State of Punjab Vs Jagdev Singh Talwandi on 16 Dec 1983

Posted on January 14 by ShadesOfKnife

A 5-judge Constitutional bench of Supreme Court deprecated the “practice increasingly adopted by the High Courts, of pronouncing the final order without a reasoned judgment“.

We would like to take this opportunity to point out that serious difficulties arise on account of the practice increasingly adopted by the High Courts, of pronouncing the final order without a reasoned judgment. It is desirable that the final order which the High Court intends to pass should not be announced until a reasoned judgment is ready for pronouncement. Suppose, for example, that a final order without a reasoned judgment is announced by the High Court that a house shall be demolished, or that the custody of a child shall be handed over to one parent as against the order, or that a person accused of a serious charge is acquitted, or that a statute is unconstitutional or, as in the instant case, that a detenu be released from detention. If the object of passing such orders is to ensure speedy compliance with them, that object is more often defeated by the aggrieved party filing a special leave petition in this Court against the order passed by the High Court. That places this Court in a predicament because, without the benefit of the reasoning of the High Court, it is difficult for this Court to allow the bare order to be implemented. The result inevitably is that the operation of the order passed by the High Court has to be stayed pending delivery of the reasoned judgment.
It may be thought that such orders are passed by this Court and therefore there is no reason why the High Courts should not do the same. We would like to point out respectfully that the orders passed by this Court are final and no appeal lies against them. The Supreme Court is the final Court in the hierarchy of our courts. Besides, orders without a reasoned judgment are passed by this Court very rarely, under exceptional circumstances. Orders passed by the High Court are subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and other provisions of the concerned statutes. We thought it necessary to make these observations in order that a practice which is not very desirable and which achieves no useful purpose may not grow out of its present infancy.

Indiankanoon version:

State of Punjab Vs Jagdev Singh Talwandi on 16 Dec 1983 (Indiankanoon)

Casemine version:

State of Punjab Vs Jagdev Singh Talwandi on 16 Dec 1983 (Casemine)

Citations : [1984 CRLJ SC 177], [1984 SCC 1 596], [1984 CRIMES SC 1 224], [1983 SCALE 2 942], [1984 SCC CRI 135], [1984 SCR 2 50], [1984 AIR SC 444]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1158281/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac0be4b014971140dde1#

Bhagirath Vs Delhi Administration on 16 April, 1985

Posted on December 20, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A highly technical issue is resolved in affirmative, by the 5-judge Constitutional Bench by interpreting a term, ‘TERM‘.

Whether persons sentenced to imprisonment for life entitled to set-off their under trial period of detention against their sentence?

The Bench said,

Life is uncertain. In more ways than one. Who knows what good may come tomorrow and how many good tomorrows there are still to go ? But , philosophical digressions apart , especially optimistic , the fact that the term of life is of an uncertain duration does not justify the conclusion that the sentence of imprisonment for life is not for a term. The relevant question and , the only one , to ask under section 428 is: Has this person been sentenced to imprisonment for a term ? For the sake of convenience , the question may be split into two parts. One, has this person been sentenced to imprisonment ? And, two, is the imprisonment to which he has been sentenced an imprisonment for a term ? There can possibly be no dispute that a person sentenced to life imprisonment is sentenced to imprisonment. Then , what is the term to which he is sentenced ? The obvious answer to that question is that term to which he has been sentenced is the term of his life. Therefore , a person who is sentenced to life imprisonment is sentenced to imprisonment for term.

In conclusion,

We have considered with great care the reasoning upon which the decision in Kartar Singh proceeds. With respect, we are unable to agree with the decision. We have already discussed why ’imprisonment for life is imprisonment for a term , within the meaning of section 428. We would like to
add that we find it difficult to agree that the expressions ’imprisonment for life’ and imprisonment for a term’ are used either in the Penal Code or in the Criminal Procedure Code in contra-distinction with each other. Sections 304 , 305 , 307 and 391 of the penal Code undoubtedly provide that persons quilty of the respective offences shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding a certain number of years. But , that is the only manner in which the Legislature could have expressed its intention that persons who are guilty of those offences shall be punished with either of the sentences mentioned in the respective sections. The circumstance on which the learned judges have placed reliance in Kartar Singh , do not afford any evidence , intrinsic or otherwise’ of the use of the two expressions in contra-distinction with each other. Two or more expressions are often used in the same section in order to exhaust the alternatives which are available to the Legislature. That does not mean that there is , necessarily , an antithesis between those expressions.
The reasoning in Kartar Singh that an order of remission does not interfere with the sentence recorded by the court but merely affects the execution of the sentence, stands answered by the interpretation which we have put upon the language of section 428 that persons sentenced to imprisonment for life are sentenced to imprisonment for a term. It is not because of remission that a sentence of life imprisonment becomes an imprisonment for a term.
We have also already answered the last of the reasons given in Kartar Singh that the question is not whether the beneficent provision contained in section 428 should be extended to life convicts on equitable considerations. We enter a most respectful caveat. Equity sustains law and the twain must meet. They cannot run in parallel streams. Equitable considerations must have an important place in the construction of beneficent provisions, particularly in the field of criminal law. To exclude such considerations is to denude law’s benevolence Or its true and lasting content. Lastly , the view expressed by the Joint Committee in its Report does not yield to the inference that the “mischief sought to be remedied has no relevance where gravity of offence requires the imposition of imprisonment for life”. As we have indicated earlier , graver the crime , longer the sentence and , longer the
sentence , greater the need for set-offs and remissions. Punishments are no longer retributory. They are reformative.
The order passed by this Court in Sukhlal Hansda related to the cases of 24 prisoners who were sentenced to life imprisonment. Most of those prisoners had undergone imprisonment for a period which , after taking account the remissions earned by them , exceeded fourteen years. It was
held by this Court that , for the purpose of considering whether the cases of those prisoners should be examined for premature release under the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Jail Manual , there was no reason why the period of imprisonment undergone by them as undertrial prisoners
should not be taken into account. The Court directed that the cases of the prisoners should be considered by the State Government , both for the purpose of setting off the period of detention undergone by them as undertrial prisoners and for taking into account the remissions earned by them. The order passed by the Court does not discuss the point which arises before us though , the observations made therein are consistent more with the view which we have taken than with the view taken in Kartar Singh.

Bhagirath Vs Delhi Administration on 16 April, 1985

Citations : [1985 SCC CRI 280], [1985 SCALE 1 719], [1985 AIR SC 1050], [1985 SCC 2 580], [1985 CRIMES SC 1 832], [1985 SCR 3 743], [1985 CRILJ 1179], [1985 AWC 11 510], [1985 BOMLR 85 400], [1985 ACR 340]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/733492/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac19e4b014971140e060

Kedar Nath Singh Vs State of Bihar on 20 Jan 1962

Posted on October 28, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A 5-judge bench decided the test to apply in case of a sedition charge against an individual, while upholding the constitutional validity of the sedition section i.e., 124A IPC.

Kedar Nath Singh Vs State of Bihar on 20 Jan 1962

Citations : [1963 ANWR 1 40], [1962 BLJR 10 636], [1963 MLJ SC 1 40], [1962 SUPP SCR 2 769], [1962 CRI LJ 2 103], [1962 SCR SUPL 2 769], [1962 AIR SC 955], [1962 AIR SC 995], [1962 SCC 0 955], [1962 CRLJ 103], [1962 AIR SCC 955], [1962 SCR 2 769], [1962 SC 0 955], [1962 SUPSCR 2 769], [1962 SUPPSCR 2 769], [1962 AIR 955], [1962 SCR SUPP 2 769]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/111867/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab1fe4b014971140bb97

P. Ramachandra Rao Vs State of Karnataka on 16 Apr 2002

Posted on October 11, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Guidelines around fixed timelines given by earlier SC judgments were deleted in this 5-Judge judgment in respect of u/s 468 CrPC

P. Ramachandra Rao Vs State of Karnataka on 16 Apr 2002

Concurring opinion from Justice Doraiswamy Raju.

P. Ramachandra Rao Vs State of Karnataka on 16 Apr 2002 (DoraiswamyRaju J)

Citations : 2002 MHLJ SC 3 1452002 SUPREME 3 2602002 SCC 4 5782002 SCALE 3 4972002 MPLJ SC 3 32002 CRLJ SC 25472002 AIR SC 18412002 BOMCR CRI SC 8592002 AIR SC 18562002 SCR 3 602012 SCC 9 4302002 PLJR 3 2292002 KLT SC 2 1892002 WLN 4 7512002 CRIMES SC 2 2002002 JCR SC 2 2732002 RCR CRIMINAL 2 5532002 OLR 1 6972002 SCR 3 682002 UC 2 2072002 JT SC 4 922002 ALD CRI 1 7922002 GLH 2 5182002 ACR SC 2 13822002 CRILJ 25472002 GLR 2 15492002 SCC CRI 8302002 MHLJ 3 1452002 AIR SCW 18412002 MPLJ SC 3

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/516669/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adb4e4b014971141208d

Public Interest Foundation and Ors Vs Union of India and Anr on 25 September 2018

Posted on May 12, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court respecting separation of powers in the Indian democracy, acknowledged that there are criminals to a large part in Parliament and in State Legislatures but held that it cannot legislate on behalf of Parliament. Still it issue some guidelines as follows.

Each contesting candidate shall fill up the form as provided by the Election Commission and the form must contain all the particulars as required therein.
It shall state, in bold letters, with regard to the criminal cases pending against the candidate.
If a candidate is contesting an election on the ticket of a particular party, he/she is required to inform the party about the criminal cases pending against him/her.
The concerned political party shall be obligated to put up on its website the aforesaid information pertaining to candidates having criminal antecedents.
The candidate as well as the concerned political party shall issue a declaration in the widely circulated newspapers in the locality about the antecedents of the candidate and also give wide publicity in the electronic media. When we say wide publicity, we mean that the same shall be done at least thrice after filing of the nomination papers.

Public Interest Foundation and Ors Vs Union of India and Anr on 25 September 2018

Citations: [(2019) 3 SCC 224]

Other Source links: https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2018/09/25/candidates-with-criminal-antecedents-parliament-has-exclusive-jurisdiction-to-lay-down-disqualification-for-membership-court-cannot-legislate-sc/ or https://indiankanoon.org/doc/146283621/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5baaa0749eff430ce652f5c8

The directions given in this Judgment were not followed by Political parties and their candidates, Hence a contempt petition was filed for violating Supreme Court Orders here.

New India Assurance Co Ltd Vs Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt Ltd on 4 March 2020

Posted on May 10, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Vineet Saran sitting in a 5-Judge bench delivered this reference judgment on the following two questions of law.

Question-1

Whether the District Forum has power to extend the time for filing of response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days, as envisaged under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act?

Answered as follows:

To conclude, we hold that our answer to the first question is that the District Forum has no power to extend the time for filing the response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days in addition to 30 days as is envisaged under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act

Question-2

What would be the commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986?

Answered as follows:

the answer to the second question is that the commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act would be from the date of receipt of the notice accompanied with the complaint by the opposite party, and not mere receipt of the notice of the complaint.

New India Assurance Co Ltd Vs Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt Ltd on 4 March 2020

Citations: [AIR 2020 SC 1267], [2020 SCC OnLine SC 287]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/96395504/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e69d2383321bc624fea2d34

Kehar Singh and Anr Vs Union of India and Anr on 16 December 1988

Posted on April 15, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

This is the Writ Petition filed by one Kehar Singh who was accused and convicted for the consipracy and murder of Indira Gandhi on the following questions.

1. Whether there is justification for the view that when exercising his powers under Art. 72 the President is precluded from entering into the merits of a case decided finally by this Court.

2. To what areas does the power to scrutinise extend?

3. Whether judicial review extends to an examination of the order passed by the President under Art. 72 of the Constitution.

4. Whether the petitioner is entitled to an oral hearing from the President on his petition invoking the powers under Article 72.

Supreme Courts answers as,

We are of the view that it is open to the President in the exercise of the power vested in him by Art. 72 of the Constitution to scrutinise the evidence on the record of the criminal case and come to a different conclusion from that recorded by the court in regard to the guilt of, and sentence imposed on, the accused. In doing so, the President does not amend or modify or supersede the judicial record. The judicial record remains intact, and undisturbed. The president acts in a wholly different plane from that in which the Court acted. He acts under a constitutional power, the nature of which is entirely different from the judicial power and cannot be regarded as an extension of it. And this is so, notwithstanding that the practical effect of the Presidential act is to remove the stigma of guilt from the accused or to remit the sentence imposed on him.

and…

It is apparent that the power under Art. 72 entitles the President to examine the record of evidence of the criminal case and to determine for himself whether the case is one deserving the grant of the relief falling within that power. We are of opinion that the President is entitled to go into the merits of the case notwithstanding that it has been judicially concluded by the consideration given to it by this Court.

Kehar Singh and Anr Vs Union of India and Anr on 16 December 1988

Citations: [1988 SUPP SCR 3 1102], [1989 SCC 1 204], [1989 SCALE 1 242], [1988 SCR SUPL 3 1102], [1989 MPJR SC 10], [1989 CRLJ SC 941], [1989 CRILJ 941], [1988 SCALE 2 1565], [1988 SCR SUPP 3 1102], [1989 AIR SC 653], [1989 CRIMES SC 1 238], [1989 PLJR 23], [1989 SCC CRI 86], [1988 JT 4 693]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1152284/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aac9e4b014971140afa4

Disclaimer:

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from main.sci.gov.in/judgments, judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

I have no control to remove copies of this document(s) that may be available on websites of High Courts or Supreme Court of India or any of the many other sites, law journal or reporters which carry the same judgment in it’s entirety, not I can remove references/links to this document(s) from the results of Search Engines such as Google.com.

Hardeep Singh Vs State of Punjab and Ors on 10 January, 2014

Posted on March 20, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Apex court held some key aspects in this landmark judgment such as,

What is the stage at which power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised?
Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. could only mean evidence tested by cross examination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned?
Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word “evidence” is limited to the evidence recorded during trial?
What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood convicted?
Does the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not charged or who have been discharged?

Hardeep Singh Vs State of Punjab and Ors on 10 January, 2014

Citations : [2014 SCC CRI 2 86], [2014 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 623], [2014 SUPREME 1 132], [2014 SLT 1 465], [2014 AIOL 21], [2014 SCC 3 92], [2014 CRIMES SC 1 133], [2014 AIR SC 1400], [2014 BOMCR CRI SC 1 772], [2014 ALLMR CRI SC 801], [2014 AIR SC 667], [2014 CRLJ SC 1118], [2014 JLJR SC 2 385], [2014 SCALE 1 241], [2014 SCC ONLINE SC 26], [2014 KLJ 1 410], [2014 AIC 135 86], [2014 ALD CRL SC 2 152], [2014 PLJR 2 482], [2014 KHC 1 170], [2014 ALLCC 85 313], [2014 CCR SC 1 244], [2014 ADJ 1 727], [2014 LW CRL 1 440], [2014 UC 1 304], [2014 CGLRW SC 1 491], [2014 RLW SC 1 727], [2014 SCJ 2 366], [2015 NCC 1 613], [2014 AD SC 1 609], [2014 JT SC 1 412], [2014 CAL LJ 2 75], [2014 KLT SC 1 336], [2014 AIR SCW 667]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/78958066/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af56e4b014971141618b

The latest case law from SC on this subject is here.

M.S.Sheriff Vs The State of Madras and Others on 18 March, 1954

Posted on March 17, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

This is the grand old daddy judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court, which says deal with perjury first.

From Para 15, the 5-judge bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

15. As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard and fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment.

From Para 16, reason for disposing of perjury (a criminal offence first) given,

16. Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust. This, however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under Section 476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished.

From the final Para 17, wherein the 4 ongoing Civil suits are stayed and the criminal prosecution u/s 193 IPC was allowed to go ahead.

The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed but with no order about costs. Civil Suits Nos. 311 of 1951 to 314 of 1951, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, will be stayed till the conclusion of the prosecution under section 193, Indian Penal Code. As the plaintiffs there are parties here, there is no difficulty about making such an order.

M.S.Sheriff Vs The State of Madras and Others on 18 March, 1954

Equivalent citations: [1954 SCR 1229], [1954 AIR SC 397], [1954 CRILJ 1019], [1954 LW 67 625], [1954 SCR 1 1144]

Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr Vs Meenakshi Marwah & Anr on 11 March, 2005

Posted on June 12, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This is an important judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court on a contention point as documented in Para 5,

5. The principal controversy revolves round the interpretation of the expression “when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court” occurring in clause (b)(ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 Cr.P.C.

Simply put, if a document is forged before being submitted in a court, there is no bar to file a complaint on the accused of the forgery under clause (b)(ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 Cr.P.C.

A Magistrate may take cognizance of any offence
(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence,
(b) upon a police report of such facts, and
(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed.

From a victim standpoint who is facing an offender of forgery, thereafter in this case, the respondents moved an application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. requesting the Court to file a criminal complaint against appellant no.1 as the will set up by him was forged.

From Paras 23-26, very valuable aspect is explained ‘expedient in the interests of justice‘:

23. In view of the language used in Section 340 CrPC the court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the section is conditioned by the words “court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice”. This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint. The broad view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged document remediless. Any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remediless, has to be discarded.

24. There is another consideration which has to be kept in mind. Sub-section (1) of Section 340 CrPC contemplates holding of a preliminary enquiry. Normally, a direction for filing of a complaint is not made during the pendency of the proceeding before the court and this is done at the stage when the proceeding is concluded and the final judgment is rendered. Section 341 provides for an appeal against an order directing filing of the complaint. The hearing and ultimate decision of the appeal is bound to take time. Section 343(2) confers a discretion upon a court trying the complaint to adjourn the hearing of the case if it is brought to its notice that an appeal is pending against the decision arrived at in the judicial proceeding out of which the matter has arisen. In view of these provisions, the complaint case may not proceed at all for decades specially in matters arising out of civil suits where decisions are challenged in successive appellate fora which are time-consuming. It is also to be noticed that there is no provision of appeal against an order passed under Section 343(2), whereby hearing of the case is adjourned until the decision of the appeal. These provisions show that, in reality, the procedure prescribed for filing a complaint by the court is such that it may not fructify in the actual trial of the offender for an unusually long period. Delay in prosecution of a guilty person comes to his advantage as witnesses become reluctant to give evidence and the evidence gets lost. This important consideration dissuades us from accepting the broad interpretation sought to be placed upon clause (b)(ii).

25. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision would also operate where after commission of an act of forgery the document is subsequently produced in court, is capable of great misuse. As pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh after preparing a forged document or committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to get a proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue court, either by himself or through someone set up by him and simply file the document in the said proceeding. He would thus be protected from prosecution, either at the instance of a private party or the police until the court, where the document has been filed, itself chooses to file a complaint. The litigation may be a prolonged one due to which the actual trial of such a person may be delayed indefinitely. Such an interpretation would be highly detrimental to the interest of the society at large.

26. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give an interpretation which leads to a situation where a person alleged to have committed an offence of the type enumerated in clause (b)(ii) is either not placed for trial on account of non-filing of a complaint or if a complaint is filed, the same does not come to its logical end. Judging from such an angle will be in consonance with the principle that an unworkable or impracticable result should be avoided.

Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr Vs Meenakshi Marwah & Anr on 11 March, 2005

Citations : [2005 AIR SC 2119], [2005 SCR 2 708], [2005 JT 3 195], [2005 SCALE 3 93], [2005 AIOL 135], [2005 MHLJ SC 3 530], [2005 BOMCR CRI SC 2 470], [2005 SCC 4 370], [2005 SUPREME 2 549], [2005 CRLJ SC 2161], [2005 SCC CRI 1101]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/618763/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae13e4b0149711412e0a

https://mynation.net/docs/402-2005/

Iqbal Singh Marwah Vs Meenakshi Marwah forgery

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 5-Judge Constitiutional Bench Decision

State of Punjab Vs Jagdev Singh Talwandi on 16 Dec 1983

Bhagirath Vs Delhi Administration on 16 April, 1985

Kedar Nath Singh Vs State of Bihar on 20 Jan 1962

P. Ramachandra Rao Vs State of Karnataka on 16 Apr 2002

Public Interest Foundation and Ors Vs Union of India and Anr on 25 September 2018

New India Assurance Co Ltd Vs Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt Ltd on 4 March 2020

Kehar Singh and Anr Vs Union of India and Anr on 16 December 1988

Hardeep Singh Vs State of Punjab and Ors on 10 January, 2014

M.S.Sheriff Vs The State of Madras and Others on 18 March, 1954

Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr Vs Meenakshi Marwah & Anr on 11 March, 2005