Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Posted on July 21 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Shiv Narayan Dhingra ji has passed this Order around the definition of a Temporary residence as held by the Section 27 of the PWDV Act 2005.

9. All legislative enactments on matrimonial disputes or custody matters make ordinary residence or residence or the place where parties lived together or the place of cause of action as a ground for invocation of jurisdiction of the Court. Domestic Violence Act is the first Act where a temporary residence of the aggrieved person has also been made a ground for invoking the jurisdiction of court. The expression “residence‟ means
“to make abode‟ – a place for dwelling. Normally place for dwelling is made with an intention to live there for considerable time or to settle there. It is a place where a person has a home. In Webster Dictionary, the residence means to dwell for length of time. The words „dwelling place‟ or abode are synonyms. A temporary residence, therefore, must be a temporary dwelling place of the person who has for the time being decided to make the place as his home. Although he may not have decided to reside there permanently or for a considerable length of time but for the time being, this must be place of her residence and this cannot be considered a place where the person has gone on a casual visit, or a fleeing visit for change of climate or simply for the purpose of filing a case against another person.
10. I, therefore, consider that the temporary residence, as envisaged under the Act is such residence where an aggrieved person is compelled to take shelter or compelled to take job or do some business, in view of domestic violence perpetuated on her or she either been turned out of the matrimonial home or has to leave the matrimonial home. This temporary residence does not include residence in a lodge or hostel or an inn or residence at a place only for the purpose of filing a domestic violence case. This temporary residence must also be a continuing residence from the date of acquiring residence till the application under Section 12 is disposed of and it must not be a fleeing residence where a woman comes only for the purpose of contesting the case and otherwise does not reside there.
11. In the present case, the aggrieved person is residing with her sister and has filed the petition under Domestic Violence Act. It cannot be said that her residence with her sister was a fleeing residence or was a temporary residence acquired for lodging the complaint of domestic violence. Her sister‟s house is a place where she has taken shelter and temporarily resides. I, therefore, find that there is no force in this petition. The petition is hereby dismissed with no orders to costs.

Citations: [2010:DHC:4306], [2010 9 Laws(DLH) 9]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/106302060/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090d56e4b014971117976a

Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here.

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Posted on July 12 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not excepted , at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Further,

The mere initial grant of anticipatory bail for lesser offence, did not entitle the respondent to insist for regular bail even if he was subsequently found to be involved in the case of murder. Neither Section 437(5) nor Section 439(1) of the Code was attracted. There was no question of cancellation of bail earlier granted to the accused for an offence punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 406 IPC. The Magistrate committed a irregularity by holding that “I do not agree with the submission made by the Ld.Prosecutor in as much as if we go by his submissions then the accused would be liable for arrest every time the charge is altered or enhanced at any stage, which is certainly not the spirit of law”. With the change of the nature of the offence, the accused becomes disentitled to the liberty granted to him in relation to a minor offence, if the offence is altered for an aggravated crime. Instead of referring to the grounds which entitled the respondent-accused the grant of bail, the Magistrate adopted a wrong approach to confer him the benefit of liberty on allegedly finding that no grounds were made out for cancellation of bail.

Finally,

We would reiterate that in cases where the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life which is triable exclusively by a court of Sessions, the Magistrate may, in his wisdom, refrain to exercise the powers of granting the bail and refer the accused to approach the higher courts unless he is fully satisfied that there is no reasonable ground for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001 (INSC)

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1067439/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ada1e4b0149711411eb9

Index of Anticipatory Bail Judgments is here.

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Posted on July 6 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that under section 311 of Cr.P.C. (read along with the Section 165 of Evidence Act), a Criminal Court has wide power to summon any person as witness, at any stage of the case, even after completion of defence evidence and argument stages.

From Para 9,

9. The very usage of the words such as ‘any court’, ‘at any stage’, or ‘of any enquiry, trial or other proceedings’, ‘any person’ and ‘any such person’ clearly spells out that this section is expressed in the widest possible terms and do not limit the discretion of the court in any way. However, the very width requires a corresponding caution that the discretionary power should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially with circumspection and consistently with the provisions of the Code. The second part of the section does not allow for any discretion but it binds and compels the court to take any of the aforementioned two steps if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case.

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Citations: [AIR 1991 SC 1346], [1991 CRILJ 1521], [1991 (1) CRIMES 818(SC)], [1991 (33) ECC 18], [1992 (61) ELT 521(SC)], [1991 (1) SCALE 401], [1991 SUPP (1) SCC 271], [1991 (2) UJ 43 (SC)], [1991 SCC(CRI) 595], [1992 CRIAPPR(SC) 73], [1991 (1) SCR 712], [1991 (1) GUJLH 11], [1991 (3) JT 17], [(1991) ALLCRIR 725], [(1992) SC CR R 51], [1991 CRILR(SC MAH GUJ) 286], [1992 CHANDLR(CIV&CRI) 421], [(1992) 1 CHANDCRIC 78], [(1991) 33 ECC 18], [(1991) 2 GUJ LR 974], [(1991) 3 RECCRIR 182], [(1991) MADLW(CRI) 284], [(1997) 68 ECR 783]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/171510013/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac6be4b014971140ed29

Index

Pune Bar Association Vs Union of India on 22 May 2026

Posted on June 2 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Supreme Court of India decided this issue, inconclusively.

Problem Statement, simply put is,

From Para 1,

1. Petitioner, Pune Bar Association, contends that Section 63(4) of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 20231, read with the Schedule thereto is unconstitutional as it imposes undue hardship on an ordinary litigant by requiring submission of a certificate prescribed in the Schedule comprising Part A which needs disclosure of the hash value of digital records, and Part B which must be signed by an expert. Ld. Counsel argues imposition of such pre-requisites for admissibility of electronic records is an extremely onerous obligation on a litigant and renders the provision manifestly arbitrary and unjust.

From Para 7,

7. If the two sub-sections are read harmoniously, it is possible to hold, in addition to entities notified as Examiner of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A, if the Court is satisfied, on the basis of unimpeachable material, that any other person has special skill and expertise in computer science and cyber forensics, opinion of such person may be held relevant as an expert with regard to electronic/digital record and such person may sign Part B of the Schedule as an expert. We are further fortified to make such observation as sub-section (2) of Section 39 (unlike 63(4) and erstwhile 65B) is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause so as to exclude the operation of sub-section (1) from the arena of electronic records. The High Court had deferred adjudication of such issue and directed the State to notify adequate number of persons under Section 79A. Under these circumstances, we hold that the finding of the High Court that Part B must be filled up by an expert notified under Section 79A of the IT Act shall not be treated as a binding precedent. As we are not inclined to admit the matter and issue notice upon the Union of India, we refrain from giving any conclusive opinion on this issue and keep the question of law open. With this clarification, the petition stands disposed of.

Pune Bar Association Vs Union of India on 22 May 2026

Citations: [2026 LiveLaw (SC) 551], [GIB-SC-2026-44]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/5836207/

https://taxguru.in/corporate-law/sc-upholds-section-634hash-requirement-ensures-authenticity-electronic-evidence.html

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/supreme-court-rejects-challenge-to-s634-bsa-mandating-hash-value-disclosure-for-electronic-evidence-535950

https://gstindia.biz/case-law/278/pune-bar-association-vs-union-of-india-and-others

https://www.lawweb.in/2026/05/section-634-bsa-supreme-court-clarifies.html

Index

Baijnath and ors vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 18 Nov 2016

Posted on February 10 by ShadesOfKnife

A two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India, in Baijnath & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (18 November 2016), held that the unnatural death of a married woman within seven years of marriage does not, by itself, amount to dowry death under Section 304B IPC. The Court ruled that the prosecution must prove cruelty or harassment for dowry to sustain such a charge.

The Supreme Court further clarified that the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act does not operate automatically. Courts may invoke it only after the prosecution establishes dowry-related cruelty soon before death. In this case, the evidence on dowry demand was inconsistent, no prior complaint was made, and medical evidence failed to conclusively determine the cause of death.

The Court held that the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal based on presumptions. As the prosecution failed to prove cruelty beyond reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court restored the Trial Court’s acquittal and granted the accused the benefit of doubt.

Relevant Extracts from the Supreme Court Judgment:

“(32) Noticeably this presumption as well is founded on the proof of cruelty or harassment of the woman dead for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the person charged with the offence. The presumption as to dowry death thus would get activated only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable contiguity of death. Such a proof is thus the legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke the otherwise statutorily ordained presumption of commission of the offence of dowry death by the person charged therewith.”
“(33) Proof of cruelty or harassment by the husband or her relative or the person charged is thus the sine qua non to inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent coherent and persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof.“
“(38) The prosecution in our estimate, has failed to prove this indispensable component of the two offences beyond reasonable doubt. The factum of unnatural death in the matrimonial home and that too within seven years of marriage therefore is thus ipso facto not sufficient to bring home the charge under Sections 304B and 498A of the Code against them.“

Baijnath vs State of MP

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Acquittal from criminal matrimonial cases is here.

Key Contributor:

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan (B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.)

Contact : +91-9606345150

Umme Farva Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 14 Jan 2026

Posted on January 31 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

From Para 14,

14. In this case, the Investigating Officer, investigated the matter and found that, no case has been made out against the wife/accused-applicant under Sections 504 and 507 I.P.C., and thereafter, he prepared the police report/final report (closure report) on 19.06.2024 under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. (Corresponding Section 193(3) BNSS) and submitted the report in the court of Magistrate, without a written complaint of offence committed under Section 177 and 182 IPC (Corresponding Section 212 and 217 Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) in respect of furnishing false information, as provided under Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C. (Corresponding Section 215(1)(a) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023).

From Para 15,

15. Sections 177 and 182 IPC (Corresponding to sections 212 and 217 of B.N.S.) cannot be made redundant, that is to say that, in case any false information is furnished with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to injury of another person, the Investigating Officer shall also prepare a police report in form of complaint as provided/required under Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C. (corresponding Section 215(1)(a) BNSS). Thus, giving a false information to police to lodge an F.I.R. or N.C.R. attracts offence provided under Section 177 and 182 IPC (corresponding Section 212 and 217 BNS) and if after investigation, the Investigating Officer finds that no such incident occurred as alleged in the F.I.R. or N.C.R., the Investigating Officer is under statutory obligation, not only to submit a final report/closure report but also to submit a report of offence of Section 177 and 182 IPC (corresponding Section 212 and 217 BNS) in form of complaint as provided, under Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C. (corresponding Section 215(1)(a) of BNSS) for taking cognizance. Otherwise, the concerned police officers are liable for committing an offence as mentioned under Section 199 (b) BNS (corresponding Section 166A(b) of Cr.P.C.).

From Para 18,

18. The offence is always against the State therefore, if the Investigating Officer is submitting police report/final report(closure report) under section 193(3) BNSS (corresponding Section 173(2) Cr.P.C.), he shall also submit police report in form of written complaint under section 212 and 217 BNS (Corresponding Sections 177 and 182 IPC), against the informant and witnesses. The format of police report, in form of written complaint under section 212 and 217 BNS (Corresponding Sections 177 and 182 IPC) as provided under Section 215(1)(a) BNSS (Corresponding Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C.), in case of false information, to police to use his lawful power to injury any person, in Hindi language as well as in English language are delineated below.

From Para 21,

21. In case of false first information report, if a written complaint against the informant and witness under section 215(1)(a) BNSS (corresponding section 195(1) (a) Cr.P.C.) is not filed by the Investigating Officer, under section 212 and 217 BNS (corresponding section 177 and 182 of I.P.C.) for giving false information to the police then it will amount that the Investigating Officer, Station House Officer, Circle Officer of the area and the prosecuting officer concerned are not discharging their official duty and liable to departmental proceedings as well as contempt proceedings.

Umme Farva Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 14 Jan 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index

Geddam Jhansi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 07 Feb 2025

Posted on December 6, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Supreme Court invoked Article 142 of the Constitution to quash a DV case, which has same allegations as in a false 498A IPC case.

40. Accordingly, we allow both the present Criminal Appeals as below:
(i) The impugned judgement and order dated 04.04.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 3105 of 2022 is set aside and the criminal proceedings in “C.C. No. 46 of 2022” pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is quashed qua the two appellants, Geddam Jhansi and Geddam Sathyakama Jabali.
(ii) The impugned judgement and order dated 03.02.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 1002 of 2022 is set aside and the criminal proceedings in DVC No. 25 of 2021 pending before the Court of the Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir is quashed qua the appellant, Geddam Jhansi. This is having regard to the criminal proceeding against her being quashed as above and as identical allegation (paragraph 28 above) are made against her in DVC No. 25 of 2021, and in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. This is also by bearing in mind the relationship of the appellant Geddam Jhansi to the complainant, being the latters’s mother-in-law’s sister.

Geddam Jhansi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 07 Feb 2025

Citations: [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1], [2025 INSC 160]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/192533816/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67a6e0c4a1572e13dd1ca525

https://testbook.com/recent-judgements/geddam-jhansi-vs-the-state-of-telangana

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/s498a-ipc-when-family-relations-are-sought-to-be-brought-under-criminal-proceedings-courts-should-be-cautious-supreme-court-283311

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/geddam-jhansi-v-the-state-of-telangana-2025-insc-160-domestic-violence-1567439

Index of DV Judgments is here. Index of Quash Judgments is here.

Srinivasa D Vs Asha on 20 Mar 2025

Posted on October 20, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A wonderful judgment from a single judge of Karnataka High Court, Bengaluru bench, acknowledging that litigants lie in their income affidavit and directing the Family Courts to initiate perjury proceedings in accordance with law.

From Paras 10 to 13,

10. Time and again, it is seen by this Court that in several matters, the parties deliberately do not disclose their correct income, avocation, details of assets and liabilities with an intent to portray lesser income and secure favourable order by misleading and misguiding the Court, which is highly deplorable. In the present case, the respondent has deliberately suppressed the materials, which was well within her knowledge and played mischief and mislead the Court to get a favourable order. The sanctity of the Court and its orders would necessarily have to be respected by all the parties to the proceedings and so also by the learned counsel representing the parties.
11. This Court hopes and trusts that the learned counsels representing the parties advise their respective parties with regard to seriousness and sanctity of the Court orders and also be aware themselves of the sanctity of the Court orders and warn their clients/parties with regard to legal consequences of misleading, misrepresenting, filing false affidavit and adducing false statements on oath by way of oral and documentary evidence.
12. In view of several instances where parties are careless and deliberately making false statements on oath and filing false affidavits, this Court deems it appropriate to direct the Family Court/Trial Court dealing with such matters to initiate suitable action in accordance with law so that careless filing of affidavits and casual approach before the Court while filing assets and liabilities in the form of affidavits and adducing evidence before the Court is curbed and the person at fault is penalized by appropriate action of the Court.
13. At this stage, this Court deems it appropriate to issue following guidelines and directions to Family Courts and trial Courts dealing in maintenance applications:
a) Family Courts/Trial Courts dealing in maintenance applications shall insist on filing assets and liabilities and expenses as per the judgment in the case of Rajnesh -vs- Neha and another reported in (2021)2 SCC 324.
b) If an application is filed to summon salary details or other source of income by either spouse, the same shall be considered favourably, in the interest of justice.
c) If the Family Courts/Trial Courts are of the opinion that the salary certificates/details and particulars of other source of income are required to decide the maintenance application, it shall do so by passing suo motu orders for the same from either or both spouses.
d) In case of false Affidavits filed on oath and false information given deliberately to mislead and secure favourable orders by such information, the defaulting party shall be liable to face legal consequences in accordance to law.
e) Any such maintenance secured by way of such misleading and false/wrong information, shall be ordered to be refunded to the aggrieved party.
f) Maintenance applications both interim and main shall be decided expeditiously.
g) These Guidelines shall be strictly followed and adhered.

Srinivasa D Vs Asha on 20 Mar 2025

Citations: [2025:KHC:11787]

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance Judgments u/s 144 BNSS is here. Index of DV Judgments is here.

Vinod Kumar K Vs Chaitra N on 3 Apr 2025

Posted on October 20, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A good judgment from a single judge of Karnataka High Court, Bengaluru bench, refusing maintenance to a lying wife and directing to initiate perjury proceedings in accordance with law.

From Paras 7 to 11,

7. As per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajnesh stated supra, in all the maintenance petitions, parties are duty bound to file assets and liabilities and disclose their true income, avocation, employment and so also details of income, assets and liabilities of the other spouse. In the present case, petitioner – husband has filed assets and liabilities showing the details of his employment, income etc., It is also stated about job of the respondent and what is the income drawn by the respondent – wife. On the contrary, respondent – wife though filed assets and liabilities for the 2nd time on 8.11.2022, very cleverly and intentionally suppressed fact of her employment as a Guest Teacher in Government Junior Primary School and income she is getting from the said employment. Nothing prevented the respondent from saying so in the affidavit of assets and she was not asked by her counsel with regard to disclosing her employment and the income and if it was brought to her notice and knowledge, she would have definitely disclosed the same in the affidavit. The fact that she has sought for unconditional apology itself apparently clear that she has suppressed the true facts before the Court. This kind of suppression of material before the Court with deliberate intention to mislead the Court to obtain a favourable order in the maintenance cases is deplorable and cannot be accepted. Fortunately, the petitioner is able to secure certain information under the RTI Act, due to which Court came to know with regard to employment of the respondent, otherwise, it would not have come to the notice of the Court. Such attitude and behaviour of the respondent before the Court is deplorable and cannot be accepted.
8. In the present case on hand, the income generated by the respondent – wife during her employment as a Guest Teacher was around Rs.10,000/- to Rs.15,000/-, which is not clearly stated. If the average is taken, it is Rs.12,500/- per month. Whereas, the petitioner – husband is earning Rs.47,240/- and after deduction getting Rs.21,000/- per month.
9. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, it is apparently clear that the respondent – wife was working and capable of working and earning as on the date of filing 2nd affidavit of assets and liabilities before the Family Court. It is not the case of the respondent that she is unable to work and incapable to earn income and therefore to be maintained by the petitioner. It is also stated that there are no children from the marriage. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the respondent – wife would not be entitled to maintenance.
10. The intent of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajnesh stated supra is to render justice to the parties on the basis of self declaration of assets and liabilities including income and occupation. But, it is seen that in most of the cases, there is deliberate suppression of facts only with an intention to secure favourable order. In view of several instances where parties are careless and deliberately making false statements on oath and filing false affidavits, this Court in RPFC No.24/2023 decided on 20th March 2025 directed the Family Court/Trial Court dealing with such matters to initiate suitable action in accordance with law so that careless filing of affidavits and casual approach before the Court while filing assets and liabilities in the form of affidavits and adducing evidence before the Court is curbed and the person at fault is penalized by appropriate action of the Court. This Court issued certain guidelines and directions to the Family Courts/Trial Courts dealing in maintenance applications. Accordingly, this Court deems it appropriate to direct the Family Court to initiate suitable action against the respondent – wife after affording reasonable opportunity
to both the parties.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in compliance of the order of the Family Court, petitioner has deposited Rs.25,000/- in the execution proceedings. In view of the respondent – wife having suppressed the material facts of her employment and income and this Court coming to the conclusion that the respondent – wife would not be entitled for maintenance, I deem it appropriate to direct the respondent – wife to refund the said amount of Rs.25,000/- to the petitioner – husband.

Vinod Kumar K Vs Chaitra N on 3 Apr 2025

Citations: [2025:KHC:14149]

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67eef65cd50c1c738ee6dd37

Index of Maintenance Judgments u/s 144 BNSS is here.

Prabhu Chawla Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr on 05 Sep 2016

Posted on October 8, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

Re-affirming Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd judgment here, Full bench of Supreme Court held that, A Petition under section 482 CrPC is maintainable even when a Revision is available under 397/401 CrPC.

From Para 4,

4. The facts of these appeals need not detain us because in our considered opinion the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court in the impugned order is contrary to law and therefore matters will have to be remanded back to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits within the scope of inherent powers available to the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It would suffice to note that in both these appeals, the miscellaneous petitions before the High Court arose out of an order dated 30.11.2006 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Jodhpur in the complaint no. 1669 of 2006, whereby it took cognizance against the appellants under Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code and summoned them through bailable warrants to face further proceedings in the case.

From Paras 6-8,

6. In our considered view any attempt to explain the law further as regards the issue relating to inherent power of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is unwarranted. We would simply reiterate that Section 482 begins with a non-obstante clause to state: “Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” A fortiori, there can be no total ban on the exercise of such wholesome jurisdiction where, in the words of Krishna Iyer, J. “abuse of the process of the Court or other extraordinary situation excites the court’s jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more.” We venture to add a further reason in support. Since Section 397 Cr.P.C. is attracted against all orders other than interlocutory, a contrary view would limit the availability of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. only to petty interlocutory orders! A situation wholly unwarranted and undesirable.
7. As a sequel, we are constrained to hold that the Division Bench, particularly in paragraph 28, in the case of Mohit alias Sonu and another (supra) in respect of inherent power of the High Court in Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. does not state the law correctly. We record our respectful disagreement.
8. In our considered opinion the learned Single Judge of the High Court should have followed the law laid down by this Court in the case of Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. (supra) and other earlier cases which were cited but wrongly ignored them in preference to a judgment of that Court in the case of Sanjay Bhandari (supra) passed by another learned Single Judge on 05.02.2009 in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 289 of 2006 which is impugned in the connected Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition No. 4744 of 2009. As a result, both the appeals, one preferred by Prabhu Chawla and the other by Jagdish Upasane & Ors. are allowed. The impugned common order dated 02.04.2009 passed by the High Court of Rajasthan is set aside and the matters are remitted back to the High Court for fresh hearing of the petitions under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the light of law explained above and for disposal in accordance with law. Since the matters have remained pending for long, the High Court is requested to hear and decide the matters expeditiously, preferably within six months.

Prabhu Chawla Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr on 05 Sep 2016

Index of Quash Judgments is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Landmark Case

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Pune Bar Association Vs Union of India on 22 May 2026

Baijnath and ors vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 18 Nov 2016

Umme Farva Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 14 Jan 2026

Geddam Jhansi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 07 Feb 2025

Srinivasa D Vs Asha on 20 Mar 2025

Vinod Kumar K Vs Chaitra N on 3 Apr 2025

Prabhu Chawla Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr on 05 Sep 2016