Shikha Lall Vs Prince Agarwal on 7 Nov 2024

Posted on July 21 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High court relying on two judgments, Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010 and Afia Rasheed Khan Vs Mazharuddin Ali Khan and Anr on 10 Oct 2022, held that New Delhi does not have jurisdiction under PWDV Act.

From Para 16,

16. A perusal of the above clearly indicates that the parties have not resided in Delhi at any given point in time during the alleged incidents for the cause of action to arise in the present jurisdiction. Thus, to state that due to the registration of marriage in New Delhi, the courts of Delhi would have jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputes of domestic violence between the present parties. There is no cause of action that arose within the local limits of the Courts of Delhi.

Shikha Lall Vs Prince Agarwal on 7 Nov 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of DV judgments is here.

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Posted on July 21 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Shiv Narayan Dhingra ji has passed this Order around the definition of a Temporary residence as held by the Section 27 of the PWDV Act 2005.

9. All legislative enactments on matrimonial disputes or custody matters make ordinary residence or residence or the place where parties lived together or the place of cause of action as a ground for invocation of jurisdiction of the Court. Domestic Violence Act is the first Act where a temporary residence of the aggrieved person has also been made a ground for invoking the jurisdiction of court. The expression “residence‟ means
“to make abode‟ – a place for dwelling. Normally place for dwelling is made with an intention to live there for considerable time or to settle there. It is a place where a person has a home. In Webster Dictionary, the residence means to dwell for length of time. The words „dwelling place‟ or abode are synonyms. A temporary residence, therefore, must be a temporary dwelling place of the person who has for the time being decided to make the place as his home. Although he may not have decided to reside there permanently or for a considerable length of time but for the time being, this must be place of her residence and this cannot be considered a place where the person has gone on a casual visit, or a fleeing visit for change of climate or simply for the purpose of filing a case against another person.
10. I, therefore, consider that the temporary residence, as envisaged under the Act is such residence where an aggrieved person is compelled to take shelter or compelled to take job or do some business, in view of domestic violence perpetuated on her or she either been turned out of the matrimonial home or has to leave the matrimonial home. This temporary residence does not include residence in a lodge or hostel or an inn or residence at a place only for the purpose of filing a domestic violence case. This temporary residence must also be a continuing residence from the date of acquiring residence till the application under Section 12 is disposed of and it must not be a fleeing residence where a woman comes only for the purpose of contesting the case and otherwise does not reside there.
11. In the present case, the aggrieved person is residing with her sister and has filed the petition under Domestic Violence Act. It cannot be said that her residence with her sister was a fleeing residence or was a temporary residence acquired for lodging the complaint of domestic violence. Her sister‟s house is a place where she has taken shelter and temporarily resides. I, therefore, find that there is no force in this petition. The petition is hereby dismissed with no orders to costs.

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Citations: [2010:DHC:4306], [2010 9 Laws(DLH) 9]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/106302060/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090d56e4b014971117976a

Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here.

Vikram Kumar Jha Vs State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 10 Jul 2026

Posted on July 16 by ShadesOfKnife

A single bench Judge of Delhi High Court rightly remarked about how the abuse of Women-oriented laws is prevalent in our Country.

From Paras 3 and 4,

3. It is contended by learned Senior Counsel for petitioners that the impugned FIR is a complete abuse of process insofar as serious allegations of sexual misconduct have been levelled against petitioners no. 1 and 2, who are brothers-in-law of the complainant de facto. It is further submitted that marriage between the complainant de facto and brother of petitioner no. 1 took place on 08.07.2016, after which they were blessed with two children. On 18.09.2023, brother of petitioner no. 1 filed divorce case against complainant de facto, so out of vengeance she lodged this police complaint on 15.04.2024. It is submitted that in the impugned FIR, the complainant de facto did not make any allegation of rape, but it is subsequently in her statement under Section 164 CrPC for the first time on 15.06.2024 that she alleged having been raped in the year 2017. It is submitted by learned Senior Counsel that there is no whiff of explanation as to why the complainant de facto remained silent for so long.
4. I also find substance in the submission of learned Senior Counsel for petitioners that in the recent past, ever since the Supreme Court delivered the judgment in the case of Arnesh Kumar vs State of Bihar & Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 273, which narrowed down the abuse of provisions under Section 498A/406 IPC as regards arrest, a trend is setting in where the complainants have started alleging such serious charges of rape, molestation and similar other sexual misconduct only to ensure that the in-laws of the complainant are compelled to settle the matrimonial disputes by paying hefty amounts.

Vikram Kumar Jha Vs State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 10 Jul 2026

Dinesh Kumar Vs Neeti and Ors on 4 Apr 2026 – Judgment Summary

Posted on April 24 by Suprajaa Rajan

In a significant ruling on interim maintenance, the Delhi High Court dealt with cross-petitions filed by both husband and wife challenging the quantum of maintenance awarded under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. While the husband argued that the amount was excessive, the wife contended that it was inadequate considering his actual financial capacity.

The dispute arose after the parties separated in 2016, with the wife seeking maintenance under both Section 125 of the CrPC (now Section 144 BNSS) and proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act. After evaluating the material on record, the High Court took a balanced approach. It neither accepted the husband’s minimal income claim nor the wife’s allegation of extremely high earnings, but instead assessed his income pragmatically.

“12. Thus, the responsibility of their day-to-day care, upbringing and education is being borne by the wife. Secondly, this Court notes that the husband has alleged that the wife is earning about ₹30,000/- per month by giving tuition. However, no document or material has been placed on record by him to substantiate this allegation. In the absence of any supporting material, such assertion cannot be accepted at this stage. Therefore, this Court does not find any infirmity in the finding of the learned Trial Court, as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court, that the income of the wife is to be treated as „Nil‟ for the purpose of deciding interim maintenance.”
“14. Thus, at this stage, while the allegation of the wife regarding the extremely high income of the husband remains unsubstantiated, the claim of the husband that he is earning only ₹12,000/- per month also requires to be examined cautiously in light of the overall facts and circumstances of the case.”
“17. In these circumstances, this Court finds no reason to disagree with the observations of the learned Appellate Court that the husband appears to have withheld material information regarding his actual income and financial status. The material placed on record therefore prima facie indicates that the husband has not made a full and candid disclosure of his financial position.”
“18. Considering the fact that the husband claims to be earning only ₹12,000/- per month, which is even below the minimum wages applicable in Delhi, this Court finds no ground to accept such a claim at this stage. “

Decision

Accordingly, the High Court dismissed both cross-petitions and upheld the Appellate Court’s order granting total interim maintenance of ₹13,000 per month to the wife and two minor children.

Furthermore, the Court clarified that:

The maintenance awarded under Section 125 CrPC (Section 144 BNSS) would be adjusted against the amount granted under the Domestic Violence Act.
The findings were purely interim in nature and subject to final adjudication after trial.
Importantly, the Court reiterated that suppression of income invites adverse inference, and courts may assess earning capacity even in the absence of full disclosure.

Thus, the judgment reinforces the principle that financial responsibility toward dependents cannot be avoided through incomplete or misleading disclosures.

Dinesh kumar Vs Neeti and Ors on 4 Apr 2026

Citation : 2026 DHC 2819

Other Sources :

Index of Maintenance judgements is here.

Key Contributor :
Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.
+91-9606345150

Vinod Kumar Vs Seema Devi and Anr on 16 Mar 2026 – Judgement Summary

Posted on April 4 by Suprajaa Rajan

In Vinod Kumar Vs Seema Devi and Anr, the Delhi High Court examined whether the maintenance awarded by the Family Court under Section 125 CrPC (now Section 144 BNSS) required interference.

The petitioner (husband) challenged the maintenance granted to his wife and daughter, arguing that:

The wife lived separately without justification
She had rental income
His own income was wrongly assessed

However, the Court found that the wife had consistently alleged cruelty, which justified her separate residence. Moreover, the Court emphasized that an able-bodied husband cannot evade maintenance liability by understating income or taking voluntary retirement.

After analysing income, evidence, and legal principles, the Court upheld the Family Court’s order and dismissed the revision petition.

“9. It is well settled that the object of granting maintenance is to prevent vagrancy by compelling those who can provide support to those who are unable to support themselves and who have a moral claim to support.”

“10. Section 125 of the CrPC elucidates conditions under which a wife may be deemed ineligible for maintenance. These conditions include instances where the wife is engaged in adulterous activities, where she, without any justifiable cause, refuse to cohabit with her husband, or where both parties have agreed to live apart through mutual consent. These provisions delineate clear legal parameters that govern the entitlement or disentitlement of maintenance to ensure that the support is granted only under circumstances that warrant such financial assistance.”

“13. Merely because Respondent No.1 remained in possession of the matrimonial house, the same does not signify that the petitioner did not neglect to maintain the respondents. Even if the contention of the petitioner is taken as correct, the case of the respondents is not helmed on Respondent No.1 leaving the company of the petitioner due to neglect, so as to disentitle her from grant of maintenance. Rather, Respondent No.1 has made categorical allegations of cruelty, which is sufficient to satisfy the threshold of balance of probabilities.”
“18. It appears to be implausible that the petitioner would have taken retirement from his stable well-paying job without securing any other mode of income. As it is a normal tendency of the parties to not disclose their true income in matrimonial disputes, the Courts are permitted to make some guess work and arrive at a figure that a party may reasonably be earning.”
“19. The petitioner is a well- bodied man capable of earning, he cannot shirk his sacrosanct duty to financially support his wife and children by claiming that he has no income after retirement apart from his pension. The petitioner is thus obliged to earn and maintain his family, and the purported lower MSP prices for his land would thus not help his case.”

Decision

The Delhi High Court held that:

The maintenance awarded by the Family Court was justified and reasonable
The wife’s allegations of cruelty justified her separate residence
The husband’s claim of low income was not credible

Accordingly:

The Court refused to interfere with the maintenance order
The revision petition was dismissed
Maintenance (₹10,000 per month each after majority, with 10% increase every two years) was upheld

Vinod Kumar Vs Seema Devi and Anr on 16 Mar 2026

Citation :

Other Sources :

Index of Maintenance Judgements under Sec 125 CrPC is here.

Related Legal Concepts

Maintenance under Section 125 CrPC (Section 144 BNSS)
Cruelty as Ground for Separate Residence
Assessment of Income in Maintenance Cases
Doctrine of Social Justice in Family Law
Adverse Inference for Non-Disclosure of Income

Key Contributor :
Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.
+91-9606345150

Vikaramjeet Rana Vs The State of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 6 Nov 2025 – Judgment Summary

Posted on March 24 by Suprajaa Rajan

The Delhi High Court held that interim rent maintenance under the DV Act cannot continue after the wife acquires her own residence.

The Court observed that the purpose of rent is to provide immediate shelter. Once the wife purchases a house, that need ends. Therefore, continuation of rent becomes unjust enrichment.Further, the Court recognised that change in circumstances under Section 25 DV Act (now read with BNSS framework) permits modification of earlier orders.

Accordingly, the Court set aside the order allowing adjustment of rent towards EMI payments.

The following paragraphs form the core reasoning of the decision:

“26. It needs no reiteration that the Domestic Violence Act had been enacted with the intention of providing immediate relief and support to a wife who has been subjected to domestic violence. The legislative intent behind the D.V. Act is to provide succour to women who are financially vulnerable and subjected to domestic violence. However, the said provision cannot be stretched to benefit a woman who is financially independent and capable of maintaining herself.”
“29. No doubt, the Interim Order directed payment of Rent of Rs.20,000/- per month. However, here is a situation when the Petitioner is claiming change of circumstances and thus, modification of this Order in terms of Section 25(2) D.V. Act which provides that in case of change of circumstances the Order may be recalled, modified or altered.”
“30. In the present case, indeed there is a change in circumstance as a flat has been admittedly acquired by Respondent No.2. The question is whether she should now continue to get Rs.20,000/- per month towards Rent.”
“31. As already noted, the purpose of granting maintenance under the D.V. Act was to provide the Respondent with alternate accommodation. However, she having acquired a flat in Hauz Khas, Delhi, she cannot be held to be in need of immediate shelter. Therefore, it would not be appropriate, fair, or just to direct that the maintenance of Rs.20,000/- per month be continued, as has been rightly argued by the Petitioner. Once a flat has been acquired by the Respondent, there remains no justification to direct continuation of payment of Rs.20,000/- per month by the Petitioner.”
“32. The very substratum upon which the maintenance was granted, has ceased to exist with the acquisition of the property. To permit the continuation of such payment, would be to allow the Respondent undue benefit, which is contrary to the purpose of interim relief under the D.V. Act.”

Decision

The Court thus allowed the revision petition. It set aside the order that permitted rent adjustment towards EMI payments. It held that rent maintenance cannot continue after property acquisition.

The Court directed that payment of ₹20,000 per month shall stop from May 2024.

Vikaramjeet Rana Vs The State of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 6 Nov 2025

Index of Maintenance Judgments under Hindu Marriage Act is here.

Citation : 2025:DHC:9719

Other Sources :

Related Legal Concepts

Interim Maintenance under DV act
Change in circumstances in maintenance law
Rent Vs EMI-legal distinction
Purpose of Interim Relief in DV Act

Key Contributor :

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

Sandeep Pathak and Ors Vs Lalitha Tiwari on 10 Mar 2026 – Judgment Summary

Posted on March 23 by Suprajaa Rajan

The Delhi High Court in Sandeep Pathak and Ors Vs Lalitha Tiwari quashed criminal proceedings under Section 498A IPC (Section 85 BNS), Section 406 IPC (Section 316 BNS), and the DV Act.

The Court held that vague and omnibus allegations cannot establish cruelty or criminal breach of trust. It also ruled that DV Act proceedings cannot survive after divorce, as the domestic relationship ceases.

Further, the Court found that the wife filed proceedings after the divorce decree. Therefore, it treated the case as an abuse of process under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS).

“45. From the entire allegations as discussed above, it emerges that the essential ingredients of Section 498A IPC are not made out from the Complaint made by Respondent No.2.”
“46. In light of the above findings, it is concluded that it is clearly a case which comes in the category of abuse of the process of law, meriting quashing of the FIR.”
“52. Thus, aside from omnibus allegations, no prima facie case of entrustment of jewellery has been made out. Thus, no offence under Section 406 IPC is made out in the Complaint against the Petitioners.”
“55. As discussion above in detail, there is not an iota of even a prima facie case of cruelty or of harassment of the Complainant by the Petitioners. There is also no element of cruelty or entrustment made out from the facts alleged by the Respondent in her Complaint. Moreover, as discussed above from the facts, when comprehensively considered, reflects that it is a case of abuse of process of law, justifying the quashing of the FIR and the Chargesheet filed therein.”
“69. Thus, the chronology of events clearly indicates that the criminal and DV proceedings were initiated after the marital relationship had already been dissolved by a decree of divorce, and is a subsequent attempt to revive matrimonial disputes through criminal proceedings, which is clearly an abuse of the process of law and an afterthought.”

“70. In view of the above discussion, the Complaint under the DV Act is based on the same vague and omnibus allegations which have already been examined in the context of the FIR. Further, the Complaint has been instituted after the decree of divorce dated 05.09.2012, which has attained finality, thereby bringing the domestic relationship between the parties to an end. In the absence of any specific allegations of domestic violence and a subsisting domestic relationship, continuation of the present proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law.”

Decision

The Court allowed both petitions. It quashed the FIR and DV Act complaint, held that the allegations were vague and legally insufficient. It also held that the domestic relationship had ended due to divorce.

Therefore, continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process under Section 482 CrPC ( Section 528 BNSS).

Sandeep Pathak and Ors Vs. Lalita Tiwari on 10 Mar 2026

Citation :

Other Sources :

Related Legal Concepts

Explore related stages and concepts in criminal procedure:

Quashing of FIR
Abuse of process of law
Domestic Relationship requirement
Abuse of process of law
Omnibus allegations in Criminal Law
Stridhan and Entrustment

Key Contributor :

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

M/s Jindal Polyster Ltd Vs Rahul Jaura on 18 Oct 2005 – Judgment Summary

Posted on March 8 by Suprajaa Rajan

The Delhi High Court examined a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging a trial court order. The dispute arose in a recovery suit where the defendant denied appointing the plaintiff as an insurance consultant. Later, the defendant realised that the denial resulted from confusion regarding the company’s earlier name. The defendant then sought amendment of the written statement.

The plaintiff opposed the amendment and also filed an application under Section 340 CrPC (Section 379 BNSS) alleging perjury.

The High Court examined whether the amendment should be allowed and whether such allegations should affect the amendment request.

The following paragraphs explain the reasoning that led to the final decision.

“The defendant then realized its mistake because the earlier name of the defendant-company was ‘M/s Hindustan Pipe Udyog Limited’ and ‘Hindustan Synthetic Fibres’ was a division of ‘Hindustan Pipe Udyog Limited’. In the year 1992 the name ‘Hindustan Pipe Udyog Limited’ was changed to ‘Jindal Polysters and Steel Limited’, which name was again changed to ‘Jindal Polysters Limited’ in the year 1995.”

“The explanation given for the amendment was that there was a communication gap between the defendant and his earlier counsel and that Mr. Sumeet Maheshwari, who joined the defendant as Company Secretary in the year 1994 was not very much acquainted with the fact that the earlier name of the defendant company was ‘Hindustan Pipe Udyog Limited’.”

“After hearing both the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that so far as the application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. is concerned, it is established law that this has to be dealt with normally at the time of final disposal of the matter and after the trial court judge forms an opinion that an offence of perjury had been intentionally committed and that it was expedient in the interest of justice to lodge a complaint.”

“I find force in the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner-defendant that there was change of names repeatedly about the defendant company and the company could not run away with any averment about its denial of the appointment of plaintiff.”

Decision

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the trial court’s order.

The Court permitted the amendment of the written statement under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. It allowed the amendment subject to costs of ₹10,000.

The Court also clarified that allegations under Section 340 CrPC (Section 379 BNSS) should be considered at the appropriate stage during the trial.

M:s Jindal Polyster Ltd Vs Rahul Jaura on 18 Oct 2005

Citation :2005:DHC:3716

Other Sources :

Index of Perjury proceedings is here.

Key Contributor :

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

Punjab Tractors Ltd Vs M/s International Traders Ltd and Ors on 18 Sep 2009 – Judgment Summary

Posted on March 8 by Suprajaa Rajan

The Delhi High Court decided an important issue on perjury proceedings under Section 340 CrP (Section 379 BNSS).

The defendants sought prosecution of the plaintiff’s officials for allegedly filing fabricated drawings and false statements. The court examined whether the circumstances justified criminal prosecution for perjury during civil proceedings.

The judgment clarifies that courts must exercise extreme caution before initiating perjury proceedings. Courts should order prosecution only in clear cases where conviction appears likely.

The following paragraphs explain the court’s reasoning that led to the final decision.

“21. Formation of prima facie opinion that a person charged has intentionally given false evidence is a condition precedent for directing lodging of a complaint. The existence of mens rea or criminal intention behind act complained of will have to be looked into and considered before any action under Section 340 of the Cr.PC is recommended.”

“22. The affidavits of Mr. Manrao and Mr. Rihal aforesaid were in the nature of pleadings of the plaintiff. The court must be very cautious in its approach in prosecuting a person for making any statement claimed to be false in regard to a pleading, so that party’s right to plead freely is not curtailed.”

“23.It cannot also be lost sight of that in criminal prosecution there is waste of public funds and time of courts. For this reason also in every case of perjury the court would not mechanically take cognizance or direct prosecution. Prosecution should be ordered only when it is considered expedient and in the interest of justice to punish the delinquent.”

“24. There is yet another principle of law though relating to witnesses. A witness is entitled to an opportunity to correct himself. In the present case, Mr. Rihal during the cross examination admitted two mistakes in the drawings alleged to be fabricated. Mr. Rihal having corrected himself, ought not to be prosecuted.”

Decision

The Delhi High Court dismissed the defendants’ application under Section 340 CrPC (Section 379 BNSS).

The court held that the facts did not justify prosecution for perjury. The alleged discrepancies in drawings did not establish deliberate falsity or criminal intent.

The court also noted that excessive perjury prosecutions may defeat the purpose of justice.

Punjab Tractors Vs International Tractors on 18 Sep 2009

Citation :167 (2010) DLT 490

Other Sources :

Index of Perjury Judgements is here.

Key Contributor :

Mrs Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

Rashmi Raikhy and Anr Vs The State of NCT Delhi and Ors on 1 Feb 2018

Posted on February 19 by ShadesOfKnife

The High Court of Delhi, quashed the Look Out Circular (LOC) issued against the petitioners registered under Sections 406/498-A/34 IPC.

The Court held that issuance and continuation of an LOC in a matrimonial dispute involving Section 406 IPC was neither reasonable nor justified, especially when the petitioners had regularly appeared before the trial court, complied with bail conditions under Section 438 CrPC, and had not misused permission to travel abroad.

The Court emphasised that an LOC is a serious coercive measure and cannot be mechanically issued in matrimonial disputes where the accused are neither absconding nor involved in heinous offences.

The LOC was accordingly directed to be withdrawn.

The following paragraphs were instrumental in the Court’s decision to quash the Look Out Circular:

Para 4 “Record reveals that on several occasions permissions were sought by the petitioners to travel abroad and the said permissions were granted; there are no allegations of their misuse. Record further reveals that the petitioners are regularly appearing before the court concerned in the said proceedings.”
Para 5 “During this period since 2009/2010, the petitioners have suffered a lot due to issuance of LOC against them. Even after discharge order on 11.12.2017, LOC against the petitioner No.2 has not been rescinded.”
Para 7 “For the offence under Section 406 IPC, in matrimonial dispute, issuance of LOC against the petitioners till disposal of the case cannot be justified; the offence is not heinous in nature.”
Para 8 “In the case of E.V.Perumal Samy Reddy, E.V.R.Santosh Reddy and Rajeshwari vs. State represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Police and State represented by the Inspector of Police MANU/TN/2308/2013, Madras High Court noted various types of persons who could be included in the LOC:-
(i) Persons with Terrorists or Militant Links,
(ii) Belligerent Foreigners,
(iii) Foreigners previously noticed for violations of visa conditions.
(iv) Persons required by courts in criminal/civil cases who are absconding
(v) Absconding Offenders wanted by Police/CBI/Customs /Central excise/ Directorate of Rev. Intelligence/other agencies”
Para 9 “Apparently, the petitioners do not fall in any of the above categories. There are no allegations that petitioner No.1 ever absconded and did not participate in the criminal proceedings.”
Para 10 “Issuance of LOC is a serious matter as it contains full particulars of the individual which are sent throughout the world. Peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and due to subsequent development whereby the petitioner No.1 was charged only under Section 406 IPC, continuation of LOC against her can’t be considered reasonable and justified.”
Para 11 “In view of the above discussion, the concerned authorities are directed to withdraw the LOC order issued against the petitioners.”

Decision of the Court

Exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 CrPC, the Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and directed the withdrawal of the Look Out Circular issued against the petitioners.

Rashmi Raikhy Vs State of NCT of Delhi

Citation: [2018:DHC:785]

Other Sources :

Index of Look Out Circular decisions is here.

Key Contributor:
Mrs Suprajaa Rajan B.Com, LL.B., LL.M.
+91-9606345150

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: High Court of Delhi Judgment or Order or Notification

Shikha Lall Vs Prince Agarwal on 7 Nov 2024

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Vikram Kumar Jha Vs State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 10 Jul 2026

Dinesh Kumar Vs Neeti and Ors on 4 Apr 2026 – Judgment Summary

Decision

Vinod Kumar Vs Seema Devi and Anr on 16 Mar 2026 – Judgement Summary

Decision

Related Legal Concepts

Vikaramjeet Rana Vs The State of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 6 Nov 2025 – Judgment Summary

Decision

Related Legal Concepts

Sandeep Pathak and Ors Vs Lalitha Tiwari on 10 Mar 2026 – Judgment Summary

Decision

Related Legal Concepts

M/s Jindal Polyster Ltd Vs Rahul Jaura on 18 Oct 2005 – Judgment Summary

Decision

Punjab Tractors Ltd Vs M/s International Traders Ltd and Ors on 18 Sep 2009 – Judgment Summary

Decision

Rashmi Raikhy and Anr Vs The State of NCT Delhi and Ors on 1 Feb 2018