Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 10 Dec 2024

Posted on June 27 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court hung the false 498A IPC case high and dry and reminded the High Courts of their solemn duty to stop the misuse of matrimonial laws as weapons.

From Para 8,

8. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants never demanded any dowry from respondent No.2. Respondent No.2 in fact used to leave the matrimonial house uninformed. In fact, on one such occasion when she left the matrimonial house on 03.10.2021, appellant No.1 made a police complaint on 05.10.2021. When the police found her whereabouts, she was allegedly living with someone. Respondent No.2 after being counselled, returned to her matrimonial house. It was further submitted that respondent No.2 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting to close the complaint made by appellant No.1 wherein she admitted that she had left her matrimonial house after quarrelling with appellant No.1 because of one Govindan, with whom she was talking over the phone for the past ten days continuously. She also stated that she would not repeat such acts in future. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that respondent No.2 again left the matrimonial house leaving appellant No.1 and children behind….

From Para 18,

18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by respondent No.2 are vague and omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant No.1 harassed her and that appellant Nos.2 to 6 instigated him to do so, respondent No.2 has not provided any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. She has also not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations.

From Paras 19-21,

19. Further, the record reveals that respondent No.2 on 03.10.2021 left the matrimonial house leading appellant No.1 to file a police complaint on 05.10.2021. When the police officials traced her, respondent No.2 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting to close the complaint made by appellant No.1. In the said letter, respondent No.2 admitted that she left her matrimonial house after quarrelling with appellant No.1 as she was talking to a person by name Govindan over the phone for the past ten days continuously. She further admitted that appellant No.1 was taking good care of her. She also stated that she will not engage in such actions in future. Despite that, in 2021 itself, respondent No.2 once again left the matrimonial house leaving appellant No.1 and also her minor children.
20. Losing hope in the marriage, appellant No.1 issued a legal notice to respondent No.1 seeking divorce by mutual consent on 13.12.2021. Instead of responding to the said legal notice issued by appellant No.1, respondent No.2 lodged the present FIR 82 of 2022 on 01.02.2022 registered with Neredmet Police Station, Rachakonda under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act.
21. Given the facts of this case and in view of the timing and context of the FIR, we find that respondent No.2 left the matrimonial house on 03.10.2021 after quarrelling with appellant No.1 with respect to her interactions with a third person in their marriage. Later she came back to her matrimonial house assuring to have a cordial relationship with appellant No.1. However, she again left the matrimonial house. When appellant No.1 issued a legal notice seeking divorce on 13.12.2021, the present FIR came to be lodged on 01.02.2022 by respondent No.2. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the FIR filed by respondent No. 2 is not a genuine complaint rather it is a retaliatory measure intended to settle scores with appellant No. 1 and his family members.

From Paras 24 and 25,

24. Insofar as appellant Nos.2 to 6 are concerned, we find that they have no connection to the matter at hand and have been dragged into the web of crime without any rhyme or reason. A perusal of the FIR would indicate that no substantial and specific allegations have been made against appellant Nos.2 to 6 other than stating that they used to instigate appellant No.1 for demanding more dowry. It is also an admitted fact that they never resided with the couple namely appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 and their children.Appellant Nos.2 and 3 resided together at Guntakal, Andhra Pradesh. Appellant Nos. 4 to 6 live in Nellore, Bengaluru and Guntur respectively.
25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No.1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.

From Para 28,

28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them.

From Para 29, (Cover drive by Supreme Court!)

29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the second respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case.

Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 10 Dec 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/93461652/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6759166862941119016e1691

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/t/2370197-dara-lakshmi-narayana-others?s=Dara%20Lakshmi%20Narayana&refine_search=&s_acts=

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/dara-lakshmi-narayana-others-v-state-of-telangana-another-2024-insc-953-498a-ipc-fir-quashed-1560806

https://www.lawtext.in/judgement.php?bid=1285

https://advamritaverma.com/legal-updates/f/498-a-ipc-has-become-the-legal-weapon?blogcategory=CPC

The Order from Telangana High Court refusing to Quash the fake 498A IPC proceedings…

Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 16 Feb 2022

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Mohammad Wajid and Anr Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 08 Aug 2023

Posted on June 26 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court cautioned High Courts about malicious matrimonial cases.

From Para 30,

30. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.

Mohammad Wajid and Anr Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 08 Aug 2023

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Ajay Rajendra Khare and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra on 10 Jun 2025

Posted on June 26 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Bombay High Court at Aurangabad Bench identified a fake case and dust-binned it.

From Para 7,

7 At the outset, we would like to start with observations that in matrimonial disputes suppression of facts carry importance. In fact, the marriage stands on the footing of faith, feelings and respect for each other.
….
In the information that was collected by applicant No.1 from the Right to Information Officer, Kharghar Police Station would show that the informant has been addressed as Dr. Sou. Sandhya Ashok Kadam (not as ‘Sandhya Ajay Khare’). If she had gone to Police Station and according to her, First Information Report was not taken, then why she had not lodged the report after she went to Nanded i.e. to her parental home, has not been explained by her. It is easy to make allegations against others, but when it comes to false allegations, they are hard to prove. This is the classic example of misuse of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code.

Ajay Rajendra Khare and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra on 10 Jun 2025

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Ghanshyam Soni Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 04 Jun 2025

Posted on June 17 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court granted Divorce to husband against a lying wife.

From Para 10,

10. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by the complainant are that in the year 1999, the Appellant inflicted mental and physical cruelty upon her for bringing insufficient dowry. The Complainant refers to few instances of such atrocities, however the allegations are generic, and rather ambiguous. The allegations against the family members, who have been unfortunately roped in, is that they used to instigate the Appellant husband to harass the Complainant wife, and taunted the Complainant for not bringing enough dowry; however, there is no specific incident of harassment or any evidence to that effect. Similarly, the allegations against the five out of six sisters that they used to insult the Complainant and demanded dowry articles from her, and upon failure beat her up, but there is not even a cursory mention of the incident. An allegation has also been made against a tailor named Bhagwat that he being a friend of the Appellant instigated him against the Complainant, and was allegedly instrumental in blowing his greed. Such allegations are merely accusatory and contentious in nature, and do not elaborate a concrete picture of what may have transpired. For this reason alone, and that the evidence on record is clearly inconsistent with the accusations, the version of the Complainant seems implausible and unreliable. The following observation in K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana Represented by Its Secretary, Department of Home & Ors.2, fits perfectly to the present scenario:
“6. The Courts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out.”
11. As regards the Appellant, the purportedly specific allegations levelled against him are also obscure in nature. Even if the allegations and the case of the prosecution is taken at its face value, apart from the bald allegations without any specifics of time, date or place, there is no incriminating material found by the prosecution or rather produced by the complainant to substantiate the ingredients of “cruelty” under section 498A IPC, as recently observed in the case of Jaydedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda & Ors. v. State of Gujarat3 and Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh.4 The Complainant has admittedly failed to produce any medical records or injury reports, x-ray reports, or any witnesses to substantiate her allegations. We cannot ignore the fact that the Complainant even withdrew her second Complaint dt. 06.12.1999 six days later on 12.12.1999. There is also no evidence to substantiate the purported demand for dowry allegedly made by the Appellant or his family and the investigative agencies in their own prudence have not added sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 to the chargesheet.

From Para 13,

13. It is rather unfortunate that the Complainant being an officer of the State has initiated criminal machinery in such a manner, where the aged parents-in-law, five sisters and one tailor have been arrayed as an accused. Notwithstanding the possibility of truth behind the allegations of cruelty, this growing tendency to misuse legal provisions has time and again been condemned by this Court. The observations in Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. v. State of Telangana & Anr.5, Preeti Gupta & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr.6 aptly captures this concern.

From Para 15,

15. It is a settled position of law that for the computation of the limitation period under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance.7 The dicta laid down in the case of Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh8 makes it unequivocally clear that the Magistrate is well within his powers to take cognizance of a complaint filed within a period of three years from the date of the commission of offence as mandated under section 468 CrPC.

Ghanshyam Soni Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 04 Jun 2025

Index of Quash Judgments is here.

Bal Manohar Jalan Vs Sunil Paswan and Anr on 30 Jun 2014

Posted on June 8 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 7,

7. The right of hearing given to accused under Section 401 clause (2) of Criminal Procedure Code was elaborately dealt with by this Court in Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia case (supra).
8. In the present case challenge is laid to order dated 4.3.2009 at the instance of the complainant in the revision petition before the High Court and by virtue of Section 401(2) of the Code, the accused mentioned in the First Information Report get the right of hearing before the revisional court although the impugned order therein was passed without their participation. The appellant who is an accused person cannot be deprived of hearing on the face of the express provision contained in Section 401(2) of the Code and on this ground, the impugned order of the High Court is liable to be set aside and the matter has to be remitted.

Bal Manohar Jalan Vs Sunil Paswan and Anr on 30 Jun 2014

Gollamudi Ramesh Vs Modukuri Nagamani and Anr on 30 Aug 2017

Posted on June 5 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of AP High Court (Erstwhile Combined High Court for TS and AP) held that Evidence must not be taken via Affidavit as per Sec 126(2) CrPC in a Sec 125 CrPC case.

From Para 6,

6. Undoubtedly the proceedings before the court below are under section 125 Cr.P.C., though it is registered as FCOP the petition is only under section 125 Cr.P.C., and the procedure followed by the Judge is only under section 126 Cr.P.C. clause [2] the Court shall take evidence in the presence of the person against whom an order for payment of maintenance is proposed to be made, or, when his personal attendance is dispensed with in the presence of his pleader, and shall be recorded in the manner prescribed for summons-cases; therefore, taking advantage of 126 [2] of Cr.P.C., the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the affidavit of the respondent cannot be permitted to be taken as evidence, like summons cases, this question no more res integra. In V.D. Solomon’s case, supra-1, the learned single Judge after elaborately dealing with section 10 of the Family Courts Act and other provisions held that in maintenance cases the proceedings under section 125 Cr.P.C., the Court has to record the evidence as contemplated under section 126 [2] Cr.P.C., and affidavits cannot be received. In view of the law declared by this Court the procedure adopted by the Judge, Additional Family Court is irregular and contrary to law. This Court in exercise of the powers conferred under section 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C., can set aside the same. Accordingly, the order passed by the court below is set aside.

Gollamudi Ramesh Vs Modukuri Nagamani and Anr on 30 Aug 2017

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e96d23d4653d053645840b9

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/Browse/Case?CaseId=407102273000&Title=GOLLAMUDI-RAMESH-Vs.-MODUKURI-NAGAMANI—MODKURI-GETHA-NAGAMANI

Index of Maintenance Judges is here.

Ritesh Sinha Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr on 2 Aug 2019

Posted on June 4 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of the Supreme Court answer the references before it in the following way…

From Paras 5 and 6,

5. Two principal questions arose for determination of the appeal which have been set out in the order of Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai dated 7th December, 2012 in the following terms.
“(1) Whether Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, which protects a person accused of an offence from being compelled to be a witness against himself, extends to protecting such an accused from being compelled to give his voice sample during the course of investigation into an offence?
(2) Assuming that there is no violation of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, whether in the absence of any provision in the Code, can a Magistrate authorize the investigating agency to record the voice sample of the person accused of an offence?”
6. While the first question was answered in the negative by both the learned Judges (Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai and Justice Aftab Alam) following the ratio of the law laid down in State of Bombay vs.Kathi Kalu Oghad1, difference of opinion has occurred insofar as second question is concerned.

From Para 10,

10. We may now proceed to answer the second question, namely, whether in the absence of any specific provision in the Cr.P.C. would a Court be competent to authorize the Investigating Agency to record the voice sample of a person accused of an offence. We are told that no authoritative pronouncement of this Court has been rendered by this Court.

From Para 12,

12. None of the said amendments specifically authorize or empower a Magistrate to direct an accused person or any other person to give his/her voice sample for the purposes of an inquiry or investigation under the Code. “Omission” of the Legislature to specifically so provide has led the learned judge (Justice Aftab Alam) on the two judge Bench to doubt as to whether legislative wisdom was in favour of a specific exclusion or omission so as to make a judicial exercise through a process of interpretation impermissible.

Finally, from Paras 24 and 25,

24. Would a judicial order compelling a person to give a sample of his voice violate the fundamental right to privacy under Article 20(3) of the Constitution, is the next question. The issue is interesting and debatable but not having been argued before us it will suffice to note that in view of the opinion rendered by this Court in Modern Dental College and Research Centre and others vs.State of Madhya Pradesh and others11, Gobind vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and another12 and the Nine Judge’s Bench of this Court in K.S. Puttaswamy and another vs. Union of India and others13 the fundamental right to privacy cannot be construed as absolute and but must bow down to compelling public interest. We refrain from any further discussion and consider it appropriate not to record any further observation on an issue not specifically raised before us.
25. In the light of the above discussions, we unhesitatingly take the view that until explicit provisions are engrafted in the Code of Criminal Procedure by Parliament, a Judicial Magistrate must be conceded the power to order a person to give a sample of his voice for the purpose of investigation of a crime. Such power has to be conferred on a Magistrate by a process of judicial interpretation and in exercise of jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. We order accordingly and consequently dispose the appeals in terms of the above.

Ritesh Sinha Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr on 2 Aug 2019

Citations: [2019 INSC 855]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/18061439/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5d5259333321bc4b5e57ce07

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/ritesh-sinha-vs-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr

https://www.nayalegal.com/ritesh-sinha-v-state-of-up-2019

Akkala Rami Reddy Vs State of AP and Anr on 30 Apr 2025

Posted on May 1 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Harinath N has passed this judgment, wherein it was held that,

From Para 36 and 37,

36. The defacto-complainant has been serving as Treasurer of Pastors Fellowship in Pittalavanipalem Mandal. In order to become Pastor one has to essentially convert to Christianity. Evidently the 2nd respondent is a Christian professing Christianity. Having converted to Christianity, the petitioner
cannot continue to be a member of Scheduled Caste community. The caste system is alien to Christianity. Having converted to Christianity and admitting his role as a Pastor in a Church the 2nd respondent could not invoke the provisions of the Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
37. The SC ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is a protective legislation introduced for preventing atrocities against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In the present case, the 2nd respondent has misused the Protective Legislation though he is not entitled to invoke the provisions of the Act. The 2nd respondent had voluntarily converted to Christianity and was admittedly working as a Pastor in a Church for the last 10 years as on the date of incident. Thus, the 2nd respondent cannot be permitted to invoke the provisions of the Protective Legislation.

From Para 40,

40. Considering all this, this is a case where the 2nd respondent has misused the SC ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and filed a false complaint. The argument of the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent that the 2nd respondent continues to hold SC Certificate issued by LW.12 is concerned, the same is a matter to be dealt under Section 5 of the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1993 by the appropriate authority under the Act. Mere non-cancellation of the caste certificate by the authority to a person who has converted into Christianity cannot instill the protection granted under the Protective Legislation. The 2nd respondent has ceased to be a Member of the Scheduled Caste Community, the day he had converted into Christianity.

Akkala Rami Reddy Vs State of AP and Anr on 30 Apr 2025

Kiran Jyot Maini Vs Anish Pramod Patel on 15 Jul 2024

Posted on April 5 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed this decision. Not sure, why this is a reportable judgment!

Kiran Jyot Maini Vs Anish Pramod Patel on 15 Jul 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/669778a11312582eb2f9e52c

Index of Maintenance Judgments under DV Act is here. Divorce Judgments here. DV Judgements here.

N.Usha Rani and Anr Vs Moodudula Srinivas on 30 Jan 2025

Posted on March 28 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court passed this judgment…

From Para 3, (Madam is very planned: MOU signed with First Husband on 25-Nov-2005; Remarriage with Second Husband on 27-Nov-2005; And someone said our judges are blind-fucks)

3. The facts of the case reveal that Appellant No.1 before this Court – Smt. N. Usha Rani married one Nomula Srinivas on 30.08.1999 at Hyderabad. During the period of their wedlock, she gave birth to a male child, namely, Sai Ganesh on 15.08.2000. The couple lived together until disputes arose between them. Following their return from the United States of America in February 2005, they began living separately. Eventually, on 25.11.2005, a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’) was executed between the couple, dissolving their marriage. Meanwhile, Appellant No. 1 got acquainted with her neighbour,the Respondent, and the couple got married on 27.11.2005.

From Para 10,

10. We have heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. The short question before us is whether a woman is entitled to claim maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC from her second husband while her first marriage is allegedly legally subsisting.

From Paras 17 and 18, (Dripping and Simping Wokeism… Thuuu)

17. This encapsulates the full scope and gravity of considerations before this Court as we deliberate on the issue at hand. The present case does not concern a live-in relationship. The Family Court made a factual finding that Appellant No. 1 married the Respondent and that finding is not disputed by the Respondent. Instead, the Respondent seeks to defeat the right to maintenance by claiming that his marriage to Appellant No. 1 is void ab initio as her first marriage is still subsisting. Two other pertinent facts must be considered: firstly, it is not the case of the Respondent that the truth was concealed from him. In fact, the Family Court makes a specific finding that Respondent was fully aware of the first marriage of the Appellant No. 1. Therefore, Respondent knowingly entered into a marriage with Appellant No. 1 not once, but twice. Secondly, Appellant No. 1 places before this Court an MoU of separation with her first husband. While this is not a legal decree of divorce, it also emerges from this document and other evidence that the parties have dissolved their ties, they have been living separately and Appellant No. 1 is not deriving maintenance from her first husband. Therefore, barring the absence of a legal decree, Appellant No. 1 is de facto separated from her first husband and is not deriving any rights and entitlements as a consequence of that marriage.
18. In the opinion of this Court, when the social justice objective of maintenance u/s. 125CrPC is considered against the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot, in good conscience, deny maintenance to Appellant No. 1. It is settled law that social welfare provisions must be subjected to an expansive and beneficial construction and this understanding has been extended to maintenance since Ramesh Chander (supra). An alternate interpretation would not only explicitly defeat the purpose of the provision by permitting vagrancy and destitution, but would also give legal sanction to the actions of the Respondent in knowingly entering into a marriage with Appellant No.1, availing its privileges but escaping its consequent duties and obligations. The only conceivable mischief that could arise in permitting a beneficial interpretation is that the Appellant No.1 could claim dual maintenance–however, that is not the case under the present facts. We are aware that this Court has previously denied maintenance in cases of subsisting marriages (See Yamunabai (supra) and Bakulabai (supra)). However, a plea of separation from the first marriage was not made in those cases and hence, they are factually distinguishable. It must be borne in mind that the right to maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC is not a benefit received by a wife but rather a legal and moral duty owed by the husband.

N.Usha Rani and Anr Vs Moodudula Srinivas on 30 Jan 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 129]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/56187356/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67a987a7c254af19d96c5a16

Index of Maintenance Judgements is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 10 Dec 2024

Mohammad Wajid and Anr Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 08 Aug 2023

Ajay Rajendra Khare and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra on 10 Jun 2025

Ghanshyam Soni Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 04 Jun 2025

Bal Manohar Jalan Vs Sunil Paswan and Anr on 30 Jun 2014

Gollamudi Ramesh Vs Modukuri Nagamani and Anr on 30 Aug 2017

Ritesh Sinha Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr on 2 Aug 2019

Akkala Rami Reddy Vs State of AP and Anr on 30 Apr 2025

Kiran Jyot Maini Vs Anish Pramod Patel on 15 Jul 2024

N.Usha Rani and Anr Vs Moodudula Srinivas on 30 Jan 2025