Issue around opening of Northern Dwaram of Lord Venkateswara Temple, Tirumala, Tirupathi for 10 days. The Writ was dismissed.K.S. Sainath Sharma Vs State of AP on 31 Dec 2020
A 3-judge bench of Supreme Court held that, Law graduates can be eligible for practicing law without having any experience but recommended that the newly hired judges under training for a period not less than 1 year and preferably two years.
All India Judges’ Association and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors on 21 Mar 2002
In the All India Judges’s case  4 SCC 288 at p. 314; this Court has observed that in order to enter the Judicial Service, an applicant must be an Advocate of at least three year’s standing. Rules were amended accordingly. With the passage of time, experience has shown that the best talent which is available is not attracted to the Judicial Service. A bright young law graduate after 3 year of practice finds the Judicial Service not attractive enough. It has been recommended by the Shetty Commission after taking into consideration the views expressed before it by various authorities, that the need for an applicant to have been an Advocate for at least 3 years should be done away with. After taking all the circumstances into consideration, we accept this recommendation of the Shetty Commission and the argument of the learned Amicus Curiae that it should be no longer mandatory for an applicant desirous of entering the Judicial Service to be an Advocate of at least three years’ standing we accordingly, in the light of experience gained after the judgment in All India Judges’ cases direct to the High Courts and to the State Governments to amend their rules so as to enable a fresh law graduate who may not even have put in even three years of practice, to be eligible to compete and enter the Judicial Service. We, however, recommend that a fresh recruit into the Judicial Service should be imparted with training of not less than one years, preferably two years. The Shetty Commission has recommended Assured Career Progessive Scheme and Functional Scales. We have accepted the said recommendation and a suggestion was mooted to the effect that in order that a Judicial Officer does not feel that he is stagnated there should be a change in the nomenclature with the change of the pay scale.
Citations : [2002 CGLJ 3 361], [2002 SCALE 3 291], [2002 AIR SC 1752], [2002 ALD SC 3 39], [2002 ALT SC 4 41], [2002 AWC SC 2 395], [2002 BLJR 2 1144], [2002 FLR 93 628], [2002 GLR 3 2017], [2002 JCR SC 2 248], [2002 JT SC 3 503], [2001 SCALE 2 327], [2002 SCC 4 247], [2002 SCR 2 712], [2002 SCT SC 2 735], [2002 SLJ SC 2 480], [2002 UPLBEC 2 1246], [2001 LIC 34 2398], [2001 AIR SC 2543], [2002 SLR 3 271], [2002 KANTLJ 3 26], [2002 AIR SC 1706], [2002 SUPREME 3 180], [2002 SLT 3 4], [2002 SCJ 2 598], [2002 SRJ 5 246], [2002 LIC 1473], [2002 LLN 2 781], [2002 UPLBEC 2 480], [2003 ILR KAR 1 321], [2002 BLJ 2 586], [2002 PAT LJR 2 210], [2001 AIR SCW 2543], [2002 BOMCR SC 5 242], [2002 SCC LS 508], [2002 AIR SCW 1706]
Other Sources :
Challenging the ‘3 years Practice Experience as a Qualification for JCJ Post’, an advocate from Andhra Pradesh filed this Writ at Supreme Court.
Supreme Court issued Notice to the respondents in the meanwhile. Did not stay the operation of the Notification though.Regalagadda Venkatesh Vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr on 30 Dec 2020
BCI impleaded itself into the Writ.Regalagadda Venkatesh Vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr on 05 Jan 2021
The Writ Petition was withdrawn.Regalagadda Venkatesh Vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr on 17 Feb 2021
A PIL was filed to stay the same of government lands in a namesake scam called as Mission Build AP. Outright Sale of land Parcels/Land Assets on behalf of Mission Build AP, Government of Andhra Pradesh, available at Guntur and Visakhapatnam Districts of Andhra Pradesh “as is where is” basis through E-auction.
Adjourned for filing of Counters by State.2020-05-28 Thota Suresh Babu Vs The Special Officer Mission AP_compressed
Multiple Writs which were filed on same subject were tagged and taken up together.2020-07-23 Thota Suresh Babu Vs The Special Officer Mission AP_compressed
4 weeks time given to file the stand of the State Government via Counter-affidavits.2020-09-18 Thota Suresh Babu Vs The Special Officer Mission AP_compressed
More Writs are tagged.2020-09-18 Thota Suresh Babu Vs The Special Officer Mission AP
Interim Orders were extended until further orders.2020-11-25 Thota Suresh Babu Vs The Special Officer Mission AP_compressed
Government filed a recusal petition seeking recusal of Justice Rakesh Kumar which was rejected by this Super scathing Order. This is a wonderful judgment from Justice Rakesh Kumar clearly laying out path towards dismantling of the State Government which was been doing all unconstitutional activities.
It would be difficult but will capture the gems from this Order below.Thota Suresh Babu Vs The Special Officer Mission AP on 30 Dec 2020
A JMFC has ordered for complaint of perjury in this Judgment. Nice one…
From Para 10, 11 and 12,
Manish Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 24 Dec 2020
10. I have accepted B summary report filed by I.O., in Crime No., 08/2020 registered at Wai police station. On that basis, in present inquiry, I come to the conclusion that informant of said crime has given false FIR at Wai police station as well false statement on oath under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code in Court of Justice. Therefore, it appears to me that the informant being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth, but she has given false FIR as well as false statement under Section 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court. The informant has given statement on oath under Section 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Wai, inspite of knowledge that the FIR lodged by her is false. Informant has lodged false FIR with intent to cause injury to the present applicant and to Bhisham Parwani, knowing that no just or lawful ground for further proceeding on the basis of that false FIR.
11. Therefore, I record my finding that Criminal Prosecution is required to be initiated against the respondent No. 2 of this application who is informant of Crime No. 08/2020 registered at Wai police station for the offences punishable under Section 193, 194, 199, 200 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code as per Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. She has prima facie committed aforesaid offences in relation to B summary proceeding before this Court. It is necessary to make mention here that there is no cogent and convincing material to proceed against respondents No. 3 to 6 for the offences mentioned above.
12. Considering all above grounds, a complaint is required to be filed against the present respondent No. 2 for the offences punishable under Section 193, 194, 199, 200 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code as per Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As per Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Code of Criminal Procedure, it is required to authorise officer of this Court to file a written complaint on behalf of this Court against respondent No. 2 in this Court.
Earlier proceedings here.
A 2-judge Division Bench held that Quash petition is maintainable even though this instant matter is dismissed on merits.
From Para 5,
5) The questions which arise for consideration in these appeals are:
(a) Whether taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is same as summoning an accused to appear?
(b) Whether the Magistrate, while considering the question of summoning an accused, is required to assign reasons for the same?
From Para 7,
7) In S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer vs. Videocon International Ltd. & Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 492, the expression “cognizance” was explained by this Court as it merely means“become aware of” and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes “to take notice of judicially”. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone. It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons.
From Para 8 (Very Imp)
8) Under Section 190 of the Code, it is the application of judicial mind to the averments in the complaint that constitutes cognizance. At this stage, the Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of enquiry. If there is sufficient ground for proceeding then the Magistrate is empowered for issuance of process under Section 204 of the Code.
From Para 9,
9) A summon is a process issued by a Court calling upon a person to appear before a Magistrate. It is used for the purpose of notifying an individual of his legal obligation to appear before the Magistrate as a response to violation of law. In other words, the summons will announce to the person to whom it is directed that a legal proceeding has been started against that person and the date and time on which the person must appear in Court. A person who is summoned is legally bound to appear before the Court on the given date and time. Willful disobedience is liable to be punished under Section 174 IPC. It is a ground for contempt of court.
From Paras 10 and 11, (Very IMP)
Bhushan Kumar and Anr Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 4 April 2012
10) Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then the summons may be issued. This section mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether there exists a sufficient ground for summons to be issued but it is nowhere mentioned in the section that the explicit narration of the same is mandatory, meaning thereby that it is not a pre-requisite for deciding the validity of the summons issued.
11) Time and again it has been stated by this Court that the summoning order under Section 204 of the Code requires no explicit reasons to be stated because it is imperative that the Magistrate must have taken notice of the accusations and applied his mind to the allegations made in the police report and the materials filed therewith.
Citations : [2012 RCR CRIMINAL SC 2 794], [2012 SUPREME 2 699], [2012 BOMCR CRI SC 4 138], [2012 SLT 3 221], [2012 AIR SC 1747], [2012 SCALE 3 191], [2012 AIOL 161], [2012 CRIMES SC 2 101], [2012 CRLJ SC 2286], [2012 AIR SC 2476], [2012 SCALE 4 191], [2012 SCC 5 424], [2012 SCC CRI 2 872], [2012 JT 4 127], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 325], [2012 AIC 113 116], [2012 UC 2 1121], [2012 JCR SC 2 269], [2012 ACR SC 2 1514], [2012 LW CRL 2 33], [2012 PLJR 2 422], [2012 JLJR 2 307], [2012 RLW SC 3 2467], [2012 SCC 5 422], [2012 DRJ 130 225], [2012 ALT CRI SC 3 223], [2012 AIR SCW 2476], [2012 DLT SC 189 252]
Other Sources :
Single Judge Bench of JUSTICE Dr. B.SIVA SANKARA RAO, quashed the false 498A/DP Act complaint on Father in law and two sisters in law. Just one Paragraph !!!
From Para 6,
Anil Kumar and 2 Ors Vs State of A.P. Anr on 03 Apr 2019
6. There is no record even shown from the police charge sheet by collecting from father of de facto complainant as to any so-called additional amount of Rs.4,30,000/- given out of his retirement benefits or 15 tulas of gold. It is crucial if at all to believe as to what were the retirement benefits he received and when from his account he parted with. There is no date or time even mentioned either in the report or from the police investigation to believe, leave about the fact that the so-called marriage performed, from the police investigation out of love affair between A-1 and de facto complainant against the will of the parents of the de facto complainant and the parents of A-1, who are A-2 & A-3 from the beginning agreed for the love marriage with no objection. Once such is the case, even the stray allegation of the petitioners/A-2 to A-4 used to abuse her as not of their caste or religion and if they marry another girl, they could get more dowry itself is unbelievable, for the very marriage is love marriage. Even to say that there was any instigation to A-1 by A-2 to A-4 for additional dowry when it is a love marriage and no dowry shown paid originally and as discussed supra of no any payment of dowry by father of de facto complainant after his retirement from his benefits alleged, the question of any payment of additional dowry is unbelievable. It clearly shows the petitioners/A-2 to A-4 are roped without any basis for reasons better known by the de facto complainant and the police investigation in this regard is also perfunctory and baseless and the legal position is very clear that unless from the specific allegations in the complaint against the other relatives of the husband, no cognizance can be taken against the family members, particularly from the tendency of making baseless allegations in roping them and even a stray sentence as suffered harassment in the hands of in-laws, etc., is not sufficient to sustain any such accusation to rope the other family members of the husband of the de facto complainant, so-called victim.
Other Sources :
Index of Quash judgments here.
The Division bench of Apex Court delivered this judgment, emphasizing the need for reasoned judgments and the damage caused by cryptic orders.
From Para 8,
8. The short question, which arises for consideration in this appeal, is whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in dismissing the appellant’s appeal in limine and thereby upholding the order of the Family Judge insofar as it related to awarding permanent alimony of Rs.15,00,000/- to the wife(respondent).
From Para 13,
13. The only question involved in the appeal before the High Court, which was carried to this Court in this appeal by the appellant (husband), was whether the award of permanent alimony of Rs.15,00,000/- by the Family Court to the respondent(wife) was legally and factually sustainable.
15. In our view, mere perusal of the order of the Family Court and the High Court quoted supra, would go to show that both the Courts failed to apply their judicial mind to the factual and legal controversy insofar as award of permanent alimony to the respondent(wife) is concerned. Both the Courts did not even mention the factual narration of the case set up by the parties on the question of award of permanent alimony and without there being any discussion, appreciation, reasoning and categorical findings on the material issues such as, financial earning capacity of husband to pay the alimony and also the financial earning capacity of wife, a direction to pay Rs.15,00,000/- by way of permanent alimony to the wife was given. In our opinion, such direction is wholly unsustainable in law.
16. Time and again, this Court has emphasized on the Courts the need to pass reasoned order in every case, which must contain the narration of the bare facts of the case of the parties to the lis, the issues arising in the case, the submissions urged by the parties, the legal principles applicable to the issues involved and the reasons in support of the findings recorded based on appreciation of evidence on all the material issues arising in the case.
17. It is really unfortunate that neither the Family Court nor the High Court kept in mind these legal principles and passed cryptic and unreasoned orders. Such orders undoubtedly cause prejudice to the parties and in this case, it caused prejudice to the appellant(husband) because the orders of the High Court and Family Court deprived him to know the reasons for fixing the permanent alimony amount of Rs.15,00,000/- payable to his wife.
18. We cannot countenance the manner in which both the Courts passed the order which has compelled us to remand the matter to the Family Court for deciding the issue afresh on merits.
Jalendra Padhiary Vs Pragati Chhotray on 17 April 2018
Citations : [2018 SCC 16 773], [2019 SCC CIV 1 703], [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 391], [2018 AIR SC 2091], [2018 ALD 4 130], [2018 ALR 130 51], [2018 AIC 188 178], [2018 CHN 3 144], [2018 CTC 6 813]
Other Sources :
A Police officer who made an illegal arrest was handed with a sentence of imprisonment for a period of four (04) weeks, and shall also pay fine of Rs.2,000/- in four (04) weeks. The sentence of imprisonment imposed on the respondent is suspended for a period of six (06) weeks.
But then, Court also said the following:
Ramadugu Omkar Varma Vs Ashok Naik on 24 Jan 2020
Subsistence allowance at the rate of Rs.200/- per day shall be deposited by petitioner within four (04) weeks.
A highly technical issue is resolved in affirmative, by the 5-judge Constitutional Bench by interpreting a term, ‘TERM‘.
Whether persons sentenced to imprisonment for life entitled to set-off their under trial period of detention against their sentence?
The Bench said,
Life is uncertain. In more ways than one. Who knows what good may come tomorrow and how many good tomorrows there are still to go ? But , philosophical digressions apart , especially optimistic , the fact that the term of life is of an uncertain duration does not justify the conclusion that the sentence of imprisonment for life is not for a term. The relevant question and , the only one , to ask under section 428 is: Has this person been sentenced to imprisonment for a term ? For the sake of convenience , the question may be split into two parts. One, has this person been sentenced to imprisonment ? And, two, is the imprisonment to which he has been sentenced an imprisonment for a term ? There can possibly be no dispute that a person sentenced to life imprisonment is sentenced to imprisonment. Then , what is the term to which he is sentenced ? The obvious answer to that question is that term to which he has been sentenced is the term of his life. Therefore , a person who is sentenced to life imprisonment is sentenced to imprisonment for term.
Bhagirath Vs Delhi Administration on 16 April, 1985
We have considered with great care the reasoning upon which the decision in Kartar Singh proceeds. With respect, we are unable to agree with the decision. We have already discussed why ’imprisonment for life is imprisonment for a term , within the meaning of section 428. We would like to
add that we find it difficult to agree that the expressions ’imprisonment for life’ and imprisonment for a term’ are used either in the Penal Code or in the Criminal Procedure Code in contra-distinction with each other. Sections 304 , 305 , 307 and 391 of the penal Code undoubtedly provide that persons quilty of the respective offences shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding a certain number of years. But , that is the only manner in which the Legislature could have expressed its intention that persons who are guilty of those offences shall be punished with either of the sentences mentioned in the respective sections. The circumstance on which the learned judges have placed reliance in Kartar Singh , do not afford any evidence , intrinsic or otherwise’ of the use of the two expressions in contra-distinction with each other. Two or more expressions are often used in the same section in order to exhaust the alternatives which are available to the Legislature. That does not mean that there is , necessarily , an antithesis between those expressions.
The reasoning in Kartar Singh that an order of remission does not interfere with the sentence recorded by the court but merely affects the execution of the sentence, stands answered by the interpretation which we have put upon the language of section 428 that persons sentenced to imprisonment for life are sentenced to imprisonment for a term. It is not because of remission that a sentence of life imprisonment becomes an imprisonment for a term.
We have also already answered the last of the reasons given in Kartar Singh that the question is not whether the beneficent provision contained in section 428 should be extended to life convicts on equitable considerations. We enter a most respectful caveat. Equity sustains law and the twain must meet. They cannot run in parallel streams. Equitable considerations must have an important place in the construction of beneficent provisions, particularly in the field of criminal law. To exclude such considerations is to denude law’s benevolence Or its true and lasting content. Lastly , the view expressed by the Joint Committee in its Report does not yield to the inference that the “mischief sought to be remedied has no relevance where gravity of offence requires the imposition of imprisonment for life”. As we have indicated earlier , graver the crime , longer the sentence and , longer the
sentence , greater the need for set-offs and remissions. Punishments are no longer retributory. They are reformative.
The order passed by this Court in Sukhlal Hansda related to the cases of 24 prisoners who were sentenced to life imprisonment. Most of those prisoners had undergone imprisonment for a period which , after taking account the remissions earned by them , exceeded fourteen years. It was
held by this Court that , for the purpose of considering whether the cases of those prisoners should be examined for premature release under the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Jail Manual , there was no reason why the period of imprisonment undergone by them as undertrial prisoners
should not be taken into account. The Court directed that the cases of the prisoners should be considered by the State Government , both for the purpose of setting off the period of detention undergone by them as undertrial prisoners and for taking into account the remissions earned by them. The order passed by the Court does not discuss the point which arises before us though , the observations made therein are consistent more with the view which we have taken than with the view taken in Kartar Singh.
Citations : [1985 SCC CRI 280], [1985 SCALE 1 719], [1985 AIR SC 1050], [1985 SCC 2 580], [1985 CRIMES SC 1 832], [1985 SCR 3 743], [1985 CRILJ 1179], [1985 AWC 11 510], [1985 BOMLR 85 400], [1985 ACR 340]
Other Sources :