Santosh Kumar Vs Asha Budakoti on 13 June, 2013

Posted on January 8 by ShadesOfKnife

Knife deserted husband for 5 years without reasonable cause and then lied to Court. Judicial Separation granted by Family Court is converted to Divorce and relief given to husband permanently.

Citations: [2014 DMC UTTA 3 524], [2014 UC 2 1190], [2013 SCC ONLINE UTT 1643]

Indiankanoon.org or Casemine link: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56b49503607dba348f010a76

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from main.sci.gov.in/judgments, judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

Ankem Madhava Rao and Anr Vs Simhadri Rama Rao and Anr on 5 October, 2015

Posted on December 15, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Based on the earlier two judgments here and here, Hon’ble Sri Justice M. Seetharama Murti of AP HC has noted in this judgment that,

This Court in a decision in A.P. Minerals Development Corporation Limited Hyderabad v. M/s.Trimex Minerals Pvt.Ltd., and another decision in Bhoopal Reddy and another v. K.Lakshmi Bhai and another held that the practice of marking the documents in the interlocutory application only shall be continued. It is thus obvious that the documents filed by either of the parties shall have to be marked, unless the parties specifically opt for not marking either on the ground of inadmissibility or for some other reasons of their own.

Ankem Madhava Rao and Anr Vs Simhadri Rama Rao and Anr on 5 October, 2015

Citations:

Indiankanoon.org link:

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

A.P. Minerals Development Corporation Limited Vs MS. Trimex Minerals Pvt Ltd on 21 November, 1997

Posted on December 15, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Similar to this judgment here, AP HC has delivered this judgment by the same Judge, on the necessity of marking documents even in Interlocutory Applications.

A.P. Minerals Development Corporation Limited Vs MS. Trimex Minerals Pvt Ltd on 21 November, 1997

Citations: 1998 (1) ALD 533, 1998 (1) ALT 182

Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/965255/

T. Bhopal Reddy and Anr Vs KR Lakshmi Bai and Anr on 6 November, 1997

Posted on December 15, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Honorable Justice Sri P. Venkatarama Reddi had delivered this judgment wherein it was held that,

9. Before parting with the case, we have to record the difficulty which we experienced to find out the nature and details of 35 documents said to have been filed by the petitioners and 118 documents said to have been filed by the respondents.

10. The learned Subordinate Judge has merely stated that the petitioners have filed 35 documents while the respondents have filed 118 documents. Probably in view of the judgment of our learned brother Mr. Justice B.K. Somasekham in G. Sambrajyam v. P. Mahalakshamim and Ors., 1995 (1) ALD 358, that there is no provision in the Civil Rules of Practice for marking the documents as exhibits at the stage of interlocutory matters, the learned Subordinate Judge has not given any mark to these documents. This led to some inconvenience to us while disposing of this appeal. In our opinion, even though Rule 115 of the Civil Rules of Practice envisages marking of exhibits adduced in evidence as ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘X’ series as the case may be during trial, the same cannot be construed so as to exclude the marking of any document in an interlocutory matter. It may be so that the Court while deciding the interlocutory application will look into the prima facie case of both sides. In that process, necessarily, each side will be depending upon certain documents which may ultimately be sought to be proved during the course of trial.

11. To visualise that the contesting parties in an interlocutory application will not be able to re!y on the documentary evidence upon which they ultimately rely in the trial would be placing the contesting party in an interlocutory application to rely only on the affidavits which the learned Judge thought would be the correct procedure, it may be so that the learned Judge was quite conscious that in spite of the fact that the affidavits cannot be the evidence as they are not included in the definition of evidence under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, the Court may permit any affidavits to be produced under Order 19 Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. That being the premise on which the learned Judge proceeded to observe that the documents cannot be given a marking, the only alternative for any trial Court which hears interlocutory applications would be to decide the prima facie case only on the strength of affidavits. At the same time, we are unable to comprehend as to how a prima facie case is established by the successful party without referring to and marking the documents.

12. It may be pointed out that a deponent of an affidavit who can be called upon to appear for cross-examination cannot be confronted with any document on which the adversory places reliance. If the documents even at that stage are not permitted to be marked, the entire cross-examination of the deponent may be a mere denial of the suggestions made. If in a particular case the deponent himself was the author of any document or a party to it, there would not be any opportunity to the opposite parly or himself to explain the circumstances under which the document was executed or to admit or deny the genuineness or otherwise of the same. No doubt, we are conscious of the fact that a document on which a particular party relies to strengthen his own case can only be admitted in the evidence during the trial of the suit. However, as observed by us supra if the same are not given any marking, both sides would be at a disadvantage to support their respective contentions even in an interlocutory application. We think that the learned Judge has not envisaged that such of the documents on which the parties relied would have to be described in extenso in the order if they were not to be marked. Further, there would be any amount of inconvenience for any appellate Court to search for a document on which the parties have relied and go through its contents, more so, if there were a large number of documents filed by the contesting parties.

13. Thus, in order to come to a prima facie conclusion, both the trial Court and the appellate Court should necessarily be able to locate the documents and know its contents to agree with either of the contentions, we may also point out that it is nowhere envisaged that the case of the contesting parties can only be decided on the affidavits and not on any other material. Thus, in the absence of any specific rule so far as marking of documents in an interlocutory stage is concerned, the Courts would not be justified in not giving any marking at all to such of the documents on which both sides would rely.

14. It is another mailer that affidavits filed by both sides are not given marking for they after all form part of the record. But to say that the documentary evidence on which the parties would ultimately rely in the suit would not be of any relevance at the time of deciding the interlocutory matters would lead to any amount of inconvenience which was in fact felt by us in disposing of the above civil miscellaneous appeal.

15. As stated earlier, we are quite conscious of the fact that the documents marked for purpose of determination of any interlocutory application cannot be treated as evidence per se but would enable the Court to prima facie come to a conclusion about the merits or demerits of the contentions advanced. For the reasons aforesaid, we disapprove the view taken by Mr. Justice Somasekhara in the case referred to supra insofar as marking of the documents in the interlocutory applications.

16. Further, in order to avoid any future difficulties, it is desirable to incorporate a rule in Civil Rules of Practice for giving a separate marking to the documents relied upon by either party in interlocutory proceedings by directing the trial Courts to mark such of the documents relied upon by the petitioners in the interlocutory applications as ‘P’ series and the documents relied upon by the respondents as ‘R’ series to avoid any difficulty in identifying the documents at a later stage of the proceedings and also during trial.

T. Bhopal Reddy and Anr Vs KR Lakshmi Bai and Anr on 6 November, 1997

Citations: [1998 (1) ALD 770], [1998 (1) ALT 292],

Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/330119/

A.Subash Babu Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 21 July, 2011

Posted on December 14, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Landmark Judgment to screw the perpetrators of 494 and 495 IPC Bigamy offences. This is specifically helpful to those who have cases in the State of Andhra Pradesh where these two crimes are made Cognizable and Non-bailable, due to a State amendment in 1992 whereas these are Non-cognizable and Bailable in the rest of the States in India.

13. In this regard, it would be, relevant to notice the provisions of Article 246 of the Constitution. Article 246 deals with subject matter of laws made by the Parliament and by the legislatures of State. Clause (1) of Article 246 inter alia provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Clauses (2) and (3) of Article 246, the Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the maters enumerated in List 1 in the Seventh Schedule. Sub-Clause 2 of the said Article provides that notwithstanding anything in Clause (3), Parliament and subject to Clause (1), the legislature of any State also have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 3 in the Seventh Schedule, whereas, Clause (3) of Article 246 amongst other things provides that subject to Clauses (1) and (2), the legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 2 in the Seventh Schedule. Entry 2 in List 3 i.e. Concurrent List in the
Seventh Schedule mentions “Criminal Procedure, including in matters included in the Code of “Criminal procedure, at the commencement of this Constitution”. Thus there is no manner of doubt that Parliament and subject to Clause (1), the legislature of any State also has power to make laws with respect to Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 2(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 defines the phrase “Cognizable Offence” to mean an offence for which and “Cognizable Case” means a case in which, a Police Officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force arrest without warrant. Part I of the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 relating to offences under the Indian Penal Code inter alia mentions that Section 494 and 495 are non-cognizable. Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code relates to information in cognizable cases and provides inter alia that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an Officer in charge of a Police Station, shall be reduced to writing by him and be read over to the informant. Section 156 of the Code provides that any Officer in charge of a Police Station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over a local area within the limits of such station would have power to enquire into or try under provisions of Chapter XIII of Criminal Procedure Code. As Sections 494 and 495 are made non-cognizable, a Police Officer would not have power to investigate those cases without the order of a Magistrate, having a power to try such cases or commit such cases for trial as provided under Section 155(2) of the Code.
However, this Court finds that the Legislative Assembly of the State of Andhra Pradesh enacted the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992. By the said Amending Act, the First Schedule to Central Act 2 of 1974 i.e. the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 came to be amended and against the entries relating to Section 494 in column 4 for the word “Ditto”, the word “Cognizable” and in column 5 for the word “Bailable” the word “Non-bailable” were substituted. Similarly, against the entries relating to Section 495 in column 4, for the word “Ditto” the word “Cognizable” and in column 5 for the word “Ditto”, the word “Non-bailable” were substituted. What is relevant to be noticed is that the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992 was reserved by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh on the 21st October, 1991 for consideration and assent of the President. The Presidential assent was received on 10th February, 1992 after which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992 was published on the 15th February, 1992 in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette Part IV-B (Ext.). Thus there is no manner of doubt that Sections 494 and 495 IPC are cognizable offences so far as State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned.

And… in Para 14

* * * * * *

In view of the above settled legal position, this Court has no doubt that the amendment made in the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992, shall prevail in the State of Andhra Pradesh, notwithstanding the fact that in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 offences under Section 494 and 495 are treated as cognizable offences. The reasoning given by the Division Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Mavuri Rani Veera Bhadranna (supra) that though the State Legislation amended the Schedule making the offence under Section 494 IPC cognizable, the legislation made by the Parliament i.e. Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code remains and in the event of any repugnancy between the two legislations, the legislation made by the Parliament would prevail, because, Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code still holds the field despite the fact that the State Legislation made amendment to the Schedule of Criminal Procedure Code, with respect, is erroneous and contrary to all cannons of interpretation of statute. Once First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stands amended and offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC are made cognizable offences, those offences will have to be regarded as cognizable offences for all purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 including for the purpose of Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 198(1)(c), after the Amendment made by the Code of Criminal Procedure(Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992 cannot be interpreted in isolation without referring to the fact that offences under Sections 494 and 495 IPC have been made cognizable so far as the State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned. Therefore, the provision made in Section 198(1)(c) that no Court shall take cognizance of an offences punishable under Chapter XX of the IPC except
upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved will have to be read subject to the amendment made by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Andhra Pradesh in 1992. Once, it is held that the offences under Section 494 and 495 IPC are cognizable offences, the bar imposed by operative part of sub-section 1 of Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code beginning with the words “No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XX of the Indian Penal Code except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence” gets lifted so far as offences
punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC are concerned. As those offences have been made cognizable offences in the State of Andhra Pradesh since 1992, the same will have to be dealt with as provided in the Section 156 which inter alia provides that any officer in charge of a Police Station, may without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. Even without the authorization under Section 155(2) or Section
156(3) of Criminal Penal Code, offences under Sections 494, 495 and 496 having been rendered cognizable and non-bailable by virtue of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment Act, 1992) can be investigated by the Police and no illegality is attached to the investigation of these offences by the police. If the Police Officer in charge of a Police Station is entitled to investigate offences punishable under Section 494 and 495 IPC, there is no manner of doubt that the competent Court would have all jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences after receipt of report as contemplated under Section 173(2) of the Code. Thus, this Court finds that correct proposition of law was not laid down in Mavuri Rani Veera Bhadranna (supra) when the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the said case held that as Section 198 of Criminal Procedure Code still holds the field despite the amendment made by State Legislature, the Court would have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 494 IPC on the basis of report submitted by the Investigating Officer. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that in view of Section 198(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is disentitled to take cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC despite the State amendment making those offences cognizable, this Court notices that in Mavuri Rani Veera Bhadranna (supra), the Division Bench has considered effect of Section 155(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code and thereafter held that the bar under Section 198 would not be applicable as complaint lodged before police for offence under Section 494 IPC also related to other cognizable offences and if police files a charge sheet, the Court can take cognizance also of offence under Section 494 along with other cognizable offences by virtue of Section 155 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

And then in Para 15,

15. Section 155(4) of the Code inter alia provides that:-
“Where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case, notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable”
Here in this case in the charge sheet it is mentioned that the appellant has also committed offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code which is cognizable and therefore this is a case which relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable and therefore the case must be deemed to be cognizable case notwithstanding that the other offences are non- cognizable. This is not a case in which the FIR is exclusively filed for commission of offences under Sections 494 and 495 IPC. The case of the respondent no. 2 is that the appellant has committed offences punishable under Sections 417, 420, 494, 495 and 498A of the IPC. A question may arise as to what should be the procedure to be followed by a complainant when a case involves not only non-cognizable offence but one or more cognizable offences as well. It is somewhat anomalous that the aggrieved person by the alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC should file complaint before a Court and that the same aggrieved person should approach the police officer for alleged commission of offences under Sections 417, 420 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Where the case involves one cognizable offence also along with non-cognizable offences it should not be treated as a non-cognizable case for the purpose of sub-section 2 of Section 155 and that is the intention of legislation which is manifested in Section 155(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the argument that the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC on the basis of submission of charge sheet, cannot be accepted and is hereby rejected.

A.Subash Babu Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 21 July, 2011

Citations:

Indiankanoon.org link:

AP High Court had passed similar judgment here.

For a similar adjudication from State of Odisha, go here.

Korimerla Videesha Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 12 October, 2018

Posted on December 12, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

In a rare act, Justice Satyanarayan Murthy has given a Quash order in a false 498A IPC case. He also invoked AP Dowry Prohibition Rule 1998 which are available here.

Korimerla Videesha Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 12 October, 2018

Citations:

Indiankanoon.org link:

Rani Narasimha Sastry Vs Rani Suneela Rani on 19 November, 2019

Posted on December 9, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court has held that after acquittal from IPC 498A case, husband can file for divorce under the ground of Cruelty.

The above observation of the High Court cannot be approved. It is true that it is open for anyone to file complaint or lodge prosecution for redressal for his or her grievances and lodge a first information report for an offence also and mere lodging of complaint or FIR cannot ipso facto be treated as cruelty. But when a person undergoes a trial in which he is acquitted of the allegation of offence under Section 498-A of IPC, levelled by the wife against the husband, it cannot be accepted that no cruelty has meted on the husband. As per pleadings before us, after parties having been married on 14.08.2005, they lived together only 18 months and thereafter they are separately living for more than a decade now.

Rani Narasimha Sastry Vs Rani Suneela Rani on 19 November, 2019

Ramrameshwari Devi and Ors Vs Nirmala Devi and Ors on 4 July, 2011

Posted on March 24, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Dalveer Bhandari at Supreme Court, held that,

From Para 4,

This is a classic example which abundantly depicts the picture of how the civil litigation moves in our courts and how unscrupulous litigants (appellants in this case) can till eternity harass the respondents and their children by abusing the judicial system.

From Para 14,

According to Dr. Arun Mohan, twenty minutes spent at that time would have saved several years in court proceedings.

From Para 21,

The learned Single Judge observed that the present appellants belong to that category of litigants whose only motive is to create obstacles during the course of trial and not to let the trial conclude. Applications after applications are being filed by the appellants at every stage, even though orders of the trial court are based on sound reasoning. Moreover, the appellants have tried to mislead the court also by filing wrong synopsis and incorrect dates of events.

From Para 22,

Those litigants or their advocates who mislead the courts by filing wrong and incorrect particulars (the list of dates and events) must be dealt with heavy hands.

From Para 26,

It may be pertinent to mention that the appellants also moved transfer application apprehending adverse order from the trial judge, which was also dismissed by the learned District Judge. This conduct of the appellants demonstratesthat they are determined not to allow the trial court to proceed with the suit. They are creating all kinds of hurdles andobstacles at every stage of the proceedings.

From Para 30,

It is abundantly clear from the facts and circumstances of this case that the appellants have seriously created obstacles at every stage during the course of trial and virtually prevented the court from proceeding with the suit. This is a typical example of how an ordinary suit moves in our courts. Some cantankerous and unscrupulous litigants on one ground or the other do not permit the courts to proceed further in the matter.

From Para 34,

According to Dr. Mohan, in our legal system, uncalled for litigation gets encouragement because our courts do notimpose realistic costs. The parties raise unwarranted claims and defences and also adopt obstructionist and delaying tactics because the courts do not impose actual or realistic costs. Ordinarily, the successful party usually remains uncompensated in our courts and that operates as the main motivating factor for unscrupulous litigants. Unless the courts, by appropriate orders or directions remove the cause for motivation or the incentives, uncalled for litigation will continue to accrue, and there will be expansion and obstruction of the litigation. Court time and resources will be consumed and justice will be both delayed and denied.

From Para 44,

In the instant case when the entire question of title has been determined by the High Court and the Special Leave Petition against that judgment has been dismissed by this court, thereafter the trial court ought not to have framed such an issue on a point which has been finally determined upto this Court. In any case, the same was exclusively barred by the principles of res judicata. That clearly demonstrates total non-application of mind.

From Para 56,

These appeals are consequently dismissed with costs, which we quantify as Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs only). We are imposing the costs not out of anguish but by following the fundamental principle that wrongdoers should not get benefit out of frivolous litigation.

Ramrameshwari Devi and Ors Vs Nirmala Devi and Ors on 4 July, 2011

Guntamukkala Naga Venkata Kanaka Durga Nagamani Vs Guntamukkala Eswar Sudhakar on 19 October, 2012

Posted on March 23, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Cunning knife did drama in court seeking huge alimony but learned Judges of Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh showed here the door and levied costs for lying to court and filing false affidavits.

From Para 30,

On necessary analysis we find it difficult to accept these observations as it appears that the legislative intendment in framing Section 18 of HAM Act and Section 25 of HM Act are quite different. This is born out from the fact that Section 18 of HAM Act is intended for granting divorce to a wife when her marriage with her husband has been subsisting against her husband subject to the limitations provided therein, whereas Section 25 of HM Act is intended for granting maintenance to a divorced wife or husband subject to their conduct. No doubt, “wife” includes a divorced wife under normal parlance, but the question of awarding maintenance to her either as a wife or divorced wife should be within the legislative intendment or spirit. In other words, when the legislature framed Section 18 of HAM Act in the context of providing maintenance to a wife against her husband while their marriage has been subsisting, that is quite different from its intention in framing Section 25 of HM Act, the provisions of which are made applicable only to a divorced wife or husband subject to the conduct of himself or herself. The interpretation made in the decision cited to treat a wife who is not a divorcee and the wife who is a divorcee on equal footing for the purpose of awarding maintenance under Section 18 of HAM Act does not appear to be logical.

Guntamukkala Naga Venkata Kanaka Durga Nagamani Vs Guntamukkala Eswar Sudhakar on 19 October, 2012

A.Shanmugam Vs Ariya K.R.K.M.N.P.Sangam on 27 April, 2012

Posted on March 23, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

My Favorite Mr Justice Dalveer Bhandari of Supreme Court of India delivered this judgment. He elaborately destroyed the false pleadings and false pleas made by the Appellate solely for the purpose of dragging on the case. Observe how he cites all his past landmark, reported judgments in this one and sets the stage to expose the appellate thoroughly.

From Para 21,

This case demonstrates widely prevalent state of affairs where litigants raise disputes and cause litigation and then obstruct the progress of the case only because they stand to gain by doing so. It is a matter of common experience that the Court’s otherwise scarce resources are spent in dealing with non-deserving cases and unfortunately those who were waiting in the queue for justice in genuine cases usually suffer. This case is a typical example of delayed administration of civil justice in our Courts. A small suit, where the appellant was directed to be evicted from the premises in 1994, took 17 years before the matter was decided by the High Court. Unscrupulous litigants are encouraged to file frivolous cases to take undue advantage of the judicial system.

From Para 35,

Experience also reveals that our Courts have been very reluctant to grant the actual or realistic costs. We would like to explain this by giving this illustration. When a litigant is compelled to spend Rs.1 lac on a frivolous litigation there is hardly any justification in awarding Rs. 1,000/- as costs unless there are special circumstances of that case.We need to decide cases while keeping pragmatic realities in view. We have to ensure that unscrupulous litigant is not permitted to derive any benefit by abusing the judicial process.

From Para 42,

On the facts of the present case, following principles emerge:
1. It is the bounden duty of the Court to uphold the truth and do justice.
2. Every litigant is expected to state truth before the law court whether it is pleadings, affidavits or evidence. Dishonest and unscrupulous litigants have no place in law courts.
3. The ultimate object of the judicial proceedings is to discern the truth and do justice. It is imperative that pleadings and all other presentations before the court should be truthful.
4. Once the court discovers falsehood, concealment, distortion, obstruction or confusion in pleadings and documents, the court should in addition to full restitution impose appropriate costs. The court must ensure that there is no incentive for wrong doer in the temple of justice. Truth is the foundation of justice and it has to be the common endeavour of all to uphold the truth and no one should be permitted to pollute the stream of justice.
5. It is the bounden obligation of the Court to neutralize any unjust and/or undeserved benefit or advantage obtained
by abusing the judicial process.
6. Watchman, caretaker or a servant employed to look after the property can never acquire interest in the property
irrespective of his long possession. The watchman, caretaker or a servant is under an obligation to hand over the possession forthwith on demand. According to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, Courts are not justified in protecting the possession of a watchman, caretaker or servant who was only allowed to live into the premises to look after the same.
7. The watchman, caretaker or agent holds the property of the principal only on behalf the principal. He acquires no right or interest whatsoever in such property irrespective of his long stay or possession.
8. The protection of the Court can be granted or extended to the person who has valid subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or licence agreement in his favour.

A.Shanmugam Vs Ariya K.R.K.M.N.P.Sangam on 27 April, 2012

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Sandeep Pamarati

Santosh Kumar Vs Asha Budakoti on 13 June, 2013

Ankem Madhava Rao and Anr Vs Simhadri Rama Rao and Anr on 5 October, 2015

A.P. Minerals Development Corporation Limited Vs MS. Trimex Minerals Pvt Ltd on 21 November, 1997

T. Bhopal Reddy and Anr Vs KR Lakshmi Bai and Anr on 6 November, 1997

A.Subash Babu Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 21 July, 2011

Korimerla Videesha Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 12 October, 2018

Rani Narasimha Sastry Vs Rani Suneela Rani on 19 November, 2019

Ramrameshwari Devi and Ors Vs Nirmala Devi and Ors on 4 July, 2011

Guntamukkala Naga Venkata Kanaka Durga Nagamani Vs Guntamukkala Eswar Sudhakar on 19 October, 2012

A.Shanmugam Vs Ariya K.R.K.M.N.P.Sangam on 27 April, 2012