Union of India and Anr Vs W.N.Chadha on 17 Dec 1992

A Division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 91,

91. More so, the accused has no right to have any say as regards the manner and method of investigation. Save under certain exceptions under the entire scheme of the Code, the accused has no participation as a matter of right during the course of the investigation of a case instituted on a police report till the investigation culminates in filing of a final report under Section 173(2) of the Code or in a proceeding instituted otherwise than on a police report till the process is issued under Section 204 of the Code, as the case may be. Even in cases where cognizance of an offence is taken on a complaint notwithstanding that the said offence is triable by a Magistrate or triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, the accused has no right to have participation till the process is issued. In case the issue of process is postponed as contemplated under Section 202 of the Code, the accused may attend the subsequent inquiry but cannot participate. There are various judicial pronouncements to this effect but we feel that it is not necessary to recapitulate those decisions. At the same time, we would like to point out that there are certain provisions under the Code empowering the Magistrate to give an opportunity of being heard under certain specified circumstances.

From Para 97

97. If prior notice and an opportunity of hearing are to be given to an accused in every criminal case before taking any action against him, such a procedure would frustrate the proceedings, obstruct the taking of prompt action as law demands, defeat the ends of justice and make the provisions of law relating to the investigation lifeless, absurd and self- defeating. Further, the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions relating to the procedure of investigation does not attract such a course in the absence of any statutory obligation to the contrary.

Indiankanoon Version:

Union of India and Anr Vs W.N.Chadha on 17 Dec 1992 (IK)

Casemine Version:

Union of India and Anr Vs W.N.Chadha on 17 Dec 1992 (CM)

LegalData Version:

Union of India and Anr Vs W.N.Chadha on 17 Dec 1992 (LD)

Citations: [1992 SCALE 3 396], [1992 SUPP SCR 3 594], [1992 AIR SC 1082], [1992 SUPP JT 1 255], [1993 AIR SC 1083], [1993 SUPP SCC 4 280], [1993 CRLJ SC 859], [1993 SUPPL SCC 4 260], [1993 SCC CRI 1171]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1787029/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac7be4b014971140f032

https://legaldata.in/court/read/793121

Manoj Kumar Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 17 Mar 2018

Posted on July 5, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A District Court in Delhi passed this details Judgment, relying on earlier Madras HC judgment here.

From Para 7,

At this juncture, reference may be made to Saleem P.A. etc. v. State reported as (1994) 2 LW (Crl.) 402, which is relevant for the present purpose. Paragraph 24 thereof is reproduced as under:
“ 24. In view of the discussion as above, the following positions emerge:
1. Issuance of a warrant of arrest by a Court under the Code shall remain in force beyond the date fixed for its return, until it is cancelled or executed.
2. Since the court, which issued the warrant has the power to cancel it, it is but necessary for the person against whom a warrant of arrest had been issued to approach the said Court, by his personal appearance, for its cancellation, which issued it.
3. Once a person accused of an offence against whom a warrant of arrest had been issued makes his personal appearance, with a petition for its cancellation, before the Court, which issued it, it behaves on its part not to take him into custody and send him to prison immediately after his appearance, but to pass an order on such petition, forthwith, without brooking any sort of a delay and if the order so passed ends in his favour, he
shall be bound over to appear before court on an earliest date fixed for hearing on trial, as the case may be, or otherwise, he could be taken into custody forthwith and sent to prison, with a direction to the prison authorities for his production before court on the earliest date fixed for such hearing or trial is over, so as to enable it to proceed, with ease and grace, and without any obstruction whatever, thereby not affecting in the least his right to speedy trial, a goal to be achieved, as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, or on his application, being presented, release him on bail, on his executing a bond for a specified sum, with sufficient number of sureties, for such sum to secure his appearance on the dates fixed for hearing or trial, as the case may be.
4. However, a person aggrieved by an order of refusal of the cancellation by a Magistrate, who issued the same, can further agitate the same, if he so desires, by filing a revision, either under Section 397 or 401 of the Code, and then resort to invoke the inherent power of this court under Section 482 of the Code, if grounds for resortment to such a course existed (emphasis supplied).”
In the light of above discussion, it is clear that the present revision petition is maintainable.

Manoj Kumar Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 17 Mar 2018

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/108983018/

NBW judgments here.

P.A.Saleem Vs State of Madras on 13 Jul 1994

Posted on July 5, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Madras High Court held that, Dismissal of NBW Cancellation is not Interlocutory so Revision is Maintainable u/s 397 CrPC.

(24) In view of the discussions as above, the following positions emerge:
(1) issuance of a warrant of arrest by a court under this code shall remain in force beyond the date fixed for its return, until it is cancelled or executed.
(2) since the court, which issued the warrant has the power to cancel it, it is but necessary for the person against whom a warrant of arrest had been issued to approach the said court, by his personal appearance, for its cancellation, which issued it.
(3) once a person of an offence against whom a warrant of arrest had been makes his personal appearance, with a petition for its cancellation, before the court, which issued it, it behoves on its part not to take him into custody and send him to prison immediately after his appearance; but to pass an order on such petition, forthwith, without borrowing any sort of a delay and if the order so passed ends in his favour, he shall be bound over to appear before court on an earliest date fixed for hearing or trial, as the case may as, or otherwise, he could be taken into custody forthwith and sent to prison, with a direction to the prison authorities for his production before court on the earliest date fixed for such hearing or trial and on such other dates till the trial is over, so as to enable it to proceed, with ease and grace, and without any obstruction whatever, thereby not affecting in the least his right to speedy trial, a goal to be achieved, as enshrined under article 21 of the constitution; or on his application, being presented, release him on bail, or his executing a bond for a specified sum, with sufficient number of sureties, for such sum to secure his appearance on the dates fixed for hearing or trial, as the case may be.
(4) however, a person, aggrieved by an order of refusal of the cancellation by a magistrate, who issued the same, can further agitate the same, if he so desires, by filing a revision, either under section 397 or 401 of the code, and then resort to invoke the inherent power of this court under section 482 of the code, if grounds for resortment to such a course existed; and
(5) section 482 of the code is not at all attracted for simpliciter tre – call of a warrant; but, on the other hand, it is getting attracted for execution of a warrant, by issuance of a direction to a police officer or for that matter, any other person to whom it is issued, for its immediate compliance.

P.A.Saleem Vs State of Madras on 13 Jul 1994

Citations : [1994 CRIMES 3 991]

Other Sources :

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56e669e9607dba6b53435671

NBW judgments here.

Girish Kumar Suneja Vs CBI on 13 Jul 2017

Posted on December 13, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that all those Order of a Trial Court which terminate the proceedings are not interlocutory Order but are intermediate orders in nature so such Orders are not prohibited in Revision at Session or High Courts.

From Para 16, 17 and 18,

16. While the text of sub-section (1) of Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. appears to confer very wide powers on the court in the exercise of its revision
jurisdiction, this power is equally severely curtailed by sub-section (2) thereof. There is a complete prohibition in a court exercising its revision
jurisdiction in respect of interlocutory orders. Therefore, what is the nature of orders in respect of which a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction?
17. There are three categories of orders that a court can pass – final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction – that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order.
18. The concept of an intermediate order first found mention in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana7 in which case the interpretation and impact of Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. came up for consideration. This decision is important for two reasons. Firstly it gives the historical reason for the enactment of Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. and secondly considering that historical background, it gives a justification for a restrictive meaning to
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

From Para 21,

21. The concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra8 by contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind – an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceedings would continue.

From Paras 23 and 24,

23. We may note that in different cases, different expressions are used for the same category of orders – sometimes it is called an intermediate order, sometimes a quasi-final order and sometimes it is called an order that is a matter of moment. Our preference is for the expression ‘intermediate order’ since that brings out the nature of the order more explicitly.
24. The second reason why Amar Nath is important is that it invokes the principle, in the context of criminal law, that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Therefore, when Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. prohibits interference in respect of interlocutory orders, Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be availed of to achieve the same objective. In other words, since Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. prohibits interference with interlocutory orders, it would not be permissible to resort to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to set aside an interlocutory order.

Finally,

27. Our conclusion on this subject is that while the appellants might have an entitlement (not a right) to file a revision petition in the High Court but that entitlement can be taken away and in any event, the High Court is under no obligation to entertain a revision petition – such a petition can be rejected at the threshold. If the High Court is inclined to accept the revision petition it can do so only against a final order or an intermediate order, namely, an order which if set aside would result in the culmination of the proceedings. As we see it, there appear to be only two such eventualities of a revisable order and in any case only one such eventuality is before us. Consequently the result of paragraph 10 of the order passed by this Court is that the entitlement of the appellants to file a revision petition in the High Court is taken away and thereby the High Court is deprived of exercising its extraordinary discretionary power available under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C.
28. However, this does not mean that the appellants have no remedy available to them – paragraph 10 of the order does not prohibit the appellants from approaching this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Therefore all that has happened is that the forum for ventilating the grievance of the appellants has shifted from the High Court to this Court. It was submitted by one of the learned counsel that this is not good enough for the appellants since this Court is not obliged to give reasons while dismissing such a petition unlike the High Court which would necessarily have to give reasons if it rejected a revision petition. In our opinion, the mere fact that this Court could dismiss the petition filed by the appellants under Article 136 of the Constitution without giving reasons does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that reasons will not be given or that some equitable order will not be passed. The submission of learned counsel has no basis and is only a presumption of what this Court might do. We cannot accept a submission that has its foundation on a hypothesis.

Girish Kumar Suneja Vs CBI on 13 Jul 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 766], [2017 AIR SC 3620], [2017 CRIMES SC 3 96], [2017 CCR SC 3 409], [2017 MLJ CRL 3 616], [2017 RCR CRIMINAL 3 665], [2017 SCALE 7 661], [2017 SCC 14 809], [2018 SCC CRI 1 202], [2017 CRI LJ 4980], [2017 AIC 180 100]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/174336697/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/59786fa94a9326202d8a7817

CrPC 397 – Calling for records to exercise powers of revision

Posted on December 13, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself; to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation.—All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.
(3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.

MS. Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs MS. Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001

Posted on March 7, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held the scope of 205 CrPC in this judgment as,

Second is that it is difficult, in the absence of other materials, to decide positively whether the order dated 28.4.2000 is an interlocutory order only.
The interdict contained in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code) is that the powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order. Whether an order is interlocutory or not, cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory stage. The safe test laid down by this Court through a series of decisions is this: If the contention of the petitioner who moves the superior court in revision, as against the order under challenge is upheld, would the criminal proceedings as a whole culminate? If it would,then the order is not interlocutory in spite of the fact that it was passed during any interlocutory stage.

And

Section 251 is the commencing provision in Chapter XX of the Code which deals with trial of summons cases by magistrates. It enjoins on the court to ask the accused whether he pleads guilty when the accused appears or is brought before the magistrate. The appearance envisaged therein can either be by personal attendance of the accused or through his advocate. This can be understood from Section 205(1) of the Code which says that whenever a magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader.
17. Thus, in appropriate cases the magistrate can allow an accused to make even the first appearance through a counsel. The magistrate is empowered to record the plea of the accused even when his counsel makes such plea on behalf of the accused in a case where the personal appearance of the accused is dispensed with. Section 317 of the Code has to be viewed in the above perspective as it empowers the court to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused (provided he is represented by a counsel in that case) even for proceeding with the further steps in the case. However, one precaution which the court should take in such a situation is that the said benefit need be granted only to an accused who gives an undertaking to the satisfaction of the court that he would not dispute his identity as the particular accused in the case, and that a counsel on his behalf would be present in court and that he has no objection in taking evidence in his absence. This precaution is necessary for the further progress of the proceedings including examination of the witnesses.

“18. A question could legitimately be asked – what might happen if the counsel engaged by the accused (whose personal appearance is dispensed with) does not appear or that the counsel does not co-operate in proceeding with the case? We may point out that the legislature has taken care for such eventualities. Section 205(2) says that the magistrate can in his discretion direct the personal attendance of the accused at any stage of the proceedings. The last limb of Section 317(1) confers a discretion on the magistrate to direct the personal attendance of the accused at any subsequent stage of the proceedings. He can even resort to other steps for enforcing such attendance.

“19. The position, therefore, bogs down to this: It is within the powers of a magistrate and in his judicial discretion to dispense with the personal appearance of an accused either throughout or at any particular stage of such proceedings in a summons case, if the magistrate finds that insistence of his personal presence would itself inflict enormous suffering or tribulations to him, and the comparative advantage would be less. Such discretion need be exercised only in rare instances where due to the far distance at which the accused resides or carries on business or on account of any physical or other good reasons the magistrate feels that dispensing with the personal attendance of the accused would only be in the interests of justice. However, the magistrate who grants such benefit to the accused must take the precautions enumerated above, as a matter of course. We may reiterate that when an accused makes an application to a magistrate through his duly authorised counsel praying for affording the benefit of his personal presence being dispensed with the magistrate can consider all aspects and pass appropriate orders thereon before proceeding further.”

MS. Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs MS. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001

Citations: [2001 KHC 0 714], [2001 AIR SC 3625], [2001 UC 2 370], [2001 AD SC 6 612], [2001 SCC 6 339], [2001 AWC SC 4 2981], [2001 CRI LJ 4250], [2001 JIC 2 685], [2001 MPLJ 3 664], [2001 SUPREME 6 339], [2001 AIR SC 0 3413], [2001 JCC 2 127], [2001 ACR SC 3 2297], [2001 KERLT 3 307], [2001 JT SC 7 127], [2001 SCC 7 401], [2001 CRIMES SC 4 199], [2002 PLJR 4 95], [2002 MAHLJ 1 81], [2002 BOMCR CRI SC 190], [2002 BOMCR SC 2 265], [2002 ALT CRI 1 13], [2001 RCR CRI 4 137], [2003 JLJ SC 1 56], [2001 SCALE 5 503], [2001 CRLJ 0 4250], [2001 S SCR 2 219], [2001 SCC CR 0 1254], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 4 137], [2001 DCR SC 602], [2001 OLR 2 613], [2002 LJ 1 161], [2001 CCR 0 208], [2001 SRJ 8 415], [2001 CRLR SC 0 481], [2001 SCC CRI 0 1254], [2001 CALCRILR 0 481], [2001 SLT 6 120], [2001 CCR 3 208], [2001 ALLMR CRI 0 1961], [2001 SCJ 3 176], [2002 BCR 2 265], [2002 MHLJ SC 1 81], [2001 ALD CRI 2 530], [2002 BCR CRI 0 190]

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: CrPC 397(2) – Revision Not Exercised in Any Interlocutory Order

Union of India and Anr Vs W.N.Chadha on 17 Dec 1992

Manoj Kumar Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 17 Mar 2018

P.A.Saleem Vs State of Madras on 13 Jul 1994

Girish Kumar Suneja Vs CBI on 13 Jul 2017

CrPC 397 – Calling for records to exercise powers of revision

MS. Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs MS. Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001