Following the landmark decision of Apex Court here, the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court held as follows,
From Para 14,
14.In Union of India v. W.N. Chaddha, 1993 Cri.L.J 859 (SC) it has been held in paragraph 93: “…….More so, the accused has no right to have any say as regards the manner and method of investigation. Save under certain exceptions under the entire scheme of the Code, the accused has no participation as a matter of right during the course of the investigation of a case instituted on a police report till the investigation culminates in filing of a final report under S. 173(2) of the Code or in a proceeding instituted otherwise than on a police report till the process is issued under S. 204 of the Code, as the case may be. Even in cases where cognizance of an offence is taken on a complaint notwithstanding the said offence is triable by a Magistrate or triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the accused has no right to have participation till the process is issued. In case the issue of process is postponed as contemplated under S. 202 of the Code, the accused may attend the subsequent inquiry but cannot participate. There are various judicial pronouncements to this effect but we feel that it is not necessary to recapitulate those decisions. At the same time, we would like to point out that there are certain provisions under the Code empowering the Magistrate to give an opportunity of being heard under certain specified circumstances.”
From Para 29,
29.From a consideration of the aforesaid authorities, it is apparent that even when a complaint is filed under section 190(1) (a) and the Court decides to take cognizance and to adopt the procedure provided for inquiry under section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C, the accused is only permitted to remain present during the proceedings, but not to intervene or to raise his defence, until the order issuing summons is passed. The right of hearing of a prospective accused at the pre-cognizance stage, when only a direction for investigation by the police is issued by the Magistrate under section 156(3) Cr.P.C., can only be placed at a lower pedestal. It is only during the course of trial that the accused has been conferred rights at different stages to raise his defence. As the authorities show, that in the absence of any statutory right of hearing to the prospective accused at the pre-cognizance stage, when the direction to investigate has only been issued by the Magistrate under section 156(3), the accused cannot be conferred with any right of hearing even under any principle of audi alteram partem.
From Para 41,
41.An order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. passed by the Magistrate directing the police officer to investigate a cognizable case on the other hand is no such order of moment, which impinges on anyvaluable rights of the party. Were any objection to the issuance of such a direction to be accepted (though it is difficult to visualize anyobjection which could result in the quashing of a simple direction for investigation), the proceedings would still not come to an end, as itwould be open to the complainant informant to move an application under section 154(3) before the Superintendent of Police (S.P.) or a superior officer under section 36 of the Code. He could also file a complaint under section 190 read with section 200 of the Code. This is the basic difference from the situations mentioned in Madhu Limaye and in Amar Nath’s cases, where acceptance of the objections could result in the said accused being discharged or the summons set aside, and the proceedings terminated. Also the direction for investigation by the Magistrate is but an incidental step in aid of investigation and trial. It is thus similar to orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, orders granting bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of pending proceedings which have been described as purely interlocutory in nature in Amar Nath (supra).
From Para 58,
58.However it is made clear that the initial order for investigation under section 156(3) is also not open to challenge in a writ petition, as it is now beyond the pale of controversy that the province of investigationby the police and the judiciary are not overlapping but complementary. As observed by the Privy Council in paragraph 37 in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18 when considering the scope of the statutory powers of the police to investigate a cognizable case under sections 154 and 156 of the Code, that it would be an unfortunate result if the Courts in exercise of their inherent powers could interfere in this function of the police. The roles of the Court and police are “complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function.”
Finally, from Paras 64 and 65,
Father Thomas Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 22 Dec 2010
64.In this view of the matter, the Opinion of the Full bench on the three questions posed is:
65.A. The order of the Magistrate made in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C directing the police to register and investigate is not open to revision at the instance of a person against whom neither cognizance has been taken nor any process issued.
B. An order made under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C is an interlocutory order and remedy of revision against such order is barred under subsection (2) of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
C. The view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ajay Malviya Vs. State of U.P and others reported in 2000(41) ACC 435 that as an order made under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is amenable to revision, and no writ petition for quashing an F.I.R registered on the basis of the order will be maintainable, is not correct.