Sanjay Kumar Shaw Vs Anjali Kumari Shaw on 07 Apr 2025

Posted on April 18 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Patna High Court held as follows,

From Para 13,

13. It appears from the petition that application for divorce has been filed by the appellant under Section 13 (1) (ia) & (ib) of the Act i.e. on the ground of cruelty and desertion. However, the main ground taken for divorce is that respondent-wife is suffering from mental disease or disorder
(schizophrenia) and permanent disability in her leg and due to her abnormal behavior the appellant-husband do not like to continue the matrimonial life with respondent. The learned Trial Court in para 12 of the impugned Judgment considered this aspect and held that appellant has failed to prove that respondent is suffering from the schizophrenia disease and her leg disability. From perusal of the record the question which this court has to decide is whether the respondent is suffering from schizophrenia or other mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the appellant cannot reasonably be expected to live with respondent-wife or not?

From Para 14,

14. Taking note of the evidence adduced by the appellant, it is clear that he has not proved the mental disease or disorder of the respondent-wife, as the doctor who is treating the respondent-wife has not been examined. The grounds claimed by the appellant-husband are that the respondent-wife is of unsound mind, aggressive and has deserted the appellant have not been proved from the material available on the record.

From Paras 20 and 21,

20. In view of the above pronouncement, it appears that the ground of a spouse suffering from schizophrenia, by itself is not sufficient for grant of divorce under Section 13 (1) (iii) of the Act as it may involve various degree of mental illness. The law provides that a spouse in order to prove a ground of divorce on the ground of mental illness, ought to prove that the spouse is suffering from a serious case of schizophrenia which must also be supported by medical reports and proved by cogent evidence before the Court that disease is of such a kind and degree that husband cannot reasonably be expected to live with wife.
21. Section 13(1)(iii) of the Act does not make mere existence of a mental disorder of any degree sufficient in law to justify dissolution of marriage. The contents in which the ideas of unsoundness of mind and mental disorder occur in section as ground for dissolution of a marriage, require assessment of degree of mental disorder and its degree must be such that spouse seeking relief cannot reasonable be expected to live with the other. All mental abnormalities are not recognized as grounds for grant of decree. The burden of proof of existence of requisite degree of mental disorder is on the spouse who bases his or her claim on such a medical condition.

Sanjay Kumar Shaw Vs Anjali Kumari Shaw on 07 Apr 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/146315829/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67f4c506bdfd43233228ae45

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/patna-high-court/patna-high-court-wife-mental-disorder-divorce-schizophrenia-hindu-marriage-act-289016

https://www.indialaw.in/blog/civil/divorce-hc-schizophrenia-isnt-enough/

https://lawtrend.in/schizophrenia-allegation-alone-not-ground-for-divorce-without-proof-of-severity-affecting-marital-life-patna-high-court/

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/patna-high-court/a-v-b-miscellaneous-appeal-no1152-of-2018-spouse-relief-mental-disorder-divorce-1573858

Mental Disorder Must Be Proven to Be of Severe Degree to Justify Divorce Under Hindu Marriage Act, Rules Patna High Court

Index of Divorce Judgments is here.

Analysis by Adv Talari Rajeswari

Kiran Jyot Maini Vs Anish Pramod Patel on 15 Jul 2024

Posted on April 5 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed this decision. Not sure, why this is a reportable judgment!

Kiran Jyot Maini Vs Anish Pramod Patel on 15 Jul 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/669778a11312582eb2f9e52c

Index of Maintenance Judgments under DV Act is here. Divorce Judgments here. DV Judgements here.

Sunita Kachwaha and Ors Vs Anil Kuchwaha on 28 Oct 2014

Posted on April 5 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From para 9,

9. Inability to maintain herself is the precondition for grant of maintenance to the wife. The wife must positively aver and prove that she is unable to maintain herself, in addition to the fact that her husband has sufficient means to maintain her and that he has neglected to maintain her. In her evidence, the appellant wife has stated that only due to help of her retired parents and brothers, she is able to maintain herself and her daughters. Where the wife states that she has great hardships in maintaining herself and the daughters, while her husband’s economic condition is quite good, the wife would be entitled to maintenance.

Sunita Kachwaha and Ors Vs Anil Kuchwaha on 28 Oct 2014

Citations: [AIR 2015 SUPREME COURT 554]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/3786357/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af48e4b01497114160aa

Index of Maintenance Judgments under 144 BNSS is here.

Mudireddy Divya Vs Sulkti Sivarama Reddy on 26 Mar 2025

Posted on April 2 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Telangana High Court held as follows,

On Limitation,

22. Moreover, it is a settled rule of construction that every effort should be made to iron the creases out in two conflicting enactments and the more liberal enactment should be adopted for resolving the conflict. Both the 1955 Act and the 1984 Act are special statutes designed to ensure efficient resolution of conflicts within the family without subjecting the parties to further procedural hiccups. We also take recourse to the principle of law that when two interpretations are found to be equally possible, the Court may reasonably accept that the Legislature intended to prescribe a larger period of limitation: Shivram Dodanna Shetty Vs. Sharmila Shivram Shetty2, Sonia Kunwar Singh Bedi Vs. Kunwar Singh Bedi3 and Chaudary Chetnaben Dilipbhai Vs. Chaudary Dilipbhai Lavjibhai4.

On Evidence for Divorce in first Marriage,

28. Admittedly, the respondent in the present case did not lead any evidence of the customary divorce between the respondent and his first wife. The impugned order dated 19.11.2024 reflects that despite conditional orders, the respondent neither appeared nor filed his evidence. This means that the respondent declined to lead evidence to prove customary divorce from his first wife or otherwise. Apart from a mere pleading that the respondent obtained divorce through customary practice, no other evidence of the existence of such a customary practice or a document showing that the divorce was indeed obtained through such a customary practice was produced by the respondent.

On impleadment of a co-respondent,

46. Further, Rule 8(3), which requires addition of a co-respondent in a petition under section 11 of the 1955 Act i.e., void marriages, cannot be equated to Rule 8(1) as the issue of whether the marriage is void is essentially a question of law rather than a question of fact. The presence or absence of a co-respondent, viewed from this angle, cannot be fatal to the outcome of the case.

51. We have considered the relevant Rules regulating the proceedings initiated under the 1955 Act and the decisions placed on the point of impleadment of a co-respondent in specific cases. We accept the contentions made on behalf of the appellant in favour of giving a comprehensive construction to the Rule. We are of the view that the presence of the respondent’s first wife as a co-respondent to the lis before us is not necessary since this is not a case where the respondent’s first wife would be required to be heard for preserving the principles of natural justice. This is also not a case where the adjudication would entail questions regarding her character, integrity or reputation. We must also take a practical view of the situation, since admittedly, the respondent’s first wife has been in a state of coma for a while.
52. The requirement of impleading the respondent’s first wife is hence dispensed with under an extended meaning given to the proviso to Rule 8(1) of the 1955 Rules. In other words, we do not find non-impleadment of the respondent’s first wife to be fatal to the petition under sections 11, 5 and 25 of the 1955 Act or in the Appeal before us.

On Desertion,

60. Moreover, the respondent has remained unrepresented in the present Appeal and the whereabouts of the respondent is not known to the appellant for over 4 years. As stated above, the notice addressed to the respondent in the present Appeal was returned with an endorsement “no such person in the address”. To put it simply, the respondent has made no effort to contest the Appeal or pursue the proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights filed before the Additional Family Court at Visakhapatnam.

Most importantly, On status of previous marriage,

67. There is a patent contradiction in the findings and reasons given by the Family Court. While the Court denied alimony to the appellant on the basis of the appellant being the second wife, the Court refused to come to any finding with regard to the status of the marriage between the respondent and his first wife. A finding on this was necessary in the context of the appellant’s petition seeking annulment of marriage under section 11 of the Act i.e., on the ground that the respondent had a surviving spouse on the date of his marriage with the appellant. To put it simply, the Trial Court failed to consider that the marriage between the appellant and the respondent, both Hindus, could not have been legally solemnized if the respondent had a spouse living at the time of the marriage.

On Income Affidavits,

69. Another unsubstantiated finding is that the appellant obtained divorce from her first husband with an alimony of Rs.50.00 Lakhs and is now claiming permanent alimony of Rs.1 Crore from the respondent. The Trial Court utterly failed to consider that the respondent was equally accountable to disclose his assets in order to resist the claim of alimony. The impugned order does not disclose any direction on the parties to file their affidavits disclosing their respective assets

Mudireddy Divya Vs Sulkti Sivarama Reddy on 26 Mar 2025

Index of Divorce/Nullity judgments is here.

Arun K.R Vs Arunima T.S on 24 Mar 2025

Posted on April 2 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Kerala High Court held as follows,

From Paras 7-9,

7. In the case at hand, the petitioner is categoric in her version that respondent treated her with cruelty. Unlike physical abuse, which is easier to prove, mental cruelty varies from case to case. When the petitioner/wife says that the respondent/ husband behaved in a manner so as to create an impression in her that she was totally neglected by the respondent, there is no reason for this Court to disbelieve the said version.
8. It is an admitted case that petitioner had earlier filed O.P.No.871/2019 and subsequently she had withdrawn it, since the respondent confided and promised to lead a family life with her. According to her, after withdrawing the said original petition, respondent again started to behave in the same manner as before.
9. The answers given by the respondent during his cross examination regarding his frequent visits to the temple by taking leave from the job fortifies the case of the petitioner that he is more interested in spiritual affairs than the family life.

Arun K.R Vs Arunima T.S on 24 Mar 2025

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

N.Usha Rani and Anr Vs Moodudula Srinivas on 30 Jan 2025

Posted on March 28 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court passed this judgment…

From Para 3, (Madam is very planned: MOU signed with First Husband on 25-Nov-2005; Remarriage with Second Husband on 27-Nov-2005; And someone said our judges are blind-fucks)

3. The facts of the case reveal that Appellant No.1 before this Court – Smt. N. Usha Rani married one Nomula Srinivas on 30.08.1999 at Hyderabad. During the period of their wedlock, she gave birth to a male child, namely, Sai Ganesh on 15.08.2000. The couple lived together until disputes arose between them. Following their return from the United States of America in February 2005, they began living separately. Eventually, on 25.11.2005, a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’) was executed between the couple, dissolving their marriage. Meanwhile, Appellant No. 1 got acquainted with her neighbour,the Respondent, and the couple got married on 27.11.2005.

From Para 10,

10. We have heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. The short question before us is whether a woman is entitled to claim maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC from her second husband while her first marriage is allegedly legally subsisting.

From Paras 17 and 18, (Dripping and Simping Wokeism… Thuuu)

17. This encapsulates the full scope and gravity of considerations before this Court as we deliberate on the issue at hand. The present case does not concern a live-in relationship. The Family Court made a factual finding that Appellant No. 1 married the Respondent and that finding is not disputed by the Respondent. Instead, the Respondent seeks to defeat the right to maintenance by claiming that his marriage to Appellant No. 1 is void ab initio as her first marriage is still subsisting. Two other pertinent facts must be considered: firstly, it is not the case of the Respondent that the truth was concealed from him. In fact, the Family Court makes a specific finding that Respondent was fully aware of the first marriage of the Appellant No. 1. Therefore, Respondent knowingly entered into a marriage with Appellant No. 1 not once, but twice. Secondly, Appellant No. 1 places before this Court an MoU of separation with her first husband. While this is not a legal decree of divorce, it also emerges from this document and other evidence that the parties have dissolved their ties, they have been living separately and Appellant No. 1 is not deriving maintenance from her first husband. Therefore, barring the absence of a legal decree, Appellant No. 1 is de facto separated from her first husband and is not deriving any rights and entitlements as a consequence of that marriage.
18. In the opinion of this Court, when the social justice objective of maintenance u/s. 125CrPC is considered against the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot, in good conscience, deny maintenance to Appellant No. 1. It is settled law that social welfare provisions must be subjected to an expansive and beneficial construction and this understanding has been extended to maintenance since Ramesh Chander (supra). An alternate interpretation would not only explicitly defeat the purpose of the provision by permitting vagrancy and destitution, but would also give legal sanction to the actions of the Respondent in knowingly entering into a marriage with Appellant No.1, availing its privileges but escaping its consequent duties and obligations. The only conceivable mischief that could arise in permitting a beneficial interpretation is that the Appellant No.1 could claim dual maintenance–however, that is not the case under the present facts. We are aware that this Court has previously denied maintenance in cases of subsisting marriages (See Yamunabai (supra) and Bakulabai (supra)). However, a plea of separation from the first marriage was not made in those cases and hence, they are factually distinguishable. It must be borne in mind that the right to maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC is not a benefit received by a wife but rather a legal and moral duty owed by the husband.

N.Usha Rani and Anr Vs Moodudula Srinivas on 30 Jan 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 129]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/56187356/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67a987a7c254af19d96c5a16

Index of Maintenance Judgements is here.

Chand Dhawan Vs Jawaharlal Dhawan on 11 Jun 1993

Posted on March 23 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court passed this landmark judgment, holding that alimony u/s 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act can be sought only when any decree is passed under sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

On the other hand, under the Hindu Marriage Act, in contrast, her claim for maintenance pendente lite is durated on the pendency of a litigation of the kind envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and her claim to permanent maintenance or alimony is based on the supposition that either her marital status has been strained or affected by passing a decree for restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation in favour or against her, or her marriage stands dissolved by a decree of nullity or divorce, with or without her consent. Thus when her marital status is to be affected or disrupted the court does so by passing a decree for or against her. On or at the time of the happening of that event, the court being siezen of the matter, invokes its ancilliary or incidental power to grant permanent alimony. Not only that, the court retains the jurisdiction at subsequent stages to fulfil this incidental or ancilliary obligation when moved by an application on that behalf by a party entitled to relief. The court further retains the power to chance or alter the order in view of the changed circumstances. Thus the whole exercise is within the gammit of a diseased of a broken marriage. And in order to avoid conflict of perceptions the legislature while codifying the Hindu Marriage Act preserved the right of permanent maintenance in favour of the husband or the wife, as the case may be, dependent on the court passing a decree of the kind as envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Act. In other words without the marital status being affected or disrupted by the matrimonial court under the Hindu Marriage Act the claim of permanent alimony was not to be valid as ancilliary or incidental to such affectation or disruption.

We have thus, in this light, no hesitation in coming to the view that when by court intervention under the Hindu Marriage Act, affection or disruption to the marital status has come by, at that juncture, while passing the decree, it undoubtedly has the power to grant permanent alimony or maintenance, if that power is invoked at that time. It also retains the power subsequently to be invoked on application by a party entitled to relief.

Finally,

On the afore analysis we have been led to the conclusion that the step of the wife to move the court of Additional District Judge, Amritsar for grant of maintenance under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act was ill-advised. The judgment of the High Court under appeal could be no other than the one that it was in the present state of law and the facts and circumstances. It is still open to the wife to stake her claim to maintenance in other fora. The judgments of the High Courts earlier quoted, and others which have been left out, which are not in line with our view are over-ruled. The earlier and predominant view was the correct one and the later an aberration; something unfortunate from the precedential point of view. The appeals thus inevitably have to and are hereby dismissed, but without any order as to costs.

Chand Dhawan Vs Jawaharlal Dhawan on 11 Jun 1993

Citations: [1993 LawSuit(SC) 494], [(1993) 3 S.C.R. 954], [1993 INSC 216], [1993 SCC (3) 406], [1993 AIR SCW 2548], [1993 CRI. L. J. 2930], [1993 SCC(CRI) 915], [(1993) IJR 335 (SC)], [1994 BOM CJ 147], [1993 (2) UJ (SC) 356], [1993 (4) JT 22], [1993 MAH LJ 1731], [(1993) 2 DMC 110], [(1993) 2 HINDULR 203], [(1993) 2 MAHLR 866], [(1993) MARRILJ 459], [(1994) MPLJ 1], [(1993) 3 RECCRIR 545], [(1994) 1 RRR 574], [(1993) 3 SCJ 50], [(1993) 22 ALL LR 240], [(1993) 2 CIVLJ 902], [1993 LawSuit(SC) 494]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1162687/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8fe4b014971140f246

https://digiscr.sci.gov.in/view_judgment?id=MTk0MTQ=

Chand Dhawan Vs. Jawaharlal Dhawan

https://lawinsider.in/judgment/smt-chand-dhawan-vs-jawaharlal-dhawan

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?caseId=002991343000&title=chanddhawan-vs-jawaharlal

Smt. Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharlal Dhawan : Case Facts, Issues, Judgement & Analysis

https://lawfyi.io/smt-chand-dhawan-vs-jawaharlal-dhawan-on-11-june-1993/

https://lawsuitcasefinder.com/casedetail?id=U2FsdGVkX1plo2GAY5xcebh78PQGFoZ2Mju1Jpebh78bGJ5ukMSE1YMgs5

Index to the Maintenance Judgments under Hindu Marriage Act here.

Musin Babulal Thengade and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 29 Jan 2025

Posted on March 2 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Bombay High Court at Aurangabab held that

From Para 6,

6. Apart from this, the learned A.P.P. has also placed reliance on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rupali Devi Vs. State of Uttar pradesh reported in AIR OnLine (2019) SC 394.

From Paras 9 and 10,

9. As regards Section 472 of the Cr. P. C, contention of the learned A.P.P. that offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing wrong will have to be accepted, but only with a rider. Although the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing wrong, it would not mean that limitation would continue to run perennially.The correct interpretation of the provision is provided in the matter of Arun Vyas and another Vs. Anita Vyas (supra) which sates that in case of offence under Section 498-A, a new starting point of limitation is start on every occasion when the wrong is committed and the period of limitation needs to be computed from the last such wrong. We may profitably quote paragraph 13 of the said decision, which reads as under :-
“ The essence of the offence in Section 498-A is cruelty as defined in the explanation appended to that section. It is a continuing offence and on each occasion on which the respondent was subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starting point of limitation. The last act of cruelty was committed against the respondent, within the meaning of the explanation, on October 13, 1988 when, on the allegation made by the respondent in the complaint to Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, she was forced to leave the matrimonial home. Having regard to the provisions of Sections 469 and 472 the period of limitation commenced for offences under Sections 406 and 498-A from October 13, 1988 and ended on October 12, 1991. But the charge sheet was filed on December 22, 1995,therefore, it was clearly barred by limitation under Section 468(2)(c) Cr. P. C.’’
10. Thereafter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has further stated in paragraph No. 14 that in complaints under Section 498-A the wife will invariably be oppressed, who is subjected to cruelty and, therefore, Section 473 of the Cr. P.C should be construed liberally in favour of wife. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also cautioned that the words interest of justice employed in Section 473 of the Cr. P. C. cannot mean in the interest of prosecution and the true object of the provision is to advance the cause of justice by protecting the oppressed and punishing the offender. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also referred to its earlier judgment in the matter of Onkar Radha Manohari (Smt) Vs. Venka Venkata Reddy reported in 1993 AIR SCW 3595 that while dealing with Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, the Court should not only examine as to whether delay is properly explained, but also as to whether it is necessary to entertain a time barred matter in the interest of justice.

From Paras 13 and 14,

13. These observations have been made in the context of territorial jurisdiction. The judgment does not deal with the aspect of limitation. Provisions of Sections 468, 472 and 473 of the Cr. P.C did not fall for consideration in this case. As against this in the cases of Arun Vyas and another Vs Anita Vyas (supra) and Ramesh and other Vs. state of Tamil Nadu (supra), the question of limitation was directly involved and the same is answered referring to the relevant statutory provisions. It is settled legal principle that judgments of the Courts have to be interpreted in the backdrop of facts of the particular case. Ratio of a case has to be understood and appreciated in the backdrop of the facts in which the judgment is delivered. The law laid down in the judgment cannot be divorced from the facts of the case in which it is delivered. A judgment cannot be interpreted like a statute. It cannot be applied uniformly every where like Euclid’s theorems of geometry. Therefore, while dealing with aforesaid three judgments cited during the course of hearing, we are of the considered opinion that the ratio laid down in the matters of Arun Vyas and Ramesh which directly deal with the question of limitation will have to be accepted. The judgment in the matter of Rupali Devi is relating to territorial jurisdiction of a Court to deal with offence under Section 498-A of the IPC.
14. In the light of above, we are of the opinion that limitation for offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC shall commence from the last act of cruelty. Offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing offence implies that each act of cruelty would offer new starting point of limitation. Limitation for prosecution under Section 498-A does not continue for indefinite period. Such interpretation will render Section 468 of the Cr. P.C. nugatory or otiose for the purpose of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code which does not appear to be the intention of legislature. Had there been intention to exclude Section 498-A of the IPC from the sweep of Section 468 of the Cr. P.C express provision could have been made for the said purpose.

Musin Babulal Thengade and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 29 Jan 2025

Citations: [2025:BHC-AUG:2858-DB]

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/bombay-high-court/bombay-high-court-cruelty-498a-ipc-limitation-283107

https://lawtrend.in/limitation-period-for-ipc-section-498-a-to-commence-from-last-act-of-cruelty-bombay-high-court/

Limitation for offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC commences from the last act of cruelty: Bombay HC

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/bombay-high-court/aurangabad-musin-babulal-thengade-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-2025-bhc-aug-2858-db-limitation-1567184

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 16 Jan 2025

Posted on February 28 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Supreme Court passed this reportable Judgment,

From Paras 10-12,

10.Ordinarily, Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. is invoked by the complainant when the police authorities decline to register a First Information Report. In such circumstances, a private complaint may be made in the court of the Judicial Magistrate and the complainant may pray that police investigation be ordered under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. However, it is the discretion of the concerned Magistrate whether to order police investigation under Section156(3) of Cr.P.C. or take cognizance upon the complaint and issue process or dismiss the complaint under Section 203 of Cr.P.C. Over a period of time and in view of many decisions of this Court, if the officer in-charge of the concerned Police Station for some reasons declines to register the FIR, then the law has left it open for the complainant to file an appropriate application before the Magistrate and pray for police investigation. Once an order is passed for police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., then it becomes a police case. At the end of the investigation the police may either file a charge-sheet or file an appropriate closure report.
11.However, what is important to observe is that whenever any application is filed by the complainant before the Court of Judicial Magistrate seeking police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., it is the duty of the concerned Magistrate to apply his mind for the purpose of ascertaining whether the allegations levelled in the complaint constitute any cognizable offence or not. In other words, the Magistrate may not undertake the exercise to ascertain whether the complaint is false or otherwise, however, the Magistrate is obliged before he proceeds to pass an order for police investigation to closely consider whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are borne out on plain reading of the complaint.

From Paras 24 and 25,

24.Thus, there are prerequisites to be followed by the complainant before approaching the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. which is a discretionary remedy as the provision proceeds with the word ‘may’. The Magistrate is required to exercise his mind while doing so. He should pass orders only if he is satisfied that the information reveals commission of cognizable offences and also about the necessity of police investigation for digging out of evidence neither in possession of the complainant nor can be procured without the assistance of the police. It is, thus, not necessary that in every case where a complaint has been filed under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. the Magistrate should direct the Police to investigate the crime merely because an application has also been filed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. even though the evidence to be led by the complainant is in his possession or can be produced by summoning witnesses, with the assistance of the court or otherwise. The issue of jurisdiction also becomes important at that stage and cannot be ignored.
25.In fact, the Magistrate ought to direct investigation by the police only where the assistance of the Investigating Agency is necessary and the Court feels that the cause of justice is likely to suffer in the absence of investigation by the police. The Magistrate is not expected to mechanically direct investigation by the police without first examining whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, investigation by the State machinery is actually required or not. If the allegations made in the complaint are simple, where the Court can straightaway proceed to conduct the trial, the Magistrate is expected to record evidence and proceed further in the matter, instead of passing the buck to the Police under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. Ofcourse, if the allegations made in the complaint require complex and complicated investigation which cannot be undertaken without active assistance and expertise of the State machinery, it would only be appropriate for the Magistrate to direct investigation by the police authorities. The Magistrate is, therefore, not supposed to act merely as a Post Office and needs to adopt a judicial approach while considering an application seeking investigation by the Police.

From Para 31,

31.A comparison of Section 175(3) of the BNSS with Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. indicates three prominent changes that have been introduced by the enactment of BNSS as follows:
a. First, the requirement of making an application to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge of a police station to lodge
the FIR has been made mandatory, and the applicant making an application under Section 175(3) is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate under Section 175(3).
b. Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct such enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order directing registration of FIR.
c. Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions under Section 175(3).

From Paras 34-35,

34.In light of the judicial interpretation and evolution of Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. by various decisions of this Court as discussed above, it becomes clear that the changes introduced by Section 175(3) of the BNSS to the existing scheme of Section 156(3) merely codify the procedural practices and safeguards which have been introduced by judicial decisions aimed at curbing the misuse of invocation of powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving ulterior motives.
35.Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs under Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner.

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 16 Jan 2025

Index of Judgments under Sec 156(3) Cr.P.C. are here.

Vishal Shah Vs Monalisha Gupta and Ors on 20 Feb 2025

Posted on February 22 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed this judgment whereby the marriage of parties is severed and Rs.25 Lakhs alimony was ordered to be paid to wife. Also since DV cases are quasi-criminal in nature, thus, there cannot be any justification to require the personal presence of the appellant in these proceedings.

From Para 18,

18. In the afore-mentioned complaint case, an application10 was filed by the respondent under Section 26 of the DV Act against the appellant, her mother-in-law, and their five other relatives. A notice was issued to the appellant vide order dated 21st July 2022. Subsequently, on 11th August 2022, the learned JMFC passed an interim order in favour of the respondent, prohibiting her eviction from the matrimonial home and directing the personal appearance of the appellant (respondent therein) and other respondents on the next hearing date. However, when the matter was listed again, the Court noticed that the appellant had not returned to India, and the concerned authorities were directed to initiate the extradition process against him.
We may observe that as the proceedings under the DV Act are quasi-criminal in nature, thus, there cannot be any justification to require the personal presence of the appellant in these proceedings. Thus, the learned Magistrate grossly erred while directing the appellant to remain personally present in the Court.

From Para 20,

20. It is apparent that the appellant’s inability to travel to India and appear in Miscellaneous Case No. 440 of 2022, filed by the respondent under Section 26 of the DV Act, stemmed from the impoundment of his passport, a circumstance beyond his control. Consequently, the order of the learned JMFC directing the initiation of extradition proceedings against the appellant as a consequence of his non-appearance, despite being aware of the fact of impounding of the passport of the appellant, is untenable and unsustainable in the eyes of the law. Otherwise also, as noted above, there is no requirement for the personal presence of any party in the proceedings under the DV Act, because they are quasi-criminal in nature and do not entail any penal consequences except when there is a breach of a protection order, which is the only offence provided under Section 31 of the DV Act.

From Para 26,

26. On the issue as to grant of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, this Court, in a very recent judgment of Rinku Baheti v Sandesh Sharda13, held that the factual analysis has to be undertaken in each case to determine as to what constitutes an ‘irretrievable breakdown’ while keeping in mind the non-exhaustive factors laid down in Shilpa Sailesh (supra).

From Para 31,

31. The filing of the aforesaid cases by the respondent-wife reflects her vindictive attitude towards the appellant and his family members and unambiguously reflects the bitterness that has seeped into the marital relationship. The tumultuous state of the marital relationship between the parties is quite evident, irrespective of the fate of the criminal complaints and the imputations made by the parties against each other. The passport of the appellant was also impounded by the concerned authorities, pursuant to the pending cases filed by the respondent.

From Paras 35-37,

35. Whatever may be the justification for the spouses living separately, with so much time having passed by any marital love or affection that may have developedbetween the parties seems to have evanesced. This is a classic case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The admitted long-standing separation, nature of differences, prolonged and multiple litigations pending adjudication, and the unwillingness of the parties to reconcile are evidence enough to establish beyond all manner of doubt that the marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably and that there is no scope whatsoever for marriage to survive. Thus, no useful purpose, emotional or practical, would be served by continuing the soured relationship. On the basis ofthe above factual matrix, the present appears to be a case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
36. Apart from the irreconcilable status of the relationship between the parties, in the present case, another factor that has weighed with this Court in favour of the exercise of the power under Article 142(1)of the Constitution of India is that there is no child born from the wedlock and therefore, any direction to allowthe parties to part ways would only affect the parties themselves and not any innocent child.
37. Thus, this is a fit case warranting the exercise of the discretion conferred under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India to dissolve the marriage between the parties on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

From Paras 42-43,

42. Before we conclude our discussion, we must note that the act of impounding the passport of the appellant by the concerned authorities of the Government of India was ex-facie illegal in the eyes of the law. In the present case, the appellant’s passport was impounded on the mere premise that the respondent has filed numerous cases before the various courts in India.
43. The law regarding the impounding of a passport of an individual has been settled by this Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr.16, wherein it was held that the rules of natural justice must be followed before impounding a passport under Section 10(3) of the Passports Act, 1967.

From Paras 45-46,

45. Further, this Court, in Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P.17, while dealing with the question of arrest and fair investigation in a case alleging the offence of cruelty under Section 498A IPC, was of the view that in respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of ‘Red Corner Notice’ should not be a routine.
46. Applying the afore-mentioned legal principles to the present case, we find that the act of impounding the appellant’s passport under Section 10 of the Passport Act, 1967, was carried out without granting the appellant an opportunity to be heard. This clear violation of the principles of natural justice renders the act of impounding the passport ex-facie illegal. Consequently, we hold that the concerned authorities should release the appellant’s passport within a period of one week from today.

Vishal Shah Vs Monalisha Gupta and Ors on 20 Feb 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 254], [2025 LiveLaw (SC) 240]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/97306350/

https://www.caseciter.com/vishal-shah-vs-monalisha-gupta-2025-insc-254-domestic-violence-act-passport-impounding-irretrievable-breakdown-of-marriage-permanent-alimony/

Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here. Divorce Judgments are here. Passport judgements are here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision

Sanjay Kumar Shaw Vs Anjali Kumari Shaw on 07 Apr 2025

Kiran Jyot Maini Vs Anish Pramod Patel on 15 Jul 2024

Sunita Kachwaha and Ors Vs Anil Kuchwaha on 28 Oct 2014

Mudireddy Divya Vs Sulkti Sivarama Reddy on 26 Mar 2025

Arun K.R Vs Arunima T.S on 24 Mar 2025

N.Usha Rani and Anr Vs Moodudula Srinivas on 30 Jan 2025

Chand Dhawan Vs Jawaharlal Dhawan on 11 Jun 1993

Musin Babulal Thengade and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 29 Jan 2025

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 16 Jan 2025

Vishal Shah Vs Monalisha Gupta and Ors on 20 Feb 2025