Hon’ble Delhi High Court had issued certain guidelines to be followed for issuing Look Out Circulars.
Sumer Singh Salkan Vs Asstt Director and Ors on 11 Aug 2010
Citations :
Other Sources :
Hon’ble Delhi High Court had issued certain guidelines to be followed for issuing Look Out Circulars.
Sumer Singh Salkan Vs Asstt Director and Ors on 11 Aug 2010
Citations :
Other Sources :
The Erudite Judge, Justice JR Midha has passed this decision on framing of issues in a DV Case.
2. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 28th March, 2017 whereby the Family Court dismissed the petitioner’s application under Order XIV Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘C.P.C.’) for framing of additional issues.
From Para 9,
9. Summary of principles
9.1. D.V. Act provides a remedy in civil law for the protection of victims of the domestic violence as noted in the Statement of Object and Reasons.
9.2. The aggrieved person can file the application for the reliefs under the D.V. Act to the Magistrate under Section 12 of the D.V. Act.
9.3. If any suit or other legal proceedings affecting the aggrieved person are pending before a Civil Court, Family Court or Criminal Court, Section 26 gives an option to the aggrieved person to approach such Court for reliefs under the D.V. Act. However, no independent application is maintainable before the Civil Court or Family Court, if no proceedings are pending before them affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent.
9.4. The Civil Court, Family Court or Criminal Court dealing with the application under Sections 18 to 22 of the D.V. Act can formulate its own procedure under Section 28(2) of the D.V. Act. The word ‘Court’ in Section 28(2) of the D.V. Act includes Civil Court, Family Court as well as the Criminal Court.
9.5. The Court shall formulate the procedure after completion of pleadings in an application under Section 26 of the D.V. Act.
9.6. After completion of pleadings, the concerned Court shall consider whether evidence is necessary to adjudicate the application under the D.V. Act and if so, the Court shall frame the issues and record the evidence. However, if no evidence is considered necessary, the Court shall list the application for hearing.
From Para 10,
S Vs J on 17 Apr 201810. Findings
10.1. In the present case, the Family Court is dealing with the petition for dissolution of marriage filed by the petitioner under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and therefore, the petitioner’s application under Section 26 of the D.V. Act seeking reliefs under Section 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the D.V. Act is maintainable before the Family Court.
10.2. The Family Court is empowered to formulate its own procedure for disposal of the petitioner’s application under D.V. Act. In that view of the matter, it is not mandatory for the Family Court to follow Cr.P.C.
10.3. The proper procedure for disposal of the petitioner’s application under Section 26 of the D.V. Act after completion of pleadings is to consider whether evidence is necessary to adjudicate the petitioner’s application under Section 26 of the D.V. Act.
10.4. If the Court finds that the evidence is not necessary, the Court shall list the application for hearing. However, if the evidence is considered necessary, the Court shall frame the issues and record the evidence along with the evidence in the divorce petition.
10.5. The respondent’s defence before the Family Court as well as this Court that the Family Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner’s application under Section 26 of the D.V. Act, is frivolous and is rejected.
10.6. The respondent attempted to mislead this Court by raising a frivolous defence with respect to the nature of proceedings under Section 26 of the D.V. Act whereas the law is clear and well settled that the Civil Court, Family Court and Criminal Court have jurisdiction to entertain and try an application under Section 26 in pending proceedings affecting the parties and the Court can formulate its own procedure to conduct the proceedings.
10.7. xxxxx
Citations : [2018 SCC ONLINE DEL 8421], [2018 DLT 248 511], [2018 HLR 2 238], [2019 HLR 1 784]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/72057276/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5ad842949eff430def4a5a08
https://vlex.in/vid/s-vs-j-709886493
Single judge bench of Delhi High Court held that the Court has to balance the rights of the aggrieved person and the parents-in-law when the question of residence arises for the aggrieved person while her marital relationship subsists.
From Paras 24 and 25,
24. Admittedly where the parties are residing is a flat, having only three bed rooms, a drawing room and the appellant is in possession of a room in the said flat, then considering there are various complaints filed by them against each other; their relations being not cordial, would it in such circumstances, be appropriate for them to stay together and fight every minute of their existence. In Satish Chander Ahuja (supra) in para No.90 the Court had observed we need to strike a balance between the rights of daughter-in-law and her in-laws.
25. Admittedly, the right of residence under Section 19 of the DV Act is not an indefeasible right of residence in shared household, especially, when the daughter-in-law is pitted against aged father-in-law and mother-in-law. In this case, both being senior citizens of aged about 74 and 69 years and being in the evening of their life, are entitled to live peacefully and not to be haunted by the marital discord between their son and daughter-in-law.
From Para 27,
27. Thus, where the residence is a shared household, it does not create any embargo upon the owner to claim eviction against his daughter-in-law. A strained frictional relationship between the parties would be relevant to decide whether the grounds of eviction exist. I am of the considered opinion, since there exist a frictional relationship between the parties, then at the fag end of their lives it would not be advisable for old parents to stay with appellant and hence it would be appropriate if an alternative accommodation is provided to the appellant as is directed in the impugned order per Section 19(1)(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act
And finally from Para 28,
Ravneet Kaur Vs Prithpal Singh Dhingra on 24 Feb 202228. Thus, there is no force in the appeal and accordingly it is dismissed. The undertaking made at Bar to provide an alternative accommodation to the appellant till her matrimony exists be filed in the form of an affidavit of the respondent within two weeks from today before the learned Trial Court. The execution of decree be postponed till such suitable alternative accommodation is found and the applicant is conveniently shifted therein. The learned Trial Court to impose conditions in case of non-payment of rental including electricity /water charges etc by respondent.
Citations : [2022 SCC ONLINE DEL 594]
Other Sources :
https://caselaw.in/delhi/shared-household-ravneet-kaur-prithpal-singh-dhingra/16/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6217abd79fca1954d2a81a9a
Relying on Apex Court’s Surinder Mohan Vikal decision, Delhi High Court held that if any offence is made out in a complaint under Section 500 IPC for defamation, Section 468(2) Cr.P.C. is attracted and cognizance of offence should be taken within a period of three years from the date of occurrence.
Ms.Romy Khanna Vs State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) on 4 Jul 2011Citations : [2011 DLT 182 221], [2012 CRICC 1 85], [2011 RCR CRIMINAL 4 735], [2011 SCC ONLINE DEL 2664], [2011 RCR CRI 4 735]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10503637/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090e0ae4b014971117b1c7
A police officer was punished with 1 day imprisonment (suspended the same so that an appeal may be filed) for breaching Arnesh Kumar Guidelines.
From Paras 1 and 2,
Rakesh Kumar Vs Vijayanta Arya (DCP) and Ors on 07 Dec 20211. The court has already held R-3 guilty of committing contempt of court. He arrested the petitioner in breach of directions passed by the Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar Vs State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal No. 1277/2014. The requisite notice was not served upon the petitioner. There were mere allegations of criminal breach of trust against the petitioner, which entailed a maximum sentence of three years. It did not warrant the arrest of a person in the manner in which it was done. The petitioner’s own complaints to the police were not responded to. The highhandedness of the police officer, in specific breach of the Supreme Court’s directions is evident. Arnesh Kumar (supra) holds that in the event of non-service of notice under section 41A of the Cr.P.C., contempt proceedings would be initiated.
2. The petitioner’s right to personal liberty is ensured by the Constitution of India. It can be curtained only by a procedure prescribed established by law. The Supreme Court has said in Arnesh Kumar that notice under s. 41A Cr.P.C. is requisite. The notice was not served. The law has been breached. It is not the petitioner only who has suffered the humiliation and the indignity of being arrested; the ordeal would have affected the reputation of his family i.e. his children, wife and parents. No amount of explanation to the neighbours or those who may have seen the arrest, would undo the
embarrassment and indignity suffered by the petitioner and his relatives. Arrest and incarceration destroys a person and collaterally affects many other innocent relatives. Subsequent release or acquittal of an innocent, is of no solace and offers no reparation to the loss of reputation or for the temporary loss of precious personal liberty. A stigma gets attached to the person who has been taken away, detained and/or put behind bars by the police. R-3 is deemed to have due knowledge of the rights of a citizen and the procedure prescribed in law.
Sri Ashwini Upadhyay ji filed this PIL at Delhi HC seeking the following prayers, which got dismissed saying that there is no public interest in this petition and the prayers are in the realm of Legislature but not Judiciary.
Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay Vs UOI and Anr on 03 Sep 2019a) direct the Union of India to ascertain the feasibility of implementing 24th recommendation of National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (Justice Venkatchaliah Commission) on Population Control;
b) declare that State may set Two Child Norm, as a criteria for government jobs, aids and subsidies, and, may withdraw statutory rights viz. right to vote, right to contest, right to property, right to free shelter, right to free legal aid etc.;
c) direct the Government to declare First Sunday of every month as ‘Health Day’ in place of ‘Polio Day’ to spread awareness on population explosion and provide contraceptive pill, condoms, vaccines etc. to EWS and BPL families, with polio vaccines;
d) in the alternative, direct the Law Commission of India to prepare a comprehensive Report on Population Explosion within three months and suggest the ways to control it; and,
e) direct the Government of India to take appropriate and reasoned steps on petitioner’s Representation dated 2.5.2018 within three months;
f) pass such other order(s) or direction(s) as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and allow the cost of the petition to petitioner.
Single judge of Delhi High Court held that issuance of a legal notice and filing of a complaint case by the petitioner would NOT amount to ‘abetment’ punishable under Section 306 IPC.
From Para 11, Issue framed.
11. The issue involved when narrowed down is whether issuance of a legal notice and filing of a complaint case by the petitioner would amount to ‘abetment’ punishable under Section 306 IPC.
From Para 31,
Atul Kumar Vs State of NCT Delhi and Anr on 23 Aug 202131. The deceased had felt harassed but, in these facts, the act of petitioner could not be held to have abetted the deceased in committing suicide. The filing of a criminal complaint by the petitioner was his legal recourse, as advised to him.
A single judge of Delhi High Court talks about the alarming increase of false cases of rape and offences under Section 354, 354A, 354B, 354C & 354D only to arm-twist the accused and make them succumb to the demands of the complainant.
From Para 6,
6. A perusal of the abovementioned facts would show that the parties have registered cross-cases against each other for offences under Section 376 IPC. It is tragic to note that practising advocates belonging to the legal fraternity are trivialising the offence of rape. Rape is not merely a physical assault; it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. The act of rape has the ability to scar the mental psyche of the victim and this trauma can persist for years.
From Para 8,
8. The issue as to whether the High Courts, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C, should quash an offence under Section 376 IPC has come for consideration before the Supreme Court in a number of cases. Rape is an offence against the society. The Supreme Court has, time and again, directed that the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash an offence of rape on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise.
From Paras 14-19,
Vimlesh Agnihotri and Ors Vs State and Anr on 16 Aug 202114. Quashing FIR for offences like rape on the basis of compromise will encourage accused to put pressure on the victims to agree to a compromise and this will open doors for the accused to get away with a heinous crime which cannot be permitted.
15. In the present case it appears that both sides have resorted to file complaints of rape without having any sensitivity to the offence of rape. While the repercussions of the offence of rape on the victim have been mentioned above, on the other hand, false allegations of rape have the potential to destroy the life and career of the accused. The accused in a false case of rape loses his honour, cannot face his family and is stigmatized for life. Allegations regarding offences such as one under Section 376 IPC cannot be made at the drop of a hat – in order to settle personal scores.
16. Further, the time spent by the police in investigating false cases hinders them from spending time in investigation of serious offences. As a result, it leads to faulty investigations and the accused end up going scot-free. Valuable judicial time is also spent in hearing cases where false allegations are made and is consequently an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, people who make such false allegations of rape cannot be permitted to go scot-free. This Court is pained to note that there is an alarming increase of false cases of rape and offences under Section 354, 354A, 354B, 354C & 354D only to arm-twist the accused and make them succumb to the demands of the complainant.
17. This Court, at the moment, is not commenting as to whether the present case is a false case or not. However, if it is found that the cases which have been filed by the parties against each other are false and frivolous then action should be taken against the prosecutrix and others who were instrumental in levelling allegations of rape only to settle some personal scores. There is an urgent need to deter such frivolous litigations.
18. False claims and allegations pertaining to cases of molestation and rape need to be dealt with an iron hand due to the serious nature of the offences. Such litigations are instituted by the unscrupulous litigants in the hope that the other party will capitulate to their demands out of fear or shame. Unless wrongdoers are not made to face the consequences of their actions, it would be difficult to prevent such frivolous litigations. The Courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive for frivolous litigations which unnecessarily consumes the Court’s otherwise scare time. This Court is of the opinion that this problem can be solved, or at least minimized, to a certain extent, if exemplary cost is imposed on the litigants for instituting frivolous litigations.
19. In view of the mandate of the Supreme Court that High Courts must not exercise its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing an offence of rape only on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise, this Court is not inclined to entertain this petition.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/53326449/
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/vimlesh-agnihotri-ors-versus-state-anr
Relying on decision of the Division bench of Kerala High Court, Justice Prathiba M Singh also struck down Sec 17 of of Senior Citizens Act 2007 as it was ultra-vires with Sec 30 of Advocates Act 1961.
From Para 4,
4. Insofar as the first issue is concerned, ld. Counsel for the Petitioner relies upon the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Adv. K.G. Suresh v. Union of India & Ors. [W.P.(C) No. 21946/2011, decided on 30th March, 2021]. He submits that Section 17 of the Act has been declared to be ultra vires Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961.
From Para 9,
9. In view of the above, since Section 17 has been declared ultra vires Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, it would obviously mean that an advocate would have the right to represent parties before the Tribunal under the Act. Ordered accordingly.
Taruna Saxena Vs Union of India and Ors on 16 Apr 2021
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/86693117/
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/taruna-saxena-versus-union-of-india-ors
See the interpretation of a single judge from Delhi High Court.
From Paras 11 and 12,
Jamaluddin Ansari Azad Vs State and Anr on 29 Jul 201311. In Pooja Saxena (supra) it was observed that the observations made in Neera Singh’s case were obiter and does not constitute a binding precedent for the reason that the provision of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 were not the subject matter of the dispute before the Court in the petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C in that case. Moreover in that case, the Court has not taken into account the protection given to a victim of offence of dowry demand as provided u/s 7(3) of The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In Pooja Saxena (supra), the allegations in the complaint were regarding demand of dowry by the father of respondent no.2 at the time of engagement ceremony of the petitioner, failing which he would call off the marriage. It was observed that the petitioner and her parents were confronted with the unenviable situation either to concede to the demand or face loss of honour of their family in the society and if under that fear the petitioner and her parents conceded to the demand for dowry, they cannot be faulted as they were victims of circumstances. As such, Section 7(3) comes to the rescue of the petitioner and she could not be subjected to prosecution for the offence u/s 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
12. A perusal of the complaint u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C filed by respondent no.2 goes to show that he was invoking Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act only on the basis of allegations made in the complaint by Noor Jahan whereas in para 7 of the complaint he did not admit to the contents of the FIR. Merely on the basis of allegations which were not admitted by respondent no.2, the petitioner could not have been booked for offence u/s 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Moreover as held in Pooja Saxena(supra) and Ram Gopal Shah v. State of Jharkhand, II 2009 DMC 848, the petitioner being father of the complainant is an aggrieved person from whom the dowry was being demanded. Such aggrieved person is protected u/s 7(3) from prosecution under the Act.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71564569/
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