Chidurala Shyamsubder Vs State of Telangana on 27 Aug 2018

I came across the following snippet of post on 23-May-2026.

Pulled out the above Order by the High Court of Telangana, with little difficulty.

Jivani Sahil Firoz Ali Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 04 May 2026

I went to the decision relied on by this case/judge in Para-3 and obtained this wonderful common Order with respect of FSS Act 2006 by the erstwhile Combined High Court of Andhra Pradesh. When I read through it, I visualized the stark similarities between FSS Act 2006 and Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 (amended in 1984 and 1986), which I intend to take full advantage in a future PIL, by making a comparison of appointment, duties, powers of a Food Safety Officer vis-a-vis that of the Dowry Prohibition Officer. There is possibility of getting State police off the offences under DP Act, just like APHC held in this Order (gainfully relying on various other High Court judgments)

Chidurala Shyamsubder Vs State of Telangana on 27 Aug 2018

The efforts to be invested in this direction connect to this page here.

Parvinder Singh Khurana Vs Enforcement of Directorate on 19 May 2026

Posted on May 26 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that an accused must be given an opportunity of hearing under the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS, even where the prosecution complaint was filed before July 1, 2024. The Court clarified that non-compliance with this requirement makes the cognizance order void ab initio.

From Para 27,

27. Though Chapter XVI of the BNSS lays down the procedural law dealing with complaints made to a Magistrate, we hold that the aforesaid proviso is substantive in nature, as it does not merely regulate the manner in which the proceedings are to be conducted, rather it confers a right upon the accused to be heard before taking cognizance which forms a part of the right of an accused to a fair trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950. We further hold that the word “shall” occurring in the said proviso has to be construed to be mandatory in nature, which enures to the benefit of an accused. Resultantly, cognizance of an offence taken by a Court without due compliance of the aforestated proviso would be void ab initio.

The Bench observed that the proviso grants a substantive right to the accused and is part of the guarantee of fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. It further held that the word “shall” in the proviso is mandatory in nature.

From Para 29,

29. A substantive right conferred under the BNSS would definitely enure to the benefit of an accused against whom none of the proceedings envisaged under Section 531(2)(a) of the BNSS has been initiated. One has to see the nature of right. It is not a case of either a retrospective or retroactive application, rather it is a prospective one when a better right has been conferred under the BNSS.

The Court also ruled that ministerial acts like numbering a complaint and posting it for cognizance do not amount to an “inquiry” under Section 2(1)(k) BNSS.

From Para 34,

34. A mere ministerial act cannot be termed as an “inquiry” under Section 2(1)(k) of the BNSS. Taking cognizance is nothing but an application of judicial mind. So long as the application of the judicial mind is not exercised, an inquiry cannot commence. It is the judicial notice of an offence by the Court which is relevant. While doing so, it is presumed that the Court would take note of the complaint along with the materials placed before it.

From Para 36,

36. As rightly held by this Court in Hardeep Singh (supra), even the stage of ensuring compliance with Sections 207 to 209 of the CrPC, 1973 cannot be termed as an inquiry because there is no application of judicial mind. In the facts of the instant case, the direction issued by the Special Court, vide order dated 24.06.2024, to number the complaint and, thereafter, post the matter on a future date for hearing on cognizance would certainly not come within the purview of an “inquiry” under Section 2(1)(k) of the BNSS. In such view of the matter, the aforestated contention raised by the learned ASG falls to the ground.

Parvinder Singh Vs Enforcement of Directorate on 19 May 2026

Citations: [2026 INSC 519]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/46844204/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6a0efbcf3da19f224cfa1ec5

https://www.verdictum.in/supreme-court/parvinder-singh-v-directorate-of-enforcement-2026-insc-519-pmla-complaints-filed-before-bnss-1614403

https://thelexpedia.com/judgements/parvinder-singh-v-directorate-of-enforcement-2026

Cognisance of Complaint under PMLA

Anu Aggarwal Vs Sushant Aggarwal on 20 Jan 2026

Posted on January 31 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court held as follows,

From Paras 5 and 6, (Lies about adopting a child!)

5. The evidence brought on record clearly demolishes the case now being sought to be set up by the petitioner. The petitioner had taken a plea that she had adopted a child, who happens to be the daughter of her real sister; however, she has specifically admitted in her cross-examination that the respondent had never given his consent for the said adoption. Admittedly, neither there is any documentary evidence or ceremony performed for the alleged adoption, nor any application was moved to change the details in the official records of the said child to demonstrate that the petitioner’s name was recorded or shown as the mother and the respondent’s name was recorded as a father of the said child.
6. The above-said fact clearly demonstrates the mala fide intent of the petitioner to mislead the Court and seek undue sympathy, which stand belied by her own admissions during cross-examination.

From Paras 7 and 8, (Multiple sources of Income)

7. Further, as regards her entitlement for maintenance, the petitioner has concealed the material facts that she was duly recorded as an employee of Markanda Oil Store. Though it has been vehemently argued by the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was never an employee of the said firm, however, in her cross-examination she admitted that she had availed various medical insurance benefits on the basis of the entries recorded in Markanda Oil Store, showing her as an employee. Moreover, the petitioner was also working as a teacher in a school, namely St. Joseph School, Ambala City; however, she failed to disclose the same in her affidavit of income and expenditure.
8. Furthermore, the petitioner has admitted that she holds various Kisan Vikas Patras and a Public Provident Fund account, wherein, the account balance exceeds Rs. 15 lakhs. Apart from these accounts, the petitioner also maintains other bank accounts, which were duly considered by the learned Trial Court, which clearly demonstrate that there was no distress or immediate financial hardship necessitating the grant of maintenance to the petitioner. Admittedly, the petitioner deliberately concealed these facts from the Court. She further admitting a separate salary account with Axis Bank, however, she neither produced proof thereof nor disclose the balance lying therein. Despite a specific suggestion being put to her, she knowingly withheld details regarding her income.

From Paras 10 and 11, (Surprise surprise!)

10. It is indeed strange that while earlier the petitioner was drawing a salary of Rs. 18,000/- per month but now she claims to be earning only Rs. 12,200/- per month, which appears highly improbable. This conduct clearly reflects an attempt to abuse the process of law merely to keep the respondent-husband entangled in continuous litigation and to extract money at her own convenience by misusing the judicial process.
11. The concept of grant of maintenance has been introduced to protect the dignity of women; however, it can’t be permitted to be used as a tool for unjust enrichment. The rising number of false and frivolous cases being filed today not only defeats the very object of the law but also inadvertently undermines a woman’s self-respect, dignity, and self-reliance. The petitioner cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the Court and abuse the process of law. In the absence of any material to demonstrate that the petitioner is in dire need of financial assistance or maintenance, the very filing of the petition amounts to an abuse of the process of law.

From Para 12, (Settled proposition of law)

12. It is settled proposition of law that maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is payable only when the wife is unable to maintain herself. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai”, (2008) 2 SCC 316 has categorically held that a wife having sufficient independent income or means is not entitled to maintenance. This principle has been reiterated and streamline in “Rajnesh v. Neha”, (2021) 2 SCC 324 wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized full disclosure of income and assets and clarified that Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a measure to prevent destitution and not a source of unjust enrichment.

From Para 13,

13. Moreover, Section 125 Cr.P.C. has been enacted with a specific purpose to protect women and children and to prevent vagrancy and destitution among them. It provides speedy remedy to the destituted and helpless women to establish their claim, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that she is unable to maintain herself and her child but in the present case, the petitioner has concealed her employment and claimed his husband is earning handsome amount, her conduct in suppressing relevant information from the Court and the fact that she is not only qualified but is capable of earning good money. Furthermore, this Court also observed that when a person approaches a Court, he/she should approach the Court not only with clean hands but also with clean mind, clean heart and clean objective. No litigant has a right to draught on the Court’s time and public money in order to get his/her affairs settled in the manner, he or she desires. Therefore, this Court does not find any error in the impugned order passed by the learned Family Court. Moreover, the petitioner has also failed to bring on record any cogent evidence to demonstrate that she was living separately from her husband on account of any situation created by the respondent-husband.

Anu Aggarwal Vs Sushant Aggarwal on 20 Jan 2026

Citations: [2026:PHHC:002754]

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance Judgments u/s 144 BNSS is here.

Neha Lal Vs Abhishek Kumar on 20 Jan 2026

Posted on January 27 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that Perjury applications shall continue, despite grant to divorce.

From Paras 28 to 30,

28. Now coming to the cases pending between the parties. All the cases pending between the parties, as mentioned in paragraph No.8.8, shall stand disposed of without any further action by them. However, the following applications filed by the parties raising plea of perjury shall continue because no one can be permitted to pollute the stream of justice, as emphasized by this Court in Kusha Duruka vs. The State of Odisha10. The cases being:
(i) Crl. M. A. No.42585 of 2019 in W. P. (Crl.) No.1025 of 2023 (under Section 340 CrPC)
(ii) Application under Section 379 read with 215 BNSS filed in MT No.151 of 2021
(iii) Application under Section 379 read with 215 BNSS filed in MT No.151 of 2021
(iv) Misc. Crl. No.7 of 2019 filed in MT No.853 of 2018
(v) Application under Section 340 CrPC in MT No.853 of 2018
29. It is clarified that if besides the cases mentioned in the paragraph 28, any other application(s) filed by the parties either under section 340 CrPC or under Section 379 read with 215 of BNSS, 2023, the same shall be dealt with on merits by the concerned Courts and will not be disposed of, in view of this order passed by this Court.
30. A copy of the order passed by this Court shall be sent to the Courts concerned for taking action as per the direction in this order. However, if there is any other case arising out of matrimonial dispute, though not mentioned in the list, but pending, the same shall also stand disposed of on production of copy of this order by the parties.

Neha Lal Vs Abhishek Kumar on 20 Jan 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Perjury Judgments is here.

Suninder Sandha Vs State of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 02 Dec 2025

Posted on January 13 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 15,

15. Evidently, Section 91 of the Code does not itself prescribe any stage. The core issue remains whether invocation of power under Section 91 of the Code by the Trial Court is as per the manner contemplated/provided for in law. We are mindful that the underlying case in Sarla Gupta (supra)1 concerned the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002. It is seen that State of Orissa v Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568, relied upon by the High Court, was considered by a Bench of equal strength in Sarla Gupta (supra).

From Para 17,

17. The law is no longer res integra, having been lastly settled by the 3-Judge Bench in Sarla Gupta (supra), which provides clarity as to the relevant stage at which power under Section 91 of the Code may be invoked. In the underlying case in these appeals, such stage has not yet been reached, as defence evidence has not commenced.

Suninder Sandha Vs State of NCT of Delhi & Anr on 02 Dec 2025

Kishan Lal Barwa Vs Sharda Saharan and Anr on 18 Feb 2015

Posted on January 8 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

From Para 14,

14.This Court finds that the basis of petitioner’s claim that the decree was obtained by fraud is a report submitted before the Chief Judicial Magistrate by the Directorate of Fingerprint Experts, according to which, the fingerprints of Ashok Kumar, as existing on the lease deed executed by Noida do not match with those upon the power of attorney claimed by Ripudman Kumar Saharan and rather matches with the agreement to sell executed in favour of the defendant-petitioner. This report has been prepared by the experts of Directorate of Fingerprint, who are public servants, and the report is in due discharge of their official duties, and by virtue of section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, a presumption of correctness of the report would be available in law, subject to further evidence which may be brought on record by the other side. The question as to whether a plea of fraud could be entertained even in collateral proceedings, at the stage of execution, after passing of the decree, is no longer res integra. It is settled that fraud and justice do not dwell together. It is equally settled that a court of law would do its utmost to ensure that injustice is not meted out to a party. Such right in a court of law has been recognized under section 44 of Evidence Act.

From Para 19,

19. It is well settled that once the plea of fraud has been setup by the defendant-petitioner before the executing court, and credible evidence in support of such plea was also placed, it was incumbent upon the executing court to have examined the issue of fraud, on merits, and such plea ought not to have been rejected merely on the ground that a decree in favour of the plaintiff-respondent had been passed, and the executing court, as such, had no occasion to examine the plea of fraud. It is also well settled that fraud vitiates all solemn acts. Though a plea of fraud was taken up before the civil court, but such plea was not adjudicated, which is clarified in the judgment of the civil court itself. However, if a credible material has come into existence, which if is found proved vitiates the decree itself, it is the duty of the executing court to consider such plea on merits. It was open for the executing court to have examined the report of the Directorate, Fingerprint Experts, in accordance with law, and for such purpose an opportunity was liable to have been allowed to the plaintiff-respondent. The executing court could have adjudicated as to whether the plea of fraud was made out on facts or not? but it was not open for the executing court to brush aside the objection itself and thereby refused to go into such issue itself.

From Para 22,

22. In view of the discussions made above, this Court finds that the orders impugned dated 26.2.2014 and 29.5.2014, passed by the courts below, cannot be sustained and are hereby quashed. The executing court is directed to reconsider the objection under section 47 CPC, afresh, in light of the observations made above. For such purposes, the executing court will go into the allegations of fraud on merits, in accordance with law, and after affording opportunity to both the parties, the plea of fraud would be adjudicated on merits. Since the proceedings have dragged for the last 13 years, therefore, the objection on merits would be decided forthwith, by fixing short dates, in accordance with law, without granting any adjournment to either of the parties, except upon imposition of cost, which shall not be less than Rs.500/-.

Kishan Lal Barwa Vs Sharda Saharan and Anr on 18 Feb 2015

Index of Judgments against Orders obtained fraudulently here.

Jinesh CR Vs Aswathy PR on 19 Nov 2025

Posted on December 8, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Kerala High Court held that the level or standard of prove for adultery is just preponderance of probability under Sec 144 BNSS case (being a civil proceeding) but not that of Proof beyond reasonable doubt which may be applicable in a criminal case.

From Para 5,

5. Section 125 of Cr.P.C. (Section 144 of BNSS) states that a husband with sufficient means is liable to provide maintenance to his wife who cannot support herself. However, the wife’s right to claim maintenance is not absolute. Sub-Section (4) of Section 125 (Section 144(4) of BNSS) clearly specifies that a wife living in adultery is not entitled to claim maintenance. The dictum laid down in all the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner and referenced earlier is that a single instance of adulterous conduct is not enough to disqualify a wife from claiming maintenance; rather, there must be evidence of continuous adulterous behaviour. In brief, there should be proof that the wife is habitually engaging in an adulterous life with the partner to invoke the provisions of subsection (4) of Section 125 of Cr.P.C. This legal principle is well settled. The key issue, however, is that when a husband defends proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. (Section 144 of BNSS) by claiming that the wife is living in adultery, what level of proof is required to establish that the wife is indeed living in adultery?

From Para 6,

6. The right claimed by the wife under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. is a civil right. Maintenance proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. are also civil proceedings, although breach may lead to penal consequences. In criminal cases, the standard of proof is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas in civil cases, the standard is based on the preponderance of probabilities. The concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies only to criminal trials and cannot be used in civil disputes, including matrimonial and maintenance cases. When the husband alleges that the wife is living in adultery and thereby disqualified from claiming maintenance, he is not required to prove the adulterous act beyond a reasonable doubt, as in criminal prosecution under the now-repealed Section 497 of IPC. Instead, proof by preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. Adultery typically occurs in secrecy, making direct proof rare. Consequently, adultery can often be established through circumstantial evidence, provided the circumstances lead logically to that conclusion.

Jinesh CR Vs Aswathy PR on 19 Nov 2025

Index of Maintenance Judgments under Sec 144 BNSS is here.

Vinod Kumar K Vs Chaitra N on 3 Apr 2025

Posted on October 20, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A good judgment from a single judge of Karnataka High Court, Bengaluru bench, refusing maintenance to a lying wife and directing to initiate perjury proceedings in accordance with law.

From Paras 7 to 11,

7. As per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajnesh stated supra, in all the maintenance petitions, parties are duty bound to file assets and liabilities and disclose their true income, avocation, employment and so also details of income, assets and liabilities of the other spouse. In the present case, petitioner – husband has filed assets and liabilities showing the details of his employment, income etc., It is also stated about job of the respondent and what is the income drawn by the respondent – wife. On the contrary, respondent – wife though filed assets and liabilities for the 2nd time on 8.11.2022, very cleverly and intentionally suppressed fact of her employment as a Guest Teacher in Government Junior Primary School and income she is getting from the said employment. Nothing prevented the respondent from saying so in the affidavit of assets and she was not asked by her counsel with regard to disclosing her employment and the income and if it was brought to her notice and knowledge, she would have definitely disclosed the same in the affidavit. The fact that she has sought for unconditional apology itself apparently clear that she has suppressed the true facts before the Court. This kind of suppression of material before the Court with deliberate intention to mislead the Court to obtain a favourable order in the maintenance cases is deplorable and cannot be accepted. Fortunately, the petitioner is able to secure certain information under the RTI Act, due to which Court came to know with regard to employment of the respondent, otherwise, it would not have come to the notice of the Court. Such attitude and behaviour of the respondent before the Court is deplorable and cannot be accepted.
8. In the present case on hand, the income generated by the respondent – wife during her employment as a Guest Teacher was around Rs.10,000/- to Rs.15,000/-, which is not clearly stated. If the average is taken, it is Rs.12,500/- per month. Whereas, the petitioner – husband is earning Rs.47,240/- and after deduction getting Rs.21,000/- per month.
9. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, it is apparently clear that the respondent – wife was working and capable of working and earning as on the date of filing 2nd affidavit of assets and liabilities before the Family Court. It is not the case of the respondent that she is unable to work and incapable to earn income and therefore to be maintained by the petitioner. It is also stated that there are no children from the marriage. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the respondent – wife would not be entitled to maintenance.
10. The intent of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajnesh stated supra is to render justice to the parties on the basis of self declaration of assets and liabilities including income and occupation. But, it is seen that in most of the cases, there is deliberate suppression of facts only with an intention to secure favourable order. In view of several instances where parties are careless and deliberately making false statements on oath and filing false affidavits, this Court in RPFC No.24/2023 decided on 20th March 2025 directed the Family Court/Trial Court dealing with such matters to initiate suitable action in accordance with law so that careless filing of affidavits and casual approach before the Court while filing assets and liabilities in the form of affidavits and adducing evidence before the Court is curbed and the person at fault is penalized by appropriate action of the Court. This Court issued certain guidelines and directions to the Family Courts/Trial Courts dealing in maintenance applications. Accordingly, this Court deems it appropriate to direct the Family Court to initiate suitable action against the respondent – wife after affording reasonable opportunity
to both the parties.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in compliance of the order of the Family Court, petitioner has deposited Rs.25,000/- in the execution proceedings. In view of the respondent – wife having suppressed the material facts of her employment and income and this Court coming to the conclusion that the respondent – wife would not be entitled for maintenance, I deem it appropriate to direct the respondent – wife to refund the said amount of Rs.25,000/- to the petitioner – husband.

Vinod Kumar K Vs Chaitra N on 3 Apr 2025

Citations: [2025:KHC:14149]

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67eef65cd50c1c738ee6dd37

Index of Maintenance Judgments u/s 144 BNSS is here.

Jagdamba Trivedi Vs Neha Trivedi on 18 Jan 2021

Posted on October 19, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A good judgment from a single judge of High Court of Chhattisgarh Judgment explaining how important it is to follow the mandate u/s 421 Cr.P.C. while executing maintenance orders u/s 125(1) Cr.P.C.

From Paras 10, 11 and 12,

10.A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that for recovery of the amount of maintenance, procedure under Section 421(1) has to be followed by either issuing warrant for levying the amount due by attachment and sale of movable property belonging to the offender or by issuing a warrant to the Collector of the district, for authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter. Section 421(3) provides that where the Court issues a warrant to the Collector under clause (b) of Subsection (1), the Collector shall realise the amount in accordance with the law relating to recovery of arrears of land revenue, as if such warrant were a certificate issued under such law.
11.A conjoint reading of the provisions contained under Section 125(3) read with Section 421 of CrPC would show that by virtue of Section 125(3) of CrPC, the Magistrate has been empowered to recover the amount of arrears of maintenance by following the procedure prescribed for levy of fine under Section 421 of CrPC. Two modes are prescribed under Section 421 of CrPC for recovery of the arrears of maintenance due as if it were a fine levied. The Court can either issue a warrant for the levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to the defaulter or issue a warrant to the Collector of the District, authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter under Section 421(1)(a) and 421(1)(b) of CrPC. It is only after the Magistrate has exhausted the two modes prescribed under Section 421 of CrPC and still fails to recover the arrears of maintenance due that he can sentence the person who committed the default to imprisonment as enjoined under Section 125(3) of CrPC for the period prescribed in the above-stated provision and if in the execution of sentence of imprisonment so awarded, the defaulter does not appear to suffer, the sentence so awarded, the Court should at the first instance issue summons/notice for his appearance and if the defaulter seems to be avoiding the summons, the Court in the second instance should issue bailable warrant for his appearance to undergo sentence. The Courts, at first and second instance, shall refrain from issuing non-bailable warrant.
12.It is quite vivid that the provisions contained under Section 125(3) of CrPC itself provide that the Court may sentence such a person for whole or
any part of each month’s allowance after the execution of the warrant, as such, Section 125(3) CrPC speaks only of issue of a warrant for levying the amount in the manner provided for levying fines and does not speak of a warrant of arrest. The issue of a warrant for levy of the amount due by way of attachment and sale is a condition precedent to the sentencing of the defaulter to imprisonment. As such, without following the procedure prescribed under Section 421(1)(a) and 421(1)(b) of CrPC and without issuance of warrant of attachment and sale, no warrant can be issued and no order for imprisonment can be passed under Section 125(3) of CrPC.

From Para 17,

17. Reverting to the facts of the instant case in light of the aforesaid legal analysis, it is quite vivid that learned Family Court, finding that the arrears of maintenance is due from the petitioner, straightway issued warrant of arrest without following the procedure laid down in Section 421(1)(a) and 421(1)(b) of CrPC, whereas learned Magistrate ought to have followed the procedure laid down in Section 421 of CrPC for recovering the arrears of the amount of maintenance, and if after following the procedure as envisaged in Section 421 of CrPC by issuance of warrant of attachment of movable and immovable property of the defaulter and sale thereof; still arrears of amount of maintenance remains due, then order of imprisonment can be passed, as such, the order directing issuance of non-bailable warrant of arrest against the petitioner is contrary to Section 125(3) read with Sections 421(1)(a) and 421(1)(b) of the CrPC. Accordingly, the order dated 09/05/2019 (Annexure A/1) passed in MJC No. 43/2019 is hereby set aside and learned Family Court is directed to follow the procedure laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Rajnesh (supra) strictly for recovery of the amount of maintenance.

Jagdamba Trivedi Vs Neha Trivedi on 18 Jan 2021

Citations: [LAWS(CHH)-2021-1-96]

Other Sources:

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/judgements/1070468/jagdamba-trivedi-vs-neha-trivedi/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6050d0e69fca195f67640edb

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/jagdamba-trivedi-versus-neha-trivedi

https://www.the-laws.com/encyclopedia/browse/case?caseId=021202701000&title=jagdamba-trivedi-vs-neha-trivedi#:~:text=He%20would%20also%20submit%20that%20if%20the,(Annexure%20A/2)%20deserve%20to%20be%20set%20aside.

Index of Maintenance Orders u/s 144 BNSS is here.

Rita Raj Vs Pabitra Roy Chaudhuri on 17 Oct 2025

Posted on October 19, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court observed as follows, while upholding the Family Court’s decision not to grant alimony.

From Paras 53 to 57,

53. In the present Appeal, the Appellant‟s primary challenge is directed against the learned Family Court‟s finding on cruelty. The evidence on record unequivocally establishes a sustained pattern of mental cruelty inflicted by the Appellant upon the Respondent.
54. The most compelling evidence comprises the series of text messages sent from the Appellant‟s mobile number between March and June 2011. These messages, which contained vile, derogatory, and scandalous language, including questioning the Respondent‟s legitimacy and making reprehensible allegations against his mother, were proved beyond doubt.
55. Specific messages dated 09.05.2011, 15.05.2011, and 27.06.2011, which included terms such as “bastard”, “son of a bitch,” and suggestions that his mother should “earn through prostitution”, are by themselves sufficient to constitute mental cruelty of the gravest kind.
56. The Appellant‟s explanation that the Respondent must have sent these messages to himself from her phone is inherently improbable and was rightly rejected by the learned Family Court as an afterthought, particularly since this defense was never pleaded in the written statement and no corroborative evidence was adduced to support it.
57. Words and communications of the sort proved in this case are not innocuous. The law recognizes that mental cruelty may be visited by persistent and deliberate verbal abuse and conduct that degrades a spouse and injures reputation and self-respect. The text messages in question contained imputations of illegitimacy, filthy epithets directed at the Respondent‟s mother and other degrading expressions a pattern of conduct which, cumulatively, the learned Family Court was entitled to regard as causing grave mental agony to the Respondent.

From Para 82,

82. The provision under Section 25 is fundamentally equitable in nature and aims to secure financial justice between spouses, ensuring that a party lacking independent means of subsistence is not left destitute following the dissolution of marriage. However, the grant of such relief is not automatic; it is contingent upon proof of genuine financial necessity and equitable considerations.
83. In the present case, the Appellant is an officer of the IRTS, a highly esteemed branch of the Indian Civil Services, whereas the Respondent is a practicing lawyer.
84. It is an undisputed fact that the Appellant, being a Group ‘A’ officer, holds a senior and responsible position in the Government of India and receives a regular and substantial salary along with numerous allowances and service benefits commensurate with her post. The material on record does not disclose any evidence of financial hardship, dependency, or extraordinary circumstances that would render her incapable of maintaining herself with dignity. There is also no pleading or proof of any financial liability, medical condition, or familial obligation that could necessitate monetary support from the Respondent. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest a substantial difference between the incomes of the parties.
85. Judicial discretion under Section 25 cannot be exercised to award alimony where the applicant is financially self-sufficient and independent, and such discretion must be exercised properly and judiciously, based on the record, the relative financial capacities of the parties, and the absence of any material demonstrating economic vulnerability on the part of the Appellant.
86. A careful examination of the record further reveals that the parties cohabited as husband and wife only for a brief and transitory period, and the marriage did not evolve into a stable or enduring union characterized by emotional, social, or financial interdependence. The absence of any child from the wedlock further eliminates a continuing financial responsibility that might otherwise justify an award of alimony or maintenance.
87. It is a settled principle that permanent alimony is intended as a measure of social justice and not as a tool for enrichment or equalizing the financial status of two capable individuals. The law requires that the applicant demonstrate a genuine need for financial assistance. In the present case, the Appellant‟s position as a senior government officer, her steady and substantial income, and the absence of dependents collectively establish that she is fully capable of maintaining herself. No evidence of financial incapacity, duress, or other compelling circumstances has been presented to justify judicial intervention.

Rita Raj Vs Pabitra Roy Chaudhuri on 17 Oct 2025

Citations: [2025:DHC:9233-DB]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/156230068/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/68f2a09ee5e6a9673013a510

Index of Maintenance and Alimony judgment under Hindu Marriage Act is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Catena of Landmark Judgments Referred/Cited to

Chidurala Shyamsubder Vs State of Telangana on 27 Aug 2018

Parvinder Singh Khurana Vs Enforcement of Directorate on 19 May 2026

Anu Aggarwal Vs Sushant Aggarwal on 20 Jan 2026

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Suninder Sandha Vs State of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 02 Dec 2025

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