Posting this Conviction judgment only for awareness of the visitors to this site, on the focal point that, how a baseless judgment looks like. Just 24 Pages. Judgment begins around Para 18.
State of Telangana Vs Bodusu Naresh Yadav and Ors on 17 Dec 2019Enjoy !!!
This is so cute judgment where in to get Anticipatory Bail, husband has to pay maintenance to knife in Divorce matter husband filed. Aaa baile mujhe maat…
Mohan Murari Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 16 Oct 2020Here is the jewel of the Order given at Patna High Court.
Mohan Murari Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 20 Sep 2019This is precisely why I advocate quick disposal of civil matters… A helpful compilation is here.
After failure at Delhi High Court here, Supreme Court dismissed the SLP summarily. Sad!
Sameer Saxena Vs State and Anr on 07 March 2011Basing on the Pooja Saxena case here, Parents of women who were alleged to have committed the crime of giving dowry were let free.
Chitranjan Dev Goel and Ors Vs State (Nct of Delhi) and Ors on 21 March 2016Citations: [2016 SCC ONLINE DEL 2130], [2016 DLT CN B 229 30]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/134987777/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5728e42ee56109277ee48517
https://www.quickcompany.in/judgements/judgement-7b760d46-8b0b-48bd-9a45-794161ac3e2c
Justice K C Bhanu from AP High Court has held as follows:
From Para 2,
2. Petitioner is an accused in C.C. No. 224/1995. Chinna Chowk Police laid a charge-sheet against him, his parents and three sisters for an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and for offences punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, for short, hereinafter to be referred to as “the Act”. A single charge under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act was framed against petitioner and A-2. After conclusion of trial and before judgment, the learned Magistrate framed separate charges under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act against petitioner and A-2 and recalled P.Ws. 1 to 3 and cross-examination them. During their cross-examination, P.Ws. 1 to 3 admitted that they had given Rs. 1 lakh as dowry and presented gold jewels worth Rs. 50,000/- to the petitioner and his father. At that stage, petitioner filed Crl. M.P. No. 4073/1998 before the Trial Court under Section 319, Cr.P.C, to implead P.Ws. 1 to 4 as accused for the offence under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, to be tried along with the other accused in the case, since both the giver and taker of dowry are equally liable for punishment under the Act. The learned Magistrate dismissed that application against which petitioner filed Crl. R.P. No. 15/1999 before the Sessions Court. The learned Sessions Judge has dismissed the revision holding that P.Ws. 1 to 4 cannot be tried as accused in the same trial as they are protected under Section 7(3) of the Act. It is as against the order of dismissal of the revision, A-1 filed the present petitioner to quash the said order.
From Para 7,
7. A plain reading of the above provision would go to show that giving or taking of dowry as well as abetment of giving or taking of dowry is an offence punishable under the Act. On the basis of the statements made before the Court by P.Ws. 1 to 3 admitting that they gave dowry, can they be tried as accused in the same trial, is the question.
From Para 10,
10. If P.Ws. 1 to 4, who were examined as witnesses, are added as accused and arrayed in the list, of the accused persons, the proceedings in respect of them shall have to be commenced afresh and thewitnesses reheard. It means they have to give evidence against themselves, which is not permissible under law. Clause (3) of Article 20 of the Constitution provides that no person accused of any offenceshall be compelled to be a witness against himself. This protection is available to the person accused ofan offence not merely with respect to the evidence to be given in the Court-room in the course of trial butis also available to him at the previous stages, if an accusation has been made against him which might, in the normal course, result in his prosecution. It follows that the protection is available to a person againstwhom the formal accusation has been made though the actual trial may not have commenced as yet andif such an accusation relates to the commission of an offence which in the normal course may result in prosecution. In view of the above provisions, the witnesses cannot be compelled to give evidence against themselves. Therefore, P.Ws. 1 to 4, cannot be arrayed as accused along with petitioner and others in the same proceedings. If the Court wants to proceed against the persons of giving dowry, then it has to resort to the provision under Section 7 of the Act. Section 7(1)(b) of the Act provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence under this Act except upon its own knowledge, or a police report of the facts which constitute such offence, or a complaint by the person aggrieved by the offence or other relative of such person or by any recognized welfare institution or organization.
Further Section 7(3) of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the timebeing in force, a statement made by the person aggrieved by the offence shall not subject such person to a prosecution under this Act.
Fundamental mistake in this case is, why police are NOT booking the Dowry givers asmushas Dowry takers in the FIR? Because in some States, Police circulars were issues precluding the Dowry givers from prosecution. So Police themselves decided that Dowry givers are not to be booked, which is totally contrary to what is said in Section 3(1).
Malreddy Ramachandra Reddy Vs C. Vanaja Reddy and Ors on 16 April 2003Citations: [2004 DMC 2 49], [2003 ALD 2 91], [2003 ALT CRI 2 253]
Other Source links:
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f83ce4b0149711141d5d
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/91122848/
Justice NN Tiwari had held as follows (without any legal basis):
From Para 6,
6. Learned Counsel for the complainant, on the other hand, submitted that the ground for assailing the impugned order by the petitioner is wholly misconceived and baseless. From the allegations made in the complaint, it is evident that the accused persons were demanding dowry and torturing the complainant for not bringing the dowry as desired by them. The petitioner is wrongly interpreting the presents given by the parents of the complainant, as dowry, which does not come within the ambit of Section 3(1) of the Act. It has been submitted that nothing new has come in course of the inquiry or trial or there is nothing in the evidence on record to suggest that any such offence has been committed by the father of the complainant and learned Court below considering the provisions of law including the provisions of Section 7(3) of the Act has rightly rejected the petitioner’s petition.
From Para 10,
10. The petitioner has sought prosecution on the basis of the statement of giving dowry by the father of the complainant. From perusal of the statement made in the complaint, I find no such incriminating statement of voluntarily giving dowry for marriage. The statement regarding giving presents ‘UPHAR’ does not come within the ambit of definition of dowry. Moreover, the father of the complainant is an aggrieved person from whom dowry was being demanded. Such aggrieved person is protected under Section 7(3) from prosecution under the Act.
Ram Gopal Sah Vs State Of Jharkhand on 03 December 2008 (LQ Ver)
Citations: [2008 SCC ONLINE JHAR 385], [2009 AIR JHAR R 1 856], [2009 CRI LJ NOC 614 159], [2009 JLJR 1 432]
Other Source links:
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56ea832d607dba377ff107fd
https://www.lawyerservices.in/Ram-Gopal-Sah-Versus-State-Of-Jharkhand-2008-12-03
This is a Delhi High Court judgment where a certain conclusion is made without basis. Just an earlier judgment is cited as support even that one lacks justification. Funny.
From Para 8,
8. It is thus evident that Section 7 (3) is a non obstante clause and will thus prevail on any other law for the time being in force and a statement made by a person aggrieved by the offence under this Act shall not subject him to prosecution under this Act. Thus the decision of this Court in Neera Singh (supra) is an obiter and does not constitute a binding precedent for the reasons that the provisions of DP Act 1961 were not subject matter of the dispute before the Court in the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Neera Singh’s case and thus, this Court did not take into consideration the provisions under Section 7 (3) of the DP Act.
From Para 9,
9. Further there is no merit in the contention of learned counsel for the Respondent that the Petitioner being the father of the victim girl was not an
“aggrieved person”. Section 7(3) of the DP Act bars cognizance of a complaint against the person aggrieved by the offence. It cannot be said that only “aggrieved person” would be the victim girl. Even the father of the victim girl, who was made to give dowry, would be an aggrieved person. Similar view has been taken in Ram Gopal Sah v. State of Jharkhand, II (2009) DMC 844.
No one explains how/why should the Dowry giving criminals (as per Sec 3(1) should be protected from prosecution along with their daughter, who can be considered an aggrieved person!!!
Yashpal Kumar Vs Bhola Nath Khanna and Anr on 1 March 2012
Citations: [2012 AD DEL 3 186], [2012 DMC 2 134], [2012 SCC ONLINE DEL 1261]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/160230226/
https://www.legitquest.com/case/yashpal-kumar-v-bhola-nath-khanna-another/73202
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090e75e4b014971117c483
Read through the Para 11 of this Delhi High Judgment to learn how NOT to draw conclusions from thin air u/s 482 CrPC proceedings.
11. The above observation of this Court obviously is an obiter and does not constitute a binding precedent for the reason that the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 were not the subject-matter of the dispute before the court in the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Neera Singh’s case. Moreover, in the aforesaid judgment, the Court has not taken into account the protection given to a victim of offence of dowry demand as provided under Section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961. Thus, in my view the above referred judgment is of no avail to respondent No.2. Further, on perusal of FIR No.232/2009, it transpires that as per the allegations in the complaint made by the petitioner, the demand for dowry was made by the father of respondent No.2 at the time of engagement ceremony of the petitioner when he allegedly asked the father of the petitioner to concede to his demand for dowry, failing which he would call off the marriage. From the aforesaid facts, it is obvious that the petitioner and her parents were confronted with the unenviable situation either to concede to the demand or face the loss of honour of their family in the society, and if under that fear, the petitioner and her parents conceded to the demand for dowry, they cannot be faulted as they were victims of the circumstances. Given the aforesaid facts, Section 7(3) comes to the rescue of the petitioner and in terms of the aforesaid provision, she cannot be subjected to prosecution for the offence under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Crux of the failed justice: Clearly from the highlighted portion of the judgment itself, one can understand the conclusion arrived by the Judge is based on the unproved allegations in the complaint which got carried as-is to the FIR. This also goes to show that the Judge has pre-judged that the allegations were true despite the fact that said allegation of demand for dowry is to be punished under Section 4 of DP Act 1961 and this being a Criminal Statute required such allegations to be proven in a Criminal Court trial with evidence. This was given a total bypass possibly in an successful attempt of harmonious interpretation but alas totally contrary to the legislature intent which being that Dowry givers are to be punished. Despite writing that Sec 7(3) gives protection only to the aggrieved person (who made the complaint) her parents are also extended protection from prosecution, which is squarely ultravires to provision, statute and legislature intent and most importantly to Principles of natural justice. Precluding the criminal who allegedly committed the crime of giving dowry even before such fact is proved in a Court trial is travesty of justice.
Pooja Saxena vs State and Anr on 20 October 2010
Citations: [2011 CRIMES 1 378], [2010 JCC 4 2780], [2011 AD DEL 1 359], [2010 SCC ONLINE DEL 3652]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/61656909/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090d12e4b0149711178c8d
Further story here.
Another dirty judgment, this time from High Court of Delhi.
R D Vs B D on 31 July, 2019Do you know how to misinterpret laws? Don’t know? Learn from this judgment from Delhi High Court.
From Paras 12-16,
12. Second proviso to sub section (1) to Section 125 Cr.P.C. stipulates grant of interim maintenance. Reading of second proviso does not in any manner indicate that making of an application seeking interim maintenance is a pre-condition for grant of interim maintenance.
13. The Third proviso to sub section (1) to Section 125 Cr.P.C. stipulates disposal of an application for grant of interim maintenance within a time bound manner.
14. If the second and third proviso to sub section (1) to Section 125 Cr.P.C are read keeping in view the very object of the statute, it shows that there is no requirement stipulated by the statute for making an application for grant of interim maintenance pending consideration of the petition under section 125 Cr.P.C. and the Court would be empowered to pass an order assessing interim maintenance even in a case where no such application has been filed by the person claiming maintenance. However, where such an application is made, the same would have to be disposed of by the Trial Court within the time stipulated therein.
15. If a narrower interpretation were to be given to the provision i.e. that an application is a pre-condition for grant of interim maintenance, the same would militate against the very object of the scheme of providing maintenance to a dependant, who is unable to maintain himself/herself, where the person who has sufficient means has refused or neglected to maintain the dependant. (Author: How?)
16. Keeping in view the beneficial object of the statute, it is held that the filing of an application seeking interim maintenance would not be a precondition for grant of interim maintenance pending consideration of the petition seeking maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C.. It would be open to the trial court to grant interim maintenance, in the facts and circumstances of the case, pending consideration of the application for grant of maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C.
Have you ever heard the words: misinterpreting, idiotic, biased, pre-judged, cunning? Sounds applicable to this judgment?
Inder Singh Vs Sumitra on 05 August, 2019
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