Rani Narasimha Sastry Vs Rani Suneela Rani on 19 November, 2019

Posted on December 9 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court has held that after acquittal from IPC 498A case, husband can file for divorce under the ground of Cruelty.

The above observation of the High Court cannot be approved. It is true that it is open for anyone to file complaint or lodge prosecution for redressal for his or her grievances and lodge a first information report for an offence also and mere lodging of complaint or FIR cannot ipso facto be treated as cruelty. But when a person undergoes a trial in which he is acquitted of the allegation of offence under Section 498-A of IPC, levelled by the wife against the husband, it cannot be accepted that no cruelty has meted on the husband. As per pleadings before us, after parties having been married on 14.08.2005, they lived together only 18 months and thereafter they are separately living for more than a decade now.

Ramrameshwari Devi and Ors Vs Nirmala Devi and Ors on 4 July, 2011

Posted on March 24 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Dalveer Bhandari at Supreme Court, held that,

From Para 4,

This is a classic example which abundantly depicts the picture of how the civil litigation moves in our courts and how unscrupulous litigants (appellants in this case) can till eternity harass the respondents and their children by abusing the judicial system.

From Para 14,

According to Dr. Arun Mohan, twenty minutes spent at that time would have saved several years in court proceedings.

From Para 21,

The learned Single Judge observed that the present appellants belong to that category of litigants whose only motive is to create obstacles during the course of trial and not to let the trial conclude. Applications after applications are being filed by the appellants at every stage, even though orders of the trial court are based on sound reasoning. Moreover, the appellants have tried to mislead the court also by filing wrong synopsis and incorrect dates of events.

From Para 22,

Those litigants or their advocates who mislead the courts by filing wrong and incorrect particulars (the list of dates and events) must be dealt with heavy hands.

From Para 26,

It may be pertinent to mention that the appellants also moved transfer application apprehending adverse order from the trial judge, which was also dismissed by the learned District Judge. This conduct of the appellants demonstratesthat they are determined not to allow the trial court to proceed with the suit. They are creating all kinds of hurdles andobstacles at every stage of the proceedings.

From Para 30,

It is abundantly clear from the facts and circumstances of this case that the appellants have seriously created obstacles at every stage during the course of trial and virtually prevented the court from proceeding with the suit. This is a typical example of how an ordinary suit moves in our courts. Some cantankerous and unscrupulous litigants on one ground or the other do not permit the courts to proceed further in the matter.

From Para 34,

According to Dr. Mohan, in our legal system, uncalled for litigation gets encouragement because our courts do notimpose realistic costs. The parties raise unwarranted claims and defences and also adopt obstructionist and delaying tactics because the courts do not impose actual or realistic costs. Ordinarily, the successful party usually remains uncompensated in our courts and that operates as the main motivating factor for unscrupulous litigants. Unless the courts, by appropriate orders or directions remove the cause for motivation or the incentives, uncalled for litigation will continue to accrue, and there will be expansion and obstruction of the litigation. Court time and resources will be consumed and justice will be both delayed and denied.

From Para 44,

In the instant case when the entire question of title has been determined by the High Court and the Special Leave Petition against that judgment has been dismissed by this court, thereafter the trial court ought not to have framed such an issue on a point which has been finally determined upto this Court. In any case, the same was exclusively barred by the principles of res judicata. That clearly demonstrates total non-application of mind.

From Para 56,

These appeals are consequently dismissed with costs, which we quantify as Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs only). We are imposing the costs not out of anguish but by following the fundamental principle that wrongdoers should not get benefit out of frivolous litigation.

Ramrameshwari Devi and Ors Vs Nirmala Devi and Ors on 4 July, 2011

Guntamukkala Naga Venkata Kanaka Durga Nagamani Vs Guntamukkala Eswar Sudhakar on 19 October, 2012

Posted on March 23 by ShadesOfKnife

Cunning knife did drama in court seeking huge alimony but learned Judges of Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh showed here the door and levied costs for lying to court and filing false affidavits.

From Para 30,

On necessary analysis we find it difficult to accept these observations as it appears that the legislative intendment in framing Section 18 of HAM Act and Section 25 of HM Act are quite different. This is born out from the fact that Section 18 of HAM Act is intended for granting divorce to a wife when her marriage with her husband has been subsisting against her husband subject to the limitations provided therein, whereas Section 25 of HM Act is intended for granting maintenance to a divorced wife or husband subject to their conduct. No doubt, “wife” includes a divorced wife under normal parlance, but the question of awarding maintenance to her either as a wife or divorced wife should be within the legislative intendment or spirit. In other words, when the legislature framed Section 18 of HAM Act in the context of providing maintenance to a wife against her husband while their marriage has been subsisting, that is quite different from its intention in framing Section 25 of HM Act, the provisions of which are made applicable only to a divorced wife or husband subject to the conduct of himself or herself. The interpretation made in the decision cited to treat a wife who is not a divorcee and the wife who is a divorcee on equal footing for the purpose of awarding maintenance under Section 18 of HAM Act does not appear to be logical.

Guntamukkala Naga Venkata Kanaka Durga Nagamani Vs Guntamukkala Eswar Sudhakar on 19 October, 2012

A.Shanmugam Vs Ariya K.R.K.M.N.P.Sangam on 27 April, 2012

Posted on March 23 by ShadesOfKnife

My Favorite Mr Justice Dalveer Bhandari of Supreme Court of India delivered this judgment. He elaborately destroyed the false pleadings and false pleas made by the Appellate solely for the purpose of dragging on the case. Observe how he cites all his past landmark, reported judgments in this one and sets the stage to expose the appellate thoroughly.

From Para 21,

This case demonstrates widely prevalent state of affairs where litigants raise disputes and cause litigation and then obstruct the progress of the case only because they stand to gain by doing so. It is a matter of common experience that the Court’s otherwise scarce resources are spent in dealing with non-deserving cases and unfortunately those who were waiting in the queue for justice in genuine cases usually suffer. This case is a typical example of delayed administration of civil justice in our Courts. A small suit, where the appellant was directed to be evicted from the premises in 1994, took 17 years before the matter was decided by the High Court. Unscrupulous litigants are encouraged to file frivolous cases to take undue advantage of the judicial system.

From Para 35,

Experience also reveals that our Courts have been very reluctant to grant the actual or realistic costs. We would like to explain this by giving this illustration. When a litigant is compelled to spend Rs.1 lac on a frivolous litigation there is hardly any justification in awarding Rs. 1,000/- as costs unless there are special circumstances of that case.We need to decide cases while keeping pragmatic realities in view. We have to ensure that unscrupulous litigant is not permitted to derive any benefit by abusing the judicial process.

From Para 42,

On the facts of the present case, following principles emerge:
1. It is the bounden duty of the Court to uphold the truth and do justice.
2. Every litigant is expected to state truth before the law court whether it is pleadings, affidavits or evidence. Dishonest and unscrupulous litigants have no place in law courts.
3. The ultimate object of the judicial proceedings is to discern the truth and do justice. It is imperative that pleadings and all other presentations before the court should be truthful.
4. Once the court discovers falsehood, concealment, distortion, obstruction or confusion in pleadings and documents, the court should in addition to full restitution impose appropriate costs. The court must ensure that there is no incentive for wrong doer in the temple of justice. Truth is the foundation of justice and it has to be the common endeavour of all to uphold the truth and no one should be permitted to pollute the stream of justice.
5. It is the bounden obligation of the Court to neutralize any unjust and/or undeserved benefit or advantage obtained
by abusing the judicial process.
6. Watchman, caretaker or a servant employed to look after the property can never acquire interest in the property
irrespective of his long possession. The watchman, caretaker or a servant is under an obligation to hand over the possession forthwith on demand. According to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, Courts are not justified in protecting the possession of a watchman, caretaker or servant who was only allowed to live into the premises to look after the same.
7. The watchman, caretaker or agent holds the property of the principal only on behalf the principal. He acquires no right or interest whatsoever in such property irrespective of his long stay or possession.
8. The protection of the Court can be granted or extended to the person who has valid subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or licence agreement in his favour.

A.Shanmugam Vs Ariya K.R.K.M.N.P.Sangam on 27 April, 2012

M.M. Malhotra Vs Union of India And Ors on 4 October, 2005

Posted on March 4 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that the offence of 498A was not made out in this case. It has a checkered history. See the tantrums of knife.

in the year 1990, she came to know that the appellant had developed illicit relations with one Miss Anna Suja John when he was posted at Trivandrum.
The appellant started beating her brutally and torturing her mercilessly because of Miss Anna Suja John.
It was further stated in the complaint that in the year 1991 itself, Miss Anna Suja John came to Nagpur and started staying with the appellant and complainant Mrs. Roopa Malhotra at their residence at Nagpur.
The complainant strongly objected to this and requested the appellant not to have any relationship with Miss Anna Suja John and told her to leave Nagpur. When complainant could not bear the torture, she sought an interview with the then Air Marshal I.G. Krishna, HQ Maintenance Command, Indian Air Force and narrated her plight to him.
brother of the appellant came to Nagpur and told the complainant that if she files a complaint against her husband, his career would be spoiled. He also promised that Miss Anna Suja John would go back to Kerala.
When the complainant had gone to Kanpur she saw Miss Anna Suja John with her child residing in the parental house of the appellant at Kanpur.
The appellant abused the complainant in front of Miss Anna Suja John in filthy language.
When they were at Kanpur, appellant and Miss Anna Suja John used to sleep in one room and complainant was asked to sleep in another room. At Kanpur, the appellant told the complainant that he and Miss Anna Suja John are married. While they were at Kanpur, appellant and Miss Anna Suja John were behaving as husband and wife and going to hotels and various other places together. The same thing continued at Nagpur.
The complainant tried her best to keep her nineteen years’ old marriage intact.

Now the hubby dear responds to the complaint filed against him

In the communication it was indicated that Mrs. Roopa Malhotra @ Ruby Basu had filed written statement on 1.10.1992 in Regular Civil Suit no. 887/1992 filed by the appellant wherein she had stated that she was already married to one D.J. Basu, her husband. The marriage was subsisting at the time when she married the appellant.
It is to be noted that the said suit was filed by the appellant in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur, inter alia, for a declaration that defendant Roopa was not his wife as her spouse was living on the date they started living as husband and wife. Suit was decreed on 19.6.1993.
It was appellant’s stand that in view of the said statement he should not be required to submit his explanation in view of Rule 16(4) of the Rules.
The appellant submitted that there was no plural marriage as so-called marriage was non existent in the eyes of law. Since there was no valid marriage at the first instance the question of plural marriage did not arise.
The High Court did not find any substance in the plea and held that the conduct of the appellant was unbecoming of a member of the disciplined force like Air Force.

M.M. Malhotra Vs Union of India And Ors on 4 October, 2005

X Vs Y on 2 November, 2018

Posted on January 17 by ShadesOfKnife

In this case before Hon’ble Bombay High Court, it was held that the word impotent when used in pleadings is sufficient to hold that defamation to husband has been done.

The statement made in the pleading is “The petitioner wanted to avoid writing this in this petition but the conduct of the respondent compels her to write that the respondent is an impotent person and the child was born by medical ovulation period technique as was suggested by the gynecologist.“

From Para 24,

Reading the afore-stated allegation as it is and without adding anything to it or subtracting anything from it prima facie, one gets an impression that it is per se defamatory in character and has been, prima facie, calculated to cause harm or injury to the reputation of the non-applicant. It also gives an impression that apparently it has been made with consciousness about the repercussion that such a statement would have on the life of the non-applicant. Even if the expression “impotent person”, as the learned Counsel for the applicant would like this Court to do, is read in all its contextual setting, in particular, in the context of the birth of the child by adopting a medical procedure on the suggestion of the Gynecologist, still the apparent harm that the expression “impotent person” causes, is not diluted or washed out. This is for the reason that prima facie the word “impotent” when understood in it’s plain and grammatical sense, reflects adversely upon the manhood of a person and has a tendency to invite derisive opinions about such person from others and, therefore, use of such word and its publication as contemplated under Section 499 of IPC would be sufficient to constitute, in a prima facie manner, the offence of defamation punishable under Section 500 of IPC. Now, if the non-applicant submits that this word has been used by her in some different sense denoting medical condition of the non-applicant affecting the process of conception, it would be a matter of evidence to be proved accordingly. At this stage, the meaning apparently indicated by the word would have to be taken as it is. Then, such imputation has been made by filing a writ petition and, therefore, the other ingredient of publication is also fulfilled in the present case. Therefore, prima facie, the offence punishable under Section 500 of IPC is made out in this case.

X Vs Y on 2 November, 2018

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Pooran Mal Etc Vs Director Of Inspection on 14 December, 1973

Posted on December 20, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Another judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly lays out that “Courts in India and in England have consistently refused to exclude relevant evidence merely on the ground that it is obtained by illegal search or seizure. Where the test of admissibility of evidence lies in relevancy, unless there is an express or implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law, evidence obtained as a result of illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out.”

Pooran Mal Etc Vs Director Of Inspection on 14 December, 1973

R.M.Malkani Vs State Of Maharashtra on 22 September, 1972

Posted on December 20, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

A landmark case wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that, “There is warrant for proposition that even if, evidence is illegally obtained it is admissible. Over a century ago it was said in an English case where a constable searched the appellant illegally and found a quantity of offending article in his pocket that it would be a dangerous obstacle to the administration of justice if it were held, because evidence was obtained by illegal means, it could not be used against a party charged with an offence. See Jones v. Owen“.

Facts of Case:

R.M.Malkani was at the crucial time the Coroner of Bombay. The evidence is that the patient died on 13 May, 1964. Dr. Motwani saw the appellant on 3 October, 1964. The appellant demanded Rs. 20,000. The appellant asked for payment of Rs. 20,000 in order that Dr. Adatia would avoid inconvenience and publicity in newspapers in case inquest was held. Dr. Motwani informed Dr. Adatia about the conversation with the appellant. On 4 October, 1964 the appellant rang up Dr. Motwani and said that he was willing to reduce the amount to Rs. 10,000. On 5 October, 1964 Dr. Adatia received calls from the appellant asking him to attend the Coroner’s Court on 6 October, 1964. Dr. Adatia got in touch with Dr. Motwani on 6 October and gave him that message. Dr. Adatia rang up the appellant on 6 October and asked for adjournment. The appellant granted the adjournment to 7 October. On 6 October there were two calls from the appellant asking Dr. Adatia to attend the Coroner’s Court on 7 October and also that Dr. Adatia should contact the appellant on 6 October. Dr. Motwani rang up the appellant and told him that the telephonic conversation had upset Dr. Adatia. On 6 October Dr. Motwani conveyed to Mugwe, Director of Intelligence Bureau about the demand of bribe to the appellant.

Punch Line:

There is no violation of section 25 of the Telegraph Act in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There is warrant for proposition that even if, evidence is illegally obtained it is admissible. Over a century ago it was said in an English case where a constable searched the appellant illegally and found a quantity of offending article in his pocket that it would be a dangerous obstacle to the administration of justice if it were held, because evidence was obtained by illegal means, it could not be used against a party charged with an offence. See Jones v. Owen.

The Court will take care in two directions in admitting such evidence. First, the Court will find out that it is genuine and free from tampering or mutilation. Secondly, the Court may also secures scrupulous conduct and behaviour on behalf of the Police. The reason is that the Police Officer is more likely to behave properly if improperly obtained evidence is liable to be viewed with care and caution by the Judge. In every case the position of the accused, the nature of the investigation and the gravity of the offence must be judged in the light of the material facts and the Surrounding circumstances.

When a Court permits a tape recording to be played over it is acting on real evidence if it treats the intonation of the words to be relevant and genuine. The fact that tape recorded conversation can be altered is also borne in mind by the Court while admitting it in evidence.

R.M.Malkani Vs State Of Maharashtra on 22 September, 1972

Sopan @ Dnyandeo Maruti Bawadkar Vs The State of Maharashtra on 05 November, 2012

Posted on December 13, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this judgment delivered by Hon’ble Bombay High Court, it was held that the accused be given benefit of doubt in the criminal case of 498a IPC, as the depositions of the complainant and other prosecution witnesses is either hearsay or different from what is averred in the original complaint/FIR.

Sopan @ Dnyandeo Maruti Bawadkar Vs The State of Maharashtra on 05 November, 2012

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Kharak Singh Vs The State Of U.P. & Others on 18 December, 1962

Posted on December 10, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this landmark judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that “We have already extracted a passage from the judgment of Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois (1), where the learned judge pointed out that “life” in the 5th and 14th Amendments of the U. S. Constitution corresponding to Art. 21, means not merely the right to the continuance of a person’s animal existence, but a right to the possession of each of his organs-his arms and legs etc. We do not entertain any doubt that the word “’life” in Art. 21 bears the same signification.”

In our view cl. (b) of Regulation 236 is plainly violative of Art. 21’ and as there is no “law” on which the same could be justified it must be struck down as unconstitutional.

This petition raises a question of far-reaching importance. namely, a right of a citizen of India to lead a free life subject to social control imposed by valid law. The fact that the question has been raised at the instance of an alleged disreputable character shall not be allowed to deflect our perspective. If the police could do what they did to the petitioner, they could also do the same to an honest and law-abiding citizen.

Let us at the outset clear the ground. We are not concerned here with a law imposing restrictions on a bad character, for admittedly there is no such law. Therefore, the petitioner’s fundamental right, if any, has to be judged on the basis that there is no such law. To state it differently, what fundamental right of the petitioner has been infringed by the acts of the police? If he has any fundamental right which has been infringed by such acts, he would be entitled to a relief straight away, for the State could not justify it on the basis of any law made by the appropriate Legislature or the rules made thereunder.

Discussion around infringement of both Articles 19 and 21

At this stage it will be convenient to ascertain the scope of the said two provisions and their relation inter se in the context of the question raised. Both of them are distinct fundamental rights. No doubt the expression “personal liberty” is a comprehensive one and the right to move freely is an attribute of personal liberty. It is said that the freedom to move freely is carved out of personal liberty and, therefore, the expression “personal liberty” in Art. 21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is not a correct approach. Both are independent fundamental rights, though there is overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out of another. The fundamen. tal right of life and personal liberty have many attributes and some of them are found in Art. 19. If a Person’s fundamental right under Art. 21 is infringed, the State can rely upon a law to sustain the action; but that cannot be a complete answer unless the said law satisfies the test laid down in Art. 19 (2) so far as the attributes covered by Art. 19 (1) are concerned. In other words, the State must satisfy that both the fundamental rights are not infringed by showing that there is a law and that it does amount -to a reasonable restriction. within the meaning of Art. 19 (2) of the Constitution. But in this case no such defence is available, as admittedly there is no such law. So the petitioner can legitimately plead that his fundamental rights both under Art. 19 (1) (d) and Art. 21 are infringed by the State.

Discussion around Article 21

We would, therefore, define the right of personal liberty in Art. 21 as a right of an individual to be free from restrictions or encroachments on his person, whether those restrictions or encroachments are directly imposed or indirectly brought about by calculated measures. If so understood, all the acts of surveillance under,Regulation 236 infringe the fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 21 of the Constitution.

Kharak Singh Vs The State Of U.P. & Others on 18 December, 1962

Citation: 1963 AIR 1295, 1964 SCR (1) 332

Indiankanoon link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/619152/

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Sandeep Pamarati

Rani Narasimha Sastry Vs Rani Suneela Rani on 19 November, 2019

Ramrameshwari Devi and Ors Vs Nirmala Devi and Ors on 4 July, 2011

Guntamukkala Naga Venkata Kanaka Durga Nagamani Vs Guntamukkala Eswar Sudhakar on 19 October, 2012

A.Shanmugam Vs Ariya K.R.K.M.N.P.Sangam on 27 April, 2012

M.M. Malhotra Vs Union of India And Ors on 4 October, 2005

X Vs Y on 2 November, 2018

Pooran Mal Etc Vs Director Of Inspection on 14 December, 1973

R.M.Malkani Vs State Of Maharashtra on 22 September, 1972

Sopan @ Dnyandeo Maruti Bawadkar Vs The State of Maharashtra on 05 November, 2012

Kharak Singh Vs The State Of U.P. & Others on 18 December, 1962