Dinesh Kumar Vs Neeti and Ors on 4 Apr 2026 – Judgment Summary

Posted on April 24 by Suprajaa Rajan

In a significant ruling on interim maintenance, the Delhi High Court dealt with cross-petitions filed by both husband and wife challenging the quantum of maintenance awarded under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. While the husband argued that the amount was excessive, the wife contended that it was inadequate considering his actual financial capacity.

The dispute arose after the parties separated in 2016, with the wife seeking maintenance under both Section 125 of the CrPC (now Section 144 BNSS) and proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act. After evaluating the material on record, the High Court took a balanced approach. It neither accepted the husband’s minimal income claim nor the wife’s allegation of extremely high earnings, but instead assessed his income pragmatically.

“12. Thus, the responsibility of their day-to-day care, upbringing and education is being borne by the wife. Secondly, this Court notes that the husband has alleged that the wife is earning about ₹30,000/- per month by giving tuition. However, no document or material has been placed on record by him to substantiate this allegation. In the absence of any supporting material, such assertion cannot be accepted at this stage. Therefore, this Court does not find any infirmity in the finding of the learned Trial Court, as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court, that the income of the wife is to be treated as „Nil‟ for the purpose of deciding interim maintenance.”
“14. Thus, at this stage, while the allegation of the wife regarding the extremely high income of the husband remains unsubstantiated, the claim of the husband that he is earning only ₹12,000/- per month also requires to be examined cautiously in light of the overall facts and circumstances of the case.”
“17. In these circumstances, this Court finds no reason to disagree with the observations of the learned Appellate Court that the husband appears to have withheld material information regarding his actual income and financial status. The material placed on record therefore prima facie indicates that the husband has not made a full and candid disclosure of his financial position.”
“18. Considering the fact that the husband claims to be earning only ₹12,000/- per month, which is even below the minimum wages applicable in Delhi, this Court finds no ground to accept such a claim at this stage. “

Decision

Accordingly, the High Court dismissed both cross-petitions and upheld the Appellate Court’s order granting total interim maintenance of ₹13,000 per month to the wife and two minor children.

Furthermore, the Court clarified that:

The maintenance awarded under Section 125 CrPC (Section 144 BNSS) would be adjusted against the amount granted under the Domestic Violence Act.
The findings were purely interim in nature and subject to final adjudication after trial.
Importantly, the Court reiterated that suppression of income invites adverse inference, and courts may assess earning capacity even in the absence of full disclosure.

Thus, the judgment reinforces the principle that financial responsibility toward dependents cannot be avoided through incomplete or misleading disclosures.

Dinesh kumar Vs Neeti and Ors on 4 Apr 2026

Citation : 2026 DHC 2819

Other Sources :

Index of Maintenance judgements is here.

Key Contributor :
Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.
+91-9606345150

Vinod Kumar Vs Seema Devi and Anr on 16 Mar 2026 – Judgement Summary

Posted on April 4 by Suprajaa Rajan

In Vinod Kumar Vs Seema Devi and Anr, the Delhi High Court examined whether the maintenance awarded by the Family Court under Section 125 CrPC (now Section 144 BNSS) required interference.

The petitioner (husband) challenged the maintenance granted to his wife and daughter, arguing that:

The wife lived separately without justification
She had rental income
His own income was wrongly assessed

However, the Court found that the wife had consistently alleged cruelty, which justified her separate residence. Moreover, the Court emphasized that an able-bodied husband cannot evade maintenance liability by understating income or taking voluntary retirement.

After analysing income, evidence, and legal principles, the Court upheld the Family Court’s order and dismissed the revision petition.

“9. It is well settled that the object of granting maintenance is to prevent vagrancy by compelling those who can provide support to those who are unable to support themselves and who have a moral claim to support.”

“10. Section 125 of the CrPC elucidates conditions under which a wife may be deemed ineligible for maintenance. These conditions include instances where the wife is engaged in adulterous activities, where she, without any justifiable cause, refuse to cohabit with her husband, or where both parties have agreed to live apart through mutual consent. These provisions delineate clear legal parameters that govern the entitlement or disentitlement of maintenance to ensure that the support is granted only under circumstances that warrant such financial assistance.”

“13. Merely because Respondent No.1 remained in possession of the matrimonial house, the same does not signify that the petitioner did not neglect to maintain the respondents. Even if the contention of the petitioner is taken as correct, the case of the respondents is not helmed on Respondent No.1 leaving the company of the petitioner due to neglect, so as to disentitle her from grant of maintenance. Rather, Respondent No.1 has made categorical allegations of cruelty, which is sufficient to satisfy the threshold of balance of probabilities.”
“18. It appears to be implausible that the petitioner would have taken retirement from his stable well-paying job without securing any other mode of income. As it is a normal tendency of the parties to not disclose their true income in matrimonial disputes, the Courts are permitted to make some guess work and arrive at a figure that a party may reasonably be earning.”
“19. The petitioner is a well- bodied man capable of earning, he cannot shirk his sacrosanct duty to financially support his wife and children by claiming that he has no income after retirement apart from his pension. The petitioner is thus obliged to earn and maintain his family, and the purported lower MSP prices for his land would thus not help his case.”

Decision

The Delhi High Court held that:

The maintenance awarded by the Family Court was justified and reasonable
The wife’s allegations of cruelty justified her separate residence
The husband’s claim of low income was not credible

Accordingly:

The Court refused to interfere with the maintenance order
The revision petition was dismissed
Maintenance (₹10,000 per month each after majority, with 10% increase every two years) was upheld

Vinod Kumar Vs Seema Devi and Anr on 16 Mar 2026

Citation :

Other Sources :

Index of Maintenance Judgements under Sec 125 CrPC is here.

Related Legal Concepts

Maintenance under Section 125 CrPC (Section 144 BNSS)
Cruelty as Ground for Separate Residence
Assessment of Income in Maintenance Cases
Doctrine of Social Justice in Family Law
Adverse Inference for Non-Disclosure of Income

Key Contributor :
Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.
+91-9606345150

Vikaramjeet Rana Vs The State of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 6 Nov 2025 – Judgment Summary

Posted on March 24 by Suprajaa Rajan

The Delhi High Court held that interim rent maintenance under the DV Act cannot continue after the wife acquires her own residence.

The Court observed that the purpose of rent is to provide immediate shelter. Once the wife purchases a house, that need ends. Therefore, continuation of rent becomes unjust enrichment.Further, the Court recognised that change in circumstances under Section 25 DV Act (now read with BNSS framework) permits modification of earlier orders.

Accordingly, the Court set aside the order allowing adjustment of rent towards EMI payments.

The following paragraphs form the core reasoning of the decision:

“26. It needs no reiteration that the Domestic Violence Act had been enacted with the intention of providing immediate relief and support to a wife who has been subjected to domestic violence. The legislative intent behind the D.V. Act is to provide succour to women who are financially vulnerable and subjected to domestic violence. However, the said provision cannot be stretched to benefit a woman who is financially independent and capable of maintaining herself.”
“29. No doubt, the Interim Order directed payment of Rent of Rs.20,000/- per month. However, here is a situation when the Petitioner is claiming change of circumstances and thus, modification of this Order in terms of Section 25(2) D.V. Act which provides that in case of change of circumstances the Order may be recalled, modified or altered.”
“30. In the present case, indeed there is a change in circumstance as a flat has been admittedly acquired by Respondent No.2. The question is whether she should now continue to get Rs.20,000/- per month towards Rent.”
“31. As already noted, the purpose of granting maintenance under the D.V. Act was to provide the Respondent with alternate accommodation. However, she having acquired a flat in Hauz Khas, Delhi, she cannot be held to be in need of immediate shelter. Therefore, it would not be appropriate, fair, or just to direct that the maintenance of Rs.20,000/- per month be continued, as has been rightly argued by the Petitioner. Once a flat has been acquired by the Respondent, there remains no justification to direct continuation of payment of Rs.20,000/- per month by the Petitioner.”
“32. The very substratum upon which the maintenance was granted, has ceased to exist with the acquisition of the property. To permit the continuation of such payment, would be to allow the Respondent undue benefit, which is contrary to the purpose of interim relief under the D.V. Act.”

Decision

The Court thus allowed the revision petition. It set aside the order that permitted rent adjustment towards EMI payments. It held that rent maintenance cannot continue after property acquisition.

The Court directed that payment of ₹20,000 per month shall stop from May 2024.

Vikaramjeet Rana Vs The State of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 6 Nov 2025

Index of Maintenance Judgments under Hindu Marriage Act is here.

Citation : 2025:DHC:9719

Other Sources :

Related Legal Concepts

Interim Maintenance under DV act
Change in circumstances in maintenance law
Rent Vs EMI-legal distinction
Purpose of Interim Relief in DV Act

Key Contributor :

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

Sandeep Pathak and Ors Vs Lalitha Tiwari on 10 Mar 2026 – Judgment Summary

Posted on March 23 by Suprajaa Rajan

The Delhi High Court in Sandeep Pathak and Ors Vs Lalitha Tiwari quashed criminal proceedings under Section 498A IPC (Section 85 BNS), Section 406 IPC (Section 316 BNS), and the DV Act.

The Court held that vague and omnibus allegations cannot establish cruelty or criminal breach of trust. It also ruled that DV Act proceedings cannot survive after divorce, as the domestic relationship ceases.

Further, the Court found that the wife filed proceedings after the divorce decree. Therefore, it treated the case as an abuse of process under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS).

“45. From the entire allegations as discussed above, it emerges that the essential ingredients of Section 498A IPC are not made out from the Complaint made by Respondent No.2.”
“46. In light of the above findings, it is concluded that it is clearly a case which comes in the category of abuse of the process of law, meriting quashing of the FIR.”
“52. Thus, aside from omnibus allegations, no prima facie case of entrustment of jewellery has been made out. Thus, no offence under Section 406 IPC is made out in the Complaint against the Petitioners.”
“55. As discussion above in detail, there is not an iota of even a prima facie case of cruelty or of harassment of the Complainant by the Petitioners. There is also no element of cruelty or entrustment made out from the facts alleged by the Respondent in her Complaint. Moreover, as discussed above from the facts, when comprehensively considered, reflects that it is a case of abuse of process of law, justifying the quashing of the FIR and the Chargesheet filed therein.”
“69. Thus, the chronology of events clearly indicates that the criminal and DV proceedings were initiated after the marital relationship had already been dissolved by a decree of divorce, and is a subsequent attempt to revive matrimonial disputes through criminal proceedings, which is clearly an abuse of the process of law and an afterthought.”

“70. In view of the above discussion, the Complaint under the DV Act is based on the same vague and omnibus allegations which have already been examined in the context of the FIR. Further, the Complaint has been instituted after the decree of divorce dated 05.09.2012, which has attained finality, thereby bringing the domestic relationship between the parties to an end. In the absence of any specific allegations of domestic violence and a subsisting domestic relationship, continuation of the present proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law.”

Decision

The Court allowed both petitions. It quashed the FIR and DV Act complaint, held that the allegations were vague and legally insufficient. It also held that the domestic relationship had ended due to divorce.

Therefore, continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process under Section 482 CrPC ( Section 528 BNSS).

Sandeep Pathak and Ors Vs. Lalita Tiwari on 10 Mar 2026

Citation :

Other Sources :

Related Legal Concepts

Explore related stages and concepts in criminal procedure:

Quashing of FIR
Abuse of process of law
Domestic Relationship requirement
Abuse of process of law
Omnibus allegations in Criminal Law
Stridhan and Entrustment

Key Contributor :

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

M/s Jindal Polyster Ltd Vs Rahul Jaura on 18 Oct 2005 – Judgment Summary

Posted on March 8 by Suprajaa Rajan

The Delhi High Court examined a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging a trial court order. The dispute arose in a recovery suit where the defendant denied appointing the plaintiff as an insurance consultant. Later, the defendant realised that the denial resulted from confusion regarding the company’s earlier name. The defendant then sought amendment of the written statement.

The plaintiff opposed the amendment and also filed an application under Section 340 CrPC (Section 379 BNSS) alleging perjury.

The High Court examined whether the amendment should be allowed and whether such allegations should affect the amendment request.

The following paragraphs explain the reasoning that led to the final decision.

“The defendant then realized its mistake because the earlier name of the defendant-company was ‘M/s Hindustan Pipe Udyog Limited’ and ‘Hindustan Synthetic Fibres’ was a division of ‘Hindustan Pipe Udyog Limited’. In the year 1992 the name ‘Hindustan Pipe Udyog Limited’ was changed to ‘Jindal Polysters and Steel Limited’, which name was again changed to ‘Jindal Polysters Limited’ in the year 1995.”

“The explanation given for the amendment was that there was a communication gap between the defendant and his earlier counsel and that Mr. Sumeet Maheshwari, who joined the defendant as Company Secretary in the year 1994 was not very much acquainted with the fact that the earlier name of the defendant company was ‘Hindustan Pipe Udyog Limited’.”

“After hearing both the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that so far as the application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. is concerned, it is established law that this has to be dealt with normally at the time of final disposal of the matter and after the trial court judge forms an opinion that an offence of perjury had been intentionally committed and that it was expedient in the interest of justice to lodge a complaint.”

“I find force in the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner-defendant that there was change of names repeatedly about the defendant company and the company could not run away with any averment about its denial of the appointment of plaintiff.”

Decision

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the trial court’s order.

The Court permitted the amendment of the written statement under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. It allowed the amendment subject to costs of ₹10,000.

The Court also clarified that allegations under Section 340 CrPC (Section 379 BNSS) should be considered at the appropriate stage during the trial.

M:s Jindal Polyster Ltd Vs Rahul Jaura on 18 Oct 2005

Citation :2005:DHC:3716

Other Sources :

Index of Perjury proceedings is here.

Key Contributor :

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

Punjab Tractors Ltd Vs M/s International Traders Ltd and Ors on 18 Sep 2009 – Judgment Summary

Posted on March 8 by Suprajaa Rajan

The Delhi High Court decided an important issue on perjury proceedings under Section 340 CrP (Section 379 BNSS).

The defendants sought prosecution of the plaintiff’s officials for allegedly filing fabricated drawings and false statements. The court examined whether the circumstances justified criminal prosecution for perjury during civil proceedings.

The judgment clarifies that courts must exercise extreme caution before initiating perjury proceedings. Courts should order prosecution only in clear cases where conviction appears likely.

The following paragraphs explain the court’s reasoning that led to the final decision.

“21. Formation of prima facie opinion that a person charged has intentionally given false evidence is a condition precedent for directing lodging of a complaint. The existence of mens rea or criminal intention behind act complained of will have to be looked into and considered before any action under Section 340 of the Cr.PC is recommended.”

“22. The affidavits of Mr. Manrao and Mr. Rihal aforesaid were in the nature of pleadings of the plaintiff. The court must be very cautious in its approach in prosecuting a person for making any statement claimed to be false in regard to a pleading, so that party’s right to plead freely is not curtailed.”

“23.It cannot also be lost sight of that in criminal prosecution there is waste of public funds and time of courts. For this reason also in every case of perjury the court would not mechanically take cognizance or direct prosecution. Prosecution should be ordered only when it is considered expedient and in the interest of justice to punish the delinquent.”

“24. There is yet another principle of law though relating to witnesses. A witness is entitled to an opportunity to correct himself. In the present case, Mr. Rihal during the cross examination admitted two mistakes in the drawings alleged to be fabricated. Mr. Rihal having corrected himself, ought not to be prosecuted.”

Decision

The Delhi High Court dismissed the defendants’ application under Section 340 CrPC (Section 379 BNSS).

The court held that the facts did not justify prosecution for perjury. The alleged discrepancies in drawings did not establish deliberate falsity or criminal intent.

The court also noted that excessive perjury prosecutions may defeat the purpose of justice.

Punjab Tractors Vs International Tractors on 18 Sep 2009

Citation :167 (2010) DLT 490

Other Sources :

Index of Perjury Judgements is here.

Key Contributor :

Mrs Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

Rashmi Raikhy and Anr Vs The State of NCT Delhi and Ors on 1 Feb 2018

Posted on February 19 by ShadesOfKnife

The High Court of Delhi, quashed the Look Out Circular (LOC) issued against the petitioners registered under Sections 406/498-A/34 IPC.

The Court held that issuance and continuation of an LOC in a matrimonial dispute involving Section 406 IPC was neither reasonable nor justified, especially when the petitioners had regularly appeared before the trial court, complied with bail conditions under Section 438 CrPC, and had not misused permission to travel abroad.

The Court emphasised that an LOC is a serious coercive measure and cannot be mechanically issued in matrimonial disputes where the accused are neither absconding nor involved in heinous offences.

The LOC was accordingly directed to be withdrawn.

The following paragraphs were instrumental in the Court’s decision to quash the Look Out Circular:

Para 4 “Record reveals that on several occasions permissions were sought by the petitioners to travel abroad and the said permissions were granted; there are no allegations of their misuse. Record further reveals that the petitioners are regularly appearing before the court concerned in the said proceedings.”
Para 5 “During this period since 2009/2010, the petitioners have suffered a lot due to issuance of LOC against them. Even after discharge order on 11.12.2017, LOC against the petitioner No.2 has not been rescinded.”
Para 7 “For the offence under Section 406 IPC, in matrimonial dispute, issuance of LOC against the petitioners till disposal of the case cannot be justified; the offence is not heinous in nature.”
Para 8 “In the case of E.V.Perumal Samy Reddy, E.V.R.Santosh Reddy and Rajeshwari vs. State represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Police and State represented by the Inspector of Police MANU/TN/2308/2013, Madras High Court noted various types of persons who could be included in the LOC:-
(i) Persons with Terrorists or Militant Links,
(ii) Belligerent Foreigners,
(iii) Foreigners previously noticed for violations of visa conditions.
(iv) Persons required by courts in criminal/civil cases who are absconding
(v) Absconding Offenders wanted by Police/CBI/Customs /Central excise/ Directorate of Rev. Intelligence/other agencies”
Para 9 “Apparently, the petitioners do not fall in any of the above categories. There are no allegations that petitioner No.1 ever absconded and did not participate in the criminal proceedings.”
Para 10 “Issuance of LOC is a serious matter as it contains full particulars of the individual which are sent throughout the world. Peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and due to subsequent development whereby the petitioner No.1 was charged only under Section 406 IPC, continuation of LOC against her can’t be considered reasonable and justified.”
Para 11 “In view of the above discussion, the concerned authorities are directed to withdraw the LOC order issued against the petitioners.”

Decision of the Court

Exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 CrPC, the Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and directed the withdrawal of the Look Out Circular issued against the petitioners.

Rashmi Raikhy Vs State of NCT of Delhi

Citation: [2018:DHC:785]

Other Sources :

Index of Look Out Circular decisions is here.

Key Contributor:
Mrs Suprajaa Rajan B.Com, LL.B., LL.M.
+91-9606345150

Tasmeer Qureshi Vs Asfia Mazaffar on 29 Oct 2025

Posted on February 14 by ShadesOfKnife

In Tasmeer Qureshi v. Asfia Muzaffar, the Delhi High Court held that a Family Court cannot fix interim maintenance without recording a clear assessment of the husband’s income. While concealment of income permits an adverse inference, the Court must still determine actual or notional monthly income before fixing the quantum. Since the Family Court failed to disclose the income basis for the amount awarded, the High Court set aside the order and remanded the matter for fresh determination in accordance with law and the principles laid down in Rajnesh v. Neha.

Before setting out the relevant extracts, the Court emphasized that maintenance cannot be fixed in vacuum and must reflect a reasoned assessment of income.

Relevant Extracts from the Judgement :

“9. Apparently, it is the petitioner’s case that he had left his job on 04.01.2019, therefore, it is questionable as to how there were credit entries of Rs.15,45,131/- in the period 2021–23, in case he was unemployed.”
“10. In these circumstances, the learned Family Court drew an adverse inference that the petitioner is a man of means and has sufficient capacity to maintain the respondent and their minor child.”
“17. However, the order does not disclose any assessment – either actual or notional – of the petitioner’s monthly income on the basis of which this quantum was determined.”
18. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order cannot be sustained in its present form. While the learned Family Court rightly observed that the petitioner had concealed his true income and possessed sufficient means, it proceeded to fix the amount of maintenance without recording any assessment of his income or indicating the basis on which the figure of ₹20,000/- per month was arrived at.
“19. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the learned Family Court for a fresh determination of interim maintenance…”

From Paras 47 to 49, A caution was sounded.

46. However, the method must be applied with accuracy and care. Minimum wages are not uniform across India; they vary by State/Union Territory, by scheduled employment, and by skill category (unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled, or highly skilled), and they are periodically revised. The learned Family Courts must therefore:
(i) identify the correct State,
(ii) determine the appropriate skill category on a prima facie view of the husband‟s qualifications, experience and past vocation, and
(iii) note the effective date of the minimum wage schedule relied upon.
47. Orders that simply assume “minimum wages in Delhi” without examining whether the husband resides or is ordinarily employed in another State result in a higher or lower income assessment. For instance, if the husband resides in the State of Haryana and there is no proof that he is employed in Delhi, the minimum wage schedule applicable in Haryana has to be applied. The inadvertent practice of applying Delhi’s minimum wages merely because the proceedings are before a court in Delhi or because the wife resides in Delhi ought to be avoided.
48. However, it is also to be considered that minimum wages are a floor, not a ceiling. If the record supports a higher prima facie income (for instance, on the basis of prior salary slips, tax returns, bank account statements, etc.), the Family Court should assess the income accordingly rather than resorting to default minimum wages.
49. It must also be borne in mind that minimum wages notified by each State are periodically revised. Therefore, while determining the income for a past period, the Family Court must refer to the minimum wages that were in force at that time, and not to the rates prevailing on the date of the order. For instance, if the income of the husband for the year 2022 is under consideration, the Court should take into account the minimum wages applicable in 2022 for the relevant category and State, rather than the revised figures of 2025.

Tasmeer Qureshi Vs Asfia Muzaffar on 29 Oct 2025

Citation: [2025:DHC:9479]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/107706650/

Index of maintenance judgements under 125 Cr.P.C is here.

Key Contributor :
Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B, LL.M.
Contact : 9606345150

Sahiba Sodhi Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 09 Dec 2025

Posted on February 14 by ShadesOfKnife

From Paras from 13 to 17,

13. From the affidavit of income, assets and liabilities filed by the petitioner-wife before the learned Trial Court in November 2020, it is evident that she did not disclose the income earned during her period of employment between April 2020 and July 2020. In the said affidavit, she asserted that she had worked only for ten months during the entire eight years of marriage. However, she later admitted having worked for a few months in 2020 also, only after the learned Trial Court specifically directed her to file her bank account statements for the period April 2020 to November 2020 – statements which she had not annexed with her affidavit despite filing it in November 2020.
14. It is further noted that although an updated income affidavit was filed by the petitioner in April 2021 in compliance with the directions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Rajnish v. Neha: (2021) 2 SCC 324, she still did not file her income tax returns for the preceding three years, claiming that the husband had been filing them on her behalf. The learned Trial Court observed that ITRs could nevertheless be accessed using her PAN details and granted her a final opportunity to file them, while imposing costs of ₹1,000/-. The relevant bank statements were eventually filed in July 2021, but legible copies were not furnished to the respondent-husband. In view of the petitioner‟s repeated non-compliance and withholding of material documents, the learned Trial Court was constrained to stay the operation of the ad-interim maintenance order. When bank statements were eventually produced, the salary of about ₹18,000/- per month, admittedly earned by the petitioner during those three months as stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner before the Court, was not reflected in the bank account statements, nor was any termination letter filed contemporaneously. These omissions led the learned Trial Court to conclude that the petitioner did have a source of income, which she attempted to suppress.
15. The learned Trial Court also took note of the petitioner‟s earlier ITRs which showed that, contrary to her claim of having no source of income, she had declared substantial earnings in the years immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. Her ITR for the FY 2017–2018 reflected a gross income exceeding ₹3,00,000/-, comprising rental income and income from other sources. Similarly, her ITR for the FY 2018–2019 showed a gross income of more than ₹3,50,000/-, again arising from rent and deposits. These disclosures were inconsistent with her submission that she was unemployed and that whatever she earned was taken away by her husband.Her bank account statements also reflected electronic transfers, credit entries and investments, none of which were satisfactorily explained by her. These circumstances, at the interim stage, provided sufficient basis for the learned Trial Court to draw a prima facie inference that the petitioner had additional sources of income which she had not disclosed in her income affidavit, and thus, suppressed material facts relating to her financial capacity.
16. The learned Sessions Court, after independently examining the Trial Court record, affirmed these findings and held that the petitioner had not approached the Court with clean hands. It noted that the petitioner had produced the relevant records only when confronted with the documents filed by the respondent-husband and only after specific and repeated directions were passed by the learned Trial Court. The learned Sessions Court also observed that her explanations for the credit entries in her bank accounts were merely oral and unsupported by documents.
17. The record further reflects that the petitioner had received substantial amounts towards maturity of LIC policies and recurring deposits upon the demise of both her parents. Her own explanation is that these amounts were reinvested for the benefit of herself and the child. However, the fact remains that such reinvestments would reasonably generate returns in the form of interest, which constitute a source of income that was never disclosed. The respondent-husband has also placed on record the ITR Acknowledgement for AY 2025–2026, of the petitioner-wife, showing an income of ₹2,04,730/-.

The beauty in this judgment is as follows:

20. However, this Court finds merit in the submission of the petitioner regarding her right to secure adequate residence. It is undisputed that after the parties vacated the rented premises, the petitioner and the minor child have been residing at her brother‟s house. The petitioner is not paying any rent and is residing there purely out of goodwill.
21. Section 19(1)(f) of the PWDV Act empowers the Court to direct the respondent to secure for the aggrieved woman the same level of alternate accommodation as enjoyed by her in the shared household, or to pay rent for the same. The husband also owes a statutory duty to provide residence for his minor child, who resides with the petitioner. The fact that the petitioner may not be entitled to monetary maintenance due to concealment of income does not, ipso facto, in the interregnum, disentitle her to a residence order under Section 19 of the PWDV Act.
22. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the petitioner-wife is entitled to a sum of Rs. 10,000/- per month, as expenses towards securing a rented accommodation for herself and the minor child, which shall be paid by the respondent herein. The directions qua payment of interim maintenance of Rs. 15,000/- per month to the minor child, as directed by the learned Trial Court and upheld by the Sessions Court, have not been challenged before this Court, and the same are accordingly not interfered with.

The mere fact that the case is only at a Stage where there is challenge to the Interim Orders, this Order sustains. Otherwise, no relief may be granted under DV Act unless DV is established by way of evidence. One should not forget that, as per Section 19(1)(f) of DV Act, ONLY on being satisfied that DV actually happened (obviously by way of evidence), the relief in sub-section can be granted, that to in Main petition

19. Residence orders.—(1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order—
(a) xxxx;
(b) xxxx;
(c) xxxx;
(d) xxxx;
(e) xxxx; or
(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require:
Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a woman.

Frankly, why is interim maintenance granted to the child, when DV was not held to be prima facie established?

Sahiba Sodhi Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 09 Dec 2025

Citations: [2025:DHC:11064]

Other Sources:

Arshi Parveen Vs Maqsood on 5 Jan 2026

Posted on February 13 by ShadesOfKnife

In Arshi Parveen v. Maqsood, the Delhi High Court enhanced interim maintenance awarded under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The Court held that when a husband suppresses income details or provides incomplete, the Court can assess income on the basis of minimum wages applicable in the concerned State.

The Court held that the wife cannot be presumed to earn merely on allegation.

“8. Mere bald assertion that the wife is working and earning, without any proof to even prima facie support this claim, cannot be of any help to the respondent-husband at this stage. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that, for the purposes of grant of interim maintenance, the petitioner-wife cannot be presumed to be earning or being capable of maintaining herself.”
“10. In such circumstances, this Court is of the view that the income of the respondent-husband must be assessed on the basis of minimum wages. Extract from Tasmeer Qureshi case cited :Minimum wages provide a statutory and reasonable basis to assess a person’s earning capacity when there is no direct or reliable proof of actual income available on record.”

From Paras 13 and 14,

13. Accordingly, to serve the interests of justice, the interim maintenance payable to the petitioner-wife is enhanced from ₹2,500/- per month to ₹3,500/- per month, payable from the date of filing of the application under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. subject to adjustment of any amount already paid.
14. The petitioner is directed to also clear the arrears of maintenance within a period of 03 months from date.

Arshi Parveen Vs Maqsood on 05 Jan 2026

Citation : [2026:DHC:13]

Other Sources :

https://lawlens.in/doc/ad1b1315-b5cf-43f9-b8e0-b623d4374582

https://www.legalbites.in/bharatiya-nagarik-suraksha-sanhita/maintenance-fixation-must-use-minimum-wages-of-husbands-state-rather-than-courts-location-1237797

Index of Maintenance Judgements under 125 Cr.P.C is here.

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