Doongar Singh and Ors Vs The State Of Rajasthan on 28 Nov 2017

A division bench of Supreme Court passed the following guidelines…

13. To conclude:
(i) The trial courts must carry out the mandate of Section 309 of the Cr.P.C. as reiterated in judgments of this Court, inter alia, in State of U.P. versus Shambhu Nath Singh and Others, Mohd. Khalid versus State of W.B. and Vinod Kumar versus State of Punjab.
(ii) The eye-witnesses must be examined by the prosecution as soon as possible.
(iii) Statements of eye-witnesses should invariably be recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. as per procedure prescribed thereunder.

Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1391], [2017 SCALE 13 752], [2018 SCC 13 741], [2019 SCC CRI 1 410], [2017 CTC 6 883], [2018 KLT 1 629], [2018 AIC 183 5], [2018 ECRN 1 667], [2017 AIR SC SUPP 328]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/99075271/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a261fe74a9326744f39e37e

Ramapada Basak and Anr Vs State of West Bengal and Ors on 23 Jul 2021

Posted on July 27, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Single judge bench of Calcutta High Court held as follows:

It is now well settled that the children and their spouses living in the senior citizen’s house are at best “licensees”. Such licence comes to an end once the senior citizens are not comfortable with their children and their families. This principle has also been followed by the Delhi High Court in in WP(C) 2761/2020 (Sandeep Gulati Vs. Divisional Commissioner), decided on 13.03.2020 and the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the cases of (a) Manmohan Singh Vs. U.T. Chandigarh and Ors. (Case No. 1365/2015), (b) Samsher Singh Vs. District Magistrate, U.T. Chandigarh (Case No. 2017 CWP 6365) and (c) Gurpreet Singh Vs. State of Punjab (Case No. 2016(1) RCR (Civil) 324)
Two issues would come up for consideration. The first of which is the availability of alternative remedy under the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The other is a right of a daughter-in-law of residence to be provided by either the husband or the father-inlaw, if directed by a competent court under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S. Vanitha Vs. Deputy Commissoner, Bangaluru Urban District and Ors. reported in 2020 SCConline SC 1023 has said that since both, the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 as also the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are special legislations, the two must be construed harmoniously and applied suitably by a writ court hearing a plea of the senior citizens that they do not want their children to live with them. At paragraphs 35-40 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has elaborately dealt with the principle under the headline “E. Harmonising competing reliefs under the PWDV Act 2005 and Senior Citizens Act 2007”.
In the instant case, it is seen that no right of residence has been sought under any Statute by the daughter-in-law. Hence, this Court is of the view that there is no impediment in allowing exclusive residentiary rights to the senior citizens and to direct eviction of the son and daughter-in-law.
On the question of alternative remedy, this Court is conscious of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trademark reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 and upheld recently in the year 2021 in the case of Radha Krishan Industries Vs.
State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. reported in 2021 SCCOnline SC 334.
However, the right of senior citizen to exclusively reside in his own house, must be viewed from the prism of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. To compel a senior citizen to approach either a civil court (the jurisdiction of which is any way barred under Section 27 of the 2007 Act) or take recourse to a special Statute like the 2007 Act would in most cases be extremely erroneous and painful for a person in the sunset days of life. This Court is therefore of the view that the principle of alternative remedy cannot be strictly applied to Senior Citizens and a Writ Court must come to the aid of a Senior Citizen in a given case.
A nation that cannot take care of its aged, old and infirm citizens cannot be regarded as having achieved complete civilization.

Ramapada Basak and Anr Vs State of West Bengal and Ors on 23 Jul 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/9363669/

Children living in parents’ house are at best licensees: Cal HC says senior citizens’ exclusive residentiary rights to be viewed from prism of Art. 21

Registrar General Vs State of Meghalaya on 23 Jun 2021

Posted on July 12, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Meghalaya High Court issued the below directions, when the Administration there tried to impose mandatory vaccination upon the traders for them to run their businesses…

Guidelines passed:

In addition thereto, we issue the following directions so that the public at large are provided with an option of making an informed choice:-
(i) All shops/establishments/local taxis/auto-rickshaws/maxi cabs and buses should display prominently at a conspicuous place, a sign, “VACCINATED”, in the event all employees and staff of the concerned shop/establishment are vaccinated. Similarly, in the case of local taxis/auto-rickshaws/maxi cabs and buses where the concerned driver or conductor or helper(s) are vaccinated.
(ii) All shops/establishments/local taxis/auto-rickshaws/maxi cabs and buses should display prominently at a conspicuous place, a sign, “NOT VACCINATED”, in the event all the employees and staff of the concerned shop/establishment are not vaccinated. Similarly, in the case of local taxis/auto-rickshaws/maxi cabs and buses where the concerned driver or conductor or helper(s) are not vaccinated.

Registrar General Vs State of Meghalaya on 23 Jun 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/70432062/

Rahul S Shah Vs Jinendra Kumar Gandhi on 22 Apr 2021

Posted on July 1, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court passed these mandatory guidelines which “All Courts dealing with suits and execution proceedings shall follow”.

From Para 42,

42. All Courts dealing with suits and execution proceedings shall mandatorily follow the below-mentioned directions:
1. In suits relating to delivery of possession, the court must examine the parties to the suit under Order X in relation to third party interest and further exercise the power under Order XI Rule 14 asking parties to disclose and produce documents, upon oath, which are in possession of the parties including declaration pertaining to third party interest in such properties.
2. In appropriate cases, where the possession is not in dispute and not a question of fact for adjudication before the Court, the Court may appoint Commissioner to assess the accurate description and status of the property.
3. After examination of parties under Order X or production of documents under Order XI or receipt of commission report, the Court must add all necessary or proper parties to the suit, so as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and also make such joinder of cause of action in the same suit.
4. Under Order XL Rule 1 of CPC, a Court Receiver can be appointed to monitor the status of the property in question as custodia legis for proper adjudication of the matter.
5. The Court must, before passing the decree, pertaining to delivery of possession of a property ensure that the decree is unambiguous so as to not only contain clear description of the property but also having regard to the status of the property.
6. In a money suit, the Court must invariably resort to Order XXI Rule 11, ensuring immediate execution of decree for payment of money on oral application.
7. In a suit for payment of money, before settlement of issues, the defendant may be required to disclose his assets on oath, to the extent that he is being made liable in a suit. The Court may further, at any stage, in appropriate cases during the pendency of suit, using powers under Section 151 CPC, demand security to ensure satisfaction of any decree.
8. The Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 47 or under Order XXI of CPC, must not issue notice on an application of third-party claiming rights in a mechanical manner. Further, the Court should refrain from entertaining any such application(s) that has already been considered by the Court while adjudicating the suit or which raises any such issue which otherwise could have been raised and determined during adjudication of suit if due diligence was exercised by the applicant.
9. The Court should allow taking of evidence during the execution proceedings only in exceptional and rare cases where the question of fact could not be decided by resorting to any other expeditious method like appointment of Commissioner or calling for electronic materials including photographs or video with affidavits.
10. The Court must in appropriate cases where it finds the objection or resistance or claim to be frivolous or mala fide, resort to Sub-rule (2) of Rule 98 of Order XXI as well as grant compensatory costs in accordance with Section 35A.
11. Under section 60 of CPC the term “…in name of the judgment- debtor or by another person in trust for him or on his behalf” should be read liberally to incorporate any other person from whom he may have the ability to derive share, profit or property.
12. The Executing Court must dispose of the Execution Proceedings within six months from the date of filing, which may be extended only by recording reasons in writing for such delay.
13. The Executing Court may on satisfaction of the fact that it is not possible to execute the decree without police assistance, direct the concerned Police Station to provide police assistance to such officials who are working towards execution of the decree. Further, in case an offence against the public servant while discharging his duties is brought to the knowledge of the Court, the same must be dealt stringently in accordance with law.
14. The Judicial Academies must prepare manuals and ensure continuous training through appropriate mediums to the Court personnel/staff executing the warrants, carrying out attachment and sale and any other official duties for executing orders issued by the Executing Courts

Rahul S Shah Vs Jinendra Kumar Gandhi on 22 Apr 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/93073896/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6085af43c07b9e7eacd85ef8

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/rahul-s-shah-versus-jinendra-kumar-gandhi-ors

Akshay Vinod Kulkarni Vs Chief Passport Officer and Anr on 03 May 2021

Posted on June 1, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Single judge bench of Delhi High Court held that without giving any opportunity to the Petitioner, the Passport Office cannot suspend, impound a passport.

From Paras 11, 12 and 13,

11. In the opinion of this court, the shocking part of the present case is that, despite long drawn correspondence the Respondents have not served the passport suspension order or the denial order to the Petitioner. He was shuttled between the RPO-Kozhikode who informed him that it was the Indian Mission in Houston which revoked his passport. It is not even the case of the Respondents that the Petitioner was heard. The passport of the petitioner has been suspended on the basis of a complaint by the wife due to matrimonial disputes for more than two and half years. The correspondence on record reveals that the Petitioner has repeatedly approached various authorities seeking revival of his passport as also for a copy of the denial order, but in vain. Even before this court the Respondents have not filed any affidavit or document on record till date, despite having more than five months to do so. The Indian Mission or the other authorities have not filed a single document to show whether it is a case of revocation of passport or suspension of passport and if so on what grounds was the action taken. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the Petitioner has been unable to travel to India. It is the case of the Petitioner that his old mother, who is a widow, lives alone in Bangalore and that he wishes to travel both in the U.S.A. and in India, in relation to his job assignments. It is clear that the Petitioner is suffering immensely both personally and professionally due to the suspension/revocation of his passport. The Petitioner’s appeal has also now been dismissed, without the said orders being made available to him. The submission is that even if the suspension order is stayed, the passport does not come back into operation.

12. In the order in appeal dated 8th May, 2020, which is under challenge in the present petition, the Appellate Forum proceeds on the basis that since the email dated 5th November, 2018 was sent to the Petitioner, it is presumed that the Petitioner was aware of the suspension of his passport. Such a conclusion cannot be arrived at unless and until, the Respondent establishes on record that proper notice was issued and a reply was called for and the Petitioner did not respond to the same.
13. Ld. Counsel for the Respondents now submits that due to the pandemic, the file of this case is also not available and so he could not place any documents on record.
14. The Petitioner cannot be made to live without a passport indefinitely. This Court has given adequate time to the Respondents to file an affidavit/documents on record, however, not a single shred of paper has been placed on record. On merits, whether the suspension/revocation was justified or not would be the subject matter of final adjudication. However, the Petitioner cannot be made to suffer further especially due to the pandemic that is currently raging which may require him to travel to India to meet his mother who is in India, owing to her age etc.

Akshay Vinod Kulkarni Vs Chief Passport Officer and Anr on 03 May 2021

Titash Banik Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 23 Dec 2016

Posted on May 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Relying on landmark decision of a Division bench of the Apex Court here, High Court of Chhattisgarh held that the accused must be provided with a certified copy of the FIR in which the accused was accused.

Titash Banik Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 23 Dec 2016

Citations: [2016 SCC ONLINE CHH 1623]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/149118573/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/58a563b84a93266eac2e0258

Police authorities cannot deny certified copy of FIR, except in some sensitive cases

Fakhrey Alam Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 15 Mar 2021

Posted on March 18, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of Supreme Court in this Order held as follows in regards to Default bail u/s 167 CrPC,

On the second aspect we cannot lose sight of the fact that what was envisaged by the Legislature was that the investigation should be completed in 24 hours but practically that was never found feasible. It is in these circumstances that Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. provided for time period within which the investigation should be completed, depending upon the nature of offences. Since, liberty is a Constitutional right, time periods were specified in the default of which the accused will have a right to default bail, a valuable right.
If we look at the scenario in the present case in that conspectus, the charge sheet under the provisions of law as originally filed on 04.09.2017 were required to be filed within 90 days but was actually filed within 180 days. This was on the premise of the charge under Section 18 of the UAPA Act. However, no charge sheet was filed even within 180 days under the UAPA Act, but post filing of the application for default bail, it was filed after 211 days. Thus, undoubtedly the period of 180 days to file the charge sheet qua UAPA Act had elapsed. We do not think that the State can take advantage of the fact that in one case there is one charge sheet and supplementary charge sheets are used to extend the time period in this manner by seeking to file the supplementary charge sheet qua the offences under the UAPA Act even beyond the period specified under Section 167 of the Cr.P.C beyond which default bail will be admissible, i.e, the period of 180 days. That period having expired and the charge sheet not having been filed qua those offences (albeit a supplementary charge sheet), we are of the view the appellant would be entitled to default bail in the aforesaid facts and circumstances.
We need only emphasize what is already observed in Bikramjit Singh case (supra) that default bail under first proviso of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. is a fundamental right and not merely a statutory right as it is, a procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus a fundamental right is granted to an accused person to be released on bail once the conditions of the first proviso to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. are fulfilled.
In fact in the majority judgment of this Court it has been held that an oral application for grant of default bail would suffice [See. Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam]3. The consequences of the UAPA Act are drastic in punishment and in that context, it has been held not to be a mere statutory right but part of the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Fakhrey Alam Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 15 Mar 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

Upkar Singh Vs Ved Prakash and Ors on 10 Sep 2004

Posted on March 11, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A landmark judgment from a 3-judge bench of Supreme Court, categorically declares as follows:

From Para 17,

17. It is clear from the words emphasised hereinabove in the above quotation, this Court in the case of T.T Antony v. State of Kerala has not excluded the registration of a complaint in the nature of a counter-case from the purview of the Code. In our opinion, this Court in that case only held that any further complaint by the same complainant or others against the same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited under the Code because an investigation in this regard would have already started and further complaint against the same accused will amount to an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original complaint, hence will be prohibited under section 162 of the code. This prohibition noticed by this Court, in our opinion, does not apply to counter-complaint by the accused in the first complaint or on his behalf alleging a different version of the said incident.

From Para 23,

23. Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this Court in T.T Antony case is to be accepted as holding that a second complaint in regard to the same incident filed as a counter-complaint is prohibited under the Code then, in our opinion, such conclusion would lead to serious consequences. This will be clear from the hypothetical example given hereinbelow i.e if in regard to a crime committed by the real accused he takes the first opportunity to lodge a false complaint and the same is registered by the jurisdictional police then the aggrieved victim of such crime will be precluded from lodging a complaint giving his version of the incident in question, consequently he will be deprived of his legitimated right to bring the real accused to book. This cannot be the purport of the Code.

Upkar Singh Vs Ved Prakash and Ors on 10 Sep 2004

Citations : [2004 AIR SC 4320], [2004 ALD CRI 2 906], [2004 CRI LJ 4219], [2004 JCR SC 4 158], [2004 JT SC 7 488], [2004 KLT SC 3 444], [2005 OLR SC 1 43], [2004 PLJR 4 157], [2004 SCALE 7 563], [2004 CRLJ 0 4219], [2004 SCC 13 2922004 ACR 3 2450], [2005 SCC CR 0 211], [2004 SCC 1 292], [2004 JT 7 4881], [2005 JIC 1 1092005 ACC 51 673], [2004 AIR SC 3240], [2004 AIR SC 0 4320], [2004 RCR CRIMINAL 4 294], [2004 SCC 22 292], [2004 SCC 6 528], [2004 AIR SC 5017], [2005 BOMCR CRI SC 1 199], [2004 CRIMES SC 4 20], [2005 SCC CRI 211], [2004 SUPREME 6 528], [2004 ALLLJ 3436], [2004 CRLJ SC 4219], [2004 RCR CRL 4 2942004 ALL LJ 3436], [2004 CRILJ 42192004 JT 7 488], [2004 AIR SCW 5017], [2004 AIR SCW 0 4320]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1054183/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adefe4b0149711412948

Pankaj Kumar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 11 Jul 2008

Posted on February 17, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

In this landmark judgment, Apex Court held that Right to speedy trial is implicit to Article 21 of Constitution of India and also passed guidelines to ensure that this right is not violated, and it violated, Constitutional Courts have a duty to fix such violation appropriately.

From Para 14,

14. Time and again this Court has emphasized the need for speedy investigations and trial as both are mandated by the letter and spirit of the provisions of the CrPC. (In particular, Sections 197, 173, 309, 437 (6) and 468 etc.) and the constitutional protection enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. Inspired by the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by a seven-Judge Bench of this Court in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India & Anr., in Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, this Court had said that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by law; that such procedure is not some semblance of a procedure but the procedure should be ‘reasonable, fair and just’; and therefrom flows, without doubt, the right to speedy trial. It was also observed that no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as ‘reasonable, fair or just’ and it would fall foul of Article 21. The Court clarified that speedy trial means reasonably expeditious trial which is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21.

From Para 15,

15. The exposition of Article 21 in Hussainara Khatoon’s case (supra) was exhaustively considered afresh by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. Vs. R.S. Nayak & Anr.11. Referring to a number of decisions of this Court and the American precedents on the Sixth Amendment of their Constitution, making the right to a speedy and public trial a constitutional guarantee, the Court formulated as many as eleven propositions with a note of caution that these were not exhaustive and were meant only to serve as guidelines. For the sake of brevity, we do not propose to reproduce all the said propositions and it would suffice to note the gist thereof. These are:
(i) fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily;
(ii) right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial;
(iii) in every case where the speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is —
who is responsible for the delay?;
(iv) while determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on— what is called, the systemic delays;
(v) each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case;
(vi) ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh several relevant factors—’balancing test’ or ‘balancing process’—and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied;
(vii) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open and having regard to the nature of offence and other circumstances when the court feels that quashing of proceedings cannot be in the interest of justice, it is open to the court to make appropriate orders, including fixing the period for completion of trial;
(viii) it is neither advisable nor feasible to prescribe any outer time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint;
(ix) an objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.

From Para 17,

17. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal persecutions is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal persecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. In every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the court has to perform the balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances, enumerated above, and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. Where the court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a situation, it is open to the court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable including fixation of time for conclusion of trial.

Pankaj Kumar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 11 Jul 2008

Citations : [2008 RCR CRI 4 890], [2008 AIR SC 0 5165], [2008 JT 8 109], [2008 AIR SC 3077], [2008 RAJ 6 293], [2008 SCC 16 117], [2008 WLC 2 677], [2008 MLJ CRI 2 1649], [2009 SCJ 1 998], [2008 SCALE 9 760], [2008 CCR 3 176], [2008 DLT CRI 3 533], [2008 SLT 6 233], [2008 AIOL 2116], [2008 ANJ SC 2 173], [2008 BOMCR CRI SC 2 590], [2010 SCC CRI 4 217], [2008 AIC SC 68 93], [2009 LLN 2 798], [2009 FLR 122 790], [2008 CRLJ SC 3944], [2008 AIR SCW 5165]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1223002/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae6ae4b0149711413c8f

All Compensation Judgments for Motor Vehicle Accidents or other mishaps

Posted on January 4, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Here is a list of case laws (includes decisions from Supreme Court, High Courts, District Court and other bodies such as Consumer forums) regarding compensation in cases of accidental death or disability or other mishap which entitles compensation for the aggrieved. This is done under provisions under CrPC or Schemes setup by Courts/Government or under Article 21 of Constitution. Can be used to seek compensation in cases of loss of life, part/full disability, loss of reputation, loss of companionship etc.

Index of MASTER sitemap here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Article 21 – Protection of life and personal liberty

Doongar Singh and Ors Vs The State Of Rajasthan on 28 Nov 2017

Ramapada Basak and Anr Vs State of West Bengal and Ors on 23 Jul 2021

Registrar General Vs State of Meghalaya on 23 Jun 2021

Rahul S Shah Vs Jinendra Kumar Gandhi on 22 Apr 2021

Akshay Vinod Kulkarni Vs Chief Passport Officer and Anr on 03 May 2021

Titash Banik Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 23 Dec 2016

Fakhrey Alam Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 15 Mar 2021

Upkar Singh Vs Ved Prakash and Ors on 10 Sep 2004

Pankaj Kumar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 11 Jul 2008

All Compensation Judgments for Motor Vehicle Accidents or other mishaps