web analytics

Menu

Skip to content
Shades of Knife
  • Home
  • True Colors of a Vile Wife
  • Need Inspiration?
  • Blog Updates
  • SOK Gallery
  • Vile News Reporter
  • About Me
  • Contact Me

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification

Bhima Razu Prasad Vs State of Tamil Nadu on 12 Mar 2021

Posted on April 6 by ShadesOfKnife

Referring to a catena of case laws, Division bench of SC said the following:

From Para 5,

It is well settled that Section 195(1)(b) creates a bar against taking cognizance of offences against the administration of justice for the purpose of guarding against baseless or vindictive prosecutions by private parties. The provisions of this Section imply that the Court is the only appropriate authority which is entitled to raise grievance in relation to perjury, forgery of documents produced before the Court, and other offences which interfere with the effective dispensation of justice by the Court. Hence, it for the Court to exercise its discretion and consider the suitability of making a complaint for such offences. However, there is a pertinent difference in the wording of Section 195(1)(b) (i) and Section 195(1)(b)(ii) inasmuch as Section 195(1)(b)(ii) is restricted to offences which are committed in respect of a document which is “produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court”. Whereas Section 195(1)(b)(i) applies to offences against public justice which are committed not only in any proceeding in any court, but also “in relation to” such proceeding. Whether such semantical difference bars the analogous application of precedents relating to Section 195(1)(b)(ii) for interpreting Section 195(1)(b)(i) will be discussed by us later.

From Para 8,

Curiously, though the facts of Iqbal Singh Marwah also required a determination as to the applicability of Section 195(1)(b)(i), the Constitution Bench did not express any specific finding on this point. This was perhaps because the limited point for consideration before the Bench was the apparent conflict between Sachida Nand Singh and Surjit Singh (supra). However, it can nevertheless be seen that the Constitution Bench did not interpret Section 195(1)(b)(ii) in isolation, but linked its construction with the overall scheme under Sections 195(1)(b) and 340, CrPC. The Court reiterated the test laid down in Sachida Nand Singh, i.e., that the offence in respect of which only the Court can make a complaint must be one which has a direct correlation to, or a direct impact on, proceedings before a court of justice. It is for this reason that only the relevant Court is vested with the right to consider the desirability of complaining against the guilty party.

From Para 17 (Very important)

17. It is possible that Courts may be more proactive in making complaints under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC upon application made by the concerned investigative agencies, than in those preferred by private parties. The former being public authorities would enjoy more credence in seeking inquiry into their claims.Therefore, the aforementioned reasons assigned by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah for adopting a narrow construction of Section 195(1)(b)(ii), CrPC may not be strictly applicable in the present case. However, the general principles of statutory interpretation laid down by the Constitution Bench should not be disregarded. This is especially given that the Court did not consider Section 195(1)(b)(ii) separately but provided a holistic view of the scheme under Section 195(1)(b).
17.1 Just like a private party who has been a victim of forgery committed outside the precincts of the Court, the investigative agency should not be left remediless against persons who have producing false evidence for the purpose of interfering with the investigation process. Moreover, the present case concerns offences alleged to have been committed under the PC Act. Public interest and the reputation of the State will suffer significant harm if corrupt public servants are facilitated by third parties in hiding their assets from scrutiny. Hence any interpretation which negates against the speedy and effective trial of such persons must be avoided.
17.2 The application of the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC to situations such as the present case can lead to two scenarios. The first is one in which the investigative agency, on the basis of false/fabricated material drops the case. Subsequently, it is brought to their notice that the evidence was falsified. Second, the investigative agency at that very stage suspects that the material produced before them is bogus or forged in nature. In both scenarios, the Court has not had an opportunity to consider the allegedly fabricated evidence, as trial has not yet commenced in respect of the offence. Hence it would not be possible for the Court to independently ascertain the need for lodging a complaint under Section 195(1)(b)(i) read with Section 340, CrPC when the evidence alleged to have been falsified is not even present on its records. Rather, it is the investigating agency which is best placed to verify and prove whether such falsification has taken place, through what means and for what purpose.
17.3 In case the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) is applied to offences committed during the course of investigation, the Court may think it fit to wait till the completion of trial to evaluate whether a complaint should be made or not. Subsequently, the Court may be of the opinion that in the larger scheme of things the alleged fabrication of evidence during investigation has not had any material impact on the trial, and decline to initiate prosecution for the same. The investigation agency cannot be compelled to take a chance and wait for the trial court to form its opinion in each and every case. This may give the offender under Section 193, IPC sufficient time to fabricate more falsehoods to hide the original crime. Further, irrespective of the potential impact that such false evidence may have on the opinion formed by the trial court, the investigating agency has a separate right to proceed against the accused for attempting to obstruct fair and transparent probe into a criminal offence. Thus, we are of the view that it would be impracticable to insist upon lodging of written complaint by the Court under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC in such a situation.

Bhima Razu Prasad Vs State of Tamil Nadu on 12 Mar 2021
Posted in Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision Bhima Razu Prasad Vs State of Tamil Nadu Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr vs Meenakshi Marwah and Anr Legal Procedure Explained - Interpretation of Statutes Reportable Judgement or Order | Leave a comment

Tata Consultancy Services Limited Vs Cyrus Investments Pvt Ltd and Ors on 26 Mar 2021

Posted on March 29 by ShadesOfKnife

 

Tata Consultancy Services Limited Vs Cyrus Investments Pvt Ltd and Ors on 26 Mar 2021

 

Cyrus Investments Pvt. Ltd. Vs Tata Sons Ltd. Ors on 06 Jan 2020

 

Cyrus Investments Pvt. Ltd. Vs Tata Sons Ltd. Ors on 18 Dec 2019
Posted in Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 3-Judge (Full) Bench Decision Catena of Landmark Judgments Landmark Case Reportable Judgement or Order Tata Consultancy Services Limited Vs Cyrus Investments Pvt Ltd and Ors | Leave a comment

Jennifer Arul Vs Michael Arul

Posted on March 28 by ShadesOfKnife

 

This is the contempt proceeding under which husband was sent to 3 months simple/civil imprisonment for failing to pay maintenance.

Jennifer Arul Vs Michael Arul on 22 Mar 2021

This is the Review Petition filed by wife

Jennifer Arul Vs Michael Arul on 12 Dec 2018

 

Michael Arul Vs Jennifer Arul on 26 Oct 2017

 

Posted in Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged PWDV Act Sec 12 - Domestic Violence Application to Magistrate | Leave a comment

Aparna Bhat and Ors Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr on 18 Mar 2021

Posted on March 23 by ShadesOfKnife

A 2-judge bench of Supreme Court passed the following directions in regards to bail proceedings in sexual offences (only applicable to women survivors).

From Para 45 and 46,

44. Having regard to the foregoing discussion, it is hereby directed that henceforth:
(a) Bail conditions should not mandate, require or permit contact between the accused and the victim. Such conditions should seek to protect the complainant from any further harassment by the accused;
(b) Where circumstances exist for the court to believe that there might be a potential threat of harassment of the victim, or upon apprehension expressed, after calling for reports from the police, the nature of protection shall be separately considered and appropriate order made, in addition to a direction to the accused not to make any contact with the victim;
(c) In all cases where bail is granted, the complainant should immediately be informed that the accused has been granted bail and copy of the bail order made over to him/her within two days;
(d) Bail conditions and orders should avoid reflecting stereotypical or patriarchal notions about women and their place in society, and must strictly be in accordance with the requirements of the Cr. PC. In other words, discussion about the dress, behavior, or past “conduct” or “morals” of the prosecutrix, should not enter the verdict granting bail;
(e) The courts while adjudicating cases involving gender related crimes, should not suggest or entertain any notions (or encourage any steps) towards compromises between the prosecutrix and the accused to get married, suggest or mandate mediation between the accused and the survivor, or any form of compromise as it is beyond their powers and jurisdiction;
(f) Sensitivity should be displayed at all times by judges, who should ensure that there is no traumatization of the prosecutrix, during the proceedings, or anything said during the arguments, and
(g) Judges especially should not use any words, spoken or written, that would undermine or shake the confidence of the survivor in the fairness or impartiality of the court.
45. Further, courts should desist from expressing any stereotype opinion, in words spoken during proceedings, or in the course of a judicial order, to the effect that (i) women are physically weak and need protection; (ii) women are incapable of or cannot take decisions on their own; (iii) men are the “head” of the household and should take all the decisions relating to family; (iv) women should be submissive and obedient according to our culture; (v) “good” women are sexually chaste; (vi) motherhood is the duty and role of every woman, and assumptions to the effect that she wants to be a mother; (vii) women should be the ones in charge of their children, their upbringing and care; (viii) being alone at night or wearing certain clothes make women responsible for being attacked; (ix) a woman consuming alcohol, smoking, etc. may justify unwelcome advances by men or “has asked for it”; (x) women are emotional and often overreact or dramatize events, hence it is necessary to corroborate their testimony; (xi) testimonial evidence provided by women who are sexually active may be suspected when assessing “consent” in sexual offence cases; and (xii) lack of evidence of physical harm in sexual offence case leads to an inference of consent by the woman.

 

Aparna Bhat and Ors Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr on 18 Mar 2021

 

Posted in Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision Aparna Bhat and Ors Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr CrPC 437 - When bail may be taken in case of Non-Bailable Offence CrPC 438 - Anticipatory Bail Legal Procedure Explained - Interpretation of Statutes Recommended Guidelines or Directions Reportable Judgement or Order | Leave a comment

Tarlochan Dev Sharma Vs State of Punjab and Ors on 25 July 2001

Posted on March 22 by ShadesOfKnife

(The popular meaning also must not be resorted to)

Tarlochan Dev Sharma Vs State of Punjab and Ors on 25 July, 2001

Citations : [2001 AIR SC 2524], [2001 JT SC 5 645], [2002 LW 1 19], [2001 SCALE 4 472], [2001 SCC 6 260], [2001 SCR 3 1146], [2001 AIR SC 2689], [2001 AIR SCW 2689], [2001 JT 5 645]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1389589/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ada0e4b0149711411e78

Posted in Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision Legal Procedure Explained - Interpretation of Statutes PIL - Dowry Givers should be Prosecuted Reportable Judgement or Order Tarlochan Dev Sharma Vs State of Punjab and Ors | Leave a comment

Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs State of Assam on 16 Aug 2017

Posted on March 18 by ShadesOfKnife

A 3-judge bench of Apex Court held as follows regards to default bail u/s 167 CrPC,

From Para 4,

Therefore, the question before us is whether, pending investigation, the petitioner could be kept in custody for a maximum period of 60 days in terms of clause (ii) of proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. or for 90 days in terms of clause (i) of proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. without a charge sheet being filed.

From Para 25,

25. While it is true that merely because a minimum sentence is provided for in the statute it does not mean that only the minimum sentence is imposable. Equally, there is also nothing to suggest that only the maximum sentence is imposable. Either punishment can be imposed and even something in between. Where does one strike a balance? It was held that it is eventually for the court to decide what sentence should be imposed given the range available. Undoubtedly, the Legislature can bind the sentencing court by laying down the minimum sentence (not less than) and it can also lay down the maximum sentence. If the minimum is laid down, the sentencing judge has no option but to give a sentence “not less than” that sentence provided for. Therefore, thewords “not less than” occurring in Clause (i) to proviso (a) of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. (and in other provisions) must be given their natural and obvious meaning which is to say, not below a minimum threshold and in the case of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. these words must relate to an offence punishable witha minimum of 10 years imprisonment.

From Para 31,

31. In the 154th Report, the Law Commission noted that the unanimous opinion of members of the Bench and the Bar, prosecuting agencies and senior police officers during legal workshops held at various places was that the investigation of serious offences punishable with a sentence of 7 years or more should invariably be undertaken by senior officers. The Law Commission concluded, as a result of these extensive discussions, that it was desirable toseparate the investigating police from the law and order police and as many as seven reasons were given for arriving at this conclusion in Chapter II of the Report.

From Paras 40 and 41,

40. In the present case, it was also argued by learned counsel for the State that the petitioner did not apply for ‘default bail’ on or after 4th January, 2017 till 24th January, 2017 on which date his indefeasible right got extinguished on the filing of the charge sheet. Strictly speaking this is correct since the petitioner applied for regular bail on 11th January, 2017 in the Gauhati High Court – he made no specific application for grant of ‘default bail’. However, the application for regular bail filed by the accused on 11th January, 2017 did advert to the statutory period for filing a charge sheet having expired and that perhaps no charge sheet had in fact being filed. In any event, this issue was argued by learned counsel for the petitioner in the High Court and it was considered but not accepted by the High Court. The High Court did not reject the submission on the ground of maintainability but on merits. Therefore it is not as if the petitioner did not make any application for default bail – such an application was definitely made (if not in writing) then at least orally before the High Court. In our opinion, in matters of personal liberty, we cannot and  should not be too technical and must lean in favour of personal liberty. Consequently, whether the accused makes a written application for ‘default bail’ or an oral application for ‘default bail’ is of no consequence. The concerned court must deal with such an application by considering the statutory requirements namely, whether the statutory period for filing a charge sheet or challan has expired, whether the charge sheet or challan has been filed and whether the accused is prepared to and does furnish bail.
41. We take this view keeping in mind that in matters of personal liberty and Article 21 of the Constitution, it is not always advisable to be formalistic or technical. The history of the personal liberty jurisprudence of this Court and other constitutional courts includes petitions for a writ of habeas corpus and for other writs being entertained even on the basis of a letter addressed to the Chief Justice or the Court.

Then finally in Paras 46 and 47,

46. It was submitted that as of today, a charge sheet having been filed against the petitioner, he is not entitled to ‘default bail’ but must apply for regular bail – the ‘default bail’ chapter being now closed. We cannot agree for the simple reason that we are concerned with the interregnum between 4th January, 2017 and 24th January, 2017 when no charge sheet had been filed, during which period he had availed of his indefeasible right of ‘default bail’. It would have been another matter altogether if the petitioner had not applied for ‘default bail’ for whatever reason during this interregnum. There could be a situation (however rare) where an accused is not prepared to be bailed out perhaps for his personal security since he or she might be facing some threat outside the correction home or for any other reason. But then in such an event, the accused voluntarily gives up the indefeasible right for default bail and having forfeited that right the accused cannot, after the charge sheet or challan has been filed, claim a resuscitation of the indefeasible right. But that is not the case insofar as the petitioner is concerned, since he did not give up his indefeasible right for ‘default bail’ during the interregnum between 4th January, 2017 and 24th January, 2017 as is evident from the decision of the High Court rendered on 11th January, 2017. On the contrary, he had availed of his right to ‘default bail’ which could not have been defeated on 11th January, 2017 and which we are today compelled to acknowledge and enforce.
47. Consequently, we are of opinion that the petitioner had satisfied all the requirements of obtaining ‘default bail’ which is that on 11th January, 2017 he had put in more than 60 days in custody pending investigations into an alleged offence not punishable with imprisonment for a minimum period of 10 years, no charge sheet had been filed against him and he was prepared to furnish bail for his release, as such, he ought to have been released by the High Court on reasonable terms and conditions of bail.

Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs State of Assam on 16 Aug 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 924], [2017 ALLCC 101 287], [2017 ACR 3 2474], [2017 ALT CRL AP 3 141], [2017 CCR SC 3 371], [2017 DLT 242 79], [2017 ILR KER 3 673], [2017 JLJR 4 37], [2017 KHC 4 470], [2017 KLT 4 284], [2017 MLJ CRL 4 62], [2017 PLJR 4 53], [2017 RCR CRIMINAL 3 996], [2017 SCALE 9 24], [2017 UC 3 1756], [2017 SCC 15 67], [2018 SCC CRI 1 401], [2017 AIR SC 3948], [2017 AIC 178 75], [2018 CRI LJ 155]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/194334432/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/599a9dfd4a93262f6c14fba6

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/rakesh-kumar-paul-versus-state-of-assam

Posted in Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 3-Judge (Full) Bench Decision Catena of Landmark Judgments CrPC 167 - Default Bail CrPC 167 - Default Bail on Oral request or application CrPC 439 - Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail Landmark Case Legal Procedure Explained - Interpretation of Statutes Prakash Singh and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs State of Assam Reportable Judgement or Order | Leave a comment

Fakhrey Alam Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 15 Mar 2021

Posted on March 18 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of Supreme Court in this Order held as follows in regards to Default bail u/s 167 CrPC,

On the second aspect we cannot lose sight of the fact that what was envisaged by the Legislature was that the investigation should be completed in 24 hours but practically that was never found feasible. It is in these circumstances that Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. provided for time period within which the investigation should be completed, depending upon the nature of offences. Since, liberty is a Constitutional right, time periods were specified in the default of which the accused will have a right to default bail, a valuable right.
If we look at the scenario in the present case in that conspectus, the charge sheet under the provisions of law as originally filed on 04.09.2017 were required to be filed within 90 days but was actually filed within 180 days. This was on the premise of the charge under Section 18 of the UAPA Act. However, no charge sheet was filed even within 180 days under the UAPA Act, but post filing of the application for default bail, it was filed after 211 days. Thus, undoubtedly the period of 180 days to file the charge sheet qua UAPA Act had elapsed. We do not think that the State can take advantage of the fact that in one case there is one charge sheet and supplementary charge sheets are used to extend the time period in this manner by seeking to file the supplementary charge sheet qua the offences under the UAPA Act even beyond the period specified under Section 167 of the Cr.P.C beyond which default bail will be admissible, i.e, the period of 180 days. That period having expired and the charge sheet not having been filed qua those offences (albeit a supplementary charge sheet), we are of the view the appellant would be entitled to default bail in the aforesaid facts and circumstances.
We need only emphasize what is already observed in Bikramjit Singh case (supra) that default bail under first proviso of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. is a fundamental right and not merely a statutory right as it is, a procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus a fundamental right is granted to an accused person to be released on bail once the conditions of the first proviso to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. are fulfilled.
In fact in the majority judgment of this Court it has been held that an oral application for grant of default bail would suffice [See. Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam]3. The consequences of the UAPA Act are drastic in punishment and in that context, it has been held not to be a mere statutory right but part of the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Fakhrey Alam Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 15 Mar 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

 

Posted in Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision Article 21 of The Constitution of India Catena of Landmark Judgments CrPC 167 - Default Bail Fakhrey Alam Vs State of Uttar Pradesh Reportable Judgement or Order | Leave a comment

State of Goa Vs Fouziya Shaikh on 12 Mar 2021

Posted on March 17 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court said, State Election Commissioner cannot be a Government functionary as this Constitutional body is supposed to be independent body.

From Para 52,

52. Given the fact that the scheme contained in Part XV is bodily lifted into the provisions contained in Part IX-A, the powers exercised by the SEC under Article 243ZA(1) are the same as those vested in the Election Commission of India under Article 324 of the Constitution of India. As has been pointed out in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) and the aforesaid decisions, the entire supervision and conduct of elections to municipalities is vested in a constitutional authority that is the SEC which is to supervise and conduct elections by giving orders and directions to the State Government as well as authorities that are set up under State statutes for the purpose of supervision and conduct of elections. The power thus conferred by the Constitution is a power given to the SEC not only to carry out the constitutional mandate but also to fill in gaps where there is no law or rule governing a particular
situation during the conduct of an election. The SEC, being anindependent constitutional functionary, is not only to be obeyed by the State Government and the other authorities under local State statutes,but can also approach the writ court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to either enforce directions or orders issued by itor to ask for appropriate orders from High Courts in that behalf.

From Para 63 (Final observations)

63. A conspectus of the aforesaid judgments in the context of municipal elections would yield the following results.
I. Under Article 243 ZG(b), no election to any municipality can be called in question except by an election petition presented to a Tribunal as is provided by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State. This would mean that from the date of notification of the election till the date of the declaration of result a judicial hands-off is mandated by the non-obstante clause contained in Article 243ZG debarring the writ court under Articles
226 and 227 from interfering once the election process has begun until it is over. The constitutional bar operates only during this period. It is therefore a matter of discretion exercisable by a writ court as to whether an interference is called for when the electoral process is “imminent” i.e, the notification for elections is yet to be announced.
II. If, however, the assistance of a writ court is required in subserving the progress of the election and facilitating its completion, the writ court may issue orders provided that the election process, once begun, cannot be postponed or protracted in any manner.
III. The non-obstante clause contained in Article 243ZG does not operate as a bar after the election tribunal decides an election dispute before it. Thus, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and that of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is not affected as the non-obstante clause in Article 243ZG operates only during the process of election.
IV. Under Article 243ZA(1), the SEC is in overall charge of the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls, and the conduct of all municipal elections. If there is a constitutional or statutory infraction by any authority including the State Government either before or during the election process, the SEC by virtue of its power under Article 243ZA(1) can set right such infraction. For this purpose, it can direct the State
Government or other authority to follow the Constitution or legislative enactment or direct such authority to correct an order which infracts the constitutional or statutory mandate. For this purpose, it can also approach a writ court to issue necessary directions in this behalf. It is entirely upto the SEC to set the election process in motion or, in cases where a constitutional or statutory provision is not followed or infracted, to postpone the
election process until such illegal action is remedied. This the SEC will do taking into account the constitutional mandate of holding elections before the term of a municipality or municipal council is over. In extraordinary cases, the SEC may conduct elections after such term is over, only for good reason.
V. Judicial review of a State Election Commission’s order is available on grounds of review of administrative orders. Here again, the writ court must adopt a hands-off policy while the election process is on and interfere either before the process commences or after such process is completed unless interfering with such order subserves and facilitates the progress of the election.
VI. Article 243ZA(2) makes it clear that the law made by the legislature of a State, making provision with respect to matters relating to or in connection with elections to municipalities, is subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and in particular Article 243T, which deals with reservation of seats.
VII. The bar contained in Article 243ZG(a) mandates that there be a judicial hands-off of the writ court or any court in questioning the validity of any law relating to delimitation of constituency or allotment of seats to such constituency made or purporting to be made under Article 243ZA. This is by virtue of the non-obstante clause contained in Article 243ZG. The statutory provisions dealing with delimitation and allotment of seats cannot therefore be questioned in any court. However, orders made under such statutory provisions can be questioned in courts provided the concerned statute does not give such orders the status of a statutory provision.
VIII. Any challenge to orders relating to delimitation or allotment of seats including preparation of electoral rolls, not being part of the election process as delineated above, can also be challenged in the manner provided by the statutory provisions dealing with delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats to such constituencies.
IX. The constitutional bar of Article 243ZG(a) applies only to courts and not the State Election Commission, which is to supervise, direct and control preparation of electoral rolls and conduct elections to municipalities.
X. The result of this position is that it is the duty of the SEC to countermand illegal orders made by any authority including the State Government which delimit constituencies or allot seats to such constituencies, as is provided in proposition (IV) above. This may be done by the SEC either before or during the electoral process, bearing in mind its constitutional duty as delineated in the said proposition.

From Para 68,

68. The most disturbing feature of these cases is the subversion of the constitutional mandate contained in Article 243K of the Constitution of India. The State Election Commissioner has to be a person who is independent of the State Government as he is an important constitutional functionary who is to oversee the entire election process in the state qua panchayats and municipalities. The importance given to the independence of a State Election Commissioner is explicit from the provision for removal from his office made in the proviso to clause (2) of Article 243K. Insofar as the manner and the ground for his removal from the office is concerned, he has been equated with a Judge of a High Court. Giving an additional charge of such an
important and independent constitutional office to an officer who is directly under the control of the State Government is, in our view, a mockery of the constitutional mandate. We therefore declare that the additional charge given to a Law Secretary to the government of the state flouts the constitutional mandate of Article 243K. The State Government is directed to remedy this position by appointing an
independent person to be the State Election Commissioner at the earliest. Such person cannot be a person who holds any office or post in the Central or any State Government. It is also made clear that henceforth, all State Election Commissioners appointed under Article 243K in the length and breadth of India have to be independent persons who cannot be persons who are occupying a post or office under the Central or any State Government. If there are any such persons holding the post of State Election Commissioner in any other state, such persons must be asked forthwith to step down from such office and the State Government concerned be bound to fulfil the constitutional mandate of Article 243K by appointing only independent persons to this high constitutional office. The directions contained in this paragraph are issued under Article 142 of the Constitution of India so as to ensure that the constitutional mandate of an independent
State Election Commission which is to conduct elections under Part IX and IXA of the Constitution be strictly followed in the future.

State of Goa Vs Fouziya Shaikh on 12 Mar 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/68534005/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/state-of-goa-anr-versus-fouziya-imtiaz-shaikh-anr

Posted in Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 3-Judge (Full) Bench Decision Catena of Landmark Judgments Election Matter Landmark Case Reportable Judgement or Order State Government must obey State Election Commission State of Goa Vs Fouziya Shaikh | Leave a comment

Sartaj Singh Vs State of Haryana on 15 Mar 2021

Posted on March 16 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that, even after getting discharged, an accused can be made to face trail u/s 319 CrPC, if new facts/evidence emerge during trial, even at chief-examination of prosecution witnesses.

From Para 6,

6.2 Considering the law laid down by this Court in Hardeep Singh (supra) and the observations and findings referred to and reproduced hereinabove, it emerges that
(i) the Court can exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief
of the witness concerned and the Court need not wait till the cross-examination of such a witness and the Court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination; and
(ii) a person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been charge-sheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under Section 319 CrPC, provided from the evidence (may be on the basis of the evidence collected in the form of statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned), it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial.

6.4 In the case of Rajesh v. State of Haryana (2019) 6 SCC 368, after considering the observations made by this Court in Hardeep Singh (supra) referred to hereinabove, this Court has further observed and held that even in a case where the stage of giving opportunity to the complainant to file a protest petition urging upon the trial court to summon other persons as well who were named in FIR but not implicated in the chargesheet has gone, in that case also, the Court is still not powerless by virtue of Section 319 CrPC and even those persons named in FIR but not implicated in chargesheet can be summoned to face the trial provided during the trial some evidence surfaces against the proposed accused.

Sartaj Singh Vs State of Haryana on 15 Mar 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/sartaj-singh-versus-state-of-haryana-anr-etc

Posted in Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision Catena of Landmark Judgments CrPC 319 - Discharged person also can be again made accused CrPC 319 - Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence Landmark Case Reportable Judgement or Order Sartaj Singh Vs State of Haryana | Leave a comment

Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay Vs Union of India (Election Reforms: Right to Reject)

Posted on March 15 by ShadesOfKnife

Adv Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay filed a PIL with regards to Election Reforms in India, i.e., Right to Reject all candidates in an election.

On 2021-03-15

Supreme Court issued notice to Union of India and Election Commission of India.

Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay Vs Union of India on 15 Mar 2021

On 2021-04-30

Computed generated date.

 

Posted in Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay Vs Union of India (Election Reforms: Right to Reject) Election Matter Litigation by Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay | Leave a comment

Post navigation

  • Older posts

Search within entire Content of “Shades of Knife”

My Twitter Timeline

Tweets by @Shadesofknife

Recent Posts

  • Varshaben Himantlal Vejani Vs State of Gujarat on 15 Jul 2016 April 13, 2021
  • Rajesh R. Nair Vs Meera Babu on 5 Mar 2013 April 13, 2021
  • Bhima Razu Prasad Vs State of Tamil Nadu on 12 Mar 2021 April 6, 2021
  • Chegireddy Venkata Reddy Vs Government of Andhra Pradesh on 30 Jul 2020 April 5, 2021
  • Lingam Seetharammayya and Ors Vs State of AP and Ors on 16 Mar 2021 April 5, 2021

Most Read Posts

  • Satish Chander Ahuja Vs Sneha Ahuja on 15 Oct 2020 (844 views)
  • Government Guesthouse at Kapuluppada, Visakhapatnam (479 views)
  • Dr Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy Vs State of AP and Ors (450 views)
  • In Re To issues certain guidelines regarding inadequacies and deficiencies in criminal trials (409 views)
  • Rajnesh Pal Naidu Vs Neha Naidu Joshi and Anr on 04 Nov 2020 (401 views)
  • IPC 498A is a Compoundable Case in Andhra Pradesh (385 views)
  • Default Bail under Code of Criminal Procedure (311 views)
  • Dr. Haniraj L. Chulani Vs Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa on 8 April 1996 (309 views)
  • Vijay Kumar Ramachandra Bhate Vs Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate on 16 April, 2003 (305 views)
  • Shabnam Sheikh Vs State of Maharashtra on 15 Oct 2020 (249 views)

Tags

Legal Procedure Explained - Interpretation of Statutes (236)Landmark Case (230)Reportable Judgement or Order (196)Work-In-Progress Article (196)Catena of Landmark Judgments (146)2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision (127)Sandeep Pamarati (82)Article 21 of The Constitution of India (64)Absurd Or After Thought Or Baseless Or False Or General Or Inherently Improbable Or Improved Or UnSpecific Or Omnibus Or Vague Allegations (50)Perjury Under 340 CrPC (47)Summary Post (46)3-Judge (Full) Bench Decision (46)1-Judge Bench Decision (45)Reprimands or Setbacks to YCP Govt of Andhra Pradesh (44)IPC 498a Not Made Out (32)CrPC 482 - Quash (32)Rules of the Act/Ordinance/Notification/Circular (32)PWDV Act 20 - Maintenance Granted (31)PIL - CrPC 125 Must Go From Statute Book (28)Advocate Antics (27)

Categories

Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification (520)Bare Acts or State Amendments or Statutes or GOs or Notifications issued by Central or State Governments (271)High Court of Andhra Pradesh Judgment or Order or Notification (138)High Court of Delhi Judgment or Order or Notification (85)High Court of Bombay Judgment or Order or Notification (79)General Study Material (53)High Court of Karnataka Judgment or Order or Notification (46)Prakasam DV Cases (46)LLB Study Material (45)Assorted Court Judgments or Orders or Notifications (40)High Court of Madras Judgment or Order or Notification (38)Judicial Activism (for Public Benefit) (35)High Court of Punjab & Haryana Judgment or Order or Notification (34)District or Sessions or Magistrate Court Judgment or Order or Notification (30)High Court of Allahabad Judgment or Order or Notification (28)High Court of Gujarat Judgment or Order or Notification (22)High Court of Madhya Pradesh Judgment or Order or Notification (21)High Court of Kerala Judgment or Order or Notification (16)High Court of Calcutta Judgment or Order or Notification (12)Chittor DV Cases (11)

Recent Comments

  • ShadesOfKnife on Sirangai Shoba @ Shoba Munnuri Vs Sirangi Muralidhar Rao on 19 October, 2016
  • muralidhar Rao Sirangi on Sirangai Shoba @ Shoba Munnuri Vs Sirangi Muralidhar Rao on 19 October, 2016
  • ShadesOfKnife on J.Shyam Babu Vs The State Of Telangana on 9 February, 2017
  • anuj on J.Shyam Babu Vs The State Of Telangana on 9 February, 2017
  • ShadesOfKnife on Syed Nazim Husain Vs Additional Principal Judge Family Court & Anr on 9 January, 2003

Archives of SoK

  • April 2021 (14)
  • March 2021 (58)
  • February 2021 (14)
  • January 2021 (50)
  • December 2020 (35)
  • November 2020 (68)
  • October 2020 (67)
  • September 2020 (29)
  • August 2020 (42)
  • July 2020 (20)
  • June 2020 (36)
  • May 2020 (40)
  • April 2020 (38)
  • March 2020 (26)
  • February 2020 (43)
  • January 2020 (36)
  • December 2019 (35)
  • November 2019 (4)
  • October 2019 (18)
  • September 2019 (58)
  • August 2019 (33)
  • July 2019 (12)
  • June 2019 (19)
  • May 2019 (5)
  • April 2019 (19)
  • March 2019 (58)
  • February 2019 (11)
  • January 2019 (90)
  • December 2018 (97)
  • November 2018 (43)
  • October 2018 (31)
  • September 2018 (74)
  • August 2018 (47)
  • July 2018 (143)
  • June 2018 (92)
  • May 2018 (102)
  • April 2018 (59)
  • March 2018 (8)

Blogroll

  • Daaman Promoting Harmony 0
  • Fight against Legal Terrorism Fight against Legal Terrorism along with MyNation Foundation 0
  • Good Morning Good Morning News 0
  • Insaaf India Insaaf Awareness Movement 0
  • MyNation Hope Foundation Wiki 0
  • MyNation.net Equality, Justice and Harmony 0
  • Sarvepalli Legal 0
  • Save Indian Family Save Indian Family Movement 0
  • SIF Chandigarh SIF Chandigarh 0
  • The Male Factor The Male Factor 0
  • Vaastav Foundation The Social Reality 0
  • Voice4india Indian Laws, Non-profits, Environment 0
  • Writing Law Writing Law by Ankur 0

RSS Cloudflare Status

  • Elevated number of 530/503 errors from Amsterdam, Netherlands - (AMS) April 14, 2021
    Apr 14, 00:23 UTCResolved - This incident has been resolved.Apr 13, 17:35 UTCInvestigating - Customers reaching Amsterdam, Netherlands - (AMS) would have experienced an elevated number of 530/503 errors.
  • Cloudflare control plane API April 13, 2021
    Apr 13, 22:12 UTCResolved - This incident has been resolved.Apr 13, 21:57 UTCMonitoring - A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.Apr 13, 21:52 UTCInvestigating - Cloudflare control plane API is experiencing a partial outage. This impacts the administration of SSL for SaaS , and Cloudflare Pages. SSL termination and Pages at […]
  • Distributed Web Resolver Issues April 12, 2021
    Apr 12, 18:00 UTCResolved - Queries to the Cloudflare Distributed Web Resolver for the Distributed Web Gateway were unsuccessful on April 12th 2020 from 18:00 to 00:00 UTC. Websites served by the gateway during this time may have displayed errors or been inaccessible.

RSS List of Spam Server IPs from Project Honeypot

  • 212.129.2.166 | SD April 13, 2021
    Event: Bad Event | Total: 26,333 | First: 2018-11-27 | Last: 2021-04-13
  • 104.223.85.87 | S April 13, 2021
    Event: Bad Event | Total: 10 | First: 2021-03-27 | Last: 2021-04-13
  • 190.247.240.155 | SD April 13, 2021
    Event: Bad Event | Total: 128 | First: 2021-04-13 | Last: 2021-04-13
Proudly powered by WordPress
Theme: Flint by Star Verte LLC
pixel