Shilpa Sailesh Vs Varun Sreenivasan on 01 May 2023

A Constitution Bench of 5 judges held as follows,

From Para 40,

40. In view of our findings recorded above, we are of the opinion that the decisions of this Court in Manish Goel (supra), Neelam Kumar (supra), Darshan Gupta (supra), Hitesh Bhatnagar (supra), Savitri Pandey (supra) and others have to be read down in the context of the power of this Court given by the Constitution of India to do ‘complete justice’ in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India. In consonance with our findings on the scope and ambit of the power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, in the context of matrimonial disputes arising out of the Hindu Marriage Act, we hold that the power to do‘complete justice’ is not fettered by the doctrine of fault and blame, applicable to petitions for divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a) of theHindu Marriage Act. As held above, this Court’s power to dissolve marriage on settlement by passing a decree of divorce by mutual consent, as well as quash and set aside other proceedings, including criminal proceedings, remains and can be exercised.

From Para 41,

41. Lastly, we must express our opinion on whether a party can directly canvass before this Court the ground of irretrievable breakdown by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. In Poonam v. Sumit Tanwar65, a two judges’ bench of this Court has rightly held that any such attempt must be spurned and not accepted, as the parties should not be permitted to file a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, or for that matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court, and seek divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The reason is that the remedy of a person aggrieved by the decision of the competent judicial forum is to approach the superior tribunal/forum for redressal of his/her grievance. The parties should not be permitted to circumvent the procedure by resorting to the writ jurisdiction under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, as the case may be. Secondly, and more importantly, relief under Article 32 of the Constitution of India can be sought to enforce the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution of India, and on the proof of infringement thereof. Judicial orders passed by the court in, or in relation to, the proceedings pending before it, are not amenable to correction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.66 Therefore, a party cannot file a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and seek relief of dissolution of marriage directly from this Court. While we accept the said view, we also clarify that reference in Poonam (supra) to Manish Goel (supra) and the observation that it is questionable whether the period of six months for moving the second motion can be waived has not been approved by us.

Shilpa Sailesh Vs Varun Sreenivasan on 01 May 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Jitendra Kumar Rode Vs Union of India on 24 Apr 2023

Posted on April 27 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed these guidelines, with respect to digitization of Court records in all High Courts as well as District Courts.

From Paras 39-42,

39. Before parting with the present leave petition another important issue must be dealt with, i.e. the digitization of records. Technology has, in the present time become increasingly enmeshed with the systems of dispute resolution and adjudication with the trends pointing leading to all the more interplay, both supplementary and complimentary between technology and law.
40. On 24.9.2021, the learned E-committee of the Supreme Court of India issued an SOP for digital preservation. Step by step implementation of the digitization process involves eighteen steps therein. Primarily, it requires all High Courts to establish Judicial Digital Repositories (JDR) as well as the
standardized system therefor; A digitisation cell at each of the High Courts is to be established to monitor the progress on day to day basis; It is the work of the cell to manage contracts with vendors for specialized services; an online data tracking system to keep track of the data transferred to the High Courts and to facilitate the receipts for each set of transferred records to the District Courts as well; District Courts to have backups
of all data transferred to the High Court on a monthly basis while maintaining an independent record thereof.
41. It cannot be doubted that had there been properly preserved records of the Trial Court, the issue in the present appeal as to whether the High Court could uphold a conviction having not perused the complete Trial Court record, would not have arisen. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that, in accordance with the SOP issued, private entities providing specialized service have been contracted, and therefore considering the importance and essentiality of such record, a robust system of responsibility and accountability must be developed and fostered in order to ensure the proper protection and regular updation of all records facilitating the smooth functioning of the judicial process.
42. Therefore, this Court finds it fit to issue the following directions:
1. The Registrar General of the High Courts shall ensure that in all cases of criminal trial, as well as civil suits, the digitization of records must be duly undertaken with promptitude at all District Courts, preferably within the time prescribed for filing an appeal within the laws of procedure.
2. The concerned District Judge, once the system of digitization along with the system of authentication of the digitized records is in place in their judgeship, to ensure that the records so digitized are verified as expeditiously as possible.
3. A continually updated record of Register of Records digitized shall be maintained with periodic reports being sent to the concerned High Courts for suitable directions.
4. Interlocutory application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Jitendra Kumar Rode Vs Union of India on 24 Apr 2023

In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail (Guidelines Issued) on 31 Jan 2023

Posted on April 4 by ShadesOfKnife

A 3-judge bench passed these directions, in relation to release of undertrial prisoners/convicts who were granted bail.

With a view to ameliorate the problems a number of directions are sought. We have examined the directions which we reproduce hereinafter with
certain modifications:
“1) The Court which grants bail to an undertrial prisoner/convict would be required to send a soft copy of the bail order by e-mail to the prisoner through the Jail Superintendent on the same day or the next day. The Jail Superintendent would be required to enter the date of grant of bail in the e-prisons software [or any other software which is being used by the Prison Department].
2) If the accused is not released within a period of 7 days from the date of grant of bail, it would be the duty of the Superintendent of Jail to inform the
Secretary, DLSA who may depute para legal volunteer or jail visiting advocate to interact with the prisoner and assist the prisoner in all ways possible for his release.
3) NIC would make attempts to create necessary fields in the e-prison software so that the date of grant of bail and date of release are entered by the Prison Department and in case the prisoner is not released within 7 days, then an automatic email can be sent to the Secretary, DLSA.
4) The Secretary, DLSA with a view to find out the economic condition of the accused, may take help of the Probation Officers or the Para Legal Volunteers to prepare a report on the socio-economic conditions of the inmate which may be placed before the concerned Court with a request to relax the condition (s) of bail/surety.
5) In cases where the undertrial or convict requests that he can furnish bail bond or sureties once released, then in an appropriate case, the Court may consider granting temporary bail for a specified period to the accused so that he can furnish bail bond or sureties.
6) If the bail bonds are not furnished within one month from the date of grant bail, the concerned Court may suo moto take up the case and consider whether the conditions of bail require modification/ relaxation.
7) One of the reasons which delays the release of the accused/ convict is the insistence upon local surety. It is suggested that in such cases, the courts
may not impose the condition of local surety.”
We order that the aforesaid directions shall be complied with.

In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail (Guidelines Issued) on 31 Jan 2023

Pravasi Legal Cell Vs Union of India and Ors on 20 Mar 2023

Posted on March 28 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court passed directions to all High Courts and States to setup online RTI portals in their respective territories…

From Paras 8-11,

8 We are of the view that such an exercise should be carried out by all the High Courts in the country no later than within a period of three months from the date of this order.
9 A certified copy of this order shall be remitted by the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court to all the Registrars General, who shall in turn, seek administrative directions from the learned Chief Justices for implementation.
10 The High Courts shall make adequate provisions to facilitate the supply of information through online web portals and for all incidental purposes connected with the implementation of the Right to Information Act 2005.
11 As regards the district judiciary, which is under the administrative control of the High Courts, we request all the Registrars General to take administrative directions from the Chief Justices. The High Courts may utilize the support of the National Informatics Centre for the purpose. NIC shall provide all logistical and technical assistance in that regard to the High Courts.

From Para 1 on Page 4,

1 In view of the orders which have been passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No 1325 of 2020, there shall be a direction to all the State governments/Union Territories to set up and operationalize online web portals so that information sought under the Right to Information Act 2005 is made available in respect of all public authorities falling within their jurisdiction. This exercise shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of this order.

Pravasi Legal Cell Vs Union of India and Ors on 20 Mar 2023

Supreme Court launched it’s own RTI Portal in November 2022.

News here and here.

This was one of my PIL ideas here.

Jai Prakash Tiwari Vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 04 Aug 2022

Posted on March 8 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full bench of the Apex Court held as follows regarding the important of fundamental right available to accused u/s 313 Cr.P.C.

From Paras 18 and 19,

18. Another important issue that merits consideration in the present appeal is that the accused-appellant, in his Section 313 statement, stated that he and the complainant belonged to opposing student parties. The accused-appellant claimed that owing to the animosity pertaining to the elections, the accused-appellant was falsely implicated in the matter. He also produced two witnesses to prove his alibi. DW1 and DW2 have stated that the accused appellant was in his village as his mother was unwell. Moreover, the accused-appellant also pointed out to the Court that the father, sister and brother of the complainant were all a part of the police department. The accused-appellant also brought to the notice of the Court the fact that the complainant had also registered another criminal case against the accused-appellant in which he already stands acquitted.

19. In the case at hand, the alternate version put forth by the appellant-accused could not be ignored. Section 313 CrPC confers a valuable right upon an accused to establish his innocence and can well be considered beyond a statutory right, as a constitutional right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.[See Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam, (2019) 13 SCC 289]

From Paras 25-28,

25. In the present case, the courts below failed to scrutinize the defence version put forward by the appellant-accusedin his Section 313 statement. The object of Section 313 of the Codeis to establish a direct dialogue between the court and the accused. (See Asraf Ali v. State of Assam, (2008) 16 SCC 328)
26. The purpose of Section 313 CrPC is to provide the accused a reasonable opportunity to explain the adverse circumstances which have emerged against him during the course of trial.A reasonable opportunity entails putting all the adverse evidences in the form of questions so as to give an opportunity to the accused to articulate his defence and givehis explanation.
27. If all the circumstances are bundled together and a singleopportunity is provided to the accused to explain himself, he may not able to put forth a rational and intelligibleexplanation. Such, exercises which defeats fair opportunity are nothing but empty formality. Non-fulfilment of the true spirit of Section 313 may ultimately cause grave prejudice tothe accused and the Court may not have the benefit of all the necessary facts and circumstances to arrive at a fair conclusion.
28. Such an omission does not ipso facto vitiate the trial, unless the accused fails to prove that grave prejudice has been caused to him. Although the counsel on behalf the accused has not proved any serious prejudice caused to him due to failure of the Court in framing individual circumstances; however, considering the long pendency of the matter and the right of the accused to have a fair and expeditious trial, we propose to proceed and decide the matter on its own merit.

From Para 29,

29. It is an established principle of criminal law that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt is upon the prosecution. Where an accused sets up a defence or offers an explanation, it is well-settled that he is not required to prove his defence beyond a reasonable doubt but only by preponderance of probabilities. [See M. Abbas v. State of Kerala, (2001) 10 SCC 103]. Further, it has been held by this Court in Parminder Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2020) 8 SCC 811 that “once a plausible version has been put forth in defence at the Section 313 CrPC examination stage, then it is for the prosecution to negate such defence plea”.

Jai Prakash Tiwari Vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 04 Aug 2022

Premchand Vs State of Maharashtra on 03 Mar 2023

Posted on March 8 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division Bench of the Supreme Court held as follows regarding the purpose and import of Section 313 of Cr.P.C.,

From Para 15,

15. What follows from these authorities may briefly be summarized thus:
a. section 313, Cr. P.C. [clause (b) of sub-section 1] is a valuable safeguard in the trial process for the accused to establish his innocence;
b. section 313, which is intended to ensure a direct dialogue between the court and the accused, casts a mandatory duty on the court to question the accused generally on the case for the purpose of enabling him to personally explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him;
c. when questioned, the accused may not admit his involvement at all and choose to flatly deny or outrightly repudiate whatever is put to him by the court;
d. the accused may even admit or own incriminating circumstances adduced against him to adopt legally recognized defences;
e. an accused can make a statement without fear of being cross-examined by the prosecution or the latter having any right to cross-examine him;
f. the explanations that an accused may furnish cannot be considered in isolation but has to be considered in conjunction with the evidence adduced by the prosecution and, therefore, no conviction can be premised solely on the basis of the section 313 statement(s);
g. statements of the accused in course of examination under section 313, since not on oath, do not constitute evidence under section 3 of the Evidence Act, yet, the answers given are relevant for finding the truth and examining the veracity of the prosecution case;
h. statement(s) of the accused cannot be dissected to rely on the inculpatory part and ignore the exculpatory part and has/have to be read in the whole, inter alia, to test the authenticity of the exculpatory nature of admission;
i. if the accused takes a defence and proffers any alternate version of events or interpretation, the court has to carefully analyze and consider his statements; and
j. any failure to consider the accused’s explanation of incriminating circumstances, in a given case, may vitiate the trial and/or endanger the conviction.

From Para 16,

16. Bearing the above well-settled principles in mind, every criminal court proceeding under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 313 has to shoulder the onerous responsibility of scanning the evidence after the prosecution closes its case, to trace the incriminating circumstances in the evidence against the accused and to prepare relevant questions to extend opportunity to the accused to explain any such circumstance in the evidence that could be used against him. Prior to the amendment of section 313 in 2009, the courts alone had to perform this task. Instances of interference with convictions by courts of appeal on the ground of failure of the trial court to frame relevant questions and to put the same to the accused were not rare. For toning up the criminal justice system and ensuring a fair and speedy trial, with emphasis on cutting down delays, the Parliament amended section 313 in 2009 and inserted sub-section (5), thereby enabling the court to take the assistance of the Public Prosecutor and Defence Counsel in preparing such questions [the first part of sub-section (5)]. Ideally, with such assistance (which has to be real and not sham to make the effort effective and meaningful), one would tend to believe that the courts probably are now better equipped to diligently prepare the relevant questions, lest there be any infirmity. However, judicial experience has shown that more often than not, the time and effort behind such an exercise put in by the trial court does not achieve the desired result. This is because either the accused elects to come forward with evasive denials or answers questions with stereotypes like ‘false’, ‘I don’t know’, ‘incorrect’, etc. Many a time, this does more harm than good to the cause of the accused. For instance, if facts within the special knowledge of the accused are not
satisfactorily explained, that could be a factor against the accused. Though such factor by itself is not conclusive of guilt, it becomes relevant while considering the totality of the circumstances. A proper explanation of one’s conduct or a version different from the prosecution version, without being obliged to face cross-examination, could provide the necessary hint or clue for the court to have a different perspective and solve the problem before it. The exercise under section 313 instead of being ritualistic ought to be realistic in the sense that it should be the means for securing the ends of justice; instead of an aimless effort, the means towards the end should be purposeful. Indeed, it is optional for the accused to explain the circumstances put to him under section 313, but the safeguard provided by it and the valuable right that it envisions, if availed of or exercised, could prove decisive and have an effect on the final outcome, which would in effect promote utility of the exercise rather than its futility.

From Para 17,

17. Once a written statement is filed by the accused under subsection (5) of section 313, Cr. P.C. and the court marks it as an exhibit, such statement must be treated as part of the accused’s statement under sub-section (1) read with sub-section (4) thereof. In view of the latter sub-section, the written statement has to be considered in the light of the evidence led by the prosecution to appreciate the truthfulness or otherwise of such case and the contents of such statement weighed with the probabilities of the case either in favour of the accused or against him.

Premchand Vs State of Maharashtra on 03 Mar 2023

Father Thomas Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 22 Dec 2010

Posted on March 4 by ShadesOfKnife

Following the landmark decision of Apex Court here, the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

From Para 14,

14.In Union of India v. W.N. Chaddha, 1993 Cri.L.J 859 (SC) it has been held in paragraph 93: “…….More so, the accused has no right to have any say as regards the manner and method of investigation. Save under certain exceptions under the entire scheme of the Code, the accused has no participation as a matter of right during the course of the investigation of a case instituted on a police report till the investigation culminates in filing of a final report under S. 173(2) of the Code or in a proceeding instituted otherwise than on a police report till the process is issued under S. 204 of the Code, as the case may be. Even in cases where cognizance of an offence is taken on a complaint notwithstanding the said offence is triable by a Magistrate or triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the accused has no right to have participation till the process is issued. In case the issue of process is postponed as contemplated under S. 202 of the Code, the accused may attend the subsequent inquiry but cannot participate. There are various judicial pronouncements to this effect but we feel that it is not necessary to recapitulate those decisions. At the same time, we would like to point out that there are certain provisions under the Code empowering the Magistrate to give an opportunity of being heard under certain specified circumstances.”

From Para 29,

29.From a consideration of the aforesaid authorities, it is apparent that even when a complaint is filed under section 190(1) (a) and the Court decides to take cognizance and to adopt the procedure provided for inquiry under section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C, the accused is only permitted to remain present during the proceedings, but not to intervene or to raise his defence, until the order issuing summons is passed. The right of hearing of a prospective accused at the pre-cognizance stage, when only a direction for investigation by the police is issued by the Magistrate under section 156(3) Cr.P.C., can only be placed at a lower pedestal. It is only during the course of trial that the accused has been conferred rights at different stages to raise his defence. As the authorities show, that in the absence of any statutory right of hearing to the prospective accused at the pre-cognizance stage, when the direction to investigate has only been issued by the Magistrate under section 156(3), the accused cannot be conferred with any right of hearing even under any principle of audi alteram partem.

From Para 41,

41.An order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. passed by the Magistrate directing the police officer to investigate a cognizable case on the other hand is no such order of moment, which impinges on anyvaluable rights of the party. Were any objection to the issuance of such a direction to be accepted (though it is difficult to visualize anyobjection which could result in the quashing of a simple direction for investigation), the proceedings would still not come to an end, as itwould be open to the complainant informant to move an application under section 154(3) before the Superintendent of Police (S.P.) or a superior officer under section 36 of the Code. He could also file a complaint under section 190 read with section 200 of the Code. This is the basic difference from the situations mentioned in Madhu Limaye and in Amar Nath’s cases, where acceptance of the objections could result in the said accused being discharged or the summons set aside, and the proceedings terminated. Also the direction for investigation by the Magistrate is but an incidental step in aid of investigation and trial. It is thus similar to orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, orders granting bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of pending proceedings which have been described as purely interlocutory in nature in Amar Nath (supra).

From Para 58,

58.However it is made clear that the initial order for investigation under section 156(3) is also not open to challenge in a writ petition, as it is now beyond the pale of controversy that the province of investigationby the police and the judiciary are not overlapping but complementary. As observed by the Privy Council in paragraph 37 in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18 when considering the scope of the statutory powers of the police to investigate a cognizable case under sections 154 and 156 of the Code, that it would be an unfortunate result if the Courts in exercise of their inherent powers could interfere in this function of the police. The roles of the Court and police are “complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function.”

Finally, from Paras 64 and 65,

64.In this view of the matter, the Opinion of the Full bench on the three questions posed is:
65.A. The order of the Magistrate made in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C directing the police to register and investigate is not open to revision at the instance of a person against whom neither cognizance has been taken nor any process issued.
B. An order made under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C is an interlocutory order and remedy of revision against such order is barred under subsection (2) of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
C. The view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ajay Malviya Vs. State of U.P and others reported in 2000(41) ACC 435 that as an order made under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is amenable to revision, and no writ petition for quashing an F.I.R registered on the basis of the order will be maintainable, is not correct.

Father Thomas Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 22 Dec 2010

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/77085610/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5767b120e691cb22da6d4314

Union of India and Anr Vs W.N.Chadha on 17 Dec 1992

Posted on March 4 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 91,

91. More so, the accused has no right to have any say as regards the manner and method of investigation. Save under certain exceptions under the entire scheme of the Code, the accused has no participation as a matter of right during the course of the investigation of a case instituted on a police report till the investigation culminates in filing of a final report under Section 173(2) of the Code or in a proceeding instituted otherwise than on a police report till the process is issued under Section 204 of the Code, as the case may be. Even in cases where cognizance of an offence is taken on a complaint notwithstanding that the said offence is triable by a Magistrate or triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, the accused has no right to have participation till the process is issued. In case the issue of process is postponed as contemplated under Section 202 of the Code, the accused may attend the subsequent inquiry but cannot participate. There are various judicial pronouncements to this effect but we feel that it is not necessary to recapitulate those decisions. At the same time, we would like to point out that there are certain provisions under the Code empowering the Magistrate to give an opportunity of being heard under certain specified circumstances.

From Para 97

97. If prior notice and an opportunity of hearing are to be given to an accused in every criminal case before taking any action against him, such a procedure would frustrate the proceedings, obstruct the taking of prompt action as law demands, defeat the ends of justice and make the provisions of law relating to the investigation lifeless, absurd and self- defeating. Further, the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions relating to the procedure of investigation does not attract such a course in the absence of any statutory obligation to the contrary.

Indiankanoon Version:

Union of India and Anr Vs W.N.Chadha on 17 Dec 1992 (IK)

Casemine Version:

Union of India and Anr Vs W.N.Chadha on 17 Dec 1992 (CM)

LegalData Version:

Union of India and Anr Vs W.N.Chadha on 17 Dec 1992 (LD)

Citations: [1992 SCALE 3 396], [1992 SUPP SCR 3 594], [1992 AIR SC 1082], [1992 SUPP JT 1 255], [1993 AIR SC 1083], [1993 SUPP SCC 4 280], [1993 CRLJ SC 859], [1993 SUPPL SCC 4 260], [1993 SCC CRI 1171]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1787029/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac7be4b014971140f032

https://legaldata.in/court/read/793121

Kalicharan and Ors Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 14 Dec 2022

Posted on February 21 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows:

From Para 22,

22. Such a case was not at all made out by the prosecution in the evidence before the Court. The material brought on record by the prosecution witnesses (PW-1 and PW-2) is to the effect that Harpal Singh died due to injuries sustained as a result of an attack made by accused nos.1,3 and 4 on him by sharp weapons. These material circumstances brought on record against the accused on which their conviction is based were never put to the accused. What was put to the accused was not the case made out by the prosecution in the evidence. No questions are asked in the Section 313 statement about the post-mortem of the body of Harpal Singh. It is not put to the witness that the cause of death of Harpal Singh was due to haemorrhage and shock as a result of injuries caused by sharp weapons. Questioning an accused under Section 313 CrPC is not an empty formality. The requirement of Section 313 CrPC is that the accused must be explained the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him so that accused can offer an explanation. After an accused is questioned under Section 313 CrPC, he is entitled to take a call on the question of examining defence witnesses and leading other evidence. If the accused is not explained the important circumstances appearing against him in the evidence on which his conviction is sought to be based, the accused will not be in a position to explain the said circumstances brought on record against him. He will not be able to properly defend himself.

Kalicharan and Ors Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 14 Dec 2022

Summary:

(credit: Pankaj Awasthi)

Citations :

Other Sources:

Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu and Ors Vs Gobardhan Sao and Ors on 27 Feb 2002

Posted on February 4 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court passed this Landmark observation wrt the Sec 5 of Limitation Act 1963,

From Para 12,

12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.

Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu and Ors Vs Gobardhan Sao and Ors on 27 Feb 2002

Citations : [2002 SCALE 2 334], [2002 SCC 3 195], [2002 AIR SC 978], [2002 ALLMR SC 2 588], [2002 SCR 2 77], [2002 AIR SC 1201], [2002 SUPREME 2 143], [2002 RD 93 556], [2006 JCR SC 1 93], [2002 LW 3 417], [2002 UC 1 718], [2002 BLJR 1 794], [2002 MLJ SC 2 85], [2002 ALR 48 101], [2002 JT SC 2 349], [2002 AIR SCW 978]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/826396/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adbce4b01497114121f8

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Landmark Case

Shilpa Sailesh Vs Varun Sreenivasan on 01 May 2023

Jitendra Kumar Rode Vs Union of India on 24 Apr 2023

In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail (Guidelines Issued) on 31 Jan 2023

Pravasi Legal Cell Vs Union of India and Ors on 20 Mar 2023

Jai Prakash Tiwari Vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 04 Aug 2022

Premchand Vs State of Maharashtra on 03 Mar 2023

Father Thomas Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 22 Dec 2010

Union of India and Anr Vs W.N.Chadha on 17 Dec 1992

Kalicharan and Ors Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 14 Dec 2022

Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu and Ors Vs Gobardhan Sao and Ors on 27 Feb 2002