Varshaben Himantlal Vejani Vs State of Gujarat on 15 Jul 2016

Posted on April 13 by ShadesOfKnife

Taking input from Kerala HC judgment here, Gujarat High Court held that, any agreement which has terms against to Public Policy, is void and not enforceable in law. Such agreements which prohibit right of maintenance are also void.

From Para 9,

9 In any case, all such issues are now well settled by few decisions of different Courts

[1] Rajesh R Nair v. Meera Babu reported in 2013 Cri. L.J. 3153, wherein Division Bench of Kerala High Court has held that waiver of right to maintenance by an agreement is not permissible because such agreement would be void agreement as against public policy. It would amount to ousting of jurisdiction of Magistrate and Family Court to entertain maintenance claim which cannot be permitted by law. Therefore, such agreement being void would be unenforceable and hence claim for maintenance cannot be rejected on the basis of such agreement of waiver of right to maintenance.
[2] In Rishikesh Singh alias T.R. Singh v. Kiran Gautam reported in 2015 Cri.L.J. 126, Chhattisgarh High Court has confirmed that decree of divorce obtained by mutual consent would be no ground to deny maintenance until wife has not remarried after divorce. It is further held that even if wife is junior advocate, it cannot be held that she is able to maintain herself and, therefore, she would be entitled for the maintenance.
[3] Smt. Vanamala v. H.M. Ranganatha Bhatta reported in [1995] 5 SCC 299, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also taken the same view that wife, who obtains divorce by mutual consent cannot be denied maintenance by virtue of section 125[4] and thereby restored the order of the Sessions Court, which has concluded that wife was entitled to maintenance notwithstanding divorce by mutual consent and remanded the matter to the trial Court for determining quantum of maintenance. Thereby, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has set aside the order of the High Court which held that wife is not entitled to maintenance once she has divorced her marriage by mutual consent. It would be appropriate to recollect here that for coming to such conclusion, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has relied upon as many as three other decisions of different High Courts, which are quoted in such reported case and approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, as on date, there are at least as many as five judgments including judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which confirm that a wife who obtains divorce by mutual consent cannot be denied maintenance by virtue of section 125 [4] of the Cr. P.C.

Varshaben Himantlal Vejani Vs State of Gujarat on 15 Jul 2016

Citations : [2016 SCC ONLINE GUJ 9136], [2017 AIC 172 524]

Other Sources:

https://mynation.net/docs/1095-2011/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5ac5e33e4a93261a1a744803

Chegireddy Venkata Reddy Vs Government of Andhra Pradesh on 30 Jul 2020

Posted on April 5 by ShadesOfKnife

Long story short, AP HC says, if the Police do not register an FIR if information about a cognizable offence is reported, the remedies are as follows:

The remedies are under Section 154(3), 156(3) and Section 190 r/w.Sec.200 of Cr.P.C.

Chegireddy Venkata Reddy Vs Government of Andhra Pradesh on 30 Jul 2020

Citations :

Other Sources :

A 2-page judgment here which cites this judgment can also be used for same purpose. Saves 24 pages !!!

Masood Khan Vs. Millie Hazarika on 04 Mar 2021

Posted on April 3 by ShadesOfKnife

Disagreeing with a catena of judgements here, here, here, here, Single-bench of High Court of Meghalaya relied upon this landmark decision from Supreme Court here and held that a false DV case can be quashed u/s 482 CrPC.

From Paras 33, 34 and 33,

33. The argument of the learned counsel for the Respondent No. 2 in the opinion of this Court are valid as regard the nature and relief contemplated under the DV Act 2005, particularly those seen in Sections 18 to 22 which are civil in nature and can be sought for before any civil court, family court or a criminal court as provided under Section 26 of the said DV Act. However, the learned counsel has failed to notice that in Section 26 of the DV Act, the aggrieved person apart from a civil court or a family court, can seek the reliefs stated above even from a criminal court and in doing so, the aggrieved person would subject herself to the jurisdiction of a criminal court following the procedure of the Criminal Procedure Code.

34. In fact, Section 28 of the DV Act 2005 specifically provides that all proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 as well as Section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, though liberty was also given to the court to lay down its own procedure.

35. The applicability of the said provision of Section 28 of the said DV Act in criminal proceedings was emphasized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Satish Chander Ahuja (supra) at paragraphs 138 and 139 where it has restated that the procedure to be followed shall be under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

From Paras 38, 39

38. It is also a fact that Section 482 Cr.P.C provides for inherent power on the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code and as stated above, proceedings under the DV Act being governed by the procedure under the Cr.P.C, therefore the logical conclusion would be that an application under Section 482 is maintainable qua order passed under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the DV Act.
39. With due respect, the decisions of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court and the Madras High Court cited above and relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No 2, as far as the procedural aspects under the DV Act is concerned, would not stand the test in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Satish Chander Ahuja (supra).

Masood Khan Vs. Millie Hazarika on 04 Mar 2021

Sarita Gosawi Vs Bharat Gosawi on 05 Mar 2021

Posted on April 2 by ShadesOfKnife

There was mental cruelty done to husband and the High Court nailed the point straight.

From Paras 18 and 19,

18. Keeping in mind the aforesaid guiding parameters, now we proceed to examine the evidence on record. Apart from the allegations and counter allegations by the parties against each other with regard to their mutual misbehavior, the crucial point on which the respondent/ husband sought decree of divorce, and which according to him is the reason for his mental sufferings and anguishes, is the suspicious and skeptical nature of the appellant/ wife, as she used to have a doubt on his character. She was doubting his relations with one lady employee from his office. It is his case that the appellant/ wife used to visit his office and used to create scenes. She used to abuse him in filthy language on his character and used to humiliate him in front of their adolescent daughters.

19. The respondent/ husband, in his pleadings and evidence, further stated that he had purchased one plot of land and constructed a house thereon on loan and at present, the same is in possession of the appellant/ wife. He is paying installments for the repayment of the loan for house from his
salary account. To pacify her, he even transferred his house in her name. He has stated that fed-up with her acrimonious behaviour, he had to lodge reports at police station, and there were counselling before the Women Cell, and in consequence thereof, she resumed cohabitation. Lastly, he said, he had no option but to leave the house and to reside in a rented house.

20. A perusal of the written statements of the appellant/ wife would reflect that she has not denied, even by way of simple denial, about the contents in para 3 of the divorce petition of the respondent/ husband which are with regard to the suspicious nature of the appellant/ wife, doubting his character, abusing in a filthy language and visiting his office and creating scenes etc.

Crucial Paras 22 and 25,

22. In the instant case, admittedly, there are no positive allegations with regard to the character of the respondent/ husband in the written statement of the appellant/ wife. However, maintaining silence in her written statement and not countering the case of cruelty of the respondent/ husband on this ground, coupled with the fact that there were specific suggestions in the cross-examination of the respondent/ husband by taking the name of the alleged lady, in the opinion of this Court, is nothing but the unfounded allegation on the character of the husband as held in the above cited case.

25. A collective reading of his cross-examination, it appears, it is more focused on the maintenance part and less on the allegations of mental cruelty as alleged by the respondent/ husband. So the material allegations, with regard to mental cruelty as pleaded by the respondent/ husband, have neither be denied in the written statement of the appellant/ wife nor have they been sufficiently countered during his cross examination. As per law, the facts, which are not denied, are deemed to have been admitted. As per Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the facts which are not denied specifically are deemed to have been admitted, and simple denial is no denial. In the instant case, there is no denial at all.

Law involved,

26. The effect of non cross-examination of a witness was discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah (Dead) Through Legal Representatives Vs. Muddasani Sarojana, reported in (2016) 12 SCC 288, wherein Their Lordships have held that the cross-examination is a matter of substance not of procedure one isrequired to put one’s own version in cross-examination of opponent. It is further observed that the effect of non-cross examination is that the statement of witness has not been disputed. In the said judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court relied on the judgment in the case of Maroti Bansi Teli Vs. Radhabai, reported in AIR 1945 Nag 60, wherein it has been laid down that the matters sworn to by one party in the pleadings notchallenged either in pleadings or cross-examination by other party must be accepted as fully established.

Closure:

31. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent/ husband the case of Vijaykumar Bhate (supra) wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court took the view that the false and malicious allegations against the character of a spouse is a ground for dissolving the marriage on account of causing mental cruelty.
32. Furthermore, the appellant/ wife could not prove her allegations with regard to demand of dowry and ill-treatment. On the contrary, it is borne out from the record that the respondent/ husband himself had to leave from his own house fed-up with her mis-behaviour.

Sarita Gosawi Vs Bharat Gosawi on 05 Mar 2021

Tata Consultancy Services Limited Vs Cyrus Investments Pvt Ltd and Ors on 26 Mar 2021

Posted on March 29 by ShadesOfKnife

Tata Consultancy Services Limited Vs Cyrus Investments Pvt Ltd and Ors on 26 Mar 2021

Cyrus Investments Pvt. Ltd. Vs Tata Sons Ltd. Ors on 06 Jan 2020

Cyrus Investments Pvt. Ltd. Vs Tata Sons Ltd. Ors on 18 Dec 2019

Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs State of Assam on 16 Aug 2017

Posted on March 18 by ShadesOfKnife

A 3-judge bench of Apex Court held as follows regards to default bail u/s 167 CrPC,

From Para 4,

Therefore, the question before us is whether, pending investigation, the petitioner could be kept in custody for a maximum period of 60 days in terms of clause (ii) of proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. or for 90 days in terms of clause (i) of proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. without a charge sheet being filed.

From Para 25,

25. While it is true that merely because a minimum sentence is provided for in the statute it does not mean that only the minimum sentence is imposable. Equally, there is also nothing to suggest that only the maximum sentence is imposable. Either punishment can be imposed and even something in between. Where does one strike a balance? It was held that it is eventually for the court to decide what sentence should be imposed given the range available. Undoubtedly, the Legislature can bind the sentencing court by laying down the minimum sentence (not less than) and it can also lay down the maximum sentence. If the minimum is laid down, the sentencing judge has no option but to give a sentence “not less than” that sentence provided for. Therefore, thewords “not less than” occurring in Clause (i) to proviso (a) of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. (and in other provisions) must be given their natural and obvious meaning which is to say, not below a minimum threshold and in the case of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. these words must relate to an offence punishable witha minimum of 10 years imprisonment.

From Para 31,

31. In the 154th Report, the Law Commission noted that the unanimous opinion of members of the Bench and the Bar, prosecuting agencies and senior police officers during legal workshops held at various places was that the investigation of serious offences punishable with a sentence of 7 years or more should invariably be undertaken by senior officers. The Law Commission concluded, as a result of these extensive discussions, that it was desirable toseparate the investigating police from the law and order police and as many as seven reasons were given for arriving at this conclusion in Chapter II of the Report.

From Paras 40 and 41,

40. In the present case, it was also argued by learned counsel for the State that the petitioner did not apply for ‘default bail’ on or after 4th January, 2017 till 24th January, 2017 on which date his indefeasible right got extinguished on the filing of the charge sheet. Strictly speaking this is correct since the petitioner applied for regular bail on 11th January, 2017 in the Gauhati High Court – he made no specific application for grant of ‘default bail’. However, the application for regular bail filed by the accused on 11th January, 2017 did advert to the statutory period for filing a charge sheet having expired and that perhaps no charge sheet had in fact being filed. In any event, this issue was argued by learned counsel for the petitioner in the High Court and it was considered but not accepted by the High Court. The High Court did not reject the submission on the ground of maintainability but on merits. Therefore it is not as if the petitioner did not make any application for default bail – such an application was definitely made (if not in writing) then at least orally before the High Court. In our opinion, in matters of personal liberty, we cannot and should not be too technical and must lean in favour of personal liberty. Consequently, whether the accused makes a written application for ‘default bail’ or an oral application for ‘default bail’ is of no consequence. The concerned court must deal with such an application by considering the statutory requirements namely, whether the statutory period for filing a charge sheet or challan has expired, whether the charge sheet or challan has been filed and whether the accused is prepared to and does furnish bail.
41. We take this view keeping in mind that in matters of personal liberty and Article 21 of the Constitution, it is not always advisable to be formalistic or technical. The history of the personal liberty jurisprudence of this Court and other constitutional courts includes petitions for a writ of habeas corpus and for other writs being entertained even on the basis of a letter addressed to the Chief Justice or the Court.

Then finally in Paras 46 and 47,

46. It was submitted that as of today, a charge sheet having been filed against the petitioner, he is not entitled to ‘default bail’ but must apply for regular bail – the ‘default bail’ chapter being now closed. We cannot agree for the simple reason that we are concerned with the interregnum between 4th January, 2017 and 24th January, 2017 when no charge sheet had been filed, during which period he had availed of his indefeasible right of ‘default bail’. It would have been another matter altogether if the petitioner had not applied for ‘default bail’ for whatever reason during this interregnum. There could be a situation (however rare) where an accused is not prepared to be bailed out perhaps for his personal security since he or she might be facing some threat outside the correction home or for any other reason. But then in such an event, the accused voluntarily gives up the indefeasible right for default bail and having forfeited that right the accused cannot, after the charge sheet or challan has been filed, claim a resuscitation of the indefeasible right. But that is not the case insofar as the petitioner is concerned, since he did not give up his indefeasible right for ‘default bail’ during the interregnum between 4th January, 2017 and 24th January, 2017 as is evident from the decision of the High Court rendered on 11th January, 2017. On the contrary, he had availed of his right to ‘default bail’ which could not have been defeated on 11th January, 2017 and which we are today compelled to acknowledge and enforce.
47. Consequently, we are of opinion that the petitioner had satisfied all the requirements of obtaining ‘default bail’ which is that on 11th January, 2017 he had put in more than 60 days in custody pending investigations into an alleged offence not punishable with imprisonment for a minimum period of 10 years, no charge sheet had been filed against him and he was prepared to furnish bail for his release, as such, he ought to have been released by the High Court on reasonable terms and conditions of bail.

Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs State of Assam on 16 Aug 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 924], [2017 ALLCC 101 287], [2017 ACR 3 2474], [2017 ALT CRL AP 3 141], [2017 CCR SC 3 371], [2017 DLT 242 79], [2017 ILR KER 3 673], [2017 JLJR 4 37], [2017 KHC 4 470], [2017 KLT 4 284], [2017 MLJ CRL 4 62], [2017 PLJR 4 53], [2017 RCR CRIMINAL 3 996], [2017 SCALE 9 24], [2017 UC 3 1756], [2017 SCC 15 67], [2018 SCC CRI 1 401], [2017 AIR SC 3948], [2017 AIC 178 75], [2018 CRI LJ 155]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/194334432/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/599a9dfd4a93262f6c14fba6

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/rakesh-kumar-paul-versus-state-of-assam

Fakhrey Alam Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 15 Mar 2021

Posted on March 18 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of Supreme Court in this Order held as follows in regards to Default bail u/s 167 CrPC,

On the second aspect we cannot lose sight of the fact that what was envisaged by the Legislature was that the investigation should be completed in 24 hours but practically that was never found feasible. It is in these circumstances that Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. provided for time period within which the investigation should be completed, depending upon the nature of offences. Since, liberty is a Constitutional right, time periods were specified in the default of which the accused will have a right to default bail, a valuable right.
If we look at the scenario in the present case in that conspectus, the charge sheet under the provisions of law as originally filed on 04.09.2017 were required to be filed within 90 days but was actually filed within 180 days. This was on the premise of the charge under Section 18 of the UAPA Act. However, no charge sheet was filed even within 180 days under the UAPA Act, but post filing of the application for default bail, it was filed after 211 days. Thus, undoubtedly the period of 180 days to file the charge sheet qua UAPA Act had elapsed. We do not think that the State can take advantage of the fact that in one case there is one charge sheet and supplementary charge sheets are used to extend the time period in this manner by seeking to file the supplementary charge sheet qua the offences under the UAPA Act even beyond the period specified under Section 167 of the Cr.P.C beyond which default bail will be admissible, i.e, the period of 180 days. That period having expired and the charge sheet not having been filed qua those offences (albeit a supplementary charge sheet), we are of the view the appellant would be entitled to default bail in the aforesaid facts and circumstances.
We need only emphasize what is already observed in Bikramjit Singh case (supra) that default bail under first proviso of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. is a fundamental right and not merely a statutory right as it is, a procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus a fundamental right is granted to an accused person to be released on bail once the conditions of the first proviso to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. are fulfilled.
In fact in the majority judgment of this Court it has been held that an oral application for grant of default bail would suffice [See. Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam]3. The consequences of the UAPA Act are drastic in punishment and in that context, it has been held not to be a mere statutory right but part of the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Fakhrey Alam Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 15 Mar 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

State of Goa Vs Fouziya Shaikh on 12 Mar 2021

Posted on March 17 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court said, State Election Commissioner cannot be a Government functionary as this Constitutional body is supposed to be independent body.

From Para 52,

52. Given the fact that the scheme contained in Part XV is bodily lifted into the provisions contained in Part IX-A, the powers exercised by the SEC under Article 243ZA(1) are the same as those vested in the Election Commission of India under Article 324 of the Constitution of India. As has been pointed out in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) and the aforesaid decisions, the entire supervision and conduct of elections to municipalities is vested in a constitutional authority that is the SEC which is to supervise and conduct elections by giving orders and directions to the State Government as well as authorities that are set up under State statutes for the purpose of supervision and conduct of elections. The power thus conferred by the Constitution is a power given to the SEC not only to carry out the constitutional mandate but also to fill in gaps where there is no law or rule governing a particular
situation during the conduct of an election. The SEC, being anindependent constitutional functionary, is not only to be obeyed by the State Government and the other authorities under local State statutes,but can also approach the writ court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to either enforce directions or orders issued by itor to ask for appropriate orders from High Courts in that behalf.

From Para 63 (Final observations)

63. A conspectus of the aforesaid judgments in the context of municipal elections would yield the following results.
I. Under Article 243 ZG(b), no election to any municipality can be called in question except by an election petition presented to a Tribunal as is provided by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State. This would mean that from the date of notification of the election till the date of the declaration of result a judicial hands-off is mandated by the non-obstante clause contained in Article 243ZG debarring the writ court under Articles
226 and 227 from interfering once the election process has begun until it is over. The constitutional bar operates only during this period. It is therefore a matter of discretion exercisable by a writ court as to whether an interference is called for when the electoral process is “imminent” i.e, the notification for elections is yet to be announced.
II. If, however, the assistance of a writ court is required in subserving the progress of the election and facilitating its completion, the writ court may issue orders provided that the election process, once begun, cannot be postponed or protracted in any manner.
III. The non-obstante clause contained in Article 243ZG does not operate as a bar after the election tribunal decides an election dispute before it. Thus, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and that of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is not affected as the non-obstante clause in Article 243ZG operates only during the process of election.
IV. Under Article 243ZA(1), the SEC is in overall charge of the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls, and the conduct of all municipal elections. If there is a constitutional or statutory infraction by any authority including the State Government either before or during the election process, the SEC by virtue of its power under Article 243ZA(1) can set right such infraction. For this purpose, it can direct the State
Government or other authority to follow the Constitution or legislative enactment or direct such authority to correct an order which infracts the constitutional or statutory mandate. For this purpose, it can also approach a writ court to issue necessary directions in this behalf. It is entirely upto the SEC to set the election process in motion or, in cases where a constitutional or statutory provision is not followed or infracted, to postpone the
election process until such illegal action is remedied. This the SEC will do taking into account the constitutional mandate of holding elections before the term of a municipality or municipal council is over. In extraordinary cases, the SEC may conduct elections after such term is over, only for good reason.
V. Judicial review of a State Election Commission’s order is available on grounds of review of administrative orders. Here again, the writ court must adopt a hands-off policy while the election process is on and interfere either before the process commences or after such process is completed unless interfering with such order subserves and facilitates the progress of the election.
VI. Article 243ZA(2) makes it clear that the law made by the legislature of a State, making provision with respect to matters relating to or in connection with elections to municipalities, is subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and in particular Article 243T, which deals with reservation of seats.
VII. The bar contained in Article 243ZG(a) mandates that there be a judicial hands-off of the writ court or any court in questioning the validity of any law relating to delimitation of constituency or allotment of seats to such constituency made or purporting to be made under Article 243ZA. This is by virtue of the non-obstante clause contained in Article 243ZG. The statutory provisions dealing with delimitation and allotment of seats cannot therefore be questioned in any court. However, orders made under such statutory provisions can be questioned in courts provided the concerned statute does not give such orders the status of a statutory provision.
VIII. Any challenge to orders relating to delimitation or allotment of seats including preparation of electoral rolls, not being part of the election process as delineated above, can also be challenged in the manner provided by the statutory provisions dealing with delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats to such constituencies.
IX. The constitutional bar of Article 243ZG(a) applies only to courts and not the State Election Commission, which is to supervise, direct and control preparation of electoral rolls and conduct elections to municipalities.
X. The result of this position is that it is the duty of the SEC to countermand illegal orders made by any authority including the State Government which delimit constituencies or allot seats to such constituencies, as is provided in proposition (IV) above. This may be done by the SEC either before or during the electoral process, bearing in mind its constitutional duty as delineated in the said proposition.

From Para 68,

68. The most disturbing feature of these cases is the subversion of the constitutional mandate contained in Article 243K of the Constitution of India. The State Election Commissioner has to be a person who is independent of the State Government as he is an important constitutional functionary who is to oversee the entire election process in the state qua panchayats and municipalities. The importance given to the independence of a State Election Commissioner is explicit from the provision for removal from his office made in the proviso to clause (2) of Article 243K. Insofar as the manner and the ground for his removal from the office is concerned, he has been equated with a Judge of a High Court. Giving an additional charge of such an
important and independent constitutional office to an officer who is directly under the control of the State Government is, in our view, a mockery of the constitutional mandate. We therefore declare that the additional charge given to a Law Secretary to the government of the state flouts the constitutional mandate of Article 243K. The State Government is directed to remedy this position by appointing an
independent person to be the State Election Commissioner at the earliest. Such person cannot be a person who holds any office or post in the Central or any State Government. It is also made clear that henceforth, all State Election Commissioners appointed under Article 243K in the length and breadth of India have to be independent persons who cannot be persons who are occupying a post or office under the Central or any State Government. If there are any such persons holding the post of State Election Commissioner in any other state, such persons must be asked forthwith to step down from such office and the State Government concerned be bound to fulfil the constitutional mandate of Article 243K by appointing only independent persons to this high constitutional office. The directions contained in this paragraph are issued under Article 142 of the Constitution of India so as to ensure that the constitutional mandate of an independent
State Election Commission which is to conduct elections under Part IX and IXA of the Constitution be strictly followed in the future.

State of Goa Vs Fouziya Shaikh on 12 Mar 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/68534005/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/state-of-goa-anr-versus-fouziya-imtiaz-shaikh-anr

Sartaj Singh Vs State of Haryana on 15 Mar 2021

Posted on March 16 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that, even after getting discharged, an accused can be made to face trail u/s 319 CrPC, if new facts/evidence emerge during trial, even at chief-examination of prosecution witnesses.

From Para 6,

6.2 Considering the law laid down by this Court in Hardeep Singh (supra) and the observations and findings referred to and reproduced hereinabove, it emerges that
(i) the Court can exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief
of the witness concerned and the Court need not wait till the cross-examination of such a witness and the Court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination; and
(ii) a person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been charge-sheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under Section 319 CrPC, provided from the evidence (may be on the basis of the evidence collected in the form of statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned), it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial.

6.4 In the case of Rajesh v. State of Haryana (2019) 6 SCC 368, after considering the observations made by this Court in Hardeep Singh (supra) referred to hereinabove, this Court has further observed and held that even in a case where the stage of giving opportunity to the complainant to file a protest petition urging upon the trial court to summon other persons as well who were named in FIR but not implicated in the chargesheet has gone, in that case also, the Court is still not powerless by virtue of Section 319 CrPC and even those persons named in FIR but not implicated in chargesheet can be summoned to face the trial provided during the trial some evidence surfaces against the proposed accused.

Sartaj Singh Vs State of Haryana on 15 Mar 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/sartaj-singh-versus-state-of-haryana-anr-etc

Palla Shanthi Kiran Vs State of A.P. and Ors on 17 Jun 2020

Posted on March 14 by ShadesOfKnife

Relying on Chanmuniya case, Single-judge bench of AP High Court held that, in case of nullity of marriage under Section 11 or 12 of HMA, 125 CrPC cannot be invoked by knife.

Palla Shanthi Kiran Vs State of A.P. and Ors on 17 Jun 2020

Citations : [2020 ALT CRI 2 227], [2020 ALT 4 329]

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5f4398cd4653d009c1ff7665

https://www.legitquest.com/case/palla-shanthi-kiran-v-the-state-of-ap-and-ors/1C400E

The Lower Family Court dismissal order is here:

Palla Shanthi Kiran Vs Gadde Dileep on 29 Apr 2019

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Catena of Landmark Judgments

Varshaben Himantlal Vejani Vs State of Gujarat on 15 Jul 2016

Chegireddy Venkata Reddy Vs Government of Andhra Pradesh on 30 Jul 2020

Masood Khan Vs. Millie Hazarika on 04 Mar 2021

Sarita Gosawi Vs Bharat Gosawi on 05 Mar 2021

Tata Consultancy Services Limited Vs Cyrus Investments Pvt Ltd and Ors on 26 Mar 2021

Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs State of Assam on 16 Aug 2017

Fakhrey Alam Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 15 Mar 2021

State of Goa Vs Fouziya Shaikh on 12 Mar 2021

Sartaj Singh Vs State of Haryana on 15 Mar 2021

Palla Shanthi Kiran Vs State of A.P. and Ors on 17 Jun 2020