Manoj Kumar Vs Nita Bharti on 17 Mar 2026

Posted on June 17 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Patna High Court, used “Doctrine of frustration” in addition to Cruelty to dissolve a marriage registered under the Special Marriage Act, 1954.

From Paras 39,

39. But, at same time, we are also mindful of the legal position that we cannot exercise power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India for complete justice.
40. At this juncture, our judicial consciousness poses a question to us: being a constitutional court “are we helpless?”. This is particularly so, when we are convinced that respondent/applicant cannot perform her marital obligation with appellant due to the aforesaid compelling circumstances.
41. Hence, this is an occasion to view the present episode in a more progressive manner by importing the “Doctrine of frustration”.
42. As a Constitutional Court it is of paramount importance to touch upon all the possible scenarios, which can result in delivery of justice. Solemnization of marriage is a pious concept which does not only involve a husband and wife but society at large. And keeping in view the best interest of the parties, best possible way to deliver justice should be adopted. The court highlights that “Justice should not only be done, but must also be seen to be done”. Going with the essence of above mentioned phrase, the court will fail in its duty, if it will not discuss the prospective probabilities which can ensure the just, reasonable and conscious delivery of justice.
43. The Indian Jurisprudence suggests that “Procedural law is the handmaid of Justice and not its mistress”, which enables the court to adopt flexible approach rather than taking a rigid view of the prescribed law.
44. At the outset, it is not in dispute that the marriage between the parties was solemnized in accordance with law under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and continued for a certain period, thereby creating a legally valid and subsisting matrimonial bond. The statutory presumption attached to such marriage stands fortified by the mandate of Section 13(2) of the Act, which accords conclusiveness to the certificate of marriage.
45. It must be acknowledged that though marriage is not a commercial contract, it undeniably embodies a bundle of reciprocal obligations—cohabitation, fidelity, companionship, emotional support, and exclusivity. Where these foundational obligations stand extinguished not by mere estrangement but by subsequent conduct that legally and morally negates the marital bond, the continuance of marriage becomes impossible in substance. In such circumstances, the Court cannot remain bound by the mere form of the relationship when its essence has ceased to exist.

From Para 46,

46. …. The doctrine of frustration, embodied in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, is founded on the principle that law does not compel performance of that which has become impossible. When applied in the matrimonial context, particularly to civil marriages under the Special Marriage Act, this principle manifests in situations where the foundation of marriage— cohabitation, consortium, mutual obligations—stands irretrievably destroyed.
47. The doctrine of frustration, as evolved in contract law, operates where an unforeseen event renders the performance of obligations impossible or destroys the very foundation upon which the relationship rests. Transposed into matrimonial jurisprudence, the doctrine applies where the substratum of marriage—mutual trust, exclusivity, and consortium—is irreversibly destroyed, leaving no scope for restoration. The law, in such a situation, must recognize reality over fiction.
48. The present case transcends the conventional doctrine of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. Irretrievable breakdown of marriage contemplates a situation where the marriage has failed due to prolonged separation, incompatibility, or absence of cohabitation. It is not merely a case where the
marriage has failed due to incompatibility or prolonged separation; rather, it is one where subsequent events—most notably the lawful remarriage of the respondent-wife and the birth of a child—have rendered the performance of marital obligations wholly impossible. The doctrine of frustration, as invoked herein, goes a step further—it applies where the very performance of marital obligations has become impossible due to supervening circumstances. The impossibility herein operates at multiple levels—moral, practical, and legal—thereby justifying the application of a doctrine analogous to frustration in order to recognize reality over legal fiction.

From Para 54,

54. While it is true that the doctrine of frustration, in its strict contractual sense, is not directly applicable to matrimonial law, the underlying principle—that a relationship rendered incapable of performance by supervening circumstances ought not to be artificially preserved—can be judiciously invoked. Constitutional courts are empowered to adopt Purposive Interpretation to advance justice and to put an end to litigation. The Rule of interpretation suggests that Constitutional Courts must be at work to fulfill the legislative intent. Marriage, though not a commercial contract, embodies reciprocal and enforceable obligations such as cohabitation, fidelity, companionship, and exclusivity. Where these essential obligations stand extinguished, not merely by estrangement but by subsequent conduct that negates the very foundation of the marriage, the continuance of such a bond becomes impossible in substance.

From Para 57,

57. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present case represents a rare but compelling situation where the doctrine of frustration must be invoked in matrimonial law.
58. The marriage, though validly solemnized, has lost its essential character due to subsequent events that render its continuation impossible. The legal bond survives only as a shell, devoid of substance, purpose, or enforceability. To compel parties to remain in such a relationship would amount to enforcing a legal fiction at the cost of justice. The law cannot insist upon the preservation of a bond that has ceased to exist in every meaningful sense.
59. Therefore, in order to do complete justice, to uphold the dignity of the parties, to secure the welfare of the child, and to serve the broader interests of society, this Court finds it appropriate to dissolve the marriage by applying the doctrine of frustration, treating the matrimonial bond as having become incapable of performance.
60. Accordingly, marriage of OP/appellant namely, Manoj Kumar @ Munna stands dissolved with respondent/applicant namely, Nita Bharti.

From Para 74 (Concurring Opinion)

74. Thus, “Doctrine of frustration” which has been introduced by my esteemed brother as a ground of divorce is supplemented by me holding inter alia that continuous uninterrupted, prolonged separation by and between the parties had caused deep frustration in the core of their heart, such frustration caused by the other spouse is a form of cruelty within the meaning of Section 27 (1) (d) of Special Marriage Act.

Manoj Kumar Vs Nita Bharti on 17 Mar 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Divorce Judgments is here.

Ann Saurabh Dutt Vs Lieutenant Colonel Saurabh Iqbal Bahadur Dutt on 12 May 2026 – Judgement Summary

Posted on May 18 by Suprajaa Rajan

The Supreme Court of India in Ann Saurabh Dutt Vs Lieutenant Colonel Saurabh Iqbal Bahadur Dutt, held that a professionally qualified woman cannot be branded “cruel” or accused of “desertion” merely because she chooses to pursue her career and create a safe environment for her child.

Allowing the appeal in part, the Supreme Court strongly criticised the reasoning adopted by the Family Court and the High Court, describing it as “pedantic,” “regressive,” “ultra-conservative,” and rooted in patriarchal assumptions. The Court held that a woman’s professional identity, autonomy, and decision to balance career with motherhood cannot be construed as matrimonial misconduct.

“3. We are well into the 21st Century, and yet an attempt by a qualified woman to pursue her professional career and to secure a safe and stable environment for the upbringing of her child has been treated as an act of cruelty and desertion by the Courts below.”
“4. The reasoning which permeates the impugned judgments appears to be founded upon deeply entrenched archaic societal assumptions that a wife’s professional identity is subject to an implied spousal veto;…”
“22. Merely because the wife decided to reside at Ahmedabad with the primary intention to provide a safer environment and better health care to her daughter… branding such conduct as constituting cruelty or desertion was atrocious to say the least.”
“26. The expectation that the wife could not even think of pursuing her career in Dentistry, is indicative of regressive and feudalistic mindset.”
“29. We are convinced that he has an attitude of domineering and control, which must have been the probable cause for the appellant taking the steps for gaining independence and pursuing her career goals.”

Decision of the Court

Accordingly, the Supreme Court passed the following directions:

In the wife’s appeal

Findings of cruelty and desertion under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 were expunged and set aside.
The decree of divorce was not disturbed, considering the respondent had remarried and the wife did not seek restoration of marriage.
The divorce decree was directed to be treated as one passed on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

In the husband’s petition

The husband’s plea seeking prosecution of the wife for perjury under Section 195 CrPC [Section 379 BNSS] read with Section 340 CrPC was rejected.
The Court found the petition motivated by personal vendetta and lacking legal merit.

Thus, the wife’s appeal was partly allowed, while the husband’s special leave petition was dismissed.

Ann Saurabh Dutt Vs Lieutenant Colonel Saurabh Iqbal on 12 May 2026

Citation : 2026 INSC 475

Other Sources :

Index of Divorce Judgments is here.

Key Contributor :

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

Pradeep Bhardwaj Vs Priya on 15 July 2025

Posted on February 25 by Suprajaa Rajan

This judgment addresses the Supreme Court’s power to dissolve a marriage under Article 142 of the Constitution where the marriage has irretrievably broken down. The Court examined whether prolonged separation, failed mediation, and complete loss of marital bond justify dissolution, even when statutory grounds such as cruelty are not established.

The Court also considered the impact of acquittal in criminal proceedings under Sections 498A/406 IPC and the welfare of the minor child. The decision reflects the Court’s evolving approach toward dead marriages that survive only on paper.

“21. There are two main considerations which have weighed heavily with this Court while considering the rival contentions. Firstly, that the appellant-husband has been acquitted in the case of cruelty preferred by the respondent against him and his family members. Secondly, it is an admitted fact that the parties have been living separately since October 2009, i.e. almost for the past sixteen years.”

“22. It has been consistently held by this Court that the institution of marriage is rooted in dignity, mutual respect and shared companionship, and when these foundational aspects are irreparably lost, forcing a couple to remain legally bound serves no beneficial purpose.”

“23. In the present case, it is apparent that due to complete detachment and the prolonged estrangement, there has been an irretrievable breakdown of the marital bond, which cannot be mended by any means.”

“24. It is as clear as a day that in the case at hand, the continuance of marriage shall only fuel animosity and litigation between the parties, which runs contrary to the ethos of matrimonial harmony envisioned by the law.”

“25. This Court finds it a fit case to exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution and grant the relief of divorce to the parties on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.”

Decision

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal.

The Court:

Set aside the High Court’s judgment.
Granted divorce under Article 142 on the ground of irretrievable breakdown.
Enhanced monthly maintenance to Rs. 15,000/- for the wife and minor son.

Pradeep Bharadwaj Vs Priya on 15 Jul 2025

Citation : 2025 INSC 852

Other Sources :

Index of Divorce Judgments is here.

Key Contributor :

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

Hitesh Bhatnagar Vs Deepa Bhatnagar on 18 Apr 2011

Posted on February 24 by Suprajaa Rajan

The Supreme Court examined whether consent given at the time of filing a joint petition continues to bind the parties until decree, or whether it can be withdrawn at any stage before the court passes the final order.

The appellant argued that once the statutory period of 18 months had expired without formal withdrawal, the court had no option but to grant divorce. The respondent contended that mutual consent must subsist till the date of decree and that she had validly withdrawn her consent before the second motion.

The judgment clarified the nature of mutual consent as a jurisdictional requirement and reaffirmed earlier precedents on the subject. It also considered whether Article 142 of the Constitution could be invoked to dissolve the marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown.

“13. The appellant contends that the Additional District Judge, Gurgaon, was bound to grant divorce if the consent was not withdrawn within a period of 18 months in view of the language employed in Section 13B(2) of the Act. We find no merit in the submission made by the appellant in the light of the law laid down by this Court in Sureshta Devi’s case (supra).”

“14. The language employed in Section 13B(2) of the Act is clear. The Court is bound to pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage of the parties before it to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree, if the following conditions are met:
a. A second motion of both the parties is made not before 6 months from the date of filing of the petition as required under sub-section (1) and not later than 18 months;
b. After hearing the parties and making such inquiry as it thinks fit, the Court is satisfied that the averments in the petition are true; and
c. The petition is not withdrawn by either party at any time before passing the decree;”

“15. In other words, if the second motion is not made within the period of 18 months, then the Court is not bound to pass a decree of divorce by mutual consent. Besides, from the language of the Section, as well as the settled law, it is clear that one of the parties may withdraw their consent at any time before the passing of the decree. The most important requirement for a grant of a divorce by mutual consent is free consent of both the parties.”

“16. In the present fact scenario, the second motion was never made by both the parties as is a mandatory requirement of the law, and as has been already stated, no Court can pass a decree of divorce in the absence of that. The non-withdrawal of consent before the expiry of the said eighteen months has no bearing.”

“18. We are not inclined to entertain this submission of the appellant since the facts in that case are not akin to those that are before us.”

“25. It is settled law that this Court grants a decree of divorce only in those situations in which the Court is convinced beyond any doubt that there is absolutely no chance of the marriage surviving and it is broken beyond repair.”

Decision

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

The Court held that:

Mutual consent must continue till the decree of divorce.
Either party may withdraw consent at any time before the decree.
The 18-month period does not bar withdrawal of consent.
Article 142 cannot be used to override statutory requirements in ordinary circumstances.

Hitesh bhatnagar Vs Deepa bhatnagar on 18 Apr 2011

Citation :(2011) 5 SCC 234

Other Sources :

Index of Divorce Judgements is here.

Key Contributor :

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

Rinku Baheti Vs Sandesh Sharda on 19 Dec 2024

Posted on October 4, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court did MCD settlement at 12 Crore rupees.

From Paras 14.4, 14.5 and 14.7,

14.4 In the instant case as well, the petitioner-wife has stated that the respondent-husband is a man of means with a net-worth of Rs.5,000 crores with multiple businesses and properties in USA and in India and that he had paid his first wife at least Rs.500 crores upon separation, excluding a house in Virginia, USA. Thus, she claims permanent alimony commensurate to the status of the respondent-husband and on the same principles as was paid to the first wife of the respondent. The respondent-husband on the other hand is willing to pay a reasonable amount to cover the difference in the income and expenditure of the petitioner-wife, which he feels should be in the range of Rs.20 to 40 lakhs as a one-time lump sum payment. Thus, there is a clear and significant divergence or “mismatch” between the offer and the desire.
14.5 We have serious reservations with the tendency of parties seeking maintenance or alimony as an equalisation of wealth with the other party. It is often seen that parties in their application for maintenance or alimony highlight the assets, status and income of their spouse, and then ask for an amount that can equal their wealth to that of the spouse. However, there is an inconsistency in this practice, because the demands of equalisation are made only in cases where the spouse is a person of means or is doing well for himself. But such demands are conspicuously absent in cases where the wealth of the spouse has decreased since the time of separation. There cannot be two different approaches to seeking and granting maintenance or alimony, depending on the status and income of the spouse. The law of maintenance is aimed at empowering the destitute and achieving social justice and dignity of the individual. The husband is under a legal obligation to sufficiently provide for his wife. As per settled law, the wife is entitled to be maintained as far as possible in a manner that is similar to what she was accustomed to in her matrimonial home while the parties were together. But once the parties have separated, it cannot be expected of the husband to maintain her as per his present status all his life. If the husband has moved ahead and is fortunately doing better in life post his separation, then to ask him to always maintain the status of the wife as per his own changing status would be putting a burden on his own personal progress. We wonder, would the wife be willing to seek an equalisation of wealth with the husband if due to some unfortunate events post-separation, he has been rendered a pauper?
14.7 But the petitioner-wife in the instant case has sought equalisation of status not just with the respondent-husband but also with the ex-wife of the respondent. In our opinion, this cannot be an acceptable approach. The fixation of alimony depends on various factors and there cannot be any straight-jacket formula for the same. Thus, the petitioner cannot simply claim an amount equal to what the ex-wife of the respondent had received or on the basis of the income of the respondent. The Court has to not just consider the income of the respondent-husband here, but also bear in mind other factors such as the income of the petitioner-wife, her reasonable needs, her residential rights, and other similar factors. Thus, her entitlement to maintenance has to be decided based on the factors applicable to her and not depend on what the respondent had paid to his ex-wife or solely on his income.

Rinku Baheti Vs Sandesh Sharda on 19 Dec 2024

Index of Maintenance and Alimony judgments is here.

Kiran Jyot Maini Vs Anish Pramod Patel on 15 Jul 2024

Posted on April 5, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed this decision. Not sure, why this is a reportable judgment!

Kiran Jyot Maini Vs Anish Pramod Patel on 15 Jul 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/669778a11312582eb2f9e52c

Index of Maintenance Judgments under DV Act is here. Divorce Judgments here. DV Judgements here.

Vishal Shah Vs Monalisha Gupta and Ors on 20 Feb 2025

Posted on February 22, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed this judgment whereby the marriage of parties is severed and Rs.25 Lakhs alimony was ordered to be paid to wife. Also since DV cases are quasi-criminal in nature, thus, there cannot be any justification to require the personal presence/appearance of the appellant in these proceedings.

From Para 18,

18. In the afore-mentioned complaint case, an application10 was filed by the respondent under Section 26 of the DV Act against the appellant, her mother-in-law, and their five other relatives. A notice was issued to the appellant vide order dated 21st July 2022. Subsequently, on 11th August 2022, the learned JMFC passed an interim order in favour of the respondent, prohibiting her eviction from the matrimonial home and directing the personal appearance of the appellant (respondent therein) and other respondents on the next hearing date. However, when the matter was listed again, the Court noticed that the appellant had not returned to India, and the concerned authorities were directed to initiate the extradition process against him.
We may observe that as the proceedings under the DV Act are quasi-criminal in nature, thus, there cannot be any justification to require the personal presence of the appellant in these proceedings. Thus, the learned Magistrate grossly erred while directing the appellant to remain personally present in the Court.

From Para 20,

20. It is apparent that the appellant’s inability to travel to India and appear in Miscellaneous Case No. 440 of 2022, filed by the respondent under Section 26 of the DV Act, stemmed from the impoundment of his passport, a circumstance beyond his control. Consequently, the order of the learned JMFC directing the initiation of extradition proceedings against the appellant as a consequence of his non-appearance, despite being aware of the fact of impounding of the passport of the appellant, is untenable and unsustainable in the eyes of the law. Otherwise also, as noted above, there is no requirement for the personal presence of any party in the proceedings under the DV Act, because they are quasi-criminal in nature and do not entail any penal consequences except when there is a breach of a protection order, which is the only offence provided under Section 31 of the DV Act.

From Para 26,

26. On the issue as to grant of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, this Court, in a very recent judgment of Rinku Baheti v Sandesh Sharda13, held that the factual analysis has to be undertaken in each case to determine as to what constitutes an ‘irretrievable breakdown’ while keeping in mind the non-exhaustive factors laid down in Shilpa Sailesh (supra).

From Para 31,

31. The filing of the aforesaid cases by the respondent-wife reflects her vindictive attitude towards the appellant and his family members and unambiguously reflects the bitterness that has seeped into the marital relationship. The tumultuous state of the marital relationship between the parties is quite evident, irrespective of the fate of the criminal complaints and the imputations made by the parties against each other. The passport of the appellant was also impounded by the concerned authorities, pursuant to the pending cases filed by the respondent.

From Paras 35-37,

35. Whatever may be the justification for the spouses living separately, with so much time having passed by any marital love or affection that may have developedbetween the parties seems to have evanesced. This is a classic case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The admitted long-standing separation, nature of differences, prolonged and multiple litigations pending adjudication, and the unwillingness of the parties to reconcile are evidence enough to establish beyond all manner of doubt that the marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably and that there is no scope whatsoever for marriage to survive. Thus, no useful purpose, emotional or practical, would be served by continuing the soured relationship. On the basis ofthe above factual matrix, the present appears to be a case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
36. Apart from the irreconcilable status of the relationship between the parties, in the present case, another factor that has weighed with this Court in favour of the exercise of the power under Article 142(1)of the Constitution of India is that there is no child born from the wedlock and therefore, any direction to allowthe parties to part ways would only affect the parties themselves and not any innocent child.
37. Thus, this is a fit case warranting the exercise of the discretion conferred under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India to dissolve the marriage between the parties on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

From Paras 42-43,

42. Before we conclude our discussion, we must note that the act of impounding the passport of the appellant by the concerned authorities of the Government of India was ex-facie illegal in the eyes of the law. In the present case, the appellant’s passport was impounded on the mere premise that the respondent has filed numerous cases before the various courts in India.
43. The law regarding the impounding of a passport of an individual has been settled by this Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr.16, wherein it was held that the rules of natural justice must be followed before impounding a passport under Section 10(3) of the Passports Act, 1967.

From Paras 45-46,

45. Further, this Court, in Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P.17, while dealing with the question of arrest and fair investigation in a case alleging the offence of cruelty under Section 498A IPC, was of the view that in respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of ‘Red Corner Notice’ should not be a routine.
46. Applying the afore-mentioned legal principles to the present case, we find that the act of impounding the appellant’s passport under Section 10 of the Passport Act, 1967, was carried out without granting the appellant an opportunity to be heard. This clear violation of the principles of natural justice renders the act of impounding the passport ex-facie illegal. Consequently, we hold that the concerned authorities should release the appellant’s passport within a period of one week from today.

Vishal Shah Vs Monalisha Gupta and Ors on 20 Feb 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 254], [2025 LiveLaw (SC) 240]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/97306350/

https://www.caseciter.com/vishal-shah-vs-monalisha-gupta-2025-insc-254-domestic-violence-act-passport-impounding-irretrievable-breakdown-of-marriage-permanent-alimony/

Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here. Divorce Judgments are here. Passport judgements are here.

N.Rajendran Vs S.Valli on 03 Feb 2022

Posted on September 26, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court granted divorce to the husband, not on the ground of cruelty by wife, but on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

From Para 29,

29. Article 142 of the Constitution undoubtedly clothes this Court with a reservoir of power to pass orders as would reach complete justice to the parties. What comes to mind is the concept of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. Undoubtedly, though there have been reports of the Law Commission in this regard recommending changes in the law, as of today the statute does not provide for irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground. However, this Court has on a number of occasions exercised its power and granted dissolution of marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage based on Article 142. In this regard, learned counsel for respondent pointed out that this is not a case for exercising power under Article 142. He addressed this submission, reminding us of the conduct of the appellant throughout. He would submit that the respondent is completely without blame. She was always ready and willing. The findings as found by the High Court being confirmed, no occasion arises for this Court to exercise power under Article 142. We record this submission for as a prefatory remark to indicate that this is not a case where both parties are agreeable for a dissolution by way of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. But that then leads us to the question as to whether the consent of the parties is necessary to order dissolution of marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. This again, is not res integra. We may notice that this Court has in a catena of decisions discussed this very aspect.

From Para 32,

32. Having found that consent of the parties is not necessary to declare a marriage dissolved, we cannot be unmindful of the facts as they exist in reality. There has been a marriage which took place on 31.10.2004. There is a child born in the said marriage. No doubt being in contravention of Section 15, it becomes a fait accompli but at the same time we do not reasonably perceive any possibility of the appellant and the respondent cohabiting as husband and wife. Whatever life was there in the marriage has been snuffed out by the passage of time, the appearance of new parties and vanishing of any bond between the parties. Not even the slightest possibility of rapprochement between the appellant and the respondent exists for reasons though which are entirely due to the actions of the appellant and for which the respondent cannot be blamed. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent has become dead. It can be described as a point of no return. There is no possibility of the appellant and the respondent stitching together any kind of a reasonable relationship as the tie between the parties has broken beyond repair and having regard to the facts of this case, we would think that it would be in the interest of justice and to do complete justice to the parties that we should pass an order dissolving the marriage between the appellant and the respondent.

From Para 34,

34. Accordingly, while we affirm the judgment of the High Court and refuse to grant a decree of dissolution on the ground of cruelty by the respondent, we in exercise of our power under Article 142 of the Constitution declare the marriage between the appellant and the respondent as dissolved. This will be on condition that the appellant will pay a sum of Rs.20,000,00/- (Rupees twenty lakhs) to the respondent by way of a demand draft within a period of eight weeks from today. We further make it clear that this will be without prejudice to all the rights available to the son who was born in the marriage between the appellant and the respondent under law in regard to property rights. Till the amount is paid as aforesaid, the appellant will continue to be liable to pay Rs.7000/- per month to the respondent.

N.Rajendran Vs S.Valli on 03 Feb 2022

Index of Divorce judgements is here.

Arti Tiwari Vs Sanjay Kumar Tiwari on 04 Sep 2024

Posted on September 14, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench at Allahabad High Court held that,

From Para 3,

3. In brief, it may be noted that the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 2.3.2000. At that time, the appellant was working as Class-III employee at the Rajkiya Bachat Karyalaya, at Bareilly. His father and siblings were residing at their house at Unnao. The family of the appellant belongs to Kanpur Nagar. According to the respondent/husband, the appellant resided at her matrimonial home for a few days, but raised complaint of not feeling safe in the company of only male family members of the respondent, his mother having died almost 20 years earlier.Occasioned by that, the respondent took the appellant to the city of his work, at Bareilly. Even there, the appellant, did not stay for long. She now cited reasons to stay at Kanpur Nagar as she was a practising advocate. Thus, the appellant is described to have left for Kanpur Nagar. However, intermittent cohabitation of the parties at Bareilly, Kanpur Nagar and Unnao, during that period, is not disputed. Then, according to the respondent, he applied for and consequently, was transferred to Kannauj. This transfer, respondent had sought only to make it possible for the respondent to stay at Kanpur Nagar with him. Upon being thus transferred, the respondent took up a rented accommodation at Kanpur Nagar and he used to commute to Kannauj from there every day. However, the appellant still did not stay with him for long. Though intermittently, the appellant did stay with the respondent at his rented premises, she preferred to stay at her parental house. In that context, it is the further case of the respondent that the appellant wanted the respondent to stay with her at her parental home at Kanpur Nagar. When the appellant did not agree to live with the respondent at the rented accommodation taken by him at Kanpur Nagar, he vacated that premises and started staying at Unnao, at his parental home from where too he could easily commute to Kannauj, in connection with his work.

From Para 7,

7. It is also the case of the respondent that the appellant offered cruel behaviour towards all family members of the respondent, from very beginning. Not only she would use harsh words andabusive language in normal household affairs, it was specifically stated by the respondent that the appellant wanted the respondentto abide absolutely, by her wishes. Failing that she threatened to level false allegations against the respondent and his father, including allegation of illicit relationship between the respondentand his real sister. While no such case was ever lodged by the appellant and no such complaint appears to have been made by the appellant to any authority, at the same time, it is on record that after the institution of the divorce suit on 01.08.2006, the appellant instituted Criminal Case No. 687 of 2006 on 14.11.2006 i.e. after three months of the institution of the divorce case. Remarkably,though allegations of demand of dowry and cruelty were made in the First Information Report, there is no prior complaint or First Information Report of such allegation ever made by the appellant,over six years of marriage between the parties.

From Para 11, (Desertion is established)

11. During his extensive cross-examination, the above noted aspects proven by the respondent during his examination-in-chief were not controverted or doubted. We have made reference to those facts to bring out the extent to which the efforts had been made by the respondent to prove desertion offered by the appellant. In absence of any doubt being raised during the extensive cross-examination of the respondent, we do not find any error in the finding of the learned Court below to believe the testimony of the respondent. Sitting in first appeal, we are ourselves inclined to draw firm conclusion that the appellant had no will or desire to live in matrimony with the respondent either at his parental home or at his place of work, or even otherwise at Kanpur Nagar. She only desired to stay at her parental home.

From Para 17,

17. In face of Criminal Revision proceeding pending, against the order of conviction passed in the appeal proceedings, we are not recording any firm conclusion with respect to falsity or otherwise the allegations made in the criminal case, at the same time, in the context of facts and circumstances proven in this case, the critical element of cruelty is found in existence. Desertion suffered over long years in a young marriage, accompanied with harsh words spoken and complete lack of desire and effort on part of the deserting spouse to cohabit as also lodging of criminal case alleging demand of dowry only after institution of divorce case proceeding by the other spouse and pursuing it in appeal to secure conviction (after initial acquittal) does indicate in any case, the marriage between the parties is irretrievably broken down.

From Para 19,

19. In view of the facts noted above we do not find it a fit case to provide for permanent alimony. The daughter born to the parties has attained the age of majority.

Arti Tiwari Vs Sanjay Kumar Tiwari on 04 Sep 2024

Rajib Kumar Roy Vs Sushmita Saha on 21 Aug 2023

Posted on December 20, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court terminated a dead marriage u/A 142 of Constitution of India and said as follows,

From Para 5,

…
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Continued bitterness, dead emotions and long separation, in the given facts and circumstances of a case, can be construed as a case of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage”, which is also a facet of “cruelty”. In Rakesh Raman v. Kavita reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 497, this is precisely what was held, that though in a given case cruelty as a fault, may not be attributable to one party alone and hence despite irretrievable breakdown of marriage keeping the parties together amounts to cruelty on both sides. Which is precisely the case at hand.
Whatever may be the justification for the two living separately, with so much of time gone by, any marital love or affection, which may have been between the parties, seems to have dried up. This is a classic case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. In view of the Constitution Bench Judgment of this court in Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 544 which has held that in such cases where there is irretrievable breakdown of marriage then dissolution of marriage is the only solution and this Court can grant a decree of divorce in exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

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Tag: Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage

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