Pradeep Ram Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 1 Jul 2019

A division of Supreme Court held as follows,

From Paras 7 and 9, (Question of law formulated due to divergent views on the point)

7. From the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and the pleadings on the record, following are the issues, which arise for consideration in these appeals:-
(i) Whether in a case where an accused has been bailed out in a criminal case, in which case, subsequently new offences are added, is it necessary that bail earlier granted should be cancelled for taking the accused in custody?
(ii) Whether re-registration of F.I.R. No.RC-06/2018/NIA/DLI is a second F.I.R. and is not permissible there being already a FIR No. 02/2016 registered at P.S. Tandwa arising out of same incident?
(iii) Whether N.I.A. could conduct any further investigation in the matter when investigation in the P.S. Case No.02/2016 having already been completed and charge sheet has been submitted on 10.03.2016 with regard to which cognizance has already been taken by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chatra on 11.03.2016?
(iv) Whether the order dated 25.06.2018 passed by Judicial Commissioner-cum-Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi remanding the appellant to judicial custody is in accordance with law?
(v) Whether the power under Section 167 Cr.P.C. can be exercised in the present case, where the cognizance has already been taken by Chief Judicial Magistrate on 11.03.2016 or the accused could have been remanded only under Section 309(2) Cr.P.C.?
9. The question, as to whether when an accused is bailed out in a criminal case, in which new offences have been added, whether for arresting the accused, it is necessary to get the bail cancelled, has arisen time and again, there are divergent views of different High Courts on the above question. On one side, the High Courts have taken the view that for arresting the accused, who is already on bail, in event of addition of new offences, the earlier bail need to be cancelled whereas the other line of opinion is that for new offences accused has to obtain a fresh bail order and the earlier bail order shall not enure to the benefit of the accused.

From Para 18,

18. Whether after addition of new non-bailable offence, police authority can straightaway arrest the accused, who is already granted bail by the Court, in reference to offences prior to addition of new offences or the police is to necessarily obtain an order from the Court either of cancellation of the bail or permission to arrest the accused in changed circumstances are questions where different views have been expressed by different High Courts. In the present case, the appellant was not arrested by the police after addition of offences under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, rather the police authorities had made an application before the Court for issue of production warrant since the accused was already in custody in jail in reference to another case.

From Para 29, Issue No.1 answered.

29. In view of the foregoing discussions, we arrive at following conclusions in respect of a circumstance where after grant of bail to an accused, further
cognizable and non-bailable offences are added:-
(i) The accused can surrender and apply for bail for newly added cognizable and non-bailable offences. In event of refusal of bail, the accused can certainly be arrested.
(ii) The investigating agency can seek order from the court under Section 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C. for arrest of the accused and his custody.
(iii) The Court, in exercise of power under Section 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C., can direct for taking into custody the accused who has already been granted bail after cancellation of his bail. The Court in exercise of power under Section 437(5) as well as Section 439(2) can direct the person
who has already been granted bail to be arrested and commit him to custody on addition of graver and non-cognizable offences which may not be necessary always with order of cancelling of earlier bail.
(iv) In a case where an accused has already been granted bail, the investigating authority on addition of an offence or offences may not proceed to arrest the accused, but for arresting the accused on such addition of offence or offences it need to obtain an order to arrest the accused from the Court which had granted the bail.

Pradeep Ram Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 1 Jul 2019

Citations: [2019 INSC 706], [AIR 2019 SUPREME COURT 3193], [2019 (3) AJR 689], [AIRONLINE 2019 SC 397], [2019 CRI LJ 3801], [(2019) 2 ALD(CRL) 453], [(2019) 2 GUJ LH 617], [(2019) 3 ALLCRILR 540], [(2019) 3 ALLCRIR 2574], [(2019) 3 CRILR(RAJ) 807], [(2019) 3 PAT LJR 265], [(2019) 3 RECCRIR 538], [2019 (4) KCCR SN 252 (SC)], [(2019) 4 MH LJ (CRI) 397], [(2019) 75 OCR 321], [(2019) 9 SCALE 120], [2019 CRILR(SC MAH GUJ) 807], [(2020) 110 ALLCRIC 654], [(2020) 206 ALLINDCAS 219], [2020 CALCRILR 1 233], [AIR 2019 SC( CRI) 1138]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/129162686/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5d39d2253321bc0f0457d8a1

https://www.legaldeskai.in/case-law/in/sc/judgment/pradeep-ram-versus-the-state-of-jharkhand-anr-2019-8-824-868

https://vlex.in/vid/crl-no-000816-000817-852332646

Index of Anticipatory Bail Judgements is here.

Chajoo Ram Vs Radhey Shyam and Anr on 23 Mar 1971

Posted on September 14 by ShadesOfKnife

A full court bench of the Apex Court held as follows, with respect to When should a Prosecution for perjury be ordered .

The prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by courts, only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. No doubt giving of false evidence and filing false affidavit is an evil which must be effectively curbed with a strong hand but to start prosecution for perjury too readily and too frequently with,out due care and caution and on inconclusive and doubtful material defeats its very purpose. Prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent and not merely because there is some inaccuracy in the statement which may be innocent or immaterial. There must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter ,of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge.

Chajoo Ram Vs Radhey Shyam and Anr on 23 Mar 1971

Citations: [1971] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 172], [1971 INSC 89], [1971 SCC (1) 774], [1971 AIR 1367], [(1971) 03 SC CK 0045], [(1971) 2 ALT 277], [(1971) CriLJ 1096], [(1971) SCC(Cri) 331]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/187090/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab75e4b014971140c8b3

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/judgements/646903/chajoo-ram-appellant-hash-radhey-shyam-and-another-respondent/

https://www.legalstreet.in/ratio/case/1971-insc-89/

https://www.legitquest.com/case/chajoo-ram-v-radhey-shyam-anr/3C67

Index of Perjury Judgments is here.

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Posted on July 21 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Shiv Narayan Dhingra ji has passed this Order around the definition of a Temporary residence as held by the Section 27 of the PWDV Act 2005.

9. All legislative enactments on matrimonial disputes or custody matters make ordinary residence or residence or the place where parties lived together or the place of cause of action as a ground for invocation of jurisdiction of the Court. Domestic Violence Act is the first Act where a temporary residence of the aggrieved person has also been made a ground for invoking the jurisdiction of court. The expression “residence‟ means
“to make abode‟ – a place for dwelling. Normally place for dwelling is made with an intention to live there for considerable time or to settle there. It is a place where a person has a home. In Webster Dictionary, the residence means to dwell for length of time. The words „dwelling place‟ or abode are synonyms. A temporary residence, therefore, must be a temporary dwelling place of the person who has for the time being decided to make the place as his home. Although he may not have decided to reside there permanently or for a considerable length of time but for the time being, this must be place of her residence and this cannot be considered a place where the person has gone on a casual visit, or a fleeing visit for change of climate or simply for the purpose of filing a case against another person.
10. I, therefore, consider that the temporary residence, as envisaged under the Act is such residence where an aggrieved person is compelled to take shelter or compelled to take job or do some business, in view of domestic violence perpetuated on her or she either been turned out of the matrimonial home or has to leave the matrimonial home. This temporary residence does not include residence in a lodge or hostel or an inn or residence at a place only for the purpose of filing a domestic violence case. This temporary residence must also be a continuing residence from the date of acquiring residence till the application under Section 12 is disposed of and it must not be a fleeing residence where a woman comes only for the purpose of contesting the case and otherwise does not reside there.
11. In the present case, the aggrieved person is residing with her sister and has filed the petition under Domestic Violence Act. It cannot be said that her residence with her sister was a fleeing residence or was a temporary residence acquired for lodging the complaint of domestic violence. Her sister‟s house is a place where she has taken shelter and temporarily resides. I, therefore, find that there is no force in this petition. The petition is hereby dismissed with no orders to costs.

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Citations: [2010:DHC:4306], [2010 9 Laws(DLH) 9]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/106302060/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090d56e4b014971117976a

Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here.

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Posted on July 12 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not excepted , at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Further,

The mere initial grant of anticipatory bail for lesser offence, did not entitle the respondent to insist for regular bail even if he was subsequently found to be involved in the case of murder. Neither Section 437(5) nor Section 439(1) of the Code was attracted. There was no question of cancellation of bail earlier granted to the accused for an offence punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 406 IPC. The Magistrate committed a irregularity by holding that “I do not agree with the submission made by the Ld.Prosecutor in as much as if we go by his submissions then the accused would be liable for arrest every time the charge is altered or enhanced at any stage, which is certainly not the spirit of law”. With the change of the nature of the offence, the accused becomes disentitled to the liberty granted to him in relation to a minor offence, if the offence is altered for an aggravated crime. Instead of referring to the grounds which entitled the respondent-accused the grant of bail, the Magistrate adopted a wrong approach to confer him the benefit of liberty on allegedly finding that no grounds were made out for cancellation of bail.

Finally,

We would reiterate that in cases where the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life which is triable exclusively by a court of Sessions, the Magistrate may, in his wisdom, refrain to exercise the powers of granting the bail and refer the accused to approach the higher courts unless he is fully satisfied that there is no reasonable ground for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001 (INSC)

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1067439/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ada1e4b0149711411eb9

Index of Anticipatory Bail Judgments is here.

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Posted on July 6 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that under section 311 of Cr.P.C. (read along with the Section 165 of Evidence Act), a Criminal Court has wide power to summon any person as witness, at any stage of the case, even after completion of defence evidence and argument stages.

From Para 9,

9. The very usage of the words such as ‘any court’, ‘at any stage’, or ‘of any enquiry, trial or other proceedings’, ‘any person’ and ‘any such person’ clearly spells out that this section is expressed in the widest possible terms and do not limit the discretion of the court in any way. However, the very width requires a corresponding caution that the discretionary power should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially with circumspection and consistently with the provisions of the Code. The second part of the section does not allow for any discretion but it binds and compels the court to take any of the aforementioned two steps if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case.

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Citations: [AIR 1991 SC 1346], [1991 CRILJ 1521], [1991 (1) CRIMES 818(SC)], [1991 (33) ECC 18], [1992 (61) ELT 521(SC)], [1991 (1) SCALE 401], [1991 SUPP (1) SCC 271], [1991 (2) UJ 43 (SC)], [1991 SCC(CRI) 595], [1992 CRIAPPR(SC) 73], [1991 (1) SCR 712], [1991 (1) GUJLH 11], [1991 (3) JT 17], [(1991) ALLCRIR 725], [(1992) SC CR R 51], [1991 CRILR(SC MAH GUJ) 286], [1992 CHANDLR(CIV&CRI) 421], [(1992) 1 CHANDCRIC 78], [(1991) 33 ECC 18], [(1991) 2 GUJ LR 974], [(1991) 3 RECCRIR 182], [(1991) MADLW(CRI) 284], [(1997) 68 ECR 783]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/171510013/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac6be4b014971140ed29

Index

Pune Bar Association Vs Union of India on 22 May 2026

Posted on June 2 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Supreme Court of India decided this issue, inconclusively.

Problem Statement, simply put is,

From Para 1,

1. Petitioner, Pune Bar Association, contends that Section 63(4) of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 20231, read with the Schedule thereto is unconstitutional as it imposes undue hardship on an ordinary litigant by requiring submission of a certificate prescribed in the Schedule comprising Part A which needs disclosure of the hash value of digital records, and Part B which must be signed by an expert. Ld. Counsel argues imposition of such pre-requisites for admissibility of electronic records is an extremely onerous obligation on a litigant and renders the provision manifestly arbitrary and unjust.

From Para 7,

7. If the two sub-sections are read harmoniously, it is possible to hold, in addition to entities notified as Examiner of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A, if the Court is satisfied, on the basis of unimpeachable material, that any other person has special skill and expertise in computer science and cyber forensics, opinion of such person may be held relevant as an expert with regard to electronic/digital record and such person may sign Part B of the Schedule as an expert. We are further fortified to make such observation as sub-section (2) of Section 39 (unlike 63(4) and erstwhile 65B) is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause so as to exclude the operation of sub-section (1) from the arena of electronic records. The High Court had deferred adjudication of such issue and directed the State to notify adequate number of persons under Section 79A. Under these circumstances, we hold that the finding of the High Court that Part B must be filled up by an expert notified under Section 79A of the IT Act shall not be treated as a binding precedent. As we are not inclined to admit the matter and issue notice upon the Union of India, we refrain from giving any conclusive opinion on this issue and keep the question of law open. With this clarification, the petition stands disposed of.

Pune Bar Association Vs Union of India on 22 May 2026

Citations: [2026 LiveLaw (SC) 551], [GIB-SC-2026-44]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/5836207/

https://taxguru.in/corporate-law/sc-upholds-section-634hash-requirement-ensures-authenticity-electronic-evidence.html

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/supreme-court-rejects-challenge-to-s634-bsa-mandating-hash-value-disclosure-for-electronic-evidence-535950

https://gstindia.biz/case-law/278/pune-bar-association-vs-union-of-india-and-others

https://www.lawweb.in/2026/05/section-634-bsa-supreme-court-clarifies.html

Index

Baijnath and ors vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 18 Nov 2016

Posted on February 10 by ShadesOfKnife

A two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India, in Baijnath & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (18 November 2016), held that the unnatural death of a married woman within seven years of marriage does not, by itself, amount to dowry death under Section 304B IPC. The Court ruled that the prosecution must prove cruelty or harassment for dowry to sustain such a charge.

The Supreme Court further clarified that the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act does not operate automatically. Courts may invoke it only after the prosecution establishes dowry-related cruelty soon before death. In this case, the evidence on dowry demand was inconsistent, no prior complaint was made, and medical evidence failed to conclusively determine the cause of death.

The Court held that the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal based on presumptions. As the prosecution failed to prove cruelty beyond reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court restored the Trial Court’s acquittal and granted the accused the benefit of doubt.

Relevant Extracts from the Supreme Court Judgment:

“(32) Noticeably this presumption as well is founded on the proof of cruelty or harassment of the woman dead for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the person charged with the offence. The presumption as to dowry death thus would get activated only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable contiguity of death. Such a proof is thus the legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke the otherwise statutorily ordained presumption of commission of the offence of dowry death by the person charged therewith.”
“(33) Proof of cruelty or harassment by the husband or her relative or the person charged is thus the sine qua non to inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent coherent and persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof.“
“(38) The prosecution in our estimate, has failed to prove this indispensable component of the two offences beyond reasonable doubt. The factum of unnatural death in the matrimonial home and that too within seven years of marriage therefore is thus ipso facto not sufficient to bring home the charge under Sections 304B and 498A of the Code against them.“

Baijnath vs State of MP

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Acquittal from criminal matrimonial cases is here.

Key Contributor:

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan (B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.)

Contact : +91-9606345150

Umme Farva Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 14 Jan 2026

Posted on January 31 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

From Para 14,

14. In this case, the Investigating Officer, investigated the matter and found that, no case has been made out against the wife/accused-applicant under Sections 504 and 507 I.P.C., and thereafter, he prepared the police report/final report (closure report) on 19.06.2024 under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. (Corresponding Section 193(3) BNSS) and submitted the report in the court of Magistrate, without a written complaint of offence committed under Section 177 and 182 IPC (Corresponding Section 212 and 217 Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) in respect of furnishing false information, as provided under Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C. (Corresponding Section 215(1)(a) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023).

From Para 15,

15. Sections 177 and 182 IPC (Corresponding to sections 212 and 217 of B.N.S.) cannot be made redundant, that is to say that, in case any false information is furnished with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to injury of another person, the Investigating Officer shall also prepare a police report in form of complaint as provided/required under Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C. (corresponding Section 215(1)(a) BNSS). Thus, giving a false information to police to lodge an F.I.R. or N.C.R. attracts offence provided under Section 177 and 182 IPC (corresponding Section 212 and 217 BNS) and if after investigation, the Investigating Officer finds that no such incident occurred as alleged in the F.I.R. or N.C.R., the Investigating Officer is under statutory obligation, not only to submit a final report/closure report but also to submit a report of offence of Section 177 and 182 IPC (corresponding Section 212 and 217 BNS) in form of complaint as provided, under Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C. (corresponding Section 215(1)(a) of BNSS) for taking cognizance. Otherwise, the concerned police officers are liable for committing an offence as mentioned under Section 199 (b) BNS (corresponding Section 166A(b) of Cr.P.C.).

From Para 18,

18. The offence is always against the State therefore, if the Investigating Officer is submitting police report/final report(closure report) under section 193(3) BNSS (corresponding Section 173(2) Cr.P.C.), he shall also submit police report in form of written complaint under section 212 and 217 BNS (Corresponding Sections 177 and 182 IPC), against the informant and witnesses. The format of police report, in form of written complaint under section 212 and 217 BNS (Corresponding Sections 177 and 182 IPC) as provided under Section 215(1)(a) BNSS (Corresponding Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C.), in case of false information, to police to use his lawful power to injury any person, in Hindi language as well as in English language are delineated below.

From Para 21,

21. In case of false first information report, if a written complaint against the informant and witness under section 215(1)(a) BNSS (corresponding section 195(1) (a) Cr.P.C.) is not filed by the Investigating Officer, under section 212 and 217 BNS (corresponding section 177 and 182 of I.P.C.) for giving false information to the police then it will amount that the Investigating Officer, Station House Officer, Circle Officer of the area and the prosecuting officer concerned are not discharging their official duty and liable to departmental proceedings as well as contempt proceedings.

Umme Farva Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 14 Jan 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index

Geddam Jhansi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 07 Feb 2025

Posted on December 6, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Supreme Court invoked Article 142 of the Constitution to quash a DV case, which has same allegations as in a false 498A IPC case.

40. Accordingly, we allow both the present Criminal Appeals as below:
(i) The impugned judgement and order dated 04.04.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 3105 of 2022 is set aside and the criminal proceedings in “C.C. No. 46 of 2022” pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is quashed qua the two appellants, Geddam Jhansi and Geddam Sathyakama Jabali.
(ii) The impugned judgement and order dated 03.02.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 1002 of 2022 is set aside and the criminal proceedings in DVC No. 25 of 2021 pending before the Court of the Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir is quashed qua the appellant, Geddam Jhansi. This is having regard to the criminal proceeding against her being quashed as above and as identical allegation (paragraph 28 above) are made against her in DVC No. 25 of 2021, and in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. This is also by bearing in mind the relationship of the appellant Geddam Jhansi to the complainant, being the latters’s mother-in-law’s sister.

Geddam Jhansi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 07 Feb 2025

Citations: [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1], [2025 INSC 160]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/192533816/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67a6e0c4a1572e13dd1ca525

https://testbook.com/recent-judgements/geddam-jhansi-vs-the-state-of-telangana

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/s498a-ipc-when-family-relations-are-sought-to-be-brought-under-criminal-proceedings-courts-should-be-cautious-supreme-court-283311

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/geddam-jhansi-v-the-state-of-telangana-2025-insc-160-domestic-violence-1567439

Index of DV Judgments is here. Index of Quash Judgments is here.

Srinivasa D Vs Asha on 20 Mar 2025

Posted on October 20, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A wonderful judgment from a single judge of Karnataka High Court, Bengaluru bench, acknowledging that litigants lie in their income affidavit and directing the Family Courts to initiate perjury proceedings in accordance with law.

From Paras 10 to 13,

10. Time and again, it is seen by this Court that in several matters, the parties deliberately do not disclose their correct income, avocation, details of assets and liabilities with an intent to portray lesser income and secure favourable order by misleading and misguiding the Court, which is highly deplorable. In the present case, the respondent has deliberately suppressed the materials, which was well within her knowledge and played mischief and mislead the Court to get a favourable order. The sanctity of the Court and its orders would necessarily have to be respected by all the parties to the proceedings and so also by the learned counsel representing the parties.
11. This Court hopes and trusts that the learned counsels representing the parties advise their respective parties with regard to seriousness and sanctity of the Court orders and also be aware themselves of the sanctity of the Court orders and warn their clients/parties with regard to legal consequences of misleading, misrepresenting, filing false affidavit and adducing false statements on oath by way of oral and documentary evidence.
12. In view of several instances where parties are careless and deliberately making false statements on oath and filing false affidavits, this Court deems it appropriate to direct the Family Court/Trial Court dealing with such matters to initiate suitable action in accordance with law so that careless filing of affidavits and casual approach before the Court while filing assets and liabilities in the form of affidavits and adducing evidence before the Court is curbed and the person at fault is penalized by appropriate action of the Court.
13. At this stage, this Court deems it appropriate to issue following guidelines and directions to Family Courts and trial Courts dealing in maintenance applications:
a) Family Courts/Trial Courts dealing in maintenance applications shall insist on filing assets and liabilities and expenses as per the judgment in the case of Rajnesh -vs- Neha and another reported in (2021)2 SCC 324.
b) If an application is filed to summon salary details or other source of income by either spouse, the same shall be considered favourably, in the interest of justice.
c) If the Family Courts/Trial Courts are of the opinion that the salary certificates/details and particulars of other source of income are required to decide the maintenance application, it shall do so by passing suo motu orders for the same from either or both spouses.
d) In case of false Affidavits filed on oath and false information given deliberately to mislead and secure favourable orders by such information, the defaulting party shall be liable to face legal consequences in accordance to law.
e) Any such maintenance secured by way of such misleading and false/wrong information, shall be ordered to be refunded to the aggrieved party.
f) Maintenance applications both interim and main shall be decided expeditiously.
g) These Guidelines shall be strictly followed and adhered.

Srinivasa D Vs Asha on 20 Mar 2025

Citations: [2025:KHC:11787]

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance Judgments u/s 144 BNSS is here. Index of DV Judgments is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Landmark Case

Pradeep Ram Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 1 Jul 2019

Chajoo Ram Vs Radhey Shyam and Anr on 23 Mar 1971

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Pune Bar Association Vs Union of India on 22 May 2026

Baijnath and ors vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 18 Nov 2016

Umme Farva Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 14 Jan 2026

Geddam Jhansi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 07 Feb 2025

Srinivasa D Vs Asha on 20 Mar 2025