeks unnecessary adjournments, the accused can file an Application for Closure of Prosecution Evidence.
This application requests the court to close the prosecution evidence and proceed to the next stage of the trial, thereby protecting the accused from prolonged and unnecessary litigation. Consequently, it becomes an important procedural remedy in criminal trials where delays are attributable to the prosecution.
This article explains the legal framework, grounds for seeking closure of prosecution evidence, drafting strategy, and provides a ready-to-use sample format with copy-to-clipboard functionality.
I. Legal Framework
The court’s power to regulate the recording of evidence and prevent unnecessary delays arises from the following provisions:
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Section 309 CrPC – Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings.
Section 231 CrPC – Evidence for prosecution in Sessions trials.
Section 242 CrPC – Evidence for prosecution before a Magistrate in warrant cases instituted on a police report.
Corresponding Provisions under BNSS, 2023
Section 346 BNSS – Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings.
Section 254 BNSS – Evidence for prosecution in Sessions trials.
Section 265 BNSS – Evidence for prosecution before a Magistrate in warrant cases instituted on a police report.
Therefore, the court possesses ample authority to close prosecution evidence when sufficient opportunities have already been granted and further delay would defeat the ends of justice.
II. What is an Application for Closure of Prosecution Evidence?
An Application for Closure of Prosecution Evidence is a formal request made by the accused before the trial court seeking closure of the prosecution evidence on the ground that the prosecution has failed to produce its witnesses or evidence despite repeated opportunities.
The application does not decide the merits of the case. Instead, it requests the court to exercise procedural control over the trial and prevent abuse of adjournments.
III. When Can This Application Be Filed?
You may file this application when:
The prosecution has received multiple opportunities to produce witnesses.
Summons have been issued repeatedly but witnesses remain absent.
The prosecution seeks repeated adjournments without sufficient cause.
Material witnesses have not been examined despite adequate time.
The delay is causing prejudice to the accused.
The trial has remained pending for an unreasonable period.
Accordingly, the application is most effective during the prosecution evidence stage after the court has already granted sufficient opportunities.
IV. Why is This Application Important?
Filing this application helps to:
Protect the accused’s right to a speedy trial.
Prevent unnecessary adjournments.
Avoid prolonged criminal proceedings.
Compel procedural discipline.
Enable the court to proceed to statement of the accused and defence evidence.
Reduce litigation costs and hardship.
Thus, it serves both judicial efficiency and fairness.
V. Factors Considered by the Court
While deciding the application, the court generally examines:
Number of opportunities already granted.
Conduct of the prosecution.
Reasons for witness absence.
Importance of remaining witnesses.
Stage of the trial.
Prejudice caused to the accused.
Overall interests of justice.
The court exercises judicial discretion and may close prosecution evidence if further opportunities are not justified.
VI. Essential Elements of the Application
Before drafting, ensure the application includes:
Name of the court.
Case number and title.
Stage of the proceedings.
Number of opportunities granted to the prosecution.
Failure of prosecution to produce witnesses.
Reference to Section 309 CrPC (Section 346 BNSS).
Prayer seeking closure of prosecution evidence.
A concise and factual application is generally more effective than an argumentative one.
VII. Drafting Strategy
While preparing the application:
Mention the chronology of adjournments.
State that sufficient opportunities have already been granted.
Highlight prejudice caused by continued delay.
Avoid unnecessary allegations against the prosecution.
Request the court to proceed to the next stage of trial.
A well-structured application demonstrates procedural fairness rather than technical obstruction.
Sample Draft – Application for Closure of Prosecution Evidence
IN THE COURT OF THE HON’BLE [COURT NAME]
AT [PLACE]Case No. ________
State / Complainant
…ProsecutionVersus
[Name of Accused]
…Accused / ApplicantAPPLICATION FOR CLOSURE OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE
The Applicant most respectfully submits:
1. That the present case is pending before this Hon’ble Court and is presently fixed for prosecution evidence.
2. That this Hon’ble Court has already granted several opportunities to the prosecution for producing its witnesses and evidence.
3. That despite repeated opportunities and issuance of summons, the prosecution has failed to produce its witnesses.
4. That the repeated adjournments sought by the prosecution are causing undue delay in the trial and serious prejudice to the Applicant.
5. That sufficient opportunities have already been granted and no useful purpose will be served by granting further adjournments.
6. It is therefore in the interest of justice that the prosecution evidence may kindly be closed and the matter be proceeded with in accordance with law.
PRAYER
It is therefore most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to close the prosecution evidence and proceed to the next stage of the trial, and pass such other order as deemed fit in the interest of justice.
Place: _______
Date: _______
Counsel for the Applicant
IX. Common Mistakes to Avoid
Avoid:
Filing the application after only one or two adjournments.
Making unsupported allegations against the prosecution.
Ignoring the importance of remaining witnesses.
Seeking closure when summons have not yet been properly served.
Filing without verifying the order sheet.
Instead, rely on the record of proceedings and the number of opportunities already granted.
Conclusion
An Application for Closure of Prosecution Evidence is an effective procedural remedy to prevent unnecessary delay and ensure that criminal trials progress efficiently. When the prosecution has failed to produce evidence despite adequate opportunities, the court may exercise its discretion to close prosecution evidence and proceed with the trial, thereby protecting the accused’s right to a speedy and fair trial.
Index of Legal Templates and Drafting is here.
Disclaimer
These templates are provided for educational and informational purposes. Every case depends on specific facts and procedural posture. Professional legal advice should be obtained before filing any application.
Ishwar Chand Sharma and Ors Vs State of U.P. on 29 May 2026
A division bench of Apex Court passed this reportable judgment.
From Para 10.2,
10.2 It is pertinent to underscore the important role played by the legal fraternity in bringing down the overall pendency of the cases in the Family Courts and criminal cases which are an adjunct to matrimonial disputes by weeding out unimportant and vexatious proceedings undertaken in pursuance of a personal vendetta by unscrupulous litigants so as to fillip attention of the courts towards genuine litigation and pressing issues and adjudication of claims. This would lead to increasing the overall efficiency and disposal of cases while at the same time preventing infraction of the interests of justice and abuse of process of law.
Citations: [2026 INSC 587]
Other Sources:
Index of Quash Judgments here.
Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram and Anr Vs Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar and Anr on 21 Jul 2026
A division bench of Supreme Court held that, ‘Typographical Errors In Pleadings Cannot Trigger Proceedings U/S 340 CrPC Unless They Amount To Deliberate Falsehood’ and ‘Wrong Statement’ In Pleadings Not Necessarily A ‘False Statement’.
Note: This is a Criminal Appeal filed in 2015, got disposed in 2026. A full 12 years… Hope the parties are still alive. Right to speedy trail seems to be a myth in India.
From Para 7,
It is by now settled that while entertaining proceedings under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C., it must be borne in mind that the material produced before the Court ought to make out a prima facie case for an inquiry to be made into an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) of the Penal Code. Further, the Court has to also consider whether it is expedient in the interest of justice that such inquiry should be made into the alleged offence. Reference in this regard can be usefully made to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another Vs. Meenakshi Marwah and another9.
From Para 10,
10. A reading of the aforesaid observations clearly indicates that the Court was prima facie satisfied that ‘wrong statements’ had been made by the defendant and his learned counsel in the miscellaneous appeal and, hence, a prima facie case for lodging a complaint had been made out.
From Para 11,
11. From the aforesaid provisions, it becomes clear that what is punishable is the giving of ‘false evidence’ under Section 193 or making of a ‘false statement’ under Section 199. What is thus required at the stage of directing initiation of proceedings for an offence punishable under the said provisions is a prima facie case of having given ‘false evidence’ or making a ‘false statement’ in a declaration which by law is receivable as evidence. As noted above, the Court for the purposes of directing the filing of a complaint recorded its prima facie satisfaction that ‘wrong statements’ had been made in the memorandum of appeal and the application for stay preferred by the defendant that was filed through his learned counsel. The order dated 19.01.2006 directing lodging of a complaint does not record any prima facie satisfaction that ‘false statement’ had been made in the aforesaid proceedings. There is a material difference between making a ‘wrong statement’ and ‘false statement’ in the context of Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code. A ‘wrong statement’ of fact may not always have the character of a ‘false statement’. While making of a ‘wrong statement’ may not fall within the ambit of Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code, a ‘false statement’ would qualify as relevant material for being considered as an offence under the said provisions. The threshold for initiating action for an offence punishable under Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code is the making of a ‘false statement’ and not the making of a ‘wrong statement’. It is so because a ‘false statement’ denotes a deliberate intention in making such statement; in other words, it is a wrongful or erroneous statement made intentionally to gain an undue advantage. Thus, the basic premise on which the Court proceeded to direct a complaint to be filed is erroneous and it does not satisfy the necessary threshold. It is, therefore, clear that no prima facie satisfaction was recorded by the Court that ‘false statements’ were made by the defendant and his learned counsel in the memorandum of appeal and in the application for stay, warranting initiation of proceedings for the offence punishable under Sections 193, 199 and 200 of the Penal Code.
From Para 12,
12. It is also pertinent to note that the Court failed to record its satisfaction that it was expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into the alleged offence in view of such statements. Without recording any satisfaction that it was indeed expedient in the interest of justice to hold an enquiry, such a direction was issued. Section 340 (1) of the Cr.P.C. mandates that a Court before directing an inquiry to be made into any offence referred to in Section 195 (1) (b) of the Penal Code, it should form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that such inquiry is in fact necessary. This would indicate that on the mere making of a ‘wrong statement’, an inquiry cannot be ordered. The forming of an opinion by the Court that holding of an inquiry is in fact expedient in the interests of justice is also a must. Ordering an inquiry without formation of any opinion as required by Section 340 (1) of the Cr.P.C. would render the order bad in law being not in accordance with the mandate of Section 340 (1).
From Para 13,
13. The High Court in the appeal preferred by the appellants challenging the order directing initiation of criminal proceedings proceeded to record its satisfaction that the appellants had filed a false affidavit in support of the application for stay. Such prima facie finding not having been recorded by the court of first instance, the High Court in the appeal preferred by the appellants challenging that order could not have recorded such finding, especially when the plaintiffs had not challenged the said order. The appellants could not have been placed in a worse position by preferring an appeal. The court of first instance having prima facie found that it was a case of making ‘wrong statements’, the High Court went on to record a finding that the appellants had in fact filed a false affidavit. Further, the High Court also recorded a finding as to the expediency of filing a complaint in the interests of justice. This finding was absent in the original order. The High Court has, thus, proceeded to improve the impugned order in an appeal preferred by the appellants, who were in fact aggrieved by the same. Such course is not permissible in law.
From Para 14,
14. We may also note that the application under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. came to be filed by the plaintiffs on 27.04.2005. Much prior thereto, on 20.09.2004 the defendant through his learned counsel moved an application seeking correction of the typing mistakes in the memorandum of appeal as well as the application for stay.
From Para 17,
17. Before parting, it may be noted that the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another (supra) was of the view that a direction for filing of a complaint normally ought not to be made during the pendency of the substantive proceedings before the Court but only when the proceedings conclude and the final judgment is rendered. The object is clear inasmuch as the main proceedings ought to be proceeded with and decided instead of diverting them with the aid of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. It is noticed that at times, the aid of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. is sought to be taken merely to delay the adjudication of the substantive proceedings, as also in the present case. The dictum of the Constitution Bench, thus, ought to be borne in mind by the Courts.
Citations: [2026 INSC 724]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/25151633/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6a5f599e5fc2952542506833
https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/wrong-statement-in-pleadings-not-necessarily-a-false-statement-supreme-court-quashes-perjury-case-542312
https://www.verdictum.in/supreme-court/prabhakar-yeshwant-masram-and-another-v-sou-tula-namdeorao-jaipurkar-and-another-2026-insc-724-1618292
The Perjury Threshold: Evaluating Wrong Statements in Pleadings
Index of Perjury Judgments here.
Shikha Lall Vs Prince Agarwal on 7 Nov 2024
A single judge of Delhi High court relying on two judgments, Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010 and Afia Rasheed Khan Vs Mazharuddin Ali Khan and Anr on 10 Oct 2022, held that New Delhi does not have jurisdiction under PWDV Act.
From Para 16,
16. A perusal of the above clearly indicates that the parties have not resided in Delhi at any given point in time during the alleged incidents for the cause of action to arise in the present jurisdiction. Thus, to state that due to the registration of marriage in New Delhi, the courts of Delhi would have jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputes of domestic violence between the present parties. There is no cause of action that arose within the local limits of the Courts of Delhi.
Citations:
Other Sources:
Index of DV judgments is here.
Pranjal Poddar and Ors Vs Shivani Gupta on 21 Apr 2026
A single judge bench of Allahabad High Court at Lucknow, held as follows,
From Para 21,
21. The present domestic violence case has been filed by the answering respondent after the case filed by applicant no.3. The applicant no.1 also filed a case under Section 12(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Faridabad, Haryana on 25.3.2025. The record reveals that there appears to be dispute between the wife and husband and they are litigating against each other, but after a bare perusal of the complaint, other attending circumstances as mentioned above, the Court is coming to the conclusion that applicant nos.2, 3 and 4 of Application U/s 528 BNSS No.1774 of 2025, have no role in the present controversy, therefore, in view of law declared by the Supreme Court in Geeta Mehrotra (supra) and Kahkashan Kausar (supra), criminal proceedings are liable to be dropped against them under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act. However, proceedings against applicant no.1 will continue. So far as proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are concerned, the same is also filed against the husband and evidence is to be led over there, therefore, at this stage, the Court cannot interfere in the proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C., as summon has been issued against the husband, who has to contest his case before the court below.
Citations:
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/149060733/
Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here.
Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010
Justice Shiv Narayan Dhingra ji has passed this Order around the definition of a Temporary residence as held by the Section 27 of the PWDV Act 2005.
9. All legislative enactments on matrimonial disputes or custody matters make ordinary residence or residence or the place where parties lived together or the place of cause of action as a ground for invocation of jurisdiction of the Court. Domestic Violence Act is the first Act where a temporary residence of the aggrieved person has also been made a ground for invoking the jurisdiction of court. The expression “residence‟ means
“to make abode‟ – a place for dwelling. Normally place for dwelling is made with an intention to live there for considerable time or to settle there. It is a place where a person has a home. In Webster Dictionary, the residence means to dwell for length of time. The words „dwelling place‟ or abode are synonyms. A temporary residence, therefore, must be a temporary dwelling place of the person who has for the time being decided to make the place as his home. Although he may not have decided to reside there permanently or for a considerable length of time but for the time being, this must be place of her residence and this cannot be considered a place where the person has gone on a casual visit, or a fleeing visit for change of climate or simply for the purpose of filing a case against another person.
10. I, therefore, consider that the temporary residence, as envisaged under the Act is such residence where an aggrieved person is compelled to take shelter or compelled to take job or do some business, in view of domestic violence perpetuated on her or she either been turned out of the matrimonial home or has to leave the matrimonial home. This temporary residence does not include residence in a lodge or hostel or an inn or residence at a place only for the purpose of filing a domestic violence case. This temporary residence must also be a continuing residence from the date of acquiring residence till the application under Section 12 is disposed of and it must not be a fleeing residence where a woman comes only for the purpose of contesting the case and otherwise does not reside there.
11. In the present case, the aggrieved person is residing with her sister and has filed the petition under Domestic Violence Act. It cannot be said that her residence with her sister was a fleeing residence or was a temporary residence acquired for lodging the complaint of domestic violence. Her sister‟s house is a place where she has taken shelter and temporarily resides. I, therefore, find that there is no force in this petition. The petition is hereby dismissed with no orders to costs.
Citations: [2010:DHC:4306], [2010 9 Laws(DLH) 9]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/106302060/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090d56e4b014971117976a
Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here.
Vikram Kumar Jha Vs State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 10 Jul 2026
A single bench Judge of Delhi High Court rightly remarked about how the abuse of Women-oriented laws is prevalent in our Country.
From Paras 3 and 4,
3. It is contended by learned Senior Counsel for petitioners that the impugned FIR is a complete abuse of process insofar as serious allegations of sexual misconduct have been levelled against petitioners no. 1 and 2, who are brothers-in-law of the complainant de facto. It is further submitted that marriage between the complainant de facto and brother of petitioner no. 1 took place on 08.07.2016, after which they were blessed with two children. On 18.09.2023, brother of petitioner no. 1 filed divorce case against complainant de facto, so out of vengeance she lodged this police complaint on 15.04.2024. It is submitted that in the impugned FIR, the complainant de facto did not make any allegation of rape, but it is subsequently in her statement under Section 164 CrPC for the first time on 15.06.2024 that she alleged having been raped in the year 2017. It is submitted by learned Senior Counsel that there is no whiff of explanation as to why the complainant de facto remained silent for so long.
4. I also find substance in the submission of learned Senior Counsel for petitioners that in the recent past, ever since the Supreme Court delivered the judgment in the case of Arnesh Kumar vs State of Bihar & Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 273, which narrowed down the abuse of provisions under Section 498A/406 IPC as regards arrest, a trend is setting in where the complainants have started alleging such serious charges of rape, molestation and similar other sexual misconduct only to ensure that the in-laws of the complainant are compelled to settle the matrimonial disputes by paying hefty amounts.
Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001
A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,
The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not excepted , at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Further,
The mere initial grant of anticipatory bail for lesser offence, did not entitle the respondent to insist for regular bail even if he was subsequently found to be involved in the case of murder. Neither Section 437(5) nor Section 439(1) of the Code was attracted. There was no question of cancellation of bail earlier granted to the accused for an offence punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 406 IPC. The Magistrate committed a irregularity by holding that “I do not agree with the submission made by the Ld.Prosecutor in as much as if we go by his submissions then the accused would be liable for arrest every time the charge is altered or enhanced at any stage, which is certainly not the spirit of law”. With the change of the nature of the offence, the accused becomes disentitled to the liberty granted to him in relation to a minor offence, if the offence is altered for an aggravated crime. Instead of referring to the grounds which entitled the respondent-accused the grant of bail, the Magistrate adopted a wrong approach to confer him the benefit of liberty on allegedly finding that no grounds were made out for cancellation of bail.
Finally,
We would reiterate that in cases where the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life which is triable exclusively by a court of Sessions, the Magistrate may, in his wisdom, refrain to exercise the powers of granting the bail and refer the accused to approach the higher courts unless he is fully satisfied that there is no reasonable ground for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.
Citations:
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1067439/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ada1e4b0149711411eb9
Index of Anticipatory Bail Judgments is here.
