Based on Satbir Singh case here, a 3-judge bench comprising the CJI N.V. Ramana, the appellant was held liable for the offence of 304B IPC>Gurmeet Singh Vs State of Punjab on 28 May 2021
Other Sources :
A Division bench of the Apex Court passed these guidelines to the Judges trying the 304 IPC cases.
From Para 36,
Satbir Singh and Anr Vs State of Haryana on 28 May 2021
36. At the cost of repetition, the law under Section 304B, IPC read with Section 113B, Evidence Act can be summarized below:
i. Section 304B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand.
ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113B, Evidence Act operates against the accused.
iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304B, IPC cannot be construed to mean ‘immediately before’. The prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.
iv. Section 304B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.
v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304B, IPC read with 113B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be careful during conduction of trial.
vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality, as it based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it enables the accused to offer an explanation for the incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused fairly, with care and caution.
vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to prepare his defense since the inception of the Trial with due caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304B, IPC read with
Section 113B, Evidence Act.
viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best efforts.
ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’, calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused.
x. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics.
xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the guidelines laid down by this Court while sentencing and imposing appropriate punishment.
xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is increasing day by day. However, it is also observed that sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no active role in commission of the offence and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its approach.
A single judge bench of Delhi High Court held that, if the DV case filer is found to be ineligible to claims any reliefs under PWDV Act, recover the maintenance paid to her along with interest.
From Para 17,
Parveen Tandon Vs Tanika Tandon on 07 Jun 2021
17. In case the Metropolitan Magistrate, after evidence is led, comes to a conclusion that the respondent herein was not entitled to the protection of the DV Act then adequate safeguards must be made to ensure that the respondent returns the amount received by her as interim maintenance in terms of the order dated 26.10.2020, passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate back to the petitioner with interest. The rate of interest is to be fiXed by the Metropolitan Magistrate. The learned Trial Court is directed to hear the matter and decide the matter finally within a period of one year.
Other Sources :
The Husband filed this appeal when his divorce petition was dismissed. Division bench of Kerala High Court relying on landmark judgments, held that the baseless accusation of the wife regd the alleged erectile dysfunction of the husband caused mental cruelty and therefore, granted the Divorce on the ground of cruelty.XXXXX Vs XXXXX on 31 May 2021
The Division bench of Apex Court reduced Death penalty to Life imprisonment for 30 years without remission.
From Para 11,
Madhuranatha and Anr Vs State of Karnataka on 28 Nov 2013
11. Thus, a witness is normally considered to be independent unless he springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and this usually means that the said witness has cause to bear such enmity against the accused so as to implicate him falsely. In view of the above, there can be no prohibition to the effect that a policeman cannot be a witness or that his deposition cannot be relied upon if it inspires confidence.
Citations : [2013 AD SC 12 587], [2014 AIR SC 394], [2014 AJR 3 489], [2014 AKR 1 305], [2014 ALD CRL SC 1 699], [2014 ALLCC 84 329], [2013 JT SC 15 58], [2014 KARLJ 2 158], [2014 KCCR 2 985], [2014 NCC 1 346], [2013 SCALE 14 502], [2014 SCC 12 419], [2014 SCC CRI 6 765], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 1048], [2014 AIC 133 87], [2014 ECRN 1 668], [2013 SUPREME 8 279], [2013 AIOL 784], [2013 CRIMES SC 4 571], [2013 AIR SC 6766], [2013 AIR SCW 6766], [2014 JCC SC 1 809], [2014 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 203]
Other Sources :
Hon’ble Delhi High Court affirmed the divorce granted to husband because of the mental cruelty caused by the wife relying on landmark decision by Hon,ble Supreme Court.
From Paras 11, 12 and 13,
Bharti Bhardwaj Vs Deepak Bhardwaj on 03 Feb 2021
11. Now, given that matrimonial disputes rarely involve production of concrete evidence in documentary or audio-visual form, and mostly proceed on the relative strength of the opposing allegations made by the parties, the entire process of leading and recording evidence has a significant role to play in establishing one’s case. Thus, notwithstanding her denials in the written statement, the appellant was expected to properly and specifically cross-examine the respondent to prove her allegations of cruelty against him and disprove those he had levelled against her. The importance of properly discharging this function of cross-examination was discussed by the Supreme Court in the following paragraphs of its decision in Rajinder Pershad Vs. Darshana Devi (2001) 7 SCC 69
12. Although the appellant, in the grounds adopted in the appeal, has assailed the reliance of the learned Family Court on the decision in State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh (1998) 3 SCC 561 to contend that the same was a criminal case and the precedent arising therefrom could not apply to cross examinations in matrimonial proceedings, which are civil proceedings by nature, there is no merit to this opposition; especially in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in Darshana Devi’s case which was a civil proceeding. In fact, the standard of proof in a matrimonial proceeding- which is also in the nature of a civil proceeding is not as strict, as in criminal proceedings. Thus, the case is required to be proved on preponderance of probabilities and not the legal standard of being beyond a reasonable doubt. Keeping in view the aforesaid, it is evident that there was a crucial responsibility placed on the shoulders of the appellant which was to ensure that she challenged the specifics of the allegations raised by the respondent and establish their lack of veracity. Paragraphs 44 to 46 of the impugned judgment clearly show that the appellant had not cross-examined the respondent/husband on these important aspects, and, thus, completely failed to draw out the facts as claimed by her. In fact, even before us, the appellant, other than contending that the onus of proving cruelty rested upon the respondent, has failed to provide any cogent reasons for failing to cross-examine the respondent in support of her own case, or to challenge his allegations of cruelty. It is a settled proposition of law that the Court would normally accept unchallenged and uncontroverted assertions of fact. The failure of the appellant to effectively cross-examine the respondent shows that she neither seriously challenged his version of the factual position, nor established her own version. Therefore, in our view, the Family Court was justified in accepting the unrebutted testimony of the respondent.
13. When we view this in addition to the fact that in her written statement, the appellant had admitted to having levelled false allegations against the respondent and his family under the DV Act, we find there were plenty of holes in the appellant’s story. Her feeble explanation for this ill-thought out act of falsely implicating the respondent and his family was that the same was not done malevolently, but only with an intention to ensure that the parties were sent to counselling in order to settle their disputes. That
Citations : [2021 SCC ONLINE DEL 1060]
Other Sources :
Taking input from Kerala HC judgment here, Gujarat High Court held that, any agreement which has terms against to Public Policy, is void and not enforceable in law. Such agreements which prohibit right of maintenance are also void.
From Para 9,
Varshaben Himantlal Vejani Vs State of Gujarat on 15 Jul 2016
9 In any case, all such issues are now well settled by few decisions of different Courts
 Rajesh R Nair v. Meera Babu reported in 2013 Cri. L.J. 3153, wherein Division Bench of Kerala High Court has held that waiver of right to maintenance by an agreement is not permissible because such agreement would be void agreement as against public policy. It would amount to ousting of jurisdiction of Magistrate and Family Court to entertain maintenance claim which cannot be permitted by law. Therefore, such agreement being void would be unenforceable and hence claim for maintenance cannot be rejected on the basis of such agreement of waiver of right to maintenance.
 In Rishikesh Singh alias T.R. Singh v. Kiran Gautam reported in 2015 Cri.L.J. 126, Chhattisgarh High Court has confirmed that decree of divorce obtained by mutual consent would be no ground to deny maintenance until wife has not remarried after divorce. It is further held that even if wife is junior advocate, it cannot be held that she is able to maintain herself and, therefore, she would be entitled for the maintenance.
 Smt. Vanamala v. H.M. Ranganatha Bhatta reported in  5 SCC 299, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also taken the same view that wife, who obtains divorce by mutual consent cannot be denied maintenance by virtue of section 125 and thereby restored the order of the Sessions Court, which has concluded that wife was entitled to maintenance notwithstanding divorce by mutual consent and remanded the matter to the trial Court for determining quantum of maintenance. Thereby, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has set aside the order of the High Court which held that wife is not entitled to maintenance once she has divorced her marriage by mutual consent. It would be appropriate to recollect here that for coming to such conclusion, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has relied upon as many as three other decisions of different High Courts, which are quoted in such reported case and approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, as on date, there are at least as many as five judgments including judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which confirm that a wife who obtains divorce by mutual consent cannot be denied maintenance by virtue of section 125  of the Cr. P.C.
Citations : [2016 SCC ONLINE GUJ 9136], [2017 AIC 172 524]
Long story short, AP HC says, if the Police do not register an FIR if information about a cognizable offence is reported, the remedies are as follows:
Chegireddy Venkata Reddy Vs Government of Andhra Pradesh on 30 Jul 2020
The remedies are under Section 154(3), 156(3) and Section 190 r/w.Sec.200 of Cr.P.C.
Other Sources :
A 2-page judgment here which cites this judgment can also be used for same purpose. Saves 24 pages !!!
Disagreeing with a catena of judgements here, here, here, here, Single-bench of High Court of Meghalaya relied upon this landmark decision from Supreme Court here and held that a false DV case can be quashed u/s 482 CrPC.
From Paras 33, 34 and 33,
33. The argument of the learned counsel for the Respondent No. 2 in the opinion of this Court are valid as regard the nature and relief contemplated under the DV Act 2005, particularly those seen in Sections 18 to 22 which are civil in nature and can be sought for before any civil court, family court or a criminal court as provided under Section 26 of the said DV Act. However, the learned counsel has failed to notice that in Section 26 of the DV Act, the aggrieved person apart from a civil court or a family court, can seek the reliefs stated above even from a criminal court and in doing so, the aggrieved person would subject herself to the jurisdiction of a criminal court following the procedure of the Criminal Procedure Code.
34. In fact, Section 28 of the DV Act 2005 specifically provides that all proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 as well as Section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, though liberty was also given to the court to lay down its own procedure.
35. The applicability of the said provision of Section 28 of the said DV Act in criminal proceedings was emphasized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Satish Chander Ahuja (supra) at paragraphs 138 and 139 where it has restated that the procedure to be followed shall be under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
From Paras 38, 39
Masood Khan Vs. Millie Hazarika on 04 Mar 2021
38. It is also a fact that Section 482 Cr.P.C provides for inherent power on the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code and as stated above, proceedings under the DV Act being governed by the procedure under the Cr.P.C, therefore the logical conclusion would be that an application under Section 482 is maintainable qua order passed under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the DV Act.
39. With due respect, the decisions of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court and the Madras High Court cited above and relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No 2, as far as the procedural aspects under the DV Act is concerned, would not stand the test in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Satish Chander Ahuja (supra).
There was mental cruelty done to husband and the High Court nailed the point straight.
From Paras 18 and 19,
18. Keeping in mind the aforesaid guiding parameters, now we proceed to examine the evidence on record. Apart from the allegations and counter allegations by the parties against each other with regard to their mutual misbehavior, the crucial point on which the respondent/ husband sought decree of divorce, and which according to him is the reason for his mental sufferings and anguishes, is the suspicious and skeptical nature of the appellant/ wife, as she used to have a doubt on his character. She was doubting his relations with one lady employee from his office. It is his case that the appellant/ wife used to visit his office and used to create scenes. She used to abuse him in filthy language on his character and used to humiliate him in front of their adolescent daughters.
19. The respondent/ husband, in his pleadings and evidence, further stated that he had purchased one plot of land and constructed a house thereon on loan and at present, the same is in possession of the appellant/ wife. He is paying installments for the repayment of the loan for house from his
salary account. To pacify her, he even transferred his house in her name. He has stated that fed-up with her acrimonious behaviour, he had to lodge reports at police station, and there were counselling before the Women Cell, and in consequence thereof, she resumed cohabitation. Lastly, he said, he had no option but to leave the house and to reside in a rented house.
20. A perusal of the written statements of the appellant/ wife would reflect that she has not denied, even by way of simple denial, about the contents in para 3 of the divorce petition of the respondent/ husband which are with regard to the suspicious nature of the appellant/ wife, doubting his character, abusing in a filthy language and visiting his office and creating scenes etc.
Crucial Paras 22 and 25,
22. In the instant case, admittedly, there are no positive allegations with regard to the character of the respondent/ husband in the written statement of the appellant/ wife. However, maintaining silence in her written statement and not countering the case of cruelty of the respondent/ husband on this ground, coupled with the fact that there were specific suggestions in the cross-examination of the respondent/ husband by taking the name of the alleged lady, in the opinion of this Court, is nothing but the unfounded allegation on the character of the husband as held in the above cited case.
25. A collective reading of his cross-examination, it appears, it is more focused on the maintenance part and less on the allegations of mental cruelty as alleged by the respondent/ husband. So the material allegations, with regard to mental cruelty as pleaded by the respondent/ husband, have neither be denied in the written statement of the appellant/ wife nor have they been sufficiently countered during his cross examination. As per law, the facts, which are not denied, are deemed to have been admitted. As per Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the facts which are not denied specifically are deemed to have been admitted, and simple denial is no denial. In the instant case, there is no denial at all.
26. The effect of non cross-examination of a witness was discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah (Dead) Through Legal Representatives Vs. Muddasani Sarojana, reported in (2016) 12 SCC 288, wherein Their Lordships have held that the cross-examination is a matter of substance not of procedure one isrequired to put one’s own version in cross-examination of opponent. It is further observed that the effect of non-cross examination is that the statement of witness has not been disputed. In the said judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court relied on the judgment in the case of Maroti Bansi Teli Vs. Radhabai, reported in AIR 1945 Nag 60, wherein it has been laid down that the matters sworn to by one party in the pleadings notchallenged either in pleadings or cross-examination by other party must be accepted as fully established.
Sarita Gosawi Vs Bharat Gosawi on 05 Mar 2021
31. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent/ husband the case of Vijaykumar Bhate (supra) wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court took the view that the false and malicious allegations against the character of a spouse is a ground for dissolving the marriage on account of causing mental cruelty.
32. Furthermore, the appellant/ wife could not prove her allegations with regard to demand of dowry and ill-treatment. On the contrary, it is borne out from the record that the respondent/ husband himself had to leave from his own house fed-up with her mis-behaviour.