Mummireddygari Prathap Reddy and Ors Vs Mummireddygari Srivani and Ors on 17 Jul 2023

Posted on October 10 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of AP High Court held that when there is No Shared household, so no domestic relationship so no DVC maintainable on family members.

From Para 7,

7. A perusal of the D.V.C. application would show that the aggrieved woman’s husband and in-laws and the siblings of her husband all are natives of Adapareddypalli Village, Tirupathi Rural Mandal, Chittoor District. By the time the D.V.C. was filed the husband of the aggrieved woman has been working as a Software Engineer at Houstan, Texas, United States of America. Aggrieved woman’s in-laws are living at their native places. Siblings of the aggrieved woman’s husband are also employed and Sri M.Suresh Reddy is working at Bangalore and Sri M.Prasad Reddy working at Hyderabad or Tirupathi. The application in D.V.C. also indicates that subsequent to the marriage the spouses lived for some time at Adapareddypalli Village and thereafter they lived at Mysore of Karnataka State and thereafter they went Abroad and lived together at Houstan, Texas, United States of America. Finally the aggrieved woman and her child came back to India and they have been living with the woman’s parents at Aditya Nagar, Nellore in SPSR Nellore District. D.V.C. was filed at Nellore. All the above facts are not in dispute.

From Paras 9 and 10, (All the respondents, except husband, reside are different locations; No shared household)

9. Coming to the parents and siblings of her husband, at para No.4 of the application, the aggrieved woman states that respondent Nos.4 and 5 therein, who are siblings of her husband, used to visit Adapareddypalli Village during weekends when she was brought by her husband from Mysore to the native place. It is on those occasions, the siblings of her husband used to harass her for money and additional dowry.
10. Coming to her in-laws, the aggrieved person at pares No.5 of her application in D.V.C. mentions that all the cruelty and bad conduct of her husband used to be informed by her to her in-laws, but they used to support their son and all of them together demanded her to bring additional dowry. It is with those allegations, the D.V.C. was filed seeking various reliefs.

From Para 17,

17. The term shared household is hinged on the concept of intentional residence of the parties in one household. Mere fleeting or casual living does not make one a shared household vide Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahujal and Rajnesh v. Neha2. In this regard, learned counsel for petitioners cited the judgment of the then composite High Court in P.Sugunamma v. State of A.P.3. Referring to a similar situation where relatives of the husband have not been living along with the spouses but living elsewhere with periodical or sporadic visits, it was held that where any person who is so related who has been not living or had not lived together at any point of time with the aggrieved person in a shared household they cannot be said to be in domestic relationship. To the similar effect is the law spelt out by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Prakash Vinayak Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra4. The averments in the application in D.V.C. of the aggrieved person do indicate that since the time of marriage it is the spouses who lived together under one roof at different places at all times and the remaining respondents who are their family members have been living at different other places and in their own respective houses. It is on occasions they paid visits to the spouses. Such occasional visits were only meant for those occasions and they were never intended and could not be intended to be visits making one to think that they are holding shared household. The definition of “aggrieved person” under Section 2(a) of the Act, 2005 requires a domestic relationship and domestic relationship as defined in Section 2(f) of the Act, 2005 means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household. The facts mentioned in the application in D.V.C. clearly show that, that domestic relationship is absent between the aggrieved woman on one hand and petitioner Nos.2 to 5 on the other hand. It is in that view of the matter, one has to agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for petitioners that without there being any case disclosed by the application in D.V.C. permitting the learned Magistrate to take up further proceedings against them would be abuse of process of Court.

Mummireddygari Prathap Reddy and Ors Vs Mummireddygari Srivani and Ors on 17 Jul 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of DV Judgments is here.

Yerramilli Srinivas Vs State of Telangana and 2 Ors on 09 Jan 2023

Posted on October 8 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Telangana High Court deprecated the practice of Telangana Police in not sending delete LOC requests to BoI, after a competent Criminal Court grants to an accused.

From Paras 7 and 8,

7. This Court has gone through the Circular that was issued by the respondents pursuant to the order passed by this Court. By and large, in criminal matters, particularly under Section 498-A IPC., where a complaint is given by wife and husband is residing abroad, without making even an effort to reach the person by way of e-mail or whatever communication, and without even coming to a conclusion that the said person is trying to avoid the investigation, police are straight away issuing the Look Out Circular, by that time, accused would not even be knowing that a case is registered against him by the respondents. In respect of accused persons who are outside the country, the police shall make an endeavour to communicate about the pending case to the said person. Recourse to LOC shall not be resorted to by the respondents in non-cognizable offences under IPC. or in any other laws if accused is not evading arrest or has not failed to appear before the Court. Necessarily issuing the Look Out Circular will affect the person’s right to movement and the respondents shall be very careful while opening the LOC and resort to it in compelling and extraordinary circumstances. Secondly, in the report that is filed by the Director General of Police, it is stated that LOC will be continued basing on their satisfaction whether the person is going to cooperate with the investigation or not. When once an accused is granted bail by the Court or a notice under Section 41-A Cr.P.C. is issued by the police, if the police have apprehensions about his non-cooperation with the investigation or trial, it is always open to the police to make an appropriate Application before the Court concerned for imposing a condition that the person be directed not to leave the country. Once the bail is granted, the respondent police cannot continue the LOC without further recourse to the Court. In every case, the police are opening the LOCs. and keeping it pending forever and causing irreparable loss and hardship to the accused who in some cases has no intention to evade the investigation. The other difficulty that has been expressed in several cases is that the respondents are not leaving a toll-free or a specific number with BOI. They are generally giving the number of the concerned Station House Officers and sometimes, if they do not pick up the calls, the person is made to wait for hours together in the Airport. The respondent police shall take appropriate steps to evolve procedure or they shall see that some mechanism is in place such as centralised 24 x 7 service to attend the calls in respect of LOC from Bureau of Investigation so that if the immigration has to contact the concerned they will be able to reach out and the inconvenience caused to the concerned may be minimised. Wherever LOCs. are opened, the respondent police shall review the same once in three months and in cases where bail is granted, they shall immediately close the LOC. The officer concerned who fails to inform the BOI is responsible and if he fails to address the letter to BOI, appropriate action shall be initiated against him for the said lapses. The Courts have to always balance the interest of the accused as well as the societal interest.

8. Fundamental right of the citizen in the democratic setup plays a pivotal role. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India1 interpreted the scope of Article 21 in the widest possible manner. The fundamental rights of a citizen can only be curtailed by a procedure known to law. The police while issuing the look out circular has to be very cautious. The circular directions issued by the Director General of Police shall be scrupulously followed. The Director General of Police apart from issuing the circular shall also see that it is implemented and fix the accountability.

Yerramilli Srinivas Vs State of Telangana and 2 Ors on 09 Jan 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/162671944/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/659eb9c767795103e653e2bd

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?CaseId=823202811000&Title=YERRAMILLI-SRINIVAS-Vs.-STATE-OF-TELANGANA

https://lawsuitcasefinder.com/casedetail?id=U2FsdGVkX19hrqxZBmhqLvP3mplo2JtpfyJa3CjqW3EDUUMgs5

Kavitha M Vs Raghu on 16 Mar 2023

Posted on October 4 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka HC held that there is no need to conduct Inquiry in the nature of summary trial before passing Interim reliefs, relying on the Magistrate’s inherent power u/s 28(2) of the PWDV Act, while overruling earlier 2009 judgment here. (Comment to myself: someone has to challenge the Sec 28(2) of the DV Act as unconstitutional and get rid of it!)

From Para 14,

14. In the aforesaid circumstances, reference being made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of KUNAPAREDDY v. KUNAPAREDDY SWARNA KUMARI1 is apposite.

The Apex Court, in the aforesaid judgment, while considering the purport of promulgation of the Act and its provisions clearly holds that sub-section (2) of Section 28 is significant. The concerned Court is well within its powers to lay down its procedure for disposal of the application under Section 12 or Section 23(2) of the Act. The Apex Court also recognizes that this provision is incorporated by the Legislature keeping a definite purpose for which it is enacted. This Court also recognizes the power of the Magistrate under Section 23 to grant an interim order ex-parte owing to the specific power under sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act which is carved out in that behalf. In the light of the judgment of the Apex Court, any other law that is laid down by the co-ordinate Benches of this Court will have to be placed into the oblivion on two counts, as the heart and soul of the Act is found in Section 12 and its beat in Section 23.The reliance placed by the respondent/State upon the judgment of the co-ordinate Bench in the case of KRISHNA MURTHYNOOKULA v. Y SAVITHA2 is in clear contradiction with what the Apex Court has held. The said judgment has also been distinguished in the case of one K.MANJUNATH REDDY v. SMT.A.C. LATHA3.

The co-ordinate Bench recognizes that the section itself provided that the Court can form its own procedure and it would override sub-section (1) of Section 28 and any Rules framed thereunder. The co-ordinate Bench then holds that there was no illegality committed by the Court in exercise of its inherent power for disposal of the application without an inquiry and by way of an affidavit filed by the parties before the concerned Court.

From Para 15-18, [Happy that Section 12(5) is emphasized and directions issued]

15. On a coalesce of the aforesaid analysis of the provisions of the Act and the law laid down by the Apex Court and that of the co-ordinate Bench of this Court, what would unmistakably emerge is that applications concerning protection orders under Section 18, residence orders under Section 19 and monetary relief under Section 20, all of which direct that if the learned Magistrate is prima facie finds justification he could grant those reliefs. Section 23 of the Act empowers the learned Magistrate to grant of interim and ex-parte orders in any application under Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21
or even 22 against the respondent, granting interim relief in terms of the application/s so filed cannot be after an eon, it has to be granted anon. Therefore, there is no warrant for any Magistrate to await for the procedure as stipulated under the CrPC to get concluded, and then grant the relief that is sought in the application. It defeats the very life blood of the Act. If Section 12 is the one under which applications are filed before the concerned Court, sub-section (5) of Section 12 mandates disposal within 60 days.
16. It is quite appalling that an application filed by the petitioner under Section 12 of the Act for the relief as available under Sections 19, 20 and 22 of the Act has been kept pending for close to 52 months after its filing, notwithstanding the fact that the mandate of the Act is disposal of those applications within 60 days. The applications being kept pending would display apathy towards the litigants. The reason for the applications being kept pending is free fall for adjournments being granted by the concerned Court. In the case at hand, close to two years have passed by and the Court has gone on granting time to the husband for filing assets and liabilities statement to determine the payment of maintenance to the wife under the provisions of the Act while the wife/aggrieved person suffers. An application that has to be disposed of within 60 days, has taken 52 months, and is yet to be disposed of.
17. The law Courts which exist to remedy the wrong when it is brought to its notice has to act swiftly, as it is trite that, actus curiae neminem gravabit that the act of Court should prejudice no person. If an act of the Court should not prejudice any person; the Court should not permit any procrastination of the proceedings before it. A woman, who is a victim of domestic violence, knocking at the doors of the Magistrate, under the Act seeking maintenance or shelter such grievance, will have to be addressed with immediacy. It is for this reason that the statute mandates that such applications have to be disposed of within 60 days in terms of sub-section (5) of Section 12 of the Act. The mandate is unequivocal as sub-section (5) mandates that the Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose every application; every application would mean each and every, not a few or more. If the delay takes away the very soul of the enactment, such delay would definitely deny justice. It is, therefore, often said that “justice delayed is justice denied”. If the facts of the case at hand are taken note of, it would display that the petitioner has been denied maintenance and other benefits available under the Act for close to five years now, after she has been out of the matrimonial house.
18. In the aforesaid circumstances, it becomes necessary for this Court to direct the Magistrates, to henceforth decide the applications filed by the aggrieved persons within the time frame. The applications could be for the benefit of Sections 19 and 20 of the Act which are filed along with the application under Section 12 of the Act. Any delay beyond 60 days to consider the application should be only for reasons to be recorded in writing. For a maintenance application, the concerned Court shall direct the husband, after receipt of notice, to file his assets and liabilities statement within four weeks from the date of appearance and in the event, he would dodge appearance before Court, the Court is empowered to grant interim maintenance, on what is filed by the aggrieved person as assets and liabilities statement and as sought in the application, failing which, such cases, like the one that is brought before this Court, would mushroom and defeat the very purport of the promulgation of the Act.

Kavitha M Vs Raghu on 16 Mar 2023

Citations: [2023 SCC OnLine Kar 11],

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/158022851/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6423e02cd66f1c555c648b74

https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/karnataka-high-court-disposal-of-application-dometic-violence-act-accommodation-monetary-relief-interim-maintenance-224447

Domestic Violence Victims Must Be Addressed With Immediacy: Karnataka High Court Issues Directions to Magistrate Courts

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?caseId=013202793200&title=kavitha-m-vs-raghu

“S. 12 is heart and soul of Domestic Violence Act”; Karnataka High Court directs Magistrates to decide applications within the mandated period of 60 days

Index of Domestic Violence judgments is here.

Parul Tyagi Vs Gaurav Tyagi on 04 Aug 2023

Posted on September 23 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Allahabad High Court passed the following guidelines in elaboration of Rajnesh Pal Naidu Vs Neha Naidu Joshi and Anr on 04 Nov 2020 and Aditi Sharma Vs Jitesh Sharma on 06 Nov 2023

G. Guidelines to the Family Courts
87.1 The Family Court Judge shall ensure compliance of the following guidelines in maintenance proceedings:
i) Both parties must submit the Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities as Enclosure-I or II (as applicable), as provided in the Rajnesh Case (supra).
ii) The memo of parties shall include the parties’ current mobile number, email address (if available), and the latest residential and official addresses, particularly if the applicant/respondent is employed.
iii) The memo of parties shall also specifically mention the name of the concerned police station, where the applicant and respondent resides and works (as applicable).
iv) Additionally, the Family Court Judge must ensure that Enclosure-I or II, as applicable, are accompanied by an affidavit from the respondent, containing the following details:
a) Permanent and current address of the respondent.
b) Mobile number of the respondent for communication during the pendency of the petition.
c) Email ID and WhatsApp number, if any.
d) Name and address of the respondent’s employer, along with a telephone number.
e) An undertaking from the respondent to promptly inform the court through an affidavit if there is any changes to his address, mobile number, E-mail ID, WhatsApp number, residential address, workplace, or employer’s name.
87.2 Upon receiving an application for maintenance, the Family Court shall include the following specifics in the initial order:
i) Mandatory requirement of an Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities, as per Enclosure-I & II, whichever is applicable, along with the reply.
ii) The respondent shall be given two opportunities for filing a reply, and the application for interim maintenance shall be decided in less than six months.
iii) The respondent must submit the reply within four weeks.
iv) If the affidavit is not filed within four weeks, the court will proceed based on the applicant’s submission and the existing pleadings to decide the application. If the respondent repeatedly delays in filing the reply with the affidavit, requesting more than two adjournments, the court may exercise its authority to strike off the respondent’s defence, provided it determines that the delays are intentional and obstructive, causing undue disruptions to the proceedings. In such cases, the Family Court may proceed to adjudicate the maintenance application based on the applicant’s submitted affidavit and the existing pleadings.
v) The order shall indicate that false statements in the Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities may lead to proceedings under section 340 Cr.P.C. besides contempt of court. It should also explain the ingredients of section 340 Cr.P.C., the potential criminal prosecution in IPC, and the maximum sentence for such offences, if proved in court.
87.3 The Family Court shall employ all legally permissible methods of serving notices to the respondent, using persuasive measures as may be necessary. The Family Court shall develop practical and effective mechanisms to ensure successful service on the respondent, aligning with the objectives and principles of these guidelines. If the court determines that the Process Server/Postman/Police Officer has submitted a routine, repetitive service report (e.g., citing unclaimed postal articles, locked premises, addressee left the address, or an unknown address), it may hold the officer accountable in accordance with the law. The Family Court may also explore modern methods of service facilitated by internet access, including courier services, email, or instant messaging platforms like WhatsApp and other electronic media. The essence of service lies in ensuring that the proceedings are duly conveyed to the respondents or contesting parties. Service on a litigant can be accomplished through e-mail or phone contact29. Serving notice, summons, and exchange of pleadings, service via e-mail, fax, or commonly used instant messaging services like WhatsApp is considered valid30.
87.4 If either party disputes the information declared in the Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities, the aggrieved party has the right to seek the other party to produce the relevant documents in question31.
87.5 To determine the amount of maintenance, the Family Court Judge shall adhere to the criteria outlined in Part-3 of the Rajnesh Case (supra). In cases where the wife has her own income, this shall not preclude her from being eligible to receive maintenance from her husband. The court must assess whether the wife’s income allows her to sustain a lifestyle commensurate with that of her husband in her matrimonial home32.
87.6 It is assumed that an able-bodied husband is capable of earning enough to support his wife and children. For interim maintenance determination, the minimum wage rates of Uttar Pradesh, as per the latest Government Notification, may serve as a guideline. This is just one of the alternatives that the Family Court Judge may consider when assessing a person who claims to be a labourer with no other income sources, among other pleadings.
88. The interim maintenance order shall contain the ingredients of the third proviso to section 125 Cr.P.C. (added by Act 50 of 2001, effective from 24.9.2001), and Uttar Pradesh State Amendments (upto date) in this regard, in plain language so that the respondent could understand understand the consequences of non-payment of interim maintenance. A table summarizing hearing dates and a brief description of Family Court orders on each date shall also be made part of the order.
89. Both interim and final maintenance orders shall include a table showing the number of orders passed by the Family Court prior to awarding interim and final maintenance, along with brief descriptions of orders passed on each date until the final adjudication of the section 125 Cr.P.C. application. The final maintenance order shall also include a date-wise account of proceedings related to section 125(3) Cr.P.C.
90. In cases involving parties from the Economically Weaker Section, individuals living below the poverty line, or casual labourers, the obligation to submit the Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities would be exempted. The court may demand an EWS/BPL certificate issued by the competent authority, which may be the Office of the Labour Commissioner or the Revenue Authority, as applicable.
91. District Judges shall develop a structural system for regularly assessing and overseeing the performance of family courts within their districts, ensuring the adherence to directives issued by the Supreme Court in Rajnesh Case (supra) and by this Court, in the instant case, this reporting mechanism would serve as a means of accountability, enabling timely interventions by the Constitutional Courts, when necessary. This may encompass routine evaluations, case audits, and feedback mechanisms to gauge the effectiveness and quality of judicial decisions in this context.
92. All District Judges shall convene semi-annual meetings of their respective Family Court Judges to review and evaluate the implementation progress of the guidelines issued by the Supreme Court in Rajnesh Case (supra) and this Court in the instant case. If the guidelines issued to Family Courts are not followed, concerned District Judge shall submit a semi-annual report to the Registrar General of this Court, against the Judicial Officer, who has not complied the guidelines. The Registrar General shall record its finding and present these reports to the respective Administrative Judge of the concerned Judicial Officer for their review and reference. Additionally, a record of these reports shall also be maintained in the service book of the concerned Judicial Officer. The District Judge shall prepare the progress report in the manner as provided in Enclosure-III attached with this judgment.
93. The District Judge along with the Principal Judge, Family Court shall flag the critical issues with respect to service of notice/summons and problems encountered in enforcement of interim maintenance/maintenance orders passed by respective Family Court Judges in the meeting of District Monitoring Committee for Family Courts, and the civil administration shall provide all assistance, as may deem necessary.
94. The District Legal Services Authority, in collaboration and cooperation with the respective District Bar Association, shall arrange awareness and training sessions/ workshops to encourage Bar members to submit pleadings in accordance with Enclosure-I & II.
95. For the sake of convenience, the Enclosures I & II attached to Rajnesh Case (supra) are hereby included as part of this order. Additionally, Enclosure-III is provided for the convenience of all District Judges to prepare the compliance report, in case aforesaid guidelines are not followed.
96. The Registrar (Compliance) of this court shall communicate copy of this judgment to all District Judges for dissemination among all Family Court Judges, and Chief Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh to circulate among all District Magistrates and Senior Superintendent of Police, of respective districts. Furthermore, a copy of this judgment shall be published on the websites of all District Courts, Family Courts, and Courts of Judicial Magistrate to facilitate awareness and implementation.

Parul Tyagi Vs Gaurav Tyagi on 04 Aug 2023

Index of Maintenance cases u/s 144 BNSS (125 CrPC) is here.

Tavaragi Rajashekhar Shiva Prasad Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 19 Jul 2024

Posted on September 4 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka High Court (Bengaluru Bench) held that along with notice under 41A CrPC (Section 35 BNSS), a copy of the FIR must be sent along.

From Para 9,

This notice does have clarity as to why the petitioner is being summoned. The matter could be disposed of recording the fact that the second notice does contain the crime number, as the issue may seem to be very simple. In the considered view of the Court, it is not, as Section 41 of the Cr.P.C., deals with arrest of persons. Any notice so issued under Section 41-A if not complied with, the Station House Officer is entitled to arrest the noticee. Therefore, the noticee must be aware of why he is being summoned to the Police Station, as summoning to the Police Station is not summoning a person to a happy place. A citizen must know as to why he is being summoned. The information to the citizen cannot be half baked; it must be in full. The notice must contain the crime number and the purpose for which he is being summoned. While it can be transmitted electronically, no fault can be found with that, but it should mention crime number. The duty of the Station House Officer would not stop at mentioning crime number, but he should also attach to the communication, a copy of the FIR, so registered against the noticee, as power is available to summon the accused or any person in connection with a crime. Therefore, the noticee, without knowing the crime number and without getting a copy of the FIR, cannot be asked to appear before an officer of the police station on receipt of notice under Section 41-A.

From Para 10,

Sub-sections (2) to (6) of Section 35 of the BNSS assume significance. Section 35(4) permits issuance of a notice to any person and the noticee shall be bound to comply with the terms of the notice. Section 35(6) commands that if a person fails to comply with the terms of the notice or is unwilling to identify himself, the Police Officer may, subject to such orders as may have been passed by the competent Court in this behalf, arrest him for the offence mentioned in the notice. Therefore, the rigour is little stronger. Stronger the rigour, the noticee is required to know all that he has to reply, prior to his appearance before the Police. It, thus, becomes mandatory for a notice to be issued under Section 35 of the BNSS to mention the crime number, the offence alleged in the crime so registered and necessarily append to it a copy of the FIR so registered, as any person who receives the notice must be aware for what he is being summoned to the Police Station.

From Para 13,

13. It is made clear that till the guidelines/check list is so notified by the State, if any person is necessary to be summoned, the drill that shall be followed are:-
(a) The notice under Section 35 of the BNSS shall mention the crime number and the offence alleged in the crime number. This can be communicated to the noticee either through the conventional method or through electronic mode.
(b) The communication shall attach copy of the FIR so registered, as the FIR would contain the gist of the complaint.
(c) In the event notice does not contain the crime number, the offence alleged or appending of the FIR, subject to just exceptions, the noticee is not obliged to appear before the officer who has directed him to appear and no coercive action can be taken for non-appearance.
(d) It is also necessary for the Police Department to bring about robust system for the FIR being uploaded immediately on their registration and make it search friendly.

Tavaragi Rajashekhar Shiva Prasad AND State of Karnataka on 19 Jul 2024

Other remedies to police atrocities are here.

James Kunjwal Vs State of Uttarakhand and Anr on 13 Aug 2024

Posted on August 14 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court passed guidelines to follow, When perjury proceedings can be initiated.

From Paras 16-20,

16. What we may conclude from a perusal of the above-noticed judicial pronouncements is that:-
(i) The Court should be of the prima facie opinion that there exists sufficient and reasonable ground to initiate proceedings against the person who has allegedly made a false statement(s);
(ii) Such proceedings should be initiated when doing the same is “expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent” and not merely because of inaccuracy in statements that may be innocent/immaterial;
(iii) There should be “deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance”;
(iv) The Court should be satisfied that there is a reasonable foundation for the charge, with distinct evidence and not mere suspicion;
(v) Proceedings should be initiated in exceptional circumstances, for instance, when a party has perjured themselves to beneficial orders from the Court.
17. The statement made by the appellant, that has been deemed to be befitting the offence of giving false evidence before the Court, which is known commonly as perjury, was more in the nature of denial of the statements made in the affidavits of the complainant herein.
18. We are of the view that, in the present facts, a denial simpliciter cannot meet the threshold, as described in the judgments above, particularly when no malafide intention/deliberate attempt can be understood from the statement made by the appellant in the affidavit. As has already been observed, mere suspicion or inaccurate statements do not attract the offence under the Section. It cannot be disputed that the statements made in the affidavit were only to state his version of events and/or deny the version put forth by the complainant.
19. We are also of the firm opinion that such statements do not make it expedient in the interest of justice, nor constitute exceptional circumstances in which such Sections may be invoked. Given that these proceedings would constitute an offence, independent of the one for which the appellant is already facing trial, it cannot be unequivocally held that there was deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance.
20. We find that at least three of the possible scenarios, as discussed supra, in which a court would be justified in invoking these powers on the face of it appear to be unmet, prosecution, therefore, would be unjust. We say so for the reason that the respondent in her counter affidavit filed before this Court makes no particular allegation nor does she provide any of the material that was allegedly placed before the competent prosecuting authorities or the Court. She only alleges untruth on the part of the appellant 8/12/2024 stating that the Court was correct in initiating proceedings against him for making the false statement. She further makes certain statements that fall outside the scope of the present adjudication and pertain to the trial of the main offence pending before the court of competent jurisdiction.

James Kunjwal Vs State of Uttarakhand and Anr on 13 Aug 2024

Citations: [2024 INSC 601], [2024 Latest Caselaw 508 SC]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/84159018/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/66beef2337d7e5445370dff1

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/james-kunjwal-versus-state-of-uttarakhand

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/s-193-ipc-when-can-perjury-proceedings-be-initiated-against-a-litigant-supreme-court-explains-266668

https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-caselaw/2024/august/2024-latest-caselaw-508-sc/

https://www.lawtext.in/judgement.php?bid=442

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/james-kunjwal-v-state-of-uttarakhand-2024-insc-601-mere-denial-of-averments-in-pleadings-not-perjury-no-malafide-intention-1547820

https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=17806

https://lawtrend.in/mere-denial-in-affidavit-doesnt-constitute-offence-under-section-193-ipc-supreme-court-quashed-perjury-charges/

Index of perjury judgments is here.

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 15 Jul 2024

Posted on July 16 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Paras 10 and 11,

10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant herein would submit that a scanning of the judgment of the trial Court would reveal that the Court had appropriately appreciated the evidence on record and convicted accused Nos.1 and 2 upon satisfying itself that the ingredients to attract the offence punishable under Section 494 I.P.C., have been made out by the appellant. Furthermore, it is submitted that a bare perusal of the impugned judgment would reveal that the High Court had rightly considered the contentions of the appellant herein against the reversal of their conviction by the First Appellate Court that it was founded on surmises and conjectures. We are of the considered view that no more narrative on the correctness of the reversal of the judgment of the First Appellate Court by the High Court under the impugned judgment is required as the indisputable and undisputed position is that its reversal was accepted by accused Nos.1 and 2 and they had undergone the sentence imposed by the High Court consequent to the reversal of the First Appellate Court’s judgment. We may note here that the learned senior counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant had not accepted any compensation and in the same breath, would further submit that the appellant did not want any such compensation.
11. In the aforesaid circumstances, the sole question surviving for consideration is whether the High Court was right in not restoring the sentence imposed for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., by the trial Court when it accepted the contentions of the appellant and reversed the acquittal of accused Nos.1 and 2 and restored the conviction entered on them by the trial Court. In other words, the question is whether the High Court had shown undeserving leniency and sympathy to accused Nos.1 and 2 even after finding that they have committed the serious offence of bigamy punishable under Section 494 I.P.C., and whether they were let off with a flea-bite sentence and whether an enhancement of sentence is invited?

From Paras 14 and 15,

14. A reading of Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C., would reveal that the legislature viewed the offence of bigamy as a serious offence. Though no minimum sentence is prescribed under Section 494 I.P.C., the maximum sentence of imprisonment prescribed thereunder for a conviction thereunder is seven years of imprisonment of either description. It is also to be noted that the said offence is compoundable only by the husband or wife of the person so marrying with the permission of the Court. The same offence under Section 494 I.P.C., with concealment of former marriage from person with whom subsequent marriage is contracted would visit the offender with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and with fine. This offence, which is an aggravated form of bigamy, is non-compoundable. The decision in Gopal Lal’s case (supra), and the prescription of maximum corporeal sentence imposable under Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C.,would undoubtedly suggest that the offence under Section 494 I.P.C., has to be treated as a serious offence.
15. When once it is found that an offence under Section494 I.P.C., is a serious offence, the circumstances obtaining in this case would constrain us to hold that the imposition of ‘imprisonment till the rising of the court’ is not a proper sentence falling in tune with the rule of proportionality in providing punishment as mentioned hereinbefore.

From Para 20, (Alteration of the imprisonment and fine)

20. Certain circumstances revealed from the evidence on record cannot go unnoticed while deciding the question of proper sentence. Earlier, the appellant herein filed HMOP 515/2012 before the Family Court, Coimbatore, seeking divorce. In the judgment of the trial Court, taking note of the evidence adduced, it was noted that the first accused had filed a petition seeking interim maintenance in the above HMOP and based on a petition in that regard the Court had ordered the appellant to pay Rs. 5,000/- per month to the first accused and she had received the maintenance till 13.07.2017. The evidence would further show that a child was born to the first and second accused in their wedlock in November, 2017. The evidence on record would reveal that on 22.01.2019, the first accused herself filed HMOP No.84 of 2019 seeking dissolution of her marriage with the appellant. In such circumstances, it is evident that the first accused married the second accused while the marriage between the appellant and the first accused was subsisting and not only that, during its subsistence, she had also begotten a child through the second accused. Taking into account all the circumstances, it can be said that undeserving leniency was shown in the case on hand. But then, taking into account the fact that the child born to the first and second accused was aged less than two years when the trial Court passed the sentence and that no minimum term of imprisonment is prescribed for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., and that the maximum sentence imposable for conviction thereunder is seven years, we are of the considered view that the trial Court had virtually struck a balance in fixing the term of one year as the corporeal sentence. But then, taking note of the fact that the said child is now aged only about six years and the sentence for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., can be of both descriptions. We think it appropriate to use our judicial discretion to modify the sentence imposed under the impugned judgment. Accordingly, we modify the term of the sentence awarded to accused Nos.1 and 2 for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., to six months each, making the nature of the sentence as simple imprisonment for the said period. We further modify the fine imposed by reducing the same from Rs. 20,000/- each to Rs. 2,000/- each, as originally awarded by the trial Court. Needless to say, that the default sentence therefor, awarded by the trial Court i.e., to undergo simple imprisonment for three months is also restored. If in terms of the impugned judgment, accused Nos.1 and 2 had already deposited Rs. 20,000/-, after making deduction in terms of the sentence of fine mentioned hereinbefore, the balance amount shall be refunded to them in accordance with the law. In the said circumstances, accused Nos.1 and 2 shall surrender before the trial Court so as to serve out the unserved period of sentence imposed on them by this judgment. Taking note of the fact that the child of accused Nos.1 and 2 is now aged only about 6 years, we further order that firstly the second accused shall surrender before the trial Court, within a period of 3 weeks from today to serve out the rest of the sentence. Upon his release from the jail, on suffering the sentence, the first accused shall surrender before the Court to serve her remaining period of sentence and such surrender shall be made by the first accused within a period of 2 weeks from the release of the second accused from the jail. This arrangement shall not be treated as a precedent as it was ordered in these special circumstances. In case the accused Nos.1 and 2 do not surrender in terms of this judgment on their own, the trial Court shall resort to appropriate steps in accordance with law to place them in custody and make them suffer the sentence as mentioned hereinbefore. The appeals are allowed as above.

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 15 Jul 2024

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/punishment-must-be-in-proportion-to-gravity-of-offence-supreme-court-enhances-sentence-bigamous-marriage-263490

https://www.legiteye.com/supreme-court-modifies-sentence-in-bigamy-case-orders-staggered-jail-terms-for-couple-justices-ct-ravikumar-sanjay-kumar-15-07-2024/

https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-caselaw/2024/july/2024-latest-caselaw-433-sc/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6696638231ed747732bfccdc

Baba Natarajan Prasad vs M. Revathi 2024 INSC 523 – S 494 IPC – Bigamy – Sentencing

https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=17724

https://x.com/SCJudgments/status/1813118439701057835

Imposition of ‘Imprisonment Till the Rising of the Court’ is Unconscionably Lenient: Supreme Court Enhances Sentence in Bigamy Case

https://www.freelaw.in/legalnews/Punishment-of-imprisonment-till-the-rising-of-the-court-is-a-flea-bite-sentence-for-those-convicted-for-an-offence-of-bigamy-Supreme-Court-

https://www.the-laws.com/encyclopedia/browse/case?caseId=004202345000&title=baba-natarajan-prasad-vs-m-revathi

Flea-Bite

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/baba-natarajan-prasad-v-m-revathi-2024-insc-523-bigamy-494-ipc-serious-offence-1544100

The decision of the District Court is here.

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 21 Apr 2019

Index of Bigamy Judgments is here.

Ruchi Agarwal Vs Amit Kumar Agrawal and Ors on 5 Nov 2004

Posted on May 22 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that Once MCD done with no future claims, maintenance cannot be claimed later.

It is based on the said compromise the appellant obtained a divorce as desired by her under Section 13(B) of the Hindu Marriage Act and in partial compliance of the terms of the compromise she withdrew the criminal case filed under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code but for reasons better known to her she did not withdraw that complaint from which this appeal arises. That apart after the order of the High Court quashing the said complaint on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, she has chosen to file this appeal. It is in this background, we will have to appreciate the merits of this appeal.

Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, however, contended that though the appellant had signed the compromise deed with the above-mentioned terms in it, the same was obtained by the respondent-husband and his family under threat and coercion and in fact she did not receive lump sum maintenance and her Stridhan properties, we find it extremely difficult to accept this argument in the background of the fact that pursuant to the compromise deed the respondent-husband has given her a consent divorce which she wanted thus had performed his part of the obligation under the compromise deed. Even the appellant partially performed her part of the obligations by withdrawing her criminal complaint filed under Section 125. It is true that she had made a complaint in writing to the Family Court where Section 125 Cr.P.C. proceedings were pending that the compromise deed was filed under coercion but she withdrew the same and gave a statement before the said court affirming the terms of the compromise which statement was recorded by the Family Court and the proceedings were dropped and a divorce was obtained. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant having received the relief she wanted without contest on the basis of the terms of the compromise, we cannot now accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. In our opinion, the conduct of the appellant indicates that the criminal complaint from which this appeal arises was filed by the wife only to harass the respondents.

Ruchi Agarwal Vs Amit Kumar Agrawal and Ors on 5 Nov 2004

Citations:

Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1892287/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adf3e4b01497114129dc

Saroj Rani Vs Sudarshan Kumar Chadha on 8 Aug 1984

Posted on May 22 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that ‘Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (popularly called as Restitution of Conjugal Rights case) is not violative of Articles 14 and 21 (right to privacy)‘.

Saroj Rani Vs Sudarshan Kumar Chadha on 8 Aug 1984

Ankit Singh and 3 Ors Vs State of U.P. and Anr

Posted on May 16 by ShadesOfKnife

A single bench judge at Allahabad High Court held as follows,

On 16 Jul 2024

From Paras ,

On 23 May 2024

From Paras 18-24,

18. This Court is witnessing that in cases where allegations of dowry is being made, same is being investigated by police and not by Dowry Prohibition Officer. The police in case diary are not recording whether procedure under the Rules of 1999 are being followed more particularly whether the principle provided under Rule 6 (4) and Rule 7 (9) of Rules of 1999 are being implemented in letter and spirit. It is to be noted that Dowry Prohibition Officer under Rule 6(4) of Rules of 1999 is empowered to take preventive and remedial measures (to save the marriage) and can pass orders in this respect, which the police is not empowered under law. Once the mandate as to whether the parties to marriage is required to be prosecuted for an offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act is to be decided by the Dowry Prohibition Officer then how the police authority is bypassing the aforesaid special procedure and jurisdiction of Dowry Prohibition Officer and are submitting chargesheet against the groom and his family members.
19. This Court is observing that in many cases the allegations are being levelled against groom and his family members with regard to dowry and other offences. The chargesheet is been submitted by police in a mechanical manner just by recording the statement of bride or their family members. In order to take away jurisdiction of Dowry Prohibition Officer, along with offence under Dowry Prohibition Act, allegations are also being levelled with regard to provisions of Indian Penal Code. In respect of offence under Dowry Prohibition Act, authority to collect evidence and prosecute is vested with Dowry Prohibition Officer and when other offences are also involved then the State Government can always resort to Section 8B (3) of Dowry Prohibition Act. However, in the garb of allegations with regard to offence under the Indian penal code being levelled by the informant, the jurisdiction of the Dowry Prohibition Officer cannot be taken away in respect of offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act.
20. A unique situation has arisen on account of the enactment of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and the Rules of 1999. The offences under the Dowry Prohibition Act would be examined and prosecuted by the Dowry Probation Officer while keeping into account the principles laid down under Rule 6 (4) of the Rules of 1999. However, when the offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act is investigated along with other offences under the Indian Penal Code then the principal of saving the marriage being resorted to at the first instance (as per Rule 6 (4) of the Rules of 1999), is ignored and the chargesheet and criminal prosecution is being resorted to by police. Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that once an offence is arising out of marriage and allegations with regard to dowry is made then the Dowry Prohibition Officer is required to examine the dispute at the first instance by resorting to the principal laid down in Rule 6 (4) of Rules of 1999 and upon being satisfied that all of the measures to save the marriage are not effective then Dowry Prohibition Officer can recommend for prosecution or himself prosecute. Any other interpretation of law would mean that bride or her family members may resort to allegations under the Indian penal code along with allegations under the Dowry Prohibition Act and thereby take away the jurisdiction of Dowry Prohibition Officer and straight away expose the groom and their family members to the rigour of criminal law and deprived them of liberty although dispute may be a matrimonial dispute between parties. Even otherwise, the State government is required to examine the necessity of exercising the power under Section 8B (3) of Dowry Prohibition Act to remove such an anomaly.
21. It is further to be noted that Rule 6 (12) of Uttar Pradesh Dowry Prohibition Rules, 1999 (as amended by Uttar Pradesh Dowry Prohibition (First Amendment) Rules, 2004) provides that Dowry Prohibition Officer shall render assistance to police investigating complaint filed under the Dowry Prohibition Act or to the court in the trial of the case. In none of cases coming up before this Court, where the police are investigating, it is found that any assistance is being rendered to police by Dowry Prohibition Officer. The purpose of Rule 6 (12) of the Rules of 1999 is to involve the Dowry Prohibition Officer at the stage of investigation so that he can pass orders for remedial and preventive nature in terms of Rule 6(4) of the Rules of 1999. The involvement of an officer who is a person outside the police department is to initiate remedial measures and collect evidence. The case diaries of investigation are not revealing that Dowry Prohibition Officer has rendered assistance in investigation. Such an approach when the matter is being investigated by police is not desirable.
22. It is further to be noted that in first information report, bride or her family members are stating that they have given dowry at time of marriage. In many cases, dowry is alleged to have been given in cash being huge amount. As per Section 3 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, giving of dowry or betting to giving dowry is also an offence. The bride and her family members are blatantly stating in First Information Report and in their statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C that they have given dowry of huge amount at time of marriage to groom and his family members. The bride and her family members in defiance of the law, which prohibits giving dowry, are indulging in giving dowry as per their own admission. Although, bride or her family members who are giving dowry are offenders as per Section 3 of Dowry Prohibition Act, however they are not being prosecuted in view of Section 7 (3) of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The effect of Section 7 (3) of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 is that bride or her family members, who indulge in giving dowry although being an offender under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, cannot be proceeded with for prosecution under the Dowry Prohibition Act. The situation can be summarised that a person who is giving dowry will not be prosecuted as per the bar under law, however receiver of dowry is being prosecuted. The situation is alarming as some citizens (bride or her family members) are openly giving in writing to authorities that they have given dowry, which is indicative of fact that they have no respect to law laid down by Parliament. It is for the executive to take effective measures so that the situation does not arise where the citizens openly disrespect the law laid down by the Parliament or State Legislature, otherwise, the law with regard to prohibition in giving dowry would be a dead letter.
23. It is also being observed by this Court that in first information report or in the statement, it is being alleged that huge amount of cash is paid at the time of marriage to the groom or his family members, as dowry. Section 269ST of Income Tax Act prohibits cash transaction beyond Rupees two lakhs, however bride and her family members are openly giving statement in the first information report or during investigation that they have paid dowry in cash beyond Rupees two Lakhs to groom or his family members. Even, when the amount is being paid in cash as dowry, is beyond the limit prescribed by law, neither any investigation is being carried out as to source of aforesaid amount nor any investigation with regard to utilisation aspect by groom side is being made by police or investigating officer. Even the amount given as dowry in cash is not being recovered during investigation by police authorities. Only on the basis of statement of person who has given dowry, the chargesheet is being filed against groom and his family members.
24. A person who has given dowry is also an offender under Dowry Prohibition Act and solely relying on the statement of such a person who defies the law and is an offender, the groom side is being proceed with, which is not permissible nor desirable. The investigating officer is required to look at corroborative evidence in this respect. The source of huge cash (beyond permissible limit) alleged to be given in dowry is required to be investigated and whether such huge cash was given by known sources of income is also required to be investigated. Even otherwise, amount given in dowry are crime proceeds (being amount from illegal activity) as such the same are also required to be recovered during investigation.

From Paras 28-29,

28. If source of dowry/cash is not found during investigation nor the dowry amount is recovered from accused-person then solely relying upon the statement of person who has given dowry (who is also an offender under the Dowry Prohibition Act) will be unjust, unfair and unreasonable. It is to be seen that the person giving dowry is an offender under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act however such a person cannot be prosecuted in view of the bar provided under Section 7 (3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The bar of prosecution of person giving dowry does not remove his status as an offender under Dowry Prohibition Act however only effect of such a bar is that he cannot be criminally proceeded with or prosecuted. In these circumstances, solely relying on statement of offender (person giving dowry) for prosecution of groom or his family members under Section 3 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 is not fair, just or reasonable. Some other evidence to corroborate the allegations is required to be looked into including source of dowry amount and whether the individual has given dowry from known sources of income more particularly when allegation of dowry is beyond the limit of cash transaction prescribed under the Income Tax Act.
29. There is another aspect of matter, under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, the punishment for demand of dowry may extend to 2 years and punishment under Section 498A of Indian Penal Code is a term which extend to three years however the punishment for receiving dowry under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is not less than five years. Where except for the allegation of giving huge amount in dowry there is no other corroborative evidence (as discussed hereinabove or where the dowry amount which are the proceeds of the crime are not recovered during investigation), it may be that the allegations under section 3 have been made so that the groom and his family members are prosecuted for bigger punishment in order to take vengeance in a matrimonial dispute.

From Para 31,

31. It is therefore, imperative that investigation in dowry matters should examine whether the presents that are being alleged as dowry are customary in nature and whether the same is within the financial status of the person who is giving dowry. A person who does not have financial status/means to give the dowry and is also not able to substantiate the source of dowry given, may be indicative of fact that the allegations are incorrect or that there is use of undisclosed income or back money or there is tax evasion. Use of black money or tax evasion is required to be reported to authorities under the Income Tax Act as the same does not stand protected under Section 7(3) of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Where there is no substantive evidence with regard to giving or receiving dowry then only on the basis of the statement of an offender, criminal prosecution under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act should not be permitted. In such matters either further investigation is required to be carried out or provisions of Section 3 of Dowry Prohibition Act may have to be eliminated from prosecution on account of lack of substantive evidence. Such aspect of matters is required to be examined by the appropriate authority.

Ankit Singh and 3 Ors Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 23 May 2024

On 08 May 2024

From Paras 4-11,

4. The legislature in its wisdom carved out an exception by providing that the presents which are given to the bride or the bridegroom at the time of marriage are not construed as dowry attracting Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. In order that the aforesaid exception is available to an individual, it is necessary that the aforesaid presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the Rules made under the Dowry Prohibition Act. The Dowry Prohibition (Maintenance of Lists of Presents to the Bride and Bridegroom) Rules, 1985 have been framed in this respect by the Central Government in the Indian marriage system gifts and presents act as a token of celebration and honouring the important event. The legislature was aware of the Indian tradition and as such the above mentioned exception was carved out. The above mentioned list would also act as a measure to thrash out the allegations of dowry which are subsequently levelled in matrimonial dispute. The maintenance of the list is also important so that both the parties to the marriage and their family members may not level false allegation of taking dowry or giving dowry in a marriage subsequently. The arrangement made by the Dowry Prohibition Act may also assist in subsequent litigation between the parties to arrive at a conclusion whether the allegations with regard to the taking or giving of dowry is covered by the exception carved out under section 3(2) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
5. Before this Court the parties to the marriage are filing cases with allegations of dowry, however, no list in terms of Section 3(2) of the Dowry Prohibition Act and Rules of 1985 are being filed by the husband or the wife or their family members. It may be a case where no list is being prepared by the parties to the marriage. It has not been brought to the notice of this Court that the aforesaid provision is in any manner being monitored or implemented by any responsible officer of the State Government. Section 3(2) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 is required to be implemented in its letter and spirit so that citizens are not subject matter of frivolous litigation.
6. As per the aforesaid provision of law, list of presents which are required to be entered in a list and the aforesaid list is required to be signed by both bride and bridegroom. Under section 8B of the Dowry Prohibition Act, Dowry Prohibition Officers are required to be appointed for the purpose to see that the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act are complied with.
7. The Chief Secretary, U.P. or any other officer authorised by him shall file an affidavit as to whether in terms of Section 8B of the Act, Dowry Prohibition Officers have been appointed by the State Government.
8. In the event, Dowry Prohibition Officers have not been appointed till date, the State Government shall explain as to why the Dowry Prohibition Officers have not been appointed when the dispute of dowry is rising.
9. In the event, the State Government has appointed Dowry Prohibition Officers, it is then imperative that the steps taken by such Dowry Prohibition officers towards implementation of the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act is shown in respect of preparation of list of presents given in the marriage as per section 3(2) of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The State Government shall also disclose the orders issued for implementation of the Dowry Prohibition (Maintenance of Lists of Presents to the Bride and Bridegroom) Rules, 1985. The Dowry Prohibition Officers are enjoined with the duty to ensure compliance of the Dowry Prohibition Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The affidavit shall also disclose how many Dowry Prohibition Officers have been appointed throughout the State and at what level.
10. The State Government shall also file an affidavit to the effect whether at the time of registration of marriage, list of presents as required by the Dowry Prohibition (Maintenance of Lists of Presents to the Bride and Bridegroom) Rules, 1985 are being taken by the officers and being maintained so that subsequently in the event there is dispute between the parties to marriage with regard to the presents being given in marriage being designated as dowry, the same can be verified.
11. The State Government shall also file an affidavit whether any rules (for carrying out the purpose of the Dowry Prohibition Act) in terms of Section 10 of the Dowry Prohibition Act has been enacted by the State Government. A copy of the same shall also be placed before this Court on the next date.

Ankit Singh and 3 Ors Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 08 May 2024

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Landmark Case

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Saroj Rani Vs Sudarshan Kumar Chadha on 8 Aug 1984

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