Sharif Ahmed and Anr Vs State of UP and Anr on 01 May 2024

Posted on August 23 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that ‘he role played by the accused in the crime should be separately and clearly mentioned in the chargesheet, for each of the accused persons‘.

From Paras 26 to 31, [Importance of clear and complete entries of all columns in the chargesheet so that the court can clearly understand which crime has been committed by which accused]

26. The object and purpose of the police investigation is manyfold. It includes the need to ensure transparent and free investigation to ascertain the facts, examine whether or not an offence is committed, identify the offender if an offence is committed, and to lay before the court the evidence which has been collected, the truth and correctness of which is thereupon decided by the court.
27. In H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. State of Delhi21, this Court notes that the process of investigation generally consists of: 1) proceeding to the concerned spot, 2) ascertainment of facts and circumstances, 3) discovery and arrest, 4) collection of evidence which includes examination of various persons, search of places and seizure of things, and 5) formation of an opinion on whether an offence is made out, and filing the chargesheet accordingly. The formation of opinion is therefore the culmination of several stages that an investigation goes through. This Court in its decision in Abhinandan Jha and Others v. Dinesh Mishra22 states that the submission of the chargesheet or the final report is dependent on the nature of opinion formed, which is the final step in the investigation.
28. The final report has to be prepared with these aspects in mind and should show with sufficient particularity and clarity, the contravention of the law which is alleged. When the report complies with the said requirements, the court concerned should apply its mind whether or not to take cognisance and also proceed by issuing summons to the accused. While doing so, the court will take into account the statement of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code and the documents placed on record by the investigating officer.
29. In case of any doubts or ambiguity arising in ascertaining the facts and evidence, the Magistrate can, before taking cognisance, call upon the investigating officer to clarify and give better particulars, order further investigation, or even record statements in terms of Section 202 of the Code.
30. Our attention has been drawn to the format prescribed for the State of Uttar Pradesh, which by column 16 requires the investigating officer to state brief facts of the case. In addition, the State of Uttar Pradesh has issued a circular dated 19.09.2023, which refers to an earlier circular bearing No. 59 of 2016 dated 20.10.2016, and states that the investigation provisions contained in the Code and the police regulations with reference to Section 173 of the Code are not being consistently complied with and followed by the investigating officers and the supervising officers. The need to provide lead details of the offence in the chargesheet is mandatory as it is in accord with paragraph 122 of the police regulations. Similar directions were issued on 09.09.2022 following the direction of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad that brief narration of the material collected during investigation, which forms the opinion of the investigating officer, should be mentioned in the chargesheet.
31. Therefore, the investigating officer must make clear and complete entries of all columns in the chargesheet so that the court can clearly understand which crime has been committed by which accused and what is the material evidence available on the file. Statements under Section 161 of the Code and related documents have to be enclosed with the list of witnesses. The role played by the accused in the crime should be separately and clearly mentioned in the chargesheet, for each of the accused persons.

From Para 46, Wow, Totally ignored Satender Kumar Antil

46. We, however, would allow the present appeal to the extent that the non-bailable warrants issued against Manager Singh are unsustainable and should be quashed. It is a settled position of law that non-bailable warrants cannot be issued in a routine manner and that the liberty of an individual cannot be curtailed unless necessitated by the larger interest of public and the State. While there are no comprehensive set of guidelines for the issuance of non-bailable warrants, this Court has observed on several occasions that non-bailable warrants should not be issued, unless the accused is charged with a heinous crime, and is likely to evade the process of law or tamper/destroy evidence.

From Para 47,

47. Further, the observation that there is no provision for granting exemption from personal appearance prior to obtaining bail, is not correct, as the power to grant exemption from personal appearance under the Code31 should not be read in a restrictive manner as applicable only after the accused has been granted bail. This Court in Maneka Sanjay Gandhi and Another v. Rani Jethmalani32 held that the power to grant exemption from personal appearance should be exercised liberally, when facts and circumstances require such exemption.33 Section 205 states that the Magistrate, exercising his discretion, may dispense with the personal attendance of the accused while issuing summons, and allow them to appear through their pleader. While provisions of the Code are considered to be exhaustive, cases arise where the Code is silent and the court has to make such order as the ends of justice require. In such cases, the criminal court must act on the principle, that every procedure which is just and fair, is understood as permissible, till it is shown to be expressly or impliedly prohibited by law.34

Sharif Ahmed and Anr Vs State of UP and Anr on 01 May 2024

Citations: [2024 INSC 363]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/13608821/

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/chargesheet-must-contain-clear-complete-entries-specify-role-of-each-accused-witness-statements-be-enclosed-with-it-supreme-court-256699

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/sharif-ahmed-and-another-versus-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-another

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/sharif-ahmed-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-2024-insc-363-chargesheet-aspects-explained-1533473

Sharif Ahmad & Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh Home DepartmentSecretary (2024)

https://verdictchronicles.plreview.net/index.php?p=show_detail&id=39&keywords=

https://testbook.com/landmark-judgements/sharif-ahmad-vs-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-home-department-secretary

Index of Antics of Police Personnel in India here. NBW Judgements is here. Exemption from Personal Appearance Judgments is here.

Ishwar Chand Sharma and Ors Vs State of U.P. on 29 May 2026

Posted on July 26 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed this reportable judgment.

From Para 10.2,

10.2 It is pertinent to underscore the important role played by the legal fraternity in bringing down the overall pendency of the cases in the Family Courts and criminal cases which are an adjunct to matrimonial disputes by weeding out unimportant and vexatious proceedings undertaken in pursuance of a personal vendetta by unscrupulous litigants so as to fillip attention of the courts towards genuine litigation and pressing issues and adjudication of claims. This would lead to increasing the overall efficiency and disposal of cases while at the same time preventing infraction of the interests of justice and abuse of process of law.

Ishwar Chand Sharma and Ors Vs State of U.P. on 29 May 2026

Citations: [2026 INSC 587]

Other Sources:

Index of Quash Judgments here.

Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram and Anr Vs Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar and Anr on 21 Jul 2026

Posted on July 26 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that, ‘Typographical Errors In Pleadings Cannot Trigger Proceedings U/S 340 CrPC Unless They Amount To Deliberate Falsehood’ and ‘Wrong Statement’ In Pleadings Not Necessarily A ‘False Statement’.

Note: This is a Criminal Appeal filed in 2015, got disposed in 2026. A full 12 years… Hope the parties are still alive. Right to speedy trail seems to be a myth in India.

From Para 7,

It is by now settled that while entertaining proceedings under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C., it must be borne in mind that the material produced before the Court ought to make out a prima facie case for an inquiry to be made into an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) of the Penal Code. Further, the Court has to also consider whether it is expedient in the interest of justice that such inquiry should be made into the alleged offence. Reference in this regard can be usefully made to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another Vs. Meenakshi Marwah and another9.

From Para 10,

10. A reading of the aforesaid observations clearly indicates that the Court was prima facie satisfied that ‘wrong statements’ had been made by the defendant and his learned counsel in the miscellaneous appeal and, hence, a prima facie case for lodging a complaint had been made out.

From Para 11,

11. From the aforesaid provisions, it becomes clear that what is punishable is the giving of ‘false evidence’ under Section 193 or making of a ‘false statement’ under Section 199. What is thus required at the stage of directing initiation of proceedings for an offence punishable under the said provisions is a prima facie case of having given ‘false evidence’ or making a ‘false statement’ in a declaration which by law is receivable as evidence. As noted above, the Court for the purposes of directing the filing of a complaint recorded its prima facie satisfaction that ‘wrong statements’ had been made in the memorandum of appeal and the application for stay preferred by the defendant that was filed through his learned counsel. The order dated 19.01.2006 directing lodging of a complaint does not record any prima facie satisfaction that ‘false statement’ had been made in the aforesaid proceedings. There is a material difference between making a ‘wrong statement’ and ‘false statement’ in the context of Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code. A ‘wrong statement’ of fact may not always have the character of a ‘false statement’. While making of a ‘wrong statement’ may not fall within the ambit of Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code, a ‘false statement’ would qualify as relevant material for being considered as an offence under the said provisions. The threshold for initiating action for an offence punishable under Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code is the making of a ‘false statement’ and not the making of a ‘wrong statement’. It is so because a ‘false statement’ denotes a deliberate intention in making such statement; in other words, it is a wrongful or erroneous statement made intentionally to gain an undue advantage. Thus, the basic premise on which the Court proceeded to direct a complaint to be filed is erroneous and it does not satisfy the necessary threshold. It is, therefore, clear that no prima facie satisfaction was recorded by the Court that ‘false statements’ were made by the defendant and his learned counsel in the memorandum of appeal and in the application for stay, warranting initiation of proceedings for the offence punishable under Sections 193, 199 and 200 of the Penal Code.

From Para 12,

12. It is also pertinent to note that the Court failed to record its satisfaction that it was expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into the alleged offence in view of such statements. Without recording any satisfaction that it was indeed expedient in the interest of justice to hold an enquiry, such a direction was issued. Section 340 (1) of the Cr.P.C. mandates that a Court before directing an inquiry to be made into any offence referred to in Section 195 (1) (b) of the Penal Code, it should form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that such inquiry is in fact necessary. This would indicate that on the mere making of a ‘wrong statement’, an inquiry cannot be ordered. The forming of an opinion by the Court that holding of an inquiry is in fact expedient in the interests of justice is also a must. Ordering an inquiry without formation of any opinion as required by Section 340 (1) of the Cr.P.C. would render the order bad in law being not in accordance with the mandate of Section 340 (1).

From Para 13,

13. The High Court in the appeal preferred by the appellants challenging the order directing initiation of criminal proceedings proceeded to record its satisfaction that the appellants had filed a false affidavit in support of the application for stay. Such prima facie finding not having been recorded by the court of first instance, the High Court in the appeal preferred by the appellants challenging that order could not have recorded such finding, especially when the plaintiffs had not challenged the said order. The appellants could not have been placed in a worse position by preferring an appeal. The court of first instance having prima facie found that it was a case of making ‘wrong statements’, the High Court went on to record a finding that the appellants had in fact filed a false affidavit. Further, the High Court also recorded a finding as to the expediency of filing a complaint in the interests of justice. This finding was absent in the original order. The High Court has, thus, proceeded to improve the impugned order in an appeal preferred by the appellants, who were in fact aggrieved by the same. Such course is not permissible in law.

From Para 14,

14. We may also note that the application under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. came to be filed by the plaintiffs on 27.04.2005. Much prior thereto, on 20.09.2004 the defendant through his learned counsel moved an application seeking correction of the typing mistakes in the memorandum of appeal as well as the application for stay.

From Para 17,

17. Before parting, it may be noted that the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another (supra) was of the view that a direction for filing of a complaint normally ought not to be made during the pendency of the substantive proceedings before the Court but only when the proceedings conclude and the final judgment is rendered. The object is clear inasmuch as the main proceedings ought to be proceeded with and decided instead of diverting them with the aid of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. It is noticed that at times, the aid of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. is sought to be taken merely to delay the adjudication of the substantive proceedings, as also in the present case. The dictum of the Constitution Bench, thus, ought to be borne in mind by the Courts.

Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram and Anr Vs Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar and Anr on 21 Jul 2026

Citations: [2026 INSC 724]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/25151633/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6a5f599e5fc2952542506833

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/wrong-statement-in-pleadings-not-necessarily-a-false-statement-supreme-court-quashes-perjury-case-542312

https://www.verdictum.in/supreme-court/prabhakar-yeshwant-masram-and-another-v-sou-tula-namdeorao-jaipurkar-and-another-2026-insc-724-1618292

The Perjury Threshold: Evaluating Wrong Statements in Pleadings

Index of Perjury Judgments here.

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Posted on July 21 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Shiv Narayan Dhingra ji has passed this Order around the definition of a Temporary residence as held by the Section 27 of the PWDV Act 2005.

9. All legislative enactments on matrimonial disputes or custody matters make ordinary residence or residence or the place where parties lived together or the place of cause of action as a ground for invocation of jurisdiction of the Court. Domestic Violence Act is the first Act where a temporary residence of the aggrieved person has also been made a ground for invoking the jurisdiction of court. The expression “residence‟ means
“to make abode‟ – a place for dwelling. Normally place for dwelling is made with an intention to live there for considerable time or to settle there. It is a place where a person has a home. In Webster Dictionary, the residence means to dwell for length of time. The words „dwelling place‟ or abode are synonyms. A temporary residence, therefore, must be a temporary dwelling place of the person who has for the time being decided to make the place as his home. Although he may not have decided to reside there permanently or for a considerable length of time but for the time being, this must be place of her residence and this cannot be considered a place where the person has gone on a casual visit, or a fleeing visit for change of climate or simply for the purpose of filing a case against another person.
10. I, therefore, consider that the temporary residence, as envisaged under the Act is such residence where an aggrieved person is compelled to take shelter or compelled to take job or do some business, in view of domestic violence perpetuated on her or she either been turned out of the matrimonial home or has to leave the matrimonial home. This temporary residence does not include residence in a lodge or hostel or an inn or residence at a place only for the purpose of filing a domestic violence case. This temporary residence must also be a continuing residence from the date of acquiring residence till the application under Section 12 is disposed of and it must not be a fleeing residence where a woman comes only for the purpose of contesting the case and otherwise does not reside there.
11. In the present case, the aggrieved person is residing with her sister and has filed the petition under Domestic Violence Act. It cannot be said that her residence with her sister was a fleeing residence or was a temporary residence acquired for lodging the complaint of domestic violence. Her sister‟s house is a place where she has taken shelter and temporarily resides. I, therefore, find that there is no force in this petition. The petition is hereby dismissed with no orders to costs.

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Citations: [2010:DHC:4306], [2010 9 Laws(DLH) 9]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/106302060/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090d56e4b014971117976a

Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here.

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Posted on July 12 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not excepted , at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Further,

The mere initial grant of anticipatory bail for lesser offence, did not entitle the respondent to insist for regular bail even if he was subsequently found to be involved in the case of murder. Neither Section 437(5) nor Section 439(1) of the Code was attracted. There was no question of cancellation of bail earlier granted to the accused for an offence punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 406 IPC. The Magistrate committed a irregularity by holding that “I do not agree with the submission made by the Ld.Prosecutor in as much as if we go by his submissions then the accused would be liable for arrest every time the charge is altered or enhanced at any stage, which is certainly not the spirit of law”. With the change of the nature of the offence, the accused becomes disentitled to the liberty granted to him in relation to a minor offence, if the offence is altered for an aggravated crime. Instead of referring to the grounds which entitled the respondent-accused the grant of bail, the Magistrate adopted a wrong approach to confer him the benefit of liberty on allegedly finding that no grounds were made out for cancellation of bail.

Finally,

We would reiterate that in cases where the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life which is triable exclusively by a court of Sessions, the Magistrate may, in his wisdom, refrain to exercise the powers of granting the bail and refer the accused to approach the higher courts unless he is fully satisfied that there is no reasonable ground for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001 (INSC)

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1067439/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ada1e4b0149711411eb9

Index of Anticipatory Bail Judgments is here.

Pooja Ramesh Singh Vs JnK Bank and Anr on 02 Jul 2026

Posted on July 8 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court was surprised to know that fake judgments mentioned in NCLT Judgment were not caught by NCLAT.

From Paras 15 and 16,

15. It is not in dispute that the judgments relied upon by the NCLT are non-existent, and some AI-generated paragraphs are wrongly attributed to genuine citations. An independent examination undertaken by us reveals the following about the judgments relied upon by the adjudicating authority: State Bank of India v. M/s Shree Ram Urban Infrastructure Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 341 (cited in para 44 of NCLT judgment) – Wrong citation of an existing reported judgment6 and a non-existent paragraph, Everest Kento Cylinders Ltd. v. Union of India (2015) 2 SCC 1 (cited in para 45 of NCLT judgment) – Correct citation but nonexistent paragraph, ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Ltd., (2019) 16 SCC 528 (cited in para 47 of NCLT judgment) – Nonexistent citation, V.S. Dempo & Co. Ltd. v. Reliance Communications Ltd., (2021) 10 SCC 176 (cited in para 49 of NCLT judgment) – Nonexistent citation, Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty & Anr., (2018) 16 SCC 228 (cited in para 51 of NCLT judgment) – Correct citation but non-existent paragraph and Sarbjit Singh v. Union Bank of India, (2022) 7 SCC 464 (cited in para 53 of NCLT judgment) – Non-existent citation.
16. Respondent No. 1 has filed an affidavit indicating that the alleged judgments relied on by NCLT were not cited by its counsel at the bar. The affidavit also indicates that the so-called precedents relied on by the adjudicating authority were obtained through its own research. What about the Appellate Tribunal? The fake, non-existent judgments escaped scrutiny by the first statutory appellate tribunal. Today’s courts and tribunals implicitly trust lawyers when referring to precedents cited before them. Imagine the hardship of a situation in which the Court must verify the authenticity of each judgment cited by an advocate.

Pooja Ramesh Singh Vs JnK Bank and Anr on 02 Jul 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Posted on July 6 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that under section 311 of Cr.P.C. (read along with the Section 165 of Evidence Act), a Criminal Court has wide power to summon any person as witness, at any stage of the case, even after completion of defence evidence and argument stages.

From Para 9,

9. The very usage of the words such as ‘any court’, ‘at any stage’, or ‘of any enquiry, trial or other proceedings’, ‘any person’ and ‘any such person’ clearly spells out that this section is expressed in the widest possible terms and do not limit the discretion of the court in any way. However, the very width requires a corresponding caution that the discretionary power should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially with circumspection and consistently with the provisions of the Code. The second part of the section does not allow for any discretion but it binds and compels the court to take any of the aforementioned two steps if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case.

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Citations: [AIR 1991 SC 1346], [1991 CRILJ 1521], [1991 (1) CRIMES 818(SC)], [1991 (33) ECC 18], [1992 (61) ELT 521(SC)], [1991 (1) SCALE 401], [1991 SUPP (1) SCC 271], [1991 (2) UJ 43 (SC)], [1991 SCC(CRI) 595], [1992 CRIAPPR(SC) 73], [1991 (1) SCR 712], [1991 (1) GUJLH 11], [1991 (3) JT 17], [(1991) ALLCRIR 725], [(1992) SC CR R 51], [1991 CRILR(SC MAH GUJ) 286], [1992 CHANDLR(CIV&CRI) 421], [(1992) 1 CHANDCRIC 78], [(1991) 33 ECC 18], [(1991) 2 GUJ LR 974], [(1991) 3 RECCRIR 182], [(1991) MADLW(CRI) 284], [(1997) 68 ECR 783]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/171510013/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac6be4b014971140ed29

Index

Pune Bar Association Vs Union of India on 22 May 2026

Posted on June 2 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Supreme Court of India decided this issue, inconclusively.

Problem Statement, simply put is,

From Para 1,

1. Petitioner, Pune Bar Association, contends that Section 63(4) of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 20231, read with the Schedule thereto is unconstitutional as it imposes undue hardship on an ordinary litigant by requiring submission of a certificate prescribed in the Schedule comprising Part A which needs disclosure of the hash value of digital records, and Part B which must be signed by an expert. Ld. Counsel argues imposition of such pre-requisites for admissibility of electronic records is an extremely onerous obligation on a litigant and renders the provision manifestly arbitrary and unjust.

From Para 7,

7. If the two sub-sections are read harmoniously, it is possible to hold, in addition to entities notified as Examiner of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A, if the Court is satisfied, on the basis of unimpeachable material, that any other person has special skill and expertise in computer science and cyber forensics, opinion of such person may be held relevant as an expert with regard to electronic/digital record and such person may sign Part B of the Schedule as an expert. We are further fortified to make such observation as sub-section (2) of Section 39 (unlike 63(4) and erstwhile 65B) is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause so as to exclude the operation of sub-section (1) from the arena of electronic records. The High Court had deferred adjudication of such issue and directed the State to notify adequate number of persons under Section 79A. Under these circumstances, we hold that the finding of the High Court that Part B must be filled up by an expert notified under Section 79A of the IT Act shall not be treated as a binding precedent. As we are not inclined to admit the matter and issue notice upon the Union of India, we refrain from giving any conclusive opinion on this issue and keep the question of law open. With this clarification, the petition stands disposed of.

Pune Bar Association Vs Union of India on 22 May 2026

Citations: [2026 LiveLaw (SC) 551], [GIB-SC-2026-44]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/5836207/

https://taxguru.in/corporate-law/sc-upholds-section-634hash-requirement-ensures-authenticity-electronic-evidence.html

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/supreme-court-rejects-challenge-to-s634-bsa-mandating-hash-value-disclosure-for-electronic-evidence-535950

https://gstindia.biz/case-law/278/pune-bar-association-vs-union-of-india-and-others

https://www.lawweb.in/2026/05/section-634-bsa-supreme-court-clarifies.html

Index

Pothugutla Sushmitha Vs State of AP and Anr on 05 Sep 2022

Posted on February 20 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of AP High Court held as follows,

From Paras 10 and 11,

10. The observations made in both the decisions are similar and they go to show that if anyone is declared as an absconder/proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code, he is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail.
11. In the instant case, Non-Bailable-Warrant was issued against the petitioner/A-4 as she was shown absconding in the charge sheet and it is not the case that proclamation proceedings were initiated and thus, the petitioner cannot at all be termed as a ‘proclaimed offender’ so as to disentitle her from getting the relief of anticipatory bail. Thus, as per the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and since proclamation proceedings under section 82 Cr.P.C. are not initiated, the present petition is maintainable.

Pothugutla Sushmitha Vs State of AP and Anr on 05 Sep 2022

Rashmi Raikhy and Anr Vs The State of NCT Delhi and Ors on 1 Feb 2018

Posted on February 19 by ShadesOfKnife

The High Court of Delhi, quashed the Look Out Circular (LOC) issued against the petitioners registered under Sections 406/498-A/34 IPC.

The Court held that issuance and continuation of an LOC in a matrimonial dispute involving Section 406 IPC was neither reasonable nor justified, especially when the petitioners had regularly appeared before the trial court, complied with bail conditions under Section 438 CrPC, and had not misused permission to travel abroad.

The Court emphasised that an LOC is a serious coercive measure and cannot be mechanically issued in matrimonial disputes where the accused are neither absconding nor involved in heinous offences.

The LOC was accordingly directed to be withdrawn.

The following paragraphs were instrumental in the Court’s decision to quash the Look Out Circular:

Para 4 “Record reveals that on several occasions permissions were sought by the petitioners to travel abroad and the said permissions were granted; there are no allegations of their misuse. Record further reveals that the petitioners are regularly appearing before the court concerned in the said proceedings.”
Para 5 “During this period since 2009/2010, the petitioners have suffered a lot due to issuance of LOC against them. Even after discharge order on 11.12.2017, LOC against the petitioner No.2 has not been rescinded.”
Para 7 “For the offence under Section 406 IPC, in matrimonial dispute, issuance of LOC against the petitioners till disposal of the case cannot be justified; the offence is not heinous in nature.”
Para 8 “In the case of E.V.Perumal Samy Reddy, E.V.R.Santosh Reddy and Rajeshwari vs. State represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Police and State represented by the Inspector of Police MANU/TN/2308/2013, Madras High Court noted various types of persons who could be included in the LOC:-
(i) Persons with Terrorists or Militant Links,
(ii) Belligerent Foreigners,
(iii) Foreigners previously noticed for violations of visa conditions.
(iv) Persons required by courts in criminal/civil cases who are absconding
(v) Absconding Offenders wanted by Police/CBI/Customs /Central excise/ Directorate of Rev. Intelligence/other agencies”
Para 9 “Apparently, the petitioners do not fall in any of the above categories. There are no allegations that petitioner No.1 ever absconded and did not participate in the criminal proceedings.”
Para 10 “Issuance of LOC is a serious matter as it contains full particulars of the individual which are sent throughout the world. Peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and due to subsequent development whereby the petitioner No.1 was charged only under Section 406 IPC, continuation of LOC against her can’t be considered reasonable and justified.”
Para 11 “In view of the above discussion, the concerned authorities are directed to withdraw the LOC order issued against the petitioners.”

Decision of the Court

Exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 CrPC, the Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and directed the withdrawal of the Look Out Circular issued against the petitioners.

Rashmi Raikhy Vs State of NCT of Delhi

Citation: [2018:DHC:785]

Other Sources :

Index of Look Out Circular decisions is here.

Key Contributor:
Mrs Suprajaa Rajan B.Com, LL.B., LL.M.
+91-9606345150

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

Sharif Ahmed and Anr Vs State of UP and Anr on 01 May 2024

Ishwar Chand Sharma and Ors Vs State of U.P. on 29 May 2026

Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram and Anr Vs Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar and Anr on 21 Jul 2026

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Pooja Ramesh Singh Vs JnK Bank and Anr on 02 Jul 2026

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Pune Bar Association Vs Union of India on 22 May 2026

Pothugutla Sushmitha Vs State of AP and Anr on 05 Sep 2022

Rashmi Raikhy and Anr Vs The State of NCT Delhi and Ors on 1 Feb 2018