Shikha Lall Vs Prince Agarwal on 7 Nov 2024

Posted on July 21 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High court relying on two judgments, Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010 and Afia Rasheed Khan Vs Mazharuddin Ali Khan and Anr on 10 Oct 2022, held that New Delhi does not have jurisdiction under PWDV Act.

From Para 16,

16. A perusal of the above clearly indicates that the parties have not resided in Delhi at any given point in time during the alleged incidents for the cause of action to arise in the present jurisdiction. Thus, to state that due to the registration of marriage in New Delhi, the courts of Delhi would have jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputes of domestic violence between the present parties. There is no cause of action that arose within the local limits of the Courts of Delhi.

Shikha Lall Vs Prince Agarwal on 7 Nov 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of DV judgments is here.

Pranjal Poddar and Ors Vs Shivani Gupta on 21 Apr 2026

Posted on July 21 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Allahabad High Court at Lucknow, held as follows,

From Para 21,

21. The present domestic violence case has been filed by the answering respondent after the case filed by applicant no.3. The applicant no.1 also filed a case under Section 12(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Faridabad, Haryana on 25.3.2025. The record reveals that there appears to be dispute between the wife and husband and they are litigating against each other, but after a bare perusal of the complaint, other attending circumstances as mentioned above, the Court is coming to the conclusion that applicant nos.2, 3 and 4 of Application U/s 528 BNSS No.1774 of 2025, have no role in the present controversy, therefore, in view of law declared by the Supreme Court in Geeta Mehrotra (supra) and Kahkashan Kausar (supra), criminal proceedings are liable to be dropped against them under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act. However, proceedings against applicant no.1 will continue. So far as proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are concerned, the same is also filed against the husband and evidence is to be led over there, therefore, at this stage, the Court cannot interfere in the proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C., as summon has been issued against the husband, who has to contest his case before the court below.

Pranjal Poddar and Ors Vs Shivani Gupta on 21 Apr 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/149060733/

Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here.

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Posted on July 21 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Shiv Narayan Dhingra ji has passed this Order around the definition of a Temporary residence as held by the Section 27 of the PWDV Act 2005.

9. All legislative enactments on matrimonial disputes or custody matters make ordinary residence or residence or the place where parties lived together or the place of cause of action as a ground for invocation of jurisdiction of the Court. Domestic Violence Act is the first Act where a temporary residence of the aggrieved person has also been made a ground for invoking the jurisdiction of court. The expression “residence‟ means
“to make abode‟ – a place for dwelling. Normally place for dwelling is made with an intention to live there for considerable time or to settle there. It is a place where a person has a home. In Webster Dictionary, the residence means to dwell for length of time. The words „dwelling place‟ or abode are synonyms. A temporary residence, therefore, must be a temporary dwelling place of the person who has for the time being decided to make the place as his home. Although he may not have decided to reside there permanently or for a considerable length of time but for the time being, this must be place of her residence and this cannot be considered a place where the person has gone on a casual visit, or a fleeing visit for change of climate or simply for the purpose of filing a case against another person.
10. I, therefore, consider that the temporary residence, as envisaged under the Act is such residence where an aggrieved person is compelled to take shelter or compelled to take job or do some business, in view of domestic violence perpetuated on her or she either been turned out of the matrimonial home or has to leave the matrimonial home. This temporary residence does not include residence in a lodge or hostel or an inn or residence at a place only for the purpose of filing a domestic violence case. This temporary residence must also be a continuing residence from the date of acquiring residence till the application under Section 12 is disposed of and it must not be a fleeing residence where a woman comes only for the purpose of contesting the case and otherwise does not reside there.
11. In the present case, the aggrieved person is residing with her sister and has filed the petition under Domestic Violence Act. It cannot be said that her residence with her sister was a fleeing residence or was a temporary residence acquired for lodging the complaint of domestic violence. Her sister‟s house is a place where she has taken shelter and temporarily resides. I, therefore, find that there is no force in this petition. The petition is hereby dismissed with no orders to costs.

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Citations: [2010:DHC:4306], [2010 9 Laws(DLH) 9]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/106302060/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090d56e4b014971117976a

Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here.

Vikram Kumar Jha Vs State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 10 Jul 2026

Posted on July 16 by ShadesOfKnife

A single bench Judge of Delhi High Court rightly remarked about how the abuse of Women-oriented laws is prevalent in our Country.

From Paras 3 and 4,

3. It is contended by learned Senior Counsel for petitioners that the impugned FIR is a complete abuse of process insofar as serious allegations of sexual misconduct have been levelled against petitioners no. 1 and 2, who are brothers-in-law of the complainant de facto. It is further submitted that marriage between the complainant de facto and brother of petitioner no. 1 took place on 08.07.2016, after which they were blessed with two children. On 18.09.2023, brother of petitioner no. 1 filed divorce case against complainant de facto, so out of vengeance she lodged this police complaint on 15.04.2024. It is submitted that in the impugned FIR, the complainant de facto did not make any allegation of rape, but it is subsequently in her statement under Section 164 CrPC for the first time on 15.06.2024 that she alleged having been raped in the year 2017. It is submitted by learned Senior Counsel that there is no whiff of explanation as to why the complainant de facto remained silent for so long.
4. I also find substance in the submission of learned Senior Counsel for petitioners that in the recent past, ever since the Supreme Court delivered the judgment in the case of Arnesh Kumar vs State of Bihar & Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 273, which narrowed down the abuse of provisions under Section 498A/406 IPC as regards arrest, a trend is setting in where the complainants have started alleging such serious charges of rape, molestation and similar other sexual misconduct only to ensure that the in-laws of the complainant are compelled to settle the matrimonial disputes by paying hefty amounts.

Vikram Kumar Jha Vs State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 10 Jul 2026

Rajashekar Vs BCI and Anr on 27 Oct 2025

Posted on July 1 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka High Court at Bengaluru held as follows,

From Para 3,

3. On an enquiry with the learned counsel appearing for Bar Council of India, as to whether there is any restriction for such enrolment, she submits that there is no such restriction and any person who has passed out of any Law colleges across the country could be registered with the State Bar council where such person intends to practice in terms of Section 24 of the Advocates Act, 1961. She further submits that it is only if transfer of registration is required to be done, certain procedures would be required to be followed.

From Para 5,

5. In view of the said submission, it being clear that the petitioner has passed out of a college which is affiliated to respondent No.1 and there being no restriction or requirement for the State Bar Council to register only persons who have passed out within that particular State and in view of Section 24 of the Advocates Act, I pass the following:
ORDER
i. Writ petition is allowed.
ii. A mandamus is issued to respondent No.2 to enroll the petitioner as an advocate on its roll as per the Advocates Act, 1961, on the next enrolment date.
iii. Respondent No.2 is directed to, in future, take into consideration any application filed by any student who has passed out in Law in any other State so long as the verification process of the certificate issued is done in a proper manner.

Rajashekar Vs BCI and Anr on 27 Oct 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/38447320/

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/karnataka-high-court/karnataka-high-court-ruling-enrolment-of-law-graduates-from-other-states-309383

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/karnataka-high-court/sri-rajashekar-v-bar-council-of-india-2025khc42704-advocate-with-law-degree-from-outside-state-can-enroll-1597580

Law Graduates From Any State Can Enroll With Any Bar Council in India: Karnataka High Court

Index of Bar Council Antics is here.

Vijay Gopal Vs Bar Council of India and Anr on 29 Apr 2026

Posted on July 1 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Telangana High Court held as follows,

From Para 4.1,

4.1 The petitioner, appearing in person, contends that Rule 6 of the Rules, 2015 is ex facie illegal, arbitrary, and ultra vires the provisions of the Act, 1961, particularly Sections 22, 30, and 33. It is argued that the statutory scheme unequivocally confers upon an enrolled Advocate the right to practice law, and such right is neither conditional nor subject to compulsory membership in any Bar Association.

From Para 4.4,

4.4. The petitioner further contends that the impugned rule violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(c) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. It is argued that the freedom to form associations inherently includes the right not to associate, as recognized in Damayanti Naranga v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 678. Therefore, any compulsion to join a Bar Association infringes this constitutional guarantee.

From Para 5.2,

5.2. The respondents argue that the impugned rules, including Rule 6.1, are within the statutory framework and are intended to regulate and identify practicing Advocates, as well as to ensure effective implementation of welfare schemes. It is specifically contended that Rule 6 does not mandate compulsory membership in any Bar Association; rather, it provides an option. An Advocate may either become a member of a recognized Bar Association or, alternatively, intimate the State Bar Council regarding non-membership and indicate how he or she proposes to avail welfare benefits.

From Para 5.4,

5.4. The respondents also contend that the requirement of certification and verification is intended solely to identify genuine practitioners and facilitate welfare distribution. There is no violation of Article 19, as the rules neither compel association membership nor restrict the right to practice.

From Para 8,

8. At the outset, Sections 29, 30, and 33 of the Act, 1961 unequivocally recognize Advocates as the only class of persons entitled to practice law, subject to enrolment under the Act. The statutory scheme does not expressly mandate membership in any Bar Association as a condition precedent to the exercise of such right.

From Paras 12 and 13,

12. A plain reading of Rule 6 indicates that membership in a Bar Association is not mandatory. The provision merely affords an option to an Advocate either to join a Bar Association or, in the alternative, to intimate the State Bar Council regarding such non-membership for the purpose of availing welfare benefits. When construed in this manner, the rule can be sustained as a regulatory measure. Notably, the respondents have also urged that the rule be interpreted in this light.
13. In such circumstances, the requirement would fall within the ambit of Sections 6, 7, and 49(1)(ah) of the Act, 1961, as a condition governing the right to practice, aimed at identifying genuine practitioners and facilitating the implementation of welfare schemes.

Finally from Para 17,

17. In view of the foregoing analysis, Rule 6 of the Rules, 2015 is read down to the following extent:
a) Membership in a Bar Association shall be purely voluntary;
b) Non-membership shall not disentitle or restrict an Advocate from practicing law;
c) Bar Associations shall not exercise any determinative or regulatory control over the right to practice.

Call to Action:

18. Accordingly, Respondent No. 1, namely the Bar Council of India, New Delhi, is directed to issue appropriate clarifications to all State Bar Councils. The requirement of certification and verification shall be implemented solely as a regulatory mechanism for availing welfare measures and not as a means of imposing coercive conditions.

Vijay Gopal Vs Bar Council of India and Anr on 29 Apr 2026

Citations: [2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 86]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/137307844/

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/telangana-high-court/telangana-high-court-bar-associations-exercise-regulatory-control-advocate-right-to-practice-538287

https://www.verdictum.in/telangana-high-court/vijay-gopal-v-bar-council-of-india-anr-bar-council-of-india-membership-1613590

Index of Bar Council Antics is here.

Bhawna Rani Vs Gurdeep Singh on 27 Nov 2025

Posted on June 30 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court held as follows,

From Para 15,

15. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent-husband in the cases of Sheetal Patil (supra), Alipka @ Lokesh (supra) and Kanchan (supra) are that of High Courts of Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan and Bombay, respectively. Since two Division Bench judgments of this Court have categorically held that once an appeal is filed within the period of limitation and after filing thereof contracting of a second marriage by the husband tantamounts to contravention of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the argument of learned counsel for the respondent-husband deserves to be rejected. Further, as noticed above, their Lordships in the case of N. Rajendran (supra) have also held that the bar on re-marriage under Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 after divorce will apply on mere filing of an appeal.

From Para 16 (the bullshit arises here; no one knows the legal mandate of Audi Alterum Partem)

16. Learned counsel for the respondent-husband has not been able to point out to any case law to the contrary that a marriage contracted in contravention of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 would not amount to civil contempt. The reliance made by learned counsel for respondent-husband to the judgment in the case of Suresh (supra) would also not come to his aid as the same does not deal with the contravention of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

From Para 17,

17. As discussed above, not only the appeal was filed within the prescribed period of limitation but the respondent-husband also appears to have evaded the service of notice in the appeal as he remained unserved on the same very address i.e. ‘House No.41, Pooja Vihar, Industrial Area, Ambala Cantt. District Ambala’, wherein he had also been served in FAO-M-5170-2018, which was the same address given by him in the divorce petition filed by him. In his reply the respondent-husband has categorically admitted that after the marriage was dissolved vide a decree of divorce dated 02.03.2020, he contracted a second marriage on 03.01.2021. The only plea taken by the respondent-husband is that he was never served and that he gained knowledge about the pendency of FAO-1935-2020 on 23.02.2021. It has further been stated that there cannot be endless time limit for the spouse not to re-marry and that the respondent-husband re-married only after the grant of decree of divorce and that the appeal pending before this Court has still not been decided. In a nutshell, in his reply the respondent-husband, instead of tendering an unqualified apology, has tried to contest his act of solemnizing the second marriage during the pendency of the above appeal and stay having been granted therein. It is only when this fact was pointed out by this Court to learned counsel for the respondent-husband that an affidavit was filed along with CM-22461-CII-2025 tendering an unqualified apology. However, the apology in the present case cannot be accepted for the reason that there has been willful contravention of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Even if the argument of learned counsel for the respondent-husband as regards the fact that respondent-husband was not served in the appeal is to be taken on its face value, he admittedly never made inquiries within the prescribed period of limitation regarding filing of the appeal.

From Para 21, (Why the fish does husband want anything to do with reconciliation, after he won his divorce case on merits against the OP?)

21. The act and conduct of the respondent-husband is such that the clock cannot be put back and the damage which has ensued cannot be rectified. Virtually, the conduct of respondent-husband has rendered the appeal filed by the petitioner-wife infructuous and the petitioner-wife being remediless. The petitioner-wife and her daughter have even missed out the chance to partake in any reconciliation process.

Note: I just wish and pray that this BS gets thrown out of window at Supreme Court.

Bhawna Rani Vs Gurdeep Singh on 27 Nov 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Contempt of Court decisions is here.

Ravi S Vs Sahana Devi A and Ors on 18 Jun 2026

Posted on June 29 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka High Court at Bengaluru held as follows:

From Para 7,

7. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 contended that respondent No.1 is the only child to her parents. No doubt she is earning around ₹1,00,000/- per month, but she is under obligation to clear all the debts which she incurred for her marriage. Therefore, Trial Court rightly directed petitioner to pay respondent No.1 a sum of ₹20,000/- towards interim maintenance and thus this writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

From Para 8,

8. …
No material whatsoever is produced by respondent No.1 which gives the details of the loans she obtained and the EMI’s. Even in the affidavit filed disclosing her assets and liabilities she has not mentioned the details of those loans, when she obtained and what amount is still due to be paid. Trial
Court made an observation at para 12 of the impugned order that as per the bank statement and pay slip produced by respondent No.1, it is evident that he is employed with Genpact India Private Limited and is drawing gross monthly salary of ₹60,646/-. The Trial Court did not consider the income of respondent No.1/wife at all. In her affidavit given disclosing assets and liabilities she herself mentioned that she gets ₹1,00,000/- per month as salary. The Trial Court which discussed about the earnings of petitioner/husband ought to have discussed about the earnings of respondent No.1/wife and thereafter should have come to a conclusion with regard to the entitlement for interim maintenance. But, totally ignoring the earnings of respondent No.1/wife, the impugned order came to be passed.

From Para 9, (Slipper shot!) Trial Court judge has no sense of difference between a case of DV and a case of neglect… Thuuu…

9. Only because a woman more particularly a wife files a petition invoking the provisions of Domestic Violence Act or the provisions of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act or the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, where the right to claim maintenance is recognized, the Courts cannot straight away pass an order awarding some amount towards maintenance payable by the husband. When the wife is financially sound and in case where the income of the wife is more than that of the husband and where no other liabilities are found on part of the wife, like looking after the children, Courts should not be inclined to pass an order granting maintenance on the ground that women are required to be maintained by men or wife is required to be maintained by her husband. It should be borne in mind that only when it is shown that the wife has no financial sources to maintain herself according to the standards of her husband, then only Courts are required to award maintenance either interim or final.

Ravi S Vs Sahana Devi A and Ors on 18 Jun 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/karnataka-high-court/wife-income-higher-than-husband-no-maintenance-unless-wife-unable-to-maintain-herself-539208

https://courtbook.in/posts/karnataka-hc-says-wife-earning-more-than-husband-cannot-claim-interim-maintenance-without-financial-need

https://mynation.net/docs/2327-2026

https://lawstreet.co/judiciary/karnataka-hc-maintenance-only-when-wife-cannot-maintain-herself-to-husband039;s-standard

https://thelexpedia.com/judgements/sri-ravi-s-at-jeevan-s-v-smt-sahana-devi-a-others-2026

Index of Maintenance under Judgments under PWDV Act is here.

Chidurala Shyamsubder Vs State of Telangana on 27 Aug 2018

Posted on May 28 by ShadesOfKnife

I came across the following snippet of post on 23-May-2026.

Pulled out the above Order by the High Court of Telangana, with little difficulty.

Jivani Sahil Firoz Ali Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 04 May 2026

I went to the decision relied on by this case/judge in Para-3 and obtained this wonderful common Order with respect of FSS Act 2006 by the erstwhile Combined High Court of Andhra Pradesh. When I read through it, I visualized the stark similarities between FSS Act 2006 and Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 (amended in 1984 and 1986), which I intend to take full advantage in a future PIL, by making a comparison of appointment, duties, powers of a Food Safety Officer vis-a-vis that of the Dowry Prohibition Officer. There is possibility of getting State police off the offences under DP Act, just like APHC held in this Order (gainfully relying on various other High Court judgments)

Chidurala Shyamsubder Vs State of Telangana on 27 Aug 2018

The efforts to be invested in this direction connect to this page here.

Birendra Kumar Tiwari Vs Neetu Tiwari on 07 Dec 2022

Posted on May 27 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench at High Court of Chhattisgarh held as follows while denying maintenance to a major daughter, who refused to live with father.

From Para 5,

5. It is explicit from impugned order that respondent has attained the majority and also pursuing B.A. final year. As per Section 125 Cr.P.C. to get maintenance daughter has to make out a case that she is unable to maintain herself or not attained the majority but in the present case, no such averment has been made. So the respondent is not entitled to get maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. However, Section 20 (3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 recognize rights of maintenance to children and it is statutory obligation of Hindu to maintain his or her daughter, who is unmarried and is unable to maintain herself out of her own earning of other property.

This kind judge gave her legal advice through this judgment. Still have the tendency to think like an advocate!

From Paras 7 and 8,

7. Therefore, in view of the proposition held in Abhilasha (Supra) the application filed by the respondent under Section 125 Cr.P.C before the Family Court is not maintainable. Further, this Court reserves liberty in favour of the respondent/daughter to take recourse to Section 20 (3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, if so advised, for claiming any maintenance against her father.
8. Reserving the aforesaid liberty, this revision is allowed and the impugned order is hereby quashed.

Birendra Kumar Tiwari Vs Neetu Tiwari on 07 Dec 2022

Citations: [2022 Latest Caselaw 7369 Chatt],

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/32464509/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/639a08eae4e7915eb4d2599d

https://www.latestlaws.com/judgements/chattisgarh-high-court/2022/december/2022-latest-caselaw-7369-chatt/

Index of Maintenance Judgments u/s 144 BNSS is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 1-Judge Bench Decision

Shikha Lall Vs Prince Agarwal on 7 Nov 2024

Pranjal Poddar and Ors Vs Shivani Gupta on 21 Apr 2026

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Vikram Kumar Jha Vs State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 10 Jul 2026

Rajashekar Vs BCI and Anr on 27 Oct 2025

Vijay Gopal Vs Bar Council of India and Anr on 29 Apr 2026

Bhawna Rani Vs Gurdeep Singh on 27 Nov 2025

Ravi S Vs Sahana Devi A and Ors on 18 Jun 2026

Chidurala Shyamsubder Vs State of Telangana on 27 Aug 2018

Birendra Kumar Tiwari Vs Neetu Tiwari on 07 Dec 2022