Whirlpool Corporation Vs Registrar of Trade Marks Mumbai and Ors on 26 Oct 1998

Landmark judgment from a division bench of the Apex Court.

From Paras 14 and 15,

14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for “any other purpose”.
15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case- law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.

Whirlpool Corporation Vs Registrar of Trade Marks Mumbai and Ors on 26 Oct 1998 (CM Ver)

Citations : [1998 SCC 8 1], [1999 AIR SC 22], [1998 AIR SC 3345], [1999 BOMCR SC 2 70], [1998 JT 7 243], [1998 SCALE 5 655], [1998 SUPREME 8 176], [1998 AIR SCW 3345]

Other Sources :

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/575fd361607dba63d7e6e044

P.A.Saleem Vs State of Madras on 13 Jul 1994

Posted on July 5 by ShadesOfKnife

Madras High Court held that, Dismissal of NBW Cancellation is not Interlocutory so Revision is Maintainable u/s 397 CrPC.

(24) In view of the discussions as above, the following positions emerge:
(1) issuance of a warrant of arrest by a court under this code shall remain in force beyond the date fixed for its return, until it is cancelled or executed.
(2) since the court, which issued the warrant has the power to cancel it, it is but necessary for the person against whom a warrant of arrest had been issued to approach the said court, by his personal appearance, for its cancellation, which issued it.
(3) once a person of an offence against whom a warrant of arrest had been makes his personal appearance, with a petition for its cancellation, before the court, which issued it, it behoves on its part not to take him into custody and send him to prison immediately after his appearance; but to pass an order on such petition, forthwith, without borrowing any sort of a delay and if the order so passed ends in his favour, he shall be bound over to appear before court on an earliest date fixed for hearing or trial, as the case may as, or otherwise, he could be taken into custody forthwith and sent to prison, with a direction to the prison authorities for his production before court on the earliest date fixed for such hearing or trial and on such other dates till the trial is over, so as to enable it to proceed, with ease and grace, and without any obstruction whatever, thereby not affecting in the least his right to speedy trial, a goal to be achieved, as enshrined under article 21 of the constitution; or on his application, being presented, release him on bail, or his executing a bond for a specified sum, with sufficient number of sureties, for such sum to secure his appearance on the dates fixed for hearing or trial, as the case may be.
(4) however, a person, aggrieved by an order of refusal of the cancellation by a magistrate, who issued the same, can further agitate the same, if he so desires, by filing a revision, either under section 397 or 401 of the code, and then resort to invoke the inherent power of this court under section 482 of the code, if grounds for resortment to such a course existed; and
(5) section 482 of the code is not at all attracted for simpliciter tre – call of a warrant; but, on the other hand, it is getting attracted for execution of a warrant, by issuance of a direction to a police officer or for that matter, any other person to whom it is issued, for its immediate compliance.

P.A.Saleem Vs State of Madras on 13 Jul 1994

Citations : [1994 CRIMES 3 991]

Other Sources :

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56e669e9607dba6b53435671

NBW judgments here.

Sukla Mukherjee Vs State on 13 Dec 1994

Posted on December 1, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Calcutta High Court held as follows,

The Ld. Magistrate dismissed that application on the ground, inter alia, that Section 205 of the Cr. P.C. is not applicable in a case which is instituted on police report. That is not the interpretation of Section 205. Sub-section (1) of Section 205 does not limit the application only to a complaint case, it can also be applied even in a case instituted on police report. So, the reason that has been given by the Ld. Magistrate for refusing the personal exemption of the petitioner is not at all logical and it is illegal.

Casemine version:

Sukla Mukherjee Vs State on 13 Dec 1994

Citations:

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/294422/

https://www.lawyerservices.in/Sukla-Mukherjee-Versus-State-1994-12-13

Index here.

Bhagwan Premchandani Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 4 Nov 1997

Posted on November 24, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Sri B S A Swamy has passed this reasoned order with regards to mechanical issuing of non-bailable warrants to accused by the trial courts.

From para 3,

3. I have already taken a view that the trial Court can proceed with the case without insisting for the presence of the accused vide Crl.M.P.Nos.4424/97 and 4422/97 dated 29-10-1997. Further, the action of the Magistrate in issuing N.B.W. having dismissed the application filed for dispensing with his presence cannot be appreciated by this Court.
As per Section 73 of the Criminal Procedure Code an N.B.W. can be issued only to secure the presence of any escaped convict, proclaimed offender or the person who is evading the arrest. In the instant case, being summons case, the question of arrest also will not arise. Further, the petitioner filed an application seeking dispensation of his presence on that day for the reasons stated in the affidavit. Instead of allowing the application, the learned Magistrate not only dismissed the application, but also even without giving time for his appearance issued N.B.W. Such conduct on the part of the Magistrate is depricated. The discretion vested in them should be properly exercised to secure the ends of justice but not to penalise or harass an individual with the procedural wrangles of the Court more so without visualising the evil consequences that will flow from the order that is going to be passed. This Court is often coming across with such type of orders passed by the Magistrates. Hence this Court would like lo emphasize that the Magistrates should shed the wrong practice of issuing N.B.Ws. the moment the accused fail to appear in the Court without giving an opportunity to explain the circumstances under which the accused failed to appear in the Court and in the light of the language employed in Section 73 of Criminal Procedure Code an N.B.W. can be issued sparingly that to after coming to the conclusion that there is no other way to secure the presence of the accused. In fact in Ramojt Rao v.V.V. Rajam in Cr.M.P.No.4424/97 dated 29-10-1997 this Court explained the legal position with regard to the appearance of the accused before a Magistrate and held that the Magistrate is having ample power to proceed with the case by dispensing with the presence of the accused even in a warrant case.

Indiankanoon copy:

Bhagwan Premchandani Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 4 Nov 1997

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1025663/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f767e4b014971113fe0e

http://document.manupatra.com/ap/1955-2000/ap1998/a980838.htm

https://www.lawyerservices.in/BHAGWAN-PREMCHANDANI-VERSUS-STATE-OF-A-P-1997-11-04

Index here.

Jangam Srinivasa Rao Vs Jaagam Rajeshwari and Anr on 13 Mar 1989

Posted on August 9, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Single Judge bench of AP HC held as follows:

From Para 6,

6. The points for determination in these proceedings are
(1) whether the order of maintenance passed in M.C. No. 18/84 stood cancelled ?
(2) Whether under Section 125(3), Cr.P.C. the wife can seek imprisonment of the husband for non-payment of maintenance accumulated beyond a period of 12 months ?
(3) Whether the payment of Rs. 3,250/- paid as per the directions of this court can be appropriated to the maintenance due for the first 25 months as claimed by the wife ?

From Para 11, Point (2) was answered.

11. Considering the different views expressed by the various High Courts I prefer to follow the Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Moddari Bin v. Sukdeo Bin, (1967 Cri LJ 335). The other decisions are judgments or single Judges. In my humble opinion the contraction put forward by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court is harmonesus construction and interpretation of the proviso making the proviso applicable to both the limbs of procedure contemplated under sub-section 3 of Section 125, Cr.P.C. I hold on point No. 2 that the wife the maintenance-holder cannot accumulate the maintenance for a period beyond 12 months. No application for execution of the maintenance order can be entertained for a period exceeding 12 months immediately preceding the date of application. I hold this point in favour of the petitioner. In this context I make it clear that they remedy provided under S. 125(3), Cr.P.C. is a speedy and expeditious remedy. By virtue of the order of maintains granted in M.C. 18/84 the right vested in the wife to receive maintenance from the date of the application i.e. 7-12-83. She may not be able to recover the earlier arrears by resorting to an application under Section 126(3), Cr.P.C., but still she would certainly be entitled to claim those arrear by filing a civil suit on the basis that the amount is die to her by virtue of the court order. But at the same time it should be remembered that under civil laws also her claim should be within the period of limitation. For instance, for the maintenance payable for the period 7-12-83 to 7-1-84 she should file a suit on or before 7-1-87. At the most she can recover arrears of maintenance for 3 years by resorting to a civil suit. Unfortunately in this case the right to file a civil suit for the earlier arrears is also barred by time.

Indiankanoon Version:

Jangam Srinivasa Rao Vs Jaagam Rajeshwari and Anr on 13 Mar 1989 (IK Ver)

Casemine Version:

Jangam Srinivasa Rao Vs Jaagam Rajeshwari and Anr on 13 Mar 1989 (CM Ver)

Citations : [1990 CRILJ 2506], [1989 ALT 2 295], [1989 SCC ONLINE AP 66], [1989 AP LJ 2 41], [1989 ALT NRC 2 8]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/471311/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f701e4b014971113ef2e

Rev. Samuel D. Stephens and Ors Vs Pastor A. Samuel Ramasamy on 27 Feb 2009

Posted on August 8, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Relying on earlier decision here, single judge bench of Madras High Court held as follows:

From Para 12,

12. Mr. V. Karthik has also brought to the notice of the Court the following decisions in Jagatbhai Punjabhai Palkhiwala and others v. Vikrambhai Punjabhai Palkhiwala and others, AIR 1985 Gujarat 112; K. Nagarajan v. K.S Ramasamy, 2003 (3) M.L.J 211; and K.R. Sengottuvelu v. Karuppa Naicker, 2005 (5) CTC 91. The above decisions are relating to Civil cases, wherein it has been held that since the documents are in the custody of the Court, the parties cannot take xerox copies of the same without the permission of the Court, but that does not mean that the Court can refuse such permission only on the ground that they have not become part of the record of the Suit.

From Para 16,

16. The main objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent is that since the documents filed along with the Complaint have not been marked, the accused, at this stage, are not entitled to get certified copies of the same. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1970 SC 962, cited supra. It has to be pointed out that in the said decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the High Court was not justified, in indirectly applying to cases instituted on Private Complaints the requirements of Section 173(4), Cr.P.C In the said decision what the Hon’ble Court has held is that it was impermissible for the High Court to read into Section 94, Cr.P.C, the
requirements of Section 173(4), Cr.P.C on the ground that Section 173(4), Cr.P.C is not applicable to Private Complaints. On the said reasoning, the direction issued by the High Court directing the prosecution to furnish copies of the documents to the accused was set aside. But it has to be pointed out that in that decision, the question as to whether the accused is entitled to get certified copies of the documents filed along with the Private Complaint did not come up for consideration and hence, the said decision is not of any help to the respondent.

From Para 18,

18. In this context, it is pertinent to point out that the learned counsel for the respondent has not referred to any provision in the Criminal Procedure Code containing any prohibition to furnish certified copies of the documents filed along with the Private Complaint. The prohibition like the one contained under Section 173(4), Cr.P.C is not there as far as the documents filed along with the Private Complaint are concerned. Therefore, unless there is a statutory prohibition, it cannot be said that the accused is not entitled to get certified copies of the documents filed along with the Private Complaint.

From Para 20,

20. Similarly, in a Criminal case taken cognizance on the basis of the Private Complaint also if the allegations contained in the Complaint and the documents accompanied with the Complaint do not prima facie reveal the commission of any offence and the ingredients of the offence are not made out, it is always open to the accused to approach the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C seeking for quashing of the proceedings. For taking recourse under Section 482, Cr.P.C, it is necessary for the accused to produce before the Court a copy of the Complaint as well as the documents filed along with the Complaint. Since before taking cognizance, the learned Judicial Magistrate is bound to apply his judicial mind not only to the allegations contained in the Complaint but also to the documents accompanying the same and an order taking cognizance is a judicial order and as such the accused is entitled to challenge the cognizance taken in the case. As per Section 363(5), Cr.P.C, Save as otherwise provided in subsection (2), any person affected by an order passed by the Court on an Application made in this behalf and on payment of the prescribed charges be given a copy of such order or of any deposition or other part of the record. If the question is considered in the light of Section 363(5), Cr.P.C, it could be held that since, as pointed out above, an order taking cognizance is a judicial order, Section 363(5) is attracted and on that ground also the accused is entitled to get a copy of the part of the record of a Criminal case to enable him to seek appropriate remedy before the higher forum. In my considered view, Rule 339 of the Criminal Rules of Practice is in consonance with the provisions contained in Section 363(5), Cr.P.C It is also to be pointed out that by furnishing of certified copies of the documents filed along with the Private Complaint, no prejudice whatsoever is going to be caused to the complainant, whereas, if the request of the accused is rejected, it will definitely prejudice the right of the accused in seeking appropriate legal remedy before the higher Courts.

From Para 22,

22. A reading of the aforesaid provision shows that in a case instituted otherwise than on a police report, if it appears to the Magistrate issuing process under Section 204, Cr.P.C, that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall furnish to the accused a copy of each of the documents filed along with the Complaint. That Sections casts duty on the Court to furnish the said documents free of cost. But similar duty is not cast on the Magistrate to furnish copies of the documents free of cost if the case is not triable exclusively by the Court of Session. It would mean that it is not incumbent on the part of the learned Judicial Magistrate to furnish copies of the documents free of cost either at the time of sending the process or on the appearance of the accused. There is no other provision which prohibits the accused from applying for certified copies of those documents filed along with the Complaint. As pointed out above, in the absence of any specific prohibition in the Cr.P.C either expressly or impliedly, in the considered view of this Court, the accused cannot be deprived of his right to get certified copies of the documents filed along with the Complaint so as to defend himself in the case as long as such furnishing of certified copies would not prejudice the case of the respondent.

Casemine Version:

Rev. Samuel D. Stephens and Ors Vs Pastor A. Samuel Ramasamy on 27 Feb 2009 (CM Ver)

Citations : [2009 LW CRL 1 386], [2009 SCC ONLINE MAD 576], [2009 MWN CRI 1 298], [2009 MLJ CRL 2 436]

Other Sources :

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56ea7cf8607dba36cc747754

K. Nagarajan Vs K.S. Ramasamy and Anr on 17 Jul 2003

Posted on August 7, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madras High Court, relying on earlier Gujarat High Court decision), held that, unmarked copies of documents can be sought for, via Copy application.

From paras 8 and 9,

8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contends that it contains certain defamatory, false and malicious allegations against the plaintiff and probably, the plaintiff may prefer to take legal action for giving such a complaint.
9. We are not concerned about the contents of the complaint or the intention of the complainant. What we are concerned is whether a party is entitled to get the certified copy of a document produced in Court, but not marked and which has not become a part of the record of that case.

From Para 12,

12. So far as this case is concerned, there is no dispute that the petitioner filed an application for grant of certified copy. But, the learned Additional District Munsif, returned the application on the sole ground that it has not been marked. Even after the petitioner resubmitted his application by making endorsement that he is entitled under Rule 127 of Civil Rules of Practice, with the same reason once again the copy application has been returned.

From Para 14, Law declared.

14. In any suit apart from the documents marked, there is likelihood of presence of other unmarked documents like warrant issued to the Commissioner or notice given to the Commissioner by the parties etc. Assuming that a party disputes receipt of notice issued by the Advocate Commissioner, then notice said to have been given by the Commissioner will become an important document and certainly copy of such notice shall be required by the other party who claims that actually notice has been given to the party who disputes it. Though the notice given by the Commissioner to the party may not be a part of the record as far as the suit is concerned, since it is not marked as an exhibit in the suit, still a notice can become necessary for a particular party for which he may require copy. Therefore, the document produced in Court even though not marked as a document in evidence in a suit, still necessity may arise for requirement of a certified copy of such a document. That is why under Order 62 and Order XI Rule 15 of Civil Rules of Practice, it is clearly mentioned that any document produced in Court can be inspected. The terms mentioned in Rule 62 and Order XI Rule 15 of Civil Rules of Practice are wider in nature, in the sense that the documents referred are not only marked but also produced in Court.

Indiankanoon Version:

K. Nagarajan Vs K.S. Ramasamy and Anr on 17 Jul 2003 (IK Ver)

Casemine Version:

K. Nagarajan Vs K.S. Ramasamy and Anr on 17 Jul 2003 (CM Ver)

Citations : [2003 MLJ 3 211]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/646246/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090140e4b0149711156312

Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P, Hyd Vs Nese Jilakara Sreeramulu on 29 Aug 2003

Posted on August 1, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full Bench gave this decision upon a reference from a Division bench of AP High Court on the question as to whether the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Ayyala Rambabu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1993 (1) Andh LT (Cri) 73 and by a learned single Judge of this Court in Nunna Venkateswarlu v. State of A. P., 1996 Cri LJ 108 is good law.

The answer was a NO.

From Paras 17-19,

17. The definition of “dowry”, the object of the Act and the above decisions of the Apex Court clearly show that any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given comes within the purview of “dowry” on three occasions in which any property or valuable security comes within its purview. They are — (i) before the marriage, (ii) at the time of marriage, and (iii) “at any time” after the marriage. The third occasion may appear to be an unending period, but the crucial words are “in connection with the marriage of the parties”. This means, giving or agreeing to give any property or valuable security on any of the above three stages should have been in connection with the marriage of the parties.

18. The Legislature in its wisdom while providing for the definition of “dowry” has emphasized that any money, property or valuable security given as consideration for marriage “before, at or any time after” the marriage would be covered by the expression “dowry”, and this definition as contained in Section 2 of the Act has to be read whenever the expression “dowry” occurs in the Act, The meaning of expression “dowry” as commonly used and understood is different from the peculiar definition thereof under the Act.

19. Under Section 3 of the Act, if a person gives or takes are abets the giving or taking dowry shall be punished. Under Section 4 of the Act mere demand of dowry is sufficient to bring home the offence to an accused. Thus, any demand of money, property or valuable security, made from the bride or her parents or other relatives, or the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives, or vice versa, would fall within the mischief of “dowry” under the Act, where such demand is not properly referable to legally recognized claim and relatable only to the consideration of the marriage.

Indiankanoon version:

Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P, Hyd Vs Nese Jilakara Sreeramulu on 29 Aug 2003 (IK Ver)

Casemine version:

Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P, Hyd Vs Nese Jilakara Sreeramulu on 29 Aug 2003 (CM Ver)

Citations : [2004 EASTCRIC 3 48], [2004 ALT 2 504], [2004 ALD CRI 1 519], [2003 SCC ONLINE AP 830], [2003 SUPP ACC 875], [2004 CRI LJ 1629], [2004 HLR 2 144]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1945624/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f835e4b0149711141c0f

Anil Rai Vs State of Bihar on 6 August 2001

Posted on February 24, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Wonderful judgment from Supreme Court, which held that Repeated adjournment of matters ‘for orders‘ after arguments are heard is impermissible. Also passed the following Guidelines.

20. Under the prevalent circumstances in some of the High Courts, I feel it appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding the pronouncement of judgments which, I am sure, shall be followed by all concerned, being the mandate of this Court. Such guidelines, as for present, are as under:

(i) The Chief Justices of the High Courts may issue appropriate directions to the Registry that in case where the judgment is reserved and is pronounced later, a column be added in the judgment where, on the first page, after the cause-title, date of reserving the judgment and date of pronouncing it be separately mentioned by the court officer concerned.

(ii) That Chief Justice of the High Courts, on their administrative side, should direct the Court Officers/ Readers of the various Benches in the High Courts to furnish every month the list of cases in the matters where the judgments reserved are not pronounced within the period of that months.

(iii) On noticing that after conclusion of the arguments the judgment is not pronounced within a period of two months, the concerned Chief Justice shall draw the attention of the Bench concerned to the pending matter. The Chief Justice may also see the desirability of circulating the statement of such cases in which the judgments have not been pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments amongst the Judges of the High Court for their information. Such communication be conveyed as confidential and in a sealed cover.

(iv) Where a judgment is not pronounced within three months, from the date of reserving it, any of the parties in the case is permitted to file an application in the High Court with prayer for early judgment. Such application, as and when filed, shall be listed before the Bench concerned within two days excluding the intervening holidays.

(v) If the judgment, for any reason, is not pronounced within a period of six months, any of the parties of the said lis shall be entitled to move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to withdraw the said case and to make it over to any other Bench for fresh arguments. It is open to the Chief Justice to grant the said prayer or to pass any other order as deems fit in the circumstances.

21. We hope and trust that the above guidelines shall be strictly followed and implemented, considering them as self-imposed restraints.

Indiankanoon version:

Anil Rai Vs State of Bihar on 6 August 2001

Casemine version:

Anil Rai v. State of Bihar on 6 August 2001

Citations: [2002 BOMCR SC 3 360], [2009 ELT SC 233 13], [2001 AIR SC 3173], [2001 SCC 7 318], [2001 SCC CRI 1009], [2001 ALD CRI 2 446], [2001 ACR SC 3 2046], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 3 722], [2001 JT SC 6 515], [2001 SCALE 5 41], [2001 BLJR 3 1777], [2001 SUPP SCR 1 298]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1517737/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad95e4b0149711411c30

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs Girdharilal Sapuru And Ors on 11 February 1981

Posted on February 15, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

In this Landmark judgment, Supreme Court had held that,

5. It, however, appears that the respondents contended that the revision petition was barred by limitation. Even this contention is founded on a very technical ground that even though the revision petition was filed very much in time the requisite power of attorney of the learned advocate on behalf of the petition was not legally complete and when it was re-submitted the limitation had expired. Without going into the nicety of this too technical contention, we may notice that Section 397 of the CrPC enables the High Court to exercise power of revision suo motu and when the attention of the High Court was drawn to a clear illegality the High Court could not have rejected the petition as time barred thereby perpetuating the illegality and miscarriage of justice. The question whether a discharge order is interlocutory or otherwise need not detain us because it is settled by a decision of this Court that the discharge order terminates the proceedings and, therefore it is revisable under Section 397(1), Cr.P.C and -Section 397(1) in terms confers power of suo motu revision on the High Court, and if the High Court exercises suo motu revision power the same cannot be denied on the ground that there is some limitation prescribed for the exercise of the power because none such is prescribed. If in such a situation the suo motu power is not exercised what a glaring illegality goes unnoticed can be demonstrably established by this case itself. We however, do not propose to say a single word on the merits of the cause because there should not be even a whimper of prejudice to the accused who in view of this judgment would have to face the trial before the learned Magistrate.

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs Girdharilal Sapuru And Ors on 11 February 1981

Citations: [1981 ACR SC 161], [1981 AIR SC 1169], [1981 PLR 83 593], [1981 SCC 2 758], [1981 UJ 13 217], [1981 CRI LJ 632], [1981 CRLJ 0 632], [1981 SCC CRI 1 598], [1981 UJ SC 1 217], [1981 CAR 348], [1981 CRLR 275], [1981 SCC CR 598]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1790776/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609abf1e4b014971140db74

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Not Authentic copy hence to be replaced

Whirlpool Corporation Vs Registrar of Trade Marks Mumbai and Ors on 26 Oct 1998

P.A.Saleem Vs State of Madras on 13 Jul 1994

Sukla Mukherjee Vs State on 13 Dec 1994

Bhagwan Premchandani Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 4 Nov 1997

Jangam Srinivasa Rao Vs Jaagam Rajeshwari and Anr on 13 Mar 1989

Rev. Samuel D. Stephens and Ors Vs Pastor A. Samuel Ramasamy on 27 Feb 2009

K. Nagarajan Vs K.S. Ramasamy and Anr on 17 Jul 2003

Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P, Hyd Vs Nese Jilakara Sreeramulu on 29 Aug 2003

Anil Rai Vs State of Bihar on 6 August 2001

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs Girdharilal Sapuru And Ors on 11 February 1981