K.S.Sumi Mol Vs Suresh Kumar E.K. on 31 Jul 2023

Posted on October 28 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court passed these guidelines in order to achieve speedy disposal of Matrimonial and family related matters.

From Para 6,

6. In view of the above, and in the absence of any specific Rules regarding the speedy disposal of cases relating to marriage and family affairs within a time frame, we hereby lay down the guidelines for strict observance by all the Family Courts in Delhi, till such time rules are formulated by the State Government in consultation with the High Court of Delhi.
“Guidelines
a. Issue of Summons: When a suit has been duly instituted, a summons may be issued to the defendant to appear and answer the claim and to file the written statement of his defence, if any, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on that defendant:
Provided that no such summons shall be issued when a defendant has appeared at the presentation of plaint and admitted the plaintiff‟s claim:
Provided further that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the written statement on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as the Court deems fit, but which shall not be later than one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons and on expiry of one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons.
Provided further, the time taken for conciliation, mediation or interaction shall be excluded.
b. Inspection: (1) All parties shall complete inspection of all documents disclosed within thirty days of the date of filing of the written statement. The Court may extend this time limit upon application at its discretion, but not beyond thirty days.
(2) Any party to the proceedings may seek directions from the Court, at any stage of the proceedings, for inspection or production of documents by the other party, of which inspection has been refused by such party or documents have not been produced despite issuance of a notice to produce.
(3) Such application shall be disposed of within thirty days of filing such application, including filing replies and rejoinders (if permitted by Court) and hearing.
(4) If the above application is allowed, inspection and copies thereof shall be furnished to the party seeking it, within five days of such order.
(5) No party shall be permitted to rely on a document, which it had failed to disclose or of which inspection has not been given, save and except with leave of Court.
c. Admission and Denial of Documents: Each party shall submit a statement of admissions or denials of all documents disclosed and of which inspection has been completed, within fifteen days of the completion of inspection or any later date as fixed by the Court.
d. Case Management Hearing: The court shall hold the first Case Management Hearing, not later than four weeks from the date of filing of affidavit of admission or denial of documents by all parties to the suit.
In a Case Management Hearing, after hearing the parties, and once it finds that there are issues of fact and law which require to be tried, the court shall-
(i) frame the issues after examining pleadings, documents and documents produced before it, and on examination conducted by the court under Rule 2 of Order X, if required;
(ii) List the number of witnesses to be examined by the parties;
(iii) Fix the schedule of the dates and evidence led by parties with all endeavour to complete the evidence in six months.
(iv) Fix the date for oral arguments within ten days and it shall be open for the Court to limit the time for oral submissions having regard to the nature and complexity of the matter.
(v) Fix the date for filing the written arguments and a party shall, within four weeks prior to commencing the oral arguments, submit concisely and under distinct headings written arguments in support of their case to the Court and such written arguments shall form part of the record and shall be filed within fifteen days;
(vi)No adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of filing the written arguments unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, considers it necessary to grant such adjournment.
(vii)Set time limits for parties and their advocates to address oral arguments.
In fixing dates or setting time limits, the court shall ensure that the arguments are closed not later than two months from the date when the evidence of the parties was concluded.
(viii)The interim applications for ‘maintenance pendente lite’, ‘interim custody’ and all other miscellaneous applications relating to marriage/family affairs shall be decided within 90 days from the date of filing.
e. Judgment & Decree: (1) The court, shall, within thirty days of the conclusion of arguments, which shall not extend beyond sixty days, pronounce judgment and copies thereof shall be issued to all the parties to the dispute through electronic mail or otherwise.”

K.S.Sumi Mol Vs Suresh Kumar E.K. on 31 Jul 2023

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023

Posted on October 25 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that, Not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for a Writ’s dismissal.

Further it was held that, A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest.

From Para 4,

4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the high courts holding writ petitions as “not maintainable” merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition “not maintainable”. In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the “maintainability” of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that “entertainability” and “maintainability” of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to “maintainability” goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of “entertainability” is entirely within the realm of discretion of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a high court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper.

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023

Citations : [2023 INSC 92], [2023 SCC ONLINE SC 95]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/62928741/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/63dc0f95831db01604ba254b

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/AdvancedV2?docid=2368646

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-godrej-sara-lee-ltd-vs-the-excise-and-taxation-officer-cum-assessing-authority

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/godrej-taxation-alternative-remedy-not-absolute-writ-petition-maintainability-entertainability-apex-court-1460513

Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs The Excise and Taxation officer-cum-Assessing Authority & Ors (Supreme Court)

Sanjeev Kumar and Ors Vs Sushma Devi on 01 Jun 2023

Posted on October 17 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Himachal Pradesh High Court as follows, regarding framing of points/issues in Domestic Violence cases.

From Para 4(iii),

4(iii) In the instant case, parties led evidence in support of their respective pleadings. The record makes it apparent that the parties led their evidence without any points/issues having been framed in the matter.
Not only the points/issues were framed by the learned Trial Court in its judgment but the onus to prove such issues was also fastened upon respective parties, who were not even aware of formulation of the issues leave aside the onus to prove them. This approach was wholly erroneous. The parties were required to be made aware of the issues or the points they needed to prove in the case before directing them to lead evidence. This would have been not only in the interest of justice and fair play, but would have also provided the parties an opportunity to know the issues required to be proved by them. In accordance with provisions of the Act, demonstration by the complainant of existence of a relationship in the nature of marriage with the petitioner would have been sufficient under the Act. The complainant accordingly led her evidence. However, the learned Trial Court held the complainant could not establish that she was lawfully married to the petitioner. The complainant was not made aware of the points/issues framed by the learned Trial Court that she was required to prove her marriage with the petitioner in order to be successful in the proceedings. In case in the given facts, learned trial Court was of the view that the respondent-complainant was required to prove solemnization of her marriage with the petitioner, then the correct procedure would have been to make this issue known to the parties before ordering them to lead evidence. Framing of issues, for the first time, only in the judgment, placing burden of proving such issues on respective parties, deciding the case on the basis of such issues about which parties have not even been made aware of, is a procedure alien to well established legal and procedural conventions. It was imperative for the learned Trial Court to have framed issues/points for determination before directing the parties to lead evidence. The order passed by the learned Trial Court determining the points/issues and fixing the onus of proving those issues/points at the time of deciding the case was not in consonance with law. The order passed by the learned Trial Court was, therefore, justly interfered with by the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court also correctly observed that the petitioner had not signed the pleadings before the learned Trial Court. Accordingly, it gave an opportunity to the petitioner to rectify this irregularity by filing his affidavit before the learned Trial Court in support of unsigned pleadings.

Sanjeev Kumar and Ors Vs Sushma Devi on 08 Jun 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/58984784/

Index of Domestic Violence cases is here.

Deepti Vs Anil Kumar on 19 Sep 2023

Posted on October 15 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held that Family Courts cannot grant divorce on ground of Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage.

From Para 4,

4. The Respondent also alleged that from the very first day of marriage, Appellant created scenes at night hours and most of the times did not allow him to enjoy his conjugal rights. She refused him to have access to her and inflicted cruelty upon him. He further alleged that he was allowed by the Appellant only 30-35 times (approximately) to enjoy conjugal relations since their marriage.

From Para 7 and 8,

7. In respect of the ground of cruelty, the Family Court has held that “there was no normal and healthy sexual relationships between (Respondent) and his wife (Appellant) and same has resulted in striking at the very foundation of their marriage. It has been well settled that normal and healthy sexual Relationships between both spouse is one of the basic ingredients for happy and harmonious marriage as the marriage without sex is an anathema. Sex is foundation of marriage and without a vigorous and harmonious sexual activity it would be impossible for any marriage to continue.”
8. The Family Court after holding that there was denial of conjugal relations, noticed that parties had been living separately for more than 11 years and held that the marriage had broken down beyond repair and thus held that the Respondent had successfully established cruelty and thus granted a decree of divorce against the Appellant.

From Para 17,

17. Said ground is clearly not available to the Respondent and the Family Court has erred in returning a finding that there is denial of conjugal relationship by the Appellant. The allegations of the Respondent of denial of conjugal relationship are vague and without any specifics. He has alleged that he was allowed by the Appellant only 30-35 times (approximately) to enjoy conjugal relations since their marriage. This clearly shows that there was never any complete denial.

From Para 25,

25. In terms of the Judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Shilpa Sailesh (supra), the power to grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is exercised by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice to both the parties. Such a power is not vested in the High Courts leave alone the Family Courts.
26. In the instant case, the Family Court has merely considered the fact that the parties have lived separately for 11 years and granted divorce on the ground of breakdown of marriage. Such an exercise of powers is not conferred on the Family Court. Family Courts have to restrict their considerations to the parameters of the provision of grant of divorce strictly in accordance with the Act. Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground in the Act.
27. Even the Supreme Court while considering exercise of discretionary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India takes into account several factors and longevity of period is only one of them. Reference may be had to Para 41 of Shilpa Sailesh (supra) extracted hereinabove. Supreme Court has placed a word of caution that “grant of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage by this Court is not a matter of right, but a discretion which is to be exercised with great care and caution, keeping in mind several factors ensuring that ‘complete justice’ is done to both parties. It is obvious that this Court should be fully convinced and satisfied that the marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead and beyond salvation and, therefore, dissolution of marriage is the right solution and the only way forward. That the marriage has irretrievably broken down is to be factually determined and firmly established.”
28. In the present case, the Family Court has erred in travelling beyond the scope of its powers to grant divorce.

Deepti Vs Anil Kumar on 19 Sep 2023

Mohit Gupta and Ors vs Govt of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 16 Oct 2006

Posted on October 15 by ShadesOfKnife

A single bench judge at Delhi High Court held that Shivcharan Lal Verma and Anr Vs State of Madhya Pradesh is the precedent that is binding and not the Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam And Others.

From Para 8,

8. These are undoubtedly strong words and clearly show that a person who ostensibly contracts a marriage with a woman and lives with her as husband and wife would also be covered within the meaning of the expression “husband” used in Section 498-A IPC. But the matter does not stop here. The Supreme Court, in the case of Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra), which is a decision of a three-judge bench, was of the contrary view. The facts in that case were that during the lifetime of the first wife, Shivcharan married for the second time. But after the marriage both the first wife and Shivcharan tortured the second wife as a result of which she ultimately committed suicide by burning herself. The incident occurred inside the house while Shivcharan and his first wife were in one room and the second wife was in the other. One of the questions which arose before the Supreme Court was whether the provisions under Section 498-A can at all be attracted since the marriage with the second wife itself was null and void, the same having been performed during the lifetime of the first wife. In answer to this question the Supreme Court observed that there was considerable force in the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that so far as conviction under Section 498-A was concerned, inasmuch as the alleged marriage with the second wife, during the subsistence of a valid marriage with the first wife, was null and void, the same cannot be sustained. The Supreme Court therefore set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 498-A IPC. Going by this a decision, it is clear that the Supreme Court was of the view that as the second marriage was null and void, Shivcharan could not be regarded as a “husband” within the meaning ascribed to it under Section 498-A IPC. Although the learned Counsel for the respondent had, as noted above, made submissions to the effect that this was not a binding precedent, I don’t see as to how this is would not constitute a binding precedent. The point in issue arose out of the facts of the case. It was specifically raised and specifically answered. The ratio of the decision is that a male partner to a null marriage cannot be covered by the expression “husband” as appearing in Section 498-A IPC. It is another thing that the Supreme Court in the case of Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) did not discuss this question with the same degree of elaboration as in the case of Reema Aggarwal (supra). But, this by itself cannot be construed to mean that in Shivcharan lal Verma (supra), the Supreme Court did not consider the entire scope and ambit of the provisions of Section 498-A IPC. It must also be pointed out that the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) has not been noticed in Reema Aggarwal (supra) although the latter decision is later in point of time. So, the decision in Reema Aggarwal (supra) has to be regarded as per incuriam. The second point that has to be kept in mind is that the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) has been rendered by a bench of three honourable judges whereas the decision in the case of Reema Aggarwal (supra) is by a bench of two honourable judges. Clearly, the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) would be binding. In this context it would be pertinent to note the observations of a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 5 SCC 578 wherein the Supreme Court observed [at para 28]:

The well settled principle of precedents which has crystallised into a rule of law is that the bench of lesser strength is bound by the view expressed by a bench of larger strength and cannot take a view in departure or in conflict there from.

Therefore the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) will clearly take precedence over the decision in Reema Aggarwal (supra).

Indiankanoon version:

Mohit Gupta and Ors vs Govt of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 16 Oct 2006 (IK ver)

Casemine version:

Mohit Gupta and Ors vs Govt of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 16 Oct 2006 (CM ver)

Citations: [2007 AD DEL 1 503], [2007 DRJ 93 606], [2006 DLT 135 390], [2007 DMC 1 47], [2006 SCC ONLINE DEL 1256], [2006 JCC 3 1923], [2007 JCC 3 1923]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/338837/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090c14e4b0149711176259

Mohit Gupta And Ors. vs State Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi And Anr. on 16 October, 2006

Index of Quash judgements is here and HMA Judgments is here.

Bimla Tiwari Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 16 Jan 2023

Posted on October 12 by ShadesOfKnife

In this reportable decision of Supreme Court, it was held that the process of criminal law, particularly in matters of grant of bail, is not akin to money recovery proceedings. Recovery of money is essentially within the realm of civil proceedings.

From Paras 9-11,

9. We have indicated on more than one occasion that the process of criminal law, particularly in matters of grant of bail, is not akin to money recovery proceedings but what has been noticed in the present case carries the peculiarities of its own.
10. We would reiterate that the process of criminal law cannot beutilised for arm-twisting and money recovery, particularly while opposing the prayer for bail. The question as to whether pre-arrest bail, or for that matter regular bail, in a given case is to begranted or not is required to be examined and the discretion isrequired to be exercised by the Court with reference to the material on record and the parameters governing bail considerations. Putting it in other words, in a given case, theconcession of pre-arrest bail or regular bail could be declined even if the accused has made payment of the money involved oroffers to make any payment; conversely, in a given case, the concession of pre-arrest bail or regular bail could be granted irrespective of any payment or any offer of payment.
11. We would further emphasize that, ordinarily, there is nojustification in adopting such a course that for the purpose of being given the concession of pre-arrest bail, the personapprehending arrest ought to make payment. Recovery of money is essentially within the realm of civil proceedings.

From Para 15,

15. Thus, it is noticed that these criminal proceedings are being prosecuted only as money recovery proceedings. We have expressed reservations even as regards the aforesaid order dated 10.03.2022, wherein the High Court has proceeded on the propositions of offer made by the co-accused of payment of the sum of Rs.6,00,000/- (six lakhs) and acceptance thereof by the informant (present petitioner). However, since the said order is not before us, we would refrain from making any directions in that regard and else, in our view, even the said order too, on the proposition of granting bail with reference to payment, has its own shortcomings.
16. Even when we are not modifying the condition in the said order dated 10.03.2022 for the same being not before us, so far as the impugned order dated 14.11.2022 is concerned, in our view, it shall be in the interest of justice to annul the requirement of payment of a sum of Rs. 75,000/- (seventy-five thousand) by the accused-respondent No. 2. Hence, the order granting pre-arrest bail to the respondents stands affirmed but, the condition therein, of payment of Rs.75,000/- (seventy-five thousand) by the respondent No.2, stands annulled.

Bimla Tiwari Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 16 Jan 2023

Index of all Bail Matters is here.

Shane George Dsouza Vs State of NCT of Delhi on 04 Oct 2023

Posted on October 12 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that criminal proceedings cannot be converted into recovery proceedings.

This Court has repeatedly held that the condition of deposit of such amount cannot be a condition of bail. In this case, the appellant had not volunteered to deposit the sum of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs). The direction in the order dated 18th January, 2023 is not only of imposing a condition on the appellant of bringing a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs) to the Trial Court but a permission has been granted to release the amount to the victim. It is a settled law that criminal proceedings cannot be converted into recovery proceedings.
Hence, in the facts of the case, there was no justification for imposing the condition of deposit of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs). Accordingly, the
appeal must succeed and we set aside clause (a) of the operative part of the order dated 18th January, 2023 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-05, New Delhi District, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi. The rest of the conditions shall remain as it is.

Shane George Dsouza Vs State of NCT of Delhi on 04 Oct 2023

Index if all Bail matters is here.

Mahima Chaturvedi Vs Deepak Malhotra on 26 Jul 2021

Posted on October 10 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows while denying interim maintenance to a working wife.

From Para 5,

5. The learned Family Judge has observed in its order dated 18.06.2020 that the Object and Intent of Section 24 is to support the spouse who has no independent source of income. The learned Family Court has relied on the income affidavit of the appellant to arrive at a conclusion that the appellant is drawing a salary of Rs. 85,000/- per month and relied on the judgment of this Court in case titled K.N. vs R.G. Reported as MAT. APP(FC) no. 93/18 (date of decision – 12.02.2019) to hold that the provision of Section 24, Hindu Marriage Act, are not meant to equalise the income of wife with that of the husband.

From Para 9,

9. Hence, we are clear that the appellant is a well-qualified professional and is drawing a salary of 85,000/- month which is adequate for a comfortable life. In K.N. v. R.G., it has been held that the provision of section 24 are not meant to equalize the income of the spouses but only to see that no spouse should suffer due to paucity of income. The purpose to grant maintenance is to tide over litigation expenses and to provide a comfortable life to the spouse.

Mahima Chaturvedi Vs Deepak Malhotra on 26 Jul 2021

Index of Maintenance Orders under HMA here.

Poonam Sethi Vs Sanjay Sethi on 07 Jan 2022

Posted on October 10 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Para 57,

57. Each and every individual is entitled to basic resources like food, shelter, clothing, education, medical expenses and other necessities required to live a dignified life. Morally and legally, it the obligation of both the parents to provide these amenities, according to the status of life being led by them, to their children by way of maintenance.

Poonam Sethi Vs Sanjay Sethi on 07 Jan 2022

Index of Maintenance Orders under HMA here.

Niharika Kundu Vs Shankar Ghosh on 12 Sep 2023

Posted on October 10 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court caught a liar in a HMA 24 proceeding.

From Para 6,

6. It is not in dispute that the appellant was M. Phil at the time of her marriage and was pursuing Ph.D which she has completed and is now having the qualification of Ph.D (Management) with professional qualification in Computers. While on the other hand the respondent is a simple graduate. It is also not denied that appellant was working at the time of her marriage at a Diamond Jewellery Showroom and was getting Rs.12,000/- per month. She had left her job since she was unable to attend her office since 22.05.2015.
7. From the submissions it is evident that not only is the appellant highly qualified but had been working even at the time of her marriage.

From Para 8,

8. The second aspect of significance is that the respondent had claimed that the appellant is working in the office of M.P. Udit Raj in Connaught Place and her claim that she is unemployed, is incorrect. In support of his assertions he had relied upon a CD showing the appellant working in the office of Mr. Udit Raj and also marking her attendance in the Register. The appellant who had initially taken a stand that she was not working, when confronted with this CD, gave an explanation that she has a friend working in the office of Mr. Udit Raj and at times when she goes to visit her friend, she also looks after the office work.

Niharika Kundu Vs Shankar Ghosh on 12 Sep 2023

Index of Maintenance Orders under HMA here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Month: October 2023

K.S.Sumi Mol Vs Suresh Kumar E.K. on 31 Jul 2023

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023

Sanjeev Kumar and Ors Vs Sushma Devi on 01 Jun 2023

Deepti Vs Anil Kumar on 19 Sep 2023

Mohit Gupta and Ors vs Govt of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 16 Oct 2006

Bimla Tiwari Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 16 Jan 2023

Shane George Dsouza Vs State of NCT of Delhi on 04 Oct 2023

Mahima Chaturvedi Vs Deepak Malhotra on 26 Jul 2021

Poonam Sethi Vs Sanjay Sethi on 07 Jan 2022

Niharika Kundu Vs Shankar Ghosh on 12 Sep 2023