RS Tamilvendan Vs The Secretary and Ors on 21 May 2026

A division bench of Madras High Court held as follows,

From Para 5,

5. None can deny there is corruption in the Judiciary. There were and are corrupt Judges. While addressing a legal conference in Kollam, Kerala, former CJI Bharucha implied that 20 per cent of the Judges in this country were corrupt. The startling statement made by the Bhushans (father and son duo) is still in public memory. We would not go that far. We refuse to even endorse such sweeping statements. But, we do know and have come across instances of judicial corruption. The Full Court of the Madras High Court regularly shows the exit door to such black sheep. The Supreme Court acknowledged in High Court of Judicature at Bombay -vs- V.Shirish Kumar Rangrao Patil (1997) 6 SCC 339 that the cancerous cells of corruption constantly keep creeping into the vital veins of the judiciary. It was also observed that the need to stem it out by judicial surgery lies on the judiciary itself by its self imposed or corrective measures or disciplinary action under Article 235 of the Constitution. Corruption in Judiciary cannot be committed without some members of the Bar becoming privy to the corrupt. The vigilant watch by the High Court is the sustaining stream to catch the corrupt and to deal with the situation appropriately.

From Para 15,

15. Judges need not be treated as holy cows. Justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken comments of ordinary men (Lord Atkin). But the lack of respect in the movie dialogues would not make any difference to us. In Sheela Barse -vs- Union of India (1988) 4 SCC 226, it was observed that criticism of judicial functioning is a healthy aid for introspection and improvement and that it is the privileged right of the Indian citizens to believe what he considers to be true and to speak out his mind, though not, perhaps, with the best of tastes; and speak perhaps, with greater courage than care for exactitude. Judiciary is not exempt from criticism. Judicial institutions are, and should be made of stronger stuff. Debates of public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open. It may well include vehement, sarcastic and sometimes unpleasant sharp criticism of Government and public officials (D.C.Saxena -vs- Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, 1996 (5) SCC 216). We would add by including Courts and Judges also. Judges are not above criticism. In Foundation Inc -vs- ANI Media (P) Ltd (2025) 10 SCC 353, it was suggested that Courts should welcome debates and constructive criticism.

RS Tamilvendan Vs The Secretary and Ors on 21 May 2026

N.Santhosh Kumar Vs S.Priyadarshini on 25 Oct 2025

Posted on January 11 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madras High Court held as follows,

From Paras 9 and 10,

9.As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the respondent has suppressed her true income in her affidavit. It is clear from the pay slip for December 2022 that the respondent is gainfully employed and earning a gross salary of more than Rs.1 lakh per month. In the affidavit filed in support of the application for interim maintenance, the averments are vague and do not even indicate whether the respondent wants maintenance for herself also or only for her minor child.
10.Be that as it may, considering the fact that the respondent, even on the date of filing of the application for interim maintenance, was employed with Cognizant and earning a gross income of more than Rs.1 lakh, I am inclined to dispose of the revision in the manner following:
(i) The order of the Sub-Court, Alandur is modified and the interim maintenance is fixed at Rs.10,000/-. However, the respondent is entitled to seek adjustment of Rs.5,000/- per month, subject to proof of payment of Rs.5,000/- for the relevant period, that is, from 14.03.2022, till disposal of the HMOP.298 of 2021.

N.Santhosh Kumar Vs S.Priyadarshini on 25 Oct 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/68fcfd509a22022a0496b67d

Index of Maintenance Judgments u/s 144 BNSS is here.

Alagarsamy Vs Mangalasundari and Anr on 20 Nov 2025

Posted on January 3 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madras High Court at Madurai Bench held as follows,

From Para 16,

16. However, the learned Magistrate’s order is devoid of any specific reference to the section under which the warrant was issued. The expression “distress warrant” under Section 125(3) and “distraint warrant” under Section 128 have distinct connotations. The former is punitive, providing for imprisonment up to one month, per month of default, while the latter is civil-enforcement-oriented, meant to attach property to recover arrears. The confusion between the two renders the order susceptible to ambiguity.

From Para 20,

20. In the instant case, though the petitioner’s persistent default is established, the record does not show that the learned Magistrate considered or issued a bailable warrant before resorting to NBW. The impugned order also lacks any recorded satisfaction as to why the petitioner’s appearance could not be secured otherwise. That apart, the respondent wife herein had made the application for arrears of maintenance for a period of 22 months, which obviously would throw light on the fact that, the application has not been filed within a period of one year and hence, in an application filed beyond a period of one year, the learned Judicial Magistrate ought to have dealt with as mandated under Section 128 of Cr.P.C., 1973, and should have issued a distraint warrant and not a distress warrant.

From Para 22,

22. Hence, while the issuance of NBW without recording reasons is procedurally defective, the learned Magistrate’s power to enforce maintenance cannot be doubted. The proper course would have been to issue a bailable warrant first, or to issue a distraint warrant under Section 128 Cr.P.C., 1973, for attachment of property, before considering arrest.

From Para 28,

28. This case underscores the need for the learned Trial Courts to distinctly record under which provision warrants are issued, whether punitive under Section 125(3) or coercive under Section 128, and to follow the statutory sequence under Section 87 Cr.P.C., 1973, before resorting to non-bailable warrants.

Alagarsamy Vs Mangalasundari and Anr on 20 Nov 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance judgments u/s 144 Cr.P.C. is here.

Shivkarthik G.S and Anr Vs Nil on 04 Sep 2025

Posted on September 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madras High Court held that Family Courts do have power to waive the cooling of period in a divorce by mutual consent under Indian Divorce Act.

From Paras 8-10,

8.The only point that arises for consideration is whether the mandatory waiting period of one year from the date of separation has to be compulsorily
sat through by the parties, who have already decided to part ways, by filing a mutual consent divorce petition. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Anup Disalva’s case, took note of an earlier decision of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Saumya Ann Thomas vs Union of India reported in 2010 SCC Online Kerala 5197 and held that the stipulation of a period of two years being a minimum mandatory period under Section 10A is arbitrary and oppressive and that the said two year period has to be read as one year, taking into account the one year period stipulated in similar legislations namely the Special Marriage Act ( Section 28(1) ) Hindu Marriage Act ( Section 13B(1)) and Parsi Marriage Act (Section 32B(1)).
9.The Honourable Division Bench further took note of the fact that an application for divorce by mutual consent presented by both the husband and
wife reflects the will of the parties to separate and get rid of the marriage. The Honourable Division Bench taking note of the entitlement of a spouse to file a petition for divorce under Section 10 on other available grounds, without any waiting period and the entitlement and power of the Court to grant a divorce, even before the period of one year, subject to being satisfied with the ground seeking divorce being made out, held that, while that is the position even for a contested proceeding before the Court, there can be no spokes put, impeding the parties from seeking divorce by mutual consent. The Honourable Division Bench, in fact, declared the stipulation of one year period or more, for the purposes of filing a divorce by mutual consent under Section 10A, as violative of fundamental rights and declared it to be unconstitutional.
10.Though said judgment of the Kerala High Court may not have a binding precedentiary value before this Court, the judgment will definitely have persuasive value, for this Court to take note of the ratio laid down by the Honourable Division Bench.
11.Even otherwise, the Honourable Supreme Court, in Shilpa Sailesh’s case, has clarified the ratio laid down in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur,
reported in 2017 (8) SCC 746, and held that the Courts can always waive the cooling period of six months under the Hindu Marriage Act to enable the parties to obtain a divorce by mutual consent, earlier.
12.However, the Family Court has relied on Amardeep Singh’s case, to hold that the one year separation period is mandatory under section 13B(1) of
the Hindu Marriage Act and therefore similarly even under the Divorce Act the cooling period cannot be condoned or waived.

From Paras 16-18,

16.Even though there is no decision of this Court toeing the same lines of the Kerala High Court, striking down the provisions of Section 10A regarding the mandatory waiting period, considering the import of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shilpa Sailesh’s case as well as the Hon’ble Division Bench in the Kerala High Court, the Family Court is certainly entitled to waive the mandatory waiting period and cannot compel the parties to sit through the same before presenting a petition for divorce in the form of mutual consent, under Section 10A of the Divorce Act.
17.Independently, I also find that both the petitioners have filed separate affidavits even in this revision, affirming their decision to go separate ways. The interest of any children is also not involved in the present case, since the parties were not blessed with any issues and both the petitioners have categorically asserted that the relationship has become irreconcilable and distressing. In such circumstances, compelling the petitioners to wait for the mandatory period to expire would only further increase their agony. The petitioners have also stated that their decision is voluntary and only based on their free will and there is no fraud, collusion or undue influence brought upon them to file the mutual consent divorce petition.
18.In the light of the above, I am inclined to set aside the docket order of the Family Court, Coimbatore, and I direct the Family Court, Coimbatore, to
number DOP CFR.No.3726 of 2025, if it is otherwise in order. The Family Court, Coimbatore, shall not return / reject the petition on the ground that the parties have to wait for the mandatory period of one year from separation to pass off, before they are entitled to file an application for divorce by mutual consent.

Shivkarthik G.S and Anr Vs Nil on 04 Sep 2025

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

C.Amarnath Vs J.Remabarathi on 22 Aug 2025

Posted on August 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madras High Court held that a ‘Wife Holding Immovable Properties & Substantial Income Does Not Need Interim Maintenance To Live Comfortably‘.

From Para 4,

4.Mr.T.Gowthaman, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner/husband would submit that the respondent is financially not only self sufficient, but also affluent and there is no necessity for the petitioner to pay any interim maintenance to his wife. However, insofar as the maintenance to his son, the petitioner does not challenge the award of maintenance and the learned Senior Counsel states that it is being paid without any default. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the challenge is only in respect of the award of interim maintenance to the wife. He would further submit that the Family Court has passed a mechanical order, without appreciating the pleadings in the maintenance application and the evidence adduced by the parties. He would further state that the very object of Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act is only to ensure that the respondent is able to sustain herself for a basic and decent living, including meeting of the litigation expenses that have been fastened upon her by the husband.

From Para 5,

5.The learned Senior Counsel would also rely on the dividends received by the respondent as a Director of M/s.Roentgen Scan World Private Limited and also her conduct in approaching the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), seeking for a restraint order to not release dividends to her. In this
connection, the learned Senior Counsel would state that the conduct of the respondent/wife is clearly malafide and only in order to make the claim for maintenance against the petitioner, the respondent has not only suppressed the huge income received by her as dividends from the Company, but also her approaching the NCLT and seeking an order for not releasing the amounts payable to her, which amounts to a self restraint order only in order to entitle her to claim maintenance from the petitioner/husband.

From Para 15,

15.It is however contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that without even consulting the petitioner, the son has been admitted into an institution where the educational fees and expenses are sky high and for the arbitrary decisions of the respondent, the petitioner cannot be mulcted with liability. It is also seen that the respondent has properties standing in her name and even one of the properties that has been settled in her favour by her mother has been re-transferred to her father, pending the proceedings. The explanation offered by the respondent is that the father was the ostensible owner having brought to the property in the name of the mother and therefore, the respondent has settled the property in favour her father, does not appear to be bonafide. If really, the father was the ostensible owner having put in the entire sale consideration, while purchasing the property in the name of his wife, nothing prevented the mother to have straight away settled the property in favour of her husband, namely the father of the respondent. However, pending the proceedings, the settlement executed by the respondent in favour of her father clearly appears to be only in order to get over the objections of the petitioner that the respondent is affluent and owns valuable immovable properties. Even otherwise, the petitioner is having landed property in Thiruporur in the outskirts of city of Chennai where also the property prices have risen considerably.

From Para 16,

16.Further, the fact that the respondent has received substantial monies for the last three financial years is also not in dispute. The object of Section 24 is only for providing interim maintenance to the wife to enable her to get sufficient income to live a comfortable lifestyle. I do not see that the respondent is not possessed of such sufficient income already, warranting further monies from the petitioner by way of interim maintenance. In all fairness, the petitioner has stated that he is willing to meet the educational expenses of his son and has also complied with the order in I.A.No.2 of 2021. Even with regard to the award of Rs.30,000/- maintenance to the son, the petitioner has accepted the said order and has not even challenged the same. In the light of the above, I am not able to sustain the order of the Family Court awarding interim maintenance to the respondent/wife, which is wholly unnecessary in the light of the substantial income that has accrued to the respondent by way of dividends in Scan World and the fact that the respondent also owns valuable immovable properties.

From Para 19,

19.Even applying the ratio laid down in Rajnesh’s case, I do not find that the respondent requires any further amounts by way of interim maintenance to lead a comfortable lifestyle. In view of the aforesaid discussions regarding her holding of immovable properties as well as the substantial income by way of substantial dividends of the Company. The Family Court has already awarded maintenance, considering all the expenses that have been set out by the respondent and fixed the maintenance amount of Rs.30,000/- in support of the minor son and the same has not been challenged by the wife, seeking enhancement as well. The petitioner has also accepted the said order and has been paying a sum of Rs.30,000/- to the son, apart from also meeting the amount of Rs.2,77,000/-. The Family Court, after taking into account the assets and liabilities filed by both the parties, has only focused its attention on the requirement of the son, A.Anirudh and without any reasons or even discussion with regard to the specific averments regarding the ownership of immovable properties and income accruing from the Company by way of dividends, has straight away proceeded to award a sum of Rs.30,000/- to the wife as well. In view of the above, I am inclined to interfere with the order passed by the Family Court.

C.Amarnath Vs J.Remabarathi on 22 Aug 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.BALAJI CRP.No.2590 of 2025 & CMP.No.14720 of 2025 Dr.C.Amarnath ..Petitioner

Index of Maintenance cases is here.

V.Rajesh Vs S.Anupriya on 04 Jun 2025

Posted on June 16, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Madras High Court passed this Judgment.

From Para 16, (How simple mistakes can turn evidence into trash!)

16. At this juncture, the learned Counsel for the petitioner would invite the attention of this Court to Ex-R.4 in H.M.O.P. No.702 of 2021 – Screenshot of Whatsapp Chat dated October 17, 2017, and would argue that the respondent herself admitted that everything is her fault and apologised to the petitioner about 10 days before making Ex-R.5 – Complaint and that in such a scenario, Ex-R.5 – Complaint could only be a false one. This Court has perused Ex-R.4 – Screenshot. It appears that the petitioner has received a message from a contact whom he has saved as “ANU”. The respondent has denied the said message in her cross-examination. The burden is upon the petitioner to prove Ex-R.4 –Screenshot. It is true that the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 would not be strictly applicable to family court matters, in view of Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. But, said Section 14 does not dispense with the burden of proof. The burden remains upon the petitioner. But the petitioner has failed to discharge the said burden. The petitioner has not taken any steps to prove that the said contact from which he received such a message, is his wife / respondent. Hence, the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner deserves to be rejected.

From Para 17,

17. Be that as it may, whether the averments contained in Ex- R.5 – Complaint are true or not is a matter for police investigation and the truth can be found only in the trial. But there was no investigation in the first place. The averments remain unestablished. The averments made in Ex-R.5 are of such nature that unless proved, they amount to defamation, which in turn constitutes to mental cruelty. If really the said averments are true, the respondent ought to have taken prudent steps to prove her averments when the petitioner failed to reunite with her. Unsubstantiated or uncorroborated defamatory averments made in Ex-R.5, causes stigma and mental agony to the petitioner as well as his family, and in the facts and circumstances of this case amounts to cruelty.

From Paras 20-21,

20. As elaborated above, the unestablished sexual allegations made by the respondent against the petitioner and his father, amounts to cruelty and thus, the petitioner has made out a case under Section 13 (1) (i-a) of H.M. Act. Points for consideration arising in these Civil Miscellaneous Appeals are answered accordingly. The petitioner is thus entitled to a Decree of divorce.
21. It is learnt that the petitioner is paying a maintenance of Rs.25,000/- to the respondent and his 8 year old child (who is under the custody of the respondent) every month. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, especially the stand taken by the respondent that she is ready and willing to let go of the past and resume her marital life with the petitioner, this Court is of the view that though divorce is granted in favour of the petitioner, maintenance rights of the respondent shall remain unaffected.

V.Rajesh Vs S.Anupriya on 04 Jun 2025

Index to Divorce Judgments is here.

S Anandanatesan Vs P Hemalatha on 23 Nov 2022

Posted on July 13, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madras High Court held as follows,

From Paras 5 and 6,

5 A careful perusal of the order passed by both the Courts below reveal that the learned Magistrate, based on the evidence and the materials, found that the respondent/wife has not proved the domestic violence caused by the petitioner/husband, however awarded Rs.3000/- as maintenance to the child. The learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Chidambaram, in the appeal filed by the respondent/wife even though confirmed the findings of the learned Magistrate, enhanced the maintenance to Rs.5000/- without even giving any specific reason or findings.
6 It is settled proposition of law that the wife is entitled to get maintenance, if she is unable to maintain herself, invoking Section 125 Cr.P.C. and during pendency of the divorce petition also she can claim interim maintenance or she can claim permanent alimony under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Leaving all the above, if the wife seeks maintenance under the Act, it is the duty of the wife to prove the domestic violence caused by the husband, whereas in this case, the Magistrate given a finding that there is no domestic violence and the learned II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Chidambaram, even though confirmed the findings of the learned Magistrate, without giving any valid reason or findings, enhanced the maintenance. The wife has not even filed any revision or cross objections against the adverse findings made by both the Courts below against her.

S Anandanatesan Vs P Hemalatha on 23 Nov 2022

Index of DV cases is here.

N Syamasundara Naidu Vs Dakshinamoorthy and Ors on 21 Jun 2022

Posted on May 29, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madras High Court held as follows,

From Paras 5 and 6,

5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Shiv Kumar Vs. Hukam Chand and Another3, after considering the nature of Sections 301 and 302 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, categorically held that a reading of the Sections 301 and 302 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it would be clear that Section 302 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be applicable for the Magistrate Court and Section 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will be applicable only for the other Courts. It is useful to extract the paragraph No.12 of the said judgment, which reads as follows:-
“ 12. In the backdrop of the above provisions we have to understand the purport of Section 301 of the Code. Unlike its succeeding provision in the Code, the application of which is confined to Magistrate Courts, this particular section is applicable to all the courts of criminal jurisdiction. This distinction can be discerned from employment of the words “any court” in Section 301. In view of the provision made in the succeeding section as for Magistrate Courts the insistence contained in Section 301(2) must be understood as applicable to all other courts without any exception.”
Therefore, the entire reasoning, which is based on Section 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is unsustainable as it is not applicable to the Magistrate Courts.
6. Secondly, the passage extracted by the learned Magistrate from the judgment of Rekha Murarka Vs. The State of West Bengal (cited supra), which is reproduced hereunder, reads as follows:-
“12.5. However, even if there is a situation where the Public Prosecutor fails to highlight some issue of importance despite it having been suggested by the victim’s counsel, the victim’s counsel may still not be given the unbridled mantle of making oral arguments or examining witnesses. This is because in such cases, he still has a recourse by channelling his questions or arguments through the Judge first. For instance, if the victim’s counsel finds that the Public Prosecutor has not examined a witness properly and not incorporated his suggestions either, he may bring certain questions to the notice of the Court. If the Judge finds merit in them, he may take action accordingly by invoking his powers under Section 311 of the CrPC or Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In this regard, we agree with the observations made by the Tripura High Court in Smt. Uma Saha v. State of Tripura 2014 SCC OnLine Tri 859 that the victim’s counsel has a limited right of assisting the prosecution, which may extend to suggesting questions to the Court or the prosecution, but not putting them by himself.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it may be seen that even in the said case, it has been held that the victim‘s learned Counsel cannot take the role of conducting the prosecution himself by examining the witnesses or making arguments, but, certainly, it would be within his right to bring it to the notice of the Court and if the learned Judge finds merits in any of the shortcomings complained, it is the Court which invokes its powers and acts accordingly. In the instant case also, P.W.1, victim, has filed an application bringing to the notice of the Court about the fact that certain specific charges are omitted to be framed, arising out of the self-same allegations, for which there need not be further investigation or additional evidence and therefore, it is for the Court to consider the same on merits. Therefore, on the mere reason that same is not emanating from the learned Public Prosecutor/Police, it cannot be thrown out. Therefore, the order of the learned Magistrate is unsustainable.

N Syamasundara Naidu Vs Dakshinamoorthy and Ors on 21 Jun 2022

Citations:

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M.R.Somasundaram and Ors Vs B Rahini and Anr on 12 Dec 2023

Posted on February 12, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madras High Court at Madurai bench held as follows, while relying on Kunapareddy case,

From Para 10,

10. Considering the above, the petitioners are entitled to approach the concerned Magistrate Court itself and raise the issue of maintainability and other preliminary issues and if such an application is filed, the learned Magistrate shall decide the same as per the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kunapareddy @ Nookala Shanka Balaji Vs. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and another reported in (2016) 11 SCC 774.

M.R.Somasundaram and Ors Vs B Rahini and Anr on 12 Dec 2023

Index of DV cases is here.

R.Sundar Vs The Sub Inspector of Police on 12 Oct 2023

Posted on February 7, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madurai bench of Madras High Court held that, the court can recall NBW without insisting upon the presence of the accused.

From Para 6,

6.On hearing both, it is clear that the revision petitioner is Accused No.1 in C.C.No.95 of 2007 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate Court, Lalgudi. Already NBW is pending against Accused No.2 from the year 2013. NBW was also pending against Accused No.3, who filed the petition to recall NBW and the same was allowed on 12.09.2023. Admittedly the petitioner was directed to appear for hearing, but he filed the petition for dispense of his presence. On perusal of decision of this Court relied on by the petitioner, there is no wrong the presence of an accused for any effective hearing. On perusal of impugned order, there is nothing mentioned about any of effective hearing. Further, in the absence co-accused, no effective hearing can be made in the main case. This Court already held that while recalling NBW appearance of accused need not be insisted upon. At the same time, the accused has to be present when the case is posted for any effective hearing. In this case, when NBWs are pending against co-accused there would not be any effective hearing. However, it is stated that the petitioner has not been appearing before the Trial Court for several years, in such circumstance, there is nothing wrong in passing order for his appearance. In the above circumstances, this Court is inclined to allow this Criminal Revision Case with conditions by setting aside the impugned order.

R.Sundar Vs The Sub Inspector of Police on 12 Oct 2023

Index of NBW judgments here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: High Court of Madras Judgment or Order or Notification

RS Tamilvendan Vs The Secretary and Ors on 21 May 2026

N.Santhosh Kumar Vs S.Priyadarshini on 25 Oct 2025

Alagarsamy Vs Mangalasundari and Anr on 20 Nov 2025

C.Amarnath Vs J.Remabarathi on 22 Aug 2025

V.Rajesh Vs S.Anupriya on 04 Jun 2025

S Anandanatesan Vs P Hemalatha on 23 Nov 2022

N Syamasundara Naidu Vs Dakshinamoorthy and Ors on 21 Jun 2022

M.R.Somasundaram and Ors Vs B Rahini and Anr on 12 Dec 2023

R.Sundar Vs The Sub Inspector of Police on 12 Oct 2023