BNSS 379 – Procedure in cases mentioned in section 215

Posted on March 3 by ShadesOfKnife

379. Procedure in cases mentioned in section 215.—
(1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 215, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary,—
(a) record a finding to that effect;
(b) make a complaint thereof in writing;
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction;
(d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and
(e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate.
(2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of section 215.
(3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed,—
(a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint;
(b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court or by such officer of the Court as the Court may authorise in writing in this behalf.
(4) In this section, “Court” has the same meaning as in section 215.

Entire BNSS is here.

Shailendra Sharma and Ors Vs Indus Residency Pvt Ltd and Ors on 07 Jan 2026

Posted on March 3 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madhya Pradesh Hugh Court at Jabalpur Bench held as follows,

From Para 8,

8. A police officer cannot directly register a crime for offence under Section 215 B.N.S.S. once the offence is committed in or in relation to a proceeding in the Court. As per Section 379 B.N.S.S., the Court has to cause preliminary enquiry and then can make a complaint in writing. However, in the present case, the Court has not made any enquiry, nor recorded any prima-facie satisfaction and has simply directed the police authorities to carry out an investigation and submit a report before the Court. Though the Court in its discretion could have directed the police authorities to investigate the matter and to furnish report before the Court, but the discretion to register FIR should not have been left at the discretion of the police authorities. It was for the Court to have applied its mind after receiving the preliminary enquiry report of the police authorities.

Shailendra Sharma and Ors Vs Indus Residency Pvt Ltd and Ors on 07 Jan 2026

Citations: [2026:MPHC-JBP:1337]

Other Sources:

Index of Perjury judgments is here.

Neha Lal Vs Abhishek Kumar on 20 Jan 2026

Posted on January 27 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that Perjury applications shall continue, despite grant to divorce.

From Paras 28 to 30,

28. Now coming to the cases pending between the parties. All the cases pending between the parties, as mentioned in paragraph No.8.8, shall stand disposed of without any further action by them. However, the following applications filed by the parties raising plea of perjury shall continue because no one can be permitted to pollute the stream of justice, as emphasized by this Court in Kusha Duruka vs. The State of Odisha10. The cases being:
(i) Crl. M. A. No.42585 of 2019 in W. P. (Crl.) No.1025 of 2023 (under Section 340 CrPC)
(ii) Application under Section 379 read with 215 BNSS filed in MT No.151 of 2021
(iii) Application under Section 379 read with 215 BNSS filed in MT No.151 of 2021
(iv) Misc. Crl. No.7 of 2019 filed in MT No.853 of 2018
(v) Application under Section 340 CrPC in MT No.853 of 2018
29. It is clarified that if besides the cases mentioned in the paragraph 28, any other application(s) filed by the parties either under section 340 CrPC or under Section 379 read with 215 of BNSS, 2023, the same shall be dealt with on merits by the concerned Courts and will not be disposed of, in view of this order passed by this Court.
30. A copy of the order passed by this Court shall be sent to the Courts concerned for taking action as per the direction in this order. However, if there is any other case arising out of matrimonial dispute, though not mentioned in the list, but pending, the same shall also stand disposed of on production of copy of this order by the parties.

Neha Lal Vs Abhishek Kumar on 20 Jan 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Perjury Judgments is here.

MS Gokaldas Paper Products Vs MS Lilliput Kidswear Ltd Anr on 5 Apr 2023

Posted on November 23, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held that acts of Contempt may be purged/remedies but not acts of perjury.

From Paras 7 and 8,

7. This brings us to the next issue i.e., whether Respondents have committed the offence of perjury by making a false statement in the reply to the present petition. In the reply, Respondent No. 2 has categorically denied the liability for Petitioner’s dues, in contrast to his earlier admission. Mr. Nakul Mohta, counsel for Respondent No. 2, argues that the stand taken in the reply was in light of aforementioned facts that came to the knowledge of Respondent No. 2 at a later stage, and for this reason a civil suit was also filed against the Petitioner. Without prejudice, to the above, he contends that a mere contradictory stand taken in a pleading should not on its own invite an action for perjury in exercise of the Court’s discretion provided under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [hereinafter “CrPC, 1973”]. Respondent No. 2, present in-person, explains that his stand was revised on account of fresh information received from his accounts team regarding debit notes that had been raised on the Petitioner for defective supplies. He states that earlier at the time of confirming Petitioner’s dues, he was unaware of the said debit notes and was in fact, hard pressed by multiple legal proceedings which were ongoing. At this juncture, he is willing to tender an unconditional apology to this Court.
8. The Court is unconvinced by the above submissions. Respondent No. 2, initially refuted the liability to pay the Petitioner’s dues, as recorded in order dated 17thDecember, 2012 in CO. PET. 519/2012. Subsequently in the said proceedings, he filed an affidavit in reply in February, 2013 [hereinafter “Affidavit of February, 2013”, provided at Annexure-C] admitting his liability and clarifying that the earlier denial was a bona fide mistake on account of a mix-up of files with a similarly named company. He further undertook to pay Petitioner’s dues in ten equal monthly instalments commencing from 01st April, 2013. Now, faced with the present contempt action he has denied his liability entirely by raising a plea of debit notes and has instead raised a claim on the Petitioner.

From Paras 10-12,

10. In the opinion of the Court, reply to the contempt petition, supported by Respondent No. 2’s affidavit, which denies the liability to pay Petitioner’s dues is plainly false in view of unambiguous and categorical admission made to the contrary, in the Affidavit of February, 2013. The explanation or the change in stand premised on Respondents being burdened by multiple pending litigations, downsizing/ lack of staff and lack of knowledge, is not convincing. In the opinion of the Court, the revised stand in the reply appears to be a wilful false statement. In the Affidavit of February, 2013, Respondent No. 2 verified that he was well-versed with the facts and circumstances of the case and that he is competent to swear the affidavit. He further verified that the statements made therein were true and correct to best of his knowledge. The legal system relies heavily on the honesty and integrity of individuals who appear before courts. When one makes a statement before the court or signs an affidavit, they are making a solemn declaration to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Filing of a false affidavit is a serious offence that undermines the very foundation of the legal system. The subsequent reply and accompanying affidavit prima facie contain false statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, which is punishable under Section 193, 199 and 200 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereinafter, “IPC, 1860”].
11. Respondent No. 2 has offered to tender an unconditional apology. However, in the opinion of the Court, the same is of no avail. Perjury, is the act of knowingly and wilfully making false statements under oath, with the intent to deceive or mislead the court. It is a serious criminal offence, as it strikes at the very heart of the judicial process by undermining the integrity of the evidence presented in Court. The act of contempt can be purged or remedied, by the offending party, but in contrast, perjury cannot. Simply recanting or correcting a false statement cannot undo the act. Affidavits in a court of law have sanctity and cannot be taken casually. Thus, a false statement to the Court has to necessarily invite adverse action. In the present matter, the Court is not concerned as to why the promised schedule of payments has been breached by Respondents. The primary concern is Respondent No. 2’s statement of denying the liability of the dues in face of an earlier unequivocal admission. Such a contradictory stand without any cogent explanation is prima facie a deliberate false statement to mislead the Court and thus an apology by Respondent No. 2 would not deter an action invited for perjury.
12. Accordingly, this Court is prima facie of the view that offences under Sections 191 and 192 of IPC, 1860 punishable under Section 193, 199 and 200 of IPC, 1860 have been committed by Respondent No.2 in relation to the present proceedings. In terms of Section 340(1) of CrPC, 1973 read with Section 195(1)(b)(i) of CrPC, 1973, this Court is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into the false statement made by Respondent No. 2 in the reply to the present petition, for which a written complaint should be made to the concerned Metropolitan Magistrate. The Registrar General is hereby directed to draw up and make a complaint in the above terms and send it to the appropriate Metropolitan Magistrate within four weeks. The said complaint will be accompanied by a complete certified copy of the entire file of the present matter and CO. PET. 519/2012.

MS Gokaldas Paper Products Vs MS Lilliput Kidswear Ltd Anr on 5 Apr 2023

Index of Perjury Judgments is here.

Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Posted on October 18, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Supreme Court held as follows,

From Para 79,

79. It is true that an affidavit is ‘evidence’ within the meaning of Section 191 of the IPC and a person swearing to a false affidavit is guilty of perjury. But the matter does not rest here. Before initiating the proceedings for perjury, the court concerned has to consider whether it would be expedient in the interest of justice to sanction such prosecution. What the courts have to see at this stage is whether there is evidence in support of the allegations made by the Union of India (respondent herein) to justify the initiation of proceedings against the writ petitioners, more particularly, the writ petitioner no. 1 herein who had filed the affidavit on behalf of himself and the other writ petitioners and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant his conviction. However, this does not mean that the court should not prima facie be of the opinion that there are sufficient and reasonable grounds for setting the machinery of criminal law in motion against the accused. As noted above, the Court has further to see that the false statement was deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. In other words, before sanctioning the prosecution there must be a prima facie case of a falsehood on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge. (see S.P. Kohli v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana, (1979) 1 SCC 212 : AIR 1978 SC 1753)

From Paras 86 and 87,

86. The conflict between the two decisions of this Court of equal strength, i.e. Pritish (supra) and Sharad Pawar (supra), was taken notice of by this Court in the case of the State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh, (2020) 12 SCC 96. A Bench of two Judges of this Court ultimately thought fit to refer the question to a Larger Bench. The Court observed as under :
“14. In any event, given that the decision of the three-Judge Bench in Sharad Pawar (supra) did not assign any reason as to why it was departing from the opinion expressed by a Coordinate Bench in Pritish (supra) regarding the necessity of a preliminary inquiry under Section 340 of the CrPC, as also the observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra), we find it necessary that the present matter be placed before a larger Bench for its consideration, particularly to answer the following questions:
14.1 (i) Whether Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 mandates a preliminary inquiry and an opportunity of hearing to the would-be accused before a complaint is made under Section 195 of the Code by a Court ?
14.2 (ii) What is the scope and ambit of such preliminary inquiry ?”
87. It appears that the reference on the aforesaid two questions to a larger Bench is still pending.

From Paras 90 and 91,

90. The essential ingredients for invoking Section 211, I.P.C. are that the complaint must have falsely charged a person with having committed an offence. The complainant, at the time of giving the complaint must have known that there is no just or lawful ground for making a charge against the person. This complaint must have been given with an intention to cause injury to a person.
91. The CrPC does not define what constitutes the making of a “charge” of an offence or what amounts to the “institution of criminal proceedings”. But, in our opinion, a false “charge” in this Section must not be understood in any restricted or technical sense, but in its ordinary meaning, of a false accusation made to any authority bound by law to investigate it or to take any steps in regard to it, such as giving information of it to the superior authorities with a view to investigation or other proceedings, and the institution of criminal proceedings includes the setting of the criminal law in motion. The nature of both expressions, and the difference between them has been explained in lucid terms in the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Karim Buksh v. Queen Emp, 17 C. 574. It points out that there may be a charge which does not amount to the institution of criminal proceedings “and there may be criminal proceedings which do not necessarily involve a charge” of any offence. As an illustration of the former it points out that a charge made to the Judge of a Civil Court or to public officers of other kinds, in order to obtain sanction to prosecute may well be a charge “but is not the institution of criminal proceedings”. It further points out that an aggrieved person may seek to put the criminal law in motion either by making a charge or in the language of the Code giving information to the Police (Section 154 CrPC) “or he may” lay a charge, or as the Code calls it, a complaint (Section 190 CrPC) before a Magistrate”.

From Para 94,

94. Thus, as explained by this Court in Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain (supra), the essential ingredient of an offence under Section 211 IPC is to institute or cause, to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing to institute false criminal proceedings assume false charge but false charge may be preferred even when no criminal proceedings result. Now, the expression “falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial. “To falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when seeking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be, read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible of analogous meaning should be understood to have been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were their colour and content from each other. They seem to have been used in a technical sense as commonly understood in our criminal law. The false charge must, therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or to someone who is in a position to get the offender punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words, it must be’ embodied either in a complaint or in a report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or to an officer having authority over the person against whom the allegations are made. The statement in order to constitute the “charges” should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion.

Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/62d7ae969fca1923f0b04184

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/himanshu-kumar-and-others-versus-state-of-chhattisgarh-and-others

Index of Perjury Judgment is here.

State of AP Vs Matham Vijaya Rao and Anr on 07 Jul 2025

Posted on July 14, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A good judgment from this Magistrate, with legally-valid reasons and conclusions… and also directing perjury proceedings to be initiated…

From Para 26,

26. The first and foremost contention of the accused and their counsel is that FIR No: 488/2017 is barred by limitation, as such the court shall dismiss the proceedings and as per exhibit P1, the alleged last act of cruelty has taken place on 18.09.2012, so the limitation period was expired on 17.09.2015, but the report was given on 03.08.2017, therefore the proceedings are time barred u/s 468 Cr.P.C. while section 473 Cr.P.C provides an exception to bar of limitation, but its application is not automatic and there must be an explanation by the prosecution for such inordinate delay. Since the case is barred by limitation, the court is required to dismiss the proceedings. In support of his contention, he relied on the following judgments:
A. Kamlesh Kalra v. Shilpa Kalra & Ors. Reported in 2020 0 Supreme (SC) 605 wherein it was held that “ As regards, the finding recorded by the High Court in respect of complaint/FIR filed under Section 498A IPC, we are of the firm opinion that the same does not call for interference. In the facts of this case, it is clear that the FIR filed in this regard in 2015 was time barred, having been filed much more than three years after the separation of Manish Kalra(husband) and Shilpika Kalra (wife) and the filing of the divorce petition by the husband, both in 2009. In the facts of the case, the reasons given by the High Court for quashing the proceedings under section 498A IPC are justified and do not call for interference by this Court”.
B. Gudipati Mallikarjun Rao v. Gudiapati Saranya 2023 0 Supreme (A.P) 582 wherein it was held that “ In the circumstances, it would have to be held that the complainant, filed by the defacto complainant, is beyond the period prescribed under Section 468 of Cr.P.C”.
C. Arun Vyas & Anr. V. Anitha Vyas 1999 0 Crl LJ 3479 wherein it was held that “ the court cannot take cognizance of an offence under Section 498-A of IPC, if the FIR is time barred, unless the delay is properly explained and condoned under Section 473 of the CrPC”.
D. Korimerla Videesha Vs. State of A.P. wherein it was held that “ According to Rule 10 of the A.P. Dowry Prohibition Rules, any offence under Section 3 and 4 or any dispute under Section 6 of the Act shall be filed before expiry of one year and finalized within two years from the date of filing”.

From Para 28,

28. In the case on hand the alleged demand for additional dowry was finally made on 18.9.2012 and that is the last date of alleged harassment. Even if the evidence of P.W.1 that the matter is place before the elders in 2013 has taken into consideration, the report is given after 4 years of said incident. But the report was given on 03.08.2017 i.e after 4 years of alleged harassment. So it can be safely conclude that the report is barred by limitation and the court has no power to take cognizance.

From Paras 36-37,

36. He further submitted that the conduct of P.W.1 amounts to perjury and warrants initiation of appropriate proceedings u/s 340 Cr.P.C in order to uphold the rule of law and protect sanctity of justice delivery system. On perusal of the record it appears that after filing the petition under section 340 Cr.P.C., my learned predecessor in the office returned the petition with some objections and the said petition is represented. But the said petition is again returned with endorsement previous objections not complied with and at present the said petition is not pending before the court. Here it is pertinent to mention that after assuming charge of this court, the said petition did not come before me and I have not given any assurance to the
counsel for the accused as mentioned in his written arguments.
37. During the cross examination P.W.1 denied that she completed her B.Tech in the year 2012. As per the evidence of D.W.1, Professor and controller of examination, JNTU Kakinada, P.W.1 completed her engineering graduation in April 2012 and on 16.10.2012 the student collected her provisional certificate from the college and as per the college rules, they cannot produce the provisional certificate of the student unless it is applied by the student. The evidence of D.W.1 clinchingly proves that P.W.1 completed her B.tech in April 2012 from JNTU. The evidence on record shows she intentionally denied that she completed her B.tech in 2012 and she has given false evidence on oath. Hence, she is certainly liable for punishment for giving false evidence. Hence, the Superintendent of this court is directed to give report before 3rd Add. Chief Judicial Magistrate Court against P.W.1 for giving false evidence.

From Paras 39, 41 and 42,

39. Learned counsel for the accused further contended that despite clear admissions of P.W.1 about unregistered land sale deeds dated 31.05.2010, 27.06.2011, this court refused to mark the said photocopies solely on the ground that they were not originals and this refusal is patently erroneous and it is settled law u/s 65 (c) of Indian Evidence Act, the secondary evidence is admissible where the original is lost or not in the possession of the party and a proper foundation is laid.
41. To mark the photocopies of documents, the party who intends to mark shall explain where is the original and as to why he is marking the photocopies of the documents. If the document is with the other party, first he has to give notice to the other party and even after receiving notice the other party fails to produce the document, then he can mark the photocopy. If he lost the original then also he is entitled to mark the photocopy, but in the case on hand there is no material on record to show that the accused or prosecution has given notice to other party to produce the documents and that the originals were lost. Without complying the conditions of section 65 of Indian Evidence Act, blaming this Court that the decision of the court is erroneous is not acceptable.
42. Learned counsel for the accused mentioned in his written arguments that the non production of the original unregistered sale deeds was reasonably explained during cross examination and it was put to P.W.1 that since accused no longer had access to the original land sale deeds dated. 31.05.2010 and 27.06.2011 since the property was transferred to Ch. Appala Raju and the denial of suggestion does not itself negate the reasonable explanation offered by the accused. On perusal of entire cross examination of P.W.1 it appears no such suggestion was given to P.W.1. As such the
contention of counsel for accused that they have given reasonable explanation for not filing the originals is not at all acceptable.

State of AP Vs Matham Vijaya Rao and Anr on 07 Jul 2025

Index of perjury judgments is here.

Cases where Perjury Proceedings were initiated

Posted on July 3, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

This page lists some cases where Criminal Proceedings were initiated for committing the offence of Perjury under IPC 1872/BNS 2023.

State of AP Vs Matham Vijaya Rao and Anr on 07 Jul 2025 [Senior Civil Judge Court, Gajuwaka, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh]

Index of Perjury Judgements is here.

Mohd. Ghouse Khan Vs State of Telangana on 15 Oct 2019

Posted on February 19, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

Relying on one Apex Court decision here and two High Court decisions here and here, a single judge bench of Telangana High Court pass this short Order.

This Criminal Petition, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is filed to direct the lower Court i.e., Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally Criminal Court, Hyderabad, to dispose of Crl.M.P.No.2956 of 2019 in C.C.No.505 of 2016 at an early date in the light of judgment reported in 2002 (1) Supreme Court Cases 253 and unreported Judgment of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court rendered in the case of Syed Nazim Husain v. Additional Principal Judge in (W.P No. 56 of 2002) and the Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Civil Application No.2939 of 2017 in W.P.No.14039 of 2017, dated 26.04.2018.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record.
3. An innocuous prayer has been sought for by the learned counsel for the petitioner to issue a direction to the Court below to dispose of the aforesaid Crl.M.P.No.2956 of 2019 in C.C.No.505 of 2016 at an early date.
4. Having regard to the same, the Criminal Petition is disposed of directing the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally Criminal Court, Hyderabad, to dispose of Crl.M.P.No.2956 of 2019 in C.C.No.505 of 2016, within a period of two (2) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, without granting any adjournment.

Mohd. Ghouse Khan Vs State of Telangana on 15 Oct 2019

Index of Perjury judgments is here.

Roshan Lal Tickoo Vs Predimant Krishan Tickoo on 02 Aug 2024

Posted on August 14, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladhak High Court at Srinagar held as follows,

From Pars 9-10,

9. From a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that before initiating an enquiry into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 of the Cr. P. C, the Court has to frame an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so, whereafter the Court has to record a finding to that effect and make a complaint thereof in writing. The same has to be sent to the Magistrate of 1st Class having the jurisdiction.
10. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 of the Cr. P. C makes a reference to the offences punishable under Section 193 to 196, 199, 200, 205 to 2011 and 228 of IPC when such offences are alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceedings in any court. The aforesaid offences fall under Chapter (XI) of the Indian Penal Code which relate to false evidence and offences against public justice. Thus, it is important for a Court to frame an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to hold an enquiry with regard to commission of aforesaid offences if the same appear to have been committed in relation to a proceeding in a Court.

From Para 13,

13. From the analysis of the legal position on the subject, it is clear that preliminary enquiry under Section 340 of the Cr. P. C can be directed only if in the opinion of the Court, it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so when it appears that the offence of perjury in relation to court proceedings has been committed. Thus, two conditions are necessary for initiating proceedings under Section 340 of the Cr. P. C, first that the offence of perjury in relation to court proceedings should appear to have been committed and secondly, in the opinion of the court it should be expedient in the interests of justice to hold such preliminary enquiry.

From Paras 14-15,

14. Coming to the present case, the respondents/applicants have alleged that the petitioner/non-applicant has made false statements in his petition which relate to estimated losses as per the audit conducted on account of unauthorized sale of 18 tanker lorries, decline in profits of the partnership firm, non-deposit of sale amount of the vehicles in the account of the partnership firm, respondent having entered into partnership without consent of the petitioner and sale of plot of land by respondent/applicant owned by the partnership firm at Channi Himmat, Jammu, unilaterally. The veracity of all these allegations is a matter in issue before the Arbitral Tribunal. It is, therefore, yet to be determined as to whether the aforesaid allegations made by the petitioner in his petition under Section 9 of the Act are false.
15. It is not a case where the petitioner is stated to have made any contradictory statements in his pleadings but it is a case where he has made certain allegations, the veracity of which is yet to be determined. Had it been a case of contradictory stands having been taken by the petitioner in his pleadings, perhaps this Court would have been justified in holding a preliminary enquiry in terms of Section 340 of Cr. P. C at this stage itself but because the veracity of the allegations made by the petitioner in his petition, which according to the respondent/applicant are false, is yet to be determined and there is no material on record to suggest that the same are, prima facie, false, this Court feels that the prayer of the respondents/applicants for initiating preliminary enquiry under Section 340 of the Cr. P. C cannot be considered at this stage. The same has to await the determination of the aforesaid issues by the Arbitral Tribunal.

Roshan Lal Tickoo Vs Predimant Krishan Tickoo on 02 Aug 2024

Index of perjury judgments is here.

James Kunjwal Vs State of Uttarakhand and Anr on 13 Aug 2024

Posted on August 14, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court passed guidelines to follow, When perjury proceedings can be initiated.

From Paras 16-20,

16. What we may conclude from a perusal of the above-noticed judicial pronouncements is that:-
(i) The Court should be of the prima facie opinion that there exists sufficient and reasonable ground to initiate proceedings against the person who has allegedly made a false statement(s);
(ii) Such proceedings should be initiated when doing the same is “expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent” and not merely because of inaccuracy in statements that may be innocent/immaterial;
(iii) There should be “deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance”;
(iv) The Court should be satisfied that there is a reasonable foundation for the charge, with distinct evidence and not mere suspicion;
(v) Proceedings should be initiated in exceptional circumstances, for instance, when a party has perjured themselves to beneficial orders from the Court.
17. The statement made by the appellant, that has been deemed to be befitting the offence of giving false evidence before the Court, which is known commonly as perjury, was more in the nature of denial of the statements made in the affidavits of the complainant herein.
18. We are of the view that, in the present facts, a denial simpliciter cannot meet the threshold, as described in the judgments above, particularly when no malafide intention/deliberate attempt can be understood from the statement made by the appellant in the affidavit. As has already been observed, mere suspicion or inaccurate statements do not attract the offence under the Section. It cannot be disputed that the statements made in the affidavit were only to state his version of events and/or deny the version put forth by the complainant.
19. We are also of the firm opinion that such statements do not make it expedient in the interest of justice, nor constitute exceptional circumstances in which such Sections may be invoked. Given that these proceedings would constitute an offence, independent of the one for which the appellant is already facing trial, it cannot be unequivocally held that there was deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance.
20. We find that at least three of the possible scenarios, as discussed supra, in which a court would be justified in invoking these powers on the face of it appear to be unmet, prosecution, therefore, would be unjust. We say so for the reason that the respondent in her counter affidavit filed before this Court makes no particular allegation nor does she provide any of the material that was allegedly placed before the competent prosecuting authorities or the Court. She only alleges untruth on the part of the appellant 8/12/2024 stating that the Court was correct in initiating proceedings against him for making the false statement. She further makes certain statements that fall outside the scope of the present adjudication and pertain to the trial of the main offence pending before the court of competent jurisdiction.

James Kunjwal Vs State of Uttarakhand and Anr on 13 Aug 2024

Citations: [2024 INSC 601], [2024 Latest Caselaw 508 SC]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/84159018/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/66beef2337d7e5445370dff1

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/james-kunjwal-versus-state-of-uttarakhand

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/s-193-ipc-when-can-perjury-proceedings-be-initiated-against-a-litigant-supreme-court-explains-266668

https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-caselaw/2024/august/2024-latest-caselaw-508-sc/

https://www.lawtext.in/judgement.php?bid=442

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/james-kunjwal-v-state-of-uttarakhand-2024-insc-601-mere-denial-of-averments-in-pleadings-not-perjury-no-malafide-intention-1547820

https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=17806

https://lawtrend.in/mere-denial-in-affidavit-doesnt-constitute-offence-under-section-193-ipc-supreme-court-quashed-perjury-charges/

Index of perjury judgments is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Perjury Under 340 CrPC

BNSS 379 – Procedure in cases mentioned in section 215

Shailendra Sharma and Ors Vs Indus Residency Pvt Ltd and Ors on 07 Jan 2026

Neha Lal Vs Abhishek Kumar on 20 Jan 2026

MS Gokaldas Paper Products Vs MS Lilliput Kidswear Ltd Anr on 5 Apr 2023

Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

State of AP Vs Matham Vijaya Rao and Anr on 07 Jul 2025

Cases where Perjury Proceedings were initiated

Mohd. Ghouse Khan Vs State of Telangana on 15 Oct 2019

Roshan Lal Tickoo Vs Predimant Krishan Tickoo on 02 Aug 2024

James Kunjwal Vs State of Uttarakhand and Anr on 13 Aug 2024