K. Ranjith Vs State of AP on 01 Oct 2021

A good judgment of single bench of AP High court. Useful in my DP3 WP.

From Para 10,

10. As can be seen from the aforesaid Section of law, when small quantity of Ganja is involved in commission of the offence, the imprisonment prescribed is for a term which may extend to one year or with fine, which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both. In the instant case, the Ganja involved in commission of the offence is only 600 grams, which is below the 1000 grams. Therefore, as per the aforesaid notification, it is to be held that the Ganja involved in this case is only a small quantity and an offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(A) of the NDPS Act is only made out. So, the very registration of F.I.R. for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act, which is relating to commercial quantity, is obviously erroneous. Clause (C) of sub-clause (ii)(b) of Section 20 of the NDPS Act applies only when the Ganja involved is of 20 Kgs. as it is a commercial quantity as per the aforesaid notification. The said offence under Section 20((ii)(b)(C) of NDPS Act relating to possession or illegal transportation of Ganja of a commercial quantity is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees. So, when it is found that only a small quantity of Ganja of 600 grams is involved in this case, it is to be held that only an offence punishable under Section 20(ii)(b)(A) of the NDPS Act is made out and not an offence punishable under Section 20(ii)(b)(C) of the NDPS Act relating to commercial quantity. So, it is obvious that the police have registered the F.I.R. quoting a wrong section of law.

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/55236845/

Citations:

Upkar Singh Vs Ved Prakash and Ors on 10 Sep 2004

Posted on March 11 by ShadesOfKnife

A landmark judgment from a 3-judge bench of Supreme Court, categorically declares as follows:

From Para 17,

17. It is clear from the words emphasised hereinabove in the above quotation, this Court in the case of T.T Antony v. State of Kerala has not excluded the registration of a complaint in the nature of a counter-case from the purview of the Code. In our opinion, this Court in that case only held that any further complaint by the same complainant or others against the same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited under the Code because an investigation in this regard would have already started and further complaint against the same accused will amount to an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original complaint, hence will be prohibited under section 162 of the code. This prohibition noticed by this Court, in our opinion, does not apply to counter-complaint by the accused in the first complaint or on his behalf alleging a different version of the said incident.

From Para 23,

23. Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this Court in T.T Antony case is to be accepted as holding that a second complaint in regard to the same incident filed as a counter-complaint is prohibited under the Code then, in our opinion, such conclusion would lead to serious consequences. This will be clear from the hypothetical example given hereinbelow i.e if in regard to a crime committed by the real accused he takes the first opportunity to lodge a false complaint and the same is registered by the jurisdictional police then the aggrieved victim of such crime will be precluded from lodging a complaint giving his version of the incident in question, consequently he will be deprived of his legitimated right to bring the real accused to book. This cannot be the purport of the Code.

Upkar Singh Vs Ved Prakash and Ors on 10 Sep 2004

Citations : [2004 AIR SC 4320], [2004 ALD CRI 2 906], [2004 CRI LJ 4219], [2004 JCR SC 4 158], [2004 JT SC 7 488], [2004 KLT SC 3 444], [2005 OLR SC 1 43], [2004 PLJR 4 157], [2004 SCALE 7 563], [2004 CRLJ 0 4219], [2004 SCC 13 2922004 ACR 3 2450], [2005 SCC CR 0 211], [2004 SCC 1 292], [2004 JT 7 4881], [2005 JIC 1 1092005 ACC 51 673], [2004 AIR SC 3240], [2004 AIR SC 0 4320], [2004 RCR CRIMINAL 4 294], [2004 SCC 22 292], [2004 SCC 6 528], [2004 AIR SC 5017], [2005 BOMCR CRI SC 1 199], [2004 CRIMES SC 4 20], [2005 SCC CRI 211], [2004 SUPREME 6 528], [2004 ALLLJ 3436], [2004 CRLJ SC 4219], [2004 RCR CRL 4 2942004 ALL LJ 3436], [2004 CRILJ 42192004 JT 7 488], [2004 AIR SCW 5017], [2004 AIR SCW 0 4320]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1054183/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adefe4b0149711412948

Kapil Agarwal and Ors Vs Sanjay Sharma and Ors 01 Mar 2021

Posted on March 9 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court quashed the FIR in this case, and u/s 210 CrPC, held as follows

From Paras 5 and 6,

Thus, as per Section 210 Cr.P.C., when in a case instituted otherwise than on a police report, i.e., in a complaint case, during the course of the inquiry or trial held by the Magistrate, it appears to the Magistrate that an investigation by the police is in progress in relation to the offence which is the subject matter of the inquiry or trial held by him, the Magistrate shall stay the proceedings of such inquiry or trial and call for a report on the matter from the police officer conducting the investigation. It also provides that if a report is made by the investigating police officer under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and on such report cognizance of any offence is taken by the Magistrate against any person who is an accused in the complaint case, the Magistrate shall inquire into or try together the complaint case and the case arising out of the police report as if both the cases were instituted on a police report. It also further provides that if the police report does not relate to any accused in the complaint case or if the Magistrate does not take cognizance of any offence on the police report, he shall proceed with the inquiry or trial, which was stayed by him, in accordance with the provisions of Cr.P.C.
Thus, merely because on the same set of facts with the same allegations and averments earlier the complaint is filed, there is no bar to lodge the FIR with the police station with the same allegations and averments.
6. However, at the same time, if it is found that the subsequent FIR is an abuse of process of law and/or the same has been lodged only to harass the accused, the same can be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution or in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In that case, the complaint case will proceed further in accordance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C.

Kapil Agarwal and Ors Vs Sanjay Sharma and Ors 01 Mar 2021

Citations : [2021 SCC OnLine SC 154]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/97191348/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/kapil-agarwal-and-others-versus-sanjay-sharma-and-others

https://www.legitquest.com/case/kapil-agarwal-and-others-v-sanjay-sharma-and-others/1DA1F3

https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/tag/inherent-powers-of-high-courts/

Swaran Singh and Ors Vs State NCT Delhi and Anr on 18 Aug 2008

Posted on November 6, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Katju held that offending words to a member of SC/ST, are liable under the Act, only if made in any place in public view, but not otherwise. A big relief for those facing false cases.

From Paras 27 and 28,

27. Learned counsel then contended that the alleged act was not committed in a public place and hence does not come within the purview of section 3(1)(x) of the Act. In this connection it may be noted that the aforesaid provision does not use the expression ‘public place’, but instead the expression used is ‘in any place within public view’. In our opinion there is a clear distinction between the two expressions.

28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a ‘Chamar’) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression ‘place within public view’ with the expression ‘public place’. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.

And relating to American cuss word Nigger,

30. In this connection it may be mentioned that in America to use the word ‘Nigger’ today for an African-American is regarded as highly offensive and is totally unacceptable, even if it was acceptable 50 years ago. In our opinion, even if the word ‘Chamar’ was not regarded offensive at one time in our country, today it is certainly a highly offensive word when used in a derogatory sense to insult and humiliate a person. Hence, it should never be used with that intent. The use of the word ‘Chamar’ will certainly attract section 3(1)(x) of the Act, if from the context it appears that it was used in a derogatory sense to insult or humiliate a member of the SC/ST.

And then Husband was held to have NOT insulted the respondent in public view,

34. However, a perusal of the F.I.R. shows that Swaran Singh did not use these offensive words in the public view. There is nothing in the F.I.R. to show that any member of the public was present when Swaran Singh uttered these words, or that the place where he uttered them was a place which ordinarily could be seen by the public. Hence in our opinion no prima facie offence is made out against appellant no.1.

Swaran Singh and Ors Vs State NCT Delhi and Anr on 18 Aug 2008

Citations : [2008 SCC 8 435], [2008 SCC CRI 3 527], [2008 AIC SC 69 25], [2008 AIOL 938], [2008 AIR SC SUPP 441], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 2 431], [2008 CRLJ SC 4369], [2008 JT 9 60], [2009 MPLJ SC 1 503], [2008 SCALE 11 346], [2008 SCR 12 132]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/531612/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/575fd270607dba63d7e69106

Hitesh Verma Vs State of Uttarakhand and Anr on 05 Nov 2020

Posted on November 6, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Wonderful judgment from 3-judge bench to arresting the misuse of SC/ST Act 1989.

From Para 13, the insult must be targeted as the member belonged to SC/ST

13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the Society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that respondent No.2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that respondent No.2 is member of Scheduled Caste.

From Para 14, the insult must be in any place within public view

14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through Standing Counsel & Ors.5. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view.

From Para 18, Offence will NOT be made out just because the member is from SC/ST

18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out.

Hitesh Verma Vs State of Uttarakhand and Anr on 05 Nov 2020

Citations : [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 907]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/111507500/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5fb6aa47b128b6ff2528fcf1

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/hitesh-verma-versus-the-state-of-uttarakhand-anr

Vijaya Rao Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr on 29 Jul 2005

Posted on October 26, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that, just by using the words/expressions used in statutes/provisions does not disclose any offence, when the necessary ingredients constituting Section 420 are conspicuously lacking in the complaint.

From Para 5,

5. Except using the expressions fraudulent misappropriation and mala fide intention, the allegations in the complaint do not at all disclose as to how the appellant can be found guilty of the offence under Section 420 IPC. The ingredients constituting Section 420 are conspicuously lacking in the complaint. All the courts have failed to address themselves to the crucial question whether as far as the appellant is concerned any offence under Section 420 or for that matter any offence under Section 409 has been committed. Even going by the allegations in the complaint, allowing the criminal proceedings to go on against the appellant, would result in abuse of the process of the court. Hence, the proceedings in Complaint Case No. 10 of 2000 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sikar are quashed as against the appellant. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

Vijaya Rao Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr on 29 Jul 2005

Citations : [2006 CCR 2 122], [2006 SLT 3 405], [2005 SCC 7 69], [2005 SCC CRI 1600]

Others Sources :

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56ea89ae607dba38b6e4923a

Lanka Venkata Subrahmanyam Vs State of Telangana on 4 January 2018

Posted on June 20, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Baseless case against Secretary to Givernment LV Subrahmanyam was quashed by AP High Court.

Lanka Venkata Subrahmanyam Vs State of Telangana on 4 January 2018

Citations: [

Om Wati and Anr Vs State Thro Delhi Admn and Ors on 19 March 2001

Posted on May 21, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Since there was prima facie opinion formed by the Trial court in framing the charges on the accused persons, Apex Court held that High Court was not correct in interfering into the Trial Court Order.

Om Wati and Anr Vs State Thro Delhi Admn and Ors on 19 March 2001

Citations: [2001 ACR SC 2 1038], [2001 AIR SC 1507], [2001 ALD CRI 1 663], [2001 CRI LJ 1723], [2001 CRIMES SC 2 59], [2001 JT SC 3 585], [2001 LW CRL 2 687], [2001 PLJR 3 4], [2001 SCALE 2 505], [2001 SCC 4 333], [2001 SCR 2 482], [2001 UC 1 551], [2001 CRLJ 1723], [2001 SCC CR 685], [2001 SUPREME 2 423], [2001 SLT 2 796], [2001 SCJ 2 528], [2001 SRJ 4 308], [2001 CCR 2 43], [2001 RENTCR 2 255], [2001 KLT SN 2 89], [2001 AIR SC 1230], [2001 BOMCR CRI SC 730], [2001 SCC CRI 685]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1931219/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad9ae4b0149711411d3b

Index of Discharge Judgments u/s 227 are here.

Commissioner of Police Delhi Vs Devender Anand on 08 August, 2019

Posted on August 8, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court has dustbinned the false criminal case instituted by the litigant on a litigation which is of a civil nature, sale purchase of a flat, citing that it is a abise of process of Court.

Commissioner of Police Delhi Vs Devender Anand on 08 August, 2019

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

Anita Tambe Vs Anand Tambe on 28 February, 2018

Posted on December 25, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This is the judgment from Bombay High Court, in a case of DV filed after twenty seven years of the dissolution of marriage.

From Para 11,

In Zuveria Abdul Majid Patni vs. Atif Iqbal Mansoori and Another, the domestic violence took place between January 2006 and 06-9-2007 on which date first information report under Sections 498A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code was lodged by the wife against her husband and his relatives. It is in the context of these facts, that the Hon’ble Apex Court observes that even if it is accepted that during the pendency of the special leave petition the wife obtained ex parte “khula” (divorce) under the Muslim Personal Law from the Mufti on 09-5-2008, the petition under Section 12 of the DV Act is maintainable.

From Para 14,

Concededly, there is no interaction whatsoever between the petitioner wife and the respondent husband since the dissolution of marriage, not a single instance of domestic violence is pleaded in the petition the theme of which is that the petitioner wife is living at the mercy of her elder brother. Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that the limitation prescribed under Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not applicable, it is trite law, that any initiation of the proceedings under the statute must be done within a reasonable period. Even if the utmost latitude is given to the petitioner wife and it is assumed that she was subjected to domestic violence prior to the dissolution of marriage, the institution of the petition under Section 12 of the DV Act after twenty seven years of the dissolution of marriage is, as observed supra, a gross abuse of the statutory provisions.

Anita Tambe Vs Anand Tambe on 28 February, 2018

Citations:

Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/175316050/

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Abuse Or Misuse of Process of Court

K. Ranjith Vs State of AP on 01 Oct 2021

Upkar Singh Vs Ved Prakash and Ors on 10 Sep 2004

Kapil Agarwal and Ors Vs Sanjay Sharma and Ors 01 Mar 2021

Swaran Singh and Ors Vs State NCT Delhi and Anr on 18 Aug 2008

Hitesh Verma Vs State of Uttarakhand and Anr on 05 Nov 2020

Vijaya Rao Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr on 29 Jul 2005

Lanka Venkata Subrahmanyam Vs State of Telangana on 4 January 2018

Om Wati and Anr Vs State Thro Delhi Admn and Ors on 19 March 2001

Commissioner of Police Delhi Vs Devender Anand on 08 August, 2019

Anita Tambe Vs Anand Tambe on 28 February, 2018