Badshah Vs Urmila Badshah Godse and Anr on 18 October 2013

Posted on April 9 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice A.K.Sikri in a 2-judge bench had held that, for the purpose of claiming maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C., such a woman (who is not a legally wedded wife), is to be treated as the legally wedded wife.

From Para 25,

25. Thus, while interpreting a statute the court may not only take into consideration the purpose for which the statute was enacted, but also the mischief it seeks to suppress. It is this mischief rule, first propounded in Heydon’s Case[11] which became the historical source of purposive interpretation. The court would also invoke the legal maxim construction ut res magis valeat guam pereat, in such cases i.e. where alternative constructions are possible the Court must give effect to that which will be responsible for the smooth working of the system for which the statute has been enacted rather than one which will put a road block in its way. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation should be avoided. We should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. If this interpretation is not accepted, it would amount to giving a premium to the husband for defrauding the wife. Therefore, at least for the purpose of claiming maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C., such a woman is to be treated as the legally wedded wife.

Badshah Vs Urmila Badshah Godse and Anr on 18 October 2013

Citations: [2014 SCJ 2 779], [2014 CRILJ 1076], [2014 SCC 1 188], [2013 SCALE 12 681], [2014 CRLJ SC 1076], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 4 764], [2013 CTC 6 86], [2014 AIR SC 256], [2014 NCC 1 238], [2013 RLW SC 4 3670], [2013 AIOL 3407], [2013 AD SC 11 9], [2013 RCR CIVIL SC 4 830], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 946], [2014 JLJR SC 1 78], [2014 LW CRL 1 646], [2014 SCC CIV 1 51], [2013 JCC SC 4 2765], [2014 LW 2 936], [2013 ACR 3 3010], [2014 MPHT 2 499], [2014 GLH 1 273], [2013 KERLT 4 367], [2013 ALR 101 704], [2013 BOMCR CRI SC 4 616], [2013 SLT 9 543], [2013 DMC 3 518], [2014 ECRN 1 241], [2014 AIR SC 869], [2013 JT 13 570], [2013 AIC 132 108]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/15901386/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af37e4b0149711415daf

Earlier Chanmuniya judgment is here.

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from main.sci.gov.in/judgments, judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

Syed Wasif Husain Rizvi Vs Hasan Raza Khan and Ors on 22 January 2016

Posted on April 3 by ShadesOfKnife

3-Judge Full Bench comprising Chief Justice DY Chandrachud (as he was at Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court) declared the following reference in affirmative,

“Whether writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution can be filed by Power of Attorney holder?”

Safeguards

Having held so, we must, at the same time, emphasize the necessity of observing adequate safeguards where a writ petition is filed through the holder of a power of attorney. These safeguards should necessarily include the following:
(1) The power of attorney by which the donor authorises the donee, must be brought on the record and must be filed together with the petition/application;
(2) The affidavit which is executed by the holder of a power of attorney must contain a statement that the donor is alive and specify the reasons for the inability of the donor to remain present before the Court to swear the affidavit; and
(3) The donee must be confined to those acts which he is authorised by the power of attorney to discharge.

Syed Wasif Husain Rizvi Vs Hasan Raza Khan and Ors on 22 January 2016

Earlier Reference Order

Syed Wasif Husain Rizvi Vs Hasan Raza Khan and Ors on 02 December 2015

Citations: [2016 AWC 2 1525], [2016 LCD 34 373], [2016 AIR ALL 52]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/114640689/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5811a4a5e691cb26fc4d9447

Sarwan Singh Lamba and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors on 12 May 1995

Posted on March 21 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that,

Para 17,

Normally even an obiter dictum is expected to be obeyed and followed.

TruePrint Version

TP_1995_4_scc_546_561_sandeeppamarati_gmailcom_20200320_233725

Citations: [1995 JT 5 386], [1995 AIR SC 1729], [1995 SCALE 3 457], [1995 SCC 4 546], [1995 SCC L&S 1064], [1995 ATC 30 585], [1995 BLJR 2 1295], [1995 SUPP SCR 1 427], [1995 SLJ SC 3 72], [1995 UPLBEC 2 1215]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/538878/ and https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609acc5e4b014971140fb0f

Landmark Judgment of Kusum Ingots is here.

Kishansing Tomar Vs Municipal Corp of Ahmedabad and Ors on 19 October 2006

Posted on March 15 by ShadesOfKnife

In this landmark judgment, Supreme Court held that State Election Commission (SEC) is a Constitutional body and invariably, State Governments should support State Election Commissioner in conducting free and fair Local body elections. It also held that State Commission shall not put forward any excuse based on unreasonable grounds and not yield to situations created by vested interests to postpone elections. It is stated that except in exceptional circumstances of man-made calamities such as rioting or breakdown of law and order, or natural calamities, Election Commission would be justified in delaying the Election Process.

In this direction, it is necessary for all the State governments to recognize the significance of the State Election Commission, which is a constitutional body and it shall abide by the directions of the Commission in the same manner in which it follows the directions of the Election Commission of India during the elections for the Parliament and State Legislatures. In fact, in the domain of elections to the Panchayats and the Municipal bodies under the Part IX and Part IX A for the conduct of the elections to these bodies they enjoy the same status as the Election Commission of India.

From the reading of the said provisions it is clear that the powers of the State Election Commission in respect of conduct of elections is no less than that of the Election Commission of India in their respective domains. These powers are, of course, subject to the law made by Parliament or by State
Legislatures provided the same do not encroach upon the plenary powers of the said Election Commissions.

The State Election Commissions are to function independent of the concerned State Governments in the matter of their powers of superintendence, direction and control of all elections and preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Panchayats and Municipalities.

Article 243 K (3) also recognizes the independent status of the State Election Commission. It states that upon a request made in that behalf the Governor shall make available to the State Election Commission “such staff as may be necessary for the discharge of the functions conferred on the
State Election Commission by clause (1). It is accordingly to be noted that in the matter of the conduct of elections, the concerned government shall have to render full assistance and co-operation to the State Election Commission and respect the latter’s assessment of the needs in order to ensure that free and fair elections are conducted.

Also, for the independent and effective functioning of the State Election Commission, where it feels that it is not receiving the cooperation of the concerned State Government in discharging its constitutional obligation of holding the elections to the Panchayats or Municipalities within the time
mandated in the Constitution, it will be open to the State Election Commission to approach the High Courts, in the first instance, and thereafter the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or such other appropriate writ directing the concerned State Government to provide all necessary cooperation and assistance to the State Election Commission to enable the latter to fulfill the constitutional mandate.

Kishansing Tomar Vs Municipal Corp of Ahmedabad and Ors on 19 October 2006

Citations: [(2006) 8 SCC 352], [2006 (9) JT 320], [2006 SCR SUPP 7 454], [2007 AIR SC 269], [2006 SCALE 10 438], [2007 BOMCR SC 4 414], [2006 AIOL 715]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1736371/ and https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae35e4b01497114132f5

Couple of election-related judgments here and here.

MS. Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs MS. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001

Posted on March 7 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held the scope of 205 CrPC in this judgment as,

Second is that it is difficult, in the absence of other materials, to decide positively whether the order dated 28.4.2000 is an interlocutory order only.
The interdict contained in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code) is that the powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order. Whether an order is interlocutory or not, cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory stage. The safe test laid down by this Court through a series of decisions is this: If the contention of the petitioner who moves the superior court in revision, asagainst the order under challenge is upheld, would the criminal proceedings as a whole culminate? If it would,then the order is not interlocutory in spite of the fact that it was passed during any interlocutory stage.

And

Section 251 is the commencing provision in Chapter XX of the Code which deals with trial of summons cases by magistrates. It enjoins on the court to ask the accused whether he pleads guilty when the accused appears or is brought before the magistrate. The appearance envisaged therein can either be by personal attendance of the accused or through his advocate. This can be understood from Section 205(1) of the Code which says that whenever a magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader.
Thus, in appropriate cases the magistrate can allow an accused to make even the first appearance through a counsel. The magistrate is empowered to record the plea of the accused even when his counsel makes such plea on behalf of the accused in a case where the personal appearance of the accused is dispensed with.

MS. Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs MS. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001

Citations: [(2001) 7 SCC 401], [

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1255592/

Ankit Bharti Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 02 March 2020

Posted on March 4 by ShadesOfKnife

A landmark judgment, where in Full-bench (5-Judge) of Allahabad High Court held that, Sessions Court and High Court have concurrent jurisdiction in matters of 438 CrPC (Anticipatory Bail) and that there is no rule that first option at Sessions Court ought to be exhausted before seeking audience at High Court, but can be done so under Special circumstances only.

Ankit Bharti Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 02 March 2020

Citations: [

Anil Rai Vs State of Bihar on 6 August 2001

Posted on February 24 by ShadesOfKnife

Wonderful judgment from Supreme Court, which held that Repeated adjournment of matters ‘for orders’ after arguments are heard is impermissible. Also passed the following Guidelines.

20. Under the prevalent circumstances in some of the High Courts, I feel it appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding the pronouncement of judgments which, I am sure, shall be followed by all concerned, being the mandate of this Court. Such guidelines, as for present, are as under:

(i) The Chief Justices of the High Courts may issue appropriate directions to the Registry that in case where the judgment is reserved and is pronounced later, a column be added in the judgment where, on the first page, after the cause-title, date of reserving the judgment and date of pronouncing it be separately mentioned by the court officer concerned.

(ii) That Chief Justice of the High Courts, on their administrative side, should direct the Court Officers/ Readers of the various Benches in the High Courts to furnish every month the list of cases in the matters where the judgments reserved are not pronounced within the period of that months.

(iii) On noticing that after conclusion of the arguments the judgment is not pronounced within a period of two months, the concerned Chief Justice shall draw the attention of the Bench concerned to the pending matter. The Chief Justice may also see the desirability of circulating the statement of such cases in which the judgments have not been pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments amongst the Judges of the High Court for their information. Such communication be conveyed as confidential and in a sealed cover.

(iv) Where a judgment is not pronounced within three months, from the date of reserving it, any of the parties in the case is permitted to file an application in the High Court with prayer for early judgment. Such application, as and when filed, shall be listed before the Bench concerned within two days excluding the intervening holidays.

(v) If the judgment, for any reason, is not pronounced within a period of six months, any of the parties of the said lis shall be entitled to move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to withdraw the said case and to make it over to any other Bench for fresh arguments. It is open to the Chief Justice to grant the said prayer or to pass any other order as deems fit in the circumstances.

21. We hope and trust that the above guidelines shall be strictly followed and implemented, considering them as self-imposed restraints.

Indiankanoon version:

Anil Rai Vs State of Bihar on 6 August 2001

Casemine version:

Anil Rai v. State of Bihar on 6 August 2001

Citations: [2002 BOMCR SC 3 360], [2009 ELT SC 233 13], [2001 AIR SC 3173], [2001 SCC 7 318], [2001 SCC CRI 1009], [2001 ALD CRI 2 446], [2001 ACR SC 3 2046], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 3 722], [2001 JT SC 6 515], [2001 SCALE 5 41], [2001 BLJR 3 1777], [2001 SUPP SCR 1 298]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1517737/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad95e4b0149711411c30

Keshav Lal Thakur Vs State of Bihar on 11 October 1996

Posted on February 23 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that any offence under section 31 of Representation of People Act, 1950 is a Non-cognizable offence and hence direct registration of FIR is not maintainable.

We need not go into the question whether in the facts of the instant case the above view of the High Court is proper or not for the impugned proceeding has got to be quashed as neither the police was entitled to investigate into the offence in question nor the Chief Judicial Magistrate to take cognizance upon the report submitted on completion of such investigation. On the own showing of the police, the offence under Section 31 of the Act is non cognizable and therefore the police could not have registered a case for such an offence under Section 154 Cr.P.C. of course, the police is entitled to investigate into a non-cognizable offence pursuant to an order of a competent Magistrate under Section 155 (2) Cr.P.C. but, admittedly, no such order was passed in the instant case. That necessarily means, that neither the police could investigate into the offence in question nor submit a report on which the question of taking cognizance could have arisen. While on this point, it may be mentioned that in view of the proviso to Section 2 (d) Cr.P.C., which defines ’complaint’, the police is entitled to submit, after investigation, a report a relating to a non-cognizable offence in which case such a report is to be treated as a ’complaint’ of the police officer concerned, but that explanation will not be available to the prosecution here as that related to a case where the police initiates investigation into a cognizable offence – unlike the present one – but ultimately finds that only a non-cognizable offence has been made out.

Keshav Lal Thakur Vs State of Bihar on 11 October 1996

Citations: [1996 AD SC 7 838], [1997 ALD CRI 1 123], [1997 ALT CRI 1 439], [1996 CRIMES SC 4 121], [1996 SCALE 7 598], [1996 SCC 11 557], [1996 SUPP SCR 7 578], [1996 CCR 4 205], [1996 ACJ 2 694], [1996 JT 616], [1996 SUPREME 7 608], [1997 SUPREME 1 150]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1892533/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609acdee4b014971140fe1f

Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency and Anr Vs CBI on 28 March 2018

Posted on February 16 by ShadesOfKnife

In this Landmark judgment, 3-judge bench held as follows,

35. In view of above, situation of proceedings remaining pending for long on account of stay needs to be remedied. Remedy is required not only for corruption cases but for all civil and criminal cases where on account of stay, civil and criminal proceedings are held up. At times, proceedings are adjourned sine die on account of stay. Even after stay is vacated, intimation is not received and proceedings are not taken up. In an attempt to remedy this, situation, we consider it appropriate to direct that in all pending cases where stay against proceedings of a civil or criminal trial is operating, the same will come to an end on expiry of six months from today unless in an exceptional case by a speaking order such stay is extended. In cases where stay is granted in future, the same will end on expiry of six months from the date of such order unless similar extension is granted by a speaking order. The speaking order must show that the case was of such exceptional nature that continuing the stay was more important than having the trial finalized. The trial Court where order of stay of civil or criminal proceedings is produced, may fix a date not beyond six months of the order of stay so that on expiry of period of stay, proceedings can commence unless order of extension of stay is produced.
36. Thus, we declare the law to be that order framing charge is not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order. Jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution. However, the said jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policy to ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any manner hampered. Thus considered, the challenge to an order of charge should be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction and not to re-appreciate the matter. Even where such challenge is entertained and stay is granted, the matter must be decided on day-to-day basis so that stay does not operate for an unduly long period. Though no mandatory time limit may be fixed, the decision may not exceed two-three months normally. If it remains pending longer, duration of stay should not exceed six months, unless extension is granted by a specific speaking order, as already indicated. Mandate of speedy justice applies to the PC Act cases as well as other cases where at trial stage proceedings are stayed by the higher court i.e. the High Court or a court below the High Court, as the case may be. In all pending matters before the High Courts or other courts relating to PC Act or all other civil or criminal cases, where stay of proceedings in a pending trial is operating, stay will automatically lapse after six months from today unless extended by a speaking order on above parameters. Same course may also be adopted by civil and criminal appellate/revisional courts under the jurisdiction of the High Courts. The trial courts may, on expiry of above period, resume the proceedings without waiting for any other intimation unless express order extending stay is produced.
37. The High Courts may also issue instructions to this effect and monitor the same so that civil or criminal proceedings do not remain pending for unduly period at the trial stage.

R.F. Nariman concurs and holds,

5. On a reference made to a 2-Judge Bench in the Delhi High Court, the learned Chief Justice framed, what he described as, “three facets which emanate for consideration”, as follows:
“(a) Whether an order framing charge under the 1988 Act would be treated as an interlocutory order thereby barring the exercise of revisional power of this Court?
(b) Whether the language employed in Section 19 of the 1988 Act which bars the revision would also bar the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for all purposes?
(c) Whether the order framing charge can be assailed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?”
Answers given to the “three facets” are in paragraph 33 as follows:
“33. In view of our aforesaid discussion, we proceed to answer the reference on following terms:
(a) An order framing charge under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is an interlocutory order.
(b) As Section 19(3)(c) clearly bars revision against an interlocutory order and framing of charge being an interlocutory order a revision will not be
maintainable.
(c) A petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and a writ petition preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are
maintainable.
(d) Even if a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is entertained by the High Court under no circumstances an order of stay should be passed regard being had to the prohibition contained in Section 19(3)(c) of the 1988 Act.
(e) The exercise of power either under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should be sparingly and in exceptional circumstances be exercised keeping in view the law laid down in Siya Ram Singh (supra), Vishesh Kumar (supra), Khalil
Ahmed Bashir Ahmed (supra), Kamal Nath & Others (supra) Ranjeet Singh (supra) and similar line of decisions in the field.
(f) It is settled law that jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot
be exercised as a “cloak of an appeal in disguise” or to re- appreciate evidence. The aforesaid proceedings should be used sparingly with great
care, caution, circumspection and only to prevent grave miscarriage of justice.”

Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency and Anr Vs CBI on 28 March 2018

Citations: [2018 ILR KER 2 79], [2018 KHC 2 380], [2018 RCR CRIMINAL 2 415], [2018 SCALE 5 269],

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/172610348/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5abbcd474a93267cfe9ebef0

Earlier Delhi High Court order (by Shiv Narayan Dhingra ji): https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/58117f222713e179478f3bf5

Vanka Radhamanohari Vs Vanka Venkata Reddy And Ors on 20 April 1993

Posted on February 16 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that,

6. At times it has come to our notice that many courts are treating the provisions of Section 468 and Section 473 of the Code as provisions parallel to the periods of limitation provided in the Limitation Act and the requirement of satisfying the court that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of that Act. There is a basic difference between Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 473 of the Code. For exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the onus is on the appellant or the applicant to satisfy the court that there was sufficient cause for condonation of the delay, whereas Section 473 enjoins a duty on the court to examine not only whether such delay has been explained but as to whether it is the requirement of the justice to condone or ignore such delay. As such, whenever the bar of Section 468 is applicable, the court has to apply its mind on the question, whether it is necessary to condone such delay in the interests of justice. While examining the question as to whether it is necessary to condone the delay in the interest of justice, the Court has to take note of the nature of offence, the class to which the victim belongs, including the background of the victim. If the power under section 473 of the code is to be exercised in the interests of justice, then while considering the grievance by a lady, of torture, cruelty and inhuman treatment, by the husband and the relatives of the husband, the interest of justice requires a deeper examination of such grievances, instead of applying the rule of limitation and saying that with lapse of time the cause of action itself has come to an end. The general rule of limitation is based on the Latin maxim : vigilantibus, et non, dormientibus, jura subveniunt (the vigilant, and not the sleepy, are assisted by the laws). That maxim cannot be applied in connection with offences relating to cruelty against women.

7. It is true that the object of introducing Section 468 was to put a bar of limitation on prosecutions and to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time, as it was thought proper that after a long lapse of time, launching of prosecution may be vexatious, because by that time even the evidence may disappear. This aspect has been mentioned in the statement and object, for introducing a period of limitation, as well as by this Court in the case of State Of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh 1981 3 SCC 34. But, that consideration cannot be extended to matrimonial offences, where the allegations are of cruelty, torture and assault by the husband or other members of the family to the complainant. It is a matter of common experience that victim is subjected to such cruelty repeatedly and it is more or less like a continuing offence. It is only as a last resort that a wife openly comes before a court to unfold and relate the day-to-day torture and cruelty faced by her, inside the house, which many of such victims do not like to be made public. As such, courts while considering the question of limitation for an offence under Section 498-A i.e subjecting a woman to cruelty by her husband or the relative of her husband, should judge that question, in the light of section 473 of the code, which requires the Court, not only to examine as to whether the delay has been properly explained, but as to whether “it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice”.

Vanka Radhamanohari Vs Vanka Venkata Reddy And Ors on 20 April 1993

Citations: [1993 (2) BLJR 875], [1993 (2) Crimes 275 SC], [I (1994) DMC 172 SC], [JT 1993 (4) SC 17], [1993 (2) SCALE 570], [(1993) 3 SCC 4]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/849288/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8ce4b014971140f1d2

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Landmark Case

Badshah Vs Urmila Badshah Godse and Anr on 18 October 2013

Syed Wasif Husain Rizvi Vs Hasan Raza Khan and Ors on 22 January 2016

Sarwan Singh Lamba and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors on 12 May 1995

Kishansing Tomar Vs Municipal Corp of Ahmedabad and Ors on 19 October 2006

MS. Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs MS. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001

Ankit Bharti Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 02 March 2020

Anil Rai Vs State of Bihar on 6 August 2001

Keshav Lal Thakur Vs State of Bihar on 11 October 1996

Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency and Anr Vs CBI on 28 March 2018

Vanka Radhamanohari Vs Vanka Venkata Reddy And Ors on 20 April 1993