H P Komala Vs N Ravikumar on 29 Jul 2024

Posted on October 6 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Karnataka High Court held as follows, when a husband filed for divorce and did not pay the interim maintenance.

From Para 10,

10. This court is coming across several cases where the husband will not pay the maintenance as ordered by the court and which attains finality but he insists for proceeding with the main case. The CPC provides for execution of the orders passed by the court. No doubt there is mechanism provided for execution of the orders. In these pending matrimonial matters, when the order is passed for maintenance pendent-lite, the party who is contesting the matter cannot tell the opposite party that I will proceed with the case and you can go before the executing court for recovery of money. In matrimonial cases thousands of execution petitions are pending. In some cases the parties are not in a position to meet their basic necessities and the opposite parties inspite of not obeying the orders of the court are enjoying the further orders passed by the court. In these matrimonial proceedings, the court while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 151 of CPC and under Order 6 Rule 16 of CPC should either stay the proceedings or strike off the pleadings. This to some extent will subserve the ends of justice. It will also send a message to the concerned that they cannot get away with non-compliance of the orders of the court and deprive other party from the fruits of the order.

Tip: Pay the money and get the divorce (your freedom!)

H P Komala Vs N Ravikumar on 29 Jul 2024

Index of Divorce Judgments is here and Maintenance Judgments is here.

Kavitha M Vs Raghu on 16 Mar 2023

Posted on October 4 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka HC held that there is no need to conduct Inquiry in the nature of summary trial before passing Interim reliefs, relying on the Magistrate’s inherent power u/s 28(2) of the PWDV Act, while overruling earlier 2009 judgment here. (Comment to myself: someone has to challenge the Sec 28(2) of the DV Act as unconstitutional and get rid of it!)

From Para 14,

14. In the aforesaid circumstances, reference being made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of KUNAPAREDDY v. KUNAPAREDDY SWARNA KUMARI1 is apposite.

The Apex Court, in the aforesaid judgment, while considering the purport of promulgation of the Act and its provisions clearly holds that sub-section (2) of Section 28 is significant. The concerned Court is well within its powers to lay down its procedure for disposal of the application under Section 12 or Section 23(2) of the Act. The Apex Court also recognizes that this provision is incorporated by the Legislature keeping a definite purpose for which it is enacted. This Court also recognizes the power of the Magistrate under Section 23 to grant an interim order ex-parte owing to the specific power under sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act which is carved out in that behalf. In the light of the judgment of the Apex Court, any other law that is laid down by the co-ordinate Benches of this Court will have to be placed into the oblivion on two counts, as the heart and soul of the Act is found in Section 12 and its beat in Section 23.The reliance placed by the respondent/State upon the judgment of the co-ordinate Bench in the case of KRISHNA MURTHYNOOKULA v. Y SAVITHA2 is in clear contradiction with what the Apex Court has held. The said judgment has also been distinguished in the case of one K.MANJUNATH REDDY v. SMT.A.C. LATHA3.

The co-ordinate Bench recognizes that the section itself provided that the Court can form its own procedure and it would override sub-section (1) of Section 28 and any Rules framed thereunder. The co-ordinate Bench then holds that there was no illegality committed by the Court in exercise of its inherent power for disposal of the application without an inquiry and by way of an affidavit filed by the parties before the concerned Court.

From Para 15-18, [Happy that Section 12(5) is emphasized and directions issued]

15. On a coalesce of the aforesaid analysis of the provisions of the Act and the law laid down by the Apex Court and that of the co-ordinate Bench of this Court, what would unmistakably emerge is that applications concerning protection orders under Section 18, residence orders under Section 19 and monetary relief under Section 20, all of which direct that if the learned Magistrate is prima facie finds justification he could grant those reliefs. Section 23 of the Act empowers the learned Magistrate to grant of interim and ex-parte orders in any application under Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21
or even 22 against the respondent, granting interim relief in terms of the application/s so filed cannot be after an eon, it has to be granted anon. Therefore, there is no warrant for any Magistrate to await for the procedure as stipulated under the CrPC to get concluded, and then grant the relief that is sought in the application. It defeats the very life blood of the Act. If Section 12 is the one under which applications are filed before the concerned Court, sub-section (5) of Section 12 mandates disposal within 60 days.
16. It is quite appalling that an application filed by the petitioner under Section 12 of the Act for the relief as available under Sections 19, 20 and 22 of the Act has been kept pending for close to 52 months after its filing, notwithstanding the fact that the mandate of the Act is disposal of those applications within 60 days. The applications being kept pending would display apathy towards the litigants. The reason for the applications being kept pending is free fall for adjournments being granted by the concerned Court. In the case at hand, close to two years have passed by and the Court has gone on granting time to the husband for filing assets and liabilities statement to determine the payment of maintenance to the wife under the provisions of the Act while the wife/aggrieved person suffers. An application that has to be disposed of within 60 days, has taken 52 months, and is yet to be disposed of.
17. The law Courts which exist to remedy the wrong when it is brought to its notice has to act swiftly, as it is trite that, actus curiae neminem gravabit that the act of Court should prejudice no person. If an act of the Court should not prejudice any person; the Court should not permit any procrastination of the proceedings before it. A woman, who is a victim of domestic violence, knocking at the doors of the Magistrate, under the Act seeking maintenance or shelter such grievance, will have to be addressed with immediacy. It is for this reason that the statute mandates that such applications have to be disposed of within 60 days in terms of sub-section (5) of Section 12 of the Act. The mandate is unequivocal as sub-section (5) mandates that the Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose every application; every application would mean each and every, not a few or more. If the delay takes away the very soul of the enactment, such delay would definitely deny justice. It is, therefore, often said that “justice delayed is justice denied”. If the facts of the case at hand are taken note of, it would display that the petitioner has been denied maintenance and other benefits available under the Act for close to five years now, after she has been out of the matrimonial house.
18. In the aforesaid circumstances, it becomes necessary for this Court to direct the Magistrates, to henceforth decide the applications filed by the aggrieved persons within the time frame. The applications could be for the benefit of Sections 19 and 20 of the Act which are filed along with the application under Section 12 of the Act. Any delay beyond 60 days to consider the application should be only for reasons to be recorded in writing. For a maintenance application, the concerned Court shall direct the husband, after receipt of notice, to file his assets and liabilities statement within four weeks from the date of appearance and in the event, he would dodge appearance before Court, the Court is empowered to grant interim maintenance, on what is filed by the aggrieved person as assets and liabilities statement and as sought in the application, failing which, such cases, like the one that is brought before this Court, would mushroom and defeat the very purport of the promulgation of the Act.

Kavitha M Vs Raghu on 16 Mar 2023

Citations: [2023 SCC OnLine Kar 11],

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/158022851/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6423e02cd66f1c555c648b74

https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/karnataka-high-court-disposal-of-application-dometic-violence-act-accommodation-monetary-relief-interim-maintenance-224447

Domestic Violence Victims Must Be Addressed With Immediacy: Karnataka High Court Issues Directions to Magistrate Courts

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?caseId=013202793200&title=kavitha-m-vs-raghu

“S. 12 is heart and soul of Domestic Violence Act”; Karnataka High Court directs Magistrates to decide applications within the mandated period of 60 days

Index of Domestic Violence judgments is here.

Parul Tyagi Vs Gaurav Tyagi on 04 Aug 2023

Posted on September 23 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Allahabad High Court passed the following guidelines in elaboration of Rajnesh Pal Naidu Vs Neha Naidu Joshi and Anr on 04 Nov 2020 and Aditi Sharma Vs Jitesh Sharma on 06 Nov 2023

G. Guidelines to the Family Courts
87.1 The Family Court Judge shall ensure compliance of the following guidelines in maintenance proceedings:
i) Both parties must submit the Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities as Enclosure-I or II (as applicable), as provided in the Rajnesh Case (supra).
ii) The memo of parties shall include the parties’ current mobile number, email address (if available), and the latest residential and official addresses, particularly if the applicant/respondent is employed.
iii) The memo of parties shall also specifically mention the name of the concerned police station, where the applicant and respondent resides and works (as applicable).
iv) Additionally, the Family Court Judge must ensure that Enclosure-I or II, as applicable, are accompanied by an affidavit from the respondent, containing the following details:
a) Permanent and current address of the respondent.
b) Mobile number of the respondent for communication during the pendency of the petition.
c) Email ID and WhatsApp number, if any.
d) Name and address of the respondent’s employer, along with a telephone number.
e) An undertaking from the respondent to promptly inform the court through an affidavit if there is any changes to his address, mobile number, E-mail ID, WhatsApp number, residential address, workplace, or employer’s name.
87.2 Upon receiving an application for maintenance, the Family Court shall include the following specifics in the initial order:
i) Mandatory requirement of an Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities, as per Enclosure-I & II, whichever is applicable, along with the reply.
ii) The respondent shall be given two opportunities for filing a reply, and the application for interim maintenance shall be decided in less than six months.
iii) The respondent must submit the reply within four weeks.
iv) If the affidavit is not filed within four weeks, the court will proceed based on the applicant’s submission and the existing pleadings to decide the application. If the respondent repeatedly delays in filing the reply with the affidavit, requesting more than two adjournments, the court may exercise its authority to strike off the respondent’s defence, provided it determines that the delays are intentional and obstructive, causing undue disruptions to the proceedings. In such cases, the Family Court may proceed to adjudicate the maintenance application based on the applicant’s submitted affidavit and the existing pleadings.
v) The order shall indicate that false statements in the Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities may lead to proceedings under section 340 Cr.P.C. besides contempt of court. It should also explain the ingredients of section 340 Cr.P.C., the potential criminal prosecution in IPC, and the maximum sentence for such offences, if proved in court.
87.3 The Family Court shall employ all legally permissible methods of serving notices to the respondent, using persuasive measures as may be necessary. The Family Court shall develop practical and effective mechanisms to ensure successful service on the respondent, aligning with the objectives and principles of these guidelines. If the court determines that the Process Server/Postman/Police Officer has submitted a routine, repetitive service report (e.g., citing unclaimed postal articles, locked premises, addressee left the address, or an unknown address), it may hold the officer accountable in accordance with the law. The Family Court may also explore modern methods of service facilitated by internet access, including courier services, email, or instant messaging platforms like WhatsApp and other electronic media. The essence of service lies in ensuring that the proceedings are duly conveyed to the respondents or contesting parties. Service on a litigant can be accomplished through e-mail or phone contact29. Serving notice, summons, and exchange of pleadings, service via e-mail, fax, or commonly used instant messaging services like WhatsApp is considered valid30.
87.4 If either party disputes the information declared in the Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities, the aggrieved party has the right to seek the other party to produce the relevant documents in question31.
87.5 To determine the amount of maintenance, the Family Court Judge shall adhere to the criteria outlined in Part-3 of the Rajnesh Case (supra). In cases where the wife has her own income, this shall not preclude her from being eligible to receive maintenance from her husband. The court must assess whether the wife’s income allows her to sustain a lifestyle commensurate with that of her husband in her matrimonial home32.
87.6 It is assumed that an able-bodied husband is capable of earning enough to support his wife and children. For interim maintenance determination, the minimum wage rates of Uttar Pradesh, as per the latest Government Notification, may serve as a guideline. This is just one of the alternatives that the Family Court Judge may consider when assessing a person who claims to be a labourer with no other income sources, among other pleadings.
88. The interim maintenance order shall contain the ingredients of the third proviso to section 125 Cr.P.C. (added by Act 50 of 2001, effective from 24.9.2001), and Uttar Pradesh State Amendments (upto date) in this regard, in plain language so that the respondent could understand understand the consequences of non-payment of interim maintenance. A table summarizing hearing dates and a brief description of Family Court orders on each date shall also be made part of the order.
89. Both interim and final maintenance orders shall include a table showing the number of orders passed by the Family Court prior to awarding interim and final maintenance, along with brief descriptions of orders passed on each date until the final adjudication of the section 125 Cr.P.C. application. The final maintenance order shall also include a date-wise account of proceedings related to section 125(3) Cr.P.C.
90. In cases involving parties from the Economically Weaker Section, individuals living below the poverty line, or casual labourers, the obligation to submit the Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities would be exempted. The court may demand an EWS/BPL certificate issued by the competent authority, which may be the Office of the Labour Commissioner or the Revenue Authority, as applicable.
91. District Judges shall develop a structural system for regularly assessing and overseeing the performance of family courts within their districts, ensuring the adherence to directives issued by the Supreme Court in Rajnesh Case (supra) and by this Court, in the instant case, this reporting mechanism would serve as a means of accountability, enabling timely interventions by the Constitutional Courts, when necessary. This may encompass routine evaluations, case audits, and feedback mechanisms to gauge the effectiveness and quality of judicial decisions in this context.
92. All District Judges shall convene semi-annual meetings of their respective Family Court Judges to review and evaluate the implementation progress of the guidelines issued by the Supreme Court in Rajnesh Case (supra) and this Court in the instant case. If the guidelines issued to Family Courts are not followed, concerned District Judge shall submit a semi-annual report to the Registrar General of this Court, against the Judicial Officer, who has not complied the guidelines. The Registrar General shall record its finding and present these reports to the respective Administrative Judge of the concerned Judicial Officer for their review and reference. Additionally, a record of these reports shall also be maintained in the service book of the concerned Judicial Officer. The District Judge shall prepare the progress report in the manner as provided in Enclosure-III attached with this judgment.
93. The District Judge along with the Principal Judge, Family Court shall flag the critical issues with respect to service of notice/summons and problems encountered in enforcement of interim maintenance/maintenance orders passed by respective Family Court Judges in the meeting of District Monitoring Committee for Family Courts, and the civil administration shall provide all assistance, as may deem necessary.
94. The District Legal Services Authority, in collaboration and cooperation with the respective District Bar Association, shall arrange awareness and training sessions/ workshops to encourage Bar members to submit pleadings in accordance with Enclosure-I & II.
95. For the sake of convenience, the Enclosures I & II attached to Rajnesh Case (supra) are hereby included as part of this order. Additionally, Enclosure-III is provided for the convenience of all District Judges to prepare the compliance report, in case aforesaid guidelines are not followed.
96. The Registrar (Compliance) of this court shall communicate copy of this judgment to all District Judges for dissemination among all Family Court Judges, and Chief Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh to circulate among all District Magistrates and Senior Superintendent of Police, of respective districts. Furthermore, a copy of this judgment shall be published on the websites of all District Courts, Family Courts, and Courts of Judicial Magistrate to facilitate awareness and implementation.

Parul Tyagi Vs Gaurav Tyagi on 04 Aug 2023

Index of Maintenance cases u/s 144 BNSS (125 CrPC) is here.

James Kunjwal Vs State of Uttarakhand and Anr on 13 Aug 2024

Posted on August 14 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court passed guidelines to follow, When perjury proceedings can be initiated.

From Paras 16-20,

16. What we may conclude from a perusal of the above-noticed judicial pronouncements is that:-
(i) The Court should be of the prima facie opinion that there exists sufficient and reasonable ground to initiate proceedings against the person who has allegedly made a false statement(s);
(ii) Such proceedings should be initiated when doing the same is “expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent” and not merely because of inaccuracy in statements that may be innocent/immaterial;
(iii) There should be “deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance”;
(iv) The Court should be satisfied that there is a reasonable foundation for the charge, with distinct evidence and not mere suspicion;
(v) Proceedings should be initiated in exceptional circumstances, for instance, when a party has perjured themselves to beneficial orders from the Court.
17. The statement made by the appellant, that has been deemed to be befitting the offence of giving false evidence before the Court, which is known commonly as perjury, was more in the nature of denial of the statements made in the affidavits of the complainant herein.
18. We are of the view that, in the present facts, a denial simpliciter cannot meet the threshold, as described in the judgments above, particularly when no malafide intention/deliberate attempt can be understood from the statement made by the appellant in the affidavit. As has already been observed, mere suspicion or inaccurate statements do not attract the offence under the Section. It cannot be disputed that the statements made in the affidavit were only to state his version of events and/or deny the version put forth by the complainant.
19. We are also of the firm opinion that such statements do not make it expedient in the interest of justice, nor constitute exceptional circumstances in which such Sections may be invoked. Given that these proceedings would constitute an offence, independent of the one for which the appellant is already facing trial, it cannot be unequivocally held that there was deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance.
20. We find that at least three of the possible scenarios, as discussed supra, in which a court would be justified in invoking these powers on the face of it appear to be unmet, prosecution, therefore, would be unjust. We say so for the reason that the respondent in her counter affidavit filed before this Court makes no particular allegation nor does she provide any of the material that was allegedly placed before the competent prosecuting authorities or the Court. She only alleges untruth on the part of the appellant 8/12/2024 stating that the Court was correct in initiating proceedings against him for making the false statement. She further makes certain statements that fall outside the scope of the present adjudication and pertain to the trial of the main offence pending before the court of competent jurisdiction.

James Kunjwal Vs State of Uttarakhand and Anr on 13 Aug 2024

Citations: [2024 INSC 601], [2024 Latest Caselaw 508 SC]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/84159018/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/66beef2337d7e5445370dff1

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/james-kunjwal-versus-state-of-uttarakhand

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/s-193-ipc-when-can-perjury-proceedings-be-initiated-against-a-litigant-supreme-court-explains-266668

https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-caselaw/2024/august/2024-latest-caselaw-508-sc/

https://www.lawtext.in/judgement.php?bid=442

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/james-kunjwal-v-state-of-uttarakhand-2024-insc-601-mere-denial-of-averments-in-pleadings-not-perjury-no-malafide-intention-1547820

https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=17806

https://lawtrend.in/mere-denial-in-affidavit-doesnt-constitute-offence-under-section-193-ipc-supreme-court-quashed-perjury-charges/

Index of perjury judgments is here.

Dolly Rani Vs Manish Kumar Chanchal on 19 Apr 2024

Posted on August 10 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that a Hindu marriage without conducting the marriage ceremonies is not a valid marriage.

We find that the registration of Hindu marriages under the said provision is only to facilitate the proof of a Hindu marriage but for that, there has to be a Hindu marriage in accordance with Section 7 of the Act inasmuch as there must be a marriage ceremony which has taken place between the parties in accordance with the said provision. Although the parties may have complied with the requisite conditions for a valid Hindu marriage as per
Section 5 of the Act in the absence of there being a “Hindu marriage” in accordance with Section 7 of the Act, i.e., solemnization of such a marriage, there would be no Hindu marriage in the eye of law. In the absence of there being a valid Hindu marriage, the Marriage Registration Officer cannot
register such a marriage under the provisions of Section 8 of the Act. Therefore, if a certificate is issued stating that the couple had undergone marriage and if the marriage ceremony had not been performed in accordance with Section 7 of the Act, then the registration of such marriage under Section 8 would not confer any legitimacy to such a marriage. The registration of a marriage under Section 8 of the Act is only to confirm that the
parties have undergone a valid marriage ceremony in accordance with Section 7 of the Act. In other words, a certificate of marriage is a proof of validity of Hindu marriage only when such a marriage has taken place and not in a case where there is no marriage ceremony performed at all.
We further observe that a Hindu marriage is a sacrament and has a sacred character. In the context of saptapadi in a Hindu marriage, according to Rig Veda, after completing the seventh step (saptapadi) the bridegroom says to his bride, “With seven steps we have become friends (sakha). May I attain to friendship with thee; may I not be separated from thy friendship”. A wife is considered to be half of oneself (ardhangini) but to be accepted with an identity of her own and to be a co-equal partner in the marriage. There is nothing like a “better-half” in a marriage but the spouses are equal halves in a marriage.

Also

No doubt, under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, a man and a woman can acquire the status of being a husband and a wife as per the provisions of the said Act. The Special Marriage Act, 1954 is not restricted to Hindus. Any man and woman irrespective of their race, caste or creed can acquire the status of being a husband and a wife under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 but under the provisions of the Act (Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955), there should not only be compliance of the conditions as prescribed under Section 5 of the said Act but also the couple must solemnise a marriage in accordance with Section 7 of the Act. In the absence of there being any such marriage in accordance with Section 7 of the Act, a certificate
issued in that regard by any entity is of no legal consequence. Further, any registration of a marriage which has not at all taken place under Section 8 of the Act and as per the rules made by the State Government would not be evidence of a Hindu marriage and also does not confer the status of a husband and a wife to a couple.
In recent years, we have come across several instances where for “practical purposes”, a man and a woman with the intention of solemnisation of their marriage at a future date seek to register their marriage under Section 8 of the Act on the basis of a document which may have been issued as proof of ‘solemnisation of their marriage’ such as in the instant case. As we have already noted, any such registration of a marriage before the Registrar of Marriages and a certificate being issued thereafter would not confirm that the parties have ‘solemnised’ a Hindu marriage. We note that parents of young couples agree for registration of a marriage in order to apply for Visa for emigration to foreign countries where either of the parties may be working “in order to save time” and pending formalising a marriage ceremony. Such practices have to be deprecated. What would be the consequence, if no such marriage is solemnised at all at a future date? What would be the status of the parties then? Are they husband and wife in law and do they acquire such status in society?

Dolly Rani Vs Manish Kumar Chanchal on 19 Apr 2024

State of Karnataka Vs T.Naseer @ Thadiantavida Naseer on 6 Nov 2023

Posted on August 10 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that when the original electronic devices were already produced and marked MOs, there was no need to produce the certificate under Section 65-B of the Act.

From Para 15,

15. Fair trial in a criminal case does not mean that it should be fair to one of the parties. Rather, the object is that no guilty should go scot-free and no innocent should be punished. A certificate under Section 65-B of the Act, which is sought to be produced by the prosecution is not an evidence which has been created now. It is meeting the requirement of law to prove a report on record. By permitting the prosecution to produce the certificate under Section 65B of the Act at this stage will not result in any irreversible prejudice to the accused. The accused will have full opportunity to rebut the evidence led by the prosecution. This is the purpose for which Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. is there. The object of the Code is to arrive at truth. However, the power under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. can be exercised to subserve the cause of justice and public interest. In the case in hand, this exercise of power is required to uphold the truth, as no prejudice as such is going to be caused to the accused.

State of Karnataka Vs T.Naseer @ Thadiantavida Naseer on 6 Nov 2023

Santhosh Shat Vs State of Karnataka and Anr on 06 Aug 2024

Posted on August 10 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Karnataka High Court held that, non-filing of certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act to mark the electronic evidence is a curable defect and at any time during the trail a certificate can be produced.

From Para 6,

6. Per contra, the learned High Court Government Pleader would vehemently refute the submissions to contend that non-filing of certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act to markthe electronic evidence is a curable defect. It is not that the document would not be entertainable at all, as at any time duringthe trail a certificate can be produced. He would contend that the petitioner has indulged in heinous act of sexual assault on the student, who was at that point in time 14 years old, being her teacher. Therefore, this Court on any ground should not interfere with the orders that are passed by the concerned Court, which are in tune with law and not contrary to law.

From Para 9,

The objection is that the CD could not have been marked in evidence, as there is no certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act and if there is no such certificate it does not become an evidence and, therefore, marking of compact disc should be rejected. In the light of the objection so made by the petitioner, the prosecution filed additional charge sheet and appended this video along with a certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act citing it as additional material to be marked through PWs-1, 2 and 3. Here again the petitioner objects contending that the certificate under Section 65-B is not by the Competent Authority.

From Paras 11 and 12,

The Apex Court, in the aforesaid judgments, would hold that electronic evidence can be marked at any time during the trial. The certificate under Section 65-B can be produced, which would neither vitiate the trial conducted on the basis of the electronic evidence nor enure to the benefit of the accused, to contend that no proceedings should be permitted to be proceeded further on the marking of the electronic evidence. The Apex Court in the case of T. NASEER supra has clearly held that Section 311 of the Cr.P.C., is in the statute only for this purpose, as it is a voyage towards discovery of truth. Under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C., marking of document, examination, re-examination, cross-examination and further cross-examination can take place. Therefore, the first glorified submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner tumbles down, as the evidence that is let in being the compact disc, without attaching to it a certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act, does not and did not vitiate the proceedings.
12. It appears that due to serious objection of the petitioner, the prosecution took recourse to another route of marking it by way of supplementary charge sheet. In fact what is produced is not a supplementary charge sheet after further investigation as is done in the normal parlance. It is termed as supplementary charge sheet, but what it appends to it is only the compact disc, with the certificate under Section 65-B. This cannot give a right in favour of the petitioner to contend that after the commencement of evidence there cannot be production of supplementary charge sheet. While
there can be no quarrel about the contention of the petitioner that once evidence would commence after framing of charges, there cannot be a supplementary charge sheet, as that right ceases or freezes in favour of the prosecution, the day charges are framed. Alteration of charge can happen at any time during the trial under Section 216 of the Cr.P.C., but not an additional charge sheet. In the case at hand, it is not an additional charge sheet or a supplementary charge sheet. Only the compact disc is marked along with the certificate, that too because the petitioner objected contending that the compact disc could not be marked without Section 65-B certificate. The submissions of the learned High Court Government Pleader overpowers what the learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended, as the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner runs counter to what the Apex Court has held in the judgments supra.

Santhosh Shat Vs State of Karnataka and Anr on 06 Aug 2024

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 15 Jul 2024

Posted on July 16 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Paras 10 and 11,

10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant herein would submit that a scanning of the judgment of the trial Court would reveal that the Court had appropriately appreciated the evidence on record and convicted accused Nos.1 and 2 upon satisfying itself that the ingredients to attract the offence punishable under Section 494 I.P.C., have been made out by the appellant. Furthermore, it is submitted that a bare perusal of the impugned judgment would reveal that the High Court had rightly considered the contentions of the appellant herein against the reversal of their conviction by the First Appellate Court that it was founded on surmises and conjectures. We are of the considered view that no more narrative on the correctness of the reversal of the judgment of the First Appellate Court by the High Court under the impugned judgment is required as the indisputable and undisputed position is that its reversal was accepted by accused Nos.1 and 2 and they had undergone the sentence imposed by the High Court consequent to the reversal of the First Appellate Court’s judgment. We may note here that the learned senior counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant had not accepted any compensation and in the same breath, would further submit that the appellant did not want any such compensation.
11. In the aforesaid circumstances, the sole question surviving for consideration is whether the High Court was right in not restoring the sentence imposed for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., by the trial Court when it accepted the contentions of the appellant and reversed the acquittal of accused Nos.1 and 2 and restored the conviction entered on them by the trial Court. In other words, the question is whether the High Court had shown undeserving leniency and sympathy to accused Nos.1 and 2 even after finding that they have committed the serious offence of bigamy punishable under Section 494 I.P.C., and whether they were let off with a flea-bite sentence and whether an enhancement of sentence is invited?

From Paras 14 and 15,

14. A reading of Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C., would reveal that the legislature viewed the offence of bigamy as a serious offence. Though no minimum sentence is prescribed under Section 494 I.P.C., the maximum sentence of imprisonment prescribed thereunder for a conviction thereunder is seven years of imprisonment of either description. It is also to be noted that the said offence is compoundable only by the husband or wife of the person so marrying with the permission of the Court. The same offence under Section 494 I.P.C., with concealment of former marriage from person with whom subsequent marriage is contracted would visit the offender with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and with fine. This offence, which is an aggravated form of bigamy, is non-compoundable. The decision in Gopal Lal’s case (supra), and the prescription of maximum corporeal sentence imposable under Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C.,would undoubtedly suggest that the offence under Section 494 I.P.C., has to be treated as a serious offence.
15. When once it is found that an offence under Section494 I.P.C., is a serious offence, the circumstances obtaining in this case would constrain us to hold that the imposition of ‘imprisonment till the rising of the court’ is not a proper sentence falling in tune with the rule of proportionality in providing punishment as mentioned hereinbefore.

From Para 20, (Alteration of the imprisonment and fine)

20. Certain circumstances revealed from the evidence on record cannot go unnoticed while deciding the question of proper sentence. Earlier, the appellant herein filed HMOP 515/2012 before the Family Court, Coimbatore, seeking divorce. In the judgment of the trial Court, taking note of the evidence adduced, it was noted that the first accused had filed a petition seeking interim maintenance in the above HMOP and based on a petition in that regard the Court had ordered the appellant to pay Rs. 5,000/- per month to the first accused and she had received the maintenance till 13.07.2017. The evidence would further show that a child was born to the first and second accused in their wedlock in November, 2017. The evidence on record would reveal that on 22.01.2019, the first accused herself filed HMOP No.84 of 2019 seeking dissolution of her marriage with the appellant. In such circumstances, it is evident that the first accused married the second accused while the marriage between the appellant and the first accused was subsisting and not only that, during its subsistence, she had also begotten a child through the second accused. Taking into account all the circumstances, it can be said that undeserving leniency was shown in the case on hand. But then, taking into account the fact that the child born to the first and second accused was aged less than two years when the trial Court passed the sentence and that no minimum term of imprisonment is prescribed for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., and that the maximum sentence imposable for conviction thereunder is seven years, we are of the considered view that the trial Court had virtually struck a balance in fixing the term of one year as the corporeal sentence. But then, taking note of the fact that the said child is now aged only about six years and the sentence for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., can be of both descriptions. We think it appropriate to use our judicial discretion to modify the sentence imposed under the impugned judgment. Accordingly, we modify the term of the sentence awarded to accused Nos.1 and 2 for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., to six months each, making the nature of the sentence as simple imprisonment for the said period. We further modify the fine imposed by reducing the same from Rs. 20,000/- each to Rs. 2,000/- each, as originally awarded by the trial Court. Needless to say, that the default sentence therefor, awarded by the trial Court i.e., to undergo simple imprisonment for three months is also restored. If in terms of the impugned judgment, accused Nos.1 and 2 had already deposited Rs. 20,000/-, after making deduction in terms of the sentence of fine mentioned hereinbefore, the balance amount shall be refunded to them in accordance with the law. In the said circumstances, accused Nos.1 and 2 shall surrender before the trial Court so as to serve out the unserved period of sentence imposed on them by this judgment. Taking note of the fact that the child of accused Nos.1 and 2 is now aged only about 6 years, we further order that firstly the second accused shall surrender before the trial Court, within a period of 3 weeks from today to serve out the rest of the sentence. Upon his release from the jail, on suffering the sentence, the first accused shall surrender before the Court to serve her remaining period of sentence and such surrender shall be made by the first accused within a period of 2 weeks from the release of the second accused from the jail. This arrangement shall not be treated as a precedent as it was ordered in these special circumstances. In case the accused Nos.1 and 2 do not surrender in terms of this judgment on their own, the trial Court shall resort to appropriate steps in accordance with law to place them in custody and make them suffer the sentence as mentioned hereinbefore. The appeals are allowed as above.

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 15 Jul 2024

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/punishment-must-be-in-proportion-to-gravity-of-offence-supreme-court-enhances-sentence-bigamous-marriage-263490

https://www.legiteye.com/supreme-court-modifies-sentence-in-bigamy-case-orders-staggered-jail-terms-for-couple-justices-ct-ravikumar-sanjay-kumar-15-07-2024/

https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-caselaw/2024/july/2024-latest-caselaw-433-sc/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6696638231ed747732bfccdc

Baba Natarajan Prasad vs M. Revathi 2024 INSC 523 – S 494 IPC – Bigamy – Sentencing

https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=17724

https://x.com/SCJudgments/status/1813118439701057835

Imposition of ‘Imprisonment Till the Rising of the Court’ is Unconscionably Lenient: Supreme Court Enhances Sentence in Bigamy Case

https://www.freelaw.in/legalnews/Punishment-of-imprisonment-till-the-rising-of-the-court-is-a-flea-bite-sentence-for-those-convicted-for-an-offence-of-bigamy-Supreme-Court-

https://www.the-laws.com/encyclopedia/browse/case?caseId=004202345000&title=baba-natarajan-prasad-vs-m-revathi

Flea-Bite

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/baba-natarajan-prasad-v-m-revathi-2024-insc-523-bigamy-494-ipc-serious-offence-1544100

The decision of the District Court is here.

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 21 Apr 2019

Index of Bigamy Judgments is here.

Mohammad Miyan and Ors Vs State of UP on 21 Aug 2018

Posted on July 14 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

Mr. R. K. Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants-accused, submits that the prosecution under section 498A of IPC was clearly not tenable in view of the case of the complainant herself that there had been a divorce almost four years before filing of the FIR.
We find much substance in the submission made by Mr. Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants-accused. Even in the FIR dated 18.8.2015, the complainant-wife has stated that her divorce had taken place about four years back. It is not possible to accept the contention made by learned counsel appearing on behalf of complainant-wife that she made the statement in ignorance of Sharia law. She is a Headmistress and must be credited with due knowledge of her meritorious status.
In view of her own averment that she was divorced four years ago, we are of the view that the prosecution is not sustainable under section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Section 498A of the IPC opens with the words “Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman….” Therefore, where the complainant approaches with a case that there has been a divorce long back i.e. four years ago before filing of the FIR, section 498A of IPC in terms would not be attracted. We accordingly consider it appropriate to quash the prosecution against all the accused persons under section 498A of IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

Mohammad Miyan Vs State of UP on 21 Aug 2018

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/150839791/

Index of Quash Judgments is here.

Inderjeet Kaur Kalsi Vs NCT of Delhi and Anr on 27 Nov 2013

Posted on July 9 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 21.1 and 21.2,

21. Findings
21.1 At the outset, this Court is of the view that having availed the remedy of revision before the Sessions Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C., the petitioner cannot be allowed to re-agitate the same point before this Court in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as it would amount to a second revision which is specifically barred by Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. This petition amounts to a second revision petition in the garb of Section 482 Cr.P.C.
21.2 Although the power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, it has to be used sparingly and cautiously to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The petitioner has also not been able to make out any case of abuse of process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This Court is, therefore, not inclined to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Inderjeet Kaur Kalsi Vs NCT of Delhi and Anr on 27 Nov 2013

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

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