Satish Ragde Vs State of Maharashtra on 19 Jan 2021
The Supreme Court Proceedings are here.
Satish Ragde Vs State of Maharashtra on 19 Jan 2021
The Supreme Court Proceedings are here.
State Government of AP went to a single bench Judge seeking stay on the Elections Schedule for Panchayats in Andhra Pradesh. They got favourable order Staying the election schedule, thereby impacting the Model Code of Conduct for political parties.Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs AP State Election Commission on 11 Jan 2021
This was set aside by a Division bench of the High Court here.
As usual, State Government moved Supreme Court.
A single-judge bench of Punjab High Court held as follows:
Nirmal Singh and Ors Vs Tarsem Singh and Ors on 01 May 2014
The High Court should not be stressed-out to deal with such a combined application compressed into one impugned order needlessly to unravel causing sheer wastage of its precious time in trying to separate what was so casually and mindlessly mixed-up in a cocktail by virtue of bad advice given by some trial lawyer to his client clubbing two disparate legal elements in a portmanteau application claiming amendment in pleadings and at the same time, in the same papers, seeking to introduce third parties in the pending litigation. Every minute of the High Court’s time squandered involves colossal expenditure which is incapable of calculation and therefore recompense. The reward of justice is none other than justice and time consumed in trying to meet it is alone its justification as an end to the means. The time required today for deciding cases of other litigants waiting desperately in the courtroom for their cause to be taken up and decided stands reduced. Poor legal advice given to a client may result in paralyzing many cases for years together causing incalculable injury to just causes needing prompt attention. But bad legal advice tendered leading to filing of interlocutory applications is a judicially unacceptable legal principle or ground itself for generosity in interference. This cannot operate as an exemption or a concession grantable to a litigant complaining that he has suffered because of ill advice to rescue an unsuspecting litigant from a predicament he may face. It has become almost a daily feature in court to wriggle out of the jamb to readily blame counsel without batting an eyelid and accept relief. If the Judge is expected to do his job so is the lawyer expected to assist the Court to the best of his ability. There is a presumption in law that a lawyer knows the law but there is no absolute presumption that a judge should know law. A judge is only called upon to balance the two sides of an argument presented before him.
But the bane is that the trial court unfortunately is not empowered to exercise summary jurisdiction of dismissal of misconceived, vexatious, frivolous, and mala fide applications designed only to obstruct the sound rhythm of a suit to achieve its target milestones within a reasonable time and bring it to fruition. Such power should deservedly be conferred on subordinate judges to deliver justice at the doorstep in limine without compromising the quality of justice delivered. But this is for Parliament to remedy and devise ways and means to achieve removal of obstructions designed to impede the life of a suit or wilt its many leaves.
Said Judge Learned Hand: “Thou shall not ration justice”
But time and energy spent in doing justice can be rationed. It can be rationalized to show better results. The trial courts can contribute in a large measure to this end by finding workable solutions thinking on their feet to do summary justice, a small example of what this case represents. The predecessor trial Judge should have returned the joint application in 2010 itself from the dais to its owner and saved valuable time of the court. He should have killed the weed before it grew. But now that has to be uprooted.
For the variety of reasons recorded above, I find no cogent ground to support the impugned order dated April 4, 2013 or to sustain it and to the contrary I think it is eminently fit to be set aside to avoid a failure of justice. It is accordingly so ordered. The matter is remitted back to the trial Judge for a re-consideration. The respondent/plaintiff is left free to file two separate applications, one under Order 6 Rule 17 and one under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC within a fortnight from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. The defendants would file replies thereto within the next fortnight. Thereafter, the learned trial Judge would take up both the applications separately and proceed to dispose them of on merits after hearing the parties after following the rule “costs must follow the event” to its true import and meaning to compensate the aggrieved litigant of the precious time lost in what could have been resolved without any prolonged agony.
Other Sources :
From Para 14,
14. On a careful reading of the aforesaid provision, it is quite vivid that the Court of Session can take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original
jurisdiction except as otherwise expressly provided by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force only if the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate.
From Para 28,
28.From the aforesaid pronouncement of law rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Special Judge is not prohibited from exercising power and jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the Code when there is no exclusion of power in respect of the point raised.
hence, from Paras 32 and 33,
32.Thus, from the aforesaid proposition of law rendered by the Supreme Court in A.R. Antulay (supra) and the M.P. High Court in Anand Swaroop Tiwari (supra), it is quite vivid that the Special Court constituted under Section 14 of the Act of 1989 is the criminal court of original jurisdiction and is not governed by Section 193 of the Code, and the Special Court can take cognizance in any of the circumstances referred to in Section 190 of the Code and is governed by Chapters XV & XVI of the Code and such other provisions of the Code which are not inconsistent with the status and functions as Courts of original jurisdiction. Therefore, the Special Courts constituted under the Act of 1989 will also have power and jurisdiction to invoke Section 156(3) of the Code to direct investigation in exercise of power conferred, to the Station House Officer subject to fulfillment of making two prior applications under Section 154(1) and thereafter under Section 154(3) of the Code by the complainant. As such, I do not find any merit in the submission of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the Special Judge under SC & ST Act has no power and jurisdiction to invoke Section 156(3) of the Code and to direct registration of FIR and investigation. Such a submission being meritless and substance-less deserves to be and is accordingly rejected.
33. Having answered question No.1 against the petitioners and in favour of respondent No.2, reverting to the second question whether the learned Special Judge is justified in invoking power and jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the Code after finding compliance with the provisions contained in subsections (1) & (3) of Section 154 of the Code, it would be necessary to point out here that in order to make a duly constituted application for invoking the jurisdiction of the learned Special Judge under Section 156(3) of the Code, compliance of subsections (1) & (3) of Section 154 of the Code would be absolutely necessary rather it would be sine-qua-non for making the application under Section 156(1) of the Code maintainable.
From Paras 35 and 36,
35.From the focused perusal of Section 154(1) of the Code, it is quite vivid that every information relating to commission of cognizable offence, if given orally to in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant and every such information given in writing or reduced in writing as above-said shall be signed by person giving it and substance thereof shall be entered into book kept by such officer. Subsection (3) of Section 154 of the Code provides the procedure to be followed by informant, if officer in charge of a police station refuses to record the information referred to Section 154(1) of the Code and mandates that substance of such information in writing may be sent by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned, who if satisfied that such information discloses commission of cognizable offence either investigate himself or direct an officer subordinate to him to investigate in the manner provided by the Code.
36.Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Priyanka Srivastava (supra) laid down duty and approach of Magistrate while exercising power under Section 156(3) of the Code and highlighted preconditions to be satisfied to maintain the application under Section 156(3). It has also been held that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind and there has to be prior application under Section 154(1) and 154(3) of the Code.
Jaisingh Agarwal and Anr Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Anr on 27 Oct 2020
Even though the MP High Court held the law point correctly, IMHO, the said FIR which was saved by this Court, has no future, unless it was treated as a FIR registered u/s 154 CrPC, which is what the case is here.
From Para 15 16
Zaid Pathan and Ors Vs State of M.P. on 22 Dec 2020
15/ The submission of counsel for the petitioners is that as per the procedure prescribed in Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., for the purpose of the offence under Section 188 of the IPC a public servant is required to file a complaint before the competent court and, therefore, the FIR cannot be registered.
16/ Such an argument advanced by counsel for the petitioners is devoid of any merit. A bare reading of Section 195(1) Cr.P.C. reveals that the provisions contained in the sub-section are attracted at the stage of taking cognizance. There is no bar under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. in respect of registration of FIR, therefore, FIR for an offence under Section 188 of the IPC can be registered by the police and after investigation on the basis of the FIR and the material collected during the course of investigation, a competent public servant can file the complaint before the concerned court. What is barred under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. is that after investigating the offence under Section 188 of the IPC, the police officer cannot file a final report in the Court and the Court cannot take cognizance on that final report, as at that stage the bar contained in Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. comes
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This is the happy tale of the elephant ‘Lalitha’ adjudged by the Madras High Court.
From Paras 12 and 13
S.G.M.Shaa @ Sheik Mohammed Vs Principal Chief Conservator of Forests on 10 Sep 2020
12.Lalitha has been accustomed to a certain lifestyle all these years. She changed hands from 1988 to 2000. But she has been in the custody of the petitioner for the last twenty years. She has been attending religious functions. She is being fed well. She is in good health. In fact, the veterinarians appointed by the department have certified that she is being maintained properly by the petitioner. Removing her from the petitioner’s custody is sure to inflict a deep psychological wound on her. It is certainly not in her best interests. Applying the yardstick of what is good for Lalitha, I have to hold that the present arrangement should continue. Lalitha should continue to be with the petitioner and participate in the religious functions hosted in
13.Lalitha’s usual place of stay is a coconut groove spread over one and half acres. There is a R.O Plant. It is owned by Thiru.Pothiraj. He appeared before me and gave in writing that the land will not be sold or encumbered during the lifetime of Lalitha. She also gets copious amounts of water to drink and to bathe. The ambience is highly conducive.
This is a case decided by single-judge bench of AP High Court regard a case involving CrPC 210.
From Paras 13, 14 and 15,
13. Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. is designed to ensure that the enquiry or trial in the case instituted on the basis of a complaint and enquiry or trial on the basis of a police report in respect of the same incident do not proceed tangentially but proceed in tandem. To enable the Magistrate to monitor the enquiry or trial under these two different streams to ensure simultaneously such enquiry or trial, Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. provides that when the case is instituted on the basis of a complaint, if it is brought to the notice of the Magistrate during the course of enquiry or trial on the basis of the said complaint that the investigation by the police in relation to the same offence is under way, the Magistrate shall stay the proceedings of such enquiry or trial and call for a report on the matter from the police officer conducting investigation. The condition for applicability of Section 210(1) of Cr.P.C. is that there must be commonality of the ‘offence’ in the subject of investigation by the police and the subject of enquiry by the Magistrate in the complaint case. But considering the context and the object of the provision, the word ‘offence’ used in Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. cannot be construed to refer to a particular provision of law defining certain offence. But it must be deemed to denote the incident or transaction in which an offence or offences have been committed.
14. However, under Sub-section (2) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C., the word ‘offence’ appears to have been used to indicate a particular transgression labelled as a particular offence under IPC or any other law. It is obvious from the fact that normally when the Court takes cognizance of an offence, it does not refer to taking cognizance of the whole incident in which offences are committed but to particular violations, which have been defined as specific offences. Inasmuch as the object of the provision appears to be as stated above to avoid enquiries or trials sought to be initiated on two different footings, namely, the complaint and the police report on parallel tracks leading to conflicting results, obviously it is the commonality of the
incident which are the subject matters of the complaint and the first information report under investigation by the police and not the labels of a particular transgression of law affixed by the complainant in the complaint or in the first information report which, if it were not so, the provisions of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. can be evaded by a mere device of labelling the transaction with different offences. As stated above in this case, the stage of staying the proceedings in the complaint case under Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C., has passed and the stage for calling for a report from the police has also been passed inasmuch as the police report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. has been filed already. The provision in Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. has been made as stated above for preventing parallel enquiries or trials. Where a question as to application of the provisions under Section 210 of Cr.P.C. arises at certain stage of enquiry in the complaint case or after the report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. has been filed by the police, it cannot be said that because the stage for invoking Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. has crossed, the other provisions under it are not applicable.
15. For application of Sub-section (2) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C., two conditions are required to be satisfied, (i) On the report of the police under Section 173 of Cr.P.C., cognizance of some offences has been taken by the Magistrate; and (ii) Any person who is an accused in the complaint case is among the accused against whom the Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence on the basis of the police report.
From Paras 21 and 22,
21. Section 210(3) Cr.P.C., would apply in two situations (i) Where the police report does not relate to ‘any’ accused in the complaint case, and (ii) if the Magistrate does not take cognizance of any offence on the police report at all. The word ‘any’ with reference to the accused and the offence in Section 210(3) and for that matter in Sub-section (2) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. would only mean ‘one or more’ and not ‘all’. The Judgment of the Orissa High Court supra proceeds on the basis that Section 210(3) of Cr.P.C., will be applicable where all the offences and all the accused are not common in both the cases.
22. In this case as seen above, in view of the application of the provision of Section 210(2) Cr.P.C., an enquiry on the basis of a police report and the complaint case for the purpose of committal proceedings was required to be conducted together as if both were instituted on a police report.
Finally, from Para 25,
Namathoti Sankaramma Vs State of A.P. and Ors on 15 Sep 2000
25. The learned Sessions Judge ought to have examined the committal order to ensure whether the requirements under Sub-section (2) of Section 210 Cr.P.C. have been complied with or not. It was necessary for him to ascertain whether the learned Magistrate while enquiring into the matter has treated the material available in the com- plaint case as if it was material brought forth on record in the police report case. This was not done. I am, therefore, satisfied that there was no substantial compliance of Section 210(2) Cr.P.C. For the purpose of committing the case not only the material available in the police report has to be considered, but the material available in the complaint case also requires to be considered as it if it is material placed before the Court in the police report case.
Casemine version:Namathoti Sankaramma Vs State of A.P. and Ors on 15 Sep 2000 Casemine
Citations : [2000 ALD CRI 2 588], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 2 323], [2000 SCC ONLINE AP 772], [2001 ALT CRI 1 17], [2000 SUP CRLJ AP 4831]
Other Sources :
Single Judge Bench of JUSTICE Dr. B.SIVA SANKARA RAO, quashed the false 498A/DP Act complaint on Father in law and two sisters in law. Just one Paragraph !!!
From Para 6,
Anil Kumar and 2 Ors Vs State of A.P. Anr on 03 Apr 2019
6. There is no record even shown from the police charge sheet by collecting from father of de facto complainant as to any so-called additional amount of Rs.4,30,000/- given out of his retirement benefits or 15 tulas of gold. It is crucial if at all to believe as to what were the retirement benefits he received and when from his account he parted with. There is no date or time even mentioned either in the report or from the police investigation to believe, leave about the fact that the so-called marriage performed, from the police investigation out of love affair between A-1 and de facto complainant against the will of the parents of the de facto complainant and the parents of A-1, who are A-2 & A-3 from the beginning agreed for the love marriage with no objection. Once such is the case, even the stray allegation of the petitioners/A-2 to A-4 used to abuse her as not of their caste or religion and if they marry another girl, they could get more dowry itself is unbelievable, for the very marriage is love marriage. Even to say that there was any instigation to A-1 by A-2 to A-4 for additional dowry when it is a love marriage and no dowry shown paid originally and as discussed supra of no any payment of dowry by father of de facto complainant after his retirement from his benefits alleged, the question of any payment of additional dowry is unbelievable. It clearly shows the petitioners/A-2 to A-4 are roped without any basis for reasons better known by the de facto complainant and the police investigation in this regard is also perfunctory and baseless and the legal position is very clear that unless from the specific allegations in the complaint against the other relatives of the husband, no cognizance can be taken against the family members, particularly from the tendency of making baseless allegations in roping them and even a stray sentence as suffered harassment in the hands of in-laws, etc., is not sufficient to sustain any such accusation to rope the other family members of the husband of the de facto complainant, so-called victim.
Other Sources :
Index of Quash judgments here.
From Paras 6 and 7,
6. The above order was passed in revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge. Obviously that jurisdiction was exercised Under Section 397, Cr.P.C. Under its provisions the Sessions Judge could pass an interlocutory order by directing “that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended….” It is, therefore, clear that in a revision, the Sessions Judge could, during the pendency of the revision, suspend either sentence or order against which the revision has been filed. In the present case there is no question of any sentence. There was only the order in question against which revision was filed. At best the said order could only be suspended during the pendency of the revision.
7. The question of suspending the order would only arise if it was still to be executed. If the order had already come into operation, there remained nothing to be suspended. In the present case it is undisputed fact that in pursuance of the order of the learned Magistrate, applicant Kamlesh Kumar had already executed the necessary bonds on the same date and had taken delivery of the said print of the film ‘Naseeb’. Accordingly there remained nothing which could be suspended.
Casemine Version:Kamlesh Kumar Vs Girish Kapoor and Anr on 12 Apr 1984
Other Sources :
Whether an Advocate, while acting under the instructions of his client and proceeding professionally, can be prosecuted / punished for the offence of defamation punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code is the precise question involved in this petition which came before High Court of Chhattisgarh.
From Para 10,
10. It appears from the aforesaid genealogical tree that respondent No.2 herein has been shown to be the concubine / wife of Ghanshyam Pandey. This, according to respondent No.2, is defamatory, as she is the legally married wife of Ghanshyam Pandey after the death of his first wife Smt. Tarini Pandey and that led to the present dispute.
From Para 24,
24. In light of above-stated legal analysis, an advocate, who acted professionally as per instructions of his/her client, cannot be made criminally liable for the offence of defamation under Section 500 of the IPC unless contrary is alleged and established.
From Para 26,
As such, an Advocate who has acted professionally and drafted plaint making averment as per the instructions of his client, cannot be held liable for the offence of defamation under Section 500 of the IPC.
Finally from Para 33,
Arun Thakur Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 10 July 2019
33. Admittedly, respondent No.2 claims that the alleged incident happened in the year 2014 and after lapse of 3-4 years, FIR has been lodged which clearly goes to show that there was no intention of the petitioner to cause harm, as in such a case, she would have rushed to the police authority well in time. As such, even it cannot be held that the petitioner has abused and insulted respondent No.2 in terms of Section 506 of the IPC.