Rajkumar Madki Vs Dr. Shailendra Beldale on 16 Oct 2026

Posted on October 20 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that a private complaint is maintainable against a lying public servant in the nomination form contains false statements.

From Para 4,

4. A substantial question of law of general public importance, hitherto undecided by this Court, does arise for our consideration. It is:
Whether Section 125-A of the RoP Act should pass muster the rigours of Section 195(1) of the Cr. PC? In other words, whether any private person can file a complaint under Section 200 of the Cr. PC against a returned candidate for an offence punishable under Section 125-A of the RoP Act?

From Para 11,

11. It is significant to note that sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 195(1) of the Cr. PC impose a statutory prohibition on a court in relation to taking cognisance of offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188, IPC or of abetment of/attempt to/criminal conspiracy to commit such offences, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. It is plain that the text of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 does not include Section 125-A of the RoP Act. Should we read into Section 195, Cr. PC a prohibition in respect of Section 125-A of the RoP Act also, apart from those expressly included? If indeed it were the intention of the legislature that cognizance of any offence relating to furnishing of false information by a candidate in an affidavit with intent of being elected in an election (referred to in Section 125-A of the RoP Act) could only be taken if the complainant were a public servant, the same could have been provided by an amendment of Section 195, Cr. PC since Section 125-A of the RoP Act is of fairly recent origin. Significantly, Section 125-A was inserted in the RoP Act with effect from 24th August, 2002, while it is noticed that Section 195, Cr. PC suffered an amendment thereafter in April, 2006. The legislature is presumed to be conscious of its insertion of Section 125-A in the RoP Act four years back. It stands to reason that omission of the legislature to include Section 125-A of the RoP Act in Section 195, Cr. PC is deliberate and no court, in terms of the latter provision, would be barred from taking cognizance of an alleged offence under Section 125-A of the RoP Act, even on the complaint lodged by a private person. This interpretation is also fortified by the absence of any provision in any enactment stipulating that a complaint in relation to an offence under Section 125-A of the RoP Act can only be lodged by a public servant as well as the ordainment in Section 125-A that the penalty it envisages is “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force”. This means that the rigour of Section 195, Cr. PC would not be applicable insofar as a complaint lodged by a private person, alleging an offence under Section 125-A of the RoP Act, under Section 200, Cr. PC, is concerned, whereby the court is urged to penalise the offender for furnishing false information in an affidavit to get elected. The High Court was, therefore, clearly in error in returning the finding that it did.

From Para 13,

13. In conclusion, we hold that a private complaint alleging offence committed under Section 125-A, RoP Act need not pass muster of the rigours of Section 195, Cr. PC, as held by the High Court. If at all a complaint is lodged to harass an elected candidate or frivolous allegations are levelled therein, the laws of the country duly equip and empower the competent magistrates to pass such order(s) as they deem fit and proper commensurate with the facts and circumstances of each case.

Rajkumar Madki Vs Dr. Shailendra Beldale on 16 Oct 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Ram Singh Vs State of UP on 21 Feb 2024

Posted on October 19 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court granted benefit of doubt to petitioner since on same set of evidence co-accused was acquitted.

From Para 6.3,

6.3. He further submits that the trial court had committed a fundamental error in convicting the appellant on the one hand and acquitting the co-accused Lala Ram on the other hand. Evidence against both were the same. When on the same set of evidence the co-accused was acquitted, the trial court ought to have acquitted the appellant as well. This aspect was overlooked by the High Court. In support of his submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi Vs. State of Gujarat, (2023) 9 SCC 164.

From Para 33,

33. Thus, on a careful analysis of the evidence on record, we are of the view that the appellant should be given the benefit of doubt as according to us, the prosecution could not prove his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. Any lingering doubt about the involvement of an accused in the crime he is accused of committing, must weigh on the mind of the court and in such a situation, the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused. This is more so when the co-accused is acquitted by the trial court on the same set of evidence.

Ram Singh Vs State of UP on 21 Feb 2024

Ram Singh Vs State of UP on 21 Feb 2024 (SCR)

Citations:

Other Sources:

Highlights:

FIR in 1982 and Conviction by Sessions Court in 1983.
Appeal in High Court filed in 1983 and Dismissed in 2018.
Criminal Appeal in Supreme Court filed in 2018 and Allowed in 2026.

Index of Quash Judgments is here.

Secretary to Government Vs Sameer Ahamed N and Ors on 15 Oct 2026

Posted on October 15 by ShadesOfKnife

A two-Judge bench of the Supreme Court held as follows,

From Para 61(a), (c), (e) and (f),

a) A person who converts from a Hindu social order to a non-Hindu social order cannot claim affirmative action under Article 16(4) of the Constitution merely on the basis of the social backwardness associated with his pre-conversion status; the backwardness suffered in the antecedent social order cannot, by itself, be carried forward so as to confer upon him the status of a backward class in the religion to which he has converted.
c) Conversion to a non-Hindu social order does not, by itself, confer membership of any particular notified Backward Class community. A person’s pre-conversion caste or community status cannot, merely by reason of conversion, be transposed into membership of a distinct notified Backward Class community in the post-conversion social order. The social backwardness which formed the basis of the person’s pre-conversion status cannot, by itself, furnish the legal foundation for conferring upon him membership of a different notified Backward Class community after conversion.
e) No statutory benefit, protection, reservation or other entitlement under Article 16(4) of the Constitution, the enjoyment of which is predicated upon a particular Hindu social order, can be claimed or extended merely on the basis of such antecedent membership after the person has converted to Islam, Christianity or any other non-Hindu social order. Such conversion severs the legal foundation of an entitlement which is specifically conditioned upon membership of that Hindu social order.
f) A community certificate is declaratory of, and does not create or confer, the status which it purports to recognise. Neither the issuance of a community certificate nor an executive instruction can enlarge, modify or dispense with the substantive constitutional and statutory conditions governing membership of the class or entitlement to the benefits attached thereto.

From Para 54,

Reservation is attached to a constitutionally identified class and not to an individual as a transferable personal entitlement. The constitutional enquiry is directed to the class, its common characteristics and the disadvantage which binds its members together…

From Paras 62 and 63 (Conclusion),

62. We therefore affirm the central conclusion of the High Court, though our reasoning proceeds on the constitutional foundations set out above. A person who converts to Islam does not, by that act alone, become a member of any one of the seven notified Backward Class Muslim communities in the State. His former caste or community status cannot automatically be transposed into the Muslim Backward Class category, nor can a private religious body conclusively determine such statutory entitlement.
63. Tested on that standard, we are of the view that the impugned G.O. cannot be sustained and has rightly been quashed by the High Court. It creates an artificial route by which a person moves from a pre-conversion backward social order into a notified Muslim backward class without establishing the necessary social and legal link.

The Special Leave Petition against the Madras High Court’s quashing of G.O.(Ms) No. 31 dated 09.03.2024 was dismissed (Para 64).

Secretary to Government Vs Sameer Ahamed N and Ors on 15 Oct 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 1129; SLP (C) No. 25507/2026 (Diary No. 39624/2026).

Other Sources:

The Judgment of Madras High Court bench at Madurai is here.

Sameer Ahamed Vs The District Collector and Ors on 25 Jun 2026

The GO issued that got struck down as unconstitutional in this context is here.

2024-03-09 Converts to Islam from BC

Non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect?

Posted on October 12 by ShadesOfKnife

A 7-Judge Bench of Supreme Court held as follows, with respect to Non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect or not?

224. The conclusions reached in this judgment are summarised below:
a. Agreements which are not stamped or are inadequately stamped are inadmissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. Such agreements are not rendered void or void ab initio or unenforceable;
b. Non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect;
c. An objection as to stamping does not fall for determination under Sections 8 or 11 of the Arbitration Act. The concerned court must examine whether the arbitration agreement prima facie exists;
d. Any objections in relation to the stamping of the agreement fall within the ambit of the arbitral tribunal; and
e. The decision in NN Global 2 (supra) and SMS Tea Estates (supra) are overruled. Paragraphs 22 and 29 of Garware Wall Ropes (supra) are overruled to that extent.

Non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect on 13 Dec 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Validity of an unstamped arbitration agreement | Judgement Summary

Index

Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and Anr Vs Indusind Bank Ltd and Ors on 6 Dec 2004

Posted on October 12 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows, with respect to what a GPA-holder can do and not.

Order III, Rules 1 and 2 CPC, empowers the holder of power of attorney to “act” on behalf of the principal. In our view the word “acts” employed in Order III, Rules 1 and 2 CPC, confines only in respect of “acts” done by the power of attorney holder in exercise of power granted by the instrument. The term “acts” would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In other words, if the power of attorney holder has rendered some “acts” in pursuance to power of attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for the acts done by the principal and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross-examined.

Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and Anr Vs Indusind Bank Ltd and Ors on 6 Dec 2004

Citations: [2004 SUPP. 6 S.C.R. 681], [2004 INSC 695], [AIR 2005 SUPREME COURT 439], [2005 (2) SCC 217], [2004 AIR SCW 7064, (2007) 2 NIJ 395], [2005 (2) SRJ 281], [(2004) 10 JT 264 (SC)], [(2005) 3 CTC 128 (SC)], [(2005) 3 MAD LJ 109], [2004 (10) JT 264, (2005) 1 CLR 737 (SC)], [(2005) 3 JCR 175 (SC)], [2004 (10) SCALE 244, 2005 (2) ALL CJ 924], [2004 (7) SLT 441], [(2005) ILR (KANT) 729], [(2005) 1 ALL WC 138], [(2004) 63 CORLA 174], [(2005) 1 RECCIVR 240], [(2005) 3 MAD LW 403], [(2004) 10 SCALE 244], [(2005) 1 SCJ 520], [(2005) 2 CIVILCOURTC 324, (2005) 2 LANDLR 585], [(2005) 98 REVDEC 371], [(2005) 3 ANDHLD 43], [(2005) 3 SUPREME 275], [(2005) 1 WLC(SC)CVL 245], [(2005) 1 CAL HN 175], [(2005) 123 COMCAS 154], [(2005) 1 MAH LJ 1170, (2005) 1 MPLJ 421], [(2005) 2 PUN LR 1], [(2005) 1 KCCR 227], [(2005) 58 ALL LR 440], [(2005) 2 ANDH LT 57, (2005) 2 KER LT 265], [(2005) 58 ALL LR 610], [(2005) 1 ALL RENTCAS 409], [(2005) 3 CIVLJ 775], [(2005) 2 CURCC 61], [(2005) 1 ALL WC 831], [(2005) 1 BANKCLR 438], [(2005) 3 BOM CR 846]

Other Sources:

Index

Pradeep Ram Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 1 Jul 2019

Posted on September 24 by ShadesOfKnife

A division of Supreme Court held as follows,

From Paras 7 and 9, (Question of law formulated due to divergent views on the point)

7. From the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and the pleadings on the record, following are the issues, which arise for consideration in these appeals:-
(i) Whether in a case where an accused has been bailed out in a criminal case, in which case, subsequently new offences are added, is it necessary that bail earlier granted should be cancelled for taking the accused in custody?
(ii) Whether re-registration of F.I.R. No.RC-06/2018/NIA/DLI is a second F.I.R. and is not permissible there being already a FIR No. 02/2016 registered at P.S. Tandwa arising out of same incident?
(iii) Whether N.I.A. could conduct any further investigation in the matter when investigation in the P.S. Case No.02/2016 having already been completed and charge sheet has been submitted on 10.03.2016 with regard to which cognizance has already been taken by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chatra on 11.03.2016?
(iv) Whether the order dated 25.06.2018 passed by Judicial Commissioner-cum-Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi remanding the appellant to judicial custody is in accordance with law?
(v) Whether the power under Section 167 Cr.P.C. can be exercised in the present case, where the cognizance has already been taken by Chief Judicial Magistrate on 11.03.2016 or the accused could have been remanded only under Section 309(2) Cr.P.C.?
9. The question, as to whether when an accused is bailed out in a criminal case, in which new offences have been added, whether for arresting the accused, it is necessary to get the bail cancelled, has arisen time and again, there are divergent views of different High Courts on the above question. On one side, the High Courts have taken the view that for arresting the accused, who is already on bail, in event of addition of new offences, the earlier bail need to be cancelled whereas the other line of opinion is that for new offences accused has to obtain a fresh bail order and the earlier bail order shall not enure to the benefit of the accused.

From Para 18,

18. Whether after addition of new non-bailable offence, police authority can straightaway arrest the accused, who is already granted bail by the Court, in reference to offences prior to addition of new offences or the police is to necessarily obtain an order from the Court either of cancellation of the bail or permission to arrest the accused in changed circumstances are questions where different views have been expressed by different High Courts. In the present case, the appellant was not arrested by the police after addition of offences under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, rather the police authorities had made an application before the Court for issue of production warrant since the accused was already in custody in jail in reference to another case.

From Para 29, Issue No.1 answered.

29. In view of the foregoing discussions, we arrive at following conclusions in respect of a circumstance where after grant of bail to an accused, further
cognizable and non-bailable offences are added:-
(i) The accused can surrender and apply for bail for newly added cognizable and non-bailable offences. In event of refusal of bail, the accused can certainly be arrested.
(ii) The investigating agency can seek order from the court under Section 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C. for arrest of the accused and his custody.
(iii) The Court, in exercise of power under Section 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C., can direct for taking into custody the accused who has already been granted bail after cancellation of his bail. The Court in exercise of power under Section 437(5) as well as Section 439(2) can direct the person
who has already been granted bail to be arrested and commit him to custody on addition of graver and non-cognizable offences which may not be necessary always with order of cancelling of earlier bail.
(iv) In a case where an accused has already been granted bail, the investigating authority on addition of an offence or offences may not proceed to arrest the accused, but for arresting the accused on such addition of offence or offences it need to obtain an order to arrest the accused from the Court which had granted the bail.

Pradeep Ram Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 1 Jul 2019

Citations: [2019 INSC 706], [AIR 2019 SUPREME COURT 3193], [2019 (3) AJR 689], [AIRONLINE 2019 SC 397], [2019 CRI LJ 3801], [(2019) 2 ALD(CRL) 453], [(2019) 2 GUJ LH 617], [(2019) 3 ALLCRILR 540], [(2019) 3 ALLCRIR 2574], [(2019) 3 CRILR(RAJ) 807], [(2019) 3 PAT LJR 265], [(2019) 3 RECCRIR 538], [2019 (4) KCCR SN 252 (SC)], [(2019) 4 MH LJ (CRI) 397], [(2019) 75 OCR 321], [(2019) 9 SCALE 120], [2019 CRILR(SC MAH GUJ) 807], [(2020) 110 ALLCRIC 654], [(2020) 206 ALLINDCAS 219], [2020 CALCRILR 1 233], [AIR 2019 SC( CRI) 1138]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/129162686/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5d39d2253321bc0f0457d8a1

https://www.legaldeskai.in/case-law/in/sc/judgment/pradeep-ram-versus-the-state-of-jharkhand-anr-2019-8-824-868

https://vlex.in/vid/crl-no-000816-000817-852332646

Index of Anticipatory Bail Judgements is here.

Md. Mashood and Ors Vs State of UP and Ors on 25 Feb 2026

Posted on September 24 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court has held as follows,

From Para 8,

8. In view of the above settled legal position, wherein this Court has held that once a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and/or Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and/or Section 528 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is preferred, the same should be decided on merits, rather than dismissing the same as infructuous or by directing the Police to follow Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar (supra).

Md. Mashood and Ors Vs State of UP and Ors on 25 Feb 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Chajoo Ram Vs Radhey Shyam and Anr on 23 Mar 1971

Posted on September 14 by ShadesOfKnife

A full court bench of the Apex Court held as follows, with respect to When should a Prosecution for perjury be ordered .

The prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by courts, only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. No doubt giving of false evidence and filing false affidavit is an evil which must be effectively curbed with a strong hand but to start prosecution for perjury too readily and too frequently with,out due care and caution and on inconclusive and doubtful material defeats its very purpose. Prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent and not merely because there is some inaccuracy in the statement which may be innocent or immaterial. There must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter ,of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge.

Chajoo Ram Vs Radhey Shyam and Anr on 23 Mar 1971

Citations: [1971] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 172], [1971 INSC 89], [1971 SCC (1) 774], [1971 AIR 1367], [(1971) 03 SC CK 0045], [(1971) 2 ALT 277], [(1971) CriLJ 1096], [(1971) SCC(Cri) 331]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/187090/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab75e4b014971140c8b3

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/judgements/646903/chajoo-ram-appellant-hash-radhey-shyam-and-another-respondent/

https://www.legalstreet.in/ratio/case/1971-insc-89/

https://www.legitquest.com/case/chajoo-ram-v-radhey-shyam-anr/3C67

Index of Perjury Judgments is here.

K Bharathi Devi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 03 Oct 2024

Posted on September 6 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 25,

25. It has been held that there are certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or a family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, the High Court would be justified in quashing the criminal proceedings, even if the offences have not been made compoundable.

From Para 28,

28. In paragraph 61, this Court observes that, in which cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised, where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the Court reiterates that the criminal cases having an overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing. The Court particularly refers to the offences arising out of commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. The Court finds that in such cases, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim.

K Bharathi Devi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 03 Oct 2024

Citations: [2024 INSC 750]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/179779353/

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/k-bharthi-devi-v-state-of-telangana-2024-insc-750-criminal-cases-with-civil-character-should-be-quashed-when-parties-have-resolved-disputes-1553531

K. BHARATHI DEVI & ANR. Vs STATE OF TELANGANA & ANR.

The Order of the Telangana High Court that was challenged.

K Suresh Kumar and Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 01 Sep 2017

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Vishnu Kumar Shukla and Anr Vs State of UP and Anr on 28 Nov 2023

Posted on August 28 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 18,

18. With great respect, we express our reservations in fully acceding to what has been stated above. If Paragraph 8 of Minakshi Bala (supra) is accepted as it is, the necessary concomitant would be that despite examining the matter in detail, a Court would find its wings clipped to intercede. This would amount to forcing a person to stand trial, even when the overwhelming material points to his/her innocence. Obviously, the hands of a Court ought not to be tied down, and especially not by a higher Court, and moreso not against liberty. Paragraph 7 of Minakshi Bala (supra) does enable examining unimpeachable documents. We are conscious that Minakshi Bala (supra) has been followed in later decisions by the Court. However, we have chosen to survey the precedents further, and then decide on the road we wish to take13.

From Para 23,

23. On a careful conspectus of the legal spectrum, juxtaposed with our view on the facts and merits expressed hereinbefore, we are satisfied that there is no suspicion, much less strong or grave suspicion that the appellants are guilty of the offence alleged. It would be unjustified to make the appellants face a full-fledged criminal trial in this backdrop. In an appeal dealing with the refusal of the High Court to quash an FIR under Section 482, CrPC albeit, this Court, while setting aside the judgment impugned therein and quashing that FIR, took the view that ‘…the Appellants are to be protected against vexatious and unwarranted criminal prosecution, and from unnecessarily being put through the rigours of an eventual trial.’15 The protection against vexatious and unwanted prosecution and from being unnecessarily dragged through a trial by melting a criminal proceeding into oblivion, either through quashing a FIR/Complaint or by allowing an appeal against an order rejecting discharge or by any other legally permissible route, as the circumstances may be, in the deserving case, is a duty cast on the High Courts. The High Court should have intervened and discharged the appellants. But this Court will intervene, being the sentinel on the qui vive.

Vishnu Kumar Shukla and Anr Vs State of UP and Anr on 28 Nov 2023

Citations: [2023 INSC 1026]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/116206067/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/656640526a2cb672cb216f82

https://www.legitquest.com/case/vishnu-kumar-shukla-anr-v-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr/78CC31

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/vishnu-kumar-shukla-versus-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh

SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT IT IS THE DUTY OF THE HIGH COURTS TO QUASH THE UNWANTED AND VEXATIOUS CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/supreme-court-ruling-discharge-application-high-court-section-482-crpc-minakshi-bala-vs-sudhir-kumar-243296

VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA VS THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Index

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

Rajkumar Madki Vs Dr. Shailendra Beldale on 16 Oct 2026

Ram Singh Vs State of UP on 21 Feb 2024

Secretary to Government Vs Sameer Ahamed N and Ors on 15 Oct 2026

Non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect?

Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and Anr Vs Indusind Bank Ltd and Ors on 6 Dec 2004

Pradeep Ram Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 1 Jul 2019

Md. Mashood and Ors Vs State of UP and Ors on 25 Feb 2026

Chajoo Ram Vs Radhey Shyam and Anr on 23 Mar 1971

K Bharathi Devi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 03 Oct 2024

Vishnu Kumar Shukla and Anr Vs State of UP and Anr on 28 Nov 2023