Sujit Kumar Vs Vandana on 08 Aug 2016

Delhi High Court said the follow about HMA 24…

11. The object behind Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is to provide for maintenance, pendente-lite, to a spouse in matrimonial proceedings so that during the pendency of the proceedings the spouse can maintain herself/himself and also have sufficient funds to carry on the litigation so that the spouse does not unduly suffer in the conduct of the case for want of funds.
12. A spouse unable to maintain himself/herself is entitled to maintenance on the principle of equi-status and respect that the spouse would have enjoyed if he/she continued to live with other spouse.
13. The provisions of Section 24 are beneficent in nature and the power is exercised by the Court not only out of compassion but also by way of judicial duty so that the indigent spouse may not suffer at the instance of the affluent spouse. The legislature, in its discretion, has not fixed any guideline regarding ceiling limit of maintenance, pendente-lite, as in the case of Divorce Act or Parsi Marriage Act. The word ‘support’ in Section 24 is not to be narrowly interpreted. It does not mean bare existence. It means that the claimant spouse should have the same comfort as the other. Of course, the Section is not intended to bring about arithmetical equality between the two.
14. The Court while considering the merits of an application for grant of an interim maintenance under Section 24 has to necessarily arrive at prima-facie determination about the earning capacity of the rival claimants. The determination cannot be made with exactitude; it is essentially interim in nature. The Court is called upon to make a summary consideration of amount which the applicant is to be awarded by way of maintenance pendente-lite and litigation expenses in accordance with the financial resources of the parties. Capacity of the other party to earn cannot be taken into consideration – it is only the actual earning of the opposite party on the basis of which relief can be granted. Permanent income and not casual income is relevant. For example if a husband brings on record that the non-applicant wife earns some amount by taking coaching classes for children, this cannot be termed as her permanent income or that the wife has independent permanent source of income. The proceedings being summary, the matter has to be decided on the basis of pleadings supported by affidavits and the documents that may be filed by the parties in support of their case.
15. Where there was sufficient means in the family of the husband on the strength of which the husband got married he has to share the burden to support his wife during the course of annulment of such marriage.

Citations : [2016 SCC ONLINE DEL 4397]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/182704867/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/581180f42713e179479e391b

Sujit Kumar Vs. Vandana [Delhi High Court, 08-08-2016]

Jiten Bhalla Vs Gaytri Bajaj on 08 Sep 2008

Posted on January 18 by ShadesOfKnife

Delhi High Court passed this Judgment, critiquing the conduct of a ADJ in a matrimonial case…

124. Here in the present case, the Addl.District Judge without recording the evidence and without going into the allegations and counter allegations made by both the parties, has disposed of this application, which is unwarranted, since all the allegations and counter allegations made in the present proceedings require evidence.
125. Now, the question which arises for consideration as to whether present appeal under Section 28 of Act is maintainable or not. Even assuming for arguments sake that appeal is not maintainable, but revision does lie and this appeal can be treated as revision.
126. When admittedly, civil suit was pending, then there was no occasion for Addl.District Judge to have admitted application under Section 151 CPC for consideration and as such, the order of Addl.District Judge in entertaining application under Section 151 CPC, was patently without jurisdiction.
127. Lastly, the Addl. District Judge has made certain observations about the health of the his predecessor.
128. There was no occasion for Sh.V.K.Khanna, Addl.District Judge, to make such observations.
129. It has nowhere been pleaded by the respondent/applicant in application under Section 151 CPC, that predecessor of Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional District Judge was not keeping good health or the judgment has not been signed by him.
131. A judicial officer has no authority or jurisdiction to comment upon the functioning and working of judicial officer of same rank, about the competency or physical condition of his successor. 132. Whether an Additional District Judge, who is subordinate to this Court, is competent to discharge his judicial functions or not, that is, for this Court to decide. Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional District Judge has assumed powers of this Court and has made sarcastic remarks on the functioning, competency and physical condition of his predecessor, Sh.S.C.Mittal, Additional District Judge (since deceased) who was much senior in hierarchy to Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional District Judge.
133. A judicial officer, has no business or right to compare the signatures of his predecessor on the judicial proceedings which have been made by him in discharge of his judicial functions. More so, when no pleadings whatsoever in respect thereof, have been made by any of the parties. The conduct of Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional Districut Judge in making the above remarks about the physical conditions and functioning of Sh.S.C.Mittal, Additional District Judge, are highly improper and uncalled for.
137. A copy of this judgment be placed before the Inspecting Judges of Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional District Judge, for taking appropriate action, against Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional District Judge for his improper conduct, in making comments against his successor, which are against the judicial ethics and discipline.

Jiten Bhalla Vs Gaytri Bajaj on 08 Sep 2008

Citations : [2008 AD DEL 9 618], [2008 DRJ 106 651], [2008 DMC 2 503], [2008 SCC ONLINE DEL 1032]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/143547006/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090c6de4b01497111771c8

https://www.legitquest.com/case/shri-jiten-bhalla-son-of-shri-rk-bhalla-v-ms-gaytri-bajaj-daughter-of-shri-anil/75C31

A challenge to this Order was dismissed at Supreme Court here.

Kirti Vashisht Vs State and Ors on 29 Nov 2019

Posted on January 10 by ShadesOfKnife

Delhi High Court passed this order based on Lalita Kumari.

16. Learned APP has fairly conceded that as per the contents of the complaint, cognizable offence is made out. Thus, even on the first complaint made to Police Station, Najafgarh, the FIR was supposed to be registered. As per section 154 Cr.P.C., if any information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence is received by any Police Station, the said Police Station is duty bound to register the FIR. However, if the crime is not occurred in the jurisdiction of the said Police Station, then after registering the ‘Zero FIR’, the same has to be transferred to the concerned Police Station for investigation, where the offence has been committed. However, neither this happened in the Police Station Najafgarh nor thereafter in Police Station Baba Hari Das Nagar and also nor in Police Station Kapashera as well.
17. It is not in dispute that the provision of ‘Zero FIR‟ came up as a recommendation in the Justice Verma Committee Report, in the new Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 after the heinous ‘Nirbhaya Case’ of December, 2012. The provision says: “A Zero FIR can be filed in any police station by the victim, irrespective of their residence or the place of occurrence of crime.”
18. It is also not in dispute that the practice of ‘Zero FIR‟ is prevalent throughout India from the last many years. Thus, the Police Station of Kapashera, Najafgarh and Baba Hari Das Nagar were also aware about the said practice but none of the Police Stations till date have registered the case on the complaint of respondent no.7 whereas admittedly, cognizable offence has been committed as per the complaint of respondent no.7. Thus, the complainant/respondent no.7 was compelled to run from pillar to post due to inaction of the Police Stations mentioned above.

Kirti Vashisht Vs State and Ors on 29 Nov 2019

Kirti Nagpal Vs Rohit Girdhar on 20 Nov 2020

Posted on November 21, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Delhi High Court confirmed the Divorce granted by Trail Court.

Kirti Nagpal Vs Rohit Girdhar on 20 Nov 2020

Index is here.

Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018

Posted on November 14, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Division bench of Delhi High Court held that, the law does not prescribe any precondition such that the arrears amount of maintenance has to be deposited before appeal or revision can be allowed.

From Para 22,

22. Neither the language used by the Legislature in Section 399 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C., nor the language used in Section 29 of the DV Act even remotely suggest that the Legislature intended to impose pre-conditions to the availment of the said remedies, of the kind evolved in Rajeev Preenja (supra).

And then from Para 25,

25. Laudable as the object of the learned Single Judge may have been, the question is, whether in the light of the settled law taken note of hereinabove, the learned Single Judge while deciding Rajeev Preenja (supra) could have issued a general direction barring entertainment of criminal revisions under Section 399 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. against orders granting interim maintenance to the wife/ child under Section 125 Cr.P.C., unless the entire arrears of maintenance up to date were first deposited? In our view, with due respect to the learned Single Judge, the answer is clearly in the negative. As to what should be the policy of the law is a matter which squarely falls within the preserve of the Legislature, and it is not a matter which the Courts can dictate, or evolve. It is one thing to interpret an existing law and, while doing so, to adopt an interpretation which is purposive, i.e. one which advances the objective of the enactment. However, it is quite a different thing to evolve a statutory scheme which, even the Legislature did not provide for.

Finally, in Para 30,

30. Thus, we answer the reference by holding that the general direction issued in Rajeev Preenja (supra) in paragraphs 15, 16 and 20 are not sustainable. The said directions could not have been issued by the learned Single Judge as they seek to curtail the statutory remedy of revision available under Section 399 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C, and of appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against orders granting interim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and Section 23 of the DV Act respectively. The direction in question over steps into the legislative field, which was impermissible for the Court to do. We agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Brijesh Kumar Gupta (supra), that there cannot be an absolute rider that the entire maintenance amount, as granted by the Trial Court, should be deposited prior to the entertainment of the statutory remedy, because it would leave the remedy of statutory revision/ appeal illusory. Accordingly, we hold that a revision under Section 399 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. and an appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against the order granting maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and under Section 23 of the DV Act respectively, would be maintainable, and would be entertained and heard without any pre-condition of deposit of the arrears of maintenance as ordered by the Ld. MM. We further hold that the pendency of such a Revision or Appeal- as the case may be, shall not operate as a stay of the operation of the order granting interim maintenance. The reference is answered accordingly.

Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018

Citations : [2018 SCC ONLINE DEL 9747], [2018 DLT 251 245], [2018 HLR 3 413], [2019 CRI LJ 218]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80568294/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b44dfac9eff431bb54655a9

Binita Dass Vs Uttam Kumar on 9 Aug 2019

Posted on November 14, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Single-judge Bench said one thing in this Order which is as follows:

7. Qualification of the wife and the capacity to earn cannot be a ground to deny interim maintenance to a wife who is dependant and does not have any source of income.

The converse is read like this:

Wife who is not-dependant and have source of income, can be a ground to deny interim maintenance to a wife.

Binita Dass Vs Uttam Kumar on 9 Aug 2019

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/92763076/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5d8b2ff8714d58374079df99

Subhash Bahadur @Upender Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 6 Nov 2020

Posted on November 10, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Delhi High Court held that there is no need for filing an formal application seeking default bail, once the conditions set out in section 167(2)(a) are made out, as continued confinement violates fundamental right under Article 21.

From Paras 32, 33 and 34,

32. A plain reading of the Proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.PC indicates that an accused would necessarily have to be released on bail “if he is prepared to and does furnish bail”. Thus, in cases where the statutory period of sixty days or ninety days has expired, the accused would be entitled to be released on bail provided he meets the condition as set out therein – that is, he is prepared to furnish and does furnish bail. It is important to note that there is no provision requiring him to make any formal application.

33. It is also trite law that there is no inherent power in a court to remand an accused to custody. Such power must be traced to an express provision of law [See: Natbar Parida Bisnu Charan vs State of Orissa: (1975) Supp SCR 137 and Union of India vs Thamsharasi: (1995) 4 SCC 190]. As is apparent from the language of Proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.PC, the power of a Court to remand an accused to custody pending investigation is circumscribed and stands denuded if the period of sixty days or ninety days, as the case may be, has expired and the accused is ready and willing to furnish bail.

34. It is also necessary to bear in mind that courts have consistently leaned to resolve the tension between form and substance, in favour of substance and have used the interpretative tools to address the substance of the matter. In Ajay Hasia Etc v Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors:1981SCR(2) 79 had, in an altogether different context, observed that “where the constitution fundamentals vital to maintenance of human rights are at stake, functional realism and not facial cosmetics must be the diagnostic tool, for constitutional law must seek the substance and not the form”. Thus, if in substance the essential conditions as set out under the Proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.PC are met and complied with – that is (i) if the investigation has not been completed within the period of sixty or ninety days, as the case may be, from the date of arrest of the accused; and (ii) if the accused is prepared to offer bail – then there would be no justifiable reason to detain the accused.

Subhash Bahadur @Upender Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 6 Nov 2020

More Gyan here.

Rampyari and Ors Vs Ms Kamlesh on 09 Mar 2010

Posted on October 21, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Shri Shiv Narayan Dhingra ji fined 25K INR to be paid to the Respondent, due to the delay tactics employed by Petitioner/her Advocate in dragging on the case…

Rampyari and Ors Vs Ms Kamlesh on 09 Mar 2010

CBI Vs Ram Swaroop Chandel and Ors on 30 Sep 2020

Posted on October 19, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Delhi High Court held this interesting point on discharge an accused.

71. In view of above facts discussed, the settled law is that if the prosecution witnesses presumed to be true, without any cross examination, still conviction cannot be awarded to the accused, then deserves for discharge, as the case in hand is.

CBI Vs Ram Swaroop Chandel and Ors on 30 Sep 2020

Citations :

Other Sources :

Index of Discharge Judgments u/s 239 are here.

Deepti Kapur Vs Kunal Julka on 30 June 2020

Posted on October 6, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

In this case, Single Judge discussed the admissibility of evidence in cases filed in Family Courts u/s 14 and also dispelled the false notion that if a spouse obtains an evidence illegally (by installing a CCTV in this case), such act would not be violative of the other spouse’s right to privacy. And also nothing in Constitution of India prohibits such evidence.

Deepti Kapur Vs Kunal Julka on 30 June 2020

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: High Court of Delhi Judgment or Order or Notification

Sujit Kumar Vs Vandana on 08 Aug 2016

Kirti Vashisht Vs State and Ors on 29 Nov 2019

Kirti Nagpal Vs Rohit Girdhar on 20 Nov 2020

Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018

Binita Dass Vs Uttam Kumar on 9 Aug 2019

Subhash Bahadur @Upender Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 6 Nov 2020

Rampyari and Ors Vs Ms Kamlesh on 09 Mar 2010

CBI Vs Ram Swaroop Chandel and Ors on 30 Sep 2020

Deepti Kapur Vs Kunal Julka on 30 June 2020