Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not excepted , at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Further,

The mere initial grant of anticipatory bail for lesser offence, did not entitle the respondent to insist for regular bail even if he was subsequently found to be involved in the case of murder. Neither Section 437(5) nor Section 439(1) of the Code was attracted. There was no question of cancellation of bail earlier granted to the accused for an offence punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 406 IPC. The Magistrate committed a irregularity by holding that “I do not agree with the submission made by the Ld.Prosecutor in as much as if we go by his submissions then the accused would be liable for arrest every time the charge is altered or enhanced at any stage, which is certainly not the spirit of law”. With the change of the nature of the offence, the accused becomes disentitled to the liberty granted to him in relation to a minor offence, if the offence is altered for an aggravated crime. Instead of referring to the grounds which entitled the respondent-accused the grant of bail, the Magistrate adopted a wrong approach to confer him the benefit of liberty on allegedly finding that no grounds were made out for cancellation of bail.

Finally,

We would reiterate that in cases where the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life which is triable exclusively by a court of Sessions, the Magistrate may, in his wisdom, refrain to exercise the powers of granting the bail and refer the accused to approach the higher courts unless he is fully satisfied that there is no reasonable ground for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001 (INSC)

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1067439/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ada1e4b0149711411eb9

Index of Anticipatory Bail Judgments is here.

Pooja Ramesh Singh Vs JnK Bank and Anr on 02 Jul 2026

Posted on July 8 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court was surprised to know that fake judgments mentioned in NCLT Judgment were not caught by NCLAT.

From Paras 15 and 16,

15. It is not in dispute that the judgments relied upon by the NCLT are non-existent, and some AI-generated paragraphs are wrongly attributed to genuine citations. An independent examination undertaken by us reveals the following about the judgments relied upon by the adjudicating authority: State Bank of India v. M/s Shree Ram Urban Infrastructure Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 341 (cited in para 44 of NCLT judgment) – Wrong citation of an existing reported judgment6 and a non-existent paragraph, Everest Kento Cylinders Ltd. v. Union of India (2015) 2 SCC 1 (cited in para 45 of NCLT judgment) – Correct citation but nonexistent paragraph, ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Ltd., (2019) 16 SCC 528 (cited in para 47 of NCLT judgment) – Nonexistent citation, V.S. Dempo & Co. Ltd. v. Reliance Communications Ltd., (2021) 10 SCC 176 (cited in para 49 of NCLT judgment) – Nonexistent citation, Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty & Anr., (2018) 16 SCC 228 (cited in para 51 of NCLT judgment) – Correct citation but non-existent paragraph and Sarbjit Singh v. Union Bank of India, (2022) 7 SCC 464 (cited in para 53 of NCLT judgment) – Non-existent citation.
16. Respondent No. 1 has filed an affidavit indicating that the alleged judgments relied on by NCLT were not cited by its counsel at the bar. The affidavit also indicates that the so-called precedents relied on by the adjudicating authority were obtained through its own research. What about the Appellate Tribunal? The fake, non-existent judgments escaped scrutiny by the first statutory appellate tribunal. Today’s courts and tribunals implicitly trust lawyers when referring to precedents cited before them. Imagine the hardship of a situation in which the Court must verify the authenticity of each judgment cited by an advocate.

Pooja Ramesh Singh Vs JnK Bank and Anr on 02 Jul 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index

A.S.S.K.Durga Prasad Vs NCDRC and Ors on 24 Jun 2026

Posted on July 7 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of AP High Court held that Advocate services do not come under the ambit of Consumer Protection Act and as such litigation against such services is not maintainable.

From Para 4,

4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner could not satisfy about the maintainability of the complaint against an advocate for alleged deficiency in rendering legal services, under the Consumer Protection Act.
5. The law is well settled that an Advocate/lawyer in connection with the service rendered by him in legal side is not covered under the Consumer Protection Act.

Finally from Paras 9 and 10,

9. In Bar of Indian Lawyers (supra) the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission had taken a view that the deficiency of, in service rendered by an advocate fell under the Consumer Protection Act and that the compliant was maintainable. The Hon‘ble Apex Court held that the view taken was not correct and set aside the order of National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission. It was held as under:
―82. Accordingly, the view taken by the NCDRC to the effect that in respect of deficiency in service rendered by the lawyers, a complaint in Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 would be maintainable, is incorrect and stands overruled.
10. In view of the aforesaid, we are of view that the complaint filed by the writ petitioner against the lawyer/advocate under the Consumer Protection Act was not maintainable. The same has rightly been dismissed. No interference is required with all the three orders impugned in the writ petition.

A.S.S.K.Durga Prasad Vs NCDRC and Ors on 24 Jun 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index

Ayush Bajpai Vs State of U.P. and Ors 25 Jun 2026

Posted on July 6 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

The other aspect, in this case, is that the petitioner is an Advocate. He can be paid his fee by the Government, by a respectable man or a man who is not so respectable. An Advocate could be defending an accused who is indeed involved in a big scam or fraud but when fee is remitted by such an accused to his learned Counsel in account the money cannot be said to be proceeds of crime. It is the lawful remuneration of the learned counsel which would be duly earned after the engagement is discharged. If for the remittance of any sum of money, an Advocate’s account is frozen describing it as a cyber fraud or the money as proceeds of a cyber fraud or other crime it could become very difficult for Advocates to discharge their professional duties under the Advocates Act. The functioning of the Court itself would be embarrassed.
Let the Additional Chief Secretary (Home), U.P., Lucknow file his own affidavit within two weeks on the issue indicating how seizure of an Advocate’s account, made by sundry officers of the Police, is to be dealt with so as not to interfere with dispensation of justice itself in Courts. It would be quite a different matter, if an Advocate is himself involved in a criminal offence and has credits of money to his account that are proceeds of his own crime.

Ayush Bajpai Vs State of U.P. and Ors 25 Jun 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://lawtrend.in/advocates-fee-cannot-be-treated-as-proceeds-of-crime-merely-because-client-is-accused-allahabad-high-court/

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/allahabad-high-court/allahabad-hc-advocate-professional-fee-accused-not-proceeds-of-crime-bank-freeze-539449

Index

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Posted on July 6 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that under section 311 of Cr.P.C. (read along with the Section 165 of Evidence Act), a Criminal Court has wide power to summon any person as witness, at any stage of the case, even after completion of defence evidence and argument stages.

From Para 9,

9. The very usage of the words such as ‘any court’, ‘at any stage’, or ‘of any enquiry, trial or other proceedings’, ‘any person’ and ‘any such person’ clearly spells out that this section is expressed in the widest possible terms and do not limit the discretion of the court in any way. However, the very width requires a corresponding caution that the discretionary power should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially with circumspection and consistently with the provisions of the Code. The second part of the section does not allow for any discretion but it binds and compels the court to take any of the aforementioned two steps if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case.

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Citations: [AIR 1991 SC 1346], [1991 CRILJ 1521], [1991 (1) CRIMES 818(SC)], [1991 (33) ECC 18], [1992 (61) ELT 521(SC)], [1991 (1) SCALE 401], [1991 SUPP (1) SCC 271], [1991 (2) UJ 43 (SC)], [1991 SCC(CRI) 595], [1992 CRIAPPR(SC) 73], [1991 (1) SCR 712], [1991 (1) GUJLH 11], [1991 (3) JT 17], [(1991) ALLCRIR 725], [(1992) SC CR R 51], [1991 CRILR(SC MAH GUJ) 286], [1992 CHANDLR(CIV&CRI) 421], [(1992) 1 CHANDCRIC 78], [(1991) 33 ECC 18], [(1991) 2 GUJ LR 974], [(1991) 3 RECCRIR 182], [(1991) MADLW(CRI) 284], [(1997) 68 ECR 783]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/171510013/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac6be4b014971140ed29

Index

Sachin Arora Vs Manju Arora on 02 Jul 2026

Posted on July 4 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court was not interested to interfere with the Delhi High Court Judgment.

Sachin Arora Vs Manju Arora on 02 Jul 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/supreme-court-refuses-to-interfere-with-delhi-hc-order-allowing-wife-to-seek-husbands-hotel-cdr-records-to-prove-adultery-539935

The following is the impugned Delhi High Court Judgment. The husband may have to have a serious discussion with his Counsel at Family Court, where the Reply was filed with certain admissions. Thoroughly self-sabotaging style drafting! Now, his only shield is Cross Examination Stage to bring out the truth. Hope it is handled at least now professionally and properly.

From Para 19,

19. … Moreover, in his written statement filed before the learned Family Court, the petitioner had taken a totally contrary stand claiming that he had gone to Jaipur on an official trip along with his female colleague for which purpose two rooms were reserved in Hotel Fairmont. This in itself, he contends is sufficient to prima facie show that the petitioner in order to conceal his adulterous acts is trying to take contradictory stands before the learned Family Court to somehow prevent disclosure of the details regarding his stay in the hotel being well aware that this disclosure would in itself show adultery on his part. In support of his plea, he seeks to place to reliance on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision Petition No.2385 and 2466 of 2018 titled K Srinivas Rao vs Nalam Naga Kamala.

From Para 32,

32. … Furthermore, what needs to be noted that the petitioner has taken contradictory stands regarding the presence of his lady friend in the hotel. While in his written statement he has stated that he was on an official trip to Jaipur, along with his female colleague and therefore, two rooms were booked for them in Hotel Fairmont, in response to the application he has claimed that he met the lady friend by chance in the hotel as she was also co-incidentally staying there. The respondent is the estranged wife of the petitioner who obviously does not has any direct evidence of her husband indulging in acts of adultery. By resort to Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, she is, only trying to seek production of evidence which she reasonably believes will prove her charge of adultery which by its very nature can be inferred only from circumstances.

From Para 39,

39. From the aforesaid, it is evident that it has been repeatedly held by the Apex Court that the right to privacy, as enshrined under Article 21, is not an absolute right. In the present case, the Court has on the one side, a husband who is taking contradictory stands in his pleadings…

Sachin Arora Vs Manju Arora on 10 May 2023

Payal Sharma Vs State of Punjab and Anr on 26 Nov 2024

Posted on July 2 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 22,

22. The fact that the present complaint which ultimately culminated in the impugned order was filed by the complainant subsequent to the grant of divorce between the first accused and the complainant’s daughter, is a fact discernible and indisputable. This had occurred in Canada. A perusal of the final report would reveal that even after the investigation no material whatsoever worthy to connect the appellant with the offences was seen collected. Therefore, the question is whether the vague, and at the same time, highly exaggerated versions of FIR and the proceedings subsequent thereto can be permitted to be proceeded against accused Nos.5 and 6. In short, on a careful consideration of FIR and the final report and materials we have no hesitation to hold that there is nothing on record to suggest, even prima facie that they would constitute the alleged offences against the accused No.6.

From Para 23,

23. A scanning of the FIR and the subsequently filed final report would reveal that the allegation against accused No.5, who is the wife of accused No.6, are also of the same nature. It is relevant to note that she is related to the husband of complainant’s daughter only through her marriage with cousin brother of the first accused viz., accused No.6. When the subject FIR and all further proceedings pursuant therefrom were quashed against the said cousin brother viz., accused No.6, the same reasons must apply to the case of accused No.5 as well. We are of the considered view that the High Court ought to have interfered and quashed the subject FIR and all other proceedings therefrom in relation to accused No.5 viz., the wife of accused No.6 as well. To secure interest of justice in the circumstances obtained, we are of the considered view that filing of the chargesheet cannot be a reason for interfering with impugned order in respect of accused No.6 or rejecting the prayer of accused No.5 to quash the proceedings and to make them to argue or to raise the legal and factual issues at the stage of framing of the charges. It is evident that making them to face the trial based on the allegations or accusation as referred above would be nothing but an abuse of process of court.

Payal Sharma Vs State of Punjab and Anr on 26 Nov 2024

Citations: [2024 INSC 896]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/101620228/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67458986e8c0441261878a34

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/payal-sharma-v-state-of-punjab-2024-insc-896-over-implication-of-close-relatives-of-husband-in-alleged-dowry-cases-1559200

https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/dowry-harassment-cases-supreme-court-stresses-courts-duty-check-exaggerated-versions

https://testbook.com/recent-judgements/payal-sharma-vs-state-of-punjab

PAYAL SHARMA V. STATE OF PUNJAB & Anr, (26 November 2024)

Karnataka High Court relied on this Judgment in Crl.Pet.No.13296/2024 to grant interim stay.

Index of Quash Judgements is here.

RS Tamilvendan Vs The Secretary and Ors on 21 May 2026

Posted on June 25 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Madras High Court held as follows,

From Para 5,

5. None can deny there is corruption in the Judiciary. There were and are corrupt Judges. While addressing a legal conference in Kollam, Kerala, former CJI Bharucha implied that 20 per cent of the Judges in this country were corrupt. The startling statement made by the Bhushans (father and son duo) is still in public memory. We would not go that far. We refuse to even endorse such sweeping statements. But, we do know and have come across instances of judicial corruption. The Full Court of the Madras High Court regularly shows the exit door to such black sheep. The Supreme Court acknowledged in High Court of Judicature at Bombay -vs- V.Shirish Kumar Rangrao Patil (1997) 6 SCC 339 that the cancerous cells of corruption constantly keep creeping into the vital veins of the judiciary. It was also observed that the need to stem it out by judicial surgery lies on the judiciary itself by its self imposed or corrective measures or disciplinary action under Article 235 of the Constitution. Corruption in Judiciary cannot be committed without some members of the Bar becoming privy to the corrupt. The vigilant watch by the High Court is the sustaining stream to catch the corrupt and to deal with the situation appropriately.

From Para 15,

15. Judges need not be treated as holy cows. Justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken comments of ordinary men (Lord Atkin). But the lack of respect in the movie dialogues would not make any difference to us. In Sheela Barse -vs- Union of India (1988) 4 SCC 226, it was observed that criticism of judicial functioning is a healthy aid for introspection and improvement and that it is the privileged right of the Indian citizens to believe what he considers to be true and to speak out his mind, though not, perhaps, with the best of tastes; and speak perhaps, with greater courage than care for exactitude. Judiciary is not exempt from criticism. Judicial institutions are, and should be made of stronger stuff. Debates of public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open. It may well include vehement, sarcastic and sometimes unpleasant sharp criticism of Government and public officials (D.C.Saxena -vs- Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, 1996 (5) SCC 216). We would add by including Courts and Judges also. Judges are not above criticism. In Foundation Inc -vs- ANI Media (P) Ltd (2025) 10 SCC 353, it was suggested that Courts should welcome debates and constructive criticism.

RS Tamilvendan Vs The Secretary and Ors on 21 May 2026

Vijay R. Nair Vs Lijitha on 12 Jun 2026

Posted on June 24 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Kerala High Court held that since the wife contracted a second marriage, the issue of permanent alimony requires fresh adjudication. Phew… 20 Lakhs is a big amount. Hopefully saved.

From Para 11,

11. On the issue of award of permanent alimony of Rs.20,00,000/- to be respondent, we find, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, that the finding of the court below was rendered in the absence of any evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant. While under normal circumstance, this Court would have been loathe to accept the request of the appellant for a remand of this issue to the court below for fresh adjudication, we find that, in the light of the changed circumstances where the respondent has contracted a second marriage during the pendency of this appeal, the issue of entitlement of the respondent to permanent alimony and the quantification thereof, would have to be necessarily gone into by the court below as and when an application under Section 25(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act is preferred before it by the appellant. That being the case, we deem it appropriate to set aside the judgment and decree of the court below, to the extent it awards permanent alimony of Rs.20,00,000/- to the respondent, and remit the matter to the court below for a fresh adjudication on the said issue after affording the parties an opportunity to lead evidence before it. While doing so, we would also request the Court below to complete the fresh adjudication on this issue within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment.

Vijay R. Nair Vs Lijitha on 12 Jun 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Divorce Judgements is here.

Pavul Yesu Dhasan Vs Registrar SHRC of TN and Ors on 30 Apr 2025

Posted on June 18 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that there was a violation of human rights on the part of the Police Inspector, who failed to register FIR and abused the mother of the complainant.

From Para 6,

6. The facts of this case, to say the least, are shocking. The third respondent visited the Police Station for lodging a complaint along with his parents. The complaint was handed over to a Sub-Inspector of Police who stated that since the transaction has taken place at three different places, he cannot accept the same and he could receive the same only after the Inspector of Police looks at it. He stated that the Inspector was not likely to come to the Police Station on that day. Therefore, he gave a cell phone number of the Inspector to the respondent. The third respondent’s mother on the same day tried to contact the present appellant who was the Inspector of Police. After talking to the third respondent’s mother, the appellant cut off the phone call. Therefore, as per the instructions received, the third respondent with his parents again visited the Police Station at 5.00 p.m. They were asked to wait till arrival of the appellant who was the Inspector of Police. Ultimately, he arrived at 8.30 p.m. Very objectionable language was used by the appellant while talking to the third respondent’s mother which is noted in paragraph (4) of the impugned judgment of the State Human Rights Commission.
7. All that the third respondent wanted is registration of FIR based on his complaint. Though law is well settled, the Sub-Inspector did not register the crime. The appellant being a senior officer ought to have immediately registered the FIR. However, not only he refused to do it but used very objectionable language, while talking to the third respondent’s mother.

Pavul Yesu Dhasan Vs Registrar SHRC of TN and Ors on 30 Apr 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

The impugned Order of the Madras High Court is here.

Pavul Yesu Dhasan Vs Registrar SHRC of TN and Ors on 17 Aug 2022

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Pooja Ramesh Singh Vs JnK Bank and Anr on 02 Jul 2026

A.S.S.K.Durga Prasad Vs NCDRC and Ors on 24 Jun 2026

Ayush Bajpai Vs State of U.P. and Ors 25 Jun 2026

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Sachin Arora Vs Manju Arora on 02 Jul 2026

Payal Sharma Vs State of Punjab and Anr on 26 Nov 2024

RS Tamilvendan Vs The Secretary and Ors on 21 May 2026

Vijay R. Nair Vs Lijitha on 12 Jun 2026

Pavul Yesu Dhasan Vs Registrar SHRC of TN and Ors on 30 Apr 2025