MP High Court held that, a person who is not convicted but merely accused cannot be denied entry into the State Bar Council rolls.
Braj Mohan Mahajan Vs Bar Council of State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors on 11 Sep 2018Citation :
Other Sources :
Later on, this advocate had trouble with AIBE exam also here.
Supreme Court talks as follows regarding Mental Cruelty:
The question that requires to be answered first is as to whether the averments, accusations and character assassination of the wife by the appellant husband in the written statement constitutes mental cruelty for sustaining the claim for divorce under Section 13(1) (i-a) of the Act. The position of law in this regard has come to be well settled and declared that leveling disgusting accusations of unchastity and indecent familiarity with a person outside wedlock and allegations of extra marital relationship is a grave assault on the character, honour, reputation, status as well as the health of the wife. Such aspersions of perfidiousness attributed to the wife, viewed in the context of an educated Indian wife and judged by Indian conditions and standards would amount to worst form of insult and cruelty, sufficient by itself to substantiate cruelty in law, warranting the claim of the wife being allowed. That such allegations made in the written statement or suggested in the course of examination and by way of cross-examination satisfy the requirement of law has also come to be firmly laid down by this Court. On going through the relevant portions of such allegations, we find that no exception could be taken to the findings recorded by the Family Court as well as the High Court. We find that they are of such quality, magnitude and consequence as to cause mental pain, agony and suffering amounting to the reformulated concept of cruelty in matrimonial law causing profound and lasting disruption and driving the wife to feel deeply hurt and reasonably apprehend that it would be dangerous for her to live with a husband who was taunting her like that and rendered the maintenance of matrimonial home impossible.
Precisely,
As to what constitute the required mental cruelty for purposes of the said provision, in our view, will not depend upon the numerical count of such incidents or only on the continuous course of such conduct, but really go by the intensity, gravity and stigmatic impact of it when meted out even once and the deleterious effect of it on the mental attitude, necessary for maintaining a conducive matrimonial home. If the taunts, complaints and reproaches are of ordinary nature only, the Courts perhaps need consider the further question as to whether their continuance or persistence over a period time render, what normally would, otherwise, not be a so serious an act to be so injurious and painful as to make the spouse charged with them genuinely and reasonable conclude that the maintenance of matrimonial home is not possible any longer. A conscious and deliberate statement leveled with pungency and that too placed on record, through the written statement, cannot so lightly be ignored or brushed aside, to be of no consequence merely because it came to be removed from the record only.
Vijay Kumar Ramachandra Bhate Vs Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate on 16 April, 2003
Citations : [2003 SCC 6 334], [2003 ALLMR SC 3 777], [2003 AIR SC 2530], [2003 SUPREME 3 416], [2003 AIR SC 2462], [2003 SCALE 4 134], [2004 BOMCR SC 2 384], [2003 ALD SC 3 124], [2003 AWC SC 3 2101], [2003 BLJR 3 1658], [2003 DMC SC 1 685], [2003 JCR SC 3 1], [2003 JT SC 4 85], [2003 LW 4 609], [2003 MLJ SC 3 115], [2003 PLJR 2 200], [2003 SCR 3 607], [2003 UC 2 1211], [2003 UJ 2 947], [2003 AIR SCW 2530]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1228342/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ade1e4b01497114126d8
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/vijay-kumar-ramachandra-bhate-vs-neela-vijay-kumar-bhate
Relying on Bipin Shantilal Panchal here, and properly identifying that certain judgments from Supreme Court have not considered Bipin Panchal, correctly held that, except for Stamp duty and Registration fee, all other objections to any document sought to be introduced during evidence stage have to be parked towards the end of trial and considered then while judgment stage.
From Para 15,
…
Coming to the expression in Shalimar Chemical Works Limited v. Surendra Oil and Dal Mills (Refineries), where it was no doubt observed that admissibility of document held to be decided at the stage of admission by marking, instead of leaving to be decided subsequently. The facts therein were Xerox copy of the trade mark registration certificate (which is in fact the suit document) without production of original even objected by opposite party from the trial Court permitted to mark subject to objection on proof and admissibility held wrong procedure. In fact it was observed that from same is the suit document and no foundation as to what happened to the original to receive as Xerox copy of the suit claim which is the trademark registration certificate, it was observed that lower appellate Court having received the document under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC without exhibit and without opportunity to the other side to rebut the evidence simply relied on it by discussing the same as if admitted in evidence that was found fault. Thereby the expression in Shalimar Chemicals supra confine to the facts for no law laid down of in any case secondary evidence cannot be permitted subject to objection. In fact the earlier expression of the Apex Court in Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State Of Gujarat particularly Para 12 and Navjot Sandhu @ Afzalguru supra holding any objection (other than on stamp duty and registration) is while marking be kept open for decision finally including on secondary evidence admissibility. Above two expressions of the Apex Court not came for consideration in Shalimar Chemical Supra.
From Para 16,
16. In fact from the expression in Bipin Shantilal there was a direction as guidance to be followed by all Courts while marking documents including on secondary evidence as subject to objections by let open to decide ultimately on the objection while recording the evidence, unless it touches stamp duty and registration to decide instantly. In fact Shalimar Chemicals supra particularly at Para 10 internal Para 20, the expression of the Apex Court in RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P Temple, referred and relied which speaks about objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into 2 classes, one is objection that the document which is sought to be proved is inadmissible and the other towards the mode of proof. In the case of objection as to admissibility, it is only a procedural aspect, if not raised while marking, it is not open to raise later including on secondary evidence for as good as primary evidence. Whereas objection as to mode of proof even not raised while marking unless it is proved it cannot be considered in evidence for which there is no waiver, thereby even no objections raised on mode or method of proof there is no waiver to consider document proved or not from objection can be raised on proof at any time but for on the objection as to nature of document for its admissibility if not raised while marking that amounts to waiver.
Finally, from Para 18,
18. From these expressions, even once the certified copy to a certified copy is within the meaning of secondary evidence and any objection to exhibit secondary evidence though in Shalimar Chemicals Supra says to decide instantly for admissibility, from the earlier expressions categorically held directing all courts to follow particularly from Bipin Shanti Lal supra and in Afzal Guru supra that but for objections on stamp duty and registration to decide instantaneously any other objection raised while marking is to record as subject to objection to decide ultimately at the end of trial and not to decide instantaneously and thus against said conclusion arrived by the lower Court, there is nothing to sit in revision against the impugned orders of the lower Court.
Sri Kathi Narsinga Rao Vs Kodi Supriya and Anr on 29 Sep 2016
Citations : [2016 SCC ONLINE HYD 346]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/115678797/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/58ae76214a9326593c4a168c
Single-judge Bench said one thing in this Order which is as follows:
7. Qualification of the wife and the capacity to earn cannot be a ground to deny interim maintenance to a wife who is dependant and does not have any source of income.
The converse is read like this:
Binita Dass Vs Uttam Kumar on 9 Aug 2019Wife who is not-dependant and have source of income, can be a ground to deny interim maintenance to a wife.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/92763076/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5d8b2ff8714d58374079df99
In regards to the explanation given to section 197 CrPC, Karnataka High Court categorically held as follows,
B.G. Prakash Kumar Vs The Commissioner on 23 Feb 201520. The submission that the sanction is necessary, as the appellants are not facing the charges under the Sections enumerated in the newly inserted Explanation to Section 197 does not commend itself to us. The Memorandum explaining the modifications contained in the Criminal Law Amendment 2013 itself states that the Explanation to Section 197 is proposed to be inserted so as to clarify that no sanction is required for prosecuting a public servant, if the offence relates to crimes against woman. Such a clarification cannot be stretched to mean that the sanction for prosecuting a public servant is a must, if the offence alleged does not relate to a crime against woman.
Citations :
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/90130688/
Justice Dipak Misra decried the practice of Trial/Session Court judges in giving adjournments on mere asking by the parties, in spite of the presence of the witnesses willing to be examined fully.
From Para 41,
Vinod Kumar Vs State of Punjab on 21 Jan 201541. Before parting with the case we are constrained to reiterate what we have said in the beginning. We have expressed our agony and anguish the manner in which trials in respect of serious offences relating to corruption are being conducted by the trial courts. Adjournments are sought on the drop of a hat by the counsel, even though the witness is present in court, contrary to all principles of holding a trial. That apart, after the examination-in-chief of a witness is over, adjournment is sought for cross-examination and the disquieting feature is that the trial courts grant time. The law requires special reasons to be recorded for grant of time but the same is not taken note of. As has been noticed earlier, in the instant case the cross-examination has taken place after a year and 8 months allowing ample time to pressurize the witness and to gain over him by adopting all kinds of tactics. There is no cavil over the proposition that there has to be a fair and proper trial but the duty of the court while conducting the trial to be guided by the mandate of the law, the conceptual fairness and above all bearing in mind its sacrosanct duty to arrive at the truth on the basis of the material brought on record. If an accused for his benefit takes the trial on the path of total mockery, it cannot be countenanced. The Court has a sacred duty to see that the trial is conducted as per law. If adjournments are granted in this manner it would tantamount to violation of rule of law and eventually turn such trials to a farce. It is legally impermissible and jurisprudentially abominable. The trial courts are expected in law to follow the command of the procedure relating to trial and not yield to the request of the counsel to grant adjournment for non-acceptable reasons. In fact, it is not all appreciable to call a witness for cross-examination after such a long span of time. It is imperative if the examination-in-chief is over, the cross-examination should be completed on the same day. If the examination of a witness continues till late hours the trial can be adjourned to the next day for cross-examination. It is inconceivable in law that the cross-examination should be deferred for such a long time. It is anathema to the concept of proper and fair trial. The duty of the court is to see that not only the interest of the accused as per law is protected but also the societal and collective interest is safe-guarded. It is distressing to note that despite series of judgments of this Court, the habit of granting adjournment, really an ailment, continues. How long shall we say, “Awake! Arise!”. There is a constant discomfort. Therefore, we think it appropriate that the copies of the judgment be sent to the learned Chief Justices of all the High Courts for circulating the same among the learned trial Judges with a command to follow the principles relating to trial in a requisite manner and not to defer the cross-examination of a witness at their pleasure or at the leisure of the defence counsel, for it eventually makes the trial an apology for trial and compels the whole society to suffer chicanery. Let it be remembered that law cannot allowed to be lonely; a destitute.
Citations: [2015 SCC 3 220], [2015 SCC ONLINE SC 53]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/188951670/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/581180e72713e179479dda10
Bombay High Court held that, “Any demand for presents after the marriage, but not having a connection with the marriage of the parties will not constitute a demand for dowry”
From Para 6,
Arjun Dhondiba Kamble and Ors Vs The State of Maharashtra on 14 February 1992Dowry in the sense of that expression contemplated by Act 28 of 1961 is a demand for property or valuable security having an inextricable nexus with the marriage. In other words it is a consideration from the side of the bride’s parents or relatives to the groom or his parents and/or guardian for the agreement to wed the bride-to-be. Where the demand for property or valuable security has no connection with the consideration for the marriage, it will not amount to a demand for dowry. In the instant case, the evidence has to be properly understood and thus viewed it is clear that what the appellants wanted was valuable presents to be made to appellant Mahadeo on the occasion of festivals like Deepavali. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the presents are customarily given to sons-in-law on festive occasions and giving of such presents is in no way connected with the wedding or marriage. It is a post-marriage expectation and the expectation and performance thereof once restricted to the affluents and the middle class, has now spread its tentacles to the poor also. The expectation is because of the relationship, but without any nexus to the agreement to marry. Therefore, it does not amount to dowry. Any demand for presents after the marriage, but not having a connection with the marriage of the parties will not constitute a demand for dowry. This is clear from the qualifying clause of section 2 in Act 28 of 1961 reproduced above.
Citations: [1993 (3) BomCR 473]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/553393/
This judgment from Supreme Court hits the final nail of those persons who say a High Court does not have territorial jurisdiction beyond it’s borders. It also cites Kusum Ingots where by Supreme Court has expressed an Obiter Dicta (Judicial opinion, different from ratio decidendi, which is word of Judge based on case facts) to the same effect.
From Para 11
Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs Union of India and Ors on 7 August 201411. On a plain reading of the amended provisions in clause (2), it is clear that now the High Court can issue a writ when the person or the authority against whom the writ is issued is located outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the cause of action wholly or partially arises within the court’s territorial jurisdiction. Cause of action for the purpose of Article 226(2) of the Constitution, for all intent and purpose must be assigned the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The expression cause of action has not been defined either in the Code of Civil Procedure or the Constitution. Cause of action is bundle of facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the suit before he can succeed. The term “cause of action” as appearing in clause (2) came up for consideration time and again before this Court.
Citations: [2014 AIR SC 3607], [2014 AJR 4 410], [2014 ALR 106 710], [2014 AWC SC 5 4947], [2014 SCSUPPL CHN 5 192], [2014 FLR 143 1015], [2014 JLJR 4 69], [2014 PLJR 4 227], [2014 SCALE 9 244], [2014 SCC 9 329], [2014 SCJ 7 307], [2014 SCT SC 4 129], [2014 SLJ SC 3 175], [2014 SCC ONLINE SC 610], [2014 AIC 142 193], [2014 ALLLR 106 710], [2014 KHC 0 4507], [2014 AIOL 481], [2014 JT 9 46], [2014 SLT 6 703], [2014 SUPREME 5 689], [2015 LW 1 810], [2014 CALHN 5 192]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/70426214/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af57e4b01497114161bb
This was followed in this 2-judge bench judgment of Allahabad High Court here.
Justice Vineet Saran sitting in a 5-Judge bench delivered this reference judgment on the following two questions of law.
Question-1
Whether the District Forum has power to extend the time for filing of response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days, as envisaged under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act?
Answered as follows:
To conclude, we hold that our answer to the first question is that the District Forum has no power to extend the time for filing the response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days in addition to 30 days as is envisaged under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act
Question-2
What would be the commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986?
Answered as follows:
New India Assurance Co Ltd Vs Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt Ltd on 4 March 2020the answer to the second question is that the commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act would be from the date of receipt of the notice accompanied with the complaint by the opposite party, and not mere receipt of the notice of the complaint.
Citations: [AIR 2020 SC 1267], [2020 SCC OnLine SC 287]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/96395504/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e69d2383321bc624fea2d34
Another judgment from Erstwhile High Court of AP which rapped on the knuckles of the JMFC who dismissed the Discharge petition filed u/s 239 CrPC, where there were no specific allegations on the petitioner.
6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that at the time of marriage of the complainant with the Accused No.1, the petitioner was 12 years old. No specific allegations are made against the petitioner, either in the charge sheet or in the statement of list of witnesses, except ominous allegations that the petitioner being sister of A.1, also demanded for additional dowry of Rs.3 lakhs. Therefore, the proceedings initiated against the petitioner cannot be maintained.
7. The learned public prosecutor appearing for the respondent state, fairly conceded that no specific allegations are made against the petitioner except a vague allegation that the petitioner also demanded for additional dowry.
8. Having heard both the counsel and from the perusal of the material on record, particularly, the charge sheet what all that is stated against the petitioner herein is that A-1 to A-4 demanded LW.1 to get additional dowry of Rs.3 lakhs for doing business and demanded LW1 to sign on diverse papers to enable the A.1 to marry another girl. In fact no specific dates, month or year have been mentioned. The said allegation is as vague as possible.
Now Start music…
C Krishna Priya Vs State of AP on 14 September 20189. In the recent times, various complaints are being lodged for the offences under Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, in which, whether any allegation is made out or not, all the family members are being roped in as accused only for the purpose of harassing the innocent family members whereby forcing them to come to terms.
10. From the above, this Court is of the opinion that when no specific allegations are made against the petitioner who is the sister of A.1, the continuation of proceedings against her would amount to abuse of process of the Court, apart from putting the petitioner to undue hardship of facing the trial. As such, this court is inclined to interfere with the order passed by the Court below in declaring the discharge of the petitioner.
Citations: [
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/79415399/
