Javed Ahmad Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 13 Feb 2023

A single judge bench of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

It is true that filing of first information report (F.I.R.) is not a condition precedent to exercise the power under Section 438(1) Cr.P.C., as held in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Vs. State of Punjab,(1980) 2 SCC 565, but at the same time it is also to be kept in mind, as held in the aforesaid case by the Hon’ble Apex Court, that“when a person apprehends arrest and approaches a court for anticipatory bail, his apprehension (of arrest), has to be based onconcrete facts (and not vague or general allegations) relatable to a specific offence or particular offences. Applications for anticipatory bail should contain clear and essential facts relating to the offence, and why the applicant reasonably apprehends his or her arrest, as well as his version of the facts. These are important for the court which is considering the application, the extent and reasonableness of the threat or apprehension, its gravity or seriousness and the appropriateness of any condition that may have to be imposed. It is not a necessary condition that an application should be moved only after an FIR is filed; it can be moved earlier,so long as the facts are clear and there is reasonable basis for apprehending arrest.“

Then, What is ‘Reason to Believe‘?

The Hon’ble Apex Court in Adri Dharan Das Vs. State of West Bengal, (2005) 4 SCC 303 has emphasized over this requirement and held as under.
“Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of an individual who is entitled to plead innocence, since he is not on the date of application for exercise of power under Section 438 CrPC convicted for the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. The applicant must show that he has “reason to believe” that he may be arrested in a non-bailable offence. Use of the expression “reason to believe” shows that the belief that the applicant may be arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. A belief can be said to be founded on reasonable grounds only if there is something tangible to go by on the basis of which it can be said that the applicant’s apprehension that he may be arrested is genuine. Mere “fear” is not “belief” for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that has some sort of vague apprehension that some one is going to make an accusation against him in pursuance of which he may be arrested. Grounds on which the belief on the applicant is based that he may be arrested in non-bailable offence must be capable of being examined. If an application is made to the High Court or the Court of Session, it is for the court concerned to decide whether a case has been made out of for granting of the relief sought. (Para 16)”
The aforesaid theory makes the legal position explicit that Section 438 (1) of Cr.P.C. applies not only at post FIR stage, but it does not require that the offence must have been registered. It is contemplated by this section that if a person is going to apply for anticipatory bail, he must have a reasonable belief that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence.

Javed Ahmad Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 13 Feb 2023

Father Thomas Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 22 Dec 2010

Posted on March 4 by ShadesOfKnife

Following the landmark decision of Apex Court here, the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

From Para 14,

14.In Union of India v. W.N. Chaddha, 1993 Cri.L.J 859 (SC) it has been held in paragraph 93: “…….More so, the accused has no right to have any say as regards the manner and method of investigation. Save under certain exceptions under the entire scheme of the Code, the accused has no participation as a matter of right during the course of the investigation of a case instituted on a police report till the investigation culminates in filing of a final report under S. 173(2) of the Code or in a proceeding instituted otherwise than on a police report till the process is issued under S. 204 of the Code, as the case may be. Even in cases where cognizance of an offence is taken on a complaint notwithstanding the said offence is triable by a Magistrate or triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the accused has no right to have participation till the process is issued. In case the issue of process is postponed as contemplated under S. 202 of the Code, the accused may attend the subsequent inquiry but cannot participate. There are various judicial pronouncements to this effect but we feel that it is not necessary to recapitulate those decisions. At the same time, we would like to point out that there are certain provisions under the Code empowering the Magistrate to give an opportunity of being heard under certain specified circumstances.”

From Para 29,

29.From a consideration of the aforesaid authorities, it is apparent that even when a complaint is filed under section 190(1) (a) and the Court decides to take cognizance and to adopt the procedure provided for inquiry under section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C, the accused is only permitted to remain present during the proceedings, but not to intervene or to raise his defence, until the order issuing summons is passed. The right of hearing of a prospective accused at the pre-cognizance stage, when only a direction for investigation by the police is issued by the Magistrate under section 156(3) Cr.P.C., can only be placed at a lower pedestal. It is only during the course of trial that the accused has been conferred rights at different stages to raise his defence. As the authorities show, that in the absence of any statutory right of hearing to the prospective accused at the pre-cognizance stage, when the direction to investigate has only been issued by the Magistrate under section 156(3), the accused cannot be conferred with any right of hearing even under any principle of audi alteram partem.

From Para 41,

41.An order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. passed by the Magistrate directing the police officer to investigate a cognizable case on the other hand is no such order of moment, which impinges on anyvaluable rights of the party. Were any objection to the issuance of such a direction to be accepted (though it is difficult to visualize anyobjection which could result in the quashing of a simple direction for investigation), the proceedings would still not come to an end, as itwould be open to the complainant informant to move an application under section 154(3) before the Superintendent of Police (S.P.) or a superior officer under section 36 of the Code. He could also file a complaint under section 190 read with section 200 of the Code. This is the basic difference from the situations mentioned in Madhu Limaye and in Amar Nath’s cases, where acceptance of the objections could result in the said accused being discharged or the summons set aside, and the proceedings terminated. Also the direction for investigation by the Magistrate is but an incidental step in aid of investigation and trial. It is thus similar to orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, orders granting bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of pending proceedings which have been described as purely interlocutory in nature in Amar Nath (supra).

From Para 58,

58.However it is made clear that the initial order for investigation under section 156(3) is also not open to challenge in a writ petition, as it is now beyond the pale of controversy that the province of investigationby the police and the judiciary are not overlapping but complementary. As observed by the Privy Council in paragraph 37 in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18 when considering the scope of the statutory powers of the police to investigate a cognizable case under sections 154 and 156 of the Code, that it would be an unfortunate result if the Courts in exercise of their inherent powers could interfere in this function of the police. The roles of the Court and police are “complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function.”

Finally, from Paras 64 and 65,

64.In this view of the matter, the Opinion of the Full bench on the three questions posed is:
65.A. The order of the Magistrate made in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C directing the police to register and investigate is not open to revision at the instance of a person against whom neither cognizance has been taken nor any process issued.
B. An order made under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C is an interlocutory order and remedy of revision against such order is barred under subsection (2) of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
C. The view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ajay Malviya Vs. State of U.P and others reported in 2000(41) ACC 435 that as an order made under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is amenable to revision, and no writ petition for quashing an F.I.R registered on the basis of the order will be maintainable, is not correct.

Father Thomas Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 22 Dec 2010

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/77085610/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5767b120e691cb22da6d4314

Sabiya Begum Malka Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 18 May 2016

Posted on January 24 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) imposed costs on 5 identified police officers (@Rs.15,000/- per officer) to be paid to the Petitioner-Mother of the deceased minor girl who was allegedly raped and murdered, because these 5 people did not register FIR and investigate the case for 6 months despite an Order u/s 156(3) by a competent Magistrate to do so.

From Paras 21-24,

21. In the case in hand though order was passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. on 3.9.2015 yet without any reason whatsoever, factual or legal, the F.I.R was not registered. Investigation was not under taken for over six months. The First Information Report has been registered after intervention of this court by way of seeking an explanation from the Station House Officer vide order dated 15.3.2016. The inaction of the concerned officers has interfered in administration of criminal justice delivery system.
22. As has been held in the inquiry report submitted by the Circle Officer concerned, the five Station House Officers named hereinabove, ignored the order passed by the Magistrate rendered under Section 156 Cr.P.C. and have also failed in discharging their statutory duty under Section 154 Cr.P.C. The petitioner, had to approach the Magistrate again. When no action was taken, the petitioner had to approach this Court with the grievance.
23. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we hereby impose costs in the sum of Rs.75,000/- to be collected from all the five police officers mentioned in the above portion of the judgment, to be paid to the petitioner.
24. The cost amount has been paid to the petitioner in court in cash today.

Sabiya Begum Malka Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 18 May 2016

Index here.

Maya and Ors Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 19 Mar 2021

Posted on September 12, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Single judge of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petition under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act was filed by the petitioners way back on
16.07.2016 and despite the opposite party nos.2 to 8 have been served, the petition is still pending before the court below and the same has not been
decided as provided under Section 12(5) of the Domestic Violence Act. While drawing the attention of this Court towards the order-sheet of the case, it has been submitted that now the case is pending for cross examination of the prosecution witness no.3.
Learned A.G.A. would have no objection to the prayer of the petitioners as it is otherwise the mandate of law to dispose of the cases pertaining to the Domestic Violence Act at the earliest.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and having regard the nature of order proposed to be passed, issuance of notice to the opposite party nos.2 to 8 is dispensed with.
Having regard to the provisions under Section 12(5) of the Domestic Violence Act, the petition is disposed of with the direction to the learned Judicial Magistrate-I, Lucknow to make all endeavors to decide the above-mentioned complaint case within two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order, without granting soft adjournments to either of the parties, in accordance with law.

Maya and Ors Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 19 Mar 2021

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/51997103/

Connects to a PIL here.

Waseem Vs State of UP and Anr on 30 Aug 2022

Posted on September 7, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge at Allahabad High Court, held as follows:

From Para 34,

In paragraph No. 4 of the affidavit, it is mentioned that a meeting was convened on 26.8.2022 under the Chairmanship of Additional Chief Secretary (Home), Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, which was attended by Mr. B.D. Paulson, Secretary, Home Department, Government of U.P. Lucknow, Mr. Tarun Gauba, Secretary Home Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, Mr. M.K. Bashal, Additional Director General of Police (Crime), U.P. Lucknow, Mr. Prem Prakash, Additional Director General of Police, Prayagraj Zone, Prayagraj (through video conferencing), Mr. Amit Pathak, Deputy Inspector General of Police (Public Grievance) DGP Headquarters, U.P. Lucknow, Mr. Rakesh Kumar Malpani, Special Secretary, Home Department, Dr. A.K. Singh, Special Secretary, Home Department, Mr. Shiv Kumar Pal, Government Advocate, High Court, Allahabad (through video conferencing), Mr. M.C. Chaturvedi, Additional Advocate General, High Court, Allahabad (through video conferencing) and Mr. Ashish Singh, Senior Prosecuting Officer and after due deliberation, following decisions were taken:
(i) Postmortem and injury reports must be typed out and made easily legible and practice of handwritten reports be discontinued.
(ii) During the postmortem examination, there should be DNA and fingerprint sampling and necessary software must be developed for this purpose.
(iii) In cases of gunshot injuries, instead of full body xray, the x-ray should be of the area where the wound is located. However, in such cases where the wound of entry or exit is not apparent, the need of taking x-ray be made mandatory.
(iv) During postmortem examination, the injuries on the dead body should be photographed in colour to highlight the same.
(v) An index be prepared to be appended with each case diary, which is submitted before the Prosecutor/Hon’ble Judges. It should be explored if necessary facility can be provided through CCTNS software.
(vi) A synopsis be prepared of the contents of the report containing the opinion of the investigating officer as encapsulated in the report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. An index should also be prepared for convenient perusal and reference. This synopsis be a part of the report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C.
(vii) The importance of the role of the supervisory officer be emphasized and that the said officer should not function only as a post office. Every investigation must be scrutinized in a microscopic manner and any lacuna or lapse must be pointed out to the investigating officer. Provisions should also be made for training the investigating officer on a regular basis.
(viii) Senior Supervisory Officers must submit the report submitted by the police under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C expeditiously and not hold it back in their custody needlessly. In this context, a letter dated 05.05.2016 had already been issued by the Director General of Police, U.P. Lucknow.
(ix) Before ordering further investigation under Section 173(8), it is desirable to seek permission/give information to the concerned learned court, but the necessity of this step be examined in the light of the relevant and applicable statutory provisions and the judgements and observations passed by Hon’ble Apex Court and Hon’ble High Court. In all cases where the statements of witnesses are recorded using audio/video mode, the relevant material be made part of the case diary by means of compact disc/pen drive.
(x) The font size used for preparing the case diary be increased to a size, which would facilitate easy and legible perusal of the same. For this purpose, the cooperation of NIC be sought to implement the increase in font-size in the records, uploaded on the CCTNS.
(xi) The strict adherence be ensured to the statutory provisions encapsulated in Section 65B IPC and that investigating officer be trained to adopt a sensitive approach in these matters.
(xii) It was emphasized that proper directions be imparted to supervisory officers to ensure that they perform their duty efficiently and diligently. It was informed by the Additional Director General of Police (crime) that in all districts (pan state) training was being imparted in orderly room and by crime meetings. The Additional Chief Secretary (Home), Government of U.P., Lucknow issued directions that action be initiated against those investigating officer who displayed negligence in discharging their duties and thereby impair fair and proper investigation.
(xiii) In every district, the Joint Director (Prosecution) should head a legal cell, which should be established with the aim to educate all investigating officers with the latest amendments in criminal law and the judgements passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court and Hon’ble High Court.
(xiv) Lastly, it was decided that the necessary government order/circular/road-map, which was to be issued covered a vast range and the support and cooperation of technical and other departments was required.

Waseem Vs State of UP and Anr on 30 Aug 2022

Malhan and 17 Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 07 Feb 2022

Posted on July 11, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Allahabad High Court held that, Once the written statement contains an admission in favor of the plaintiff, the amendment of such admission of the defendants cannot be allowed to be withdrawn and such withdrawal would amount to totally displacing the case of the plaintiff which would cause him irretrievable prejudice. In the present case the question now is whether the admission made by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff can be withdrawn and the answer in the language of the apex court is ‘not permissible’.

From Para 4,

4. We have heard Sri Madan Mohan Chaurasiya, learned counsel for the review applicants, and requested him to explain the delay in filing the review application, to which he gave a strange reply that he advised his clients that they may take a chance by filing this review application after a period of six years. We are pained to note that an advocate should not give such an advise when there is no error apparent on the face of record nor was there any other reason that why the matter be re-agitated after it was finally decided.

From Para 7,

7. The expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of Act, 1963 has been held to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally a delay in preferring appeal may be condoned in interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is
imputable to parties, seeking condonation of delay. In Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. Katiji, 1987(2) SCC 107, the Court said, that, when substantial justice and technical considerations are taken against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for, the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. The Court further said that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

Malhan and 17 Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 07 Feb 2022

Mukesh Bansal Vs State of UP and Anr on 13 Jun 2022

Posted on June 16, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A judge from Allahabad High Court used choicest words in this judgment.

From Para 8,

[8] The story narrated in the FIR is not only abhorring, full of dirt, filth and venomous accusations where the informant fiercely abused her own husband and in-laws by using all the ways and means in the tone, tenor and texture in the extreme manner. The graphic and vivid descriptions of the incident without any shame or hitch of any sort which, speaks out volume of mental condition and amount of venom and poison in the mind of the informant. She without mincing any word, rather exaggerating the incident to manifolds, had vomitted the snide before the Court. Interestingly, general and sweeping allegations have been fastened against all the family members for committing sodomy, attempt to rape and illegal abortion etc. upon all the family members with special focus upon her husband, Sahib Bansal.

From Para 12,

[12] The police, after probing the matter in depth, has submitted the charge sheet dropping all the offences, wherein the informant had made wild
accusations in the FIR against her husband and his family members. The aforesaid charge sheet has been filed only under sections 498A, 323, 504, 506, 307 IPC and 3 and 4 of D.P. Act. Thus, it is explicitly clear that the FIR is nothing but a virtual canard and full of venom where the informant unmindful of the fact to its far-reaching repercussions, pasted all the filth upon revisionist in wild manner but was unable to produce any documentary evidence/proof to substantiate the levelled allegations and thus, all the sections of unnatural/oral sex, forcible abortion have gone to haywire resultantly dropped from charge sheet. Not only this, names of Chirag Bansal and Ms. Shipra Jain finds no place in the charge sheet, so filed by the police.

From Para 30,

[30] Yet coming to another aspect of the issue which is disturbing and mind-boggling to the Court. After reading the FIR allegedly lodged by Ms.
Shivangi Bansal after 18 days of the incident, which is ever-abhorring, full of dirt and filth. The graphical description portrayed by her in her FIR is deplorable to be condemned in its strongest terms. The FIR is the place where the informant gives the story mobilizing the State Machinery engaging in the commission of cognizable offence. It is not soft porn literature where the graphical description should be made. Hon’ble the Apex Court in its judgment in the case of Priti Gupta Vs State of Jharkhand, 2010(71) SCC 667 has fastened the liability upon the counsels;

From Para 31,

[31] Therefore, the Court is of the opinion that while deciding the present issue, the Court should not take into these graphical description of the accusation made by the complainant and simply over-look these graphic and distressful allegations made by a lady who after receiving legal advice, pasted those dirt and filth upon her husband and other family members. The interesting feature is that she has been unable to substantiate those allegations even at the time of investigation and these allegations were found false and the sections related to it were dropped.
The Court records its strongest exception to such type of language used by the informant. The language of the FIR should be decent one and no amount of atrocitiesfaced by the informant, would justify her to use such type of castic expressions. FIR/complaint is the gateway of any criminal case even soft and decent expressionwould well communicate the alleged atrocities faced by her.

Guidelines issued from para 35,

[35] Thus, It is directed that :-
(i) No arrest or police action to nab the named accused persons shall be made after lodging of the FIR or complaints without concluding the “Cooling-Period” which is two months from the lodging of the FIR or the complaint. During this “Cooling-Period”, the matter would be immediately referred to Family Welfare Committe (hereinafter referred to as FWC) in the each district.
(ii) Only those cases which would be transmitted to FWC in which Section 498-A IPC along with, no injury 307 and other sections of the IPC in which the imprisonment is less than 10 years.
(iii) After lodging of the complaint or the FIR, no action should take place without concluding the “Cooling-Period” of two months. During this “Cooling-Period”, the matter may be referred to Family Welfare Committee in each districts.
(iv) Every district shall have at least one or more FWC (depending upon the geographical size and population of that district constituted under the District Legal Aid Services Authority) comprising of at least THREE MEMBERS. Its constitution and function shall be reviewed periodically by the District & Sessions Judge/Principal Judge, Family Court of that District, who shall be the Chairperson or Co-chairperson of that district at Legal Service Authority.
(v) The said FWC shall comprise of the following members :-
(a) a young mediator from the Mediation Centre of the district or young advocate having the practices up to five years or senior most student of Vth year, Government Law College or the State University or N.L.Us. having good academic track record and who is public spirited young man, OR;
(b) well acclaimed and recognized social worker of that district having clean antecedant, OR;
(c) retired judicial officers residing in or nearby district, who can devote time for the object of the proceeding OR;
(d) educated wives of senior judicial or administrative officers of the district.
(vi) The member of the FWC shall never be called as a witness.
(vii) Every complaint or application under Section 498A IPC and other allied sections mentioned above, be immediately referred to Family Welfare Committee by the concerned Magistrate. After receiving the said complaint or FIR, the Committee shall summon the contesting parties along with their four senior elderly persons to have personal interaction and would try to settle down the issue/misgivings between them within a period of two months from its lodging.
The contesting parties are obliged to appear before the Committee with their four elderly persons (maximum) to have a serious deliberation between them with the aid of members of the Committee.
(viii) The Committee after having proper deliberations, would prepare a vivid report and would refer to the concerned Magistrate/police authorties to whom such complaints are being lodged after expiry of two months by inserting all factual aspects and their opinion in the matter.
(ix) Continue deliberation before the Committee, the police officers shall themselves to avoid any arrest or any coercive action pursuant to the applications or complaint against the named accused persons. However, the Investigating Officer shall continue to have a peripheral investigation into
the matter namely preparing a medical report, injury report, the statements of witnesses.
(x) The said report given by the Committee shall be under the consideration of I.O. or the Magistrate on its own merit and thereafter suitable action should be taken by them as per the provision of Code of Criminal Procedure after expiry of the “Cooling-Period” of two months.
(xi) Legal Services Aid Committee shall impart such basic training as may be considered necessary to the members of Family Welfare Committee from time to time(not more than one week).
(xii) Since, this is noble work to cure abrasions in the society where tempos of the contesting parties are very high that they would melow down the heat between them and try to resolve the misgivings and misunderstanding between them. Since, this is a job for public at large, social work, they are acting on a pro bono basis or basic minimum honrarium as fixed by the District & Sessions Judge of every district.
(xiii) The investigation of such FIRs or complaint containing Section 498A IPC and other allied sections as mentioned above, shall be investigated by dynamic Investigating Officers whose integrity is certified after specialized training not less than one week to handle and investigate such matrimonal cases with utmost sincerity and transparancy.
(xiv) When settlement is reached between the parties, it would be open for the District & Sessions Judge and other senior judicial officers nominated by him in the district to dispose of the proceedings including closing of the criminal case.
At the cost of repetition, it is made clear that after lodging of the F.I.R. or the complaint case without exhausting the “Cooling-Period” of two months, no arrest or any coercive action shall be taken against the husband or his family members in order to derail the proceedings before the Family Welfare Committee.

Mukesh Bansal Vs State of UP and Anr on 13 Jun 2022

Jagannath Verma and Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 23 Sep 2014

Posted on May 1, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full bench of Allahabad High Court held that, an order of the magistrate rejecting an application under Section 156 (3) of the Code for the registration of a case by the police and for investigation is not an interlocutory order. Such an order is amenable to the remedy of a criminal revision under Section 397′

In view of the discussion above and for the reasons which we have furnished, we have come to the following conclusion:
(i) Before the Full Bench of this Court in Father Thomas, the controversy was whether a direction to the police to register a First Information Report in regard to a case involving a cognizable offence and for investigation is open to revision at the instance of a person suspected of having committed a crime against whom neither cognizance has been taken nor any process issued. Such an order was held to be interlocutory in nature and, therefore, to attract the bar under sub-section (2) of Section 397. The decision in Father Thomas does not decide the issue as to whether the rejection of an application under Section 156 (3) would be amenable to a revision under Section 397 by the complainant or the informant whose application has
been rejected;
(ii) An order of the magistrate rejecting an application under Section 156 (3) of the Code for the registration of a case by the police and for investigation is not an interlocutory order. Such an order is amenable to the remedy of a criminal revision under Section 397; and
(iii) In proceedings in revision under Section 397, the prospective accused or, as the case may be, the person who is suspected of having committed the crime is entitled to an opportunity of being heard before a decision is taken in the criminal revision.

Jagannath Verma and Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 23 Sep 2014

Citations : [2015 ALLMR CRI 129], [2014 JIC 3 930], [2015 ALLCC 88 1], [2014 UPLBEC 4 2665], [2014 KLT SN 4 109], [2014 CTC 6 353], [2014 AIR ALL 214], [2014 ADJ 8 439], [2015 CCR ALL 2 59], [2015 RCR CRIMINAL 1 414], [2014 SCC ONLINE ALL 11859], [2014 MWN CRI 3 161], [2014 ALL LJ 6 405]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/128706736/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56b49301607dba348f003b58

Asha Devi and Anr Vs State of UP and 2 Ors on 1 Dec 2020

Posted on April 4, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench at Allahabad High Court held as follows:

From Para 16,

16. According to own case of the petitioners, the petitioner no.1 is still a legally wedded wife of one Mahesh Chandra. As per own alleged application dated 17.09.2020 (as reproduced in para 6 above), the petitioners are living as husband and wife and they have sought protection from interference in their living together as husband and wife. Once the petitioner No.1 is a married woman being wife of one Mahesh Chandra, the act of petitioners particularly the petitioner No.2, may constitute an offence under Sections 494/495 I.P.C. Such a relationship does not fall within the phrase “live-in-relationship” or “relationship in the nature of marriage”. The writ petition has been filed by the petitioners for protection from interference by others in their living as husband and wife. If the protection as prayed is granted, it may amount to grant protection against commission of offences under Sections 494/495 I.P.C.

From Para 18,

18. It is settled law that writ of mandamus can be issued if the petitioner has a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and such right must be subsisting on the date of the petition. Similar view has also been taken by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalyan Singh vs. State of U.P. 13. Applying the principles of issuance of writ of mandamus on the facts of the present case, we find that the petitioners have no legal right for protection on the facts of the present case inasmuch as such the protection as being asked, may amount to protection against commission of offence under Section 494/495 I.P.C. It is well settled law that writ of mandamus can not be issued contrary to law or to defeat a statutory provision including penal provision. The petitioners do not have legally protected and judicially enforceable subsisting right to ask for mandamus.

Asha Devi and Anr Vs State of UP and 2 Ors on 1 Dec 2020

Ram Charitra Tiwari and Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 13 Jul 2021

Posted on March 7, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Another misinterpretation of Section 3 of DP… this time from Allahabad High Court.

Ram Charitra Tiwari and Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 13 Jul 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/44284755/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/60f50c979fca193a50689444

News:

Dowry Prohibition Act Protects Dowry Giver: Allahabad HC

https://lawsisto.com/legalnewsread/MTA2NzU=/Dowry-Prohibition-Act-Protects-Dowry-Giver-Allahabad-HC

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: High Court of Allahabad Judgment or Order or Notification

Javed Ahmad Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 13 Feb 2023

Father Thomas Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 22 Dec 2010

Sabiya Begum Malka Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 18 May 2016

Maya and Ors Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 19 Mar 2021

Waseem Vs State of UP and Anr on 30 Aug 2022

Malhan and 17 Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 07 Feb 2022

Mukesh Bansal Vs State of UP and Anr on 13 Jun 2022

Jagannath Verma and Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 23 Sep 2014

Asha Devi and Anr Vs State of UP and 2 Ors on 1 Dec 2020

Ram Charitra Tiwari and Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 13 Jul 2021