Vimlesh Agnihotri and Ors Vs State and Anr on 16 Aug 2021

Posted on August 19, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court talks about the alarming increase of false cases of rape and offences under Section 354, 354A, 354B, 354C & 354D only to arm-twist the accused and make them succumb to the demands of the complainant.

From Para 6,

6. A perusal of the abovementioned facts would show that the parties have registered cross-cases against each other for offences under Section 376 IPC. It is tragic to note that practising advocates belonging to the legal fraternity are trivialising the offence of rape. Rape is not merely a physical assault; it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. The act of rape has the ability to scar the mental psyche of the victim and this trauma can persist for years.

From Para 8,

8. The issue as to whether the High Courts, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C, should quash an offence under Section 376 IPC has come for consideration before the Supreme Court in a number of cases. Rape is an offence against the society. The Supreme Court has, time and again, directed that the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash an offence of rape on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise.

From Paras 14-19,

14. Quashing FIR for offences like rape on the basis of compromise will encourage accused to put pressure on the victims to agree to a compromise and this will open doors for the accused to get away with a heinous crime which cannot be permitted.
15. In the present case it appears that both sides have resorted to file complaints of rape without having any sensitivity to the offence of rape. While the repercussions of the offence of rape on the victim have been mentioned above, on the other hand, false allegations of rape have the potential to destroy the life and career of the accused. The accused in a false case of rape loses his honour, cannot face his family and is stigmatized for life. Allegations regarding offences such as one under Section 376 IPC cannot be made at the drop of a hat – in order to settle personal scores.
16. Further, the time spent by the police in investigating false cases hinders them from spending time in investigation of serious offences. As a result, it leads to faulty investigations and the accused end up going scot-free. Valuable judicial time is also spent in hearing cases where false allegations are made and is consequently an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, people who make such false allegations of rape cannot be permitted to go scot-free. This Court is pained to note that there is an alarming increase of false cases of rape and offences under Section 354, 354A, 354B, 354C & 354D only to arm-twist the accused and make them succumb to the demands of the complainant.
17. This Court, at the moment, is not commenting as to whether the present case is a false case or not. However, if it is found that the cases which have been filed by the parties against each other are false and frivolous then action should be taken against the prosecutrix and others who were instrumental in levelling allegations of rape only to settle some personal scores. There is an urgent need to deter such frivolous litigations.
18. False claims and allegations pertaining to cases of molestation and rape need to be dealt with an iron hand due to the serious nature of the offences. Such litigations are instituted by the unscrupulous litigants in the hope that the other party will capitulate to their demands out of fear or shame. Unless wrongdoers are not made to face the consequences of their actions, it would be difficult to prevent such frivolous litigations. The Courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive for frivolous litigations which unnecessarily consumes the Court’s otherwise scare time. This Court is of the opinion that this problem can be solved, or at least minimized, to a certain extent, if exemplary cost is imposed on the litigants for instituting frivolous litigations.
19. In view of the mandate of the Supreme Court that High Courts must not exercise its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing an offence of rape only on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise, this Court is not inclined to entertain this petition.

Vimlesh Agnihotri and Ors Vs State and Anr on 16 Aug 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/53326449/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/vimlesh-agnihotri-ors-versus-state-anr

Dr.P.Pathmanathan and Ors Vs V.Monica and Anr on 18 Jan 2021

Posted on January 19, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A very good judgment regarding PWDV Act 2005 (Act) and the procedure to be following, in detail. Snippets from the same follow along with the 14 directions issued for the Judicial Magistrate to be followed by them in disposing DV cases in Tamil Nadu.

From Paras 3 and 4,

3. Upon a close reading of the D.V Act, this Court found that the nature of rights that were protected and enforced under the Act were purely civil in nature. However, considering the forum which was dealing with such applications, and the procedure adopted, a criminal color has been unwittingly given to these proceedings. Like a chameleon changing its colour depending on the situation, the proceedings under the D.V Act were also camouflaged due to the nature of the forum provided under the Act.

4. On the flip side, this faulty understanding of the nature of the proceedings has also given rise to a tendency to misuse these proceedings as a weapon of harassment against parties who are unrelated to the proceedings by making them stand before a Magistrate like accused persons. It is mainly on account of this abuse of process that a deluge of petitions came to be filed for quashing the proceedings under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. This sorry state of affairs was a clear clarion call that impelled this Court to undertake this exercise to bring the situation under control by laying down certain guidelines for the disposal of the applications under Section 12 of the D.V Act.

Proceedings and Offences under the Act

18. Before examining this issue, it is necessary to notice the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Magistrate under the D.V Act. The procedure to be followed by a Magistrate in dealing with an application for reliefs under Chapter IV is set out in Section 28 of the Act. A close reading of Section 28 would show that it draws a distinction between “proceedings” (Section 12, 18 to 23) and “offences” (Sections 31 & 33) and states that they will be governed by Cr.P.C. This general rule is subject to two exceptions. The first exception is contained in the opening words of Section 28(1) of the Act which begins with the expression “save as otherwise provided by this Act”, the effect of which is to exclude the application of the Code in areas where the procedure has been expressly set out in the D.V Act or the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “D.V Rules” or “the Rules”). The second exception is found in Section 28(2) of the Act which is in the nature of a non-obstante clause expressly authorizing the Court to deviate from the procedure set out in Section 28(1) and lay down its own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 or a proceeding under Section 23(2) of the Act.
19. In the first instance, it is, therefore, necessary to examine the areas where the D.V. Act or the D.V. Rules have specifically set out the procedure thereby excluding the operation of Cr.P.C as contemplated under Section 28(1) of the Act. This takes us to the D.V Rules. At the outset, it may be noticed that a “complaint” as contemplated under the D.V. Act and the D.V Rules is not the same as a “complaint” under Cr.P.C. A complaint under Rule 2(b) of the D.V Rules is defined as an allegation made orally or in writing by any person to a Protection Officer. On the other hand, a complaint, under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. is any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the Code, that some person, whether known or unknown has committed an offence. However, the Magistrate dealing with an application under Section 12 of the Act is not called upon to take action for the commission of an offence. Hence, what is contemplated is not a Officer as contemplated under Rule 4(1) of the D.V Rules.
20. Rule 6(1) sets out that an application under Section 12 of the Act shall be as per Form II appended to the Act. Thus, an application under Section 12 not being a complaint as defined under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C, the procedure for cognizance set out under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code followed by the procedure set out in Chapter XV of the Code for taking cognizance will have no application to a proceeding under the D.V. Act. To reiterate, Section 190(1)(a) of the Code and the procedure set out in the subsequent Chapter XV of the Code will apply only in cases of complaints, under Section 2(d) of Cr.P.C, given to a Magistrate and not to an application under Section 12 of the Act.
21. Consequently, the stage for issuance of process contemplated under Section 204, Cr.P.C has no application to a proceeding under the D.V Act as the Magistrate, in an application under Section 12 of the D.V Act, is not taking cognizance of any offence, but is only dealing with an application for civil reliefs. Furthermore, as has already been pointed out, the respondent before the Court in an application under Section 12 of the Act is not an accused. Hence, the requirement of framing a charge does not arise either. (See V. Palaniammal v. Thenmozhi (2010) 1 MWN Cri 217).

24. A close reading of the aforesaid provisions would show that the procedure set out in the D.V Act and the Rules makes a conscious deviation from the traditional modes of a criminal court taking cognizance, issuing process and then trying the accused under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. save in the case of offences under Section 31 & 33 of the Act. Thus, the application of the Cr.P.C. to an application under Section 12 is residuary in nature by virtue of the mandate of Section 28(1) of the D.V Act.

So, 482 CrPC does not apply to a DV proceeding, which is civil in nature…

40. As the proceedings before a Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under Chapter IV is not a criminal proceeding before a Criminal Court, the next question is whether a petition under Section 482 of the Code would lie to quash an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. It is settled law that a petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C would lie only against an order of a criminal court.

41. As pointed out by a Division Bench of this Court in Rajamanickam v State of Tamil Nadu, 2015 (3) MWN Cri 379, Section 482 Cr.P.C preserves only the inherent criminal jurisdiction of the High Court. Thus, a petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C would be maintainable only if the order complained of is passed by a criminal Court or by a Court in exercise of powers under the Cr.P.C. Quashing an application under Section 12 of the D.V Act does not fall in either category, as what the Court is called upon to do at that stage is to interdict the exercise of civil jurisdiction by the Magistrate at the threshold. As indicated supra, since the Magistrate is exercising only a civil jurisdiction in granting reliefs under Chapter IV of the Act, it follows that a Magistrate is not a criminal court for the purposes of proceedings under Chapter IV of the Act. It follows that an application under Section 482, Cr.P.C does not lie to quash an application under Section 12 of the D.V Act.

So, no remedy then…? (IMHO, apart from Article 227, a petition under sec 151 C.P.C. should also be available to quash the DV proceeding, if it is necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.)

42. This does not, however, mean that an aggrieved respondent is remediless. The Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under Chapter IV of the D.V Act, is certainly a subordinate Court for the purposes of Article 227, and a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution would still be available challenging the proceedings under Chapter IV of the D.V Act, in an appropriate case.

Class for the lower trial Courts…

51. It has been brought to the notice of this Court that in several cases, Magistrates continue to mechanically follow the drill of the procedure set out in Sections 190(1)(a), 200 to 204, Cr.P.C and issue summons as if the respondents before it are accused of offences. To compound the confusion, in most of these cases all and sundry are roped in as respondents before the Magistrate. These respondents, upon being summoned, file petitions under Section 205, Cr.P.C to dispense with their personal attendance and thereafter file petitions under Section 482, Cr.P.C to obtain a stay of all further proceedings in the case, and in most cases their personal appearance before the Magistrate is also dispensed with, and the case is then thrown into the backburner. All of this, it appears, is on account a perceptible lack of clarity in the procedure followed by the Magistrates while deciding applications under the Act.

Directions follow:

52.While it is no doubt true that the Court of Magistrate is invested with a great deal of flexibility under Section 28(2) of the Act to devise its own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 of the Act, the twin principles of consistency and clarity dictate that this Court must now lay down some broad guidelines, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution & in respect of Judicial Magistrates under Section 483 of the Cr.P.C, for the proper disposal of applications under Section 12 of the D.V Act. A corrective mechanism is available in the D.V Act itself for aggrieved parties to agitate their grievances and obtain redress.

The following directions are, therefore, issued:

i. An application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, is not a complaint under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. Consequently, the procedure set out in Section 190(1)(a) & 200 to 204, Cr.P.C as regards cases instituted on a complaint has no application to a proceeding under the D.V Act. The Magistrate cannot, therefore, treat an application under the D.V Act as though it is a complaint case under the Cr.P.C.
ii.An application under Section 12 of the Act shall be as set out in Form II of the D.V Rules, 2006, or as nearly as possible thereto. In case interim ex-parte orders are sought for by the aggrieved person under Section 23(2) of the Act, an affidavit, as contemplated under Form III, shall be sworn to.
iii. The Magistrate shall not issue a summon under Section 61, Cr.P.C to a respondent(s) in a proceeding under Chapter IV of the D.V Act. Instead, the Magistrate shall issue a notice for appearance which shall be as set out in Form VII appended to the D.V Rules, 2006. Service of such notice shallbe in the manner prescribed under Section 13 of the Act and Rule 12 (2) of the D.V Rules, and shall be accompanied by a copy of the petition and affidavit, if any.
iv. Personal appearance of the respondent(s) shall not be ordinarily insisted upon, if the parties are effectively represented through a counsel. Form VII of the D.V Rules, 2006, makes it clear that the parties can Magistrate either in person or through a duly authorized counsel. In all cases, the personal appearance of relatives and other third parties to the domestic relationship shall be insisted only upon compelling reasons being shown. (See Siladitya Basak v State of West Bengal (2009 SCC Online Cal 1903).
v. If the respondent(s) does not appear either in person or through a counsel in answer to a notice under Section 13, the Magistrate may proceed to determine the application ex-parte.
vi. It is not mandatory for the Magistrate to issue notices to all parties arrayed as respondents in an application under Section 12 of the Act. As pointed out by this Court in Vijaya Baskar (cited supra), there should be some application of mind on the part of the Magistrate in deciding the respondents upon whom notices should be issued. In all cases involving relatives and other third parties to the matrimonial relationship, the Magistrate must set out reasons that have impelled them to issue notice to such parties. To a large extent, this would curtail the pernicious practice of roping in all and sundry into the proceedings before the Magistrate.
vii. As there is no issuance of process as contemplated under Section 204, Cr.P.C in a proceeding under the D.V Act, the principle laid down in Adalat Prasad v Rooplal Jindal (2004 7 SCC 338) that a process, under Section 204, Cr.P.C, once issued cannot be reviewed or recalled, will not apply to a proceeding under the D.V Act. Consequently, it would be open to an aggrieved respondent(s) to approach the Magistrate and raise the issue of maintainability and other preliminary issues. Issues like the existence of a shared household/domestic relationship etc., which form the jurisdictional basis for entertaining an application under Section 12, can be determined as a preliminary issue, in appropriate cases. Any person aggrieved by such an order may also take recourse to an appeal under Section 29 of the D.V Act for effective redress (See V.K Vijayalekshmi Amma v Bindu. V, (2010) 87 AIC 367). This would stem the deluge of petitions challenging the maintainability of an application under Section 12 of the D.V Act, at the threshold before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.
viii. Similarly, any party aggrieved may also take recourse to Section 25 which expressly authorises the Magistrate to alter, modify or revoke any order under the Act upon showing change of circumstances.
ix. In Kunapareddy (cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the order of a Magistrate purportedly exercising powers under Order VI, Rule 17 of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “C.P.C.”), to permit the amendment of an application under Section 12 of the D.V Act. Taking a cue therefrom, it would be open to any of the respondent(s), at any stage of the proceeding, to apply to the Magistrate to have their names deleted from the array of respondents if they have been improperly joined as parties. For this purpose, the Magistrate can draw sustenance from the power under Order I Rule 10(2) of the C.P.C. A judicious use of this power would ensure that the proceedings under the D.V Act do not generate into a weapon of harassment and would prevent the process of Court from being abused by joining all and sundry as parties to the lis.
x. The Magistrates must take note that the practice of mechanically issuing notices to the respondents named in the application has been deprecated by this Court nearly a decade ago in Vijaya Baskar (cited supra). Precedents are meant to be followed and not forgotten, and the Magistrates would,
therefore, do well to examine the applications at the threshold and confine the inquiry only to those persons whose presence before it is proper and necessary for the grant of reliefs under Chapter IV of the D.V Act.
xi. In Satish Chandra Ahuja (cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has pointed out the importance of the enabling provisions under Section 26 of the D.V Act to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Hence, the reliefs under Chapter IV of the D.V can also be claimed in a pending proceeding before a civil, criminal or family court as a counter claim.
xii. While recording evidence, the Magistrate may resort to chief examination of the witnesses to be furnished by affidavit (See Lakshman v Sangeetha, 2009 3 MWN (Cri) 257. The Magistrate shall generally follow the procedure set out in Section 254, Cr.P.C while recording evidence.
xiii. Section 28(2) of the Act is an enabling provision permitting the Magistrate to deviate from the procedure prescribed under Section 28(1), if the facts and circumstances of the case warrants such a course, keeping in mind that in the realm of procedure, everything is taken to be permitted unless
prohibited (See Muhammad Sulaiman Khan v Muhammad Yar Khan, 1888 11 ILR All 267).
xiv. A petition under Article 227 of the Constitution may still be maintainable if it is shown that the proceedings before the Magistrate suffer from a patent lack of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction under Article 227 is one of superintendence and is visitorial in nature and will not be exercised unless there exists a clear jurisdictional error and that manifest or substantial injustice would be caused if the power is not exercised in favour of the petitioner. (See Abdul Razak v. Mangesh Rajaram Wagle (2010) 2 SCC 432, Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai v. Tuticorin Educational Society, (2019) 9 SCC 538.) In normal circumstances, the power under Article 227 will not be exercised, as a measure of self-imposed restriction, in view of the corrective mechanism available to the aggrieved parties before the Magistrate, and then by way of an appeal under Section 29 of the Act.

Dr.P.Pathmanathan and Ors Vs V.Monica and Anr on 18 Jan 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

Anil Kumar and 2 Ors Vs State of A.P. Anr on 03 Apr 2019

Posted on December 25, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Single Judge Bench of JUSTICE Dr. B.SIVA SANKARA RAO, quashed the false 498A/DP Act complaint on Father in law and two sisters in law. Just one Paragraph !!!

From Para 6,

6. There is no record even shown from the police charge sheet by collecting from father of de facto complainant as to any so-called additional amount of Rs.4,30,000/- given out of his retirement benefits or 15 tulas of gold. It is crucial if at all to believe as to what were the retirement benefits he received and when from his account he parted with. There is no date or time even mentioned either in the report or from the police investigation to believe, leave about the fact that the so-called marriage performed, from the police investigation out of love affair between A-1 and de facto complainant against the will of the parents of the de facto complainant and the parents of A-1, who are A-2 & A-3 from the beginning agreed for the love marriage with no objection. Once such is the case, even the stray allegation of the petitioners/A-2 to A-4 used to abuse her as not of their caste or religion and if they marry another girl, they could get more dowry itself is unbelievable, for the very marriage is love marriage. Even to say that there was any instigation to A-1 by A-2 to A-4 for additional dowry when it is a love marriage and no dowry shown paid originally and as discussed supra of no any payment of dowry by father of de facto complainant after his retirement from his benefits alleged, the question of any payment of additional dowry is unbelievable. It clearly shows the petitioners/A-2 to A-4 are roped without any basis for reasons better known by the de facto complainant and the police investigation in this regard is also perfunctory and baseless and the legal position is very clear that unless from the specific allegations in the complaint against the other relatives of the husband, no cognizance can be taken against the family members, particularly from the tendency of making baseless allegations in roping them and even a stray sentence as suffered harassment in the hands of in-laws, etc., is not sufficient to sustain any such accusation to rope the other family members of the husband of the de facto complainant, so-called victim.

Anil Kumar and 2 Ors Vs State of A.P. Anr on 03 Apr 2019

Citations :

Other Sources :

Index of Quash judgments here.

Pradeepkumar Vs State of Kerala on 23 Nov 2020

Posted on November 27, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A consensual sexual act is given a color of a rape in this case and the accused got bail u/s 439 CrPC on his third attempt, as this very same judge was not inclined to grant bail in earlier two instance and hence the bail applications were withdrawn.

Pradeepkumar Vs State of Kerala on 23 Nov 2020

Maheshwar Tigga Vs State of Jharkhand on 28 Sep 2020

Posted on October 31, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

The 3-judge bench again reiterated the usage and importance of Sec 313 CrPC, in this case where the parties very well knew they cannot get married due to their different religions and their parents are opposed to their marriage as they insisted that the marriage happen in a Temple Vs a Church !!!

From Para 6,

9. It stands well settled that circumstances not put to an accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be used against him, and must be excluded from consideration. In a criminal trial, the importance of the questions put to an accused are basic to the principles of natural justice as it provides him the opportunity not only to furnish his defence, but also to explain the incriminating circumstances against him. A probable defence raised by an accused is sufficient to rebut the accusation without the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. This Court, time and again, has emphasised the importance of putting all relevant questions to an accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

Maheshwar Tigga Vs State of Jharkhand on 28 Sep 2020

Shabnam Sheikh Vs State of Maharashtra on 15 Oct 2020

Posted on October 21, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Vagua allegations don’t take fake cases far. Bombay HS quashed the fake case of 498A IPC against the relatively.

From Para 14,

14. Nowadays, it has become a tendency to make vague and omnibus allegations, against every member of the family of the husband, implicating everybody under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. Hence, it has become necessary for the Courts to carefully scrutinize the allegations and to find out if the allegations made really constitute an offence and meet the requirements of the law at least prima facie.

Shabnam Sheikh Vs State of Maharashtra on 15 Oct 2020

Anil Bharadwaj Vs The High Court of MP and Ors on 13 Oct 2020

Posted on October 14, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A District-Judge aspirant lost that opportunity due to a false 498A IPC case from which he got acquitted, after the selection for the post completed.

Anil Bharadwaj Vs The High Court of MP and Ors on 13 Oct 2020

Earlier High Court Judgment dismissing the Writ petition

Anil Bhardwaj Vs The High Court of Madhya Pradesh and Ors on 06 Jan 2020

~~~

Other Source: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/103138593/

Kamlesh Kalra Vs Shilpika Kalra and Ors on 24 April 2020

Posted on August 24, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Daughter-in-law launched a pressure tactic (supreme court’s words) against her in-laws and husband but had to eat dirt in the end. Since the complaint was filed after more than limitation period of 3 years, the 498A case was quashed.

Trivia: No launching of criminal proceedings for filing a false case.

Kamlesh Kalra Vs Shilpika Kalra and Ors on 24 April 2020

Citations :

Other Sources :

Satpal Singh Vs State of Punjab on 15 July 2020

Posted on July 25, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Sensible Judge understood the nefarious arrangement between two parties to marriage, more as a contract to immigrate to Canada. AB granted.

Satpal Singh Vs State of Punjab on 15 July 2020

Tahmeena Kaleem and Ors Vs State of AP on 17 January 2014

Posted on July 18, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

High Court of AP has held in this Anticipatory Bail application, to be a falsely implicated case against petitioners. Certain guidelines were passed.

It is most unfortunate that the de facto complainant has implicated her in laws, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, parents of the mother-in-law and their relatives, two more sisters of her husband and their husbands who are residing in foreign countries. A reading of the complaint gives an impression that the de facto complainant has implicated almost all the relatives of her husband and their other close relatives who are visiting her husbands house. This is most unfortunate situation. This type of complaint gives an impression that Section 498-A is being misused to harass not only the husband of the de facto complainant but all his relatives. It is alleged that in order to force the husband to come to their terms or in order to meet their huge demands, this kind of complaints are being given. How difficult it would be for those persons staying in Australia, Jeddah or USA to come over to India and face the criminal case and prove their innocence.

Truth or otherwise of the allegations cannot be decided unless fair and dispassionate investigation is completed. Sometimes, after full-fledged trial only, truth may come out. There cannot be any doubt to say that there is dowry menace in the society. But, at the same time, it is also a fact that certain marriages are performed without any dowry. Due to ill-advice or under a wrong impression that if a complaint is lodged under section 498-A IPC, the husband may come to terms, complaints are being lodged with the police. When differences arise, there should be proper counselling before and after marriage. It is quite natural that husband and wife would have faced different circumstances and environment from their childhood resulting in gaining different impressions and opinions and therefore they may have difference of opinion on life style and on several other issues. Therefore, issues have to be resolved by trying to understand one another, particularly, when the parties have children, special care has to be taken to protect the interest of the children. The welfare of the children should be given utmost importance. Therefore, proper counselling at initial stage would help the parties. It is most unfortunate that Section 498-A IPC has become a weapon in breaking the families rather than in uniting them.

Here are the guidelines.

It appears that there is every need to give similar directions in Andhra Pradesh. Under Domestic Violence Act, protection officer is required to assist the police and the Court. Section 14 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 envisages that the Magistrate may, at any stage of the proceedings under this Act, direct the respondents or the aggrieved person either singly or jointly to undergo counselling with any member of a service provider who posses such qualification and experience in counselling as may be prescribed. Section 498-A IPC is a cognizable and non-compoundable offence.
In the light of the above discussion, the following guidelines have been issued.
a) A fair and dispassionate investigation should be conducted. After completing investigation, the same should be verified by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police.
b) During the course of investigation, if the investigating officer is satisfied that there is false implication of any person in the complaint then he may delete the names of such persons from the charge sheet after obtaining necessary permission from the Superintendent of Police or any other officer equivalent to that rank.
c) As soon as a complaint is received either from the wife alleging dowry harassment or from the husband that there is every likelihood of him being implicated in a case of dowry harassment, then, both the parties should be asked to undergo counselling with any experienced counsellor or counsellors. The report of such counsellors should be made as a part of the report to be submitted by the investigating officer to the Court.
d) The Superintendent of Police, in consultation with the Chairman, District Legal Services Authority, may prepare a panel of counsellors and such panel of counsellors along with their address and phone numbers should be made available at all the police stations.
e) Normally, no accused should be arrested, where the allegation is simple dowry harassment. If the arrest is necessary during the course of investigation, the investigating officer should obtain permission of the Superintendent of Police or any other officer of the equal rank in metropolitan cities. If arrest is not necessary, the police may complete the investigation and lay charge sheet before the Court without arresting the accused and seek necessary orders from the Court. However, in the case of dowry death, suspicious death, suicide or where the allegations are serious in nature such as inflicting of bodily injury etc., the police officer may arrest the accused. However, the intimation of such arrest should be immediately sent to the concerned Superintendent of Police who may give necessary guidance to the arresting officer.
f) No accused or witness should be unnecessarily called to the police station and as soon as the purpose of summoning them to the police station is over they should be sent back. There should not be any unnecessary harassment to any person i.e. either to the relatives of the de facto complainant or to the relatives of the husband.
g) The higher police officers should see that the parties do not make any allegations that they are forced to come to any settlement in police stations against their wish. However, this does not mean that the police officers should not make any effort for amicable settlement.
h) The advocates have to play their role in trying to unite the families. They must act as social reformers while dealing with these kind of cases, particularly, where the couple have children. Even when an accused is produced before the Magistrate, they should examine the matter judiciously and consider whether there are valid grounds for remanding the accused to the judicial custody. No accused should be remanded to judicial custody mechanically in routine manner. If the Magistrate feels that the accused cannot be released after taking bonds, necessary orders may be passed accordingly.

The Director General of Police, Andhra Pradesh, is requested to issue necessary instructions to all the concerned in this regard.

Tahmeena Kaleem and Ors Vs State of AP on 17 January 2014

Citations: [

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Legal Terrorism

Vimlesh Agnihotri and Ors Vs State and Anr on 16 Aug 2021

Dr.P.Pathmanathan and Ors Vs V.Monica and Anr on 18 Jan 2021

Anil Kumar and 2 Ors Vs State of A.P. Anr on 03 Apr 2019

Pradeepkumar Vs State of Kerala on 23 Nov 2020

Maheshwar Tigga Vs State of Jharkhand on 28 Sep 2020

Shabnam Sheikh Vs State of Maharashtra on 15 Oct 2020

Anil Bharadwaj Vs The High Court of MP and Ors on 13 Oct 2020

Kamlesh Kalra Vs Shilpika Kalra and Ors on 24 April 2020

Satpal Singh Vs State of Punjab on 15 July 2020

Tahmeena Kaleem and Ors Vs State of AP on 17 January 2014