Kishan Lal Barwa Vs Sharda Saharan and Anr on 18 Feb 2015

A single Judge of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

From Para 14,

14.This Court finds that the basis of petitioner’s claim that the decree was obtained by fraud is a report submitted before the Chief Judicial Magistrate by the Directorate of Fingerprint Experts, according to which, the fingerprints of Ashok Kumar, as existing on the lease deed executed by Noida do not match with those upon the power of attorney claimed by Ripudman Kumar Saharan and rather matches with the agreement to sell executed in favour of the defendant-petitioner. This report has been prepared by the experts of Directorate of Fingerprint, who are public servants, and the report is in due discharge of their official duties, and by virtue of section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, a presumption of correctness of the report would be available in law, subject to further evidence which may be brought on record by the other side. The question as to whether a plea of fraud could be entertained even in collateral proceedings, at the stage of execution, after passing of the decree, is no longer res integra. It is settled that fraud and justice do not dwell together. It is equally settled that a court of law would do its utmost to ensure that injustice is not meted out to a party. Such right in a court of law has been recognized under section 44 of Evidence Act.

From Para 19,

19. It is well settled that once the plea of fraud has been setup by the defendant-petitioner before the executing court, and credible evidence in support of such plea was also placed, it was incumbent upon the executing court to have examined the issue of fraud, on merits, and such plea ought not to have been rejected merely on the ground that a decree in favour of the plaintiff-respondent had been passed, and the executing court, as such, had no occasion to examine the plea of fraud. It is also well settled that fraud vitiates all solemn acts. Though a plea of fraud was taken up before the civil court, but such plea was not adjudicated, which is clarified in the judgment of the civil court itself. However, if a credible material has come into existence, which if is found proved vitiates the decree itself, it is the duty of the executing court to consider such plea on merits. It was open for the executing court to have examined the report of the Directorate, Fingerprint Experts, in accordance with law, and for such purpose an opportunity was liable to have been allowed to the plaintiff-respondent. The executing court could have adjudicated as to whether the plea of fraud was made out on facts or not? but it was not open for the executing court to brush aside the objection itself and thereby refused to go into such issue itself.

From Para 22,

22. In view of the discussions made above, this Court finds that the orders impugned dated 26.2.2014 and 29.5.2014, passed by the courts below, cannot be sustained and are hereby quashed. The executing court is directed to reconsider the objection under section 47 CPC, afresh, in light of the observations made above. For such purposes, the executing court will go into the allegations of fraud on merits, in accordance with law, and after affording opportunity to both the parties, the plea of fraud would be adjudicated on merits. Since the proceedings have dragged for the last 13 years, therefore, the objection on merits would be decided forthwith, by fixing short dates, in accordance with law, without granting any adjournment to either of the parties, except upon imposition of cost, which shall not be less than Rs.500/-.

Kishan Lal Barwa Vs Sharda Saharan and Anr on 18 Feb 2015

Index of Judgments against Orders obtained fraudulently here.

Jinesh CR Vs Aswathy PR on 19 Nov 2025

Posted on December 8, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Kerala High Court held that the level or standard of prove for adultery is just preponderance of probability under Sec 144 BNSS case (being a civil proceeding) but not that of Proof beyond reasonable doubt which may be applicable in a criminal case.

From Para 5,

5. Section 125 of Cr.P.C. (Section 144 of BNSS) states that a husband with sufficient means is liable to provide maintenance to his wife who cannot support herself. However, the wife’s right to claim maintenance is not absolute. Sub-Section (4) of Section 125 (Section 144(4) of BNSS) clearly specifies that a wife living in adultery is not entitled to claim maintenance. The dictum laid down in all the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner and referenced earlier is that a single instance of adulterous conduct is not enough to disqualify a wife from claiming maintenance; rather, there must be evidence of continuous adulterous behaviour. In brief, there should be proof that the wife is habitually engaging in an adulterous life with the partner to invoke the provisions of subsection (4) of Section 125 of Cr.P.C. This legal principle is well settled. The key issue, however, is that when a husband defends proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. (Section 144 of BNSS) by claiming that the wife is living in adultery, what level of proof is required to establish that the wife is indeed living in adultery?

From Para 6,

6. The right claimed by the wife under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. is a civil right. Maintenance proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. are also civil proceedings, although breach may lead to penal consequences. In criminal cases, the standard of proof is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas in civil cases, the standard is based on the preponderance of probabilities. The concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies only to criminal trials and cannot be used in civil disputes, including matrimonial and maintenance cases. When the husband alleges that the wife is living in adultery and thereby disqualified from claiming maintenance, he is not required to prove the adulterous act beyond a reasonable doubt, as in criminal prosecution under the now-repealed Section 497 of IPC. Instead, proof by preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. Adultery typically occurs in secrecy, making direct proof rare. Consequently, adultery can often be established through circumstantial evidence, provided the circumstances lead logically to that conclusion.

Jinesh CR Vs Aswathy PR on 19 Nov 2025

Index of Maintenance Judgments under Sec 144 BNSS is here.

Vinod Kumar K Vs Chaitra N on 3 Apr 2025

Posted on October 20, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A good judgment from a single judge of Karnataka High Court, Bengaluru bench, refusing maintenance to a lying wife and directing to initiate perjury proceedings in accordance with law.

From Paras 7 to 11,

7. As per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajnesh stated supra, in all the maintenance petitions, parties are duty bound to file assets and liabilities and disclose their true income, avocation, employment and so also details of income, assets and liabilities of the other spouse. In the present case, petitioner – husband has filed assets and liabilities showing the details of his employment, income etc., It is also stated about job of the respondent and what is the income drawn by the respondent – wife. On the contrary, respondent – wife though filed assets and liabilities for the 2nd time on 8.11.2022, very cleverly and intentionally suppressed fact of her employment as a Guest Teacher in Government Junior Primary School and income she is getting from the said employment. Nothing prevented the respondent from saying so in the affidavit of assets and she was not asked by her counsel with regard to disclosing her employment and the income and if it was brought to her notice and knowledge, she would have definitely disclosed the same in the affidavit. The fact that she has sought for unconditional apology itself apparently clear that she has suppressed the true facts before the Court. This kind of suppression of material before the Court with deliberate intention to mislead the Court to obtain a favourable order in the maintenance cases is deplorable and cannot be accepted. Fortunately, the petitioner is able to secure certain information under the RTI Act, due to which Court came to know with regard to employment of the respondent, otherwise, it would not have come to the notice of the Court. Such attitude and behaviour of the respondent before the Court is deplorable and cannot be accepted.
8. In the present case on hand, the income generated by the respondent – wife during her employment as a Guest Teacher was around Rs.10,000/- to Rs.15,000/-, which is not clearly stated. If the average is taken, it is Rs.12,500/- per month. Whereas, the petitioner – husband is earning Rs.47,240/- and after deduction getting Rs.21,000/- per month.
9. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, it is apparently clear that the respondent – wife was working and capable of working and earning as on the date of filing 2nd affidavit of assets and liabilities before the Family Court. It is not the case of the respondent that she is unable to work and incapable to earn income and therefore to be maintained by the petitioner. It is also stated that there are no children from the marriage. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the respondent – wife would not be entitled to maintenance.
10. The intent of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajnesh stated supra is to render justice to the parties on the basis of self declaration of assets and liabilities including income and occupation. But, it is seen that in most of the cases, there is deliberate suppression of facts only with an intention to secure favourable order. In view of several instances where parties are careless and deliberately making false statements on oath and filing false affidavits, this Court in RPFC No.24/2023 decided on 20th March 2025 directed the Family Court/Trial Court dealing with such matters to initiate suitable action in accordance with law so that careless filing of affidavits and casual approach before the Court while filing assets and liabilities in the form of affidavits and adducing evidence before the Court is curbed and the person at fault is penalized by appropriate action of the Court. This Court issued certain guidelines and directions to the Family Courts/Trial Courts dealing in maintenance applications. Accordingly, this Court deems it appropriate to direct the Family Court to initiate suitable action against the respondent – wife after affording reasonable opportunity
to both the parties.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in compliance of the order of the Family Court, petitioner has deposited Rs.25,000/- in the execution proceedings. In view of the respondent – wife having suppressed the material facts of her employment and income and this Court coming to the conclusion that the respondent – wife would not be entitled for maintenance, I deem it appropriate to direct the respondent – wife to refund the said amount of Rs.25,000/- to the petitioner – husband.

Vinod Kumar K Vs Chaitra N on 3 Apr 2025

Citations: [2025:KHC:14149]

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67eef65cd50c1c738ee6dd37

Index of Maintenance Judgments u/s 144 BNSS is here.

Jagdamba Trivedi Vs Neha Trivedi on 18 Jan 2021

Posted on October 19, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A good judgment from a single judge of High Court of Chhattisgarh Judgment explaining how important it is to follow the mandate u/s 421 Cr.P.C. while executing maintenance orders u/s 125(1) Cr.P.C.

From Paras 10, 11 and 12,

10.A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that for recovery of the amount of maintenance, procedure under Section 421(1) has to be followed by either issuing warrant for levying the amount due by attachment and sale of movable property belonging to the offender or by issuing a warrant to the Collector of the district, for authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter. Section 421(3) provides that where the Court issues a warrant to the Collector under clause (b) of Subsection (1), the Collector shall realise the amount in accordance with the law relating to recovery of arrears of land revenue, as if such warrant were a certificate issued under such law.
11.A conjoint reading of the provisions contained under Section 125(3) read with Section 421 of CrPC would show that by virtue of Section 125(3) of CrPC, the Magistrate has been empowered to recover the amount of arrears of maintenance by following the procedure prescribed for levy of fine under Section 421 of CrPC. Two modes are prescribed under Section 421 of CrPC for recovery of the arrears of maintenance due as if it were a fine levied. The Court can either issue a warrant for the levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to the defaulter or issue a warrant to the Collector of the District, authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter under Section 421(1)(a) and 421(1)(b) of CrPC. It is only after the Magistrate has exhausted the two modes prescribed under Section 421 of CrPC and still fails to recover the arrears of maintenance due that he can sentence the person who committed the default to imprisonment as enjoined under Section 125(3) of CrPC for the period prescribed in the above-stated provision and if in the execution of sentence of imprisonment so awarded, the defaulter does not appear to suffer, the sentence so awarded, the Court should at the first instance issue summons/notice for his appearance and if the defaulter seems to be avoiding the summons, the Court in the second instance should issue bailable warrant for his appearance to undergo sentence. The Courts, at first and second instance, shall refrain from issuing non-bailable warrant.
12.It is quite vivid that the provisions contained under Section 125(3) of CrPC itself provide that the Court may sentence such a person for whole or
any part of each month’s allowance after the execution of the warrant, as such, Section 125(3) CrPC speaks only of issue of a warrant for levying the amount in the manner provided for levying fines and does not speak of a warrant of arrest. The issue of a warrant for levy of the amount due by way of attachment and sale is a condition precedent to the sentencing of the defaulter to imprisonment. As such, without following the procedure prescribed under Section 421(1)(a) and 421(1)(b) of CrPC and without issuance of warrant of attachment and sale, no warrant can be issued and no order for imprisonment can be passed under Section 125(3) of CrPC.

From Para 17,

17. Reverting to the facts of the instant case in light of the aforesaid legal analysis, it is quite vivid that learned Family Court, finding that the arrears of maintenance is due from the petitioner, straightway issued warrant of arrest without following the procedure laid down in Section 421(1)(a) and 421(1)(b) of CrPC, whereas learned Magistrate ought to have followed the procedure laid down in Section 421 of CrPC for recovering the arrears of the amount of maintenance, and if after following the procedure as envisaged in Section 421 of CrPC by issuance of warrant of attachment of movable and immovable property of the defaulter and sale thereof; still arrears of amount of maintenance remains due, then order of imprisonment can be passed, as such, the order directing issuance of non-bailable warrant of arrest against the petitioner is contrary to Section 125(3) read with Sections 421(1)(a) and 421(1)(b) of the CrPC. Accordingly, the order dated 09/05/2019 (Annexure A/1) passed in MJC No. 43/2019 is hereby set aside and learned Family Court is directed to follow the procedure laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Rajnesh (supra) strictly for recovery of the amount of maintenance.

Jagdamba Trivedi Vs Neha Trivedi on 18 Jan 2021

Citations: [LAWS(CHH)-2021-1-96]

Other Sources:

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/judgements/1070468/jagdamba-trivedi-vs-neha-trivedi/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6050d0e69fca195f67640edb

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/jagdamba-trivedi-versus-neha-trivedi

https://www.the-laws.com/encyclopedia/browse/case?caseId=021202701000&title=jagdamba-trivedi-vs-neha-trivedi#:~:text=He%20would%20also%20submit%20that%20if%20the,(Annexure%20A/2)%20deserve%20to%20be%20set%20aside.

Index of Maintenance Orders u/s 144 BNSS is here.

Rita Raj Vs Pabitra Roy Chaudhuri on 17 Oct 2025

Posted on October 19, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court observed as follows, while upholding the Family Court’s decision not to grant alimony.

From Paras 53 to 57,

53. In the present Appeal, the Appellant‟s primary challenge is directed against the learned Family Court‟s finding on cruelty. The evidence on record unequivocally establishes a sustained pattern of mental cruelty inflicted by the Appellant upon the Respondent.
54. The most compelling evidence comprises the series of text messages sent from the Appellant‟s mobile number between March and June 2011. These messages, which contained vile, derogatory, and scandalous language, including questioning the Respondent‟s legitimacy and making reprehensible allegations against his mother, were proved beyond doubt.
55. Specific messages dated 09.05.2011, 15.05.2011, and 27.06.2011, which included terms such as “bastard”, “son of a bitch,” and suggestions that his mother should “earn through prostitution”, are by themselves sufficient to constitute mental cruelty of the gravest kind.
56. The Appellant‟s explanation that the Respondent must have sent these messages to himself from her phone is inherently improbable and was rightly rejected by the learned Family Court as an afterthought, particularly since this defense was never pleaded in the written statement and no corroborative evidence was adduced to support it.
57. Words and communications of the sort proved in this case are not innocuous. The law recognizes that mental cruelty may be visited by persistent and deliberate verbal abuse and conduct that degrades a spouse and injures reputation and self-respect. The text messages in question contained imputations of illegitimacy, filthy epithets directed at the Respondent‟s mother and other degrading expressions a pattern of conduct which, cumulatively, the learned Family Court was entitled to regard as causing grave mental agony to the Respondent.

From Para 82,

82. The provision under Section 25 is fundamentally equitable in nature and aims to secure financial justice between spouses, ensuring that a party lacking independent means of subsistence is not left destitute following the dissolution of marriage. However, the grant of such relief is not automatic; it is contingent upon proof of genuine financial necessity and equitable considerations.
83. In the present case, the Appellant is an officer of the IRTS, a highly esteemed branch of the Indian Civil Services, whereas the Respondent is a practicing lawyer.
84. It is an undisputed fact that the Appellant, being a Group ‘A’ officer, holds a senior and responsible position in the Government of India and receives a regular and substantial salary along with numerous allowances and service benefits commensurate with her post. The material on record does not disclose any evidence of financial hardship, dependency, or extraordinary circumstances that would render her incapable of maintaining herself with dignity. There is also no pleading or proof of any financial liability, medical condition, or familial obligation that could necessitate monetary support from the Respondent. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest a substantial difference between the incomes of the parties.
85. Judicial discretion under Section 25 cannot be exercised to award alimony where the applicant is financially self-sufficient and independent, and such discretion must be exercised properly and judiciously, based on the record, the relative financial capacities of the parties, and the absence of any material demonstrating economic vulnerability on the part of the Appellant.
86. A careful examination of the record further reveals that the parties cohabited as husband and wife only for a brief and transitory period, and the marriage did not evolve into a stable or enduring union characterized by emotional, social, or financial interdependence. The absence of any child from the wedlock further eliminates a continuing financial responsibility that might otherwise justify an award of alimony or maintenance.
87. It is a settled principle that permanent alimony is intended as a measure of social justice and not as a tool for enrichment or equalizing the financial status of two capable individuals. The law requires that the applicant demonstrate a genuine need for financial assistance. In the present case, the Appellant‟s position as a senior government officer, her steady and substantial income, and the absence of dependents collectively establish that she is fully capable of maintaining herself. No evidence of financial incapacity, duress, or other compelling circumstances has been presented to justify judicial intervention.

Rita Raj Vs Pabitra Roy Chaudhuri on 17 Oct 2025

Citations: [2025:DHC:9233-DB]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/156230068/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/68f2a09ee5e6a9673013a510

Index of Maintenance and Alimony judgment under Hindu Marriage Act is here.

Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Posted on October 18, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Supreme Court held as follows,

From Para 79,

79. It is true that an affidavit is ‘evidence’ within the meaning of Section 191 of the IPC and a person swearing to a false affidavit is guilty of perjury. But the matter does not rest here. Before initiating the proceedings for perjury, the court concerned has to consider whether it would be expedient in the interest of justice to sanction such prosecution. What the courts have to see at this stage is whether there is evidence in support of the allegations made by the Union of India (respondent herein) to justify the initiation of proceedings against the writ petitioners, more particularly, the writ petitioner no. 1 herein who had filed the affidavit on behalf of himself and the other writ petitioners and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant his conviction. However, this does not mean that the court should not prima facie be of the opinion that there are sufficient and reasonable grounds for setting the machinery of criminal law in motion against the accused. As noted above, the Court has further to see that the false statement was deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. In other words, before sanctioning the prosecution there must be a prima facie case of a falsehood on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge. (see S.P. Kohli v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana, (1979) 1 SCC 212 : AIR 1978 SC 1753)

From Paras 86 and 87,

86. The conflict between the two decisions of this Court of equal strength, i.e. Pritish (supra) and Sharad Pawar (supra), was taken notice of by this Court in the case of the State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh, (2020) 12 SCC 96. A Bench of two Judges of this Court ultimately thought fit to refer the question to a Larger Bench. The Court observed as under :
“14. In any event, given that the decision of the three-Judge Bench in Sharad Pawar (supra) did not assign any reason as to why it was departing from the opinion expressed by a Coordinate Bench in Pritish (supra) regarding the necessity of a preliminary inquiry under Section 340 of the CrPC, as also the observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra), we find it necessary that the present matter be placed before a larger Bench for its consideration, particularly to answer the following questions:
14.1 (i) Whether Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 mandates a preliminary inquiry and an opportunity of hearing to the would-be accused before a complaint is made under Section 195 of the Code by a Court ?
14.2 (ii) What is the scope and ambit of such preliminary inquiry ?”
87. It appears that the reference on the aforesaid two questions to a larger Bench is still pending.

From Paras 90 and 91,

90. The essential ingredients for invoking Section 211, I.P.C. are that the complaint must have falsely charged a person with having committed an offence. The complainant, at the time of giving the complaint must have known that there is no just or lawful ground for making a charge against the person. This complaint must have been given with an intention to cause injury to a person.
91. The CrPC does not define what constitutes the making of a “charge” of an offence or what amounts to the “institution of criminal proceedings”. But, in our opinion, a false “charge” in this Section must not be understood in any restricted or technical sense, but in its ordinary meaning, of a false accusation made to any authority bound by law to investigate it or to take any steps in regard to it, such as giving information of it to the superior authorities with a view to investigation or other proceedings, and the institution of criminal proceedings includes the setting of the criminal law in motion. The nature of both expressions, and the difference between them has been explained in lucid terms in the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Karim Buksh v. Queen Emp, 17 C. 574. It points out that there may be a charge which does not amount to the institution of criminal proceedings “and there may be criminal proceedings which do not necessarily involve a charge” of any offence. As an illustration of the former it points out that a charge made to the Judge of a Civil Court or to public officers of other kinds, in order to obtain sanction to prosecute may well be a charge “but is not the institution of criminal proceedings”. It further points out that an aggrieved person may seek to put the criminal law in motion either by making a charge or in the language of the Code giving information to the Police (Section 154 CrPC) “or he may” lay a charge, or as the Code calls it, a complaint (Section 190 CrPC) before a Magistrate”.

From Para 94,

94. Thus, as explained by this Court in Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain (supra), the essential ingredient of an offence under Section 211 IPC is to institute or cause, to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing to institute false criminal proceedings assume false charge but false charge may be preferred even when no criminal proceedings result. Now, the expression “falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial. “To falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when seeking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be, read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible of analogous meaning should be understood to have been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were their colour and content from each other. They seem to have been used in a technical sense as commonly understood in our criminal law. The false charge must, therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or to someone who is in a position to get the offender punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words, it must be’ embodied either in a complaint or in a report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or to an officer having authority over the person against whom the allegations are made. The statement in order to constitute the “charges” should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion.

Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/62d7ae969fca1923f0b04184

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/himanshu-kumar-and-others-versus-state-of-chhattisgarh-and-others

Index of Perjury Judgment is here.

Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 10 Dec 2024

Posted on October 1, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court did settlement between parties at around 6 Crore rupees, but at least acknowledged and reproduced Delhi High Court observations. Thanks

From Paras 14 and 15,

14. In this case, the High Court observed that the appellant’s income, primarily from employment and investments, demonstrated his ability to provide for the wife and child’s maintenance adequately. The evidence revealed that the appellant earned over ₹4,00,000 (Rupees four lakhs only) per month
between 2007 and 2016. Although he claimed higher living expenses due to his residence in Mauritius, the High Court found his arguments to be unsubstantiated, as his financial resources allowed him to meet maintenance obligations without undue hardship. The High Court further noted several instances of the appellant’s deliberate attempts to mislead the judicial process. He withheld critical financial documents and selectively disclosed information to conceal the full extent of his wealth. The inquiry into the statutory forms of the appellant revealed that he had investments in mutual funds valued at ₹5.10 crores as early as 2009-2010, significant sums deposited in bank accounts, and other financial transactions that were not initially disclosed.
15. The High Court also identified false representations by the appellant regarding his property and income. He denied ownership of a property located at F-146, Richmond Park, Gurgaon, despite evidence of its ownership and rental income accruing to him. Additionally, the appellant misrepresented his association with Prasham Consultants LLP, wherein he continued to receive financial benefits until his father replaced him in 2016. These findings demonstrated a pattern of deliberate suppression of material facts and assets by the appellant, aimed at minimizing his maintenance liability. Such conduct warranted judicial intervention to ensure justice and provide adequate financial support to the wife and child, reflecting principles of fairness, transparency, and equity. Consequently, the High Court directed the appellant to pay interim maintenance that adequately addressed the needs of the wife and child, proportionate to his financial capacity and consistent with the obligations of a responsible spouse and parent.

From Paras 29

29. The main issue between the parties all these years, since separation, is the quantum of maintenance to be paid by the appellant to the respondent. The issue of maintenance pendente lite is now infructuous with the dissolution of marriage, but the financial interest of the wife still needs to be protected through grant of permanent alimony. The learned senior counsels for the parties have made submissions at length regarding the financial condition of both the parties. In order to establish the correct financial position of both the parties, they have filed their respective affidavits of income and assets as ordered by this Court.

From Para 34,

34. In the present case, it is a matter of record and an admitted fact that the respondent is unemployed while the appellant is a well accomplished banker who has worked in multiple senior roles at various banks over the years. We have perused the records of finances produced before us. Even though the records of the DEMAT accounts and the employment letters produced by the appellant are almost ten years ago or earlier, his financial position can be suitably ascertained from them.

Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 10 Dec 2024

Citations: [2024 INSC 961], [2024 LiveLaw (SC) 969]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/102090299/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6759168762941119016e16ef

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/permanent-alimony-shouldnt-penalize-husband-but-should-ensure-decent-living-for-wife-supreme-court-lists-out-factors-277959

Parvin Kumar Jain vs Anju Jain Divorce Case

https://testbook.com/recent-judgements/parvin-kumar-jain-vs-anju-jain

https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/marriage-be-dissolved-if-succumbed-due-long-standing-differences-supreme-court

PARVIN KUMAR JAIN vs. ANJU JAIN

https://www.lawtext.in/judgement.php?bid=1281

Supreme Court Upholds Financial Security in Marriage Breakdown: A Case Study

Alimony Decoded: 8 Critical Guidelines to Ensure Fair Settlements in Divorce Cases

The impugned Order from the Delhi High Court is below. Few relevant Paras from the said Order follow.

41. The Husband disputes the aforesaid finding on concealment. On behalf of the Husband, it has been strenuously urged that the Family Court though takes note of the affidavit dated 11thMay, 2018 filed by the Husband however, it does not deal with the same. We have carefully gone through the said affidavit. In our view, the said affidavit was yet another attempt on the part of the Husband to mislead the Family Court and conceal particulars of his income as well as assets.
47. On behalf of the Husband, it has been vehemently argued that it is the Wife who has filed false affidavits before this Court to the effect that she lives in a rented house and is paying rent on a regular basis. It is further alleged that the Wife has filed a forged Rent Agreement to claim that she is paying monthly rent to one Ms Sudesh Bansal. It is submitted that the Wife has failed to disclose that the house in which she lives has been transferred by Ms Sudesh Bansal in favour of the Wife’s mother vide registered General Power of Attorney and Agreement to Sell dated 25th June, 2009. On the basis of the aforesaid averments, an application has been filed by the Husband under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C before the Family Court, which is yet to be decided.
49. In our view, the explanation offered by the Wife is plausible. A perusal of the Rent Agreement dated 13th December, 2011 shows that the Wife was paying rent of Rs.11,000/- per month. It is not the case of the Husband that the Wife owns the said property or that she has paid any amount towards the purchase of the said property. There is nothing placed on record which would have us believe that what was apparent was not real. The Husband, in our opinion, is seeking to muddy the waters. The Husband’s concealments have been alluded to above. The Husband’s contentions on this count are, therefore, rejected. In our opinion, this cannot be a ground to deny the lawful maintenance to the Wife.
50. It must be emphasized that the discussion above leaves no doubt in our minds that the Husband has grossly concealed the real income as well as his movable and immovable assets in order to avoid paying the rightful amount of maintenance to the wife. The Family Court has correctly returned findings with regard to the earnings of the husband as well as attempts on the part of the Husband to conceal his real income.

Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 01 Aug 2024

Index of Maintenance and Alimony cases under HMA is here.

Sanjay D Jain and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 26 Sep 2025

Posted on September 28, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court ruled that none of the offences in the FIR were made out against the Petitioners.

From Paras 8-12,

8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the FIR dated 06.02.2022 as well as the final report, we are of the considered opinion that the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellants pursuant to the registration of offence punishable under Sections 498-A, 377 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code deserve to be quashed.
9. Before examining the FIR along with the complaint of the complainant, we may refer to the parameters that are to be borne in mind while entertaining the prayer for quashing of the FIR. If the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even when taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out any case against the accused, quashing of the proceedings would be justified. Vague and general allegations cannot lead to forming of a prima facie case. As regards the ingredients for making out an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Penal Code is concerned, the requirement is that there has to be cruelty inflicted against the victim which either drives her to commit suicide or cause grave injury to herself or lead to such conduct that would cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health. The latter part of the provision refers to harassment with a view to satisfy an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security raised by the husband or his relatives. These aspects have been considered in detail in a recent decision in Digambar and Another (supra) (to which one of us, B.R. Gavai, J, as he then was, was a party).
10. A perusal of the FIR and its consideration in entirety indicates that statements of a general nature have been made therein as against the present appellants. The complainant states that on 07.08.2021 when she had gone to her parental house, she had received a call from her mother-in-law raising a demand for clothes and jewellery. When she returned to her matrimonial house on 30.08.2021, she had taken few clothes for the family members. Except this statement, all other statements are of a general nature as well as vague without any particulars. There are other omnibus statements made in the complaint without any particulars whatsoever. It is also to be noted that for the purpose of constituting an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Penal Code, cruelty as indicated in the Explanation to the said provision must be stated to be inflicted. The cruelty caused by the husband and his family members should be of such nature that it is inflicted with the intention to cause grave injury or drive the victim to commit suicide or inflict grave injury to herself. Such allegations are absent in the present case. We do not find that on a complete reading of the complaint, a prima facie case for proceeding under Section 498-A of the Penal Code has been made out against the appellants.
11. As regards the offence punishable under Sections 377 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code is concerned, it is seen that the allegations in this regard have been made only against the complainant’s husband and not against the present appellants. The entire tenor of the complaint in that regard seeks to implicate the complainant’s husband and all incidents stated therein relate to him. There is no allegation whatsoever in that context against the appellants that would require them to face trial on that count. The proceedings insofar as the present appellants are concerned, thus, deserve to be quashed in their entirety. In our view, the High Court failed to notice this aspect of the matter while declining to quash the proceedings against the appellants.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, we are satisfied that on the touchstone of the law laid down in State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others2, a case has been made out by the appellants for quashing of the criminal proceedings lodged against them under Sections 498-A, 377 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. Continuation of these proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law and, hence, the appellants are entitled to relief.

Sanjay D Jain and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 26 Sep 2025

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Arshad Neyaz Khan Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 24 Sep 2025

Posted on September 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that IPC 420 and IPC 406 offences cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each other.

From Para 21,

21. Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention that if it is the case of the complainant/respondent No.2 that the offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405 IPC, punishable under Section 406 IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be said that the accused has also committed the offence of cheating as defined in Section 415, punishable under Section 420 IPC. This Court in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 10 SCC 690 observed that there is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making false or misleading representation i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriates the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver a property. In such a situation, both offences cannot co-exist simultaneously. Consequently, the complaint cannot contain both the offences that are independent and distinct. The said offences cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each other.

Arshad Neyaz Khan Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 24 Sep 2025

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Kundan Singh Vs State of (NCT) of Delhi on 24 Nov 2015

Posted on August 30, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Para 37,

37. Sub-clause (b) to sub-section (5) is rather ambiguously uses the expression “any official” without explaining what is meant by the said term. However, when we read sub-section (4) to Section 65B, the meaning to be given to the expression “any official” emerges. Subclause (b) applies when information is supplied to “any official” in the course of activities carried on by him, i.e., in the course of “official” activities with a view that the said information shall be stored and processed for the purpose of the activities carried on by that officer or official. It is also elucidated that the information could be beyond or otherwise in the course of the said activities. Even in such cases the information is treated as supplied in the course of the activities of the official. We clarify that the word “official”, as used in clause (b) of sub-section (5) of Section 65B, is not intended to mean or be restricted to a person holding an office or employed in public capacity. It connotes, as exemplified by the use of the same expression (albeit in its adjective form) in sub-section (4), a person primarily responsible for the management or the use, upkeep or operations of such device. It would, thus, cover a computer device containing electronic records in the hands or control of a private individual or entity.

Kundan Singh Vs State of (NCT) of Delhi on 24 Nov 2015

Citations: [2015:DHC:9600-DB], [(2015) 11 DEL CK 0089], [2015 SCC Online Del 13647], [MANU/DE/3674/2015]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10902800/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5728e3ede56109277ee476fe

https://vlex.in/vid/kundan-singh-vs-the-654461357

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/AdvancedV2?docid=998850

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Catena of Landmark Judgments Referred/Cited to

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