Secretary to Government Vs Sameer Ahamed N and Ors on 15 Oct 2026

A two-Judge bench of the Supreme Court held as follows,

From Para 61(a), (c), (e) and (f),

a) A person who converts from a Hindu social order to a non-Hindu social order cannot claim affirmative action under Article 16(4) of the Constitution merely on the basis of the social backwardness associated with his pre-conversion status; the backwardness suffered in the antecedent social order cannot, by itself, be carried forward so as to confer upon him the status of a backward class in the religion to which he has converted.
c) Conversion to a non-Hindu social order does not, by itself, confer membership of any particular notified Backward Class community. A person’s pre-conversion caste or community status cannot, merely by reason of conversion, be transposed into membership of a distinct notified Backward Class community in the post-conversion social order. The social backwardness which formed the basis of the person’s pre-conversion status cannot, by itself, furnish the legal foundation for conferring upon him membership of a different notified Backward Class community after conversion.
e) No statutory benefit, protection, reservation or other entitlement under Article 16(4) of the Constitution, the enjoyment of which is predicated upon a particular Hindu social order, can be claimed or extended merely on the basis of such antecedent membership after the person has converted to Islam, Christianity or any other non-Hindu social order. Such conversion severs the legal foundation of an entitlement which is specifically conditioned upon membership of that Hindu social order.
f) A community certificate is declaratory of, and does not create or confer, the status which it purports to recognise. Neither the issuance of a community certificate nor an executive instruction can enlarge, modify or dispense with the substantive constitutional and statutory conditions governing membership of the class or entitlement to the benefits attached thereto.

From Para 54,

Reservation is attached to a constitutionally identified class and not to an individual as a transferable personal entitlement. The constitutional enquiry is directed to the class, its common characteristics and the disadvantage which binds its members together…

From Paras 62 and 63 (Conclusion),

62. We therefore affirm the central conclusion of the High Court, though our reasoning proceeds on the constitutional foundations set out above. A person who converts to Islam does not, by that act alone, become a member of any one of the seven notified Backward Class Muslim communities in the State. His former caste or community status cannot automatically be transposed into the Muslim Backward Class category, nor can a private religious body conclusively determine such statutory entitlement.
63. Tested on that standard, we are of the view that the impugned G.O. cannot be sustained and has rightly been quashed by the High Court. It creates an artificial route by which a person moves from a pre-conversion backward social order into a notified Muslim backward class without establishing the necessary social and legal link.

The Special Leave Petition against the Madras High Court’s quashing of G.O.(Ms) No. 31 dated 09.03.2024 was dismissed (Para 64).

Secretary to Government Vs Sameer Ahamed N and Ors on 15 Oct 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 1129; SLP (C) No. 25507/2026 (Diary No. 39624/2026).

Other Sources:

The Judgment of Madras High Court bench at Madurai is here.

Sameer Ahamed Vs The District Collector and Ors on 25 Jun 2026

The GO issued that got struck down as unconstitutional in this context is here.

2024-03-09 Converts to Islam from BC

Non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect?

Posted on October 12 by ShadesOfKnife

A 7-Judge Bench of Supreme Court held as follows, with respect to Non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect or not?

224. The conclusions reached in this judgment are summarised below:
a. Agreements which are not stamped or are inadequately stamped are inadmissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. Such agreements are not rendered void or void ab initio or unenforceable;
b. Non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect;
c. An objection as to stamping does not fall for determination under Sections 8 or 11 of the Arbitration Act. The concerned court must examine whether the arbitration agreement prima facie exists;
d. Any objections in relation to the stamping of the agreement fall within the ambit of the arbitral tribunal; and
e. The decision in NN Global 2 (supra) and SMS Tea Estates (supra) are overruled. Paragraphs 22 and 29 of Garware Wall Ropes (supra) are overruled to that extent.

Non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect on 13 Dec 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Validity of an unstamped arbitration agreement | Judgement Summary

Index

Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and Anr Vs Indusind Bank Ltd and Ors on 6 Dec 2004

Posted on October 12 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows, with respect to what a GPA-holder can do and not.

Order III, Rules 1 and 2 CPC, empowers the holder of power of attorney to “act” on behalf of the principal. In our view the word “acts” employed in Order III, Rules 1 and 2 CPC, confines only in respect of “acts” done by the power of attorney holder in exercise of power granted by the instrument. The term “acts” would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In other words, if the power of attorney holder has rendered some “acts” in pursuance to power of attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for the acts done by the principal and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross-examined.

Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and Anr Vs Indusind Bank Ltd and Ors on 6 Dec 2004

Citations: [2004 SUPP. 6 S.C.R. 681], [2004 INSC 695], [AIR 2005 SUPREME COURT 439], [2005 (2) SCC 217], [2004 AIR SCW 7064, (2007) 2 NIJ 395], [2005 (2) SRJ 281], [(2004) 10 JT 264 (SC)], [(2005) 3 CTC 128 (SC)], [(2005) 3 MAD LJ 109], [2004 (10) JT 264, (2005) 1 CLR 737 (SC)], [(2005) 3 JCR 175 (SC)], [2004 (10) SCALE 244, 2005 (2) ALL CJ 924], [2004 (7) SLT 441], [(2005) ILR (KANT) 729], [(2005) 1 ALL WC 138], [(2004) 63 CORLA 174], [(2005) 1 RECCIVR 240], [(2005) 3 MAD LW 403], [(2004) 10 SCALE 244], [(2005) 1 SCJ 520], [(2005) 2 CIVILCOURTC 324, (2005) 2 LANDLR 585], [(2005) 98 REVDEC 371], [(2005) 3 ANDHLD 43], [(2005) 3 SUPREME 275], [(2005) 1 WLC(SC)CVL 245], [(2005) 1 CAL HN 175], [(2005) 123 COMCAS 154], [(2005) 1 MAH LJ 1170, (2005) 1 MPLJ 421], [(2005) 2 PUN LR 1], [(2005) 1 KCCR 227], [(2005) 58 ALL LR 440], [(2005) 2 ANDH LT 57, (2005) 2 KER LT 265], [(2005) 58 ALL LR 610], [(2005) 1 ALL RENTCAS 409], [(2005) 3 CIVLJ 775], [(2005) 2 CURCC 61], [(2005) 1 ALL WC 831], [(2005) 1 BANKCLR 438], [(2005) 3 BOM CR 846]

Other Sources:

Index

Pradeep Ram Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 1 Jul 2019

Posted on September 24 by ShadesOfKnife

A division of Supreme Court held as follows,

From Paras 7 and 9, (Question of law formulated due to divergent views on the point)

7. From the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and the pleadings on the record, following are the issues, which arise for consideration in these appeals:-
(i) Whether in a case where an accused has been bailed out in a criminal case, in which case, subsequently new offences are added, is it necessary that bail earlier granted should be cancelled for taking the accused in custody?
(ii) Whether re-registration of F.I.R. No.RC-06/2018/NIA/DLI is a second F.I.R. and is not permissible there being already a FIR No. 02/2016 registered at P.S. Tandwa arising out of same incident?
(iii) Whether N.I.A. could conduct any further investigation in the matter when investigation in the P.S. Case No.02/2016 having already been completed and charge sheet has been submitted on 10.03.2016 with regard to which cognizance has already been taken by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chatra on 11.03.2016?
(iv) Whether the order dated 25.06.2018 passed by Judicial Commissioner-cum-Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi remanding the appellant to judicial custody is in accordance with law?
(v) Whether the power under Section 167 Cr.P.C. can be exercised in the present case, where the cognizance has already been taken by Chief Judicial Magistrate on 11.03.2016 or the accused could have been remanded only under Section 309(2) Cr.P.C.?
9. The question, as to whether when an accused is bailed out in a criminal case, in which new offences have been added, whether for arresting the accused, it is necessary to get the bail cancelled, has arisen time and again, there are divergent views of different High Courts on the above question. On one side, the High Courts have taken the view that for arresting the accused, who is already on bail, in event of addition of new offences, the earlier bail need to be cancelled whereas the other line of opinion is that for new offences accused has to obtain a fresh bail order and the earlier bail order shall not enure to the benefit of the accused.

From Para 18,

18. Whether after addition of new non-bailable offence, police authority can straightaway arrest the accused, who is already granted bail by the Court, in reference to offences prior to addition of new offences or the police is to necessarily obtain an order from the Court either of cancellation of the bail or permission to arrest the accused in changed circumstances are questions where different views have been expressed by different High Courts. In the present case, the appellant was not arrested by the police after addition of offences under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, rather the police authorities had made an application before the Court for issue of production warrant since the accused was already in custody in jail in reference to another case.

From Para 29, Issue No.1 answered.

29. In view of the foregoing discussions, we arrive at following conclusions in respect of a circumstance where after grant of bail to an accused, further
cognizable and non-bailable offences are added:-
(i) The accused can surrender and apply for bail for newly added cognizable and non-bailable offences. In event of refusal of bail, the accused can certainly be arrested.
(ii) The investigating agency can seek order from the court under Section 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C. for arrest of the accused and his custody.
(iii) The Court, in exercise of power under Section 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C., can direct for taking into custody the accused who has already been granted bail after cancellation of his bail. The Court in exercise of power under Section 437(5) as well as Section 439(2) can direct the person
who has already been granted bail to be arrested and commit him to custody on addition of graver and non-cognizable offences which may not be necessary always with order of cancelling of earlier bail.
(iv) In a case where an accused has already been granted bail, the investigating authority on addition of an offence or offences may not proceed to arrest the accused, but for arresting the accused on such addition of offence or offences it need to obtain an order to arrest the accused from the Court which had granted the bail.

Pradeep Ram Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 1 Jul 2019

Citations: [2019 INSC 706], [AIR 2019 SUPREME COURT 3193], [2019 (3) AJR 689], [AIRONLINE 2019 SC 397], [2019 CRI LJ 3801], [(2019) 2 ALD(CRL) 453], [(2019) 2 GUJ LH 617], [(2019) 3 ALLCRILR 540], [(2019) 3 ALLCRIR 2574], [(2019) 3 CRILR(RAJ) 807], [(2019) 3 PAT LJR 265], [(2019) 3 RECCRIR 538], [2019 (4) KCCR SN 252 (SC)], [(2019) 4 MH LJ (CRI) 397], [(2019) 75 OCR 321], [(2019) 9 SCALE 120], [2019 CRILR(SC MAH GUJ) 807], [(2020) 110 ALLCRIC 654], [(2020) 206 ALLINDCAS 219], [2020 CALCRILR 1 233], [AIR 2019 SC( CRI) 1138]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/129162686/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5d39d2253321bc0f0457d8a1

https://www.legaldeskai.in/case-law/in/sc/judgment/pradeep-ram-versus-the-state-of-jharkhand-anr-2019-8-824-868

https://vlex.in/vid/crl-no-000816-000817-852332646

Index of Anticipatory Bail Judgements is here.

Chajoo Ram Vs Radhey Shyam and Anr on 23 Mar 1971

Posted on September 14 by ShadesOfKnife

A full court bench of the Apex Court held as follows, with respect to When should a Prosecution for perjury be ordered .

The prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by courts, only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. No doubt giving of false evidence and filing false affidavit is an evil which must be effectively curbed with a strong hand but to start prosecution for perjury too readily and too frequently with,out due care and caution and on inconclusive and doubtful material defeats its very purpose. Prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent and not merely because there is some inaccuracy in the statement which may be innocent or immaterial. There must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter ,of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge.

Chajoo Ram Vs Radhey Shyam and Anr on 23 Mar 1971

Citations: [1971] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 172], [1971 INSC 89], [1971 SCC (1) 774], [1971 AIR 1367], [(1971) 03 SC CK 0045], [(1971) 2 ALT 277], [(1971) CriLJ 1096], [(1971) SCC(Cri) 331]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/187090/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab75e4b014971140c8b3

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/judgements/646903/chajoo-ram-appellant-hash-radhey-shyam-and-another-respondent/

https://www.legalstreet.in/ratio/case/1971-insc-89/

https://www.legitquest.com/case/chajoo-ram-v-radhey-shyam-anr/3C67

Index of Perjury Judgments is here.

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Posted on July 21 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Shiv Narayan Dhingra ji has passed this Order around the definition of a Temporary residence as held by the Section 27 of the PWDV Act 2005.

9. All legislative enactments on matrimonial disputes or custody matters make ordinary residence or residence or the place where parties lived together or the place of cause of action as a ground for invocation of jurisdiction of the Court. Domestic Violence Act is the first Act where a temporary residence of the aggrieved person has also been made a ground for invoking the jurisdiction of court. The expression “residence‟ means
“to make abode‟ – a place for dwelling. Normally place for dwelling is made with an intention to live there for considerable time or to settle there. It is a place where a person has a home. In Webster Dictionary, the residence means to dwell for length of time. The words „dwelling place‟ or abode are synonyms. A temporary residence, therefore, must be a temporary dwelling place of the person who has for the time being decided to make the place as his home. Although he may not have decided to reside there permanently or for a considerable length of time but for the time being, this must be place of her residence and this cannot be considered a place where the person has gone on a casual visit, or a fleeing visit for change of climate or simply for the purpose of filing a case against another person.
10. I, therefore, consider that the temporary residence, as envisaged under the Act is such residence where an aggrieved person is compelled to take shelter or compelled to take job or do some business, in view of domestic violence perpetuated on her or she either been turned out of the matrimonial home or has to leave the matrimonial home. This temporary residence does not include residence in a lodge or hostel or an inn or residence at a place only for the purpose of filing a domestic violence case. This temporary residence must also be a continuing residence from the date of acquiring residence till the application under Section 12 is disposed of and it must not be a fleeing residence where a woman comes only for the purpose of contesting the case and otherwise does not reside there.
11. In the present case, the aggrieved person is residing with her sister and has filed the petition under Domestic Violence Act. It cannot be said that her residence with her sister was a fleeing residence or was a temporary residence acquired for lodging the complaint of domestic violence. Her sister‟s house is a place where she has taken shelter and temporarily resides. I, therefore, find that there is no force in this petition. The petition is hereby dismissed with no orders to costs.

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Citations: [2010:DHC:4306], [2010 9 Laws(DLH) 9]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/106302060/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090d56e4b014971117976a

Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here.

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Posted on July 12 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not excepted , at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Further,

The mere initial grant of anticipatory bail for lesser offence, did not entitle the respondent to insist for regular bail even if he was subsequently found to be involved in the case of murder. Neither Section 437(5) nor Section 439(1) of the Code was attracted. There was no question of cancellation of bail earlier granted to the accused for an offence punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 406 IPC. The Magistrate committed a irregularity by holding that “I do not agree with the submission made by the Ld.Prosecutor in as much as if we go by his submissions then the accused would be liable for arrest every time the charge is altered or enhanced at any stage, which is certainly not the spirit of law”. With the change of the nature of the offence, the accused becomes disentitled to the liberty granted to him in relation to a minor offence, if the offence is altered for an aggravated crime. Instead of referring to the grounds which entitled the respondent-accused the grant of bail, the Magistrate adopted a wrong approach to confer him the benefit of liberty on allegedly finding that no grounds were made out for cancellation of bail.

Finally,

We would reiterate that in cases where the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life which is triable exclusively by a court of Sessions, the Magistrate may, in his wisdom, refrain to exercise the powers of granting the bail and refer the accused to approach the higher courts unless he is fully satisfied that there is no reasonable ground for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001 (INSC)

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1067439/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ada1e4b0149711411eb9

Index of Anticipatory Bail Judgments is here.

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Posted on July 6 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that under section 311 of Cr.P.C. (read along with the Section 165 of Evidence Act), a Criminal Court has wide power to summon any person as witness, at any stage of the case, even after completion of defence evidence and argument stages.

From Para 9,

9. The very usage of the words such as ‘any court’, ‘at any stage’, or ‘of any enquiry, trial or other proceedings’, ‘any person’ and ‘any such person’ clearly spells out that this section is expressed in the widest possible terms and do not limit the discretion of the court in any way. However, the very width requires a corresponding caution that the discretionary power should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially with circumspection and consistently with the provisions of the Code. The second part of the section does not allow for any discretion but it binds and compels the court to take any of the aforementioned two steps if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case.

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Citations: [AIR 1991 SC 1346], [1991 CRILJ 1521], [1991 (1) CRIMES 818(SC)], [1991 (33) ECC 18], [1992 (61) ELT 521(SC)], [1991 (1) SCALE 401], [1991 SUPP (1) SCC 271], [1991 (2) UJ 43 (SC)], [1991 SCC(CRI) 595], [1992 CRIAPPR(SC) 73], [1991 (1) SCR 712], [1991 (1) GUJLH 11], [1991 (3) JT 17], [(1991) ALLCRIR 725], [(1992) SC CR R 51], [1991 CRILR(SC MAH GUJ) 286], [1992 CHANDLR(CIV&CRI) 421], [(1992) 1 CHANDCRIC 78], [(1991) 33 ECC 18], [(1991) 2 GUJ LR 974], [(1991) 3 RECCRIR 182], [(1991) MADLW(CRI) 284], [(1997) 68 ECR 783]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/171510013/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac6be4b014971140ed29

Index

Pune Bar Association Vs Union of India on 22 May 2026

Posted on June 2 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Supreme Court of India decided this issue, inconclusively.

Problem Statement, simply put is,

From Para 1,

1. Petitioner, Pune Bar Association, contends that Section 63(4) of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 20231, read with the Schedule thereto is unconstitutional as it imposes undue hardship on an ordinary litigant by requiring submission of a certificate prescribed in the Schedule comprising Part A which needs disclosure of the hash value of digital records, and Part B which must be signed by an expert. Ld. Counsel argues imposition of such pre-requisites for admissibility of electronic records is an extremely onerous obligation on a litigant and renders the provision manifestly arbitrary and unjust.

From Para 7,

7. If the two sub-sections are read harmoniously, it is possible to hold, in addition to entities notified as Examiner of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A, if the Court is satisfied, on the basis of unimpeachable material, that any other person has special skill and expertise in computer science and cyber forensics, opinion of such person may be held relevant as an expert with regard to electronic/digital record and such person may sign Part B of the Schedule as an expert. We are further fortified to make such observation as sub-section (2) of Section 39 (unlike 63(4) and erstwhile 65B) is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause so as to exclude the operation of sub-section (1) from the arena of electronic records. The High Court had deferred adjudication of such issue and directed the State to notify adequate number of persons under Section 79A. Under these circumstances, we hold that the finding of the High Court that Part B must be filled up by an expert notified under Section 79A of the IT Act shall not be treated as a binding precedent. As we are not inclined to admit the matter and issue notice upon the Union of India, we refrain from giving any conclusive opinion on this issue and keep the question of law open. With this clarification, the petition stands disposed of.

Pune Bar Association Vs Union of India on 22 May 2026

Citations: [2026 LiveLaw (SC) 551], [GIB-SC-2026-44]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/5836207/

https://taxguru.in/corporate-law/sc-upholds-section-634hash-requirement-ensures-authenticity-electronic-evidence.html

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/supreme-court-rejects-challenge-to-s634-bsa-mandating-hash-value-disclosure-for-electronic-evidence-535950

https://gstindia.biz/case-law/278/pune-bar-association-vs-union-of-india-and-others

https://www.lawweb.in/2026/05/section-634-bsa-supreme-court-clarifies.html

Index

Baijnath and ors vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 18 Nov 2016

Posted on February 10 by ShadesOfKnife

A two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India, in Baijnath & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (18 November 2016), held that the unnatural death of a married woman within seven years of marriage does not, by itself, amount to dowry death under Section 304B IPC. The Court ruled that the prosecution must prove cruelty or harassment for dowry to sustain such a charge.

The Supreme Court further clarified that the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act does not operate automatically. Courts may invoke it only after the prosecution establishes dowry-related cruelty soon before death. In this case, the evidence on dowry demand was inconsistent, no prior complaint was made, and medical evidence failed to conclusively determine the cause of death.

The Court held that the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal based on presumptions. As the prosecution failed to prove cruelty beyond reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court restored the Trial Court’s acquittal and granted the accused the benefit of doubt.

Relevant Extracts from the Supreme Court Judgment:

“(32) Noticeably this presumption as well is founded on the proof of cruelty or harassment of the woman dead for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the person charged with the offence. The presumption as to dowry death thus would get activated only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable contiguity of death. Such a proof is thus the legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke the otherwise statutorily ordained presumption of commission of the offence of dowry death by the person charged therewith.”
“(33) Proof of cruelty or harassment by the husband or her relative or the person charged is thus the sine qua non to inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent coherent and persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof.“
“(38) The prosecution in our estimate, has failed to prove this indispensable component of the two offences beyond reasonable doubt. The factum of unnatural death in the matrimonial home and that too within seven years of marriage therefore is thus ipso facto not sufficient to bring home the charge under Sections 304B and 498A of the Code against them.“

Baijnath vs State of MP

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Acquittal from criminal matrimonial cases is here.

Key Contributor:

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan (B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.)

Contact : +91-9606345150

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Landmark Case

Secretary to Government Vs Sameer Ahamed N and Ors on 15 Oct 2026

Non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect?

Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and Anr Vs Indusind Bank Ltd and Ors on 6 Dec 2004

Pradeep Ram Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 1 Jul 2019

Chajoo Ram Vs Radhey Shyam and Anr on 23 Mar 1971

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Pune Bar Association Vs Union of India on 22 May 2026

Baijnath and ors vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 18 Nov 2016