Vishnu Kumar Tiwari Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 09 Jul 2019

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows:

From Paras 41 and 42,

41. In the facts of this case, having regard to the nature of the allegations contained in the protest petition and the annexures which essentially consisted of affidavits, if the Magistrate was convinced on the basis of the consideration of the final report, the statements under Section 161 of the Code that no prima facie case is made out, certainly the Magistrate could not be compelled to take cognizance by treating the protest petition as a complaint. The fact that he may have jurisdiction in a case to treat the protest petition as a complaint, is a different matter. Undoubtedly, if he treats the protest petition as a complaint, he would have to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 200 and 202 of the Code if the latter Section also commends itself to the Magistrate. In other words, necessarily, the complainant and his witnesses would have to be examined. No doubt, depending upon the material which is made available to a Magistrate by the complainant in the protest petition, it may be capable of being relied on in a particular case having regard to its inherent nature and impact on the conclusions in the final report. That is, if the material is such that it persuades the court to disagree with the conclusions arrived at by the Investigating Officer, cognizance could be taken under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code for which there is no necessity to examine the witnesses under Section 200 of the Code. But as the Magistrate could not be compelled to treat the protest petition as a complaint, the remedy of the complainant would be to file a fresh complaint and invite the Magistrate to follow the procedure under Section 200 of the Code or Section 200 read with Section 202 of the Code. Therefore, we are of the view that in the facts of this case, we cannot support the decision of the High Court.
42. It is true that law mandates notice to the informant/complainant where the Magistrate contemplates accepting the final report. On receipt of notice, the informant may address the court ventilating his objections to the final report. This he usually does in the form of the protest petition.

From Para 45,

45. If a protest petition fulfills the requirements of a complaint, the Magistrate may treat the protest petition as a complaint and deal with the same as required under Section 200 read with Section 202 of the Code. In this case, in fact, there is no list of witnesses as such in the protest petition. The prayer in the protest petition is to set aside the final report and to allow the application against the final report. While we are not suggesting that the form must entirely be decisive of the question whether it amounts to a complaint or liable to be treated as a complaint, we would think that essentially, the protest petition in this case, is summing up of the objections the second respondent against the final report.

Vishnu Kumar Tiwari Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 09 Jul 2019

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80081494/

https://www.lawyerservices.in/Vishnu-Kumar-Tiwari-Versus-State-of-Uttar-Pradesh-and-Others-2019-07-09

Ms New Era Fabrics Ltd Vs Bhanumati Keshrichand Jhaveri and Ors on 03 Mar 2020

Posted on June 26 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court , based on Madras HC Advocates Association decision here, initiated Perjury proceedings.

5.3 We do not wish to comment in detail upon the intention behind making the aforesaid interpolations. At this juncture, all that is required to be assessed is whether a prima facie case is made out that there is a reasonable likelihood that the offence specified in Section 340 read with Section 195(1)(b) of the CrPC has been committed, and it is expedient in the interest of justice to take action. From the above discussion, it is evident that the handwritten modification made by the Petitioner in Column 12 of the balance sheet dated 19.09.2008 is a significant alteration from the terms as used in the original document. Hence we find that a prima facie case is made out that the Petitioner has fabricated evidence for the purpose of the SLP proceedings before this Court.
We further find that prima facie case is also made out against Mr. R.K. Agarwal, for having sworn in his affidavit before this Court as to the veracity of the facts stated and documents filed in SLP (Civil) No. 3309/2018, even though he had relied upon the original auditor’s report, which did not contain any handwritten interpolation, in his evidence before the Trial Court.

Ms New Era Fabrics Ltd Vs Bhanumati Keshrichand Jhaveri and Ors on 03 Mar 2020

Madras High Court Advocates Association Vs Dr.A.S.Anand, Honble The C.J.I. on 12 May 2001

Posted on June 26 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court passed scathing remarks regards litigants who lie with impunity in their affidavits filed into the Court.

This case is also called as Re: Suo Moto Proceedings Against MR. R, KARUPPAN, ADVOCATE Vs Unknown.

From Para 15,

15. Court are entrusted with the powers of dispensation and adjudication of justice of the rival claims of the parties besides determining the criminal liability of the offenders for offences committed against the society. The courts are further expected to do justice quickly and impartially not being biased by any extraneous considerations. Justice dispensation system would be wrecked if statutory restrictions are not imposed upon the litigants, who attempt to mislead the court by filing and relying upon the false evidence particularly in cases, the adjudication of which is depended upon the statement of facts. if the result of the proceedings are to be respected, these issues before the courts must be resolved to the extent possible in accordance with the truth. The purity of proceedings of the court cannot be permitted to be sullied by a party on frivolous, vexatious or insufficient grounds or relying upon false evidence inspired by extraneous considerations or revengeful desire to harass or spite his opponent. Sanctity of the affidavits has to be preserved and protected discouraging the filing of irresponsible statements, without any regard to accuracy.

17. In India, law relating to the offence of perjury is given a statutory definition under Section 191 and Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code, incorporated to deal with the offences relating to giving false evidence against public justice. The offences incorporated under this Chapter are based upon recognition of the decline of moral values and erosion of sanctity of oath. Unscrupulous litigants are found daily resorting to utter blatant falsehood in the courts which has, to some extent, resulted in polluting the judicial system. It is a fact, though unfortunate, that a general impression is created that most of the witnesses coming in the courts despite taking oath make false statements to suit the interests of the parties calling them. Effective and stern action is required to be taken for preventing the evil of perjury, concededly let lose by vested interest and professional litigants. The mere existence of the penal provisions to deal with perjury would be a cruel joke with the society unless the courts stop to take an evasive recourse despite proof of the commission of the offence under Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code. If the system is to service, effective action is the need of the time. The present case is no exception to the general practice being followed by many of the litigants in the country.

18. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case, the record of proceedings in Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Criminal) No.5 of 2000 and Writ Petition No.77 of 2001, we are prima facie satisfied that the respondent herein, in his affidavit filed in support of the writ petition (for the purposes of being used in the judicial proceedings, i.e. writ petition), has wrongly made a statement that the age of Dr. Justice A.S. Anand has not been determined by the President of India in terms of-Article 217 of the constitution. We are satisfied that such a statement supported by an affricative of the respondent was known to him to be false which he believed to be false and/or atleast did not believe to be true. It is not disputed that an affidavit is evidence within the meaning of Section 191 of the Indian Penal Code and a person swearing to a false affidavit is guilty of perjury punishable under Section 193 IPC. The respondent herein, being legally bound by an oath to state the truth in his affidavit accompanying the petition is prima facie held to have made a false statement which constitutes an offence of giving false evidence as defined under Section 191 IPC, punishable under Section 193 IPC.

19. With the object of eradicating the evil of perjury, we empower the Registrar General of this Court to depute an officer of the rank of Deputy Registrar or above of the Court to file a complaint under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code against the respondent herein, before a Magistrate of competent jurisdiction at Delhi. Such officer is directed to file such complaint and take all steps necessary for prosecuting the complaint.

Madras High Court Advocates Association Vs Dr.A.S.Anand, Honble The C.J.I. on 12 May 2001

Citations : [2001 OLR 2 188], [2001 SCC 5 289], [2001 SCALE 4 199], [2001 SUPREME 4 108], [2001 JT SUPP 1 332], [2001 CGLJ 2 499], [2001 CRLJ SC 2611], [2001 SCR 3 750], [2001 AIR SC 2204], [2001 LW 3 61], [2001 SCC CRI 876], [2001 AIR SCW 2104]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1356442/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad9be4b0149711411d8a

Swaran Singh Vs State of Punjab on 26 Apr 2000

Posted on June 26 by ShadesOfKnife

From the decision of the division bench of Supreme Court, this is the concurring opinion of Justice D.P. Wadhwa. Wonderful, indeed!

D.P Wadhwa, J. (concurring)— I agree with the judgment pronounced by my noble and learned sister Ruma Pal, J. I, however, wish to add a few lines.

35. The first information report was lodged within 2-1/2 hours of the occurrence and the case registered against four persons, namely, Shamsher Singh, Jagjit Singh, Amrik Singh and Mittar Pal Singh alias Lovely. These four accused were named in the FIR. While Shamsher Singh surrendered a day following the lodging of the FIR, no steps were taken to apprehend the other named accused. The case was not only investigated by Sub-Inspector Karnail Singh, SHO of the police station concerned but also by Mohinder Singh, DSP, Baldev Sharma, DSP, Sanjeev Gupta, SP (Detective) and B.P Tiwari, DIG (Crime). When challan was put up, it was only against Shamsher Singh. A criminal complaint was filed by the complainant and all the accused were committed to stand their trial in the Court of Session for various offences. In the course of the trial, more than 50 prosecution witnesses were given up having been won over and the case hinged on the statements of seven witnesses which led to the conviction of Shamsher Singh and Jagjit Singh by the trial court, upheld by the High Court and now affirmed by this Court. The questions that arise for consideration are as to why the police did not challan the accused Jagjit Singh and why over 50 witnesses should have been given up. It only shows that the criminal justice system is in doldrums. There has to be honest investigation uninfluenced by any political or other pressure.

36. A criminal case is built on the edifice of evidence, evidence that is admissible in law. For that, witnesses are required whether it is direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. Here are the witnesses who are a harassed lot. A witness in a criminal trial may come from a far-off place to find the case adjourned. He has to come to the court many times and at what cost to his own self and his family is not difficult to fathom. It has become more or less a fashion to have a criminal case adjourned again and again till the witness tires and gives up. It is the game of unscrupulous lawyers to get adjournments for one excuse or the other till a witness is won over or is tired. Not only is a witness threatened, he is abducted, he is maimed, he is done away with, or even bribed. There is no protection for him. In adjourning the matter without any valid cause a court unwittingly becomes party to miscarriage of justice. A witness is then not treated with respect in the court. He is pushed out from the crowded courtroom by the peon. He waits for the whole day and then he finds that the matter is adjourned. He has no place to sit and no place even to have a glass of water. And when he does appear in court, he is subjected to unchecked and prolonged examination and cross-examination and finds himself in a hapless situation. For all these reasons and others a person abhors becoming a witness. It is the administration of justice that suffers. Then appropriate diet money for a witness is a far cry. Here again the process of harassment starts and he decides not to get the diet money at all. High Courts have to be vigilant in these matters. Proper diet money must be paid immediately to the witness (not only when he is examined but for every adjourned hearing) and even sent to him and he should not be left to be harassed by the subordinate staff. If the criminal justice system is to be put on a proper pedestal, the system cannot be left in the hands of unscrupulous lawyers and the sluggish State machinery. Each trial should be properly monitored. Time has come that all the courts, district courts, subordinate courts are linked to the High Court with a computer and a proper check is made on the adjournments and recording of evidence. The Bar Council of India and the State Bar Councils must play their part and lend their support to put the criminal system back on its trail. Perjury has also become a way of life in the law courts. A trial Judge knows that the witness is telling a lie and is going back on his previous statement, yet he does not wish to punish him or even file a complaint against him. He is required to sign the complaint himself which deters him from filing the complaint. Perhaps law needs amendment to clause (b) of Section 340(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in this respect as the High Court can direct any officer to file a complaint. To get rid of the evil of perjury, the court should resort to the use of the provisions of law as contained in Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Swaran Singh Vs State of Punjab on 26 Apr 2000

Citations : [2000 ACR SC 2 1648], [2000 AIR SC 2017], [2000 CRI LJ 2780], [2000 JT SC 6 623], [2000 RCR CRIMINAL 2 762], [2000 SCALE 4 153], [2000 SCC 5 668], [2001 SCC CRI 190], [2000 CRLJ 0 2780], [2001 SCC CR 0 190], [2000 AIR SC 1895], [2000 CRIMES SC 3 12], [2000 SUPREME 4 364], [2000 CRLJ 106 2780], [2000 CCR 2 149], [2000 SLT 4 138], [2000 SRJ 5 487], [2000 JCC SC 2 694], [2000 JT 6 623], [2000 CRIMES 3 12], [2000 RECENTCR 2 762], [2000 AIR SCW 1895], [2000 CRILJ 2780]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/489802/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad6ae4b0149711411587

Sanjay Vs The State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 20 Jun 2022

Posted on June 25 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows:

We are of the considered view that in a matter involving personal liberty, the Court is expected to pass orders in one way or other taking into account the merits of the matter at the earliest. At any rate, posting an application for anticipatory bail after a couple of months cannot be appreciated.
We request the High Court to dispose of the application for anticipatory bail on its own merits and in accordance with law expeditiously, preferably within a period of three weeks after reopening of the Court. If the main application could not be disposed of, for any reason, within the stipulated time, relief sought for in the interlocutory application shall be considered on its own merits. Till such time, we grant interim protection from arrest to the petitioner herein.

Sanjay Vs The State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 20 Jun 2022

Elizabeth Dinshaw Vs Arvand M.Dinshaw and Anr on 11 Nov 1986

Posted on June 21 by ShadesOfKnife

The Division Bench of the Apex Court held as follows (in regards to Custody of Children):

8. Whenever a question arises before a court pertaining to the custody of a minor child, the matter is to be decided not on considerations of the legal rights of parties but on the sole and predominant criterion of what would best serve the interest and welfare of the minor. We have twice interviewed Dustan in our chambers and talked with him. We found him to be too tender in age and totally immature to be able to form any independent opinion of his own as to which parent he should stay with. The child is an American citizen. Excepting for the last few months that have elapsed since his being brought to India by the process of illegal abduction by the father, he has spent the rest of his life in the United States of America and he was doing well in school there. In our considered opinion it will be in the best interests and welfare of Dustan that he should go back to the United States of America and continue his education there under the custody and guardianship of the mother to whom such custody and guardianship have been entrusted by a competent court in that country. We are also satisfied that the petitioner who is the mother, is full of genuine love and affection for the child and she can be safely trusted to look after him, educate him and attend in every possible way to his proper upbringing. The child has not taken root in this country and he is still accustomed and acclimatized to the conditions and environments obtaining in the place of his origin in the United States of America. The child’s presence in India is the result of an illegal act of abduction and the father who is guilty of the said act cannot claim any advantage by stating that he has already put the child in some school in Pune. The conduct of the father has not been such as to inspire confidence in us that he is a fit and suitable person to be entrusted with the custody and guardianship of the child for the present.

Comity of Courts:

9. In Re H. (infants)1 the Court of Appeal in England had occasion to consider a somewhat similar question. That case concerned the abduction to England of two minor boys who were American citizens. The father was a natural-born American citizen and the mother, though of Scottish origin, had been resident for 20 years in the United States of America. They were divorced in 1953 by a decree in Mexico, which embodied provisions entrusting the custody of the two boys to the mother with liberal access to the father. By an amendment made in that order in December 1964, a provision was incorporated that the boys should reside at all times in the State of New York and should at all times be under the control and jurisdiction of the State of New York. In March 1965, the mother removed the boys to England, without having obtained the approval of the New York court, and without having consulted the father; she purchased a house in England with the intention of remaining there permanently and of cutting off all contacts with the father. She ignored an order made in June 1965, by the Supreme Court of New York State to return the boys there. On a motion on notice given by the father in the Chancery Division of the Court in England, the trial Judge Cross, J. directed that since the children were American children and the American court was the proper court to decide the issue of custody, and as it was the duty of courts in all countries to see that a parent doing wrong by removing children out of their country did not gain any advantage by his or her wrongdoing, the court without going into the merits of the question as to where and with whom the children should live, would order that the children should go back to America. In the appeal filed against the said judgment in the Court of Appeal, Willmer, L.J while dismissing the appeal extracted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Cross, J.‡:

“The sudden and unauthorised removal of children from one country to another is far too frequent nowadays, and as it seems to me, it is the duty of all courts in all countries to do all they can to ensure that the wrongdoer does not gain an advantage by his wrongdoing.

The courts in all countries ought, as I see it, to be careful not to do anything to encourage this tendency. This substitution of self-help for due process of law in this field can only harm the interests of wards generally, and a Judge should, as I see it, pay regard to the orders of the proper foreign court unless he is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that to do so would inflict serious harm on the child.”

10. With respect we are in complete agreement with the aforesaid enunciation of the principles of law to be applied by the courts in situations such as this.

Elizabeth Dinshaw Vs Arvand M.Dinshaw and Anr on 11 Nov 1986

Citations : [1987 SCC 1 42], [1987 SCR 1 175], [1987 CRIMES SC 1 71], [1986 SCALE 2 745], [1987 AIR SC 3], [1986 JT 1 795], [1987 SCC CRI 13]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/271434/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac23e4b014971140e22f

Union of India and Ors Vs MS J.K.Mittal and Co and Ors on 28 Mar 2018

Posted on June 17 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court allowed the transfer petitions of UOI praying to transfer two case pending before High Courts of Delhi and Chhattisgarh.

Union of India and Ors Vs MS J.K.Mittal and Co and Ors on 28 Mar 2018

Here is the earlier order, staying operation of the further proceedings in above pending Writs before High Courts of Delhi and Chhattisgarh.

Union of India and Ors Vs MS J.K.Mittal and Co and Ors on 22 Jan 2018

In Re Enforcement And Implementation of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on 02 May 2005

Posted on June 14 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court held as follows and passed directions to take steps to implement specific sections of DP Act 1961:

From Para 2,

2. Possibly, a social revolution is needed to put an end to the menace. Refusal by the bride’s father to pay dowry, refusal of the girls to get married if dowry is insisted upon and the attaching of a social stigma to those who demand dowry, can alone ultimately put an end to this system or at least reduce its prevalence. Obviously, the enactment of a law prohibiting this evil should go a long way in tackling the menace.

From Para 4,

4. There was a further amendment to the Act by Act 43 of 1986 making the provisions more stringent and enhancing the punishment for taking or abetting the taking of dowry. In spite of all this, it was seen that the enforcement of the provisions of the Act was thoroughly unsatisfactory and this is reflected by the filing of this Writ Petition in this Court, in public interest.

From Para 8,

8. In the context of the developments that have taken place, it is submitted by the amicus curiae appointed by this Court that no serious effort has been made to implement the provisions of the Act and the Rules and unless directions are issued by this Court it is highly unlikely that the provisions of the Act and the Rules will be effectively implemented. It is, therefore, submitted that this Court may direct the Central Government and the State Governments to give wide publicity to the relevant provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Rules 2 and 3 of the Dowry Prohibition (Maintenance of Lists of presents to the Bride and Bridegroom) Rules, 1985 by appropriate means including educating the student community about the relevant provisions and the mandatory requirements of the Act and the Rules. It is further submitted that the State Governments may be directed to appoint sufficient number of Dowry Prohibition Officers with independent charge in each district of the concerned State, commensurate with the population of the District and to ensure that only dedicated and sincere officers are so appointed. It is submitted that directions may be issued to the Dowry Prohibition Officers to take immediate steps for strict enforcement and implementation of the provisions of Section 3, 4, 4A and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Rules 2 and 3 of the Dowry Prohibition (Maintenance of Lists of presents to the Bride and Bridegroom) Rules, 1985.

From Para 10,

10. When there is failure on the part of the Executive to strictly implement a law like the one in question, enacted to tackle a social problem which has assumed menacing proportions, the Court has a duty to step in with a mandamus to direct its implementation rigorously and effectively. In that context, we find that it is necessary to step in and issue some more directions to the respondents in addition to incorporating the directions already issued by this Court by way of interim measure as part of this final judgment.

From Para 11,

11. Therefore, in addition to directing the respondents to implement all the interim directions which were issued in this case thus far, we further direct the Union of India and the States to take more effective steps to implement the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 with particular reference to Sections 3 and 4 thereof and the various rules framed thereunder. In that process, they are also directed to activate the Dowry Prohibition Officers.

Closing comments:

12. The conscience of the society needs to be fully awakened to the evils of the dowry system so that the demand for dowry itself should lead to loss of face in the society for those who demand it. We have no doubt that our young and enlightened women would rise to the occasion to fight the evil which tends to make them articles of commerce. We also hope that our educated young males would refuse to be sold in the marriage market and come forward to choose their partners in life in a fair manner.

13. The establishment of a committed and sincere machinery to implement the Act and the Rules can hasten the eradication of the evil. The Union of India and the State Governments are directed to devise means to create honest, efficient and committed machinery for the purpose of implementation of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and the various Rules framed thereunder.

In Re Enforcement And Implementation Of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on 02 May 2005

Citations : [2005 BOMCR 5 198], [2005 SUPREME 3 739], [2005 DLT SC 119 452], [2005 DMC SC 1 805], [2005 CRILJ 2598], [2005 CRLJ SC 2598], [2005 AIR SC 2375], [2005 JCR SC 3 170], [2005 JT SC 5 71], [2005 UJ SC 2 880], [2005 AIOL 241], [2005 SCC 4 565], [2005 SCALE 4 535], [2005 ALLMR SC 5 570], [2005 SCR 3 1020], [2005 BLJR 2 1285], [2005 SCC CRI 1163], [2005 CRI LJ 2598]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/899749/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae12e4b0149711412dda

https://www.legitquest.com/case/in-re-enforcement-and-implementation-of-dowry-prohibition-act-1961/18C

Rohitash Kumar and Ors Vs Om Prakash Sharma and Ors on 6 Nov 2012

Posted on June 13 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court talks about Interpretation of Statutes:

Addition and Subtraction of words:
22. The Court has to keep in mind the fact that, while interpreting the provisions of a Statute, it can neither add, nor subtract even a single word. The legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum” means, “From the words of law, there must be no departure”. A section is to be interpreted by reading all of its parts together, and it is not permissible, to omit any part thereof. The Court cannot proceed with the assumption that the legislature, while enacting the Statute has committed a mistake; it must proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said; even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by it in framing the statute, and it is not open to the court to add and amend, or by construction, make up for the deficiencies, which have been left in the Act. The Court can only iron out the creases but while doing so, it must not alter the fabric, of which an Act is woven. The Court, while interpreting statutory provisions, cannot add words to a Statute, or read words into it which are not part of it, especially when a literal reading of the same, produces an intelligible result. (Vide: Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar & Ors., AIR 1953 SC 148; Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459; M. Pentiah & Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1107; The Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 849; and Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 71).
23. The Statute is not to be construed in light of certain notions that the legislature might have had in mind, or what the legislature is expected to have said, or what the legislature might have done, or what the duty of the legislature to have said or done was. The Courts have to administer the law as they find it, and it is not permissible for the Court to twist the clear language of the enactment, in order to avoid any real, or imaginary hardship which such literal interpretation may cause.
24. In view of the above, it becomes crystal clear that, under the garb of interpreting the provision, the Court does not have the power to add or subtract even a single word, as it would not amount to interpretation, but legislation.

Citations : [2013 AIR SC 30], [2013 ALD SC 1 135], [2013 ALR 96 825], [2013 AWC SC 2 1245], [2013 FLR 136 92], [2012 JT SC 11 219], [2012 SCALE 11 30], [2013 SCC 11 451], [2012 SCR 13 47], [2013 SCT SC 1 537], [2013 SLJ SC 1 27], [2013 SLJ SC 2 16], [2013 SCC L&S 3 368], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 922], [2013 AIC 121 163], [2012 AIOL 508], [2012 SLT 8 316], [2012 SUPREME 7 696], [2012 LLN 5 83], [2012 SCJ 8 534], [2012 AIR SC 6157], [2012 CLT 4 325], [2013 KCCR SN 1 19], [2012 AIR SCW 6157]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/58524857/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af20e4b0149711415afe

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004

Posted on June 13 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows:

10. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous i.e they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. (See J.P Bansal v. State of Rajasthan 2003 5 SCC 134.)

11. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As was noted by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner 1846 6 Moo PC 1:

“We cannot aid the legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there.”

The view was reiterated by this Court in State of M.P v. G.S Dall and Flour Mills AIR 1991 SC 772 and State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel JT 1998 2 SC 253. Speaking briefly, the court cannot reframe the legislation, as noted in J.P Bansal case for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate.

12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature.

13. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the “language” is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as the legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making.

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004

Citations : [2005 SCC CRI 1570], [2004 SCALE 10 174], [2005 CRIMES SC 1 49], [2005 AIR SC 294], [2005 SUPREME 1 477], [2005 SCC 10 437], [2004 JT SC 10 349]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1029488/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae07e4b0149711412c03

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification

Vishnu Kumar Tiwari Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 09 Jul 2019

Ms New Era Fabrics Ltd Vs Bhanumati Keshrichand Jhaveri and Ors on 03 Mar 2020

Madras High Court Advocates Association Vs Dr.A.S.Anand, Honble The C.J.I. on 12 May 2001

Swaran Singh Vs State of Punjab on 26 Apr 2000

Sanjay Vs The State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 20 Jun 2022

Elizabeth Dinshaw Vs Arvand M.Dinshaw and Anr on 11 Nov 1986

Union of India and Ors Vs MS J.K.Mittal and Co and Ors on 28 Mar 2018

In Re Enforcement And Implementation of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on 02 May 2005

Rohitash Kumar and Ors Vs Om Prakash Sharma and Ors on 6 Nov 2012

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004