Abbas Hatimbhai Kagalwala Vs The State of Maharashtra and Anr on 23 Aug 2022

A division bench of Bombay HC held as follows,

From Para 3, 4 and 5,

3. Learned Counsel for the Union relies upon Notification dated 25.8.1993 and Section 6.2 (f) of the Passport Act, 1967, to conclude that the Petitioner has to obtain a permission of the Court where criminal case is pending against the Petitioner for the purpose of issuance of the Passport. It will be a case of issuance of the Passport and not renewal of the Passport.
4. It is the case of the Petitioner that validity of the Passport came to an end in the year 2017. The Petitioner applied for renewal and said application is pending for more than 4 years. It is also a fact that a criminal case is pending against the Petitioner u/s 420, 465, 467 r/w 120-B of the Indian Penal Code.
5. In view of the fact that petitioner is already issued a Passport earlier and the Petitioner would be seeking renewal of the Passport and the said application is pending with the Respondent, so also, considering the Order passed by the Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No.1342/2017 (supra) we pass the following order.

Mrugesh Wasnik Vs Shweta Mrugesh on 22 Jun 2022

Posted on September 12 by ShadesOfKnife

A Single judge of Bombay High Court held as follows,

From Para 5, (some one tried hard to help the knife just so that she can reap the benefit of interim reliefs!)

5. Section 12(5) of the D.V. Act casts the obligation on the Magistrate to make every endevour to dispose of the application within a period of 60 days from the date of first hearing. The record itself speaks that in disregard to the statutory mandate, the Magistrate has adjourned the Matter for no reason. It is informed that the Magistrate has already passed the order of interim maintenance which is prevailing till date. It is submitted that the non-applicant/wife without prosecuting her main petition, is interested in deriving benefits of interim order.

From Para 6, why not?

6. Though it is prayed that the D.V. proceeding be dismissed for want of prosecution, however, the same course is not advisable. As on date, the non-applicant/ wife’s amendment application is on record which is to be responded. At this stage, only requirement is to issue certain directions to the Magistrate to expedite the proceeding. Certainly such direction would be in the interest of non-applicant/wife. The applicant/husband undertakes to file his reply to amendment application on the next date i.e. on 12.07.2022 itself.

From Para 7,

7. In view of above, learned Magistrate is directed to hear and decide the amendment application within one week from filing of reply and the non-applicant/wife shall file evidence-affidavit within one week thereafter. The Magistrate shall not grant adjournment to either of the parties barring exceptional situation. In any case, the Magistrate shall dispose of the D. V. Proceeding within three months from the date of filing of wife’s evidence-affidavit.

Mrugesh Wasnik Vs Shweta Mrugesh on 22 Jun 2022

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/105650848/

Connects to a PIL here.

Rajesh Pundkar and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 08 Jun 2022

Posted on June 12 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Bombay High Court said that, FIR cannot be quashed against relatives living in far away places just on that ground, when there are allegedly specific allegations in the Complaint/FIR.

From Paras 8-10,

8. On going through the allegations made in the First Information Report, we find that the allegations are not vague in nature. They are not general in nature either and that they specifically assign a role to each of the applicants which they had performed while subjecting the respondent No.2 to cruelty and harassment.
9. It appears to us that the entire story of woes of respondent No.2 began, going by the allegations made against applicant No.1, after the applicant No.1 established extra marital relations with applicant No.6 and even performed second marriage with her clandestinely. The respondent No.2 got married to applicant No.1 in the year 2007 and the respondent No.2 also bore three children from out of the wedlock. Out of three children, one is son and two are daughters. The eldest daughter of respondent No.2 is aged about 14 years, second daughter is aged about 7 years and the son, who is the youngest, is aged about 4 years. It is further seen that the year 2017 proved to be a disaster for respondent No.2 as it was from this year and on wards the marital discord began. From this year hence, the applicant No.1 started harassing the respondent No.2. It is alleged that he even used to subject her to severe beating. Soon thereafter, it is further seen, the respondent No.2 learnt about the extra marital affair that applicant No.1 was having with the applicant No.6 and when questioned by respondent No.2, applicant No.1 would further subject respondent No.2 to cruelty. The acts of cruelty and harassment have been specifically stated by respondent No.2 in the FIR as well as in police statement. The respondent No.2 has also alleged that when she brought all these facts to the notice of remaining applicants, they being her in-laws and probably in a position to control and regulate the conduct of applicant No.1, unexpected reaction came from the remaining applicants. The remaining applicants instead of exercising proper control over the applicant No.1, according to respondent No.2, started instigating applicant No.1 against respondent No.2. As alleged by respondent No.2, these applicants even raised illegal demand of Rs.50,000/- from respondent No.2 and upon her failure to meet that demand, the respondent No.2 was subjected by all these applicants to verbal abuses. They even instigated husband i.e. applicant to drive respondent No.2 out of his house.
10. The afore-stated allegations, we do not think, could be called as vague and general. These allegations have been made not only against the applicant-husband but also against all the in-laws i.e. remaining applicants and they are all specific in nature. They disclose sufficiently commission of cognizable offence cruelty, punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. It also does not appear to us that they have been made with some hidden motive to just rope in all in-laws.

From Para 12,

12. This is a case wherein specific instances of involvement of not only the husband but also his relatives have been stated and therefore, with due respect, we would say that the case of Kahkashan Kausar would not assist the applicants in any manner. In the case of Kahkashan Kausar, it is also held that when there are general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial dispute and if they are not checked, it would result in misuse of the process of law. As stated earlier, in this case, there are no general omnibus allegations made against all the applicants rather, these allegations make out a prima-facie case against all the applicants and therefore, on this count also the case of Kahkashan Kausar would not help the applicants.

Rajesh Pundkar and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 08 Jun 2022

TIP: Don’t waste money on Quash in such circumstances. Just file a 205 CrPC application on the EXACT same grounds and sit at home relax! Let the prosecution scrabble to prove their false allegations.

Ramchandra Laxman Kamble Vs Shobha Ramchandra Kamble and Anr on 21 Dec 2018

Posted on May 29 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Bombay High Court held that if/when the wife gives up or relinquishes her right to claim maintenance at any time in the future through an agreement, such agreement is not enforceable since such an agreement is opposed to public policy.

Submissions from Paras 7-8,

7. Mr. Chavan submits that irrespective of pending Miscellaneous Application No.229 of 2012, and the so called consent decree, any agreement for waiver to receive maintenance is void, since, it is opposed to public policy. He submits that there can be no agreement in derogation of the provisions of Section 125 of Cr.P.C., since, such provisions have been designed as a matter of public policy to protect against destitution and vagrancy.
8. Mr. Chavan relies upon several decisions to point out that even assuming that right to claim maintenance was voluntarily given up by the wife, that by itself does not bar the wife from seeking maintenance, provided the circumstances prescribed in Section 125 of Cr.P.C. stands fulfilled. For these reasons, Mr. Chavan submits that there is absolutely no error in the impugned orders and this petition may, therefore, be dismissed.

From Paras 12-13,

12. The consent decrees made by the courts are in effect of nothing but contracts with the seal of the court super-added to them. Accordingly, if the term of the contract is itself opposed to public policy then, such term, is void and unenforceable. If the term is severable then, only the term can be declared as void. If the term is not severable, then, perhaps, the entire contract may fall.
13. There are several rulings, which take the view that an agreement, in which the wife gives up or relinquishes her right to claim maintenance at any time in the future, is opposed to public policy and, therefore, such an agreement, even if voluntarily entered, is not enforceable. The two courts in the present case have basically relied upon such rulings and held that even if it is assumed that the parties had voluntarily agreed to give up their time to claim maintenance from each other, such agreement is opposed to public policy and, therefore, the same is not enforceable, or the same does not bar the maintainability of an application under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. There is no jurisdictional error in the view taken by these two courts so as to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Ramchandra Laxman Kamble Vs Shobha Ramchandra Kamble and Anr on 21 Dec 2018

Citations : [2018 SCC ONLINE BOM 7039], [2019 HLR 1 404]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/54396962/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5c23adc49eff4309994e4f52

https://www.myrights.in/2020/07/ramchandra-laxman-kamble-vs-shobha.html

Bhagyashri Jagdish Jaiswal Vs Jagdish Sajjanlala Jaiswal and Anr on 26 Feb 2022

Posted on April 1 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench held that Section 25 of HMA 1955 can be filed after passing of divorce decree.

From Para 14,

14. A conjoint reading of both the provisions, would reveal that both the sections in the Act of 1955 are enabling provisions and confer a right on the indigent spouse to claim maintenance either pendente lite or in the nature of permanent alimony and maintenance.

From Para 15,

15. The words applied in Section 25 of the Act of 1955 permit any court exercising jurisdiction under this Act, i.e. under Sections 9 to 13, at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto, on an application made to it, by either of the spouse pay to the applicant for her/his maintenance, either gross sum or monthly or periodical sums for not exceeding the life of the applicant, having regard to the income and the other property, etc. The term used “at any time subsequent thereto” cannot be made redundant, by giving constricted meaning to the words “wife or husband”, applied in Section 25 of the Act of 1955 and this can be said so, in the wake of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 25, which empower the court to vary, modify or rescind the amount of permanent alimony and maintenance as awarded under sub-section (1) and, on existence of the circumstances set out in sub-section (3), order granting permanent alimony and maintenance can be varied and modified or rescinded as the court may deem just and proper.
Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 25 are thus indicative of the fact that if at the time of decree, an application is made or at any subsequent time of the passing of the decree, an application is made, claiming maintenance by either of the spouse, the court is empowered to grant the claim, which is just and proper and the payment can be secured if necessary, by creating charge on the immoveable property of the respondent. If sub-section (1) is given a restrictive meaning as attempted to be canvassed by Mr. Thombre, then the words used “at any time subsequent thereto” would become redundant, which cannot be the intention of the legislature. The legislature does not use the words in vacuum and when it specifically permits the exercise of power of granting permanent alimony and maintenance on the court exercising jurisdiction under the Act, at the time of passing of the order or at any time subsequent thereto, it is open for the court to grant such maintenance at the time of passing the decree or even subsequent to the decree being passed. The provision cannot be read to constrict it, if the relationship between the husband and the wife is severed and as per Mr. Thombre, on divorce, they no longer remain husband and wife. Section 25 is not only restricted to a decree of divorce, but the decree can also be for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9, the decree can also be for judicial separation under Section 10 or the decree can also be for divorce under Section 13 or the decree can also be for a divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B. In the contingency other than the one covered by a decree of divorce, the parties are still husband and wife, when a decree for restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation is passed. The scope of Section 25, therefore, cannot be restricted by holding that on divorce / dissolution of marriage, the wife or the husband cannot bring such proceedings.

Bhagyashri Jagdish Jaiswal Vs Jagdish Sajjanlala Jaiswal and Anr on 26 Feb 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

Jovita Olga Ignesia Mascarenhase Coutinho Vs Rajan Maria Coutinho and Anr on 24 Aug 2010

Posted on April 1 by ShadesOfKnife

A Bench at Goa of Bombay High Court, held that, Issues may be framed after Hearing Both Parties in a DVC.

From Para 13,

13. In civil proceedings after perusing the claim and the reply or written statement, issues are framed. Issues are framed when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by one party and denied by the other. The object of framing issues plays a distinguished role in a civil proceeding and the whole object is to direct the attention of the parties to the principal questions on which they are at variance and they are required to be framed for the purpose of having the material points in controversy rightly decided, and to bring a finality in the litigation. Unless proper issues are framed, a party who suffers a Judgment on the basis of findings not based on proper issues may have a legitimate grievance to contend that because of such non framing of issues he has been denied the opportunity of leading proper evidence for rebutting relevant facts. Issues can be of fact or of law and the duty is that of the Court to frame the issues. An issue can also be framed on the basis of the reliefs. Although in cases of this nature where there are no pleadings as such and the applications are filed in the prescribed form by ticking the reliefs sought, it would be desirable that the Court after hearing both the parties frames issues on the basis of the reliefs sought by the Petitioner so that each can meet the case of the other and avoid such orders of remand. If this procedure is followed there is no question of any of the reliefs going unnoticed and undecided, like the case at hand. This can also reduce the controversy between the parties, in case the columns in the application, were ticked earlier without much application of mind.

Jovita Olga Ignesia Mascarenhase Coutinho Vs Rajan Maria Coutinho and Anr on 24 Aug 2010

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b683c3b4a932645d86ec147

Arunkumar N Chaturvedi Vs The State of Maharashtra and Anr on 24 Dec 2013

Posted on November 24, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble single-judge bench at Bombay High Court held as follows,

4 Since the Applicant was ready to appear before the Magistrate after cancellation of warrant and since there was reasonable apprehension in the mind of the Applicant that he might be put beyond the bars if he appeared before cancellation of warrant, the learned Magistrate should have considered the application on merits.
5 In my considered opinion, there is no law that the accused shall personally remain present for cancellation of warrant. If the lawyer makes an application for cancellation of warrant, the same needs to be considered on merits by the learned Magistrate without insisting the for appearance of the Applicant/accused. It is noted by this Court that many Writ Petitions are filed in this Court only because the learned Magistrate straight way take a view that warrant cannot be cancelled unless accused appears before the Court. The view taken by a few of the Magistrates particularly in the city of Bombay, in my opinion, is not correct. It is high time that this Court lets the Magistrate note that the appearance of the applicant/accused is not necessary when application for cancellation of warrant is made.

Arunkumar N Chaturvedi vs The State of Maharashtra and Anr on 24 Dec 2013

Citations : [2013 SCC ONLINE BOM 1607]

Other Sources :

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/58117fdb2713e1794795896e

https://mynation.net/docs/4429-2013/

https://www.lawyerservices.in/Arunkumar-N-Chaturvedi-Versus-The-State-of-Maharashtra-and-Another-2013-12-24

Arun Kumar N. Chaturvedi Vs.State of Maharashtra

Index here.

Rahim Pathan Vs State of Maharashtra on 04 Jun 2019

Posted on July 31, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Single bench judge of Bombay High Court held as follows, while acquitting a husband from the allegations of strangulating his wife.

From Para 16,

16. Perusal of aforesaid findings reflect that the learned Sessions Judge kept implicit reliance on the evidence of PW-2 Sayed Bandeali as well as recitals of the FIR, scribed by PW-9 Gauri More to arrive at the conclusion of guilt of the accused. The approach of learned Sessions Judge appears superficial and erroneous one. He drawn the conclusion that the death of victim was custodial death and it was imperative for the accused husband to explain how the deceased Rubina died. It reveals that the learned Sessions Judge overlooked or glossed over serious legal infirmities in this case. It was fallacious to appreciate that the shop of accused was located at a distance of 3. k.m. from his residential house. Therefore, there was ample opportunity for him to visit to the house from his shop for committing crime. This sort of speculative findings rests on assumption is totally impermissible and inadmissible in law. There is no evidence available on record about the last scene together of the accused in the company of deceased wife Rubina at the relevant time. In contrast, kith and kin of Rubina turned hostile and refused to cast aspersion on the appellant-accused for her homicidal death.

Rahim Pathan Vs State of Maharastra on 04 Jun 2019

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/141994995/

Gulfasha Vs State of Maharashtra on 28 Jun 2021

Posted on July 11, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Bombay High Court asked a trial court to explain it’s stand when the trail court refused to accept cash bail and release an accused who is in jail with her 10 months son.

From Paras 4-9,

4. Learned counsel for the Applicant states that in spite of this order and in spite of urgency mentioned in the order itself, the trial Court has not accepted cash bail and has not released the Applicant on bail as of today.
5. This is serious breach of order passed by this Court. The trial Court was expected to follow the clear directions issued in the operative part of the order mentioned in paragraph No.8 of that order. The trial Court was not concerned with the other narration as well as reasoning part in the order. There is absolutely no ambiguity in the operative part of the order and it was duty of the trial Court to follow the order. In spite of that, unnecessary hurdles are created in giving effect to that order. Learned counsel for the Applicant states that specious reason given for not releasing the Applicant, was that section 302 of IPC was not mentioned in first paragraph of the order.
6. This Court does not have to explain the narration mentioned in this order to the trial Court. However, to clarify this, it is necessary to mention that, initially the offence was registered u/s 307 of the IPC on the basis of statement given by the deceased herself. Subsequently, the deceased had succumbed to her burns and the informant was described as ‘the deceased’ in the order. There is also reference to the ‘dying declaration’, in paragraph No.7. In spite of this, the trial Court exceeding its jurisdiction, has refused to obey order of this Court, specifically mentioned in paragraph No.8 as the operative part. This has seriously affected the Applicant’s valuable right of getting released on bail at the earliest. Her liberty is affected in spite of clear directions of this Court.
7. If there was any ambiguity in the order, it was for the parties and in particular was for learned APP, who had appeared in the matter, to point it at. The order could have also been corrected by a higher forum. But the trial Court had no authority to question that order. In any case, the operative part of the order is very clear and there was absolutely no ambiguity. The trial Court was supposed to follow these directions mentioned in the operative part.
8. In spite of this order, the Applicant had to suffer in jail custody for more period than was necessary, particularly when she had 10 months old child with her. Considering the repeated concerns expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court regarding unnecessary crowding of the jail, the attitude of the trial Court is not proper in this case.
9. In these circumstances to prevent any further hurdles and only for that purpose, I am clarifying and adding section 302 of IPC in the first paragraph of the order. However, the trial Court will have to explain its stand and report will have to be submitted to this Court.

Gulfasha Vs State of Maharashtra on 28 Jun 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/101221193/

Sameer Datta Kadam Vs Supriya Sameer Kadam

Posted on June 30, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Interim Maintenance of 5 lakhs per month was granted by Trial Court which was challenged at Bombay High Court. High Court did not find any error in the Interim Order of the trial Court. It held that the Trial Court rightly gave reasons for granting the interim maintenance from the date of application instead of from the date of Order.

Sameer Datta Kadam Vs Supriya Sameer Kadam on 10 Jan 2019

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/42033330/

https://www.legitquest.com/case/sameer-datta-kadam-v-supriya-sameer-kadam/1E27A6

Supreme Court also denied to interfere into the Interlocutory Order but extended the time to settle the arrears from 4 weeks to 8 weeks.

Sameer Datta Kadam Vs Supriya Sameer Kadam on 08 Feb 2019

Source:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/83077908/

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: High Court of Bombay Judgment or Order or Notification

Abbas Hatimbhai Kagalwala Vs The State of Maharashtra and Anr on 23 Aug 2022

Mrugesh Wasnik Vs Shweta Mrugesh on 22 Jun 2022

Rajesh Pundkar and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 08 Jun 2022

Ramchandra Laxman Kamble Vs Shobha Ramchandra Kamble and Anr on 21 Dec 2018

Bhagyashri Jagdish Jaiswal Vs Jagdish Sajjanlala Jaiswal and Anr on 26 Feb 2022

Jovita Olga Ignesia Mascarenhase Coutinho Vs Rajan Maria Coutinho and Anr on 24 Aug 2010

Arunkumar N Chaturvedi Vs The State of Maharashtra and Anr on 24 Dec 2013

Rahim Pathan Vs State of Maharashtra on 04 Jun 2019

Gulfasha Vs State of Maharashtra on 28 Jun 2021

Sameer Datta Kadam Vs Supriya Sameer Kadam