In this judgment delivered by Hon’ble Bombay High Court, it was held that the accused be given benefit of doubt in the criminal case of 498a IPC, as the depositions of the complainant and other prosecution witnesses is either hearsay or different from what is averred in the original complaint/FIR.Sopan @ Dnyandeo Maruti Bawadkar Vs The State of Maharashtra on 05 November, 2012
In this landmark judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that “We have already extracted a passage from the judgment of Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois (1), where the learned judge pointed out that “life” in the 5th and 14th Amendments of the U. S. Constitution corresponding to Art. 21, means not merely the right to the continuance of a person’s animal existence, but a right to the possession of each of his organs-his arms and legs etc. We do not entertain any doubt that the word “’life” in Art. 21 bears the same signification.”
In our view cl. (b) of Regulation 236 is plainly violative of Art. 21’ and as there is no “law” on which the same could be justified it must be struck down as unconstitutional.
This petition raises a question of far-reaching importance. namely, a right of a citizen of India to lead a free life subject to social control imposed by valid law. The fact that the question has been raised at the instance of an alleged disreputable character shall not be allowed to deflect our perspective. If the police could do what they did to the petitioner, they could also do the same to an honest and law-abiding citizen.
Let us at the outset clear the ground. We are not concerned here with a law imposing restrictions on a bad character, for admittedly there is no such law. Therefore, the petitioner’s fundamental right, if any, has to be judged on the basis that there is no such law. To state it differently, what fundamental right of the petitioner has been infringed by the acts of the police? If he has any fundamental right which has been infringed by such acts, he would be entitled to a relief straight away, for the State could not justify it on the basis of any law made by the appropriate Legislature or the rules made thereunder.
Discussion around infringement of both Articles 19 and 21
At this stage it will be convenient to ascertain the scope of the said two provisions and their relation inter se in the context of the question raised. Both of them are distinct fundamental rights. No doubt the expression “personal liberty” is a comprehensive one and the right to move freely is an attribute of personal liberty. It is said that the freedom to move freely is carved out of personal liberty and, therefore, the expression “personal liberty” in Art. 21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is not a correct approach. Both are independent fundamental rights, though there is overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out of another. The fundamen. tal right of life and personal liberty have many attributes and some of them are found in Art. 19. If a Person’s fundamental right under Art. 21 is infringed, the State can rely upon a law to sustain the action; but that cannot be a complete answer unless the said law satisfies the test laid down in Art. 19 (2) so far as the attributes covered by Art. 19 (1) are concerned. In other words, the State must satisfy that both the fundamental rights are not infringed by showing that there is a law and that it does amount -to a reasonable restriction. within the meaning of Art. 19 (2) of the Constitution. But in this case no such defence is available, as admittedly there is no such law. So the petitioner can legitimately plead that his fundamental rights both under Art. 19 (1) (d) and Art. 21 are infringed by the State.
Discussion around Article 21
We would, therefore, define the right of personal liberty in Art. 21 as a right of an individual to be free from restrictions or encroachments on his person, whether those restrictions or encroachments are directly imposed or indirectly brought about by calculated measures. If so understood, all the acts of surveillance under,Regulation 236 infringe the fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 21 of the Constitution.
Kharak Singh Vs The State Of U.P. & Others on 18 December, 1962
Citation: 1963 AIR 1295, 1964 SCR (1) 332
Indiankanoon link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/619152/
Crucial judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court in regards to when can a case be dismissed for default under 256 CrPC.
In simple terms, if the examination/enquiry stage has started in a case and then there is absenteeism from complainant, Hon’ble magistrate is expected to proceed with the case on merit and dispose it accordingly. Dismissal for default is not to be invoked at the stage.
From Para 10,
Section 256 of the Code provides for disposal of a complaint in default. It entails in acquittal. But, the question which arises for consideration is as to whether the said provision could have been resorted to in the facts of the case as the witnesses on behalf of complainant have already been examined.
From Para 13,
S.Anand Vs Vasumathi Chandrasekar on 14 February, 2008
Furthermore, when the prosecution has closed its case and the accused has been examined under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court was required to pass a judgment on merit of the matter.
A well-reasoned judgment from Hon’ble First Class Magistrate ably supported by a catena of judgments held that this DVC was an attempt by the knife to usurp the property and nothing to do with domestic violence.
Last nail in the coffin on the money-hungry, gold-diggin knife:
A.Sujatha Vs C.Nagaraju on 29 January, 2016
When she is having capacity to maintain herself then extending her palm for the alms of the respondent is highly un-acceptable. So as per the Domestic Violence Act, though it is a beneficial legislation but the basic principles cannot be deviated under the facts and circumstances of this case and the petitioner is not entitled to claim any maintenance and for residence.
The legal contention to be decided authoritatively in this case in front of Apex Court is that “it should not be understood to have meant that Judges can quash any kind of criminal case merely because there has been a compromise between the parties. After all, a crime is an offence against society, and not merely against a private individual”.
This was referred from a 2-judge bench of Apex Court to decide the issue authoritatively and dissolve the ambiguity, if any.
Gian Singh Vs State Of Punjab & Anr on 24 September, 2012
Some or all of the following tests may be relevant to decide whether to quash or not to quash the criminal proceedings in a given case;
(a) the nature and gravity of case;
(b) does the dispute reflect overwhelming and predominantly civil flavour;
(c) would the quashing involve settlement of entire or almost the entire dispute;
(d) the compromise/settlement between parties and/or other facts and the circumstances render possibility of conviction remote and bleak;
(e) not to quash would cause extreme injustice and would not serve ends of justice and
(f) not to quash would result in abuse of process of court.
The key judgment cited in this judgment is here.
What can I say about this case and the advocate involved? Read for yourself.Mahipal Singh Rana Vs State Of U.P on 5 July, 2016
In this well-reasoned judgment from Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, it was held that in addition to the approach courts should take while considering whether the main Act as well as its amendment are prospective or retrospective in effect.
From para 22,
Mohit Yadam Vs State of A.P. on 13 November, 2009
If a statute does not provide an offender liable to any penalty (conviction or sentence) in favour of the state, it can be said that legislation will be classified as remedial statute. Remedial statutes are known as welfare, beneficent or social justice oriented legislations. A remedial statute receives a liberal construction. In case of remedial statutes, doubt is resolved in favour of the class of persons for whose benefit the statute is enacted. Whenever a legislation prescribes a duty or penalty for breach of it, it must be understood that the duty is prescribed in the interest of the community or some part of it and the penalties prescribed as a sanction for its purpose. None of the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has direct penal consequences.
Nice judgment from Apex Court in quashing the false DVC on relatives of husband.Ashish Dixit & Ors Vs State Of U.P. & Anr on 7 January, 2013
A landmark quash judgment by Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, which laid down few criteria only under which DVC quash under CrPC 482 is maintainable.
From Para 13,
The next aspect is having regard to the fact that the reliefs provided under Section 18 to 22 are civil reliefs and enquiry under Sec. 12 of D.V. Act is not a trial of a criminal case, whether the respondents can seek for quashment of the proceedings that they were unnecessarily roped in and thereby continuation of the proceedings amounts to abuse of process of Court etc., pleas. In my considered view, having regard to the facts that the scheme of the Act which provide civil reliefs and the Magistrate can lay his own procedure by not taking coercive steps in general course and the enquiry being not the trial of a criminal offence, the respondents cannot rush with 482 Cr.P.C petitions seeking quashment of the proceedings on the ground that they were unnecessarily roped in. They can establish their non involvement in the matter and non-answerability to the reliefs claimed by participating in the enquiry. It is only in exceptional cases like without there existing any domestic relationship as laid under Section 2(f) of the D.V. Act between the parties, the petitioner filed D.V case against them or a competent Court has already acquitted them of the allegations which are identical to the ones leveled in the Domestic Violence Case, the respondents can seek for quashment of the proceedings since continuation of the proceedings in such instances certainly amounts to abuse of process of Court.
Giduthuri Kesari Kumar And Others Vs State Of Telangana on 16 February, 2015
This is a quash judgment from Hon’ble High of Andhra Pradesh, wherein the DVC of relatives of husband are quashed on grounds that there is ‘no shared household’ and ‘no domestic relationship’ conditions.
P.Sugunamma And Others Vs State Of A.P. on 19 January, 2015
5. ( i) Coming back to the facts of the case, all the petitioners are residents of Prakasam District whereas the respondent is a resident of Hyderabad. There is nothing on record to show that the present petitioners had any domestic relationship and lived together with the 2nd respondent in a shared household at any point of time. Further after the proceedings in Crime No.204 of 2010 were quashed by this Court, by orders dated 04.10.2012, the present DV case is filed by the 2nd respondent.
6 . Viewed thus, this Court finds that the petitioners have made out valid and sufficient grounds to quash the proceedings against them in D.V.C.No.18 of 2012 on the file of VI Metropolitan Magistrate, Medchal, Ranga Reddy District.
7. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed. Consequently, the proceedings against the petitioners herein in D.V.C.No.18 of 2012 on the file of VI Metropolitan Magistrate, Medchal, Ranga Reddy District are hereby quashed.
Earlier 498a case that was quashed is available here.