Showkat Aziz Zargar Vs Nabeel Showkat and Anr on 02 Sep 2022

Posted on September 18 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of J&K&L High Court held as follows, while declaring two judgments as per incuriam, relying on multiple Supreme Court decisions as Precedents.

From Paras 13-15,

13) It is a settled principle of interpretation of Statutes that words and expressions used in a Statute have to be assigned their plain meaning. A court does not have power to add or subtract something from a Statute which is not there. If a court finds some ambiguity in a Statute which becomes an impediment in achieving the aim and object of the Statute, the court can give a purposive interpretation to the Statute but where the language of the Statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not open to the Court to add, alter or supply words to the said Statute and no need of interpretation would arise. The purpose of interpretation of Statutes is to help the Judge to ascertain the intention of the Legislature and not to control that intention or to confine it within the limits, which the Judge may deem reasonable or expedient.
14) The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has, in the case of A. R. Antulay vs. R. S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, held that if the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The Court observed that the question of interpretation arises only in the event of an ambiguity or if the plain meaning of the words used in the Statute would be self defeating.
15) Again, the Supreme in the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297, has followed the same principle and observed that where the words are clear and there is no obscurity or ambiguity, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. The Court further observed that while doing so, what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided.

From Paras 22 and 24,

22) In a recent case of Abhilasha vs. Parkash & ors. (Criminal Appeal No.615 of 2020 decided on 15th September, 2020), a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether a Hindu unmarried daughter is entitled to claim maintenance from her father under Section 125 of the Cr. P. C only till she attains majority or she can claim maintenance till she remains unmarried. The Court observed that a bare perusal of Section 125(1) of the Cr. P. C indicates that it limits the claim of maintenance of a child until he or she attains majority.
24) From the foregoing analysis of the law on the subject, it is clear that the Supreme Court has taken a consistent view that a major son or daughter cannot be awarded maintenance by a Magistrate in exercise of his powers under Section 125 of the Central Cr. P. C/488 of the Jammu and Kashmir Cr. P. C but in an appropriate case, a Family Court has jurisdiction to grant maintenance to a major Hindu daughter on the basis of a combined reading of the provisions contained in Section 125 of the Cr. P. C and Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act.

Finally,

27) For what has been discussed hereinbefore, the petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the trial Magistrate as upheld by the Revisional Court is set aside and it is held that the respondents are entitled to maintenance from their father i.e., the petitioner herein, only up to the age of their majority. If any amount of maintenance has been paid by the petitioner to the respondents after the attainment of their age of majority, the same, having regard to the relationship between the parties, shall not be recovered from them. The amount deposited in the Registry pursuant to the order dated 11.09.2019, shall be released in favour of the petitioner. The petition stands disposed of accordingly.

Showkat Aziz Zargar Vs Nabeel Showkat and Anr on 02 Sep 2022

Maintenance cases index here.

Atul and Ors Vs State and Anr on 30 Nov 2022

Posted on December 15, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Bombay High Court held, marrying another woman while having an alive spouse is cruelty u/s 498A IPC.

From Para 5,

5. The cruelty prima facie handed out to non-applicant no. 2 did not stop at physically torturing non-applicant no. 2 but, it went beyond the physical state of pain in the sense that the husband i.e. applicant no. 1 with impunity performed marriage with another woman and that was done with the active aid and assistance of the rest of the applicants. When a husband performs the second marriage while his first marriage is alive, a question arises as to whether such act on the part of husband would amount to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A of the IPC. As per explanation to Section 498-A of the IPC, cruelty means; any wilful conduct of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (mental or physical) of the woman. It also includes harassment caused with a view to coercing the woman or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. Here, we are concerned with wilful conduct of such a nature which has caused or which is likely to cause danger to health of non-applicant no. 2. Marrying another woman by the husband during existence of his first marriage is something which is most likely to cause trauma and grave injury to the mental health of the first wife, unless it has been done with the consent of the first wife. If the act of performance of second marriage during subsistence of the first marriage is not interpreted as amounting to cruelty contemplated under Section 498-A of the IPC, it would frustrate the legislative intent to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relative of her husband and, therefore, that interpretation has to be adopted which sub-serves the object sought to be achieved by the Legislation. Useful reference in this regard may be made to the cases of B.S. Joshi and ors. Vs. State Of Haryana and anr. [2003 Cri L.J. 2028 (SC)] and Reema Aggarwal Vs. Anupam and ors. [(2004) 3 SCC 199]. By these parameters, we find here that the second marriage performed by applicant no. 1 while his first marriage with non-applicant no. 2 was on, prima facie amounted to cruelty. It has been further prima facie aggravated here when the applicant no. 1 made a false representation to other woman with whom he performed marriage during subsistence of the present marriage with non-applicant no. 2 that his first wife had died and the rest of the applicants i.e. both his parents, his siblings and also aunt joined in chorus with applicant no. 1. They falsely told the second woman that the first wife of applicant no. 1 had died. All these details have been graphically stated by the second woman in her statement recorded under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short the “Cr.P.C.”). She has also informed the police
that she too had lodged a criminal complaint against applicant no. 1 which was registered by Police Station, Imamwada, Nagpur for certain cognizable offences. Although, it is not known as to exactly which are those offences but, the fact remains that even the second wife of applicant no. 1 has lodged a criminal report against him.

Atul and Ors Vs State and Anr on 30 Nov 2022

Rohitash Kumar and Ors Vs Om Prakash Sharma and Ors on 6 Nov 2012

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court talks about Interpretation of Statutes:

Addition and Subtraction of words:
22. The Court has to keep in mind the fact that, while interpreting the provisions of a Statute, it can neither add, nor subtract even a single word. The legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum” means, “From the words of law, there must be no departure”. A section is to be interpreted by reading all of its parts together, and it is not permissible, to omit any part thereof. The Court cannot proceed with the assumption that the legislature, while enacting the Statute has committed a mistake; it must proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said; even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by it in framing the statute, and it is not open to the court to add and amend, or by construction, make up for the deficiencies, which have been left in the Act. The Court can only iron out the creases but while doing so, it must not alter the fabric, of which an Act is woven. The Court, while interpreting statutory provisions, cannot add words to a Statute, or read words into it which are not part of it, especially when a literal reading of the same, produces an intelligible result. (Vide: Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar & Ors., AIR 1953 SC 148; Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459; M. Pentiah & Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1107; The Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 849; and Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 71).
23. The Statute is not to be construed in light of certain notions that the legislature might have had in mind, or what the legislature is expected to have said, or what the legislature might have done, or what the duty of the legislature to have said or done was. The Courts have to administer the law as they find it, and it is not permissible for the Court to twist the clear language of the enactment, in order to avoid any real, or imaginary hardship which such literal interpretation may cause.
24. In view of the above, it becomes crystal clear that, under the garb of interpreting the provision, the Court does not have the power to add or subtract even a single word, as it would not amount to interpretation, but legislation.

Citations : [2013 AIR SC 30], [2013 ALD SC 1 135], [2013 ALR 96 825], [2013 AWC SC 2 1245], [2013 FLR 136 92], [2012 JT SC 11 219], [2012 SCALE 11 30], [2013 SCC 11 451], [2012 SCR 13 47], [2013 SCT SC 1 537], [2013 SLJ SC 1 27], [2013 SLJ SC 2 16], [2013 SCC L&S 3 368], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 922], [2013 AIC 121 163], [2012 AIOL 508], [2012 SLT 8 316], [2012 SUPREME 7 696], [2012 LLN 5 83], [2012 SCJ 8 534], [2012 AIR SC 6157], [2012 CLT 4 325], [2013 KCCR SN 1 19], [2012 AIR SCW 6157]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/58524857/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af20e4b0149711415afe

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows:

10. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous i.e they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. (See J.P Bansal v. State of Rajasthan 2003 5 SCC 134.)

11. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As was noted by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner 1846 6 Moo PC 1:

“We cannot aid the legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there.”

The view was reiterated by this Court in State of M.P v. G.S Dall and Flour Mills AIR 1991 SC 772 and State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel JT 1998 2 SC 253. Speaking briefly, the court cannot reframe the legislation, as noted in J.P Bansal case for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate.

12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature.

13. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the “language” is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as the legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making.

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004

Citations : [2005 SCC CRI 1570], [2004 SCALE 10 174], [2005 CRIMES SC 1 49], [2005 AIR SC 294], [2005 SUPREME 1 477], [2005 SCC 10 437], [2004 JT SC 10 349]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1029488/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae07e4b0149711412c03

Nathi Devi Vs Radha Devi Gupta on 17 Dec 2004

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A 5-judge Constitutional Bench held as follows regarding when the need of interpreting a statute arises.

The interpretative function of the Court is to discover the true legislative intent. It is trite that in interpreting a statute the Court must, if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Courts are not concerned with the policy involved or that the results are injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In considering whether there is ambiguity, the Court must look at the statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or unreasonableness which may render the statute unconstitutional.
It is equally well settled that in interpreting a statute, effort should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the Legislature. The Courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as obvious drafting errors. (See \026 State of U.P. and others vs. Vijay Anand Maharaj : AIR 1963 SC 946 ; Rananjaya Singh vs. Baijnath Singh and others : AIR 1954 SC 749 ; Kanai Lal Sur vs. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan : AIR 1957 SC 907; Nyadar Singh vs. Union of India and others : AIR 1988 SC 1979 ; J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. : AIR 1961 S.C. 1170 and Ghanshyam Das vs. Regional Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax : AIR 1964 S.C. 766).
It is well settled that literal interpretation should be given to a statute if the same does not lead to an absurdity.

Nathi Devi Vs Radha Devi Gupta on 17 Dec 2004

Citations : [2005 AIR SC 648], [2005 DRJ SUPP 80 518], [2005 JCR SC 2 71], [2005 JT SC 1 1], [2005 KLT SC 1 443], [2005 SCC 2 271], [2005 DRJ SUPPL 80 518]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/641119/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adf2e4b01497114129b9

Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise Vs Ms Hongo India (P) Ltd. and Anr on 27 Mar 2009

Posted on May 7, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A 3-judge bench of Apex Court held that, ‘It is well settled law that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Act.‘

From Para 20,

20) Though, an argument was raised based on Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming that Section 29(2) would be attracted what we have to determine is whether the provisions of this section are expressly excluded in the case of reference to High Court. It was contended before us that the words “expressly excluded” would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law here in this case is Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the legislature intended it to be a complete Code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court. The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 support the conclusion that the time limit prescribed under Section 35H(1) to make a reference to High Court is absolute and unextendable by court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well settled law that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Act.

Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise Vs Ms Hongo India (P) Ltd. and Anr on 27 Mar 2009

Citations : [2009 SCC 5 791], [2009 JT 7 83], [2009 AIR SC 2325], [2009 LW 2 495], [2009 AIOL 407], [2009 ELT SC 315 449], [2009 SCALE 4 374], [2009 SCR 4 1197], [2009 SUPREME 3 120], [2009 ITR SC 315 449], [2009 ELT SC 236 417], [2009 VST SC 24 298]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1046996/

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Legislative Intent must be Respect while Interpreting Statutes

Showkat Aziz Zargar Vs Nabeel Showkat and Anr on 02 Sep 2022

Atul and Ors Vs State and Anr on 30 Nov 2022

Rohitash Kumar and Ors Vs Om Prakash Sharma and Ors on 6 Nov 2012

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004

Nathi Devi Vs Radha Devi Gupta on 17 Dec 2004

Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise Vs Ms Hongo India (P) Ltd. and Anr on 27 Mar 2009