Neha Vs Vibhor Garg on 12 Nov 2021
Category: High Court of Punjab & Haryana Judgment or Order or Notification
Harkanwalpreet Singh Vs Harshpreet Kaur on 17 Jan 2014
A division declared a null and void marriage, a null and void marriage. hehehe. Check the list of events/dates…
- a divorce petition between the respondent-Harshpreet Kaur and said Varinder Singh Thandi was filed on 23.12.2006
- the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 21.2.2007
- a divorce petition was pending between the respondent-Harshpreet Kaur and said Varinder Singh Thandi was decided on 18.1.2010
- the copy of the judgment dated 18.1.2010 (Ex.P-3) and copy of decree sheet dated 18.1.2010 (Ex.P-4) whereby divorce was granted to the respondent in respect of her earlier marriage
- she was in India as she arrived on 01.1.2012
- husband came to know that the respondent-Harshpreet Kaur was already married with one Varinder Singh Thandi in June, 2012
- there was no cohabitation between the parties after June, 2012
- thereafter she left for USA on 05.10.2012.
- She had again come to India on 10.1.2014 and was residing with her parents.
Finally,
Harkanwalpreet Singh Vs Harshpreet Kaur on 17 Jan 2014In the facts and circumstances, the respondent has admitted the case of the appellant. It is accepted by her that she had a spouse living at the time of her marriage with the appellant. This indeed contravenes Section 5(i) of the Act. As such merely because they have been married for a considerable time, it cannot per se be said that they are acting in collusion with each other. It is better if the marriage is declared null and void on the basis of the accepted position rather than making the parties go through a protracted litigative process. Besides, it is the statutory provision of Section 5(i) of the Act, which has been infringed and there is no estoppel against a statute. Therefore, in view of the admission on the part of the respondent that she had a spouse living at the time when her marriage was solemnized with the appellant-Harkanwalpreet Singh, we find no reason, why the marriage between the parties should not be declared void as it contravenes Section 5(i) of the Act.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court is set aside and the marriage between the parties is declared void. There shall be no order as to costs.
Citations : [2015 DMC P&H 1 225], [2014 AIR P&H 60], [2014 SCC ONLINE P&H 1049]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/120220289/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56099ebae4b01497113dccfa
Surjit Singh Vs State of Punjab and Anr on 05 Sep 2011
Relying on a previous single judge decision, Punjab High Court held as follows,
Surjit Singh Vs State of Punjab and Anr on 05 Sep 2011As per Section 468 Cr.P.C., the period of limitation shall be one year if the offence is punishable with punishment for a term not exceeding one year. The punishment for an offence under Section 182 IPC is an imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to 1,000/- rupees or with both. Thus, the calendra could have been presented within one year from the date when the investigating agency had concluded that the averments in the complaint were false. However, in the present case the s has been presented after the period of limitation as envisaged under Section 468 Cr.P.C.
Citations:
Other Sources:
Paramjit Kumar Saroya Vs Union of India and Anr on 28 May 2014
Sitting on a Division bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court, Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul held that, Appeals under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act 2007 can be filed by any of the affected parties.
We may add at this stage that in order to have assistance to this Court in view of the complexity in the matter involved, we considered it appropriate not only for the counsels to assist us, but to appoint Amicus Curiae to have dispassionate view of the matter. We, thus, appointed Mr. Puneet Bali, Senior Advocate as the Amicus Curiae to be assisted by Ms. Divya Sharma, Advocate. They have done a comprehensive research on various aspects of the matter and this includes the Parliamentary debates when the Bill for enactment of the said Act was introduced. A perusal of these debates reflect that therehas been no debate qua Section 16(1) of the said Act, nor has any intent been reflected to exclude the right of appeal to persons other than thesenior citizens or parents, unlike the debate on Section 17 of the said Act where the right of legal representation has been excluded.
And here is the conclusion.
Paramjit Kumar Saroya Vs Union of India and Anr on 28 May 2014We are thus of the view that Section 16(1) of the said Act is valid, but must be read to provide for the right of appeal to any of the affected parties.
Citations : [2014 AIR P&H 121], [2014 SCC ONLINE P&H 10864]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/156882703/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609a051e4b01497113e6023
Rakesh Kumar Singla Vs Union of India on 14 Jan 2021
Punjab High Court granted Regular Bail on the following basis:
- the self inculpatory statement given to police cannot be relied upon
- no certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act is available at the present moment to authenticate the said messages
- The investigation in the matter is complete and the challan stands presented and therefore, this Court is of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served in keeping the petitioner behind bars.
Nirmal Singh and Ors Vs Tarsem Singh and Ors on 01 May 2014
A single-judge bench of Punjab High Court held as follows:
Nirmal Singh and Ors Vs Tarsem Singh and Ors on 01 May 2014The High Court should not be stressed-out to deal with such a combined application compressed into one impugned order needlessly to unravel causing sheer wastage of its precious time in trying to separate what was so casually and mindlessly mixed-up in a cocktail by virtue of bad advice given by some trial lawyer to his client clubbing two disparate legal elements in a portmanteau application claiming amendment in pleadings and at the same time, in the same papers, seeking to introduce third parties in the pending litigation. Every minute of the High Court’s time squandered involves colossal expenditure which is incapable of calculation and therefore recompense. The reward of justice is none other than justice and time consumed in trying to meet it is alone its justification as an end to the means. The time required today for deciding cases of other litigants waiting desperately in the courtroom for their cause to be taken up and decided stands reduced. Poor legal advice given to a client may result in paralyzing many cases for years together causing incalculable injury to just causes needing prompt attention. But bad legal advice tendered leading to filing of interlocutory applications is a judicially unacceptable legal principle or ground itself for generosity in interference. This cannot operate as an exemption or a concession grantable to a litigant complaining that he has suffered because of ill advice to rescue an unsuspecting litigant from a predicament he may face. It has become almost a daily feature in court to wriggle out of the jamb to readily blame counsel without batting an eyelid and accept relief. If the Judge is expected to do his job so is the lawyer expected to assist the Court to the best of his ability. There is a presumption in law that a lawyer knows the law but there is no absolute presumption that a judge should know law. A judge is only called upon to balance the two sides of an argument presented before him.
But the bane is that the trial court unfortunately is not empowered to exercise summary jurisdiction of dismissal of misconceived, vexatious, frivolous, and mala fide applications designed only to obstruct the sound rhythm of a suit to achieve its target milestones within a reasonable time and bring it to fruition. Such power should deservedly be conferred on subordinate judges to deliver justice at the doorstep in limine without compromising the quality of justice delivered. But this is for Parliament to remedy and devise ways and means to achieve removal of obstructions designed to impede the life of a suit or wilt its many leaves.
Said Judge Learned Hand: “Thou shall not ration justice”
But time and energy spent in doing justice can be rationed. It can be rationalized to show better results. The trial courts can contribute in a large measure to this end by finding workable solutions thinking on their feet to do summary justice, a small example of what this case represents. The predecessor trial Judge should have returned the joint application in 2010 itself from the dais to its owner and saved valuable time of the court. He should have killed the weed before it grew. But now that has to be uprooted.
For the variety of reasons recorded above, I find no cogent ground to support the impugned order dated April 4, 2013 or to sustain it and to the contrary I think it is eminently fit to be set aside to avoid a failure of justice. It is accordingly so ordered. The matter is remitted back to the trial Judge for a re-consideration. The respondent/plaintiff is left free to file two separate applications, one under Order 6 Rule 17 and one under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC within a fortnight from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. The defendants would file replies thereto within the next fortnight. Thereafter, the learned trial Judge would take up both the applications separately and proceed to dispose them of on merits after hearing the parties after following the rule “costs must follow the event” to its true import and meaning to compensate the aggrieved litigant of the precious time lost in what could have been resolved without any prolonged agony.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://www.legitquest.com/case/nirmal-singh-and-others-v-tarsem-singh-and-others/1838C4
Pardeep Kumar Vs State of Haryana and Anr on 14 May 2020
High Court held that the alleged insult happened not in public view but over a phone call, hence FIR and Charge framing is quashed
Pardeep Kumar Vs State of Haryana and Anr on 14 May 2020Therefore, in view of the above, it is evident that the prosecution has failed to make out a prima facie case for commission of offence punishable under Section 3 of SC & ST Act.
Moreover, the basic ingredients of the offence in the FIR are that there must be intentional insult, secondly the insult must be done in a public place within public view, which is not in the present case. Thus, the essential ingredients which must be fulfilled, are not found in the present case. Since these are the penal provisions, the same are to be given a strict construction and if any of the ingredients are found lacking, it would not constitute the offence under the SC/ST Act.
Since no offence under Section 3 of the SC & ST Act is found to be made out, the offence under Section 506 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, which stemmed out of the alleged offence under Section 3 of the SC and ST Act, is also not made out.
Shiv Kumar Chauhan Vs State of Haryana and Ors on 05 Nov 2020
High Court of Punjab and Haryana has taken the arrogant advocate to the ride enhancing the costs from Rs.50,000/- to Rs.1,00,000/-, on his invitation. LOL
From Para 11,
11. No doubt, merely because civil suits are pending would not mean that simultaneous criminal proceedings cannot be instituted on the same cause of action. Provided of course, any criminal case is made out. Prima facie, the lis herein seems to be of civil in nature and institution of the criminal proceedings is being sought for collateral pressure and for settling private scores/gains. Be that as it may, it is for the appropriate court to look into the same, in accordance with law.
Legal options for getting a Criminal FIR registered, from Para 12,
12. In my opinion, the petitioner ought to have first approached the trial Court under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C for redressal of his grievance, if any, before directly approaching this Court. Section 156 (3) empowers aMagistrate to ensure proper investigation. Ordinarily, in case of a grievance arising out of non registration of an FIR, first remedy is to approach theSuperintendent of Police under Section 154(3) Cr.P.C. or any other competent police officer per Section 36 Cr.P.C. However, even if thereafter,grievance is unmitigated, one can take judicial recourse by approaching a Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Still, thereafter, an aggrieved partyhas a further remedy of filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. Reference may be had to Apex Court judgment in “Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P and others”.
NOTE: First complaint at nearest police station u/s 154(1) CrPC, then escalation to SP/SSP/CP u/s 154(3) CrPC, then complaint to Jurisdictional Magistrate u/s 156(3) CrPC and then filing a criminal complaint u/s 200 CrPC.
Then rubbing the saw-dust on the wound of the losing party, High Court held as follows while levying costs,
13. The other relief qua dissolution of trust and/or induct/appoint the petitioner as its Secretary sought herein being civil in nature, instant petition qua the same is an abuse of the court process. In any case, conduct of the petitioner for indulging in subtle concealment, as aforesaid, does not inspire
any confidence so as to exercise any jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Petition is dismissed with a cost of Rs.50,000/- to be deposited in Covid-19 fund created by U.T. Administration, Chandigarh. Liberty is though granted to approach trial court, as already observed herein above.
14. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner very rowdily exuberates that paying costs is not an issue and he is even ready to pay Rs.1.00 lac towards the same. He also boisterously claims that he has been instrumental in making many a judges and how can his arguments/contentions,therefore, be rejected by this court to dismiss the instant petition. To say the least, the tone, tenor, manner and conduct of the learned counsel for petitioner leaves a lot to desire. Yet, taking a lenient view thereof, this court rather prefers a self-restraint from taking any further action. However, on the invitation of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the cost imposed is enhanced to Rs.1 lac.
Shiv Kumar Chauhan Vs State of Haryana and Ors on 05 Nov 2020
Sewa Singh Vs Surjit Kaur on 14 Feb 2012
Interrogatories are allowed in the DV cases and they are independent of Written Statement/Counter filing. Such Interrogatories have to be disposed off in 7 days from filing.
The observations made by the learned trial Judge appear to be stringent and contrary to the provisions of CPC, as in view of the amendment of CPC w.e.f. July 1, 2002, it is mandatory for a Court to decide an application forleave to deliver interrogatories within a period of seven days from the date of filing of the said application. There is no provision warranting that stay could be granted merely for non-filing of the written statement.
And then…
Sewa Singh Vs Surjit Kaur on 14 Feb 2012After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the defendant- petitioner wants to delay the filing of written statement on the pretext that an application for interrogatories under Order 11 Rule 4 CPC has been submitted before the trial Court. I have gone through the interrogatories. The interrogatories only seek to get a reply from the plaintiff- wife pertaining to an earlier application having been filed by her under the Domestic Violence Act, she being owner of properties mentioned in para Nos. 2 to 5 of the interrogatories. There is nothing mentioned in the interrogatories which could create an obstacle in fling of the written statement. Defendant- petitioner can conveniently take up a plea regarding plaintiff- respondent being owner of particular property disentitling her to any relief under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act while contesting her claim of permanent injunction. Besides this, obligation to file written statement is not subject to the adjudication of the application for interrogatories. There is an independent obligation on the part of the Court to decide the interrogatories within a period of seven days as per provisions of Order 11 Rule 2 CPC.
Other sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/94382253/
Robin Sharma Vs State of Punjab on 11 August 2020
Single-Judge bench held the importance of fair investigation by Investigating officer. And more importantly, advised as following, wrt sec 166A(b), which I elaborated here:
Robin Sharma Vs State of Punjab on 11 August 2020The complainant/victim of a crime may accordingly apply to the Judicial Magistrate, empowered to take cognizance of the offences in question on police report, for monitoring of investigation who can issue appropriate directions for expeditious completion of investigation. The complainant/ victim of a crime may also file complaint under section 166A (b) of the IPC against the Investigating Officer for knowingly disobeying, any direction of the law regulating the manner in which he shall conduct such investigation. In view of explanation to Section 197 (1) of the Cr.P.C. no sanction is required in case of a public servant accused of any offence alleged to have been committed under Section 166 A of the IPC. The complainant/victim of a crime may alternatively file petition in the High Court for transfer of investigation to an independent agency such as CBI etc.. However, it may be observed here that in substantial number of such cases the complainant/victim of a crime is not able to pursue these remedies due to lack of awareness and legal aid at the initial stages.
