All Compensation Judgments for Motor Vehicle Accidents or other mishaps

Posted on January 4 by ShadesOfKnife

Here is a list of case laws (includes decisions from Supreme Court, High Courts, District Court and other bodies such as Consumer forums) regarding compensation in cases of accidental death or disability or other mishap which entitles compensation for the aggrieved. This is done under provisions under CrPC or Schemes setup by Courts/Government or under Article 21 of Constitution. Can be used to seek compensation in cases of loss of life, part/full disability, loss of reputation, loss of companionship etc.

Index of MASTER sitemap here.

Paramvir Singh Saini Vs Baljit Singh and Ors on 02 Dec 2020

Posted on December 16, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court passed this Order in furtherance to earlier Orders as follows:

From Paras 2 and 3,

2. This Court, vide Order dated 03.04.2018 in SLP (Crl) No. 2302 of 2017, reported as Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018) 5 SCC 311, directed that a Central Oversight Body (hereinafter referred to as the “COB”) be set up by the Ministry of Home Affairs to implement the plan of action with respect to the use of videography in the crime scene during the investigation. This Court, while considering the directions issued in D.K. Basu Vs. State of West Bengal & Others (2015) 8 SCC 744, held that there was a need for further directions that in every State an oversight mechanism be created whereby an independent committee can study the CCTV camera footages and periodically publish a report of its observations thereon. The COB was further directed to issue appropriate instructions in this regard at the earliest.

From Paras 5, 6 and 7,

5. This Court, vide Order dated 16.07.2020, issued notice in the instant Special Leave Petition to the Ministry of Home Affairs on the question of audio-video recordings of Section 161 CrPC statements as is provided by Section 161 (3) proviso, as well as the larger question as to installation of CCTV cameras in police stations generally. While issuing notice this Court also took note of the directions in Shafhi Mohammad (supra).

6. This Court, vide Order dated 16.09.2020, impleaded all the States and Union Territories to find out the exact position of CCTV cameras qua each Police Station as well as the constitution of Oversight Committees in accordance with the Order dated 03.04.2018 of this Court in Shafhi Mohammad (supra).

7. Pursuant to the said directions of this Court, Compliance Affidavits and Action Taken Reports were filed by 14 States (till 24.11.2020), namely, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Nagaland, Karnataka, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, Assam, Sikkim, Mizoram, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya, Manipur; and 2 Union Territories, namely, Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry.

Duties of SLOC and DLOC are as follows:

12. It shall be the duty of the SLOC to see that the directions passed by this Court are carried out. Amongst others, the duties shall consist of:
a) Purchase, distribution and installation of CCTVs and its equipment; b) Obtaining the budgetary allocation for the same;
c) Continuous monitoring of maintenance and upkeep of CCTVs and its equipment;
d) Carrying out inspections and addressing the grievances received from the DLOC; and
e) To call for monthly reports from the DLOC and immediately address any concerns like faulty equipment.
Likewise, the DLOC shall have the following obligations:
a) Supervision, maintenance and upkeep of CCTVs and its equipment;
b) Continuous monitoring of maintenance and upkeep of CCTVs and its equipment;
c) To interact with the Station House Officer (hereinafter referred to as the “SHO”) as to the functioning and maintenance of CCTVs and its equipment; and
d) To send monthly reports to the SLOC about the functioning of CCTVs and allied equipment.
e) To review footage stored from CCTVs in the various Police Stations to check for any human rights violation that may have occurred but are not reported.

13. It is obvious that none of this can be done without allocation of adequate funds for the same, which must be done by the States’/Union Territories’ Finance Departments at the very earliest.

One of the most important aspect is settled here… Awesome…

14. The duty and responsibility for the working, maintenance and recording of CCTVs shall be that of the SHO of the police station concerned. It shall be the duty and obligation of the SHO to immediately report to the DLOC any fault with the equipment or malfunctioning of CCTVs. If the CCTVs are not functioning in a particular police station, the concerned SHO shall inform the DLOC of the arrest / interrogations carried out in that police station during the said period and forward the said record to the DLOC. If the concerned SHO has reported malfunctioning or non-functioning of CCTVs of a particular Police Station, the DLOC shall immediately request the SLOC for repair and purchase of the equipment, which shall be done immediately.

15. The Director General/Inspector General of Police of each State and Union Territory should issue directions to the person in charge of a Police Station to entrust the SHO of the concerned Police Station with the responsibility of assessing the working condition of the CCTV cameras installed in the police station and also to take corrective action to restore the functioning of all non-functional CCTV cameras. The SHO should also be made responsible for CCTV data maintenance, backup of data, fault rectification etc.

Regarding placement of CCTV cameras:

16. The State and Union Territory Governments should ensure that CCTV cameras are installed in each and every Police Station functioning in the respective State and/or Union Territory. Further, in order to ensure that no part of a Police Station is left uncovered, it is imperative to ensure that CCTV cameras are installed at all entry and exit points; main gate of the police station; all lock-ups; all corridors; lobby/the reception area; all verandas/outhouses, Inspector’s room; Sub-Inspector’s room; areas outside the lock-up room; station hall; in front of the police station compound; outside (not inside) washrooms/toilets; Duty Officer’s room; back part of the police station etc.

17. CCTV systems that have to be installed must be equipped with night vision and must necessarily consist of audio as well as video footage. In areas in which there is either no electricity and/or internet, it shall be the duty of the States/Union Territories to provide the same as expeditiously as possible using any mode of providing electricity, including solar/wind power. The internet systems that are provided must also be systems which provide clear image resolutions and audio. Most important of all is the storage of CCTV camera footage which can be done in digital video recorders and/or network video recorders. CCTV cameras must then be installed with such recording systems so that the data that is stored thereon shall be preserved for a period of 18 months. If the recording equipment, available in the market today, does not have the capacity to keep the recording for 18 months but for a lesser period of time, it shall be mandatory for all States, Union Territories and the Central Government to purchase one which allows storage for the maximum period possible, and, in any case, not below 1 year. It is also made clear that this will be reviewed by all the States so as to purchase equipment which is able to store the data for 18 months as soon as it is commercially available in the market. The affidavit of compliance to be filed by all States and Union Territories and Central Government shall clearly indicate that the best equipment available as of date has been purchased.
18. Whenever there is information of force being used at police stations resulting in serious injury and/or custodial deaths, it is necessary that persons be free to complain for a redressal of the same. Such complaints may not only be made to the State Human Rights Commission, which is then to utilise its powers, more particularly under Sections 17 and 18 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, for redressal of such complaints, but also to Human Rights Courts, which must then be set up in each District of every State/Union Territory under Section 30 of the aforesaid Act. The Commission/Court can then immediately summon CCTV camera footage in relation to the incident for its safe keeping, which may then be made available to an investigation agency in order to further process the complaint made to it.

And, finally explicitly publicising that the said premises is under CCTV monitoring in vernacular and English languages.

20. The SLOC and the COB (where applicable) shall give directions to all Police Stations, investigative/enforcement agencies to prominently display at the entrance and inside the police stations/offices of investigative/enforcement agencies about the coverage of the concerned premises by CCTV. This shall be done by large posters in English, Hindi and vernacular language. In addition to the above, it shall be clearly mentioned therein that a person has a right to complain about human rights violations to the National/State Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Court or the Superintendent of Police or any other authority empowered to take cognizance of an offence. It shall further mention that CCTV footage is preserved for a certain minimum time period, which shall not be less than six months, and the victim has a right to have the same secured in the event of violation of his human rights.

Paramvir Singh Saini Vs Baljit Singh and Ors on 02 Dec 2020

Subhranshu Rout @ Gugul Vs State of Odisha on 23 Nov 2020

Posted on November 25, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Single judge bench of Orissa High Court, in this bail matter, held that right to be forgotten (or left alone) is part of bouquet of rights enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.

From Para 5,

5. While examining the pages of the case records, prima facie, it appears that the petitioner has uploaded the said photos/videos on a social media platform i.e. Facebook and with the intervention of the police, after some days, he deleted the said objectionable contents from the Facebook. In fact, the information in the public domain is like toothpaste, once it is out of the tube one can’t get it back in and once the information is in the public domain it will never go away. Under the Indian Criminal Justice system a strong penal action is prescribed against the accused for such heinous crime but there is no mechanism available with respect to the right of the victim to get the objectionable photographs deleted from the server of the Facebook. The different types of harassment, threats and assaults that frighten citizens in regard to their online presence pose serious concerns for
citizens. There is an unprecedented escalation of such insensitive behavior on the social media platforms and the victim like the present one could not get those photos deleted permanently from server of such social media platforms like facebook. Though the statute prescribes penal action for the
accused for such crimes, the rights of the victim, especially, her right to privacy which is intricately linked to her right to get deleted in so far as those objectionable photos have been left unresolved. There is a widespread and seemingly consensual convergence towards an adoption and enshrinement of the right to get deleted or forgotten but hardly any effort has been undertaken in India till recently, towards adoption of such a right, despite such an issue has inexorably posed in the technology dominated world. Presently, there is no statute in India which provides for the right to be forgotten/getting the photos erased from the server of the social media platforms permanently. The legal possibilities of being forgotten on line or off line cries for a widespread debate. It is also an undeniable fact that the implementation of right to be forgotten is a thorny issue in terms of practicality and technological nuances. In fact, it cries for a clear cut demarcation of institutional boundaries and redressal of many delicate issues which hitherto remain unaddressed in Indian jurisdiction. The dynamics of hyper connectivity- the abundance, pervasiveness and accessibility of communication network have redefined the memory and the prescriptive mandate to include in the technological contours is of pressing importance.

From Para 14,

14. Section 27 of the draft Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018 contains the right to be forgotten. Under Section 27, a data principal (an individual) has the right to prevent continuing disclosure of personal data by a data fiduciary. The aforesaid provision which falls under Chapter VI (Data Principal Rights) of the Bill, distinctly carves out the “right to be forgotten” in no uncertain terms. In terms of this provision, every data principal shall have the right to restrict or prevent continuing disclosure of personal data (relating to such data principal) by any data fiduciary if such disclosure meets any one of the following three conditions, namely if the disclosure of personal data:
(i) has served the purpose for which it was made or is no longer necessary; or
(ii) was made on the basis of the data principal’s consent and such consent has since been withdrawn; or
(iii) was made contrary to the provisions of the bill or any other law in force.
In addition to this, Section 10 of the Bill provides that a data fiduciary shall retain personal data only as long as may be reasonably necessary to satisfy the purpose for which it is processed. Further, it imposes an obligation on every data fiduciary to undertake periodic reviews in order to determine whether it is necessary to retain the personal data in its possession. If it is not necessary for personal data to be retained by a data fiduciary, then such personal data must be deleted in a manner as may be specified.

Subhranshu Rout @ Gugul Vs State of Odisha on 23 Nov 2020

Index of Article 21 case laws is here.

Subhash Bahadur @Upender Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 6 Nov 2020

Posted on November 10, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Delhi High Court held that there is no need for filing an formal application seeking default bail, once the conditions set out in section 167(2)(a) are made out, as continued confinement violates fundamental right under Article 21.

From Paras 32, 33 and 34,

32. A plain reading of the Proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.PC indicates that an accused would necessarily have to be released on bail “if he is prepared to and does furnish bail”. Thus, in cases where the statutory period of sixty days or ninety days has expired, the accused would be entitled to be released on bail provided he meets the condition as set out therein – that is, he is prepared to furnish and does furnish bail. It is important to note that there is no provision requiring him to make any formal application.

33. It is also trite law that there is no inherent power in a court to remand an accused to custody. Such power must be traced to an express provision of law [See: Natbar Parida Bisnu Charan vs State of Orissa: (1975) Supp SCR 137 and Union of India vs Thamsharasi: (1995) 4 SCC 190]. As is apparent from the language of Proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.PC, the power of a Court to remand an accused to custody pending investigation is circumscribed and stands denuded if the period of sixty days or ninety days, as the case may be, has expired and the accused is ready and willing to furnish bail.

34. It is also necessary to bear in mind that courts have consistently leaned to resolve the tension between form and substance, in favour of substance and have used the interpretative tools to address the substance of the matter. In Ajay Hasia Etc v Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors:1981SCR(2) 79 had, in an altogether different context, observed that “where the constitution fundamentals vital to maintenance of human rights are at stake, functional realism and not facial cosmetics must be the diagnostic tool, for constitutional law must seek the substance and not the form”. Thus, if in substance the essential conditions as set out under the Proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.PC are met and complied with – that is (i) if the investigation has not been completed within the period of sixty or ninety days, as the case may be, from the date of arrest of the accused; and (ii) if the accused is prepared to offer bail – then there would be no justifiable reason to detain the accused.

Subhash Bahadur @Upender Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 6 Nov 2020

More Gyan here.

Balaji Baliram Mupade Vs State of Maharashtra on 29 Oct 2020

Posted on November 8, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court, again, highlighted the need of delivering judgments at the earliest, as the “problem is compounded where the result is known but not the reasons.”

From Para 3,

3. Further, much later but still almost two decades ago, this Court in Anil Rai v. State of Bihar – 2001 (7) SCC 318 deemed it appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding the pronouncement of judgments, expecting them to be followed by all concerned under the mandate of this Court. It is not necessary to reproduce the directions except to state that normally the judgment is expected within two months of the conclusion of the arguments, and on expiry of three months any of the parties can file an application in the High Court with prayer for early judgment. If, for any reason, no judgment is pronounced for six months, any of the parties is entitled to move an application before the then Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to re-assign the case before another Bench for fresh arguments.

From Para 10,

10. We must note with regret that the counsel extended through various judicial pronouncements including the one referred to aforesaid appear to have been ignored, more importantly where oral orders are pronounced. In case of such orders, it is expected that they are either dictated in the Court or at least must follow immediately thereafter, to facilitate any aggrieved party to seek redressal from the higher Court. The delay in delivery of judgments has been observed to be a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in Anil Rai’s case (supra) and as stated aforesaid, the problem gets aggravated when the operative portion is made available early and the reasons follow much later.

Balaji Baliram Mupade Vs State of Maharashtra on 29 Oct 2020

Citations :

Other Sources :

Swaran Singh and Ors Vs State NCT Delhi and Anr on 18 Aug 2008

Posted on November 6, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Katju held that offending words to a member of SC/ST, are liable under the Act, only if made in any place in public view, but not otherwise. A big relief for those facing false cases.

From Paras 27 and 28,

27. Learned counsel then contended that the alleged act was not committed in a public place and hence does not come within the purview of section 3(1)(x) of the Act. In this connection it may be noted that the aforesaid provision does not use the expression ‘public place’, but instead the expression used is ‘in any place within public view’. In our opinion there is a clear distinction between the two expressions.

28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a ‘Chamar’) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression ‘place within public view’ with the expression ‘public place’. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.

And relating to American cuss word Nigger,

30. In this connection it may be mentioned that in America to use the word ‘Nigger’ today for an African-American is regarded as highly offensive and is totally unacceptable, even if it was acceptable 50 years ago. In our opinion, even if the word ‘Chamar’ was not regarded offensive at one time in our country, today it is certainly a highly offensive word when used in a derogatory sense to insult and humiliate a person. Hence, it should never be used with that intent. The use of the word ‘Chamar’ will certainly attract section 3(1)(x) of the Act, if from the context it appears that it was used in a derogatory sense to insult or humiliate a member of the SC/ST.

And then Husband was held to have NOT insulted the respondent in public view,

34. However, a perusal of the F.I.R. shows that Swaran Singh did not use these offensive words in the public view. There is nothing in the F.I.R. to show that any member of the public was present when Swaran Singh uttered these words, or that the place where he uttered them was a place which ordinarily could be seen by the public. Hence in our opinion no prima facie offence is made out against appellant no.1.

Swaran Singh and Ors Vs State NCT Delhi and Anr on 18 Aug 2008

Citations : [2008 SCC 8 435], [2008 SCC CRI 3 527], [2008 AIC SC 69 25], [2008 AIOL 938], [2008 AIR SC SUPP 441], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 2 431], [2008 CRLJ SC 4369], [2008 JT 9 60], [2009 MPLJ SC 1 503], [2008 SCALE 11 346], [2008 SCR 12 132]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/531612/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/575fd270607dba63d7e69106

Arun Sharma Vs State of M.P. on 02 Dec 2020

Posted on November 6, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

In this wonderful Order from 1-judge Gwalior bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court, it was held that parading suspects in the media/public is violative of Article 21 and the concerned officers are liable for the violation of fundamental rights including compensation.

Arun Sharma Vs State of M.P. on 02 Nov 2020

Here is the Final Judgment… Some snippets follow…

From Paras 21, 22 and 23,

21. The Counsel for the State also could not point out as to how, the respondent no. 3 could have taken cognizance of the complaint made by the landlady. From the plain reading of the application, it is clear that She had prayed for recovery of arrears of rent as well as for eviction of the petitioner. By no stretch of imagination, the complaint filed made by the landlady can be said to have disclosed cognizable offence. Even a non-cognizable offence was not disclosed in the complaint. The entire complaint was beyond the jurisdiction of the police authorities but still cognizance of the same was taken.

22. When a specific question was put to Shri Amit Sanghi, Superintendent of Police, Gwalior, that whether it is the official duty of the police to get the shops vacated without there being any orders of the Court, then it was rightly admitted by Shri Amit Sanghi, Superintendent of Police, Gwalior, that the police has no authority whatsoever under any law, to evict the tenants from the tenanted premises and the eviction can take place only under the decree of eviction issued by the Court of competent jurisdiction. However, it is submitted by Shri Sanghi, that the incident of 25-7-2020 took place
prior to his posting in Gwalior. Even the respondent no.3, in his return has categorically stated that the matter of eviction is a civil matter and police has no jurisdiction.

23. Although the Counsel for the respondent no. 4 relied upon Section 23 of Police Act, but as a departmental enquiry is pending against the respondents no. 3 to 5, therefore, only undisputed facts and the stand taken by the respondents as well as the preliminary enquiry reports are being considered for deciding this petition. However, it is not out of place to mention here, that now the respondents no. 3 to 5 are involved in mud-sledging on each other, thereby placing certain documents on record, which were suppressed by the respondents no. 1 and 2.

From Para 24,

24. It is the case of the respondent no. 4 that it was the respondent no. 3, who had directed her to enquire the complaint made by the landlady, whereas it is the case of the respondent no. 3, that the copy of the complaint was given to him by respondent no. 4, only when he returned back to the police station at 16:00 and the endorsement made on the application thereby, directing the respondent no. 4 to enquire, does not bear his signatures. However, the return of the respondent no. 3 is beautifully silent as to whether such endorsement is in his handwriting or not? In para 8 of the return, the respondent no. 3 has pleaded that as per routine procedure when any complaint is submitted in Police Station, it is registered in Complaint register and is placed by the Police Station Munshi before the respondent no.3. Although it is the contention of the respondent no. 3 that he was
given the said application by the respondent no.4, only after he came back to the police station at 16:00, but his return is completely silent as to why he did not ask the respondent no. 4, that under whose authority, the endorsement of entrusting enquiry to the respondent no. 4 was written. In absence of such pleadings, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the respondent no.3, and it is held that endorsement made on the application dated 25-7-2020 made by the landlady is in the handwriting of the respondent no.3 and it was the respondent no.3 who had entrusted the enquiry to the respondent no.

Arun Sharma Vs State of M.P. on 02 Dec 2020

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/19697017/

Reena Hazarika Vs State of Assam on 31 Oct 2018

Posted on October 29, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Navin Sinha held that procedure u/s 313 CrPC may very well be considered as a fundamental right as part of Rights available under Article 21 of the Constitution.

From Para 16,

16. Section 313, Cr.P.C. cannot be seen simply as a part of audi alteram partem. It confers a valuable right upon an accused to establish his innocence and can well be considered beyond a statutory right as a constitutional right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, even if it is not to be considered as a piece of substantive evidence, not being on oath under Section 313(2), Cr.P.C. The importance of this right has been considered time and again by this court, but it yet remains to be applied in practice as we shall see presently in the discussion to follow. If the accused takes a defence after the prosecution evidence is closed, under Section 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C. the Court is duty bound under Section 313(4) Cr.P.C. to consider the same. The mere use of the word ‘may’ cannot be held to confer a discretionary power on the court to consider or not to consider such defence, since it constitutes a valuable right of an accused for access to justice, and the likelihood of the prejudice that may be caused thereby. Whether the defence is acceptable or not and whether it is compatible or incompatible with the evidence available is an entirely different matter. If there has been no consideration at all of the defence taken under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in the given facts of a case, the conviction may well stand vitiated. To our mind, a solemn duty is cast on the court in dispensation of justice to adequately consider the defence of the accused taken under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and to either accept or reject the same for reasons specified in writing.

Citations : 2018 SCC ONLINE SC 2281, 2019 (1) AICLR 192 (SC), 2018 (3) JIC 75 (SC), AIR 2018 SC 5361

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/152892250/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5bd9d9c99eff430a1b47fd8c

Section 313 CrPC can well be considered as a constitutional right under Article 21; invocation of last seen theory sans facts and evidence does not shift onus on accused: SC

Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs Union of India and Ors on 16 Dec 1983

Posted on October 13, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice P.N. Bhagawati held as follows…

It is the fundamental right of every one in this Country, assured under the interpretation given to Article 21 by this Court in Francis Mullen’s case, to live with human dignity, free from exploitation. This right to live with human dignity, enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from the Directive Principles of State Policy and particularly clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and Article 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, it must include protection of the health and strength of workers men and women, and of the tender age of children against abuse, opportunities and facilities for children to develop in healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. These are the minimum requirements which must exist in order to enable a person to live with human dignity and no State neither the Central Government nor any State Government-has the right to take any action which will deprive a person of the enjoyment of these basic essentials. Since the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39, Article 41 and 42 are not enforceable in a court of law, it may not be possible to compel the State through the judicial process to make provision by statutory enactment or executive fiat for ensuring these basic essentials which go to make up a life of human dignity but where legislation is already enacted by the State providing these basic requirements to the workmen and thus investing their right to live with basic human dignity, with concrete reality and content, the State can certainly be obligated to ensure observance of such legislation for inaction on the part of the State in securing implementation of such legislation would amount to denial of the right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21, more so in the context of Article 256 which provides that, the executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in that State.

Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs Union of India and Ors on 16 Dec 1983

Citations : [1984 AIR SC 802], [1984 SCC 3 161], [1984 SCR 2 67], [1983 SCALE 2 1151], [1984 SCC L&S 389], [1984 LABIC 560], [1984 LLN 2 60], [1984 UJ 16 29], [1984 AIR 802], [1984 LAB IC 560]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/595099/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac0fe4b014971140dea7

List of other case laws around Article 21 are here.

Article 21 – Protection of life and personal liberty

Posted on October 4, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Article 21 of The Constitution of India

All Compensation Judgments for Motor Vehicle Accidents or other mishaps

Paramvir Singh Saini Vs Baljit Singh and Ors on 02 Dec 2020

Subhranshu Rout @ Gugul Vs State of Odisha on 23 Nov 2020

Subhash Bahadur @Upender Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 6 Nov 2020

Balaji Baliram Mupade Vs State of Maharashtra on 29 Oct 2020

Swaran Singh and Ors Vs State NCT Delhi and Anr on 18 Aug 2008

Arun Sharma Vs State of M.P. on 02 Dec 2020

Reena Hazarika Vs State of Assam on 31 Oct 2018

Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs Union of India and Ors on 16 Dec 1983

Article 21 – Protection of life and personal liberty