Shilpa Sailesh Vs Varun Sreenivasan on 01 May 2023

A Constitution Bench of 5 judges held as follows,

From Para 40,

40. In view of our findings recorded above, we are of the opinion that the decisions of this Court in Manish Goel (supra), Neelam Kumar (supra), Darshan Gupta (supra), Hitesh Bhatnagar (supra), Savitri Pandey (supra) and others have to be read down in the context of the power of this Court given by the Constitution of India to do ‘complete justice’ in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India. In consonance with our findings on the scope and ambit of the power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, in the context of matrimonial disputes arising out of the Hindu Marriage Act, we hold that the power to do‘complete justice’ is not fettered by the doctrine of fault and blame, applicable to petitions for divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a) of theHindu Marriage Act. As held above, this Court’s power to dissolve marriage on settlement by passing a decree of divorce by mutual consent, as well as quash and set aside other proceedings, including criminal proceedings, remains and can be exercised.

From Para 41,

41. Lastly, we must express our opinion on whether a party can directly canvass before this Court the ground of irretrievable breakdown by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. In Poonam v. Sumit Tanwar65, a two judges’ bench of this Court has rightly held that any such attempt must be spurned and not accepted, as the parties should not be permitted to file a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, or for that matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court, and seek divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The reason is that the remedy of a person aggrieved by the decision of the competent judicial forum is to approach the superior tribunal/forum for redressal of his/her grievance. The parties should not be permitted to circumvent the procedure by resorting to the writ jurisdiction under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, as the case may be. Secondly, and more importantly, relief under Article 32 of the Constitution of India can be sought to enforce the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution of India, and on the proof of infringement thereof. Judicial orders passed by the court in, or in relation to, the proceedings pending before it, are not amenable to correction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.66 Therefore, a party cannot file a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and seek relief of dissolution of marriage directly from this Court. While we accept the said view, we also clarify that reference in Poonam (supra) to Manish Goel (supra) and the observation that it is questionable whether the period of six months for moving the second motion can be waived has not been approved by us.

Shilpa Sailesh Vs Varun Sreenivasan on 01 May 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Bar Council of India Vs Bonnie Foi Law College and Ors

Posted on September 24, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A constitution bench of Apex Court decided the fate of AIBE exam (SLP(C)No.22337/2008)…

Bar Council of India Vs Bonnie Foi Law College and Ors on 20 Sep 2022

2022-Sep-27

Here is the causelist for 27 Sep 2022 and 28 Sep 2022

2022-09-27 Court-3 Constitution Bench

And here is the Order passed on 27-Sep-2022, saying Part-Heard.

2022-09-27 Bar Council of India Vs Bonnie Foi Law College and Ors on 27 Sep 2022

2022-Sep-28

Arguments heard. Hearing Concluded. Judgment reserved.

2022-09-28 Bar Council of India Vs Bonnie Foi Law College and Ors on 28 Sep 2022

2023-Feb-10

After around 3 months, the pronouncement of the judgment happened today. The highlights from the judgment are:

From Para 14,

d. Currently, any person who is provisionally enrolled is allowed to practice for two years, but is allowed to take the All India Bar Examination not just for those two years but for any number of times till he passes the All India Bar Examination. The date of reckoning seniority of the candidate is from the date of the provisional enrolment. However, it was submitted that unlimited number of attempts would not be in line with the scheme proposed by this Court and must be limited to any number that this Court deems fit.

From Para 30,

30. We are unable to agree with the reasoning in V. Sudeer24 that because the State Bar Councils’ power for providing training or for holding examination was taken away by the 1973 Amendment, it ipso facto amounts to taking away such powers if they so vested with the Bar Council of India.The legislative object was clear i.e. not to confer such powers on the State Bar Councils. However, that could not affect the position of the power of the Bar Council of India, and naturally such a power existed. If the Bar Council of India never had such a power, then the same could not be read by implication. But, if the Bar Council of India had sufficient powers, then the 1973 Amendment would not take away those powers of the Bar Council of India as the said amendment did not deal with the aspect of the powers of the Bar Council of India.

From Para 31,

31. In addition, the learned Judges in V. Sudeer25 opined that if such a power has to be conferred, it should be conferred legislatively. While in principle, there can be no disagreement with the broad proposition, the issue is whether such a power is already existing with the Bar Council of India
under the statutory provisions. The functions of the Bar Council of India, as specified under Section 7, inter alia prescribe an exercise of general supervision and control over the State Bar Councils under Clause (g) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 7. Further, under Sub-Clause (l), the Bar Council of India has the power to perform all other functions conferred on it by or under the said Act and under Clause (m) to do all other things necessary for discharging the aforesaid functions. The powers are, thus, wide and extensive as conferred by the legislature. Thus, when under Section 24(1), the Bar Council of India has the statutory power of prescribing Rules subject to which a person may be treated as qualified to be admitted as an Advocate in the State roll, then we believe that the Bar Council of India is not devoid of its jurisdiction in undertaking a pre-enrolment training course or examination prescribed by the Bar Council of India.

From Para 32,

32. In case of any subsisting doubt, we must refer to Section 49(1)(ag) of the said Act, which while dealing with the general powers of the Bar Council of India to make rules, specifically stipulates that the class orcategory of person entitled to be enrolled as advocates, is an aspect for which all powers have been conferred on the Bar Council of India. Thus, the provision for an examination for enrolment of advocates by the Bar Council of India can hardly be doubted. We had specified at the inception itself that quality control of entry into the Bar is the need of the hour.

From Paras 33 and 35,

33. The objective of the legislature while giving wide powers to the Bar Council of India under Section 49, which gives it the powers to make Rules, read with Section 24(3)(d), which gives it the powers to prescribe the norms for entitlement to be enrolled as an Advocate under the Rules of the Bar Council of India, leads us to the conclusion that these are adequate powers with the Bar Council of India under the said Act to provide such norms and Rules.
34. We are, thus, of the view that while considering the questions referred to us, the only conclusion which can be laid is that the interdict placed by the judgment of this Court in V. Sudeer26 on the powers of the Bar Council of India cannot be sustained and we cannot hold that V. Sudeer27 lays down the correct position of law.

Bar Council of India Vs Bonnie Foi Law College and Ors on 10 Feb 2023 (FULL)

Citations:

Other Sources:

CPIO SCI Vs Subhash Chandra Agarwal on 13 Nov 2019

Posted on July 28, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A constitution bench of Apex Court held as follows:

From Para 59,

59. Reading of the aforesaid judicial precedents, in our opinion, would indicate that personal records, including name, address, physical, mental and psychological status, marks obtained, grades and answer sheets, are all treated as personal information. Similarly, professional records, including qualification, performance, evaluation reports, ACRs, disciplinary proceedings, etc. are all personal information. Medical records, treatment, choice of
medicine, list of hospitals and doctors visited, findings recorded, including that of the family members, information relating to assets, liabilities, income tax returns, details of investments, lending and borrowing, etc. are personal information. Such personal information is entitled to protection from unwarranted invasion of privacy and conditional access is available when stipulation of larger public interest is satisfied. This list is indicative and not exhaustive.

CPIO SCI Vs Subhash Chandra Agarwal on 13 Nov 2019 Para 59

Citations : [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 1459]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/101637927/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5dcc51443321bc4f5eaf25b5

Nathi Devi Vs Radha Devi Gupta on 17 Dec 2004

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A 5-judge Constitutional Bench held as follows regarding when the need of interpreting a statute arises.

The interpretative function of the Court is to discover the true legislative intent. It is trite that in interpreting a statute the Court must, if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Courts are not concerned with the policy involved or that the results are injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In considering whether there is ambiguity, the Court must look at the statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or unreasonableness which may render the statute unconstitutional.
It is equally well settled that in interpreting a statute, effort should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the Legislature. The Courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as obvious drafting errors. (See \026 State of U.P. and others vs. Vijay Anand Maharaj : AIR 1963 SC 946 ; Rananjaya Singh vs. Baijnath Singh and others : AIR 1954 SC 749 ; Kanai Lal Sur vs. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan : AIR 1957 SC 907; Nyadar Singh vs. Union of India and others : AIR 1988 SC 1979 ; J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. : AIR 1961 S.C. 1170 and Ghanshyam Das vs. Regional Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax : AIR 1964 S.C. 766).
It is well settled that literal interpretation should be given to a statute if the same does not lead to an absurdity.

Nathi Devi Vs Radha Devi Gupta on 17 Dec 2004

Citations : [2005 AIR SC 648], [2005 DRJ SUPP 80 518], [2005 JCR SC 2 71], [2005 JT SC 1 1], [2005 KLT SC 1 443], [2005 SCC 2 271], [2005 DRJ SUPPL 80 518]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/641119/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adf2e4b01497114129b9

State of Punjab Vs Jagdev Singh Talwandi on 16 Dec 1983

Posted on January 14, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A 5-judge Constitutional bench of Supreme Court deprecated the “practice increasingly adopted by the High Courts, of pronouncing the final order without a reasoned judgment“.

We would like to take this opportunity to point out that serious difficulties arise on account of the practice increasingly adopted by the High Courts, of pronouncing the final order without a reasoned judgment. It is desirable that the final order which the High Court intends to pass should not be announced until a reasoned judgment is ready for pronouncement. Suppose, for example, that a final order without a reasoned judgment is announced by the High Court that a house shall be demolished, or that the custody of a child shall be handed over to one parent as against the order, or that a person accused of a serious charge is acquitted, or that a statute is unconstitutional or, as in the instant case, that a detenu be released from detention. If the object of passing such orders is to ensure speedy compliance with them, that object is more often defeated by the aggrieved party filing a special leave petition in this Court against the order passed by the High Court. That places this Court in a predicament because, without the benefit of the reasoning of the High Court, it is difficult for this Court to allow the bare order to be implemented. The result inevitably is that the operation of the order passed by the High Court has to be stayed pending delivery of the reasoned judgment.
It may be thought that such orders are passed by this Court and therefore there is no reason why the High Courts should not do the same. We would like to point out respectfully that the orders passed by this Court are final and no appeal lies against them. The Supreme Court is the final Court in thehierarchy of our courts. Besides, orders without a reasoned judgment are passed by this Court very rarely, under exceptional circumstances. Orders passed by the High Court are subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and other provisions of theconcerned statutes. We thought it necessary to make these observations in order that a practice which is not very desirable and which achieves no useful purpose may not grow out of its present infancy.

State of Punjab Vs Jagdev Singh Talwandi on 16 Dec 1983

Indiankanoon version:

State of Punjab Vs Jagdev Singh Talwandi on 16 Dec 1983 (Indiankanoon)

Casemine version:

State of Punjab Vs Jagdev Singh Talwandi on 16 Dec 1983 (Casemine)

Citations : [1984 CRLJ SC 177], [1984 SCC 1 596], [1984 CRIMES SC 1 224], [1983 SCALE 2 942], [1984 SCC CRI 135], [1984 SCR 2 50], [1984 AIR SC 444]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1158281/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac0be4b014971140dde1#

Bhagirath Vs Delhi Administration on 16 April, 1985

Posted on December 20, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A highly technical issue is resolved in affirmative, by the 5-judge Constitutional Bench by interpreting a term, ‘TERM‘.

Whether persons sentenced to imprisonment for life entitled to set-off their under trial period of detention against their sentence?

The Bench said,

Life is uncertain. In more ways than one. Who knows what good may come tomorrow and how many good tomorrows there are still to go ? But , philosophical digressions apart , especially optimistic , the fact that the term of life is of an uncertain duration does not justify the conclusion that the sentence of imprisonment for life is not for a term. The relevant question and , the only one , to ask under section 428 is: Has this person been sentenced to imprisonment for a term ? For the sake of convenience , the question may be split into two parts. One, has this person been sentenced to imprisonment ? And, two, is the imprisonment to which he has been sentenced an imprisonment for a term ? There can possibly be no dispute that a person sentenced to life imprisonment is sentenced to imprisonment. Then , what is the term to which he is sentenced ? The obvious answer to that question is that term to which he has been sentenced is the term of his life. Therefore , a person who is sentenced to life imprisonment is sentenced to imprisonment for term.

In conclusion,

We have considered with great care the reasoning upon which the decision in Kartar Singh proceeds. With respect, we are unable to agree with the decision. We have already discussed why ’imprisonment for life is imprisonment for a term , within the meaning of section 428. We would like to
add that we find it difficult to agree that the expressions ’imprisonment for life’ and imprisonment for a term’ are used either in the Penal Code or in the Criminal Procedure Code in contra-distinction with each other. Sections 304 , 305 , 307 and 391 of the penal Code undoubtedly provide that persons quilty of the respective offences shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding a certain number of years. But , that is the only manner in which the Legislature could have expressed its intention that persons who are guilty of those offences shall be punished with either of the sentences mentioned in the respective sections. The circumstance on which the learned judges have placed reliance in Kartar Singh , do not afford any evidence , intrinsic or otherwise’ of the use of the two expressions in contra-distinction with each other. Two or more expressions are often used in the same section in order to exhaust the alternatives which are available to the Legislature. That does not mean that there is , necessarily , an antithesis between those expressions.
The reasoning in Kartar Singh that an order of remission does not interfere with the sentence recorded by the court but merely affects the execution of the sentence, stands answered by the interpretation which we have put upon the language of section 428 that persons sentenced to imprisonment for life are sentenced to imprisonment for a term. It is not because of remission that a sentence of life imprisonment becomes an imprisonment for a term.
We have also already answered the last of the reasons given in Kartar Singh that the question is not whether the beneficent provision contained in section 428 should be extended to life convicts on equitable considerations. We enter a most respectful caveat. Equity sustains law and the twain must meet. They cannot run in parallel streams. Equitable considerations must have an important place in the construction of beneficent provisions, particularly in the field of criminal law. To exclude such considerations is to denude law’s benevolence Or its true and lasting content. Lastly , the view expressed by the Joint Committee in its Report does not yield to the inference that the “mischief sought to be remedied has no relevance where gravity of offence requires the imposition of imprisonment for life”. As we have indicated earlier , graver the crime , longer the sentence and , longer the
sentence , greater the need for set-offs and remissions. Punishments are no longer retributory. They are reformative.
The order passed by this Court in Sukhlal Hansda related to the cases of 24 prisoners who were sentenced to life imprisonment. Most of those prisoners had undergone imprisonment for a period which , after taking account the remissions earned by them , exceeded fourteen years. It was
held by this Court that , for the purpose of considering whether the cases of those prisoners should be examined for premature release under the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Jail Manual , there was no reason why the period of imprisonment undergone by them as undertrial prisoners
should not be taken into account. The Court directed that the cases of the prisoners should be considered by the State Government , both for the purpose of setting off the period of detention undergone by them as undertrial prisoners and for taking into account the remissions earned by them. The order passed by the Court does not discuss the point which arises before us though , the observations made therein are consistent more with the view which we have taken than with the view taken in Kartar Singh.

Bhagirath Vs Delhi Administration on 16 April, 1985

Citations : [1985 SCC CRI 280], [1985 SCALE 1 719], [1985 AIR SC 1050], [1985 SCC 2 580], [1985 CRIMES SC 1 832], [1985 SCR 3 743], [1985 CRILJ 1179], [1985 AWC 11 510], [1985 BOMLR 85 400], [1985 ACR 340]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/733492/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac19e4b014971140e060

Kedar Nath Singh Vs State of Bihar on 20 Jan 1962

Posted on October 28, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A 5-judge bench decided the test to apply in case of a sedition charge against an individual, while upholding the constitutional validity of the sedition section i.e., 124A IPC.

Kedar Nath Singh Vs State of Bihar on 20 Jan 1962

Citations : [1963 ANWR 1 40], [1962 BLJR 10 636], [1963 MLJ SC 1 40], [1962 SUPP SCR 2 769], [1962 CRI LJ 2 103], [1962 SCR SUPL 2 769], [1962 AIR SC 955], [1962 AIR SC 995], [1962 SCC 0 955], [1962 CRLJ 103], [1962 AIR SCC 955], [1962 SCR 2 769], [1962 SC 0 955], [1962 SUPSCR 2 769], [1962 SUPPSCR 2 769], [1962 AIR 955], [1962 SCR SUPP 2 769]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/111867/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab1fe4b014971140bb97

P. Ramachandra Rao Vs State of Karnataka on 16 Apr 2002

Posted on October 11, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Guidelines around fixed timelines given by earlier SC judgments were deleted in this 5-Judge judgment in respect of u/s 468 CrPC

P. Ramachandra Rao Vs State of Karnataka on 16 Apr 2002

Concurring opinion from Justice Doraiswamy Raju.

P. Ramachandra Rao Vs State of Karnataka on 16 Apr 2002 (DoraiswamyRaju J)

Citations : 2002 MHLJ SC 3 1452002 SUPREME 3 2602002 SCC 4 5782002 SCALE 3 4972002 MPLJ SC 3 32002 CRLJ SC 25472002 AIR SC 18412002 BOMCR CRI SC 8592002 AIR SC 18562002 SCR 3 602012 SCC 9 4302002 PLJR 3 2292002 KLT SC 2 1892002 WLN 4 7512002 CRIMES SC 2 2002002 JCR SC 2 2732002 RCR CRIMINAL 2 5532002 OLR 1 6972002 SCR 3 682002 UC 2 2072002 JT SC 4 922002 ALD CRI 1 7922002 GLH 2 5182002 ACR SC 2 13822002 CRILJ 25472002 GLR 2 15492002 SCC CRI 8302002 MHLJ 3 1452002 AIR SCW 18412002 MPLJ SC 3

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/516669/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adb4e4b014971141208d

Public Interest Foundation and Ors Vs Union of India and Anr on 25 September 2018

Posted on May 12, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court respecting separation of powers in the Indian democracy, acknowledged that there are criminals to a large part in Parliament and in State Legislatures but held that it cannot legislate on behalf of Parliament. Still it issue some guidelines as follows.

Each contesting candidate shall fill up the form as provided by the Election Commission and the form must contain all the particulars as required therein.
It shall state, in bold letters, with regard to the criminal cases pending against the candidate.
If a candidate is contesting an election on the ticket of a particular party, he/she is required to inform the party about the criminal cases pending against him/her.
The concerned political party shall be obligated to put up on its website the aforesaid information pertaining to candidates having criminal antecedents.
The candidate as well as the concerned political party shall issue a declaration in the widely circulated newspapers in the locality about the antecedents of the candidate and also give wide publicity in the electronic media. When we say wide publicity, we mean that the same shall be done at least thrice after filing of the nomination papers.

Public Interest Foundation and Ors Vs Union of India and Anr on 25 September 2018

Citations: [(2019) 3 SCC 224]

Other Source links: https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2018/09/25/candidates-with-criminal-antecedents-parliament-has-exclusive-jurisdiction-to-lay-down-disqualification-for-membership-court-cannot-legislate-sc/ or https://indiankanoon.org/doc/146283621/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5baaa0749eff430ce652f5c8

The directions given in this Judgment were not followed by Political parties and their candidates, Hence a contempt petition was filed for violating Supreme Court Orders here.

New India Assurance Co Ltd Vs Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt Ltd on 4 March 2020

Posted on May 10, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Vineet Saran sitting in a 5-Judge bench delivered this reference judgment on the following two questions of law.

Question-1

Whether the District Forum has power to extend the time for filing of response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days, as envisaged under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act?

Answered as follows:

To conclude, we hold that our answer to the first question is that the District Forum has no power to extend the time for filing the response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days in addition to 30 days as is envisaged under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act

Question-2

What would be the commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986?

Answered as follows:

the answer to the second question is that the commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act would be from the date of receipt of the notice accompanied with the complaint by the opposite party, and not mere receipt of the notice of the complaint.

New India Assurance Co Ltd Vs Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt Ltd on 4 March 2020

Citations: [AIR 2020 SC 1267], [2020 SCC OnLine SC 287]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/96395504/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e69d2383321bc624fea2d34

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 5-Judge Constitiutional Bench Decision

Shilpa Sailesh Vs Varun Sreenivasan on 01 May 2023

Bar Council of India Vs Bonnie Foi Law College and Ors

CPIO SCI Vs Subhash Chandra Agarwal on 13 Nov 2019

Nathi Devi Vs Radha Devi Gupta on 17 Dec 2004

State of Punjab Vs Jagdev Singh Talwandi on 16 Dec 1983

Bhagirath Vs Delhi Administration on 16 April, 1985

Kedar Nath Singh Vs State of Bihar on 20 Jan 1962

P. Ramachandra Rao Vs State of Karnataka on 16 Apr 2002

Public Interest Foundation and Ors Vs Union of India and Anr on 25 September 2018

New India Assurance Co Ltd Vs Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt Ltd on 4 March 2020