RS Tamilvendan Vs The Secretary and Ors on 21 May 2026

A division bench of Madras High Court held as follows,

From Para 5,

5. None can deny there is corruption in the Judiciary. There were and are corrupt Judges. While addressing a legal conference in Kollam, Kerala, former CJI Bharucha implied that 20 per cent of the Judges in this country were corrupt. The startling statement made by the Bhushans (father and son duo) is still in public memory. We would not go that far. We refuse to even endorse such sweeping statements. But, we do know and have come across instances of judicial corruption. The Full Court of the Madras High Court regularly shows the exit door to such black sheep. The Supreme Court acknowledged in High Court of Judicature at Bombay -vs- V.Shirish Kumar Rangrao Patil (1997) 6 SCC 339 that the cancerous cells of corruption constantly keep creeping into the vital veins of the judiciary. It was also observed that the need to stem it out by judicial surgery lies on the judiciary itself by its self imposed or corrective measures or disciplinary action under Article 235 of the Constitution. Corruption in Judiciary cannot be committed without some members of the Bar becoming privy to the corrupt. The vigilant watch by the High Court is the sustaining stream to catch the corrupt and to deal with the situation appropriately.

From Para 15,

15. Judges need not be treated as holy cows. Justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken comments of ordinary men (Lord Atkin). But the lack of respect in the movie dialogues would not make any difference to us. In Sheela Barse -vs- Union of India (1988) 4 SCC 226, it was observed that criticism of judicial functioning is a healthy aid for introspection and improvement and that it is the privileged right of the Indian citizens to believe what he considers to be true and to speak out his mind, though not, perhaps, with the best of tastes; and speak perhaps, with greater courage than care for exactitude. Judiciary is not exempt from criticism. Judicial institutions are, and should be made of stronger stuff. Debates of public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open. It may well include vehement, sarcastic and sometimes unpleasant sharp criticism of Government and public officials (D.C.Saxena -vs- Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, 1996 (5) SCC 216). We would add by including Courts and Judges also. Judges are not above criticism. In Foundation Inc -vs- ANI Media (P) Ltd (2025) 10 SCC 353, it was suggested that Courts should welcome debates and constructive criticism.

RS Tamilvendan Vs The Secretary and Ors on 21 May 2026

Vijay R. Nair Vs Lijitha on 12 Jun 2026

Posted on June 24 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Kerala High Court held that since the wife contracted a second marriage, the issue of permanent alimony requires fresh adjudication. Phew… 20 Lakhs is a big amount. Hopefully saved.

From Para 11,

11. On the issue of award of permanent alimony of Rs.20,00,000/- to be respondent, we find, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, that the finding of the court below was rendered in the absence of any evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant. While under normal circumstance, this Court would have been loathe to accept the request of the appellant for a remand of this issue to the court below for fresh adjudication, we find that, in the light of the changed circumstances where the respondent has contracted a second marriage during the pendency of this appeal, the issue of entitlement of the respondent to permanent alimony and the quantification thereof, would have to be necessarily gone into by the court below as and when an application under Section 25(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act is preferred before it by the appellant. That being the case, we deem it appropriate to set aside the judgment and decree of the court below, to the extent it awards permanent alimony of Rs.20,00,000/- to the respondent, and remit the matter to the court below for a fresh adjudication on the said issue after affording the parties an opportunity to lead evidence before it. While doing so, we would also request the Court below to complete the fresh adjudication on this issue within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment.

Vijay R. Nair Vs Lijitha on 12 Jun 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Divorce Judgements is here.

Pavul Yesu Dhasan Vs Registrar SHRC of TN and Ors on 30 Apr 2025

Posted on June 18 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that there was a violation of human rights on the part of the Police Inspector, who failed to register FIR and abused the mother of the complainant.

From Para 6,

6. The facts of this case, to say the least, are shocking. The third respondent visited the Police Station for lodging a complaint along with his parents. The complaint was handed over to a Sub-Inspector of Police who stated that since the transaction has taken place at three different places, he cannot accept the same and he could receive the same only after the Inspector of Police looks at it. He stated that the Inspector was not likely to come to the Police Station on that day. Therefore, he gave a cell phone number of the Inspector to the respondent. The third respondent’s mother on the same day tried to contact the present appellant who was the Inspector of Police. After talking to the third respondent’s mother, the appellant cut off the phone call. Therefore, as per the instructions received, the third respondent with his parents again visited the Police Station at 5.00 p.m. They were asked to wait till arrival of the appellant who was the Inspector of Police. Ultimately, he arrived at 8.30 p.m. Very objectionable language was used by the appellant while talking to the third respondent’s mother which is noted in paragraph (4) of the impugned judgment of the State Human Rights Commission.
7. All that the third respondent wanted is registration of FIR based on his complaint. Though law is well settled, the Sub-Inspector did not register the crime. The appellant being a senior officer ought to have immediately registered the FIR. However, not only he refused to do it but used very objectionable language, while talking to the third respondent’s mother.

Pavul Yesu Dhasan Vs Registrar SHRC of TN and Ors on 30 Apr 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

The impugned Order of the Madras High Court is here.

Pavul Yesu Dhasan Vs Registrar SHRC of TN and Ors on 17 Aug 2022

Manoj Kumar Vs Nita Bharti on 17 Mar 2026

Posted on June 17 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Patna High Court, used “Doctrine of frustration” in addition to Cruelty to dissolve a marriage registered under the Special Marriage Act, 1954.

From Paras 39,

39. But, at same time, we are also mindful of the legal position that we cannot exercise power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India for complete justice.
40. At this juncture, our judicial consciousness poses a question to us: being a constitutional court “are we helpless?”. This is particularly so, when we are convinced that respondent/applicant cannot perform her marital obligation with appellant due to the aforesaid compelling circumstances.
41. Hence, this is an occasion to view the present episode in a more progressive manner by importing the “Doctrine of frustration”.
42. As a Constitutional Court it is of paramount importance to touch upon all the possible scenarios, which can result in delivery of justice. Solemnization of marriage is a pious concept which does not only involve a husband and wife but society at large. And keeping in view the best interest of the parties, best possible way to deliver justice should be adopted. The court highlights that “Justice should not only be done, but must also be seen to be done”. Going with the essence of above mentioned phrase, the court will fail in its duty, if it will not discuss the prospective probabilities which can ensure the just, reasonable and conscious delivery of justice.
43. The Indian Jurisprudence suggests that “Procedural law is the handmaid of Justice and not its mistress”, which enables the court to adopt flexible approach rather than taking a rigid view of the prescribed law.
44. At the outset, it is not in dispute that the marriage between the parties was solemnized in accordance with law under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and continued for a certain period, thereby creating a legally valid and subsisting matrimonial bond. The statutory presumption attached to such marriage stands fortified by the mandate of Section 13(2) of the Act, which accords conclusiveness to the certificate of marriage.
45. It must be acknowledged that though marriage is not a commercial contract, it undeniably embodies a bundle of reciprocal obligations—cohabitation, fidelity, companionship, emotional support, and exclusivity. Where these foundational obligations stand extinguished not by mere estrangement but by subsequent conduct that legally and morally negates the marital bond, the continuance of marriage becomes impossible in substance. In such circumstances, the Court cannot remain bound by the mere form of the relationship when its essence has ceased to exist.

From Para 46,

46. …. The doctrine of frustration, embodied in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, is founded on the principle that law does not compel performance of that which has become impossible. When applied in the matrimonial context, particularly to civil marriages under the Special Marriage Act, this principle manifests in situations where the foundation of marriage— cohabitation, consortium, mutual obligations—stands irretrievably destroyed.
47. The doctrine of frustration, as evolved in contract law, operates where an unforeseen event renders the performance of obligations impossible or destroys the very foundation upon which the relationship rests. Transposed into matrimonial jurisprudence, the doctrine applies where the substratum of marriage—mutual trust, exclusivity, and consortium—is irreversibly destroyed, leaving no scope for restoration. The law, in such a situation, must recognize reality over fiction.
48. The present case transcends the conventional doctrine of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. Irretrievable breakdown of marriage contemplates a situation where the marriage has failed due to prolonged separation, incompatibility, or absence of cohabitation. It is not merely a case where the
marriage has failed due to incompatibility or prolonged separation; rather, it is one where subsequent events—most notably the lawful remarriage of the respondent-wife and the birth of a child—have rendered the performance of marital obligations wholly impossible. The doctrine of frustration, as invoked herein, goes a step further—it applies where the very performance of marital obligations has become impossible due to supervening circumstances. The impossibility herein operates at multiple levels—moral, practical, and legal—thereby justifying the application of a doctrine analogous to frustration in order to recognize reality over legal fiction.

From Para 54,

54. While it is true that the doctrine of frustration, in its strict contractual sense, is not directly applicable to matrimonial law, the underlying principle—that a relationship rendered incapable of performance by supervening circumstances ought not to be artificially preserved—can be judiciously invoked. Constitutional courts are empowered to adopt Purposive Interpretation to advance justice and to put an end to litigation. The Rule of interpretation suggests that Constitutional Courts must be at work to fulfill the legislative intent. Marriage, though not a commercial contract, embodies reciprocal and enforceable obligations such as cohabitation, fidelity, companionship, and exclusivity. Where these essential obligations stand extinguished, not merely by estrangement but by subsequent conduct that negates the very foundation of the marriage, the continuance of such a bond becomes impossible in substance.

From Para 57,

57. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present case represents a rare but compelling situation where the doctrine of frustration must be invoked in matrimonial law.
58. The marriage, though validly solemnized, has lost its essential character due to subsequent events that render its continuation impossible. The legal bond survives only as a shell, devoid of substance, purpose, or enforceability. To compel parties to remain in such a relationship would amount to enforcing a legal fiction at the cost of justice. The law cannot insist upon the preservation of a bond that has ceased to exist in every meaningful sense.
59. Therefore, in order to do complete justice, to uphold the dignity of the parties, to secure the welfare of the child, and to serve the broader interests of society, this Court finds it appropriate to dissolve the marriage by applying the doctrine of frustration, treating the matrimonial bond as having become incapable of performance.
60. Accordingly, marriage of OP/appellant namely, Manoj Kumar @ Munna stands dissolved with respondent/applicant namely, Nita Bharti.

From Para 74 (Concurring Opinion)

74. Thus, “Doctrine of frustration” which has been introduced by my esteemed brother as a ground of divorce is supplemented by me holding inter alia that continuous uninterrupted, prolonged separation by and between the parties had caused deep frustration in the core of their heart, such frustration caused by the other spouse is a form of cruelty within the meaning of Section 27 (1) (d) of Special Marriage Act.

Manoj Kumar Vs Nita Bharti on 17 Mar 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Divorce Judgments is here.

Parvinder Singh Khurana Vs Enforcement of Directorate on 19 May 2026

Posted on May 26 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that an accused must be given an opportunity of hearing under the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS, even where the prosecution complaint was filed before July 1, 2024. The Court clarified that non-compliance with this requirement makes the cognizance order void ab initio.

From Para 27,

27. Though Chapter XVI of the BNSS lays down the procedural law dealing with complaints made to a Magistrate, we hold that the aforesaid proviso is substantive in nature, as it does not merely regulate the manner in which the proceedings are to be conducted, rather it confers a right upon the accused to be heard before taking cognizance which forms a part of the right of an accused to a fair trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950. We further hold that the word “shall” occurring in the said proviso has to be construed to be mandatory in nature, which enures to the benefit of an accused. Resultantly, cognizance of an offence taken by a Court without due compliance of the aforestated proviso would be void ab initio.

The Bench observed that the proviso grants a substantive right to the accused and is part of the guarantee of fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. It further held that the word “shall” in the proviso is mandatory in nature.

From Para 29,

29. A substantive right conferred under the BNSS would definitely enure to the benefit of an accused against whom none of the proceedings envisaged under Section 531(2)(a) of the BNSS has been initiated. One has to see the nature of right. It is not a case of either a retrospective or retroactive application, rather it is a prospective one when a better right has been conferred under the BNSS.

The Court also ruled that ministerial acts like numbering a complaint and posting it for cognizance do not amount to an “inquiry” under Section 2(1)(k) BNSS.

From Para 34,

34. A mere ministerial act cannot be termed as an “inquiry” under Section 2(1)(k) of the BNSS. Taking cognizance is nothing but an application of judicial mind. So long as the application of the judicial mind is not exercised, an inquiry cannot commence. It is the judicial notice of an offence by the Court which is relevant. While doing so, it is presumed that the Court would take note of the complaint along with the materials placed before it.

From Para 36,

36. As rightly held by this Court in Hardeep Singh (supra), even the stage of ensuring compliance with Sections 207 to 209 of the CrPC, 1973 cannot be termed as an inquiry because there is no application of judicial mind. In the facts of the instant case, the direction issued by the Special Court, vide order dated 24.06.2024, to number the complaint and, thereafter, post the matter on a future date for hearing on cognizance would certainly not come within the purview of an “inquiry” under Section 2(1)(k) of the BNSS. In such view of the matter, the aforestated contention raised by the learned ASG falls to the ground.

Parvinder Singh Vs Enforcement of Directorate on 19 May 2026

Citations: [2026 INSC 519]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/46844204/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6a0efbcf3da19f224cfa1ec5

https://www.verdictum.in/supreme-court/parvinder-singh-v-directorate-of-enforcement-2026-insc-519-pmla-complaints-filed-before-bnss-1614403

https://thelexpedia.com/judgements/parvinder-singh-v-directorate-of-enforcement-2026

Cognisance of Complaint under PMLA

Dr. Garima Dubey and Ors Vs Dr. Saurabh Anand Dubey on 21 Apr 2026 – Judgement Summary

Posted on April 30 by Suprajaa Rajan

In Dr. Garima Dubey & Ors. v. Dr. Saurabh Anand Dubey, the Allahabad High Court addressed whether a highly qualified spouse can claim interim maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) despite having the capacity to earn.

The case arose from a matrimonial dispute where the husband, a neurosurgeon, filed for divorce, and the wife, a qualified gynaecologist (M.D.), sought maintenance for herself and her children under Sections 24 and 26 HMA. While the trial court granted ₹60,000 per month for the children under Section 26, it denied maintenance to the wife under Section 24.

Challenging this partial rejection, the wife approached the High Court, claiming unemployment and entitlement to maintain the same standard of living. The Court, however, emphasised that earning capacity and qualifications cannot be ignored, particularly where evidence shows substantial prior income.

The Court ultimately upheld the trial court’s decision, reiterating that maintenance is not meant to support voluntary unemployment.

“5. Undisputedly, the appellant is a trained Gynecologist being a Post- Graduate possessing a degree in M.D. (Gynecology)…..”

“6. Where a qualified person is capable of earning more than enough through the use of her expertise and still refrains from doing so only to impose a burden upon her husband, in such a situation the Courts can deny maintenance under Section 24. Therefore, having gone through the order passed by the learned trial court where the application under Section 24 was rejected where the learned trial court has held that the appellant was earning handsomely based upon her ITRs which reflected that she was earning more than Rs.31 lakhs per annum.”

“7. Under the circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order cannot be faulted.”

Decision

The Allahabad High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the trial court’s order, holding that:

The wife, being a highly qualified medical professional, possesses sufficient earning capacity.
Voluntary unemployment cannot be a ground to claim maintenance under Section 24 HMA.
Documentary evidence (ITRs) demonstrated that the wife had substantial prior earnings, weakening her claim of financial dependency.
Maintenance granted to the children under Section 26 HMA was appropriate and continues at ₹60,000 per month.

The Court concluded that the trial court’s decision was legally sound and required no interference.

Garima Dubey and Ors Vs Saurabh Anand Dubey on 21 Apr 2026

Citation : 2026:AHC:88382-DB

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance Judgments under Hindu Marriage Act is here.

Key Contributor :
Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.
+91-9606345150

Sivaraman Nair and Ors Vs State of Kerala and Anr on 24 Apr 2026 – Judgement Summary

Posted on April 29 by Suprajaa Rajan

In Sivaraman Nair & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., the Supreme Court examined whether criminal proceedings for offences under Sections 498A, 494 read with 34 IPC (now corresponding provisions under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)) could be sustained against the husband’s relatives in the absence of specific allegations.

The case arose from an FIR alleging dowry harassment, cruelty, and bigamy. While detailed accusations were made against the husband, the allegations against the in-laws were largely general, vague, and based on their familial relationship.

The accused-appellants approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS) seeking quashing of proceedings, but the High Court refused. On appeal, the Supreme Court re-evaluated whether the continuation of proceedings amounted to abuse of process of law.

The Court ultimately held that mere presence, passive knowledge, or general allegations are insufficient to prosecute relatives in matrimonial disputes. Consequently, it quashed proceedings against the in-laws while allowing the case against the husband to continue.

“21. That the inherent powers of the Court under section 482 CrPC are to be exercised ‘to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”
“24. The FIR does not attribute to them any specific act of demand, threat, or physical assault on any identifiable occasion.”
“25. Accused-appellant no. 3, the sister-in-law, is alleged to have received money for the purchase of a flat from the proceeds of the sale of gold, but no specific act of cruelty or coercion on her part has been alleged.”
“26….the complainant is required to prima facie prove the overt act or omission of the accused persons in the second marriage ceremony. The prosecution has failed to provide any cogent evidence to establish such overt act or intention on part of the accused-appellants.”
“27. However, such inferential knowledge, without more, is insufficient to satisfy the threshold established in S. Nitheen (supra), which requires evidence of an overt act or omission. While it has been alleged that the accused-appellants were aware of the second marriage, mere knowledge that an act is being or has been committed by another person does not, by itself, establish the requisite common intention.”

Decision

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held that:

Proceedings against the in-laws lacked specific, credible allegations necessary to constitute offences under Sections 498A and 494 IPC (read with Section 34 IPC) [BNS equivalents].
The continuation of such proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS).
Mere familial relationship, presence, or passive knowledge does not establish criminal liability.
No material existed to show active participation in the alleged second marriage, a requirement for Section 494 IPC.

Accordingly, the Court quashed the criminal proceedings qua the accused-appellants (in-laws) while leaving the case against the husband unaffected.

Sivaraman Nair and Ors Vs State of Kerala and Anr on 24 Apr 2026

Citation : 2026 INSC 412

Other Sources :

Index of Quash judgements is here.

Related Legal Concepts

Explore related remedies and procedural safeguards in criminal law:

Abuse of Process of Law
First Information Report (FIR)
Quashing of FIR
Inherent Powers of High Court

Key Contributor :
Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.
+91-9606345150

Dr.Sushil Kumar Purbey and Anr Vs The State of Bihar and Ors on 9 Mar 2026 – Judgement Summary

Posted on April 9 by Suprajaa Rajan

In Dr. Sushil Kumar Purbey & Anr. vs State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), the Supreme Court addressed the issue of parity in quashing criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC [Section 528 BNSS] in matrimonial disputes.

The case arose from a dowry harassment FIR filed by the complainant against her husband and his family members. While the High Court quashed proceedings against the sister-in-law on the ground of vague and omnibus allegations, it declined similar relief to the parents-in-law.

Aggrieved by this differential treatment, the appellants approached the Supreme Court. The Court, upon examining the FIR, held that:

The allegations against all accused were identical in nature.
No specific role or overt act was attributed to the parents-in-law.
Differential treatment by the High Court was unsustainable in law.

Consequently, the Court extended the benefit of quashing to the parents-in-law as well, reiterating that criminal law cannot be invoked on the basis of generalised allegations.

“7. A comparative reading of the FIR reveals that the allegations levelled against the sister-in-law and those against the present appellants are, in all material particulars, identical.”
“7. The lone allegation that stands separately against the present appellants is that they would quarrel. This, however, does not constitute a criminal offence and cannot, by itself, sustain cognizance of the offences.”
“8. The criminal complaint against the appellants was, however, lodged only in March 2022, nearly a year after the filing of the divorce petition. Though this delay, standing alone, would not constitute a sufficient ground for quashing the criminal proceedings against the appellants. However, viewed in conjunction with the absence of any specific allegations attributable to them, the delay lends credence to the submission that the criminal complaint against the in-laws may have been instituted by way of a counter-blast to the divorce proceedings initiated by the husband.”
“10. In view of the foregoing, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court erred in applying different standards to persons who stand on an identical footing insofar as the nature of the allegations against them is concerned.”

Decision

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s order to the extent it denied relief to the parents-in-law. It held that identical allegations must be treated uniformly, and differential treatment is legally unsustainable.
The Court emphasized that vague and omnibus allegations without specific roles cannot sustain criminal prosecution. It further noted that the delay in filing the FIR, coupled with absence of specific allegations, supported the inference of misuse.
Accordingly, exercising its powers under Section 482 CrPC [Section 528 BNSS], the Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellants.
However, the Court clarified that proceedings against the husband would continue independently in accordance with law.

Dr.Sushil Kumar Purbey and Anr Vs The State of Bihar and Ors on 9 Mar 2026

Citation : 2026 INSC 212

Other Sources :

Index of Quash judgements is here.

Related Legal Concepts

Inherent powers of High Court
Quashing of FIR
Delay in FIR
Omnibus Allegations in matrimonial cases
Abuse of Process of Law

Key Contributor :
Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.
+91-9606345150

Charul Shukla Vs State of UP and Ors on 25 Mar 2026 – Judgment Summary

Posted on April 5 by Suprajaa Rajan

In Charul Shukla vs State of U.P. & Others (2026), the Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court’s refusal to quash criminal proceedings against the complainant’s sister-in-law and parents-in-law. The case alleged offences under Sections 498A, 323, 354 IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

The Court carefully examined whether the allegations—filed after a delay of over six years—were supported by material evidence. It found that the accusations were largely vague, omnibus, and unsubstantiated, particularly against relatives who were either living separately or were senior citizens.

“21. At the same time, the said allegations also have to be juxtaposed with the fact that the complaint was registered by the complainant only on 15.11.2023 i.e. after a delay of more than six years and seven months from the alleged dowry demand. The prosecution has failed to put forth any sufficient cause for such delay and this casts aspersions on their story. At this juncture, we find it apposite to underline the importance of taking an early recourse to pursue and prosecute criminal complaints.”
“22. Time and again, this Court has observed that merely stating certain vague and omnibus allegations without any cogent material evidence to support the same should not become a fillip to jump-start the criminal machinery of the State.”
“23. Upon bare perusal of the Chargesheet No.01/2024 and the medical examination report annexed thereto, no offence under Section 313 of IPC has been made out. The attached medical examination report fails to ascribe or delineate any particular injury that relates to or supports the claim of the complainant either. We must hasten to add that upon completion of the investigation, the investigating officer also deemed it fit to drop the charges under Section 313 of IPC against the accused/appellants.”
“24. It would not be out of place to mention that the delay of almost seven years between the alleged incident and lodgment of the FIR has not been explained sufficiently by the complainant.”
“25. It is merely stated that the father- in-law held her hands and tried to commit obscene acts with her. The complainant has failed to elaborate upon said ‘obscene acts’ allegedly committed by him. It is trite that the FIR cannot be an encyclopaedia of the events but even upon the perusal of the chargesheet as presented by the investigation officer, the counsel for prosecution/State has not been able to substantiate or discern any substantive material in support of the allegation under Section 354 of IPC. At this juncture, it would not be out of place to mention that the complainant herself has failed to enter appearance in the present proceedings despite service of notice upon her. The said non-appearance, despite the service of notice being complete upon her, inevitably draws our attention towards an adverse inference that the complainant herself is indifferent and uninterested in contesting the said appeals.”

Decision

Importantly, the Court emphasized that:

Mere allegations without supporting evidence cannot justify criminal prosecution.
Delay in lodging FIR, especially in matrimonial disputes, must be satisfactorily explained.
Courts must guard against misuse of criminal law to harass family members.

Applying the principles laid down in Bhajan Lal, the Court concluded that continuing the proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law and quashed the FIR and all consequential proceedings against the appellants.

Charul Shukla Vs State of UP and Ors on 25 Mar 2026

Citation : 2026 INSC 297

Other Sources :

Index of Quash Judgements is here.

Related Legal Concepts

Explore the relevant concepts;

Abuse of process of Law
Cruelty under IPC
Cognizable and Non-cognizable offences
Quashing of Fir

Key Contributor :
Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.
+91-9606345150

Anju Garg and Anr Vs Deepak Kumar Garg on 28 Sep 2022 – Judgement Summary

Posted on April 4 by Suprajaa Rajan

In Anju Garg and Anr Vs Deepak Kumar Garg, the Supreme Court of India examined whether a wife is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC (now Section 144 BNSS) despite adverse findings by lower courts.

The appellants (wife and son) challenged the denial of maintenance to the wife by the Family Court and the High Court. The Court observed that the husband not only neglected his duty but also made baseless allegations regarding the wife’s character, which justified her living separately.

Moreover, the Court emphasised that maintenance provisions serve a social justice function. Therefore, once neglect and inability to maintain oneself are established, courts must grant relief.

Accordingly, the Court set aside the erroneous findings of lower courts and granted maintenance to the wife.

“9. Section 125 of Cr.P.C. was conceived to ameliorate the agony, anguish and financial suffering of a woman who is required to leave the matrimonial home, so that some suitable arrangements could be made to enable her to sustain herself and the children.”
“10. It is the sacrosanct duty of the husband to provide financial support to the wife and to the minor children. The husband is required to earn money even by physical labour, if he is an able-bodied, and could not avoid his obligation, except on the legally permissible grounds mentioned in the statute.”
“11. She had clearly stated as to how she was harassed and subjected to cruelty by the respondent, which had constrained her to leave the matrimonial home along with her children, and as to how the respondent had failed and neglected to maintain her and her children. She had also proved by producing the documentary evidence that her father had paid money to the respondent from time to time to help the respondent for his business. Even if the allegations of demand of dowry by the respondent were not believed, there was enough evidence to believe that money was being paid to the respondent by the father of the appellant-wife, which substantiated her allegation that the respondent was demanding money from her father and was subjecting her to harassment.”
“13. The respondent being an able- bodied, he is obliged to earn by legitimate means and maintain his wife and the minor child. Having regard to the evidence of the appellant-wife before the Family Court, and having regard to the other evidence on record, the Court has no hesitation in holding that though the respondent had sufficient source of income and was able-bodied, had failed and neglected to maintain the appellants.”

Decision

The Supreme Court of India allowed the appeal and held that the wife was entitled to maintenance.

Accordingly:

The Court awarded ₹10,000 per month as maintenance to the wife.
This amount was in addition to ₹6,000 per month already granted to the son.
The maintenance was made payable from the date of filing of the petition.
The Court also directed the husband to clear arrears within 8 weeks.

Thus, the Court corrected the perverse findings of the Family Court and High Court and reinforced the protective intent of maintenance law.

Anju Garg and Anr Vs Deepak Kumar Garg on 28 Sep 2022

Citation :

Other Sources :

Index of Maintenance Judgements under Sec 125 CrPC is here.

Related Legal Concepts

Explore related stages and concepts in criminal procedure:

Maintenance under Section 125 CrPC (Section 144 BNSS)
Social Justice Jurisprudence in Family Law
Cruelty as Ground for Separate Residence
Burden of Proof in Maintenance Cases
Obligation of Able-Bodied Husband to Maintain Wife

Key Contributor :

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision

RS Tamilvendan Vs The Secretary and Ors on 21 May 2026

Vijay R. Nair Vs Lijitha on 12 Jun 2026

Pavul Yesu Dhasan Vs Registrar SHRC of TN and Ors on 30 Apr 2025

Manoj Kumar Vs Nita Bharti on 17 Mar 2026

Parvinder Singh Khurana Vs Enforcement of Directorate on 19 May 2026

Dr. Garima Dubey and Ors Vs Dr. Saurabh Anand Dubey on 21 Apr 2026 – Judgement Summary

Decision

Sivaraman Nair and Ors Vs State of Kerala and Anr on 24 Apr 2026 – Judgement Summary

Decision

Related Legal Concepts

Dr.Sushil Kumar Purbey and Anr Vs The State of Bihar and Ors on 9 Mar 2026 – Judgement Summary

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