Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Posted on October 18, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Supreme Court held as follows,

From Para 79,

79. It is true that an affidavit is ‘evidence’ within the meaning of Section 191 of the IPC and a person swearing to a false affidavit is guilty of perjury. But the matter does not rest here. Before initiating the proceedings for perjury, the court concerned has to consider whether it would be expedient in the interest of justice to sanction such prosecution. What the courts have to see at this stage is whether there is evidence in support of the allegations made by the Union of India (respondent herein) to justify the initiation of proceedings against the writ petitioners, more particularly, the writ petitioner no. 1 herein who had filed the affidavit on behalf of himself and the other writ petitioners and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant his conviction. However, this does not mean that the court should not prima facie be of the opinion that there are sufficient and reasonable grounds for setting the machinery of criminal law in motion against the accused. As noted above, the Court has further to see that the false statement was deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. In other words, before sanctioning the prosecution there must be a prima facie case of a falsehood on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge. (see S.P. Kohli v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana, (1979) 1 SCC 212 : AIR 1978 SC 1753)

From Paras 86 and 87,

86. The conflict between the two decisions of this Court of equal strength, i.e. Pritish (supra) and Sharad Pawar (supra), was taken notice of by this Court in the case of the State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh, (2020) 12 SCC 96. A Bench of two Judges of this Court ultimately thought fit to refer the question to a Larger Bench. The Court observed as under :
“14. In any event, given that the decision of the three-Judge Bench in Sharad Pawar (supra) did not assign any reason as to why it was departing from the opinion expressed by a Coordinate Bench in Pritish (supra) regarding the necessity of a preliminary inquiry under Section 340 of the CrPC, as also the observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra), we find it necessary that the present matter be placed before a larger Bench for its consideration, particularly to answer the following questions:
14.1 (i) Whether Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 mandates a preliminary inquiry and an opportunity of hearing to the would-be accused before a complaint is made under Section 195 of the Code by a Court ?
14.2 (ii) What is the scope and ambit of such preliminary inquiry ?”
87. It appears that the reference on the aforesaid two questions to a larger Bench is still pending.

From Paras 90 and 91,

90. The essential ingredients for invoking Section 211, I.P.C. are that the complaint must have falsely charged a person with having committed an offence. The complainant, at the time of giving the complaint must have known that there is no just or lawful ground for making a charge against the person. This complaint must have been given with an intention to cause injury to a person.
91. The CrPC does not define what constitutes the making of a “charge” of an offence or what amounts to the “institution of criminal proceedings”. But, in our opinion, a false “charge” in this Section must not be understood in any restricted or technical sense, but in its ordinary meaning, of a false accusation made to any authority bound by law to investigate it or to take any steps in regard to it, such as giving information of it to the superior authorities with a view to investigation or other proceedings, and the institution of criminal proceedings includes the setting of the criminal law in motion. The nature of both expressions, and the difference between them has been explained in lucid terms in the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Karim Buksh v. Queen Emp, 17 C. 574. It points out that there may be a charge which does not amount to the institution of criminal proceedings “and there may be criminal proceedings which do not necessarily involve a charge” of any offence. As an illustration of the former it points out that a charge made to the Judge of a Civil Court or to public officers of other kinds, in order to obtain sanction to prosecute may well be a charge “but is not the institution of criminal proceedings”. It further points out that an aggrieved person may seek to put the criminal law in motion either by making a charge or in the language of the Code giving information to the Police (Section 154 CrPC) “or he may” lay a charge, or as the Code calls it, a complaint (Section 190 CrPC) before a Magistrate”.

From Para 94,

94. Thus, as explained by this Court in Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain (supra), the essential ingredient of an offence under Section 211 IPC is to institute or cause, to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing to institute false criminal proceedings assume false charge but false charge may be preferred even when no criminal proceedings result. Now, the expression “falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial. “To falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when seeking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be, read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible of analogous meaning should be understood to have been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were their colour and content from each other. They seem to have been used in a technical sense as commonly understood in our criminal law. The false charge must, therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or to someone who is in a position to get the offender punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words, it must be’ embodied either in a complaint or in a report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or to an officer having authority over the person against whom the allegations are made. The statement in order to constitute the “charges” should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion.

Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/62d7ae969fca1923f0b04184

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/himanshu-kumar-and-others-versus-state-of-chhattisgarh-and-others

Index of Perjury Judgment is here.

Mr xxxx Bhat Vs State of Karnataka and Ms xxxx Rao on 28 Jun 2024

Posted on September 4, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka High Court (Bengaluru Bench) held that the husband may initiate perjury proceedings against the knife, if he desires so.

From Para 7,

A perusal at the complaint would indicate that the complainant laid emphasis upon infections of the husband on his genital areas which resembled as STD. Therefore, the husband is guilty of mental harassment dishonestly concealing his mental condition and breaching the trust of the wife. Minute details of certain allegations are made which are found in the complaint. The crux of the complaint was STD on him, making her leave her job after marriage and therefore, she would be dependent upon him. There is not a single sentence about the petitioner demanding dowry and indulging in cruelty for the purpose of demand of dowry. All the harassments that the complainant narrates are minor skirmishes between the husband and the wife.
A perusal at the summary of the charge sheet would also not indicate any demand of dowry or cruelty on the part of the husband. Prior to filing of the charge sheet by the Police, statements were recorded of the family members of the complainant.
The mother herself in her statement speaks that at the time of discussions about the marriage, the parents of the petitioner and the petitioner had clearly indicated that they do not want any dowry and they are not demanding anything. The same goes with the statements of others.
What is given to the complainant, according to the complainant’s tradition, is 614 grams of silver and 160 grams of gold, not as demand but as a tradition of her family which at best be said to be ‘Stridhana’. Such statements galore. If the statements recorded of the mother and the brother of the complainant, the complaint, the charge sheet and summary of the charge sheet are red in tandem, what would unmistakably emerge is that, no demand for dowry was made and no cruelty that would become ingredients of Section 498A of the IPC would get attracted in the case at hand.
Section 498A has two circumstances, which can draw an accused into its web. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty which is likely to drive the woman to suicide or the harassment should be such that they would coerce the woman for meeting any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security, and on failure to fulfill the demand, indulge in cruelty. If the contents of the complaint, summary of the charge and the statements are considered on the bedrock of necessary ingredients of Section 498A of the IPC, the allegation of the offence would tumble down like a pack of cards, as, no where it is indicative, of the fact that there is dowry harassment and cruelty by the husband or the members of the family of the petitioner.

From Para 8,

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that every time the petitioner was accused of suffering from STD. In the aforesaid affidavit, it is clearly indicated by the wife that the petitioner is suffering from HPV infection as he has some rashes on his buttock. The petitioner gets himself tested at the Victoria Hospital and several hospitals.
The diagnostic centre at Columbus, USA observes that history and physical examination of the petitioner was done. He has no physical signs and no history of concern for HPV or any other infection in the body. Therefore, the bogey that is projected by the complainant/wife that the husband has some physical problem appears to be a white lie.

From Para 9,

9. The other bogey projected by the wife is that the petitioner has closed all channels of communications and had never shown any interest in getting the complainant to the USA, this is completely belied by the documents appended to the petition itself, as not one but four appointments were taken by the petitioner for VISA purposes of the wife. The first appointment after the petitioner left to the USA was on 13-10-2020. There are four appointments, confirmation acknowledgments of which are produced by the petitioner as annexures to the petition. They are dated 13-10-2020, 02-03-2021, 07-05-2021 and 24-05-2021;
It is on the 5th appointment, the complainant goes before the visa office and Visa is granted to the complainant, which is also appended as document to the petition. These are documents which speak for themselves. A mail communication on 05-12-2021 is quoted hereinabove. The complainant seeks confirmation regarding her travel to USA. Therefore, it is clearly a bogey projected by the complainant that the petitioner was not interested in getting her to the USA and had blocked all channels; but the documents speak otherwise. The attitude of the complainant also speaks for itself.
Therefore, it is not a case where there is an iota of ingredient against the petitioner/husband for the offences punishable under Section 498A of the IPC or Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. It is misuse and abuse of criminal justice system by the complainant right from the word go.

Para 10,

10. This Court has completely considered the complaint, summary of the charge sheet, the statements recorded and the law as laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment. All this exercise is undertaken only to arrive at a conclusion as to any of the ingredients of the offences are met or otherwise. The unmistakable conclusion is that, the complainant in gross misuse and abuse of law has set the criminal law into motion. Such frivolous cases registered by the wife have taken enormous judicial time, be it before the concerned Court or before this Court, and has led to enormous civil unrest, destruction of harmony and happiness in the society. It may not be that these would be the facts in every given case. The Court is only concerned about frivolous and vexatious litigations clogging the criminal justice delivery system, where genuine cases lie in cold storage. If the facts narrated hereinabove are noticed and as observed, the complainant has, in gross misuse and abuse of the process of the law, has set the criminal law into motion. Therefore, it becomes a fit case where the husband must be given liberty to initiate proceedings for malicious prosecution or initiate proceedings under Section 211 of the IPC. Liberty is thus reserved to the husband, for such action to be initiated in accordance with law, if he so desires.

Mr xxxx Bhat Vs State of Karnataka and Ms xxxx Rao on 28 Jun 2024

List of Quash judgments is here and List of Perjury judgments is here.

S.Mukanchand Bothra Vs Rajiv Gandhi Memorial Educational Charitable Trust Chennai and Ors on 22 December, 2015

Posted on February 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Distinguishing the law laid down by Apex Court in Perumal Vs Janaki, Single Judge bench of Madras High Court held that, Investigating officers can not be made liable for perjury (filing false affidavits) in cases where accused was acquitted after trial.

S.Mukanchand Bothra Vs Rajiv Gandhi Memorial Educational Charitable Trust Chennai and Ors on 22 Dec 2015

Citations : [2015 SCC ONLINE MAD 11421]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/139009470/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5728e0c8e561092708a3b8c4

https://www.legitquest.com/case/s-mukanchand-bothra-v-rajiv-gandhi-memorial-educational-charitable-trust-chennai-others/973BF

Index of Perjury judgments here.

Santokh Singh Vs Izhar Hussain and Anr on 25 Apr 1973

Posted on February 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A 2-judge bench of Apex Court held that, in this particular case, the Police officer can not be saddled with IPC 211 and prosecuted u/s 340 CrPC read with 195 CrPC. But the necessary ingredients are clearly articulated and hence this case law has to be relied upon as landmark judgment to file perjury against the person who made the false complaint (FIR need not be registered).

From Para 8,

8. In this Court, Shri Gupta has very forcefully contended that on the material on the record this direction is wholly unjustified, if not positively illegal, being based on misreading of evidence and on erroneous view of law. According to the submission, the appellant had neither lodged the FIR nor otherwise instituted any criminal proceeding or falsely charged Izhar Hussain within the contemplation of Section 211 IPC. Besides, there is absolutely no material on the record on which the High Court could have formed an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that a complaint under Section 211 IPC should be filed against the appellant.

From Para 10,

… The short question posed, therefore, is, if by giving false evidence as a witness against Izhar Hussain the appellant can be said to have charged him within the contemplation of Section 211 IPC. If this question is answered in the affirmative, then it will have to be determined whether there is in fact a false accusation and finally whether it is expedient in the interest of justice on the facts and circumstances of the present case to direct a complaint to be filed under Section 211 IPC. This section as its marginal note indicates renders punishable false charge of offence with intent to injure. The essential ingredient of an offence under Section 211 IPC is to institute or cause to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing to institute false criminal proceedings assume false charge but false charge may be preferred even when no criminal proceedings result. It is frankly conceded by Shri Kohli that the appellant cannot be said to have instituted any criminal proceeding against any person. So that part of Section 211 IPC is eliminated. Now, the expression “falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial. To “falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when speaking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible of analogous meaning should be understood to have been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were their colour and content from each other. They seem to have been used in a technical sense as commonly understood in our criminal law. The false charge must, therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or to someone who is in a position to get the offender punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words, it must be embodied either in a complaint or in a report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or an officer having authority over the person against whom the allegations are made. The statement in order to constitute the “charge” should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion. Statement on oath falsely supporting the prosecution case against an accused person more appropriately amounts to an offence under Sections 193 and 195 IPC and not under Section 211 IPC. We do not think that the offences contemplated by Sections 193/195 IPC on the one hand and Section 211 IPC on the other were intended by the legislature in this context, to overlap so as to make it optional whether to proceed under one or the other. ..…

From Para 11,

Every incorrect or false statement does not make it incumbent on the court to order prosecution. The Court has to exercise judicial discretion in the light of all the relevant circumstances when it determines the question of expediency. The court orders prosecution in the larger interest of the administration of justice and not to gratify feelings of personal revenge or vindictiveness or to serve the ends of a private party. Too frequent prosecutions for such offences tend to defeat its very object. It is only in glaring cases of deliberate falsehood where conviction is highly likely that the court should direct prosecution.

Original:

Santokh Singh Vs Izhar Hussain and Anr on 25 Apr 1973 (SCI)

Casemine Version.

Santokh Singh Vs Izhar Hussain and Anr on 25 Apr 1973

Citations : [1973 AIR SC 2190], [1974 BLJR 22 877], [1973 SCC 2 406], [1974 SCR 1 78], [1973 CAR 316], [1973 CRLR SC 473], [1973 SCC CR 828], [1973 SCC CRI 828], [1973 CRLJ SC 1176]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/56524/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab94e4b014971140cd11

Index of Perjury judgments here.

A.Radhika Vs Wilson Sundararaj on 26 Feb 2021

Posted on February 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Citing landmark judgments, Madras High Court held that Investigating Officer cannot made liable u/s 211 IPC and based on another decision by Madras High Court here said such officers may be proceeded u/s 218 IPC which does not come under the procedure of 340 CrPC r/w 195 CrPC.

From Para 21,

21. The above judgements set out the procedure while dealing with an application under Section 340, Cr.P.C. Firstly, in order to initiate proceedings under Section 340,Cr.P.C., an application has to be made to the Court upon which the Court can initiate an inquiry into any offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. Secondly, offences as set out in the complaint have to be made out. In the present case, the complainant alleges that an offence under Section 211, I.P.C. has been made out.

From Para 22,

22. In the present case, based on the complaint given by one Mr. Rajamani, the FIR was registered by the F-2 Police Station, Egmore and the arrest was also carried out by the said police. The Petitioner came into the scene only at a later point of time when the case was transferred to the file of the CBCID. The language used under Section 211, I.P.C. regarding false charge can only relate to the original or initial accusation through which the criminal law was set in motion. Admittedly, it was not the Petitioner who had set the criminal law in motion. That apart, as held in Iqbal Singh Marwah’s Case (cited supra) the offences referred to under Section 195(1)(b), Cr.P.C. will get attracted only with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis.

And finally from paras 24 and 25,

24. This Court after considering the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki (cited supra) has come up with this fine distinction in the case of S.Mukanchand Bothra (cited supra). That apart, the facts of the present case is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki.
25. In view of the above discussion, this Court holds that the offence under Section 211, I.P.C. has not been made out against the Petitioner. The Respondent cannot pick and choose certain observations made by the trial court and this Court, and make it a basis for filing an application under Section 340, Cr.P.C. to punish the Petitioner under Section 211, I.P.C.

Silver lining from para 26,

26. A careful reading of the petition filed by the Respondent at the best makes out a case for malicious prosecution. In a case of malicious prosecution, which gives rise to a tortious liability, only a suit for damages can be filed by establishing the ingredients to maintain such a suit. The grounds for maintaining a suit for malicious prosecution cannot form the basis for filing a petition under Section 340, Cr.P.C. since it has to independently satisfy the requirements of Section 195(1)(b), Cr.P.C.

A.Radhika Vs Wilson Sundararaj on 26 Feb 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

State of Andhra Pradesh Vs M Srinivasa Rao on 28 August 2020

Posted on August 31, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

See Supreme Court deprecated the unethical practice of State Government of Andhra Pradesh in this Order… Hehehe

State of Andhra Pradesh does it again! The incorrigible inefficiency in filing appeal is apparent from page 78 where the present special leave petition has been filed after a delay of 455 days. In view of Post Master General & Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr.reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 there are no more acceptable excuses. These are matters brought before the Court only to obtain a certificate of dismissal to put a quietus to the matter. We strongly deprecate the same.

State of Andhra Pradesh Vs M Srinivasa Rao on 28 August 2020

The earlier judgment from erstwhile High Court of AP.

M.Srinivasa Rao Vs The State of A.P. on 28 August 2018

A complete indexed and mess-wise segregated collection of reprimands received by this incumbent State Government of YSRC Party are here.

Perumal Vs Janaki on 20 January, 2014

Posted on April 21, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Another landmark judgment from Justice Jasti Chalameswar on the Supervisory Authority of High Courts on Lower Courts in a state and how and why it should have been invoked in this case gainfully. If not under 193 IPC, invocation of 211 IPC was very much desirable in this case.

Another observation is that one can file Perjury under section 340 CrPC even after getting acquittal.

Perumal Vs Janaki on 20 January, 2014

Citations : [2015 NCC 1 678], [2014 SCC 5 377], [2014 SCC CRI 2 591], [2014 SCC ONLINE SC 46], [2014 CTC 1 664], [2014 AIC 135 224], [2014 AIOL 32], [2014 AIR SC 993], [2014 BOMCR CRI SC 2 70], [2014 CRLJ SC 1454], [2014 JT 2 180], [2014 SCALE 1 406], [2014 SLT 1 680], [2014 KLJ 1 688], [2014 AICLR 1 828], [2014 MLJ CRI 1 505], [2014 RAJ 1 30], [2014 SCJ 3 152], [2014 LW CRL 1 793], [2014 KCCR SN 3 166], [2014 AIR SCW 993], [2014 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 851], [2014 CUT LT 118 22]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/25369927/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af43e4b0149711415fb6

IPC 211 – False charge of offence made with intent to injure

Posted on July 17, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

—Whoever, with intent to cause injury to any person, institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding against that person, or falsely charges any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge against that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;

and if such criminal proceeding be instituted on a false charge of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for seven years or upwards, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: IPC 211 – False charge of offence made with intent to injure

Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Mr xxxx Bhat Vs State of Karnataka and Ms xxxx Rao on 28 Jun 2024

S.Mukanchand Bothra Vs Rajiv Gandhi Memorial Educational Charitable Trust Chennai and Ors on 22 December, 2015

Santokh Singh Vs Izhar Hussain and Anr on 25 Apr 1973

A.Radhika Vs Wilson Sundararaj on 26 Feb 2021

State of Andhra Pradesh Vs M Srinivasa Rao on 28 August 2020

Perumal Vs Janaki on 20 January, 2014

IPC 211 – False charge of offence made with intent to injure