Rajashekar Vs BCI and Anr on 27 Oct 2025

A single judge of Karnataka High Court at Bengaluru held as follows,

From Para 3,

3. On an enquiry with the learned counsel appearing for Bar Council of India, as to whether there is any restriction for such enrolment, she submits that there is no such restriction and any person who has passed out of any Law colleges across the country could be registered with the State Bar council where such person intends to practice in terms of Section 24 of the Advocates Act, 1961. She further submits that it is only if transfer of registration is required to be done, certain procedures would be required to be followed.

From Para 5,

5. In view of the said submission, it being clear that the petitioner has passed out of a college which is affiliated to respondent No.1 and there being no restriction or requirement for the State Bar Council to register only persons who have passed out within that particular State and in view of Section 24 of the Advocates Act, I pass the following:
ORDER
i. Writ petition is allowed.
ii. A mandamus is issued to respondent No.2 to enroll the petitioner as an advocate on its roll as per the Advocates Act, 1961, on the next enrolment date.
iii. Respondent No.2 is directed to, in future, take into consideration any application filed by any student who has passed out in Law in any other State so long as the verification process of the certificate issued is done in a proper manner.

Rajashekar Vs BCI and Anr on 27 Oct 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/38447320/

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/karnataka-high-court/karnataka-high-court-ruling-enrolment-of-law-graduates-from-other-states-309383

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/karnataka-high-court/sri-rajashekar-v-bar-council-of-india-2025khc42704-advocate-with-law-degree-from-outside-state-can-enroll-1597580

Law Graduates From Any State Can Enroll With Any Bar Council in India: Karnataka High Court

Index of Bar Council Antics is here.

Vijay Gopal Vs Bar Council of India and Anr on 29 Apr 2026

Posted on July 1 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Telangana High Court held as follows,

From Para 4.1,

4.1 The petitioner, appearing in person, contends that Rule 6 of the Rules, 2015 is ex facie illegal, arbitrary, and ultra vires the provisions of the Act, 1961, particularly Sections 22, 30, and 33. It is argued that the statutory scheme unequivocally confers upon an enrolled Advocate the right to practice law, and such right is neither conditional nor subject to compulsory membership in any Bar Association.

From Para 4.4,

4.4. The petitioner further contends that the impugned rule violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(c) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. It is argued that the freedom to form associations inherently includes the right not to associate, as recognized in Damayanti Naranga v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 678. Therefore, any compulsion to join a Bar Association infringes this constitutional guarantee.

From Para 5.2,

5.2. The respondents argue that the impugned rules, including Rule 6.1, are within the statutory framework and are intended to regulate and identify practicing Advocates, as well as to ensure effective implementation of welfare schemes. It is specifically contended that Rule 6 does not mandate compulsory membership in any Bar Association; rather, it provides an option. An Advocate may either become a member of a recognized Bar Association or, alternatively, intimate the State Bar Council regarding non-membership and indicate how he or she proposes to avail welfare benefits.

From Para 5.4,

5.4. The respondents also contend that the requirement of certification and verification is intended solely to identify genuine practitioners and facilitate welfare distribution. There is no violation of Article 19, as the rules neither compel association membership nor restrict the right to practice.

From Para 8,

8. At the outset, Sections 29, 30, and 33 of the Act, 1961 unequivocally recognize Advocates as the only class of persons entitled to practice law, subject to enrolment under the Act. The statutory scheme does not expressly mandate membership in any Bar Association as a condition precedent to the exercise of such right.

From Paras 12 and 13,

12. A plain reading of Rule 6 indicates that membership in a Bar Association is not mandatory. The provision merely affords an option to an Advocate either to join a Bar Association or, in the alternative, to intimate the State Bar Council regarding such non-membership for the purpose of availing welfare benefits. When construed in this manner, the rule can be sustained as a regulatory measure. Notably, the respondents have also urged that the rule be interpreted in this light.
13. In such circumstances, the requirement would fall within the ambit of Sections 6, 7, and 49(1)(ah) of the Act, 1961, as a condition governing the right to practice, aimed at identifying genuine practitioners and facilitating the implementation of welfare schemes.

Finally from Para 17,

17. In view of the foregoing analysis, Rule 6 of the Rules, 2015 is read down to the following extent:
a) Membership in a Bar Association shall be purely voluntary;
b) Non-membership shall not disentitle or restrict an Advocate from practicing law;
c) Bar Associations shall not exercise any determinative or regulatory control over the right to practice.

Call to Action:

18. Accordingly, Respondent No. 1, namely the Bar Council of India, New Delhi, is directed to issue appropriate clarifications to all State Bar Councils. The requirement of certification and verification shall be implemented solely as a regulatory mechanism for availing welfare measures and not as a means of imposing coercive conditions.

Vijay Gopal Vs Bar Council of India and Anr on 29 Apr 2026

Citations: [2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 86]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/137307844/

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/telangana-high-court/telangana-high-court-bar-associations-exercise-regulatory-control-advocate-right-to-practice-538287

https://www.verdictum.in/telangana-high-court/vijay-gopal-v-bar-council-of-india-anr-bar-council-of-india-membership-1613590

Index of Bar Council Antics is here.

Bhawna Rani Vs Gurdeep Singh on 27 Nov 2025

Posted on June 30 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court held as follows,

From Para 15,

15. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent-husband in the cases of Sheetal Patil (supra), Alipka @ Lokesh (supra) and Kanchan (supra) are that of High Courts of Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan and Bombay, respectively. Since two Division Bench judgments of this Court have categorically held that once an appeal is filed within the period of limitation and after filing thereof contracting of a second marriage by the husband tantamounts to contravention of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the argument of learned counsel for the respondent-husband deserves to be rejected. Further, as noticed above, their Lordships in the case of N. Rajendran (supra) have also held that the bar on re-marriage under Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 after divorce will apply on mere filing of an appeal.

From Para 16 (the bullshit arises here; no one knows the legal mandate of Audi Alterum Partem)

16. Learned counsel for the respondent-husband has not been able to point out to any case law to the contrary that a marriage contracted in contravention of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 would not amount to civil contempt. The reliance made by learned counsel for respondent-husband to the judgment in the case of Suresh (supra) would also not come to his aid as the same does not deal with the contravention of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

From Para 17,

17. As discussed above, not only the appeal was filed within the prescribed period of limitation but the respondent-husband also appears to have evaded the service of notice in the appeal as he remained unserved on the same very address i.e. ‘House No.41, Pooja Vihar, Industrial Area, Ambala Cantt. District Ambala’, wherein he had also been served in FAO-M-5170-2018, which was the same address given by him in the divorce petition filed by him. In his reply the respondent-husband has categorically admitted that after the marriage was dissolved vide a decree of divorce dated 02.03.2020, he contracted a second marriage on 03.01.2021. The only plea taken by the respondent-husband is that he was never served and that he gained knowledge about the pendency of FAO-1935-2020 on 23.02.2021. It has further been stated that there cannot be endless time limit for the spouse not to re-marry and that the respondent-husband re-married only after the grant of decree of divorce and that the appeal pending before this Court has still not been decided. In a nutshell, in his reply the respondent-husband, instead of tendering an unqualified apology, has tried to contest his act of solemnizing the second marriage during the pendency of the above appeal and stay having been granted therein. It is only when this fact was pointed out by this Court to learned counsel for the respondent-husband that an affidavit was filed along with CM-22461-CII-2025 tendering an unqualified apology. However, the apology in the present case cannot be accepted for the reason that there has been willful contravention of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Even if the argument of learned counsel for the respondent-husband as regards the fact that respondent-husband was not served in the appeal is to be taken on its face value, he admittedly never made inquiries within the prescribed period of limitation regarding filing of the appeal.

From Para 21, (Why the fish does husband want anything to do with reconciliation, after he won his divorce case on merits against the OP?)

21. The act and conduct of the respondent-husband is such that the clock cannot be put back and the damage which has ensued cannot be rectified. Virtually, the conduct of respondent-husband has rendered the appeal filed by the petitioner-wife infructuous and the petitioner-wife being remediless. The petitioner-wife and her daughter have even missed out the chance to partake in any reconciliation process.

Note: I just wish and pray that this BS gets thrown out of window at Supreme Court.

Bhawna Rani Vs Gurdeep Singh on 27 Nov 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Contempt of Court decisions is here.

Ravi S Vs Sahana Devi A and Ors on 18 Jun 2026

Posted on June 29 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka High Court at Bengaluru held as follows:

From Para 7,

7. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 contended that respondent No.1 is the only child to her parents. No doubt she is earning around ₹1,00,000/- per month, but she is under obligation to clear all the debts which she incurred for her marriage. Therefore, Trial Court rightly directed petitioner to pay respondent No.1 a sum of ₹20,000/- towards interim maintenance and thus this writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

From Para 8,

8. …
No material whatsoever is produced by respondent No.1 which gives the details of the loans she obtained and the EMI’s. Even in the affidavit filed disclosing her assets and liabilities she has not mentioned the details of those loans, when she obtained and what amount is still due to be paid. Trial
Court made an observation at para 12 of the impugned order that as per the bank statement and pay slip produced by respondent No.1, it is evident that he is employed with Genpact India Private Limited and is drawing gross monthly salary of ₹60,646/-. The Trial Court did not consider the income of respondent No.1/wife at all. In her affidavit given disclosing assets and liabilities she herself mentioned that she gets ₹1,00,000/- per month as salary. The Trial Court which discussed about the earnings of petitioner/husband ought to have discussed about the earnings of respondent No.1/wife and thereafter should have come to a conclusion with regard to the entitlement for interim maintenance. But, totally ignoring the earnings of respondent No.1/wife, the impugned order came to be passed.

From Para 9, (Slipper shot!) Trial Court judge has no sense of difference between a case of DV and a case of neglect… Thuuu…

9. Only because a woman more particularly a wife files a petition invoking the provisions of Domestic Violence Act or the provisions of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act or the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, where the right to claim maintenance is recognized, the Courts cannot straight away pass an order awarding some amount towards maintenance payable by the husband. When the wife is financially sound and in case where the income of the wife is more than that of the husband and where no other liabilities are found on part of the wife, like looking after the children, Courts should not be inclined to pass an order granting maintenance on the ground that women are required to be maintained by men or wife is required to be maintained by her husband. It should be borne in mind that only when it is shown that the wife has no financial sources to maintain herself according to the standards of her husband, then only Courts are required to award maintenance either interim or final.

Ravi S Vs Sahana Devi A and Ors on 18 Jun 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/karnataka-high-court/wife-income-higher-than-husband-no-maintenance-unless-wife-unable-to-maintain-herself-539208

https://courtbook.in/posts/karnataka-hc-says-wife-earning-more-than-husband-cannot-claim-interim-maintenance-without-financial-need

https://mynation.net/docs/2327-2026

https://lawstreet.co/judiciary/karnataka-hc-maintenance-only-when-wife-cannot-maintain-herself-to-husband039;s-standard

https://thelexpedia.com/judgements/sri-ravi-s-at-jeevan-s-v-smt-sahana-devi-a-others-2026

Index of Maintenance under Judgments under PWDV Act is here.

Chidurala Shyamsubder Vs State of Telangana on 27 Aug 2018

Posted on May 28 by ShadesOfKnife

I came across the following snippet of post on 23-May-2026.

Pulled out the above Order by the High Court of Telangana, with little difficulty.

Jivani Sahil Firoz Ali Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 04 May 2026

I went to the decision relied on by this case/judge in Para-3 and obtained this wonderful common Order with respect of FSS Act 2006 by the erstwhile Combined High Court of Andhra Pradesh. When I read through it, I visualized the stark similarities between FSS Act 2006 and Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 (amended in 1984 and 1986), which I intend to take full advantage in a future PIL, by making a comparison of appointment, duties, powers of a Food Safety Officer vis-a-vis that of the Dowry Prohibition Officer. There is possibility of getting State police off the offences under DP Act, just like APHC held in this Order (gainfully relying on various other High Court judgments)

Chidurala Shyamsubder Vs State of Telangana on 27 Aug 2018

The efforts to be invested in this direction connect to this page here.

Birendra Kumar Tiwari Vs Neetu Tiwari on 07 Dec 2022

Posted on May 27 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench at High Court of Chhattisgarh held as follows while denying maintenance to a major daughter, who refused to live with father.

From Para 5,

5. It is explicit from impugned order that respondent has attained the majority and also pursuing B.A. final year. As per Section 125 Cr.P.C. to get maintenance daughter has to make out a case that she is unable to maintain herself or not attained the majority but in the present case, no such averment has been made. So the respondent is not entitled to get maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. However, Section 20 (3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 recognize rights of maintenance to children and it is statutory obligation of Hindu to maintain his or her daughter, who is unmarried and is unable to maintain herself out of her own earning of other property.

This kind judge gave her legal advice through this judgment. Still have the tendency to think like an advocate!

From Paras 7 and 8,

7. Therefore, in view of the proposition held in Abhilasha (Supra) the application filed by the respondent under Section 125 Cr.P.C before the Family Court is not maintainable. Further, this Court reserves liberty in favour of the respondent/daughter to take recourse to Section 20 (3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, if so advised, for claiming any maintenance against her father.
8. Reserving the aforesaid liberty, this revision is allowed and the impugned order is hereby quashed.

Birendra Kumar Tiwari Vs Neetu Tiwari on 07 Dec 2022

Citations: [2022 Latest Caselaw 7369 Chatt],

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/32464509/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/639a08eae4e7915eb4d2599d

https://www.latestlaws.com/judgements/chattisgarh-high-court/2022/december/2022-latest-caselaw-7369-chatt/

Index of Maintenance Judgments u/s 144 BNSS is here.

Dinesh Kumar Vs Neeti and Ors on 4 Apr 2026 – Judgment Summary

Posted on April 24 by Suprajaa Rajan

In a significant ruling on interim maintenance, the Delhi High Court dealt with cross-petitions filed by both husband and wife challenging the quantum of maintenance awarded under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. While the husband argued that the amount was excessive, the wife contended that it was inadequate considering his actual financial capacity.

The dispute arose after the parties separated in 2016, with the wife seeking maintenance under both Section 125 of the CrPC (now Section 144 BNSS) and proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act. After evaluating the material on record, the High Court took a balanced approach. It neither accepted the husband’s minimal income claim nor the wife’s allegation of extremely high earnings, but instead assessed his income pragmatically.

“12. Thus, the responsibility of their day-to-day care, upbringing and education is being borne by the wife. Secondly, this Court notes that the husband has alleged that the wife is earning about ₹30,000/- per month by giving tuition. However, no document or material has been placed on record by him to substantiate this allegation. In the absence of any supporting material, such assertion cannot be accepted at this stage. Therefore, this Court does not find any infirmity in the finding of the learned Trial Court, as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court, that the income of the wife is to be treated as „Nil‟ for the purpose of deciding interim maintenance.”
“14. Thus, at this stage, while the allegation of the wife regarding the extremely high income of the husband remains unsubstantiated, the claim of the husband that he is earning only ₹12,000/- per month also requires to be examined cautiously in light of the overall facts and circumstances of the case.”
“17. In these circumstances, this Court finds no reason to disagree with the observations of the learned Appellate Court that the husband appears to have withheld material information regarding his actual income and financial status. The material placed on record therefore prima facie indicates that the husband has not made a full and candid disclosure of his financial position.”
“18. Considering the fact that the husband claims to be earning only ₹12,000/- per month, which is even below the minimum wages applicable in Delhi, this Court finds no ground to accept such a claim at this stage. “

Decision

Accordingly, the High Court dismissed both cross-petitions and upheld the Appellate Court’s order granting total interim maintenance of ₹13,000 per month to the wife and two minor children.

Furthermore, the Court clarified that:

The maintenance awarded under Section 125 CrPC (Section 144 BNSS) would be adjusted against the amount granted under the Domestic Violence Act.
The findings were purely interim in nature and subject to final adjudication after trial.
Importantly, the Court reiterated that suppression of income invites adverse inference, and courts may assess earning capacity even in the absence of full disclosure.

Thus, the judgment reinforces the principle that financial responsibility toward dependents cannot be avoided through incomplete or misleading disclosures.

Dinesh kumar Vs Neeti and Ors on 4 Apr 2026

Citation : 2026 DHC 2819

Other Sources :

Index of Maintenance judgements is here.

Key Contributor :
Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.
+91-9606345150

Rani Bibi Vs Sk Nurullah and Ors on 8 Dec 2025 – Judgement Summary

Posted on April 8 by Suprajaa Rajan

In Rani Bibi vs Sk. Nurullah & Ors. (2026), the Calcutta High Court dealt with a crucial issue concerning territorial jurisdiction under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and the maintainability of a petition under Section 482 CrPC [Section 528 BNSS].

The petitioner-wife, after being allegedly subjected to cruelty and dowry harassment, shifted to a rented accommodation in Kolkata and initiated proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act. While the Magistrate upheld jurisdiction, the appellate court reversed the decision, directing return of the application for lack of territorial jurisdiction.

“25. Since in the instant case, the question which has been dealt herein by the court below as to the maintainability of the Application under section 12 of the D.V. Act before the said Trial court is on the ground of territoriality principle of jurisdiction, I am of the firm view that the order impugned attracts the second part of section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and therefore instant application under section 482 of the Code against the impugned order is maintainable.”
“29. In the light of said judgment the temporary residence as envisaged under the Act is such residence where an aggrieved person compelled to take shelter in view of domestic violence perpetrated on her or she either been turned out of the matrimonial home or has to leave the matrimonial home. Of course the temporary residence does not include residence in a lodge or hotel or an inn or residence at a place only for the purpose of filing a domestic violence case, but the temporary residence must also be a continuing residence from the date of acquiring residence till the Application under section 12 disposed of and it must not be a fleeing residence where a woman comes only for the purpose of contesting the case and otherwise does not reside there.”
“30. In the instant case the document which has been relied by the petitioner and also considering the fact that the petitioner had received court notices from the Taltala Address it does not indicate that it is not her continuing residence nor there is anything to suggest that the petitioner comes to that residence only for the purpose of contesting the said cases and otherwise does not reside therein.”
“34. “Economic abuse” interalia includes deprivation of financial or economic resources to which an aggrieved person is entitled to under the law or custom and such claim is a continuing one which continues from day to day. It is settled law that continuity of joint residence in a shared house hold or domestic relationship inter se is not a sine qua non for the perpetration of domestic violence to an aggrieved person in the form “economic abuse” under the Act.”

Decision

The Court, after detailed analysis, thus, held that:

A woman can initiate DV proceedings where she temporarily resides.
Temporary residence must be genuine and not merely a “fleeting” arrangement.
Economic abuse constitutes a continuing cause of action, thereby conferring jurisdiction.

Therefore, the High Court set aside the appellate court’s order and restored the Magistrate’s decision.

Rani Bibi Vs Sk Nurullah and Ors on 8 Dec 2025

Citation : 2026:CHC-AS:289

Other Sources :

Index of Domestic Violence judgements is here.

Related Legal Concepts

Inherent powers of High Court
Temporary vs Permanent Residence
Economic Abuse under DV Act
Maintainability of Criminal Revision
Abuse of Process of Law

Key Contributor :
Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.
+91-9606345150

Vinod Kumar Vs Seema Devi and Anr on 16 Mar 2026 – Judgement Summary

Posted on April 4 by Suprajaa Rajan

In Vinod Kumar Vs Seema Devi and Anr, the Delhi High Court examined whether the maintenance awarded by the Family Court under Section 125 CrPC (now Section 144 BNSS) required interference.

The petitioner (husband) challenged the maintenance granted to his wife and daughter, arguing that:

The wife lived separately without justification
She had rental income
His own income was wrongly assessed

However, the Court found that the wife had consistently alleged cruelty, which justified her separate residence. Moreover, the Court emphasized that an able-bodied husband cannot evade maintenance liability by understating income or taking voluntary retirement.

After analysing income, evidence, and legal principles, the Court upheld the Family Court’s order and dismissed the revision petition.

“9. It is well settled that the object of granting maintenance is to prevent vagrancy by compelling those who can provide support to those who are unable to support themselves and who have a moral claim to support.”

“10. Section 125 of the CrPC elucidates conditions under which a wife may be deemed ineligible for maintenance. These conditions include instances where the wife is engaged in adulterous activities, where she, without any justifiable cause, refuse to cohabit with her husband, or where both parties have agreed to live apart through mutual consent. These provisions delineate clear legal parameters that govern the entitlement or disentitlement of maintenance to ensure that the support is granted only under circumstances that warrant such financial assistance.”

“13. Merely because Respondent No.1 remained in possession of the matrimonial house, the same does not signify that the petitioner did not neglect to maintain the respondents. Even if the contention of the petitioner is taken as correct, the case of the respondents is not helmed on Respondent No.1 leaving the company of the petitioner due to neglect, so as to disentitle her from grant of maintenance. Rather, Respondent No.1 has made categorical allegations of cruelty, which is sufficient to satisfy the threshold of balance of probabilities.”
“18. It appears to be implausible that the petitioner would have taken retirement from his stable well-paying job without securing any other mode of income. As it is a normal tendency of the parties to not disclose their true income in matrimonial disputes, the Courts are permitted to make some guess work and arrive at a figure that a party may reasonably be earning.”
“19. The petitioner is a well- bodied man capable of earning, he cannot shirk his sacrosanct duty to financially support his wife and children by claiming that he has no income after retirement apart from his pension. The petitioner is thus obliged to earn and maintain his family, and the purported lower MSP prices for his land would thus not help his case.”

Decision

The Delhi High Court held that:

The maintenance awarded by the Family Court was justified and reasonable
The wife’s allegations of cruelty justified her separate residence
The husband’s claim of low income was not credible

Accordingly:

The Court refused to interfere with the maintenance order
The revision petition was dismissed
Maintenance (₹10,000 per month each after majority, with 10% increase every two years) was upheld

Vinod Kumar Vs Seema Devi and Anr on 16 Mar 2026

Citation :

Other Sources :

Index of Maintenance Judgements under Sec 125 CrPC is here.

Related Legal Concepts

Maintenance under Section 125 CrPC (Section 144 BNSS)
Cruelty as Ground for Separate Residence
Assessment of Income in Maintenance Cases
Doctrine of Social Justice in Family Law
Adverse Inference for Non-Disclosure of Income

Key Contributor :
Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.
+91-9606345150

Ankit Saha Vs State of UP and Anr on 03 Dec 2025

Posted on April 3 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Allahabad bench of Allahabad High Court held as follows on two aspects,

From Paras 9 to 11, (Failed to prove that Wife was ‘unable to maintain herself‘)

9. From the perusal of Section 125 Cr.P.C., it is clear that maintenance can be awarded to the wife, when she is unable to maintain herself.
10. A perusal of the paragraph 23 of the impugned judgment which is at internal page no. 12 of the impugned indicates that in the affidavit filed before the trial court, the opposite party no. 2 herself admitted that she is a Post-Graduate, Web Designer by qualification, and is working as a Senior Sales Coordinator in Keiath Telecom Pvt. Ltd., getting salary of Rs. 34,000/- per month but in her cross-examination she has further admitted that she is earning of Rs. 36,000/- per month and such amount, for a wife who has no other liability, cannot be said to be meagre, whereas the revisionist has the responsibility of maintaining his aged parents and other social obligations.
11. Thus, this Court is of the view that as per the provision of Section 125(1) (a), the opposite party no. 2 is not entitled to get any maintenance from her husband/revisionist as she is an earning lady and able to maintain herself.

From Paras 12 to 15,

12. On the second issue, learned counsel for the revisionist has alleged that she did not came before the trial court with clean hands. A perusal of the affidavit filed by the opposite party no.2 at page no. 67-70 clearly reflects that she has not mentioned that she is an earning lady as well as a perusal of application under Section 125 Cr. P.C. paper no. 33 to 38 at paragraph no. 16 reflects that she has claimed herself as an illiterate and unemployed woman but when the document filed by the revisionist was shown to her before the trial court, she has admitted her aforesaid income during her cross-examination. Thus, it is clear that she did not came before the trial court with clean hands.
13. It is settled law that when a person approaches a Court, he should approach the Court not only with clean hands but also with clean mind, clean heart and clean objective. It is a law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another. The judicial process should never become an instrument of appreciation or abuse or a means in the process of the Court to subvert justice. No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner he wishes. Easy, access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. If a petitioner is guilty of suppression of very important fact his case cannot be considered on merits. Thus, a litigant is bound to make “full and true disclosure of facts”.
14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Rekha Sharad Ushir Vs. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC641, para no. 11 is reproduced herein below:
“11. It is settled law that a litigant who, while filing proceedings in the court, suppresses material facts or makes a false statement, cannot seek justice from the court. The facts suppressed must be material and relevant to the controversy, which may have a bearing on the decision making. Cases of those litigants who have no regard for the truth and those who indulge in suppressing material facts need to be thrown out of the court.”
15. In view of the said judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court, the opposite party no. 2 does not deserve any sympathy and is not entitled to receive maintenance from the revisionist.

Ankit Saha Vs State of UP and Anr on 03 Dec 2025

Index of Maintenance Judgements under Section 144 BNSS here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 1-Judge Bench Decision

Rajashekar Vs BCI and Anr on 27 Oct 2025

Vijay Gopal Vs Bar Council of India and Anr on 29 Apr 2026

Bhawna Rani Vs Gurdeep Singh on 27 Nov 2025

Ravi S Vs Sahana Devi A and Ors on 18 Jun 2026

Chidurala Shyamsubder Vs State of Telangana on 27 Aug 2018

Birendra Kumar Tiwari Vs Neetu Tiwari on 07 Dec 2022

Dinesh Kumar Vs Neeti and Ors on 4 Apr 2026 – Judgment Summary

Decision

Rani Bibi Vs Sk Nurullah and Ors on 8 Dec 2025 – Judgement Summary

Decision

Related Legal Concepts

Vinod Kumar Vs Seema Devi and Anr on 16 Mar 2026 – Judgement Summary

Decision

Related Legal Concepts

Ankit Saha Vs State of UP and Anr on 03 Dec 2025