Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 13 Apr 2021

This is a landmark judgment from the 3-judge full-bench of Supreme Court of India.

From Para 23,

23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:

i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;
ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;
iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;
iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).
v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;
vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;
vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;
viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;
ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;
x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;
xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;
xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;
xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;
xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;
xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;
xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or
till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court
while passing such an interim order.
xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.

Citations : [2021 SCC ONLINE SC 315]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/199473647/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/607d22efba0bb01cbed0c0a7

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-neeharika-infrastructure-pvt-ltd-versus-state-of-maharashtra-and-others

Japani Sahoo Vs Chandra Sekhar Mohanty on 27 Jul 2007

Posted on October 16 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court declared that, Limitation u/s 468 starts from the date of making the complaint and not on the date the cognizance was taken.

Reasoning

52. The matter can be looked at from different angle also. Once it is accepted (and there is no dispute about it) that it is not within the domain of the complainant or prosecuting agency to take cognizance of an offence or to issue process and the only thing the former can do is to file a complaint or initiate proceedings in accordance with law. If that action of initiation of proceedings has been taken within the period of limitation, the complainant is not responsible for any delay on the part of the Court or Magistrate in issuing process or taking cognizance of an offence. Now, if he is sought to be penalized because of the omission, default or inaction on the part of the Court or Magistrate, the provision of law may have to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. It can possibly be urged that such a provision is totally arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable. It is settled law that a Court of Law would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity of law by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than making it vulnerable and unconstitutional by adopting rule of ‘litera legis’. Connecting the provision of limitation in Section 468 of the Code with issuing of process or taking of cognizance by the Court may make it unsustainable and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.

Conclusion

53. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date must be considered as the date of filing of complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by a Magistrate or issuance of process by a Court. We, therefore, overrule all decisions in which it has been held that the crucial date for computing the period of limitation is taking of cognizance by the Magistrate/Court and not of filing of complaint or initiation of criminal proceedings.

Japani Sahoo Vs Chandra Sekhar Mohanty on 27 Jul 2007

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1432851/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae4ae4b0149711413706

Surinder Mohan Vikal Vs Ascharaj Lal Chopra on 28 Feb 1978

Posted on October 16 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that, the defamation has to be filed with in time limitation while also referring to 468, 469 and 470 CrPC.

It would thus appear that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of sub-section (1) of section 468 which prohibits every Court from taking cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation. It is hardly necessary to say that statutes of limitation have legislative policy behind them. For instance, they shut out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused from unnecessary harassment. They also save the accused from the risk of having to face trial at a time when his evidence might have been lost because of the delay on the part of the prosecutor. As has been stated, a bar to the taking of cognizance has been prescribed under section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and there is no reason why the appellant should not be entitled to it in the facts and circumstances of this case.

Surinder Mohan Vikal Vs Ascharaj Lal Chopra on 28 Feb 1978

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/885750/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609abcae4b014971140d573

Balraj Khanna and Ors Vs Moti Ram on 22 Apr 1971

Posted on October 16 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed this Judgment regd

After a consideration of the various decisions referred to above, we are of the opinion that the propositions laid down in English decisions dealing with libel that the actual words alleged to be used must be stated in the indictment cannot be applied on all fours when dealing with the cases of defamation by spoken words under Section 499 I. P. C. it will be highly desirable no doubt if the actual words stated to have been used by an accused and which are alleged to be defamatory are reproduced by the complainant. The actual words used or the statements made may be reproduced verbatim by the complainant if the words are few and the statement is very brief. But in cases where the words spoken are too many or the statements made are too long, in our opinion, it will be the height of technicality to insist that the actual words and the entire statements should be reproduced verbatim. The object of having, if possible, the actual words or the statements before the court is to enable it to consider whether those words or the statements are defamatory in nature. That purpose or object will be served if the complainant is able to reproduce in his complaint or evidence in a substantial measure the words of imputation alleged to have been uttered. If the statements or the words placed before the court by the complainant are held to be not defamatory, it will mean that the complainant will have to lose. Therefore it is to his interest to get a proper adjudication from, the court that as far as possible the words spoken or the statements actually made and which he alleges to be defamatory are before the court. But a complaint cannot be thrown out on the mere ground that the actual words spoken or the statements made have not been stated in the complaint. From the point of view of accused also it is necessary that the matters alleged to be defamatory in the complaint must be so stated as to enable them to know the nature of the allegations that they have to meet.

Balraj Khanna and Ors Vs Moti Ram on 22 Apr 1971

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1946272/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab73e4b014971140c842

Citations:

Rakesh and Anr Vs State of UP and Anr on 13 Aug 2014

Posted on August 30 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows

From Para 2, Issue was fixed.

2. Whether a Magistrate after accepting a negative final report submitted by the Police can take action on the basis of the protest petition filed by the complainant/first informant? The above question having been answered in the affirmative by the Allahabad High Court, this appeal has been filed by the accused.

From Para 7, issue was answered.

7. If we are to go back to trace the genesis of the views expressed by this Court in Gopal Vijay Verma (supra), notice must be had of the decision of this Court in H.S. Bains vs. State (Union Territory of Chandigarh) 3 wherein it was held that after receipt of the police report under Section 173, the Magistrate has three options –
“(1) he may decide that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drop action;
(2) he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1)(b) on the basis of the police report and issue process; this he may do without being bound in any manner by the conclusion arrived at by the police in their report;
(3) he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a) on the basis of the original complaint and proceed to examine upon oath the complainant and his witnesses under Section 200. If he adopts the third alternative, he may hold or direct an inquiry under Section 202 if he thinks fit. Thereafter he may dismiss the complaint or issue process, as the case may be.”
8. The second and third options available to the Magistrate as laid down in H.S. Bains (supra) has been referred to and relied upon in subsequent decisions of this Court to approve the action of the Magistrate in accepting the final report and at the same time in proceeding to treat either the police report or the initial complaint as the basis for further action/enquiry in the matter of the allegations levelled therein.

Rakesh and Anr Vs State of UP and Anr on 13 Aug 2014

Citations : [2014 RCR CRIMINAL SC 4 52], [2014 MPWN SC 3 73], [2014 AIR SC 3509], [2014 SCALE 9 347], [2014 AIOL 490], [2014 CRIMES SC 4 183], [2014 CRLJ SC 4195], [2014 JLJR SC 4 16], [2014 BOMCR CRI SC 4 643], [2014 SUPREME 7 286], [2014 SLT 7 183], [2014 SCC 13 133], [2014 SCC CRI 5 611], [2014 SCC ONLINE SC 619], [2014 AIC 142 75], [2014 ACR SC 3 3091], [2014 UC 3 1651], [2014 ALLCC 87 299], [2014 SCJ 9 159], [2014 ALT CRL AP 3 531], [2014 ALLMR CRI SC 3782], [2014 AJR 4 387], [2015 LW CRL 1 229], [2014 CCR SC 3 577], [2014 PLJR 4 176], [2014 MLJ CRL SC 4 113], [2014 ALL LJ 6 82]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/118305084/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af4be4b0149711416134

Shahada Khatoon and Ors Vs Amjad Ali and Ors on 7 Apr 1999

Posted on August 15 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that,

The short question that arises for consideration is whether the learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court correctly interpreted sub-section (3) of Section 125 of CrPC by directing that the Magistrate can only sentence for a period of one month or until payment, if sooner made. The learned counsel for the appellants contends that the liability of the husband arising out of an order passed under Section 125 to make payment of maintenance is a continuing one and on account of non-payment there has been a breach of the order and therefore the Magistrate would be entitled to impose sentence on such a person continuing him in custody until payment is made. We are unable to accept this contention of the learned
counsel for the appellants. The language of sub-section (3) of Section 125 is quite clear and it circumscribes the power of the Magistrate to impose imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until the payment, if sooner made. This power of the Magistrate cannot be enlarged and therefore the only remedy would be after expiry of one month. For breach or non-compliance with the order of the Magistrate the wife can approach the Magistrate again for similar relief. By no stretch of imagination can the Magistrate be permitted to impose sentence for more than one month. In that view of the matter the High Court was fully justified in passing the impugned order and we see no infirmity in the said order to be interfered with by this Court. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.

Indiankanoon Version:

Shahada Khatoon and Ors Vs Amjad Ali and Ors on 7 Apr 1999 (IK Ver)

Casemine Version:

Shahada Khatoon and Ors Vs Amjad Ali and Ors on 7 Apr 1999 (CM Ver)

Citations : [1999 MHLJ SC 3 290], [1999 SCC CRI 1029], [1999 SUPREME 9 396], [1999 MPLJ SC 2 448], [1999 AIR SC 4880], [1999 SCC 5 672], [1999 BOMCR SC SUPP 1 978], [2000 ALD CRI 1 305], [1999 CRILJ 5060], [2000 DMC SC 1 313], [2000 KLT SC 1 696], [2000 MPHT 2 1], [1999 OLR SC 2 333], [1999 JT SC 10 260], [1999 AIR SCW 4880]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/517650/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad57e4b01497114111fb

Jangam Srinivasa Rao Vs Jaagam Rajeshwari and Anr on 13 Mar 1989

Posted on August 9 by ShadesOfKnife

Single Judge bench of AP HC held as follows:

From Para 6,

6. The points for determination in these proceedings are
(1) whether the order of maintenance passed in M.C. No. 18/84 stood cancelled ?
(2) Whether under Section 125(3), Cr.P.C. the wife can seek imprisonment of the husband for non-payment of maintenance accumulated beyond a period of 12 months ?
(3) Whether the payment of Rs. 3,250/- paid as per the directions of this court can be appropriated to the maintenance due for the first 25 months as claimed by the wife ?

From Para 11, Point (2) was answered.

11. Considering the different views expressed by the various High Courts I prefer to follow the Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Moddari Bin v. Sukdeo Bin, (1967 Cri LJ 335). The other decisions are judgments or single Judges. In my humble opinion the contraction put forward by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court is harmonesus construction and interpretation of the proviso making the proviso applicable to both the limbs of procedure contemplated under sub-section 3 of Section 125, Cr.P.C. I hold on point No. 2 that the wife the maintenance-holder cannot accumulate the maintenance for a period beyond 12 months. No application for execution of the maintenance order can be entertained for a period exceeding 12 months immediately preceding the date of application. I hold this point in favour of the petitioner. In this context I make it clear that they remedy provided under S. 125(3), Cr.P.C. is a speedy and expeditious remedy. By virtue of the order of maintains granted in M.C. 18/84 the right vested in the wife to receive maintenance from the date of the application i.e. 7-12-83. She may not be able to recover the earlier arrears by resorting to an application under Section 126(3), Cr.P.C., but still she would certainly be entitled to claim those arrear by filing a civil suit on the basis that the amount is die to her by virtue of the court order. But at the same time it should be remembered that under civil laws also her claim should be within the period of limitation. For instance, for the maintenance payable for the period 7-12-83 to 7-1-84 she should file a suit on or before 7-1-87. At the most she can recover arrears of maintenance for 3 years by resorting to a civil suit. Unfortunately in this case the right to file a civil suit for the earlier arrears is also barred by time.

Indiankanoon Version:

Jangam Srinivasa Rao Vs Jaagam Rajeshwari and Anr on 13 Mar 1989 (IK Ver)

Casemine Version:

Jangam Srinivasa Rao Vs Jaagam Rajeshwari and Anr on 13 Mar 1989 (CM Ver)

Citations : [1990 CRILJ 2506], [1989 ALT 2 295], [1989 SCC ONLINE AP 66], [1989 AP LJ 2 41], [1989 ALT NRC 2 8]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/471311/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f701e4b014971113ef2e

Shantha @ Ushadevi and Anr Vs B.G.Shivananjappa on 6 May 2005

Posted on August 9 by ShadesOfKnife

Division bench of Apex Court held as follows:

It is true that the amount of maintenance became due by virtue of the Magistrate’s order passed on 20th January, 1993 and in order to seek recovery of the amount due by issuance of warrant, application shall be made within a period of one year from the date the amount became due. In the present case, the application, namely, Crl. Misc. Petition No. 47 of 1993 was filed well within one year. As no amount was paid even after the disposal of the matter by the High Court, the appellant filed IA No. 1 in Crl. Misc. Petition No. 47 of 1993 wherein the arrears due up to that date were calculated and sought recovery of that amount under Section 125(3). Thus, IA No. 1 was filed even when Crl. Misc. Petition No. 47 of 1993 was pending and no action to issue warrant was taken in that proceeding. Crl. Misc. Petition No. 47 of 1993 which was filed within one year from the date the amount became due was kept alive and it was pending throughout. The purpose of filing IA on 16-6-1998 was only to mention the amount due up to date. The fact that the additional amount was specified in the IA does not mean that the application for execution of the order by issuing a warrant under Section 125(3) was a fresh application made for the first time. As already noticed, the main petition filed in the year 1993 was pending and kept alive and the filing of subsequent IA in 1998 was only to specify the exact amount which accrued due up to that date. Such application is only supplementary or incidental to the petition already filed in 1993 admittedly within the period of limitation. The fact that only a sum of Rs 5365 representing the arrears of eight months was mentioned therein does not curtail the scope of criminal miscellaneous petition filed in 1993 more so when no action was taken thereon and it remained pending.

8. We are, therefore, of the view that in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the bar under Section 125(3) cannot be applied and the High Court has erred in reversing the order of the Sessions Judge. It must be borne in mind that Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social legislation and it has to be construed liberally for the welfare and benefit of the wife and daughter. It is unreasonable to insist on filing successive applications when the liability to pay the maintenance as per the order passed under Section 125(1) is a continuing liability.

Note: The last line of para 8 (underlined) is against the law laid down by the Apex Court in Shahada Khatoon and Ors Vs Amjad Ali and Ors.

Shantha @ Ushadevi and Anr Vs B.G.Shivananjappa on 6 May 2005

Citations : [2005 SCC 4 468], [2005 SCC CRI 1089], [2005 AIR SC 2410], [2005 CRI LJ 2615], [2005 KANTLJ 4 208], [2005 CRIMES SC 2 225], [2005 AIR SC 0 2613], [2005 RCR CRI 2 796], [2005 AIOL 264], [2005 BOMCR CRI SC 2 548], [2005 CRLJ SC 2615], [2005 JT 5 347], [2005 SCALE 4 742], [2005 SCC 4 463], [2005 SCC CRI 1098], [2005 SCR 153], [2005 SUPREME 4 93], [2005 SCC CR 1098], [2005 SCJ 4 553], [2005 AD SC 5 319], [2005 BCR 2 548], [2005 MLJ CRI 1 665], [2005 SRJ 6 238], [2005 ALT CRI 2 282], [2005 CRLR 356], [2005 CALLJ 2 233], [2005 ALD CRI 1 370], [2005 CALCRILR 2 1], [2005 CCC 2 430], [2005 ALL MR CRI 179], [12005 DMC 2 1], [2005 JCRIC 2 753], [2005 SLT 4 292], [2005 CCR 2 231], [2005 MLJ CRL 1 665], [2005 AIR SCW 0 2613], [2005 AIR SCW 2613], [2005 CRIMES 2 225], [2005 CRLJ 2615], [2005 BCR CRI 2 548]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1928800/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae1ce4b0149711412fec

Yuvraj Digvijay Singh Vs Yuvrani Pratap Kumari on 2 May, 1969

Posted on August 2 by ShadesOfKnife

The division bench of Apex Court held as follows regarding how to prove non-consummation of marriage under Hindu Marriage Act 1955.

A party is impotent if his or her mental or physical condition makes consummation of the marriage a practical impossibility. The condition must be one, according to the statute, which existed at the time of the marriage and continued to be so until the institution of the proceedings. In order to entitle the appellant to obtain a decree of nullity, as prayed for by him, he will have to establish that his wife, the respondent, was impotent at the time of the marriage and continued to be so until the institution of the proceedings.

Yuvraj Digvijay Singh Vs Yuvrani Pratap Kumari on 2 May, 1969

Citations : [1970 AIR SC 137], [1969 SCC 2 279], [1970 SCR 1 559], [1970 AIR SC 1373]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1514023/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab60e4b014971140c4a5

The UK case law is here.

The Index is here.

Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P, Hyd Vs Nese Jilakara Sreeramulu on 29 Aug 2003

Posted on August 1 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full Bench gave this decision upon a reference from a Division bench of AP High Court on the question as to whether the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Ayyala Rambabu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1993 (1) Andh LT (Cri) 73 and by a learned single Judge of this Court in Nunna Venkateswarlu v. State of A. P., 1996 Cri LJ 108 is good law.

The answer was a NO.

From Paras 17-19,

17. The definition of “dowry”, the object of the Act and the above decisions of the Apex Court clearly show that any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given comes within the purview of “dowry” on three occasions in which any property or valuable security comes within its purview. They are — (i) before the marriage, (ii) at the time of marriage, and (iii) “at any time” after the marriage. The third occasion may appear to be an unending period, but the crucial words are “in connection with the marriage of the parties”. This means, giving or agreeing to give any property or valuable security on any of the above three stages should have been in connection with the marriage of the parties.

18. The Legislature in its wisdom while providing for the definition of “dowry” has emphasized that any money, property or valuable security given as consideration for marriage “before, at or any time after” the marriage would be covered by the expression “dowry”, and this definition as contained in Section 2 of the Act has to be read whenever the expression “dowry” occurs in the Act, The meaning of expression “dowry” as commonly used and understood is different from the peculiar definition thereof under the Act.

19. Under Section 3 of the Act, if a person gives or takes are abets the giving or taking dowry shall be punished. Under Section 4 of the Act mere demand of dowry is sufficient to bring home the offence to an accused. Thus, any demand of money, property or valuable security, made from the bride or her parents or other relatives, or the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives, or vice versa, would fall within the mischief of “dowry” under the Act, where such demand is not properly referable to legally recognized claim and relatable only to the consideration of the marriage.

Indiankanoon version:

Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P, Hyd Vs Nese Jilakara Sreeramulu on 29 Aug 2003 (IK Ver)

Casemine version:

Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P, Hyd Vs Nese Jilakara Sreeramulu on 29 Aug 2003 (CM Ver)

Citations : [2004 EASTCRIC 3 48], [2004 ALT 2 504], [2004 ALD CRI 1 519], [2003 SCC ONLINE AP 830], [2003 SUPP ACC 875], [2004 CRI LJ 1629], [2004 HLR 2 144]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1945624/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f835e4b0149711141c0f

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Landmark Case

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 13 Apr 2021

Japani Sahoo Vs Chandra Sekhar Mohanty on 27 Jul 2007

Surinder Mohan Vikal Vs Ascharaj Lal Chopra on 28 Feb 1978

Balraj Khanna and Ors Vs Moti Ram on 22 Apr 1971

Rakesh and Anr Vs State of UP and Anr on 13 Aug 2014

Shahada Khatoon and Ors Vs Amjad Ali and Ors on 7 Apr 1999

Jangam Srinivasa Rao Vs Jaagam Rajeshwari and Anr on 13 Mar 1989

Shantha @ Ushadevi and Anr Vs B.G.Shivananjappa on 6 May 2005

Yuvraj Digvijay Singh Vs Yuvrani Pratap Kumari on 2 May, 1969

Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P, Hyd Vs Nese Jilakara Sreeramulu on 29 Aug 2003