A division bench of Apex Court passed this reportable judgment.
From Para 10.2,
10.2 It is pertinent to underscore the important role played by the legal fraternity in bringing down the overall pendency of the cases in the Family Courts and criminal cases which are an adjunct to matrimonial disputes by weeding out unimportant and vexatious proceedings undertaken in pursuance of a personal vendetta by unscrupulous litigants so as to fillip attention of the courts towards genuine litigation and pressing issues and adjudication of claims. This would lead to increasing the overall efficiency and disposal of cases while at the same time preventing infraction of the interests of justice and abuse of process of law.
A division bench of Supreme Court held that, ‘Typographical Errors In Pleadings Cannot Trigger Proceedings U/S 340 CrPC Unless They Amount To Deliberate Falsehood’ and ‘Wrong Statement’ In Pleadings Not Necessarily A ‘False Statement’.
Note: This is a Criminal Appeal filed in 2015, got disposed in 2026. A full 12 years… Hope the parties are still alive. Right to speedy trail seems to be a myth in India.
From Para 7,
It is by now settled that while entertaining proceedings under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C., it must be borne in mind that the material produced before the Court ought to make out a prima facie case for an inquiry to be made into an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) of the Penal Code. Further, the Court has to also consider whether it is expedient in the interest of justice that such inquiry should be made into the alleged offence. Reference in this regard can be usefully made to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another Vs. Meenakshi Marwah and another9.
From Para 10,
10. A reading of the aforesaid observations clearly indicates that the Court was prima facie satisfied that ‘wrong statements’ had been made by the defendant and his learned counsel in the miscellaneous appeal and, hence, a prima facie case for lodging a complaint had been made out.
From Para 11,
11. From the aforesaid provisions, it becomes clear that what is punishable is the giving of ‘false evidence’ under Section 193 or making of a ‘false statement’ under Section 199. What is thus required at the stage of directing initiation of proceedings for an offence punishable under the said provisions is a prima facie case of having given ‘false evidence’ or making a ‘false statement’ in a declaration which by law is receivable as evidence. As noted above, the Court for the purposes of directing the filing of a complaint recorded its prima facie satisfaction that ‘wrong statements’ had been made in the memorandum of appeal and the application for stay preferred by the defendant that was filed through his learned counsel. The order dated 19.01.2006 directing lodging of a complaint does not record any prima facie satisfaction that ‘false statement’ had been made in the aforesaid proceedings. There is a material difference between making a ‘wrong statement’ and ‘false statement’ in the context of Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code. A ‘wrong statement’ of fact may not always have the character of a ‘false statement’. While making of a ‘wrong statement’ may not fall within the ambit of Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code, a ‘false statement’ would qualify as relevant material for being considered as an offence under the said provisions. The threshold for initiating action for an offence punishable under Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code is the making of a ‘false statement’ and not the making of a ‘wrong statement’. It is so because a ‘false statement’ denotes a deliberate intention in making such statement; in other words, it is a wrongful or erroneous statement made intentionally to gain an undue advantage. Thus, the basic premise on which the Court proceeded to direct a complaint to be filed is erroneous and it does not satisfy the necessary threshold. It is, therefore, clear that no prima facie satisfaction was recorded by the Court that ‘false statements’ were made by the defendant and his learned counsel in the memorandum of appeal and in the application for stay, warranting initiation of proceedings for the offence punishable under Sections 193, 199 and 200 of the Penal Code.
From Para 12,
12. It is also pertinent to note that the Court failed to record its satisfaction that it was expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into the alleged offence in view of such statements. Without recording any satisfaction that it was indeed expedient in the interest of justice to hold an enquiry, such a direction was issued. Section 340 (1) of the Cr.P.C. mandates that a Court before directing an inquiry to be made into any offence referred to in Section 195 (1) (b) of the Penal Code, it should form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that such inquiry is in fact necessary. This would indicate that on the mere making of a ‘wrong statement’, an inquiry cannot be ordered. The forming of an opinion by the Court that holding of an inquiry is in fact expedient in the interests of justice is also a must. Ordering an inquiry without formation of any opinion as required by Section 340 (1) of the Cr.P.C. would render the order bad in law being not in accordance with the mandate of Section 340 (1).
From Para 13,
13. The High Court in the appeal preferred by the appellants challenging the order directing initiation of criminal proceedings proceeded to record its satisfaction that the appellants had filed a false affidavit in support of the application for stay. Such prima facie finding not having been recorded by the court of first instance, the High Court in the appeal preferred by the appellants challenging that order could not have recorded such finding, especially when the plaintiffs had not challenged the said order. The appellants could not have been placed in a worse position by preferring an appeal. The court of first instance having prima facie found that it was a case of making ‘wrong statements’, the High Court went on to record a finding that the appellants had in fact filed a false affidavit. Further, the High Court also recorded a finding as to the expediency of filing a complaint in the interests of justice. This finding was absent in the original order. The High Court has, thus, proceeded to improve the impugned order in an appeal preferred by the appellants, who were in fact aggrieved by the same. Such course is not permissible in law.
From Para 14,
14. We may also note that the application under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. came to be filed by the plaintiffs on 27.04.2005. Much prior thereto, on 20.09.2004 the defendant through his learned counsel moved an application seeking correction of the typing mistakes in the memorandum of appeal as well as the application for stay.
From Para 17,
17. Before parting, it may be noted that the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another (supra) was of the view that a direction for filing of a complaint normally ought not to be made during the pendency of the substantive proceedings before the Court but only when the proceedings conclude and the final judgment is rendered.The object is clear inasmuch as the main proceedings ought to be proceeded with and decided instead of diverting them with the aid of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. It is noticed that at times, the aid of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. is sought to be taken merely to delay the adjudication of the substantive proceedings, as also in the present case. The dictum of the Constitution Bench, thus, ought to be borne in mind by the Courts.
16. A perusal of the above clearly indicates that the parties have not resided in Delhi at any given point in time during the alleged incidents for the cause of action to arise in the present jurisdiction. Thus, to state that due to the registration of marriage in New Delhi, the courts of Delhi would have jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputes of domestic violence between the present parties. There is no cause of action that arose within the local limits of the Courts of Delhi.
A single judge bench of Allahabad High Court at Lucknow, held as follows,
From Para 21,
21. The present domestic violence case has been filed by the answering respondent after the case filed by applicant no.3. The applicant no.1 also filed a case under Section 12(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Faridabad, Haryana on 25.3.2025. The record reveals that there appears to be dispute between the wife and husband and they are litigating against each other, but after a bare perusal of the complaint, other attending circumstances as mentioned above, the Court is coming to the conclusion that applicant nos.2, 3 and 4 of Application U/s 528 BNSS No.1774 of 2025, have no role in the present controversy, therefore, in view of law declared by the Supreme Court in Geeta Mehrotra (supra) and Kahkashan Kausar (supra), criminal proceedings are liable to be dropped against them under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act. However, proceedings against applicant no.1 will continue. So far as proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are concerned, the same is also filed against the husband and evidence is to be led over there, therefore, at this stage, the Court cannot interfere in the proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C., as summon has been issued against the husband, who has to contest his case before the court below.
Justice Shiv Narayan Dhingra ji has passed this Order around the definition of a Temporary residence as held by the Section 27 of the PWDV Act 2005.
9. All legislative enactments on matrimonial disputes or custody matters make ordinary residence or residence or the place where parties lived together or the place of cause of action as a ground for invocation of jurisdiction of the Court. Domestic Violence Act is the first Act where a temporary residence of the aggrieved person has also been made a ground for invoking the jurisdiction of court. The expression “residence‟ means “to make abode‟ – a place for dwelling. Normally place for dwelling is made with an intention to live there for considerable time or to settle there. It is a place where a person has a home. In Webster Dictionary, the residence means to dwell for length of time. The words „dwelling place‟ or abode are synonyms. A temporary residence, therefore, must be a temporary dwelling place of the person who has for the time being decided to make the place as his home. Although he may not have decided to reside there permanently or for a considerable length of time but for the time being, this must be place of her residence and this cannot be considered a place where the person has gone on a casual visit, or a fleeing visit for change of climate or simply for the purpose of filing a case against another person. 10. I, therefore, consider that the temporary residence, as envisaged under the Act is such residence where an aggrieved person is compelled to take shelter or compelled to take job or do some business, in view of domestic violence perpetuated on her or she either been turned out of the matrimonial home or has to leave the matrimonial home. This temporary residence does not include residence in a lodge or hostel or an inn or residence at a place only for the purpose of filing a domestic violence case. This temporary residence must also be a continuing residence from the date of acquiring residence till the application under Section 12 is disposed of and it must not be a fleeing residence where a woman comes only for the purpose of contesting the case and otherwise does not reside there. 11. In the present case, the aggrieved person is residing with her sister and has filed the petition under Domestic Violence Act. It cannot be said that her residence with her sister was a fleeing residence or was a temporary residence acquired for lodging the complaint of domestic violence. Her sister‟s house is a place where she has taken shelter and temporarily resides. I, therefore, find that there is no force in this petition. The petition is hereby dismissed with no orders to costs.
A single bench Judge of Delhi High Court rightly remarked about how the abuse of Women-oriented laws is prevalent in our Country.
From Paras 3 and 4,
3. It is contended by learned Senior Counsel for petitioners that the impugned FIR is a complete abuse of process insofar as serious allegations of sexual misconduct have been levelled against petitioners no. 1 and 2, who are brothers-in-law of the complainant de facto. It is further submitted that marriage between the complainant de facto and brother of petitioner no. 1 took place on 08.07.2016, after which they were blessed with two children. On 18.09.2023, brother of petitioner no. 1 filed divorce case against complainant de facto, so out of vengeance she lodged this police complaint on 15.04.2024. It is submitted that in the impugned FIR, the complainant de facto did not make any allegation of rape, but it is subsequently in her statement under Section 164 CrPC for the first time on 15.06.2024 that she alleged having been raped in the year 2017. It is submitted by learned Senior Counsel that there is no whiff of explanation as to why the complainant de facto remained silent for so long. 4. I also find substance in the submission of learned Senior Counsel for petitioners that in the recent past, ever since the Supreme Court delivered the judgment in the case of Arnesh Kumar vs State of Bihar & Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 273, which narrowed down the abuse of provisions under Section 498A/406 IPC as regards arrest, a trend is setting in where the complainants have started alleging such serious charges of rape, molestation and similar other sexual misconduct only to ensure that the in-laws of the complainant are compelled to settle the matrimonial disputes by paying hefty amounts.
A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,
The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not excepted , at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Further,
The mere initial grant of anticipatory bail for lesser offence, did not entitle the respondent to insist for regular bail even if he was subsequently found to be involved in the case of murder. Neither Section 437(5) nor Section 439(1) of the Code was attracted. There was no question of cancellation of bail earlier granted to the accused for an offence punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 406 IPC. The Magistrate committed a irregularity by holding that “I do not agree with the submission made by the Ld.Prosecutor in as much as if we go by his submissions then the accused would be liable for arrest every time the charge is altered or enhanced at any stage, which is certainly not the spirit of law”. With the change of the nature of the offence, the accused becomes disentitled to the liberty granted to him in relation to a minor offence, if the offence is altered for an aggravated crime. Instead of referring to the grounds which entitled the respondent-accused the grant of bail, the Magistrate adopted a wrong approach to confer him the benefit of liberty on allegedly finding that no grounds were made out for cancellation of bail.
Finally,
We would reiterate that in cases where the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life which is triable exclusively by a court of Sessions, the Magistrate may, in his wisdom, refrain to exercise the powers of granting the bail and refer the accused to approach the higher courts unless he is fully satisfied that there is no reasonable ground for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.
A practical legal remedy to request the court to conduct continuous day-to-day hearings for the expeditious disposal of a criminal case.
Delay in criminal trials often results in prolonged litigation, increased costs, fading witness memory, and unnecessary hardship to both the accused and the complainant. Recognising the importance of a speedy trial as an integral part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, courts have repeatedly emphasized that criminal proceedings should be concluded without avoidable adjournments.
An Application for Day-to-Day Trial requests the court to hear the matter on consecutive working days until the recording of evidence or the trial is completed. Such applications are particularly useful where the matter has been pending for several years, witnesses are repeatedly attending court, or the case requires urgent disposal.
This article explains the legal framework, grounds for seeking day-to-day trial, drafting strategy, and provides a ready-to-use sample format with copy-to-clipboard functionality.
I. Legal Framework
The principle of day-to-day trial is recognised under the following provisions:
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Section 309 CrPC – Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings; mandates that examination of witnesses should ordinarily continue from day to day until all witnesses in attendance have been examined.
Corresponding Provision under BNSS, 2023
Section 346 BNSS – Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings; retains the principle that evidence should ordinarily be recorded on a day-to-day basis.
Additionally, the right to a speedy trial forms part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
II. What is an Application for Day-to-Day Trial?
An Application for Day-to-Day Trial is a formal request made before the trial court seeking continuous hearing of the case without unnecessary adjournments.
The applicant requests the court to:
Fix consecutive hearing dates.
Record witness evidence without interruption.
Minimise unnecessary delays.
Ensure expeditious completion of the trial.
The application seeks procedural efficiency, not preferential treatment.
III. When Should This Application Be Filed?
This application may be filed when:
The trial has remained pending for several years.
Frequent adjournments are delaying proceedings.
Witnesses are repeatedly attending court without examination.
The accused is suffering prejudice due to delay.
The complainant seeks early adjudication.
Senior citizens, women, or vulnerable witnesses are involved.
Documentary and oral evidence is ready for recording.
Therefore, it is most effective once the matter reaches the evidence stage.
IV. Why is This Application Important?
Filing this application helps to:
Protect the constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Reduce unnecessary adjournments.
Prevent witnesses from turning hostile due to prolonged delay.
Lower litigation costs.
Improve judicial efficiency.
Facilitate early disposal of the case.
Thus, it benefits both parties as well as the administration of justice.
V. Factors Considered by the Court
While deciding the application, the court may consider:
Age of the case.
Stage of the trial.
Number of remaining witnesses.
Reasons for previous adjournments.
Availability of parties and advocates.
Nature and complexity of the case.
Court’s existing docket.
The court ultimately exercises its discretion while balancing fairness and judicial convenience.
VI. Essential Elements of the Application
Before drafting, ensure the application includes:
Name of the court.
Case number.
Stage of the proceedings.
Brief history of delays.
Grounds seeking day-to-day trial.
Reference to Section 309 CrPC (Section 346 BNSS).
Prayer for continuous hearing.
A concise and well-supported application is more likely to receive favourable consideration.
VII. Drafting Strategy
While preparing the application:
Mention the period for which the matter has remained pending.
Avoid blaming the opposite party unless supported by the record.
Highlight prejudice caused by delay.
Cite the statutory requirement for day-to-day evidence.
Emphasise readiness to proceed without seeking unnecessary adjournments.
A practical and balanced approach strengthens the application.
VIII. Sample Draft Format – Application for Day-to-Day Trial
Sample Draft – Application for Day-to-Day Trial
IN THE COURT OF THE HON’BLE [COURT NAME]
AT [PLACE]
1. That the above-mentioned criminal case is presently pending before this Hon’ble Court and is fixed for recording of evidence.
2. That the matter has remained pending for a considerable period and repeated adjournments have delayed the progress of the trial.
3. That further delay is likely to prejudice the rights of the parties and may adversely affect the quality of evidence.
4. That Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 346 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) provides that the examination of witnesses should ordinarily continue from day to day until all witnesses in attendance have been examined.
5. That the Applicant is ready to proceed with the trial and undertakes not to seek unnecessary adjournments.
6. It is therefore in the interest of justice that this Hon’ble Court may kindly direct that the matter be taken up on a day-to-day basis until completion of evidence.
PRAYER
It is therefore most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to conduct the trial on a day-to-day basis in accordance with Section 309 CrPC (Section 346 BNSS) and pass such other order as deemed fit in the interest of justice.
Place: _______
Date: _______
Counsel for the Applicant
✔ Draft Copied Successfully!
IX. Common Mistakes to Avoid
Avoid:
Filing the application at an inappropriate stage of the proceedings.
Seeking day-to-day trial while frequently requesting adjournments yourself.
Making unsupported allegations against the opposite party.
Failing to mention the prejudice caused by delay.
Ignoring the court’s existing schedule and workload.
Instead, present a balanced request demonstrating readiness to proceed and commitment to an expeditious trial.
Conclusion
An Application for Day-to-Day Trial is an effective procedural tool to secure the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial. When filed with genuine reasons and at the appropriate stage, it assists the court in minimizing delays, preserving the quality of evidence, and ensuring timely justice for all parties.
These templates are provided for educational and informational purposes. Every case depends on specific facts and procedural posture. Professional legal advice should be obtained before filing any application.
A division bench of Apex Court was surprised to know that fake judgments mentioned in NCLT Judgment were not caught by NCLAT.
From Paras 15 and 16,
15. It is not in dispute that the judgments relied upon by the NCLT are non-existent, and some AI-generated paragraphs are wrongly attributed to genuine citations. An independent examination undertaken by us reveals the following about the judgments relied upon by the adjudicating authority: State Bank of India v. M/s Shree Ram Urban Infrastructure Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 341 (cited in para 44 of NCLT judgment) – Wrong citation of an existing reported judgment6 and a non-existent paragraph, Everest Kento Cylinders Ltd. v. Union of India (2015) 2 SCC 1 (cited in para 45 of NCLT judgment) – Correct citation but nonexistent paragraph, ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Ltd., (2019) 16 SCC 528 (cited in para 47 of NCLT judgment) – Nonexistent citation, V.S. Dempo & Co. Ltd. v. Reliance Communications Ltd., (2021) 10 SCC 176 (cited in para 49 of NCLT judgment) – Nonexistent citation, Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty & Anr., (2018) 16 SCC 228 (cited in para 51 of NCLT judgment) – Correct citation but non-existent paragraph and Sarbjit Singh v. Union Bank of India, (2022) 7 SCC 464 (cited in para 53 of NCLT judgment) – Non-existent citation. 16. Respondent No. 1 has filed an affidavit indicating that the alleged judgments relied on by NCLT were not cited by its counsel at the bar. The affidavit also indicates that the so-called precedents relied on by the adjudicating authority were obtained through its own research. What about the Appellate Tribunal? The fake, non-existent judgments escaped scrutiny by the first statutory appellate tribunal. Today’s courts and tribunals implicitly trust lawyers when referring to precedents cited before them. Imagine the hardship of a situation in which the Court must verify the authenticity of each judgment cited by an advocate.
A division bench of AP High Court held that Advocate services do not come under the ambit of Consumer Protection Act and as such litigation against such services is not maintainable.
From Para 4,
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner could not satisfy about the maintainability of the complaint against an advocate for alleged deficiency in rendering legal services, under the Consumer Protection Act. 5. The law is well settled that an Advocate/lawyer in connection with the service rendered by him in legal side is not covered under the Consumer Protection Act.
Finally from Paras 9 and 10,
9. In Bar of Indian Lawyers (supra) the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission had taken a view that the deficiency of, in service rendered by an advocate fell under the Consumer Protection Act and that the compliant was maintainable. The Hon‘ble Apex Court held that the view taken was not correct and set aside the order of National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission. It was held as under: ―82. Accordingly, the view taken by the NCDRC to the effect that in respect of deficiency in service rendered by the lawyers, a complaint in Consumer Protection Act, 1986 would be maintainable, is incorrect and stands overruled. 10. In view of the aforesaid, we are of view that the complaint filed by the writ petitioner against the lawyer/advocate under the Consumer Protection Act was not maintainable. The same has rightly been dismissed. No interference is required with all the three orders impugned in the writ petition.
