Apex Court confirmed the decision of Bombay High Court which said, Doctor’s (Healthcare) services are within the ambit of Consumer Protection Act 2019.
Medicos Legal Action Group Vs Union of India on 29 Apr 2022Citations :
Other Sources :
Bombay High Court decision:
Medicos Legal Action Group Vs Union of India on 25 Oct 2021A division bench of Apex Court held that, there is no allegations of domestic violence against the respondents and more importantly, there is no shared household between the complainant and the respondents.
Kamlesh Devi Vs Jaipal and Ors on 04 Oct 2019The High Court has rightly found in effect that the ingredients of domestic violence are wholly absent in this case. The petitioner and the respondents are not persons living together in a shared household. There is a vague allegation that the respondents are family members. There is not a whisper of the respondents with the petitioner. They appear to be neighbours.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/46655686/
https://lawsisto.com/legalnewsread/MzAxMg==/Supreme-Court-If-Parties-Are-Not-Living-Together-In-A-Shared-House-Domestic-Violence-Complaint-Not-Maintainable
https://www.lawyerservices.in/Kamlesh-Devi-Versus-Jaipal-and-Others-2019-10-04
https://lawstreet.co/judiciary/complaint-not-maintainable-if-parties-are-living-separately/
Here is the High Court decision:
Kamlesh Devi Vs Jaipal and Ors on 16 Sep 2016The learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Narnaul, after discussing the provisions of the Act found that none of the witnesses on record has established any fact to the effect that the respondents and the petitioner have been living in a shared household and the respondents have caused domestic violence upon them. The Court below also held that no violence whatsoever has been alleged of any kind within the premises of shared household. The only allegation is that though they did obscene activities with the daughters of the petitioner, the allegations as per pleadings are that respondents Jaipal, Krishan Kumar and Sandeep used to misbehave with the daughters of the petitioner, namely, Anusaya and Gaytri while they went outside for the purpose of their study and they used to do obscene activities with the daughters of the petitioner. The findings given by the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Narnaul, are correct as per evidence and law. No illegality has been committed by the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Narnaul.
From the perusal of the complaint itself, it transpires that the offence, if any, which has been alleged, falls in the provisions of IPC and it does not attract the provisions of the Act. The important fact that accused Jaipal, Krishan Kumar and Sandeep are the nephews itself will not bring the case under the Act.
The appeal filed by the present petitioner against the judgment of the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Narnaul, before the learned Sessions Judge was also dismissed by giving the reasoning as per law. The learned Sessions Judge also discussed that there is not an iota of evidence that the petitioner Kamlesh Devi and the respondents are living together in share household. Rather, certificate Ex.C.3/Ex.PW.1/C also shows that it has been mentioned therein that Sube Singh alias Shiv Lal, Siri Ram, Chhote Lal and Babu Lal reside separately in separate houses. Protection Officer had also reported that Kamlesh Devi along with her family is residing at Narnaul since a long time and had performed the marriages of her daughters at Narnaul and Smt. Kamlesh Devi and her husband are not residing in Village Gaud. The learned Sessions Judge, Narnaul also held that Kamlesh Devi-petitioner is not aggrieved person under the provision of Section 2(a) of the Act and is not entitled to any protection under Section 18 of the Act. A perusal of the judgments passed by the Courts below shows that the same have been passed as per evidence and law and the same are upheld.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e24c7f546571b7222aa868e
Relying on Supreme Court judgment here, Single bench of Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur held that non-citizen women residing in India temporarily also are classified as ‘aggrieved person’.
Robarto Nieddu Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr on 20 Nov 2021It is noted that as per section 2(a) of the Act of 2005, the definition of ‘aggrieved person’ is given and as per the definition itself, any woman including a foreign citizen who is subjected to domestic violence can maintain an application before the trial court under the Act of 2005.
Not only this, section 12 of the Act of 2005 provides that even an aggrieved person can prefer an application through protection officer seeking the relief under the Act of 2005.
The fact that the respondent No.2 is resident of Jodhpur for last about 25 years and after having solemnized marriage with the petitioner, the incident which is reported in the complaint also took place at Jodhpur and therefore, in view of definitions enumerated under sections 2 (a) and 12 of the Act of 2005, it is held that the application preferred by the respondent No.2 before the trial court is maintainable. The observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Shyamlal Devda & Ors. V/s Parimala reported in AIR 2020 SC 762 also fortifies the fact of maintainability of the application under section 12 of the Act of 2005 in the present case. Para 10 of the judgment rendered in the case of Shyamlal Devda.
A plain reading of Act of 2005 also reveals that protection under this Act is also extended to the persons who are temporarily resident of India being covered under the definition of aggrieved person as per section 2 (a) of the Act of 2005.
Even Article 21 of the Constitution of India extends the benefit of protection not only to every citizen of this country, but also to a “person” who may not be a citizen of the Country. Article 21 states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to a procedure established by law. Therefore, looked at from that angle, a person aggrieved i.e. respondent No.2 is very much entitled to get protection of section 12 of the Act of 2005.
A single judge bench of AP High Court held as follows:
Time and again this Court is coming across many cases, wherein the deposit of passport is being ordered by the Courts at the time of granting bail etc. The Hon’ble SupremeCourt of India in Suresh Nanda’s case (1 supra) has very clearly laid down that impounding of passport is not power that is available to the police. The police have a right tomerely seize the passport under Section 102 Cr.P.C., but they do not have the power to retain the passport. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has already clearly held that the retention of a passport for a long time also amounts to impounding of the passport. This is very clearly laid down in the judgment of Suresh Nanda’s case (1 supra). Apart from that the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India also clearly held thatafter the passport is seized and if the State was of the opinion that the petitioner was likely to flee the country or that he is at a flight risk, the only option available to the State or theprosecution is to file an appropriate application before the Passport Authorities to impound the passport for the reasonsmentioned in Section 10(3) of the Act. The Passport Authorities shall give a notice to the accused and after hearing the accused, they will have to pass an order. Sincethe cancellation of the passport is an order having severe civilconsequences, the accused also has a right of being heardbefore the passport is impounded. The Passport Act, being a special law will prevail over the general law.
Next Para,
D.Suryaprakash Venkata Rao Vs State of AP on 06 Dec 2019In that view of the matter, irrespective of the fact that whether in the present case the issue relates to the voluntary deposit of the passport or deposit pursuant to an order of the Court, the fact remains that neither case is supported by the law. If the counsel made a wrong concession, the same cannot be enure to the benefit of the prosecution. A party should not suffer for any mistake committed by the counsel. If the same is a part and parcel of the lower Courts order, then it is clearly opposed by the law as interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Suresh Nanda’s case (1 supra). Therefore, for both these reasons, this Court holds that the condition about the deposit of the passport cannot be imposed by a Court while granting bail or for any other reason. The only option left in such cases, when the passport is seized is to take steps under the Act for cancellation/impounding. Learned Public Prosecutor has stated that the original passport is lost and the accused has applied for a duplicate passport and has flouted the Court
order. Basing on the written instructions received by him, he states that petitioner/A.1 is also liable for contempt of Court. This is also not correct and the order of the Court does not seem to suggest this. As mentioned earlier, neither the Court can impose such a condition nor can the counsel give a
concession and deposit the passport. Even if the passport is deposited pursuant to the concession made by a counsel, the same cannot be retained indefinitely by the Court or the Police till the trial is concluded.
In fact, in the decision of Suresh Nanda (1supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India noticed that under Section 10(a) of the Act, even the Central Government can only retain the passport for four weeks. Thereafter, a further order from Passport Authorities is necessary for retention of the passport.
After clarifying the law on the subject and holding that the impugned order passed by the I Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is contrary to law, this Court leaves it open to the prosecution to take such steps as are warranted by law, if they are so advised to cancel the passport of the accused.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/130750295/
A Full Bench of Apex Court passed these guidelines while issuing bail orders.
Sanjay Awasthi Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 14 Jul 2015In the result, we issue the following directions:
(i) Such of the petitioners as have not already furnished bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial courts concerned shall do so within a period of two weeks from today in which event the protection against arrest shall continue but only subject to their furnishing such bonds.
(ii) The trial court(s) shall satisfy themselves about the deposit of the amount directed by us, in terms of our Order(s) passed in each one of the
cases. In case deposit is not made as directed, the same shall be made within four weeks from the date the trial Court issues a direction to that effect after verification.
(iii) Liberty is reserved to the CBI to move the trial court concerned in case the amount already deposited by the petitioners does not match the amount on a proportionate basis that should be recovered from them having regard to the amount alleged to have been misappropriated or
wrongfully paid/received. Should the petitioner(s) fail to deposit any such further amount directed by the trial court, the bail order granted in his/her favour shall stand cancelled without any further reference to this Court.
(iv) The trial court(s) shall be free to direct deposit of Passports by the accused-persons in such of the cases at it may consider just and proper.
(v) The petitioners shall not tamper with the evidence in any manner whatsoever and if they do so, the Court shall be free to cancel the bail granted to the accused concerned.
(vi) The amount deposited by the petitioners shall be remitted by the trial court(s) to the State Government, Department of Health and Family Welfare, for utilisation in the ongoing NRHM Scheme.
(vii) The trial court(s) shall endeavour to expedite the trial and shall be free to pass appropriate order(s) against the petitioners including an order withdrawing the concession of bail granted to them or any one of them, if the accused do not cooperate or otherwise resort to dilatory tactics.
A division bench of Apex Court held that procedural lapses are crucial in proceedings under Contempt of Courts Act 1971.
From Para 23,
Muthu Karuppan Vs Parithi Ilamvazhuthi and Anr on 15 Apr 201123) We have already pointed out that while dealing with criminal contempt in terms of Section 2(c) of the Act, strict procedures are to be adhered. In a series of decisions, this Court has held that jurisdiction to initiate proceedings for contempt as also the jurisdiction to punish for contempt are discretionary with the court. Contempt generally and criminal contempt certainly is a matter between the court and the alleged contemnor. No one can compel or demand as of right initiation of proceedings for contempt. The person filing an application or petition before the court does not become a complainant or petitioner in the proceedings. He is just an informer or relator. His duty ends with the facts being brought to the notice of the court. It is thereafter for the court to act on such information or not. [Vide Om Prakash Jaiswal vs. D.K. Mittal, (2000) 3 SCC 171] Further Section 15 of the Act as well as the Madras High Court Contempt of Court Rules insist that, particularly, for initiation of criminal contempt, consent of the Advocate General is required. Any deviation from the prescribed Rules should not be accepted or condoned lightly and must be deemed to be fatal to the proceedings taken to initiate action for contempt. In the present case, the above provisions have not been strictly adhered to and even the notice issued by the then Division Bench merely sought for explanation from the appellant about the allegations made by Respondent No. 1.
Citations : [2011 AIR SC 1645], [2011 CRI LJ 2680], [2011 CRIMES SC 2 163], [2011 CTC 3 520], [2011 JCR SC 3 23], [2011 JT SC 4 268], [2011 KCCR SN 3 329], [2011 RCR CRIMINAL 2 829], [2011 SCALE 4 664], [2011 SCC 5 496], [2011 SCC CRI 2 709], [2011 SCR 5 329], [2011 UC 2 922], [2011 UJ 2 1658], [2011 AIR SC 2588], [2012 CUTLT 113 822], [2011 AIC 102 74], [2011 AIOL 291], [2011 CRLJ SC 2680], [2011 JT 4 273], [2011 SUPREME 3 217], [2011 SUPREME 3 228], [2011 LW CRL 1 666], [2011 SCC CR 2 709], [2011 SCJ 4 82], [2011 MLJ CRI 3 542], [2011 CCR 2 214], [2011 SLT 3 438], [2011 RCR CRIMINAL SC 2 829], [2011 KCCRSN 3 329], [2012 CUT LT 113 822], [2011 MLJ CRL 3 54], [22011 KHC SN 2 212011 CRLJ 2680], [2011 AIR SCW 2588], [2011 JT 4 268], [2011 CRILJ 2680]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1204818/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aef4e4b014971141544e
Index of all Perjury case laws is here.
A division bench of Apex Court laid down certain guidelines to be followed in cases of arrest and detention till legal provisions are made in that behalf as preventive measures. The said guidelines read as follows:-
D.K. Basu Vs State of West Bengal on 18 Dec 1996(1) The police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling the interrogation of the arrestee should bear accurate, visible and clear identification and name tags with their designations. The particulars of all such police personnel who handle interrogation of the arrestee must be recorded in a register.
(2) That the police officer carrying out the arrest of the arrestee shall prepare a memo of arrest at the time of arrest and such memo shall be attested by at least one witness, who may either be a member of the family of the arrestee or a respectable person of the locality from where the arrest is made. It shall also be countersigned by the arrestee and shall contain the time and date of arrest.
(3) A person who has been arrested or detained and is being held in custody in a police station or interrogation centre or other lock-up, shall be entitled to have one friend or relative or other person known to him or having interest in his welfare being informed, as soon as practicable, that he has been arrested and is being detained at the particular place, unless the attesting witness of the memo of arrest is himself such a friend or a
relative of the arrestee.
(4) The time, place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee must be notified by the police where the next friend or relative of the arrestee lives outside the district or town through the Legal Aid Organisation in the District and the police station of the area concerned telegraphically within a period of 8 to 12 hours after the arrest.
(5) The person arrested must be made aware of this right to have someone informed of his arrest or detention as soon as he is put under arrest or is detained.
(6) An entry must be made in the diary at the place of detention regarding the arrest of the person which shall also disclose the name of the next friend of the person who has been informed of the arrest and the names and particulars of the police officials in whose custody the arrestee is.
(7) The arrestee should, where he so requests, be also examined at the time of his arrest and major and minor injuries, if any present on his/her body, must be recorded at that time. The “Inspection Memo” must be signed both by the arrestee and the police officer effecting the arrest and its copy provided to the arrestee.
(8) The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination by a trained doctor every 48 hours during his detention in custody by a doctor on the panel of approved doctors appointed by Director, Health Services of the State or Union Territory concerned. Director, Health Services should prepare such a panel for all tehsils and districts as well.
(9) Copies of all the documents including the memo of arrest, referred to above, should be sent to the Illaqa Magistrate for his record.
(10) The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation.
(11) A police control room should be provided at all district and State headquarters, where information regarding the arrest and the place of custody of the arrestee shall be communicated by the officer causing the arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the arrest and at the police control room it should be displayed on a conspicuous notice board.
Citations : [1997 ACR SC 21 277], [1997 AIR SC 610], [1997 ALD CRI 1 248], [1998 BLJR 1 161], [1997 CRILJ 743], [1996 CRIMES SC 4 233], [1997 GLR 2 1631], [1997 JT SC 1 1], [1997 RCR CRIMINAL 1 372], [1997 RLW SC 1 94], [1996 SCALE 9 298], [1997 SCC 1 416], [1996 SUPP SCR 10 284], [1997 SCC CRI 92], [1996 SUPPSCR 10 284]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/501198/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ace1e4b014971140fee9#
A division bench of Supreme Court granted compensation to victims of police harassment, while quashing the criminal proceedings.
From Para 27,
Dr. Rini Johar and Anr Vs State of MP and Ors on 03 Jun 201627. In the case at hand, there has been violation of Article 21 and the petitioners were compelled to face humiliation. They have been treated with an attitude of insensibility. Not only there are violation of guidelines issued in the case of D.K. Basu (supra), there are also flagrant violation of mandate of law enshrined under Section 41 and Section 41-A of CrPC. The investigating officers in no circumstances can flout the law with brazen proclivity. In such a situation, the public law remedy which has been postulated in Nilawati Behra (supra), Sube Singh v. State of Haryana9, Hardeep Singh v. State of M.P.10, comes into play. The constitutional courts taking note of suffering and humiliation are entitled to grant compensation. That has been regarded as a redeeming feature. In the case at hand, taking into consideration the totality of facts and circumstances, we think it appropriate to grant a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (rupees five lakhs only) towards compensation to each of the petitioners to be paid by the State of M.P. within three months hence. It will be open to the State to proceed against the erring officials, if so advised.
Citations : [2016 AIOL 3407], [2016 SCC ONLINE SC 594], [2016 SCC 11 703], [2017 SCC CRI 1 364], [2016 AIR SC 2679], [2016 AIC 163 98], [2016 CRI LJ 3156], [2016 GUJ LH 2 607], [2016 KLJ 3 613], [2016 KLT 3 502]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/103942103/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b545e561097e45a4e6b3
A division bench of Apex Court held that, there is no mens rea, on part of Appellant-accused, to abet the suicide of the Class 9 student, therefore necessary ingredient for attracting 306 IPC.
From Para 35,
Geo Varghese Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr on 05 Oct 202139. Insofar as, the suicide note is concerned, despite our minute examination of the same, all we can say is that suicide note is rhetoric document, penned down by an immature mind. A reading of the same also suggests the hypersensitive temperament of the deceased which led him to take such an extraordinary step, as the alleged reprimand by the accused, who was his teacher, otherwise would not ordinarily induce a similarly circumstanced student to commit suicide.
40. In the absence of any material on record even, prima-facie, in the FIR or statement of the complainant, pointing out any such circumstances showing any such act or intention that he intended to bring about the suicide of his student, it would be absurd to even think that the appellant had any intention to place the deceased in such circumstances that there was no option available to him except to commit suicide.
41. In the absence of any specific allegation and material of definite nature, not imaginary or inferential one, it would be travesty of justice, to ask the
appellant-accused to face the trial. A criminal trial is not exactly a pleasant experience and the appellant who is a teacher would certainly suffer great prejudice, if he has to face prosecution on absurd allegations of irrelevant nature.
42. Bearing in mind the factual aspects of the case delineated herein above and the legal principles enunciated by a series of pronouncements of this Court discussed herein above, we are of the view that High Court was not justified in dismissing the application under section 482 CrPC for quashing the First Information Report in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.
43. We are conscious of the pain and suffering of the complainant who is the mother of the deceased boy. It is also very unfortunate that a young life has been lost in this manner, but our sympathies and the pain and suffering of the complainant, cannot translate into a legal remedy, much less a criminal prosecution.
Citations :
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Supreme Court refused (dismissed summarily) to consider the SLPs filed by Bar Council of Kerala against the decision of the division bench of Kerala High Court upon a writ appeal from here (including one filed against T.Koshy, Diary No. 43042/2018), which held that Bar Council (of any State or India) do not have power to prescribe any fee for the enrolment, either in the form of enrolment fee or special fee. .
2019-01-04 Bar Council Of Kerala Vs Raju Y and Anr on 04 Jan 2019Citations:
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