A good judgment by Hon’ble Bombay High Court which sent the false rape case of liar woman packing to dustbin.
Dattatray @ Kashinath Babaso Khatal Vs The State of Maharashtra on 16 January 2019Livelaw News: https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/false-rape-accusation-distress-humiliation-accused-bombay-hc-142468
Based on AP High Court judgment here, Hon’ble Bombay High Court also held that,
Jitendra Manohar Dixit And Anr Vs Gopal Babulal Upadyay And Ors on 16 April, 2001inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be pressed into service either for permitting a non-compoundable offence to be compounded or for quashing of prosecution on the ground that the parties wish to compound the offence which is otherwise non-compoundable.
Citation : (2002) 104 BOMLR 313
Indiankanoon.org link : https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1815287/
In this case before Hon’ble Bombay High Court, it was held that the word impotent when used in pleadings is sufficient to hold that defamation to husband has been done.
The statement made in the pleading is “The petitioner wanted to avoid writing this in this petition but the conduct of the respondent compels her to write that the respondent is an impotent person and the child was born by medical ovulation period technique as was suggested by the gynecologist.“
From Para 24,
X Vs Y on 2 November, 2018Reading the afore-stated allegation as it is and without adding anything to it or subtracting anything from it prima facie, one gets an impression that it is per se defamatory in character and has been, prima facie, calculated to cause harm or injury to the reputation of the non-applicant. It also gives an impression that apparently it has been made with consciousness about the repercussion that such a statement would have on the life of the non-applicant. Even if the expression “impotent person”, as the learned Counsel for the applicant would like this Court to do, is read in all its contextual setting, in particular, in the context of the birth of the child by adopting a medical procedure on the suggestion of the Gynecologist, still the apparent harm that the expression “impotent person” causes, is not diluted or washed out. This is for the reason that prima facie the word “impotent” when understood in it’s plain and grammatical sense, reflects adversely upon the manhood of a person and has a tendency to invite derisive opinions about such person from others and, therefore, use of such word and its publication as contemplated under Section 499 of IPC would be sufficient to constitute, in a prima facie manner, the offence of defamation punishable under Section 500 of IPC. Now, if the non-applicant submits that this word has been used by her in some different sense denoting medical condition of the non-applicant affecting the process of conception, it would be a matter of evidence to be proved accordingly. At this stage, the meaning apparently indicated by the word would have to be taken as it is. Then, such imputation has been made by filing a writ petition and, therefore, the other ingredient of publication is also fulfilled in the present case. Therefore, prima facie, the offence punishable under Section 500 of IPC is made out in this case.
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In this order from Bombay High Court, it is ruled out that based on evidence that knife is working, inferences cannot be taken for the income being earned. Similar situation when reversed, husband’s property/business are expected to give returns and that can be inferred and ass-umed.
Wah bhai High Courat. Tumhaaraa kaarname kamaal ki hey.
Deepak Laxminarayan Verma Vs State of Maharashtra on 1 April, 2016[related_posts_by_tax title=”5 Recently Updated Posts, Similar or Related To Above Post” orderby=”post_modified” posts_per_page=”5″ show_date=”true”]
Archana Hemant Naik Vs Urmilaben I. Naik And Anr on 25 August, 2009
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According to Hon’ble Bombay High Court, Phone sex of knife with Husband’s friend did not cause abetment to husband’s suicide.
Anagha Hitesh Arya Vs State of Maharastra on 14 December, 2018[related_posts_by_tax title=”5 Recently Updated Posts, Similar or Related To Above Post” orderby=”post_modified” posts_per_page=”5″ show_date=”true”]
Following questions arise for consideration in this petition filed with Hon’ble Bombay High Court:
“Whether an order passed on an application made under section 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”) is appelable under section 29 of the said Act?
Whether an appeal will lie under section 29 of the said Act against every order passed by the learned Magistrate in proceedings initiated on the basis of an application made under section 12 of the said Act?
What is the scope of an appeal under section 29 of the said Act?”
From Para 25,
Abhijit Bhikaseth Auti Vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 16 September, 2008Thus, the conclusions which can be summarised are as under:
(i) An appeal will lie under section 29 of the said Act against the final order passed by the learned Magistrate under sub-section 1 of section 12 of the said Act;(ii) Under sub-section 2 of section 23 of the said Act, the learned Magistrate is empowered to grant an ex-parte ad-interim relief in terms of sections 18 to 22 of the said Act. The power under sub-section 1 is of granting interim relief in terms of sections 18 to 22 of the said Act. Before granting an interim relief under sub-section 1, an opportunity of being heard is required to be granted to the respondent.
(iii) An appeal will also lie against orders passed under sub section 1 and sub section 2 of the section 23 of the said Act which are passed by the learned Magistrate. However, while dealing with an appeal against the order passed under section 23 of the said Act, the Appellate Court will usually not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the learned Magistrate. The appellate Court will interfere only if it is found that the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely or if it is found that the Court has ignored settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interim relief.
(iv) An appeal under section 29 will not be maintainable against purely procedural orders which do not decide or determine the rights and liabilities of the parties.
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The legal contention in this case adjudicated by Hon’ble Bombay High Court is
From Para 8,
“whether passing of an exparte order in the present case, was proper and justified.”
“There was no such pressing necessity in the facts of this case to pass an exparte order, particularly when it was nobody’s case that the petitioner was willfully remaining absent or was willfully avoiding service of the notice which was already been issued to him.”
From Para 9,
Santosh Sashkant Dhonde Vs Sarika Santosh Dhonde and Ors on 11 September, 2014On the contrary, in the decision reported in Abhijit Bhikaseth Auti Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr (supra), it has been mentioned that an opportunity of being heard should be given to the husband even while passing an interim order of maintenance. In the instant case, when interim orders for maintenance passed by two the other Courts were already in favour of the respondent no.1 wife, there was hardly any occasion to pass an exparte order of maintenance.
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This is the judgment from Bombay High Court, in a case of DV filed after twenty seven years of the dissolution of marriage.
From Para 11,
In Zuveria Abdul Majid Patni vs. Atif Iqbal Mansoori and Another, the domestic violence took place between January 2006 and 06-9-2007 on which date first information report under Sections 498A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code was lodged by the wife against her husband and his relatives. It is in the context of these facts, that the Hon’ble Apex Court observes that even if it is accepted that during the pendency of the special leave petition the wife obtained ex parte “khula” (divorce) under the Muslim Personal Law from the Mufti on 09-5-2008, the petition under Section 12 of the DV Act is maintainable.
From Para 14,
Anita Tambe Vs Anand Tambe on 28 February, 2018Concededly, there is no interaction whatsoever between the petitioner wife and the respondent husband since the dissolution of marriage, not a single instance of domestic violence is pleaded in the petition the theme of which is that the petitioner wife is living at the mercy of her elder brother. Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that the limitation prescribed under Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not applicable, it is trite law, that any initiation of the proceedings under the statute must be done within a reasonable period. Even if the utmost latitude is given to the petitioner wife and it is assumed that she was subjected to domestic violence prior to the dissolution of marriage, the institution of the petition under Section 12 of the DV Act after twenty seven years of the dissolution of marriage is, as observed supra, a gross abuse of the statutory provisions.
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