Musin Babulal Thengade and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 29 Jan 2025

Posted on March 2, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Bombay High Court at Aurangabab held that

From Para 6,

6. Apart from this, the learned A.P.P. has also placed reliance on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rupali Devi Vs. State of Uttar pradesh reported in AIR OnLine (2019) SC 394.

From Paras 9 and 10,

9. As regards Section 472 of the Cr. P. C, contention of the learned A.P.P. that offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing wrong will have to be accepted, but only with a rider. Although the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing wrong, it would not mean that limitation would continue to run perennially.The correct interpretation of the provision is provided in the matter of Arun Vyas and another Vs. Anita Vyas (supra) which sates that in case of offence under Section 498-A, a new starting point of limitation is start on every occasion when the wrong is committed and the period of limitation needs to be computed from the last such wrong. We may profitably quote paragraph 13 of the said decision, which reads as under :-
“ The essence of the offence in Section 498-A is cruelty as defined in the explanation appended to that section. It is a continuing offence and on each occasion on which the respondent was subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starting point of limitation. The last act of cruelty was committed against the respondent, within the meaning of the explanation, on October 13, 1988 when, on the allegation made by the respondent in the complaint to Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, she was forced to leave the matrimonial home. Having regard to the provisions of Sections 469 and 472 the period of limitation commenced for offences under Sections 406 and 498-A from October 13, 1988 and ended on October 12, 1991. But the charge sheet was filed on December 22, 1995,therefore, it was clearly barred by limitation under Section 468(2)(c) Cr. P. C.’’
10. Thereafter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has further stated in paragraph No. 14 that in complaints under Section 498-A the wife will invariably be oppressed, who is subjected to cruelty and, therefore, Section 473 of the Cr. P.C should be construed liberally in favour of wife. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also cautioned that the words interest of justice employed in Section 473 of the Cr. P. C. cannot mean in the interest of prosecution and the true object of the provision is to advance the cause of justice by protecting the oppressed and punishing the offender. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also referred to its earlier judgment in the matter of Onkar Radha Manohari (Smt) Vs. Venka Venkata Reddy reported in 1993 AIR SCW 3595 that while dealing with Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, the Court should not only examine as to whether delay is properly explained, but also as to whether it is necessary to entertain a time barred matter in the interest of justice.

From Paras 13 and 14,

13. These observations have been made in the context of territorial jurisdiction. The judgment does not deal with the aspect of limitation. Provisions of Sections 468, 472 and 473 of the Cr. P.C did not fall for consideration in this case. As against this in the cases of Arun Vyas and another Vs Anita Vyas (supra) and Ramesh and other Vs. state of Tamil Nadu (supra), the question of limitation was directly involved and the same is answered referring to the relevant statutory provisions. It is settled legal principle that judgments of the Courts have to be interpreted in the backdrop of facts of the particular case. Ratio of a case has to be understood and appreciated in the backdrop of the facts in which the judgment is delivered. The law laid down in the judgment cannot be divorced from the facts of the case in which it is delivered. A judgment cannot be interpreted like a statute. It cannot be applied uniformly every where like Euclid’s theorems of geometry. Therefore, while dealing with aforesaid three judgments cited during the course of hearing, we are of the considered opinion that the ratio laid down in the matters of Arun Vyas and Ramesh which directly deal with the question of limitation will have to be accepted. The judgment in the matter of Rupali Devi is relating to territorial jurisdiction of a Court to deal with offence under Section 498-A of the IPC.
14. In the light of above, we are of the opinion that limitation for offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC shall commence from the last act of cruelty. Offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing offence implies that each act of cruelty would offer new starting point of limitation. Limitation for prosecution under Section 498-A does not continue for indefinite period. Such interpretation will render Section 468 of the Cr. P.C. nugatory or otiose for the purpose of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code which does not appear to be the intention of legislature. Had there been intention to exclude Section 498-A of the IPC from the sweep of Section 468 of the Cr. P.C express provision could have been made for the said purpose.

Musin Babulal Thengade and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 29 Jan 2025

Citations: [2025:BHC-AUG:2858-DB]

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/bombay-high-court/bombay-high-court-cruelty-498a-ipc-limitation-283107

https://lawtrend.in/limitation-period-for-ipc-section-498-a-to-commence-from-last-act-of-cruelty-bombay-high-court/

Limitation for offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC commences from the last act of cruelty: Bombay HC

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/bombay-high-court/aurangabad-musin-babulal-thengade-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-2025-bhc-aug-2858-db-limitation-1567184

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002

Posted on February 12, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

Sitting on the full bench of Apex Court, Justice Arijit Pasayat, held as follows, while interpreting the statutes passed by the Legislature.

From Para 9,

No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner [(1846) 6 Moore PC 1] “we cannot aid the Legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there”. In case of an ordinary word there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase of general application. Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding the particular case. This principle is too well settled and reference to few decisions of this Court would suffice. [See: Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat and Anr. (AIR 1990 SC 1747), Union of India and Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal (AIR 1992 SC 96), Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse and Anr. (1997 (6) SCC 312) and Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India and Ors. (JT 2002 (3) SC 21)]

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002

Court Kutchehry Version:

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002 (CK)

Ashwini Pradhan Vs UOI and Anr on 08 Aug 2023

Posted on February 12, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur, held as follows,

From Para 19, (Presumption of Legislature is correct)

19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P., reported in 1960 SCC OnLine SC 16 has held that in the interpretation of the statutes the Court always presumes that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. Therefore, a provision of a statute cannot be used to defeat another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. Hence, the interpretation which involves conflict, must be avoided.

From Para 20,

20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Aphali Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (1989) 4 SCC 378 has explained the principles of interpretation of statutes. It has been held as follows:
“39. …….The best interpretation is made from the context, ‘Injustum est nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejus particula proposita judicare vel respondere’. It is unjust to decide or respond as to any particular part of a law without examining the whole of the law. ‘Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus’. To interpret and in such a way as to harmonise laws with laws, is the best mode of interpretation…….”

From Para 21,

21. In the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, reported in (2002) 4 SCC 297, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:
“10. ………Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating (sic altering) the statutory provisions……”

Note: My intention of adding this case on the website is to make use of the Supreme Court judgments cited in this case, specifically the Grasim Industries Ltd one.

Ashwini Pradhan Vs UOI and Anr on 08 Aug 2023

Index of DV cases is here.

Showkat Aziz Zargar Vs Nabeel Showkat and Anr on 02 Sep 2022

Posted on September 18, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of J&K&L High Court held as follows, while declaring two judgments as per incuriam, relying on multiple Supreme Court decisions as Precedents.

From Paras 13-15,

13) It is a settled principle of interpretation of Statutes that words and expressions used in a Statute have to be assigned their plain meaning. A court does not have power to add or subtract something from a Statute which is not there. If a court finds some ambiguity in a Statute which becomes an impediment in achieving the aim and object of the Statute, the court can give a purposive interpretation to the Statute but where the language of the Statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not open to the Court to add, alter or supply words to the said Statute and no need of interpretation would arise. The purpose of interpretation of Statutes is to help the Judge to ascertain the intention of the Legislature and not to control that intention or to confine it within the limits, which the Judge may deem reasonable or expedient.
14) The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has, in the case of A. R. Antulay vs. R. S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, held that if the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The Court observed that the question of interpretation arises only in the event of an ambiguity or if the plain meaning of the words used in the Statute would be self defeating.
15) Again, the Supreme in the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297, has followed the same principle and observed that where the words are clear and there is no obscurity or ambiguity, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. The Court further observed that while doing so, what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided.

From Paras 22 and 24,

22) In a recent case of Abhilasha vs. Parkash & ors. (Criminal Appeal No.615 of 2020 decided on 15th September, 2020), a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether a Hindu unmarried daughter is entitled to claim maintenance from her father under Section 125 of the Cr. P. C only till she attains majority or she can claim maintenance till she remains unmarried. The Court observed that a bare perusal of Section 125(1) of the Cr. P. C indicates that it limits the claim of maintenance of a child until he or she attains majority.
24) From the foregoing analysis of the law on the subject, it is clear that the Supreme Court has taken a consistent view that a major son or daughter cannot be awarded maintenance by a Magistrate in exercise of his powers under Section 125 of the Central Cr. P. C/488 of the Jammu and Kashmir Cr. P. C but in an appropriate case, a Family Court has jurisdiction to grant maintenance to a major Hindu daughter on the basis of a combined reading of the provisions contained in Section 125 of the Cr. P. C and Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act.

Finally,

27) For what has been discussed hereinbefore, the petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the trial Magistrate as upheld by the Revisional Court is set aside and it is held that the respondents are entitled to maintenance from their father i.e., the petitioner herein, only up to the age of their majority. If any amount of maintenance has been paid by the petitioner to the respondents after the attainment of their age of majority, the same, having regard to the relationship between the parties, shall not be recovered from them. The amount deposited in the Registry pursuant to the order dated 11.09.2019, shall be released in favour of the petitioner. The petition stands disposed of accordingly.

Showkat Aziz Zargar Vs Nabeel Showkat and Anr on 02 Sep 2022

Maintenance cases index here.

Atul and Ors Vs State and Anr on 30 Nov 2022

Posted on December 15, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Bombay High Court held, marrying another woman while having an alive spouse is cruelty u/s 498A IPC.

From Para 5,

5. The cruelty prima facie handed out to non-applicant no. 2 did not stop at physically torturing non-applicant no. 2 but, it went beyond the physical state of pain in the sense that the husband i.e. applicant no. 1 with impunity performed marriage with another woman and that was done with the active aid and assistance of the rest of the applicants. When a husband performs the second marriage while his first marriage is alive, a question arises as to whether such act on the part of husband would amount to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A of the IPC. As per explanation to Section 498-A of the IPC, cruelty means; any wilful conduct of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (mental or physical) of the woman. It also includes harassment caused with a view to coercing the woman or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. Here, we are concerned with wilful conduct of such a nature which has caused or which is likely to cause danger to health of non-applicant no. 2. Marrying another woman by the husband during existence of his first marriage is something which is most likely to cause trauma and grave injury to the mental health of the first wife, unless it has been done with the consent of the first wife. If the act of performance of second marriage during subsistence of the first marriage is not interpreted as amounting to cruelty contemplated under Section 498-A of the IPC, it would frustrate the legislative intent to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relative of her husband and, therefore, that interpretation has to be adopted which sub-serves the object sought to be achieved by the Legislation. Useful reference in this regard may be made to the cases of B.S. Joshi and ors. Vs. State Of Haryana and anr. [2003 Cri L.J. 2028 (SC)] and Reema Aggarwal Vs. Anupam and ors. [(2004) 3 SCC 199]. By these parameters, we find here that the second marriage performed by applicant no. 1 while his first marriage with non-applicant no. 2 was on, prima facie amounted to cruelty. It has been further prima facie aggravated here when the applicant no. 1 made a false representation to other woman with whom he performed marriage during subsistence of the present marriage with non-applicant no. 2 that his first wife had died and the rest of the applicants i.e. both his parents, his siblings and also aunt joined in chorus with applicant no. 1. They falsely told the second woman that the first wife of applicant no. 1 had died. All these details have been graphically stated by the second woman in her statement recorded under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short the “Cr.P.C.”). She has also informed the police
that she too had lodged a criminal complaint against applicant no. 1 which was registered by Police Station, Imamwada, Nagpur for certain cognizable offences. Although, it is not known as to exactly which are those offences but, the fact remains that even the second wife of applicant no. 1 has lodged a criminal report against him.

Atul and Ors Vs State and Anr on 30 Nov 2022

Rohitash Kumar and Ors Vs Om Prakash Sharma and Ors on 6 Nov 2012

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court talks about Interpretation of Statutes:

Addition and Subtraction of words:
22. The Court has to keep in mind the fact that, while interpreting the provisions of a Statute, it can neither add, nor subtract even a single word. The legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum” means, “From the words of law, there must be no departure”. A section is to be interpreted by reading all of its parts together, and it is not permissible, to omit any part thereof. The Court cannot proceed with the assumption that the legislature, while enacting the Statute has committed a mistake; it must proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said; even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by it in framing the statute, and it is not open to the court to add and amend, or by construction, make up for the deficiencies, which have been left in the Act. The Court can only iron out the creases but while doing so, it must not alter the fabric, of which an Act is woven. The Court, while interpreting statutory provisions, cannot add words to a Statute, or read words into it which are not part of it, especially when a literal reading of the same, produces an intelligible result. (Vide: Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar & Ors., AIR 1953 SC 148; Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459; M. Pentiah & Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1107; The Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 849; and Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 71).
23. The Statute is not to be construed in light of certain notions that the legislature might have had in mind, or what the legislature is expected to have said, or what the legislature might have done, or what the duty of the legislature to have said or done was. The Courts have to administer the law as they find it, and it is not permissible for the Court to twist the clear language of the enactment, in order to avoid any real, or imaginary hardship which such literal interpretation may cause.
24. In view of the above, it becomes crystal clear that, under the garb of interpreting the provision, the Court does not have the power to add or subtract even a single word, as it would not amount to interpretation, but legislation.

Citations : [2013 AIR SC 30], [2013 ALD SC 1 135], [2013 ALR 96 825], [2013 AWC SC 2 1245], [2013 FLR 136 92], [2012 JT SC 11 219], [2012 SCALE 11 30], [2013 SCC 11 451], [2012 SCR 13 47], [2013 SCT SC 1 537], [2013 SLJ SC 1 27], [2013 SLJ SC 2 16], [2013 SCC L&S 3 368], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 922], [2013 AIC 121 163], [2012 AIOL 508], [2012 SLT 8 316], [2012 SUPREME 7 696], [2012 LLN 5 83], [2012 SCJ 8 534], [2012 AIR SC 6157], [2012 CLT 4 325], [2013 KCCR SN 1 19], [2012 AIR SCW 6157]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/58524857/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af20e4b0149711415afe

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows:

10. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous i.e they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. (See J.P Bansal v. State of Rajasthan 2003 5 SCC 134.)
11. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As was noted by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner 1846 6 Moo PC 1:
“We cannot aid the legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there.”
The view was reiterated by this Court in State of M.P v. G.S Dall and Flour Mills AIR 1991 SC 772 and State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel JT 1998 2 SC 253. Speaking briefly, the court cannot reframe the legislation, as noted in J.P Bansal case for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate.
12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature.
13. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the “language” is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as the legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making.

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004

Citations : [2005 SCC CRI 1570], [2004 SCALE 10 174], [2005 CRIMES SC 1 49], [2005 AIR SC 294], [2005 SUPREME 1 477], [2005 SCC 10 437], [2004 JT SC 10 349]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1029488/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae07e4b0149711412c03

Nathi Devi Vs Radha Devi Gupta on 17 Dec 2004

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A 5-judge Constitutional Bench held as follows regarding when the need of interpreting a statute arises.

The interpretative function of the Court is to discover the true legislative intent. It is trite that in interpreting a statute the Court must, if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Courts are not concerned with the policy involved or that the results are injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In considering whether there is ambiguity, the Court must look at the statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or unreasonableness which may render the statute unconstitutional.
It is equally well settled that in interpreting a statute, effort should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the Legislature. The Courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as obvious drafting errors. (See \026 State of U.P. and others vs. Vijay Anand Maharaj : AIR 1963 SC 946 ; Rananjaya Singh vs. Baijnath Singh and others : AIR 1954 SC 749 ; Kanai Lal Sur vs. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan : AIR 1957 SC 907; Nyadar Singh vs. Union of India and others : AIR 1988 SC 1979 ; J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. : AIR 1961 S.C. 1170 and Ghanshyam Das vs. Regional Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax : AIR 1964 S.C. 766).
It is well settled that literal interpretation should be given to a statute if the same does not lead to an absurdity.

Nathi Devi Vs Radha Devi Gupta on 17 Dec 2004

Citations : [2005 AIR SC 648], [2005 DRJ SUPP 80 518], [2005 JCR SC 2 71], [2005 JT SC 1 1], [2005 KLT SC 1 443], [2005 SCC 2 271], [2005 DRJ SUPPL 80 518]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/641119/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adf2e4b01497114129b9

Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise Vs Ms Hongo India (P) Ltd. and Anr on 27 Mar 2009

Posted on May 7, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A 3-judge bench of Apex Court held that, ‘It is well settled law that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Act.‘

From Para 20,

20) Though, an argument was raised based on Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming that Section 29(2) would be attracted what we have to determine is whether the provisions of this section are expressly excluded in the case of reference to High Court. It was contended before us that the words “expressly excluded” would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law here in this case is Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the legislature intended it to be a complete Code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court. The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 support the conclusion that the time limit prescribed under Section 35H(1) to make a reference to High Court is absolute and unextendable by court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well settled law that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Act.

Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise Vs Ms Hongo India (P) Ltd. and Anr on 27 Mar 2009

Citations : [2009 SCC 5 791], [2009 JT 7 83], [2009 AIR SC 2325], [2009 LW 2 495], [2009 AIOL 407], [2009 ELT SC 315 449], [2009 SCALE 4 374], [2009 SCR 4 1197], [2009 SUPREME 3 120], [2009 ITR SC 315 449], [2009 ELT SC 236 417], [2009 VST SC 24 298]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1046996/

Harikumar Vs State of Karnataka on 22 October 1993

Posted on May 19, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

The 3-judge bench of Karnataka High Court held that Section 8A of Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 is constitutionally valid and the burden of proof laid on the accused in offences under this Act carry onus on the Prosecution to discharge their duty to establish their case based on foundational facts relevant and only then the proof of burden shifts to accused.

From Paras 4-8,

4. It is true that if Section 8-A of the Act, is read literally, an impression is gathered therefrom that once an accused is prosecuted and charged for the offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, then the entire burden is on him to show that he had not committed any offence and the prosecution may not be required to prove anything else except placing implicit reliance on the contents of the charge framed against the accused. But, on a closer scrutiny, such first-hand impression about the Section gets dispelled. It has to be kept in view that Section deals with burden of proving innocence in given cases. Therefore the Section,in substance, creates a Rule of Evidence and deals with casting of burden of proof in certain cases on the accused. A close reading of the Section shows that merely because the accused is charged with offences under Section 3 or Section 4 of the Act, the initial burden which is always on the prosecution to prove basic ingredients of the Sections for bringing home the charges to the accused will not get displaced or dispensed with. Section 8-A will have to be read with Section 2, which defines the term dowry. When so read, it becomes clear that when an accused is charged of an offence of giving or taking or abetting in giving or taking any dowry, under Section 3, the following ingredients of the offence will have to be established before a competent Criminal Court before which the accused is prosecuted.
i) any property or valuable security must be proved to have been given or taken by the accused pursuant to an agreement or otherwise; or
ii) the accused must be shown to have abetted such giving or taking of any property or valuable security;
iii) such giving or taking of any property or valuable security either directly or indirectly or its abetment must be done by any party to the marriage vis-a-vis the other party to the marriage; or;
iv) such giving or taking of any property or valuable security either directly or indirectly or its abetment is done by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, for the benefit of either party to the marriage or any other person;
v) such property or valuable security is given or taken at or before or at any time after the marriage;
vi) such property or valuable security must be given in connection with the marriage of said parties.
5. Now it is obvious that before any offence can be brought home to the accused under Section 3 read with Section 2 of the Act, the aforesaid ingredients have to be established. So far as Section 8A is concerned, all that it mandates is that the burden of proof that he has not committed such an offence is on the accused. Meaning thereby, that it will be for the accused to show that he had not taken or given or abetted in giving or taking any property or valuable security in connection with the marriage of the said parties. He will have to show that last ingredient of the offence being ingredient No. (vi), is not established.The only burden cast on the accused is to prove that he had not committed offence of giving or taking or abetting the giving or taking of dowry as contemplated by Section 3 of the Act. It is not as if he has also to prove that he has not taken or given or abetted in giving or taking any property or valuable security or that he has not taken or given or abetted in giving or taking any property or valuable security or that he has to disprove all the ingredients (i) to (vi). As per Section 8A, once prosecution establishes beyond reasonable doubt the basic ingredients (i) to (v), burden shifts on the accused to prove that the last one is not established viz., that he had not taken or given or abetted in giving or taking any property or valuable security in connection with the marriage of the said parties. The Section, of necessity, will have to be read down as aforesaid.
6. Similarly, for the purpose of proving an offence under Section 4, Section 8A will have to be read with Sections 4 and 2 of the Act. On a conjoint reading of these provisions, it becomes clear that before any offence under Section 4 is brought home to an accused, the following facts will have to be established:
(1) The accused must be shown to have demanded directly or indirectly from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be;
(2) Any property or valuable security to be given by one party to the marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(3) Any property or valuable security to be given by parents of either party to the marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person;
(4) Such demand should be made at or before or any time after the marriage;
(5) Such demand for any property or valuable security must be in connection with the marriage of the said parties.
Before any offence under Section 4 is brought home to the accused, all the aforesaid ingredients must be established. So far as the first four ingredients are concerned, they will have to be established as basic facts by the prosecution and only when the burden would shift to the accused to show that he had not demanded directly or indirectly any property or valuable security in connection with the marriage of the said parties. The burden of proving non-existence of last ingredient rests on the accused as per Section8A of the Act. But the initial burden to establish beyond reasonable doubt the aforesaid ingredients (1) to (4) will rest on the prosecution. Once these basic ingredients are established by the prosecution, the burden would shift on the accused to show that such demand if any by him was not in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Meaning thereby, that he had not demanded any dowry from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be. Thus burden will shift on him only to establish that the last ingredient is not proved. Section 8-A, in its operation, will have to be read down in the light of Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Act. Once it is so read down, the challenge to the said Section on the anvil of Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India, would not survive. However, as the learned Advocate for the appellant has sought to challenge the Constitutional validity of Section 8-A on the anvil of Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution, we may now deal with these challenges.

From Para 9,

9. As we have discussed earlier, if Section 8-A is read down as aforesaid, then there would remain no substance in what the learned Advocate submits. Once it is read down as indicated hereinabove, then the challenge to this Section on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, would not survive. The prosecution will have to lead in the first instance evidence to prove the basic ingredients of the offences under Sections 3 and 4. Once the prosecution proves them beyond reasonable doubt, then only the burden is shifted on the accused under Section 8A of the Act. Thus, the initial burden will rest on the prosecution to bring home the basic ingredients of the Sections and that will never shift on the accused under Section 8A of the Act. The Section so read down, would represent only a rule of evidence and nothing more. Even the objects and reasons for introducing Section 8-A to which we have made reference earlier, clearly indicate the legislative intent that the Section is to serve only as a rule of evidence by casting on the accused the burden of proving that he had not taken or given or abetted in taking or giving of dowry or that he had not demanded either directly or indirectly any dowry.

Harikumar Vs State of Karnataka on 22 October 1993

Citations: [1995 ALT CRI 1 25], [1993 ILR KAR 3035], [1994 DMC 1 356], [1995 CRIMES 1 573], [1994 KARLJ 3 335], [1994 KANTLJ 3 335], [1993 SCC ONLINE KAR 240], [1994 KANT LJ 3 335], [1993 HLR 2 672]

Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1973279/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56093aeee4b0149711228334

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