This is such an atrocious case whereby the so-called mother flouts the orders passed by Canadian Courts regd Custody of a minor child and reaches India only to file a 498A IPC case. Crooks!
Vijaya Mahantesh Mulemane Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 03 Mar 2022The Earlier decision from Karnataka High Court’s Division Bench, where a parenting plan was devised by the judges.
Vijaya Mahantesh Mulemane Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 22 Nov 2020Another false case filer bites the dust…
Faisal Ahmed Khan Vs State of Karnataka Mahila PS Bengaluru and Anr on 11 Oct 201910. Undisputed facts of the case are, petitioner was married with complainant in July 2008. Even after her marriage with the petitioner, complainant was defending the petition for restitution of conjugal rights filed by her previous husband Asif Farooqi. Within about three years after marriage, her relation with petitioner came to an end in August 2011 as per her own admission recorded by the learned Sessions Judge in paragraph No. 14 of his order in Criminal Appeal No. 256/2016. There is yet another judicial finding that complainant had contracted into third marriage with one Asrar Ahmed and given birth to a child. The order also discloses that complainant initiated proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act (DV Act for short) in April 2012. The learned Sessions Judge has also recorded that it was proved by Ex.R7 that complainant had married for third time and ultimately, dismissed the petition. The Criminal Appeal filed thereon has also been dismissed with costs.
11. Not being satisfied, complainant initiated proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. in the year 2014. (C.Mis.No.526/2014) seeking maintenance for her and the child. The said petition has also been rejected so far as complainants claim was concerned.
12. Having thus suffered in the hands of complainant, petitioner also filed a private complaint in PCR No.1085/2016 alleging inter alia that complainant had suppressed her earlier marriage with Asif Ali Farooqi and when questioned about the same, she has filed the instant false complaint. Thereafter, she has married for the third time. With the said allegations, petitioner sought action against complainant and three others for commission of offences punishable under Sections 120A, 120B, 107, 108, 494, 496 read with Section 34 IPC. The learned Magistrate referred the case for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Accordingly, FIR No.149/2016 has been registered on 11th August 2016 in Narasimharaja Police Station, Mysuru City. Records further disclose that complainant and other accused unsuccessfully challenged the said FIR before this Court in Criminal Petition No.1182/2017.
13. Petitioners application under Section 239 Cr.P.C. seeking discharge has been dismissed by the learned trial Judge by recording that presence of accused as on the date of incident and whether marriage is void, cannot be considered at the stage of discharge.
14. A conspectus of facts narrated by the petitioner and the undisputed facts which can be gathered from the records lead to an irresistible inference that though complaint is filed alleging commission of offence under Section 498A IPC, it is, in fact the petitioner who has suffered an untold misery in the hands of the complainant.
15. It cannot be gainsaid that disclosure of a previous subsisting marriage causes immense mental pain and agony to a husband.
16. Complainant has, though unsuccessfully, driven the petitioner to various Courts unabatedly. It started with complainant initiating proceedings under the provisions of DV Act followed by proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Judicial findings have been recorded by the learned Trial Magistrates in both proceedings with regard to complainants conduct. Learned Magistrate adjudicating proceedings under DV Act has recorded that as per Ex.R7, complainants marriage with her third husband was proved. This finding has been affirmed by the learned Sessions Judge while dismissing the appeal.
17. Suffice to note that records unequivocally disclose that complainant was respondent in a matrimonial case for restitution of conjugal rights initiated by her first husband when she got married with the petitioner. She has admitted this fact in proceedings before the learned Magistrate in proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
18. This is a classic case in which a complainant by initiating criminal proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C and Section 498A IPC against the petitioner has abused the said provisions.
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20. It is relevant to note that though the complaint contains the allegations recorded above, there is interpolation with regard to the date 03.08.2011, on which date she was allegedly confined in a room and attempt was made to kill her by pouring kerosene. Further, it is stated that Faizal made an attempt to hang her to a Ceiling fan. In the following sentence, it is stated that Faizal made her fall from a motor cycle and tried to kill her. The two allegations that Faizal attempted to hang the complainant and thereafter made her fall from the motor cycle contradict each other. If Faizal had really attempted to hang her, how did she escape from his clutches? No details are forthcoming in this behalf. However, even if it is assumed that the said allegation were true, it is not understandable why she sat on Faisals motor cycle.
22. Thus, the Complaint is full of unbelievable and self contradicting allegations. The first allegation of demand for Rs.3,00,000/- is said to have been made jointly by petitioner and his family members. The second allegation regarding demand of money to purchase a car is alleged jointly against petitioner and his sisters. Thus all allegations in the complaint are omnibus in nature and in the least, made jointly with other accused and there are no specific against the petitioner.
23. After investigation, admittedly police have not filed charge-sheet against accused No.2 to 6 namely Shahjahan Begum, Afzal Ahmed Khan, Parveez Ahamed, Anjum Nazeer and Siddique. Neither the prosecution nor the complainant have placed any other material which may suggest commission of any of the alleged criminal act/s by the petitioner. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that allegations against petitioner are designed to harass him.
Citations: [2019 SCC ONLINE KAR 3113], [2020 ILR KAR 130], [2020 KCCR 1 236], [2020 AIC 205 770], [2020 AIR KANT R 1 306], [2020 KANT LJ 1 323]
Other Sources:
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5ded72464a932629f01c7297
A good judgment of single bench of AP High court. Useful in my DP3 WP.
From Para 10,
K. Ranjith Vs State of AP on 01 Oct 202110. As can be seen from the aforesaid Section of law, when small quantity of Ganja is involved in commission of the offence, the imprisonment prescribed is for a term which may extend to one year or with fine, which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both. In the instant case, the Ganja involved in commission of the offence is only 600 grams, which is below the 1000 grams. Therefore, as per the aforesaid notification, it is to be held that the Ganja involved in this case is only a small quantity and an offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(A) of the NDPS Act is only made out. So, the very registration of F.I.R. for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act, which is relating to commercial quantity, is obviously erroneous. Clause (C) of sub-clause (ii)(b) of Section 20 of the NDPS Act applies only when the Ganja involved is of 20 Kgs. as it is a commercial quantity as per the aforesaid notification. The said offence under Section 20((ii)(b)(C) of NDPS Act relating to possession or illegal transportation of Ganja of a commercial quantity is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees. So, when it is found that only a small quantity of Ganja of 600 grams is involved in this case, it is to be held that only an offence punishable under Section 20(ii)(b)(A) of the NDPS Act is made out and not an offence punishable under Section 20(ii)(b)(C) of the NDPS Act relating to commercial quantity. So, it is obvious that the police have registered the F.I.R. quoting a wrong section of law.
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/55236845/
Citations:
A landmark judgment from a 3-judge bench of Supreme Court, categorically declares as follows:
From Para 17,
17. It is clear from the words emphasised hereinabove in the above quotation, this Court in the case of T.T Antony v. State of Kerala has not excluded the registration of a complaint in the nature of a counter-case from the purview of the Code. In our opinion, this Court in that case only held that any further complaint by the same complainant or others against the same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited under the Code because an investigation in this regard would have already started and further complaint against the same accused will amount to an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original complaint, hence will be prohibited under section 162 of the code. This prohibition noticed by this Court, in our opinion, does not apply to counter-complaint by the accused in the first complaint or on his behalf alleging a different version of the said incident.
From Para 23,
23. Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this Court in T.T Antony case is to be accepted as holding that a second complaint in regard to the same incident filed as a counter-complaint is prohibited under the Code then, in our opinion, such conclusion would lead to serious consequences. This will be clear from the hypothetical example given hereinbelow i.e if in regard to a crime committed by the real accused he takes the first opportunity to lodge a false complaint and the same is registered by the jurisdictional police then the aggrieved victim of such crime will be precluded from lodging a complaint giving his version of the incident in question, consequently he will be deprived of his legitimated right to bring the real accused to book. This cannot be the purport of the Code.
Upkar Singh Vs Ved Prakash and Ors on 10 Sep 2004
Citations : [2004 AIR SC 4320], [2004 ALD CRI 2 906], [2004 CRI LJ 4219], [2004 JCR SC 4 158], [2004 JT SC 7 488], [2004 KLT SC 3 444], [2005 OLR SC 1 43], [2004 PLJR 4 157], [2004 SCALE 7 563], [2004 CRLJ 0 4219], [2004 SCC 13 2922004 ACR 3 2450], [2005 SCC CR 0 211], [2004 SCC 1 292], [2004 JT 7 4881], [2005 JIC 1 1092005 ACC 51 673], [2004 AIR SC 3240], [2004 AIR SC 0 4320], [2004 RCR CRIMINAL 4 294], [2004 SCC 22 292], [2004 SCC 6 528], [2004 AIR SC 5017], [2005 BOMCR CRI SC 1 199], [2004 CRIMES SC 4 20], [2005 SCC CRI 211], [2004 SUPREME 6 528], [2004 ALLLJ 3436], [2004 CRLJ SC 4219], [2004 RCR CRL 4 2942004 ALL LJ 3436], [2004 CRILJ 42192004 JT 7 488], [2004 AIR SCW 5017], [2004 AIR SCW 0 4320]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1054183/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adefe4b0149711412948
Apex Court quashed the FIR in this case, and u/s 210 CrPC, held as follows
From Paras 5 and 6,
Kapil Agarwal and Ors Vs Sanjay Sharma and Ors 01 Mar 2021Thus, as per Section 210 Cr.P.C., when in a case instituted otherwise than on a police report, i.e., in a complaint case, during the course of the inquiry or trial held by the Magistrate, it appears to the Magistrate that an investigation by the police is in progress in relation to the offence which is the subject matter of the inquiry or trial held by him, the Magistrate shall stay the proceedings of such inquiry or trial and call for a report on the matter from the police officer conducting the investigation. It also provides that if a report is made by the investigating police officer under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and on such report cognizance of any offence is taken by the Magistrate against any person who is an accused in the complaint case, the Magistrate shall inquire into or try together the complaint case and the case arising out of the police report as if both the cases were instituted on a police report. It also further provides that if the police report does not relate to any accused in the complaint case or if the Magistrate does not take cognizance of any offence on the police report, he shall proceed with the inquiry or trial, which was stayed by him, in accordance with the provisions of Cr.P.C.
Thus, merely because on the same set of facts with the same allegations and averments earlier the complaint is filed, there is no bar to lodge the FIR with the police station with the same allegations and averments.
6. However, at the same time, if it is found that the subsequent FIR is an abuse of process of law and/or the same has been lodged only to harass the accused, the same can be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution or in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In that case, the complaint case will proceed further in accordance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C.
Citations : [2021 SCC OnLine SC 154]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/97191348/
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/kapil-agarwal-and-others-versus-sanjay-sharma-and-others
https://www.legitquest.com/case/kapil-agarwal-and-others-v-sanjay-sharma-and-others/1DA1F3
https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/tag/inherent-powers-of-high-courts/
Justice Katju held that offending words to a member of SC/ST, are liable under the Act, only if made in any place in public view, but not otherwise. A big relief for those facing false cases.
From Paras 27 and 28,
27. Learned counsel then contended that the alleged act was not committed in a public place and hence does not come within the purview of section 3(1)(x) of the Act. In this connection it may be noted that the aforesaid provision does not use the expression ‘public place’, but instead the expression used is ‘in any place within public view’. In our opinion there is a clear distinction between the two expressions.
28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a ‘Chamar’) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression ‘place within public view’ with the expression ‘public place’. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.
And relating to American cuss word Nigger,
30. In this connection it may be mentioned that in America to use the word ‘Nigger’ today for an African-American is regarded as highly offensive and is totally unacceptable, even if it was acceptable 50 years ago. In our opinion, even if the word ‘Chamar’ was not regarded offensive at one time in our country, today it is certainly a highly offensive word when used in a derogatory sense to insult and humiliate a person. Hence, it should never be used with that intent. The use of the word ‘Chamar’ will certainly attract section 3(1)(x) of the Act, if from the context it appears that it was used in a derogatory sense to insult or humiliate a member of the SC/ST.
And then Husband was held to have NOT insulted the respondent in public view,
Swaran Singh and Ors Vs State NCT Delhi and Anr on 18 Aug 200834. However, a perusal of the F.I.R. shows that Swaran Singh did not use these offensive words in the public view. There is nothing in the F.I.R. to show that any member of the public was present when Swaran Singh uttered these words, or that the place where he uttered them was a place which ordinarily could be seen by the public. Hence in our opinion no prima facie offence is made out against appellant no.1.
Citations : [2008 SCC 8 435], [2008 SCC CRI 3 527], [2008 AIC SC 69 25], [2008 AIOL 938], [2008 AIR SC SUPP 441], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 2 431], [2008 CRLJ SC 4369], [2008 JT 9 60], [2009 MPLJ SC 1 503], [2008 SCALE 11 346], [2008 SCR 12 132]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/531612/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/575fd270607dba63d7e69106
Wonderful judgment from 3-judge bench to arresting the misuse of SC/ST Act 1989.
From Para 13, the insult must be targeted as the member belonged to SC/ST
13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the Society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that respondent No.2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that respondent No.2 is member of Scheduled Caste.
From Para 14, the insult must be in any place within public view
14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through Standing Counsel & Ors.5. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view.
From Para 18, Offence will NOT be made out just because the member is from SC/ST
Hitesh Verma Vs State of Uttarakhand and Anr on 05 Nov 202018. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out.
Citations : [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 907]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/111507500/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5fb6aa47b128b6ff2528fcf1
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/hitesh-verma-versus-the-state-of-uttarakhand-anr
Supreme Court held that, just by using the words/expressions used in statutes/provisions does not disclose any offence, when the necessary ingredients constituting Section 420 are conspicuously lacking in the complaint.
From Para 5,
Vijaya Rao Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr on 29 Jul 20055. Except using the expressions fraudulent misappropriation and mala fide intention, the allegations in the complaint do not at all disclose as to how the appellant can be found guilty of the offence under Section 420 IPC. The ingredients constituting Section 420 are conspicuously lacking in the complaint. All the courts have failed to address themselves to the crucial question whether as far as the appellant is concerned any offence under Section 420 or for that matter any offence under Section 409 has been committed. Even going by the allegations in the complaint, allowing the criminal proceedings to go on against the appellant, would result in abuse of the process of the court. Hence, the proceedings in Complaint Case No. 10 of 2000 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sikar are quashed as against the appellant. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
Citations : [2006 CCR 2 122], [2006 SLT 3 405], [2005 SCC 7 69], [2005 SCC CRI 1600]
Others Sources :
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56ea89ae607dba38b6e4923a
Baseless case against Secretary to Givernment LV Subrahmanyam was quashed by AP High Court.
Lanka Venkata Subrahmanyam Vs State of Telangana on 4 January 2018
Citations: [
Other Source links:
Since there was prima facie opinion formed by the Trial court in framing the charges on the accused persons, Apex Court held that High Court was not correct in interfering into the Trial Court Order.
Om Wati and Anr Vs State Thro Delhi Admn and Ors on 19 March 2001Citations: [2001 ACR SC 2 1038], [2001 AIR SC 1507], [2001 ALD CRI 1 663], [2001 CRI LJ 1723], [2001 CRIMES SC 2 59], [2001 JT SC 3 585], [2001 LW CRL 2 687], [2001 PLJR 3 4], [2001 SCALE 2 505], [2001 SCC 4 333], [2001 SCR 2 482], [2001 UC 1 551], [2001 CRLJ 1723], [2001 SCC CR 685], [2001 SUPREME 2 423], [2001 SLT 2 796], [2001 SCJ 2 528], [2001 SRJ 4 308], [2001 CCR 2 43], [2001 RENTCR 2 255], [2001 KLT SN 2 89], [2001 AIR SC 1230], [2001 BOMCR CRI SC 730], [2001 SCC CRI 685]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1931219/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad9ae4b0149711411d3b
Index of Discharge Judgments u/s 227 are here.
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