Pothugutla Sushmitha Vs State of AP and Anr on 05 Sep 2022

A single judge of AP High Court held as follows,

From Paras 10 and 11,

10. The observations made in both the decisions are similar and they go to show that if anyone is declared as an absconder/proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code, he is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail.
11. In the instant case, Non-Bailable-Warrant was issued against the petitioner/A-4 as she was shown absconding in the charge sheet and it is not the case that proclamation proceedings were initiated and thus, the petitioner cannot at all be termed as a ‘proclaimed offender’ so as to disentitle her from getting the relief of anticipatory bail. Thus, as per the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and since proclamation proceedings under section 82 Cr.P.C. are not initiated, the present petition is maintainable.

Rashmi Raikhy and Anr Vs The State of NCT Delhi and Ors on 1 Feb 2018

Posted on February 19 by ShadesOfKnife

The High Court of Delhi, quashed the Look Out Circular (LOC) issued against the petitioners registered under Sections 406/498-A/34 IPC.

The Court held that issuance and continuation of an LOC in a matrimonial dispute involving Section 406 IPC was neither reasonable nor justified, especially when the petitioners had regularly appeared before the trial court, complied with bail conditions under Section 438 CrPC, and had not misused permission to travel abroad.

The Court emphasised that an LOC is a serious coercive measure and cannot be mechanically issued in matrimonial disputes where the accused are neither absconding nor involved in heinous offences.

The LOC was accordingly directed to be withdrawn.

The following paragraphs were instrumental in the Court’s decision to quash the Look Out Circular:

Para 4 “Record reveals that on several occasions permissions were sought by the petitioners to travel abroad and the said permissions were granted; there are no allegations of their misuse. Record further reveals that the petitioners are regularly appearing before the court concerned in the said proceedings.”
Para 5 “During this period since 2009/2010, the petitioners have suffered a lot due to issuance of LOC against them. Even after discharge order on 11.12.2017, LOC against the petitioner No.2 has not been rescinded.”
Para 7 “For the offence under Section 406 IPC, in matrimonial dispute, issuance of LOC against the petitioners till disposal of the case cannot be justified; the offence is not heinous in nature.”
Para 8 “In the case of E.V.Perumal Samy Reddy, E.V.R.Santosh Reddy and Rajeshwari vs. State represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Police and State represented by the Inspector of Police MANU/TN/2308/2013, Madras High Court noted various types of persons who could be included in the LOC:-
(i) Persons with Terrorists or Militant Links,
(ii) Belligerent Foreigners,
(iii) Foreigners previously noticed for violations of visa conditions.
(iv) Persons required by courts in criminal/civil cases who are absconding
(v) Absconding Offenders wanted by Police/CBI/Customs /Central excise/ Directorate of Rev. Intelligence/other agencies”
Para 9 “Apparently, the petitioners do not fall in any of the above categories. There are no allegations that petitioner No.1 ever absconded and did not participate in the criminal proceedings.”
Para 10 “Issuance of LOC is a serious matter as it contains full particulars of the individual which are sent throughout the world. Peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and due to subsequent development whereby the petitioner No.1 was charged only under Section 406 IPC, continuation of LOC against her can’t be considered reasonable and justified.”
Para 11 “In view of the above discussion, the concerned authorities are directed to withdraw the LOC order issued against the petitioners.”

Decision of the Court

Exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 CrPC, the Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and directed the withdrawal of the Look Out Circular issued against the petitioners.

Rashmi Raikhy Vs State of NCT of Delhi

Citation: [2018:DHC:785]

Other Sources :

Index of Look Out Circular decisions is here.

Key Contributor:
Mrs Suprajaa Rajan B.Com, LL.B., LL.M.
+91-9606345150

Sahiba Sodhi Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 09 Dec 2025

Posted on February 14 by ShadesOfKnife

From Paras from 13 to 17,

13. From the affidavit of income, assets and liabilities filed by the petitioner-wife before the learned Trial Court in November 2020, it is evident that she did not disclose the income earned during her period of employment between April 2020 and July 2020. In the said affidavit, she asserted that she had worked only for ten months during the entire eight years of marriage. However, she later admitted having worked for a few months in 2020 also, only after the learned Trial Court specifically directed her to file her bank account statements for the period April 2020 to November 2020 – statements which she had not annexed with her affidavit despite filing it in November 2020.
14. It is further noted that although an updated income affidavit was filed by the petitioner in April 2021 in compliance with the directions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Rajnish v. Neha: (2021) 2 SCC 324, she still did not file her income tax returns for the preceding three years, claiming that the husband had been filing them on her behalf. The learned Trial Court observed that ITRs could nevertheless be accessed using her PAN details and granted her a final opportunity to file them, while imposing costs of ₹1,000/-. The relevant bank statements were eventually filed in July 2021, but legible copies were not furnished to the respondent-husband. In view of the petitioner‟s repeated non-compliance and withholding of material documents, the learned Trial Court was constrained to stay the operation of the ad-interim maintenance order. When bank statements were eventually produced, the salary of about ₹18,000/- per month, admittedly earned by the petitioner during those three months as stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner before the Court, was not reflected in the bank account statements, nor was any termination letter filed contemporaneously. These omissions led the learned Trial Court to conclude that the petitioner did have a source of income, which she attempted to suppress.
15. The learned Trial Court also took note of the petitioner‟s earlier ITRs which showed that, contrary to her claim of having no source of income, she had declared substantial earnings in the years immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. Her ITR for the FY 2017–2018 reflected a gross income exceeding ₹3,00,000/-, comprising rental income and income from other sources. Similarly, her ITR for the FY 2018–2019 showed a gross income of more than ₹3,50,000/-, again arising from rent and deposits. These disclosures were inconsistent with her submission that she was unemployed and that whatever she earned was taken away by her husband.Her bank account statements also reflected electronic transfers, credit entries and investments, none of which were satisfactorily explained by her. These circumstances, at the interim stage, provided sufficient basis for the learned Trial Court to draw a prima facie inference that the petitioner had additional sources of income which she had not disclosed in her income affidavit, and thus, suppressed material facts relating to her financial capacity.
16. The learned Sessions Court, after independently examining the Trial Court record, affirmed these findings and held that the petitioner had not approached the Court with clean hands. It noted that the petitioner had produced the relevant records only when confronted with the documents filed by the respondent-husband and only after specific and repeated directions were passed by the learned Trial Court. The learned Sessions Court also observed that her explanations for the credit entries in her bank accounts were merely oral and unsupported by documents.
17. The record further reflects that the petitioner had received substantial amounts towards maturity of LIC policies and recurring deposits upon the demise of both her parents. Her own explanation is that these amounts were reinvested for the benefit of herself and the child. However, the fact remains that such reinvestments would reasonably generate returns in the form of interest, which constitute a source of income that was never disclosed. The respondent-husband has also placed on record the ITR Acknowledgement for AY 2025–2026, of the petitioner-wife, showing an income of ₹2,04,730/-.

The beauty in this judgment is as follows:

20. However, this Court finds merit in the submission of the petitioner regarding her right to secure adequate residence. It is undisputed that after the parties vacated the rented premises, the petitioner and the minor child have been residing at her brother‟s house. The petitioner is not paying any rent and is residing there purely out of goodwill.
21. Section 19(1)(f) of the PWDV Act empowers the Court to direct the respondent to secure for the aggrieved woman the same level of alternate accommodation as enjoyed by her in the shared household, or to pay rent for the same. The husband also owes a statutory duty to provide residence for his minor child, who resides with the petitioner. The fact that the petitioner may not be entitled to monetary maintenance due to concealment of income does not, ipso facto, in the interregnum, disentitle her to a residence order under Section 19 of the PWDV Act.
22. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the petitioner-wife is entitled to a sum of Rs. 10,000/- per month, as expenses towards securing a rented accommodation for herself and the minor child, which shall be paid by the respondent herein. The directions qua payment of interim maintenance of Rs. 15,000/- per month to the minor child, as directed by the learned Trial Court and upheld by the Sessions Court, have not been challenged before this Court, and the same are accordingly not interfered with.

The mere fact that the case is only at a Stage where there is challenge to the Interim Orders, this Order sustains. Otherwise, no relief may be granted under DV Act unless DV is established by way of evidence. One should not forget that, as per Section 19(1)(f) of DV Act, ONLY on being satisfied that DV actually happened (obviously by way of evidence), the relief in sub-section can be granted, that to in Main petition

19. Residence orders.—(1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order—
(a) xxxx;
(b) xxxx;
(c) xxxx;
(d) xxxx;
(e) xxxx; or
(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require:
Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a woman.

Frankly, why is interim maintenance granted to the child, when DV was not held to be prima facie established?

Sahiba Sodhi Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 09 Dec 2025

Citations: [2025:DHC:11064]

Other Sources:

Nikhat Parveen Vs Rafiqui and Ors on 17 Oct 2023

Posted on February 11 by Suprajaa Rajan

A single-judge Bench of the Delhi High Court held that the biological father must pay child maintenance. The Court examined a case where a DNA test excluded the husband’s paternity and ruled that a man who is not the biological father cannot be forced to maintain the child.

The Court clarified that scientific evidence prevails over the presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act. Parental liability arises from biological parentage. Since the DNA report excluded the husband, the Court removed his liability toward the child.

The following paragraph forms the foundation of the Court’s reasoning:

“26. Therefore, in face of DNA report existing on record, respondent no. 1 herein cannot be held liable to make payment of maintenance to the child, even though the child was born during the subsistence of marriage between the petitioner and respondent no. 1. In this regard, the law is also settled that the biological father is liable to maintain his child.”

Nikhat Parveen Vs Rafiqui and Ors on 17 Oct 2023

Citation : [2023:DHC:7772]

Other Sources :

Index of Maintenance Judgements under PWDV Act here.

Key Contributor :

Mrs Suprajaa Rajan B.Com, LL.B, LL.M.

Contact number : +91-9606345150

Anu Aggarwal Vs Sushant Aggarwal on 20 Jan 2026

Posted on January 31 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court held as follows,

From Paras 5 and 6, (Lies about adopting a child!)

5. The evidence brought on record clearly demolishes the case now being sought to be set up by the petitioner. The petitioner had taken a plea that she had adopted a child, who happens to be the daughter of her real sister; however, she has specifically admitted in her cross-examination that the respondent had never given his consent for the said adoption. Admittedly, neither there is any documentary evidence or ceremony performed for the alleged adoption, nor any application was moved to change the details in the official records of the said child to demonstrate that the petitioner’s name was recorded or shown as the mother and the respondent’s name was recorded as a father of the said child.
6. The above-said fact clearly demonstrates the mala fide intent of the petitioner to mislead the Court and seek undue sympathy, which stand belied by her own admissions during cross-examination.

From Paras 7 and 8, (Multiple sources of Income)

7. Further, as regards her entitlement for maintenance, the petitioner has concealed the material facts that she was duly recorded as an employee of Markanda Oil Store. Though it has been vehemently argued by the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was never an employee of the said firm, however, in her cross-examination she admitted that she had availed various medical insurance benefits on the basis of the entries recorded in Markanda Oil Store, showing her as an employee. Moreover, the petitioner was also working as a teacher in a school, namely St. Joseph School, Ambala City; however, she failed to disclose the same in her affidavit of income and expenditure.
8. Furthermore, the petitioner has admitted that she holds various Kisan Vikas Patras and a Public Provident Fund account, wherein, the account balance exceeds Rs. 15 lakhs. Apart from these accounts, the petitioner also maintains other bank accounts, which were duly considered by the learned Trial Court, which clearly demonstrate that there was no distress or immediate financial hardship necessitating the grant of maintenance to the petitioner. Admittedly, the petitioner deliberately concealed these facts from the Court. She further admitting a separate salary account with Axis Bank, however, she neither produced proof thereof nor disclose the balance lying therein. Despite a specific suggestion being put to her, she knowingly withheld details regarding her income.

From Paras 10 and 11, (Surprise surprise!)

10. It is indeed strange that while earlier the petitioner was drawing a salary of Rs. 18,000/- per month but now she claims to be earning only Rs. 12,200/- per month, which appears highly improbable. This conduct clearly reflects an attempt to abuse the process of law merely to keep the respondent-husband entangled in continuous litigation and to extract money at her own convenience by misusing the judicial process.
11. The concept of grant of maintenance has been introduced to protect the dignity of women; however, it can’t be permitted to be used as a tool for unjust enrichment. The rising number of false and frivolous cases being filed today not only defeats the very object of the law but also inadvertently undermines a woman’s self-respect, dignity, and self-reliance. The petitioner cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the Court and abuse the process of law. In the absence of any material to demonstrate that the petitioner is in dire need of financial assistance or maintenance, the very filing of the petition amounts to an abuse of the process of law.

From Para 12, (Settled proposition of law)

12. It is settled proposition of law that maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is payable only when the wife is unable to maintain herself. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai”, (2008) 2 SCC 316 has categorically held that a wife having sufficient independent income or means is not entitled to maintenance. This principle has been reiterated and streamline in “Rajnesh v. Neha”, (2021) 2 SCC 324 wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized full disclosure of income and assets and clarified that Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a measure to prevent destitution and not a source of unjust enrichment.

From Para 13,

13. Moreover, Section 125 Cr.P.C. has been enacted with a specific purpose to protect women and children and to prevent vagrancy and destitution among them. It provides speedy remedy to the destituted and helpless women to establish their claim, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that she is unable to maintain herself and her child but in the present case, the petitioner has concealed her employment and claimed his husband is earning handsome amount, her conduct in suppressing relevant information from the Court and the fact that she is not only qualified but is capable of earning good money. Furthermore, this Court also observed that when a person approaches a Court, he/she should approach the Court not only with clean hands but also with clean mind, clean heart and clean objective. No litigant has a right to draught on the Court’s time and public money in order to get his/her affairs settled in the manner, he or she desires. Therefore, this Court does not find any error in the impugned order passed by the learned Family Court. Moreover, the petitioner has also failed to bring on record any cogent evidence to demonstrate that she was living separately from her husband on account of any situation created by the respondent-husband.

Anu Aggarwal Vs Sushant Aggarwal on 20 Jan 2026

Citations: [2026:PHHC:002754]

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance Judgments u/s 144 BNSS is here.

Neha Lal Vs Abhishek Kumar on 20 Jan 2026

Posted on January 27 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that Perjury applications shall continue, despite grant to divorce.

From Paras 28 to 30,

28. Now coming to the cases pending between the parties. All the cases pending between the parties, as mentioned in paragraph No.8.8, shall stand disposed of without any further action by them. However, the following applications filed by the parties raising plea of perjury shall continue because no one can be permitted to pollute the stream of justice, as emphasized by this Court in Kusha Duruka vs. The State of Odisha10. The cases being:
(i) Crl. M. A. No.42585 of 2019 in W. P. (Crl.) No.1025 of 2023 (under Section 340 CrPC)
(ii) Application under Section 379 read with 215 BNSS filed in MT No.151 of 2021
(iii) Application under Section 379 read with 215 BNSS filed in MT No.151 of 2021
(iv) Misc. Crl. No.7 of 2019 filed in MT No.853 of 2018
(v) Application under Section 340 CrPC in MT No.853 of 2018
29. It is clarified that if besides the cases mentioned in the paragraph 28, any other application(s) filed by the parties either under section 340 CrPC or under Section 379 read with 215 of BNSS, 2023, the same shall be dealt with on merits by the concerned Courts and will not be disposed of, in view of this order passed by this Court.
30. A copy of the order passed by this Court shall be sent to the Courts concerned for taking action as per the direction in this order. However, if there is any other case arising out of matrimonial dispute, though not mentioned in the list, but pending, the same shall also stand disposed of on production of copy of this order by the parties.

Neha Lal Vs Abhishek Kumar on 20 Jan 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Perjury Judgments is here.

Suninder Sandha Vs State of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 02 Dec 2025

Posted on January 13 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 15,

15. Evidently, Section 91 of the Code does not itself prescribe any stage. The core issue remains whether invocation of power under Section 91 of the Code by the Trial Court is as per the manner contemplated/provided for in law. We are mindful that the underlying case in Sarla Gupta (supra)1 concerned the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002. It is seen that State of Orissa v Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568, relied upon by the High Court, was considered by a Bench of equal strength in Sarla Gupta (supra).

From Para 17,

17. The law is no longer res integra, having been lastly settled by the 3-Judge Bench in Sarla Gupta (supra), which provides clarity as to the relevant stage at which power under Section 91 of the Code may be invoked. In the underlying case in these appeals, such stage has not yet been reached, as defence evidence has not commenced.

Suninder Sandha Vs State of NCT of Delhi & Anr on 02 Dec 2025

Kishan Lal Barwa Vs Sharda Saharan and Anr on 18 Feb 2015

Posted on January 8 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

From Para 14,

14.This Court finds that the basis of petitioner’s claim that the decree was obtained by fraud is a report submitted before the Chief Judicial Magistrate by the Directorate of Fingerprint Experts, according to which, the fingerprints of Ashok Kumar, as existing on the lease deed executed by Noida do not match with those upon the power of attorney claimed by Ripudman Kumar Saharan and rather matches with the agreement to sell executed in favour of the defendant-petitioner. This report has been prepared by the experts of Directorate of Fingerprint, who are public servants, and the report is in due discharge of their official duties, and by virtue of section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, a presumption of correctness of the report would be available in law, subject to further evidence which may be brought on record by the other side. The question as to whether a plea of fraud could be entertained even in collateral proceedings, at the stage of execution, after passing of the decree, is no longer res integra. It is settled that fraud and justice do not dwell together. It is equally settled that a court of law would do its utmost to ensure that injustice is not meted out to a party. Such right in a court of law has been recognized under section 44 of Evidence Act.

From Para 19,

19. It is well settled that once the plea of fraud has been setup by the defendant-petitioner before the executing court, and credible evidence in support of such plea was also placed, it was incumbent upon the executing court to have examined the issue of fraud, on merits, and such plea ought not to have been rejected merely on the ground that a decree in favour of the plaintiff-respondent had been passed, and the executing court, as such, had no occasion to examine the plea of fraud. It is also well settled that fraud vitiates all solemn acts. Though a plea of fraud was taken up before the civil court, but such plea was not adjudicated, which is clarified in the judgment of the civil court itself. However, if a credible material has come into existence, which if is found proved vitiates the decree itself, it is the duty of the executing court to consider such plea on merits. It was open for the executing court to have examined the report of the Directorate, Fingerprint Experts, in accordance with law, and for such purpose an opportunity was liable to have been allowed to the plaintiff-respondent. The executing court could have adjudicated as to whether the plea of fraud was made out on facts or not? but it was not open for the executing court to brush aside the objection itself and thereby refused to go into such issue itself.

From Para 22,

22. In view of the discussions made above, this Court finds that the orders impugned dated 26.2.2014 and 29.5.2014, passed by the courts below, cannot be sustained and are hereby quashed. The executing court is directed to reconsider the objection under section 47 CPC, afresh, in light of the observations made above. For such purposes, the executing court will go into the allegations of fraud on merits, in accordance with law, and after affording opportunity to both the parties, the plea of fraud would be adjudicated on merits. Since the proceedings have dragged for the last 13 years, therefore, the objection on merits would be decided forthwith, by fixing short dates, in accordance with law, without granting any adjournment to either of the parties, except upon imposition of cost, which shall not be less than Rs.500/-.

Kishan Lal Barwa Vs Sharda Saharan and Anr on 18 Feb 2015

Index of Judgments against Orders obtained fraudulently here.

Geddam Jhansi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 07 Feb 2025

Posted on December 6, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Supreme Court invoked Article 142 of the Constitution to quash a DV case, which has same allegations as in a false 498A IPC case.

40. Accordingly, we allow both the present Criminal Appeals as below:
(i) The impugned judgement and order dated 04.04.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 3105 of 2022 is set aside and the criminal proceedings in “C.C. No. 46 of 2022” pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is quashed qua the two appellants, Geddam Jhansi and Geddam Sathyakama Jabali.
(ii) The impugned judgement and order dated 03.02.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 1002 of 2022 is set aside and the criminal proceedings in DVC No. 25 of 2021 pending before the Court of the Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir is quashed qua the appellant, Geddam Jhansi. This is having regard to the criminal proceeding against her being quashed as above and as identical allegation (paragraph 28 above) are made against her in DVC No. 25 of 2021, and in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. This is also by bearing in mind the relationship of the appellant Geddam Jhansi to the complainant, being the latters’s mother-in-law’s sister.

Geddam Jhansi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 07 Feb 2025

Citations: [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1], [2025 INSC 160]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/192533816/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67a6e0c4a1572e13dd1ca525

https://testbook.com/recent-judgements/geddam-jhansi-vs-the-state-of-telangana

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/s498a-ipc-when-family-relations-are-sought-to-be-brought-under-criminal-proceedings-courts-should-be-cautious-supreme-court-283311

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/geddam-jhansi-v-the-state-of-telangana-2025-insc-160-domestic-violence-1567439

Index of DV Judgments is here. Index of Quash Judgments is here.

Rekha Sharad Ushir Vs Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd on 26 Mar 2025

Posted on November 23, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held (again!) as follows,

From Para 11,

11. It is settled law that a litigant who, while filing proceedings in the court, suppresses material facts or makes a false statement, cannot seek justice from the court. The facts suppressed must be material and relevant to the controversy, which may have a bearing on the decision making. Cases of those litigants who have no regard for the truth and those who indulge in suppressing material facts need to be thrown out of the court.

From Para 15,

15. It is pertinent to note that in the counter to the present appeal, the respondent has not denied the receipt of the letters dated 28th November 2016 and 13th December 2016. The complaint and affidavit in support of the complaint only refer to the notice dated 15th November 2016 issued by the advocate for the appellant to the respondent. What is stated in the complaint reads thus:
“……………………………………………………..
[D] The notice sent on the first address has been received on 15.11.2016. However, from the second address, envelope has been returned on 15.11.2016 with the postal remark as ‘left’.”
However, the respondent suppressed the letters dated 28th November 2016 and 13th December 2016 in the complaint and its statement on oath.

From Para 18 and 19,

18. The fact remains that in the complaint, the respondent has suppressed the reply dated 28th November 2016 and the letter dated 13th December 2016 sent by the appellant’s advocate. These two documents have also been suppressed in the statement on oath. The respondent made out a false case that the appellant did not reply to the demand notice. Moreover, the case that the documents as demanded were supplied is not pleaded in the complaint and statement under Section 200 of CrPC.
19. If these two letters were disclosed in the complaint, the learned Magistrate while recording the statement under Section 200 of CrPC, could have always questioned the respondent on the supply of documents to the appellant. What is important is that in the reply dated 28th November 2016, the appellant had reserved her right to give a reply to the demand notice after receiving the documents. It was the respondent’s duty to supply documents to the appellant or her advocate to enable the appellant to properly reply to the demand notice. At least, the inspection of documents could have been provided to the appellant. After noticing the fact that notwithstanding service of two letters written by the appellant, relied upon documents were not provided to the appellant, the learned Magistrate could have dismissed the complaint by exercising power under Section 203 of CrPC, as the appellant could not have replied to the statutory notice without looking at the documents relied upon.

From Para 21,

21. While filing a complaint under Section 200 of CrPC and recording his statement on oath in support of the complaint, as the complainant suppresses material facts and documents, he cannot be allowed to set criminal law in motion based on the complaint. Setting criminal law in motion by suppressing material facts and documents is nothing but an abuse of the process of law.

Rekha Sharad Ushir Vs Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd on 26 Mar 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 399], [2025 SCC OnLine SC641]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/120031673/

Index of Perjury Judgments is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

Pothugutla Sushmitha Vs State of AP and Anr on 05 Sep 2022

Rashmi Raikhy and Anr Vs The State of NCT Delhi and Ors on 1 Feb 2018

Sahiba Sodhi Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 09 Dec 2025

Nikhat Parveen Vs Rafiqui and Ors on 17 Oct 2023

Anu Aggarwal Vs Sushant Aggarwal on 20 Jan 2026

Neha Lal Vs Abhishek Kumar on 20 Jan 2026

Suninder Sandha Vs State of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 02 Dec 2025

Kishan Lal Barwa Vs Sharda Saharan and Anr on 18 Feb 2015

Geddam Jhansi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 07 Feb 2025

Rekha Sharad Ushir Vs Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd on 26 Mar 2025