A saga of illicit relationship of 5 years between two advocates is twisted into a tale of rape!!!
Santhanam and Anr Vs State and Anr on 20 Sep 2021Citations :
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Category: High Court of Madras Judgment or Order or Notification
R. Krishnamurthy Vs State of T.N. on 07 Nov 2019
Relying on this decision here, Madras High Court held as follows,
From Para 9,
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contentions had relied upon the decisions of this Court reported in (i) MANU/TN/0650/2009 (Rev.Samuel D.Stephens and others Vs. Pastor A.Samuel Ramasamy) (ii) an order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 11.6.2015 in Crl.O.P.No.14184 of 2015 (A.Leo Charles Vs. M.Vijayakumar). The citations referred pertains to entries made for docket order and on a case of private
complaint where the procedure adopted are different . The facts of the above cases, are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
From Para 12,
R. Krishnamurthy Vs State of T.N. on 07 Nov 201912. It is seen that the documents are voluminous and hence the petitioner could not be furnished with the same. Further the trial court had rightly rejected the same and this court finds no reason to interfere with it. In view of the petitioner’s specific plea that he needs the copy of documents and non furnishing would greatly cause prejudice to the petitioner in answering the charges and to defend his case, the petitioner shall peruse the voluminious documents and specify the pages of the necessary documents. On such specification, copies of that pages alone has to be furnished to him. The petitioner shall make a copy application to that effect. It is made clear that only specific pages sought by the petitioner has to be furnished to
him on payment of necessary fees.
Citations : [2019 SCC ONLINE MAD 33279]
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https://indiankanoon.org/doc/124761565/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5ffd8ba29fca1917ab0e6622
Rev. Samuel D. Stephens and Ors Vs Pastor A. Samuel Ramasamy on 27 Feb 2009
Relying on earlier decision here, single judge bench of Madras High Court held as follows:
From Para 12,
12. Mr. V. Karthik has also brought to the notice of the Court the following decisions in Jagatbhai Punjabhai Palkhiwala and others v. Vikrambhai Punjabhai Palkhiwala and others, AIR 1985 Gujarat 112; K. Nagarajan v. K.S Ramasamy, 2003 (3) M.L.J 211; and K.R. Sengottuvelu v. Karuppa Naicker, 2005 (5) CTC 91. The above decisions are relating to Civil cases, wherein it has been held that since the documents are in the custody of the Court, the parties cannot take xerox copies of the same without the permission of the Court, but that does not mean that the Court can refuse such permission only on the ground that they have not become part of the record of the Suit.
From Para 16,
16. The main objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent is that since the documents filed along with the Complaint have not been marked, the accused, at this stage, are not entitled to get certified copies of the same. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1970 SC 962, cited supra. It has to be pointed out that in the said decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the High Court was not justified, in indirectly applying to cases instituted on Private Complaints the requirements of Section 173(4), Cr.P.C In the said decision what the Hon’ble Court has held is that it was impermissible for the High Court to read into Section 94, Cr.P.C, the
requirements of Section 173(4), Cr.P.C on the ground that Section 173(4), Cr.P.C is not applicable to Private Complaints. On the said reasoning, the direction issued by the High Court directing the prosecution to furnish copies of the documents to the accused was set aside. But it has to be pointed out that in that decision, the question as to whether the accused is entitled to get certified copies of the documents filed along with the Private Complaint did not come up for consideration and hence, the said decision is not of any help to the respondent.
From Para 18,
18. In this context, it is pertinent to point out that the learned counsel for the respondent has not referred to any provision in the Criminal Procedure Code containing any prohibition to furnish certified copies of the documents filed along with the Private Complaint. The prohibition like the one contained under Section 173(4), Cr.P.C is not there as far as the documents filed along with the Private Complaint are concerned. Therefore, unless there is a statutory prohibition, it cannot be said that the accused is not entitled to get certified copies of the documents filed along with the Private Complaint.
From Para 20,
20. Similarly, in a Criminal case taken cognizance on the basis of the Private Complaint also if the allegations contained in the Complaint and the documents accompanied with the Complaint do not prima facie reveal the commission of any offence and the ingredients of the offence are not made out, it is always open to the accused to approach the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C seeking for quashing of the proceedings. For taking recourse under Section 482, Cr.P.C, it is necessary for the accused to produce before the Court a copy of the Complaint as well as the documents filed along with the Complaint. Since before taking cognizance, the learned Judicial Magistrate is bound to apply his judicial mind not only to the allegations contained in the Complaint but also to the documents accompanying the same and an order taking cognizance is a judicial order and as such the accused is entitled to challenge the cognizance taken in the case. As per Section 363(5), Cr.P.C, Save as otherwise provided in subsection (2), any person affected by an order passed by the Court on an Application made in this behalf and on payment of the prescribed charges be given a copy of such order or of any deposition or other part of the record. If the question is considered in the light of Section 363(5), Cr.P.C, it could be held that since, as pointed out above, an order taking cognizance is a judicial order, Section 363(5) is attracted and on that ground also the accused is entitled to get a copy of the part of the record of a Criminal case to enable him to seek appropriate remedy before the higher forum. In my considered view, Rule 339 of the Criminal Rules of Practice is in consonance with the provisions contained in Section 363(5), Cr.P.C It is also to be pointed out that by furnishing of certified copies of the documents filed along with the Private Complaint, no prejudice whatsoever is going to be caused to the complainant, whereas, if the request of the accused is rejected, it will definitely prejudice the right of the accused in seeking appropriate legal remedy before the higher Courts.
From Para 22,
22. A reading of the aforesaid provision shows that in a case instituted otherwise than on a police report, if it appears to the Magistrate issuing process under Section 204, Cr.P.C, that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall furnish to the accused a copy of each of the documents filed along with the Complaint. That Sections casts duty on the Court to furnish the said documents free of cost. But similar duty is not cast on the Magistrate to furnish copies of the documents free of cost if the case is not triable exclusively by the Court of Session. It would mean that it is not incumbent on the part of the learned Judicial Magistrate to furnish copies of the documents free of cost either at the time of sending the process or on the appearance of the accused. There is no other provision which prohibits the accused from applying for certified copies of those documents filed along with the Complaint. As pointed out above, in the absence of any specific prohibition in the Cr.P.C either expressly or impliedly, in the considered view of this Court, the accused cannot be deprived of his right to get certified copies of the documents filed along with the Complaint so as to defend himself in the case as long as such furnishing of certified copies would not prejudice the case of the respondent.
Casemine Version:
Rev. Samuel D. Stephens and Ors Vs Pastor A. Samuel Ramasamy on 27 Feb 2009 (CM Ver)Citations : [2009 LW CRL 1 386], [2009 SCC ONLINE MAD 576], [2009 MWN CRI 1 298], [2009 MLJ CRL 2 436]
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https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56ea7cf8607dba36cc747754
K. Nagarajan Vs K.S. Ramasamy and Anr on 17 Jul 2003
A single judge of Madras High Court, relying on earlier Gujarat High Court decision), held that, unmarked copies of documents can be sought for, via Copy application.
From paras 8 and 9,
8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contends that it contains certain defamatory, false and malicious allegations against the plaintiff and probably, the plaintiff may prefer to take legal action for giving such a complaint.
9. We are not concerned about the contents of the complaint or the intention of the complainant. What we are concerned is whether a party is entitled to get the certified copy of a document produced in Court, but not marked and which has not become a part of the record of that case.
From Para 12,
12. So far as this case is concerned, there is no dispute that the petitioner filed an application for grant of certified copy. But, the learned Additional District Munsif, returned the application on the sole ground that it has not been marked. Even after the petitioner resubmitted his application by making endorsement that he is entitled under Rule 127 of Civil Rules of Practice, with the same reason once again the copy application has been returned.
From Para 14, Law declared.
14. In any suit apart from the documents marked, there is likelihood of presence of other unmarked documents like warrant issued to the Commissioner or notice given to the Commissioner by the parties etc. Assuming that a party disputes receipt of notice issued by the Advocate Commissioner, then notice said to have been given by the Commissioner will become an important document and certainly copy of such notice shall be required by the other party who claims that actually notice has been given to the party who disputes it. Though the notice given by the Commissioner to the party may not be a part of the record as far as the suit is concerned, since it is not marked as an exhibit in the suit, still a notice can become necessary for a particular party for which he may require copy. Therefore, the document produced in Court even though not marked as a document in evidence in a suit, still necessity may arise for requirement of a certified copy of such a document. That is why under Order 62 and Order XI Rule 15 of Civil Rules of Practice, it is clearly mentioned that any document produced in Court can be inspected. The terms mentioned in Rule 62 and Order XI Rule 15 of Civil Rules of Practice are wider in nature, in the sense that the documents referred are not only marked but also produced in Court.
Indiankanoon Version:
K. Nagarajan Vs K.S. Ramasamy and Anr on 17 Jul 2003 (IK Ver)Casemine Version:
K. Nagarajan Vs K.S. Ramasamy and Anr on 17 Jul 2003 (CM Ver)Citations : [2003 MLJ 3 211]
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https://indiankanoon.org/doc/646246/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090140e4b0149711156312
Ajita David Vs State on 29 Jun 2009
Inherent bias towards women can lead to incorrect judgments… This judgment totally fails to consider a question (may be not posed to the Court by the Counsels on both sides) isn’t this interpretation violative of Articles 14 and 21, Principles of Natural Justice and many more… More so, since the person aggrieved by the offence is not defined in the Act, every tom, dick and harry are given any interpretation to the provisions of this law.
From Paras 5-9,
5. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner would vehemently contend that the Trial Court failed to appreciate the ambit of section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 which proposed to punish not only the receiver of dowry but also the giver of dowry. Referring to section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Act, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner would submit that though protection is provided from charging a person who is aggrieved by the offence under section 7(1)(b)(ii), the parents of the aggrieved wife do not fall under the category of person aggrieved by the offence. Therefore, the exemption contemplated under section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 does not apply to the father of the de facto complainant, who purportedly gave dowry. It is his further submission that even before the case reaches the stage of trial, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, while taking cognizance of the case as per section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is duty bound to array all the persons against whom offences have been made out. Therefore, it is his submission that when the giver of the dowry is also punishable under section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, he cannot claim any exemption under section 7(3) of the said Act. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is bound to act under section 190 and take cognizance as against the father of the de facto complainant also, it is contended.
6. There was no representation for the intervenor. Learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) appearing for the State would submit that the object of the amendment introduced by Act 43/1986 to exclude the person aggrieved from prosecution under Dowry Prohibition Act will have to be considered by this court before approaching the ambit of section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Referring to section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, he would further submit that a clear exemption is contemplated from prosecuting a person aggrieved by any offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act. Further, he would submit that the petition seeking to array the father of the de facto complainant is totally misconceived, inappropriate and premature.
7. The statement of objects and reasons for the enactment of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 would reflect that the Act is enacted to prohibit the evil practice of giving and taking dowry. But, while dealing with the salient features of the Act 43/1986 which introduced the amendment, it has been stated that the statement made by the person aggrieved by the offence shall not subject him to prosecution under the Act.
8. In terms of the statement of objects and reasons of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, provision under section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was enacted to punish not only the receiver but also the giver of the dowry. Section 7(1)(b)(ii) would read that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, no court shall take cognizance of the offence under this Act except upon a complaint by the person aggrieved by the offence or a parent or other relative of such person or by any recognised welfare institution or organisation. Section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act would provide that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, a statement made by the person aggrieved by the offence shall not subject him to prosecution under the Act.
9. In order to provide more clarity to the provision under section 7(1)(b)(ii), the legislature has thought it fit to clarify that a parent or other relative of such a person also is entitled to lodge a complaint apart from the person aggrieved by the offence. Firstly, it is found that Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 does not define the person aggrieved by the offence. The aforesaid provision made to provide more clarity cannot be interpreted that the word ‘parent’ does not fall within the category of an aggrieved person by the offence provided under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The parent of the victim girl is definitely a person aggrieved by the offence. By no stretch of imagination, the legislature would have thought of excluding the parent from the purview of the person aggrieved by the offence while drafting section 7(3) of the Act to exempt from prosecution the person aggrieved by the offence for the statement made by him. At any rate, the phrase “person aggrieved by the offence” employed in sub-section 3 of section 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 cannot be construed that it only refers to the victim girl who was deprived of the marital bliss on account of the harassment meted out to her demanding dowry. In the considered opinion of this court, parents and other relatives of the victim girl can safely be classified as person aggrieved by the offence as contemplated under section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
From Para 12,
12. Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is subject to section 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on account of the non-obstante clause found under the above Act. When the provision under section 7(3) of the Special Act prohibits taking cognizance as against a person aggrieved by the offence for the incriminating statement made by him, the Judicial Magistrate cannot invoke the provision under section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and include a person exempted under the Special Act as one of the accused. On account of the introduction of the provision to the Special Act to exclude certain persons from prosecution, the powers of the Judicial Magistrate under section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure referred to in the above ratio cannot be exercised.
Ajita David Vs State on 29 Jun 2009
Citations : [2009 MLJ CRL 3 728]
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https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1269967/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609039fe4b014971115c0a5
Ramasamy Udayar Vs District Collector and Ors on 30 Apr 2021
A division bench of Madras High Court put the peacefools in their right place and allowed Hindu religious processions in all the streets of the village.
19.As stated earlier, before the year 2012, Temple’s processions were conducted through all the streets in the village and there was no problem. Even from the year 2012 to 2015, processions were conducted through all the streets and roads which have been approved by this Court in W.P.No.23487 of 2012 and W.P.No.33288 of 2015 filed by the private respondent herein. Therefore, it is evident that taking out Temple’s processions through all the streets and roads in V.Kalathur village have been the custom and practice of the Hindus for the past many decades. It seems from the year 2012 onwards, when the Muslims started objecting, the problem seems to have started.
From Para 20,
As per Section 180-A of the District Municipalities Act 1920, roads or streets should be used as access to the people irrespective of their religion, caste or creed. Merely because one religious group is dominating in a particular locality, it cannot be a ground to prohibit from celebrating religious festivals or taking processions of other religious groups through those roads. If it is to be accepted, then a day will come when a particular religious group which is predominantly occupying the area, will not allow the people belonging to other religious groups even to use the roads even for movement, transportation or the normal access. Even the marriage processions and funeral processions would be prohibited/prevented which is not good for our society.
From Para 25,
Ramasamy Udayar Vs District Collector and Ors on 30 Apr 202125.The abovesaid facts of the case would reveal that all along there had been religious tolerance and the religious festivals were conducted very smoothly and religious procession were conducted without any problem through all the streets and roads of the village. If religious intolerance is going to be allowed, it is not good for a secular country. Intolerance in any form by any religious group has to be curtailed and prohibited. In this case,
intolerance of a particular religious group is exhibited by objecting for the festivals which have been conducted for decades together and the procession through the streets and roads of the village are sought to be prohibited stating that the area is dominated by Muslims and therefore, there cannot be any Hindu festival or procession through the locality. India is a secular country and merely because one religious group is living in majority in a particular area, it cannot be a reason for not allowing other religious festivals or processions through that area. If the contention of the private
respondent is to be accepted then it would create a situation in which minority people cannot conduct any festival or procession in most of the areas in India. If resistance is being exhibited by one religious group and it is reciprocated by the other religious groups, there would be chaos, riots, religious fights causing loss of lives and destruction of properties. Consequently, the secular character of our country will be destroyed or damaged.
S.Ramesh Vs MS.Cethar Ltd on 12 Jan 2016
Even though this is not a matrimonial case, the following is nice statement made by the Division bench of Madurai bench of Madras High Court.
From Para 17,
S.Ramesh Vs MS.Cethar Ltd on 12 Jan 2016….
It is needless to point out that a person who enjoyed the benefit of an interim order, is liable to compensate the other party, when the main case is decided against him.
….
Citations :
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https://indiankanoon.org/doc/110371360/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5728e0d6e561092708a3c705
S.Mukanchand Bothra Vs Rajiv Gandhi Memorial Educational Charitable Trust Chennai and Ors on 22 December, 2015
Distinguishing the law laid down by Apex Court in Perumal Vs Janaki, Single Judge bench of Madras High Court held that, Investigating officers can not be made liable for perjury (filing false affidavits) in cases where accused was acquitted after trial.
S.Mukanchand Bothra Vs Rajiv Gandhi Memorial Educational Charitable Trust Chennai and Ors on 22 Dec 2015Citations : [2015 SCC ONLINE MAD 11421]
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https://indiankanoon.org/doc/139009470/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5728e0c8e561092708a3b8c4
https://www.legitquest.com/case/s-mukanchand-bothra-v-rajiv-gandhi-memorial-educational-charitable-trust-chennai-others/973BF
A.Radhika Vs Wilson Sundararaj on 26 Feb 2021
Citing landmark judgments, Madras High Court held that Investigating Officer cannot made liable u/s 211 IPC and based on another decision by Madras High Court here said such officers may be proceeded u/s 218 IPC which does not come under the procedure of 340 CrPC r/w 195 CrPC.
From Para 21,
21. The above judgements set out the procedure while dealing with an application under Section 340, Cr.P.C. Firstly, in order to initiate proceedings under Section 340,Cr.P.C., an application has to be made to the Court upon which the Court can initiate an inquiry into any offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. Secondly, offences as set out in the complaint have to be made out. In the present case, the complainant alleges that an offence under Section 211, I.P.C. has been made out.
From Para 22,
22. In the present case, based on the complaint given by one Mr. Rajamani, the FIR was registered by the F-2 Police Station, Egmore and the arrest was also carried out by the said police. The Petitioner came into the scene only at a later point of time when the case was transferred to the file of the CBCID. The language used under Section 211, I.P.C. regarding false charge can only relate to the original or initial accusation through which the criminal law was set in motion. Admittedly, it was not the Petitioner who had set the criminal law in motion. That apart, as held in Iqbal Singh Marwah’s Case (cited supra) the offences referred to under Section 195(1)(b), Cr.P.C. will get attracted only with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis.
And finally from paras 24 and 25,
24. This Court after considering the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki (cited supra) has come up with this fine distinction in the case of S.Mukanchand Bothra (cited supra). That apart, the facts of the present case is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki.
25. In view of the above discussion, this Court holds that the offence under Section 211, I.P.C. has not been made out against the Petitioner. The Respondent cannot pick and choose certain observations made by the trial court and this Court, and make it a basis for filing an application under Section 340, Cr.P.C. to punish the Petitioner under Section 211, I.P.C.
Silver lining from para 26,
A.Radhika Vs Wilson Sundararaj on 26 Feb 202126. A careful reading of the petition filed by the Respondent at the best makes out a case for malicious prosecution. In a case of malicious prosecution, which gives rise to a tortious liability, only a suit for damages can be filed by establishing the ingredients to maintain such a suit. The grounds for maintaining a suit for malicious prosecution cannot form the basis for filing a petition under Section 340, Cr.P.C. since it has to independently satisfy the requirements of Section 195(1)(b), Cr.P.C.
Citations :
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