State of Maharashtra Vs Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede on 29 Jul 2009

A division bench of Apex Court cited precedents holding that,

From Para 20,

20. Even in a case where the burden is on the accused, it is well-known, the prosecution must prove the foundational facts. [See Noor Aga v. State of Punjab 2008 (9) SCALE 691 and Jayendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. 2009 (7) SCALE 757]

From Para 21,

21. It is also a well-settled principle of law that where it is possible to have both the views, one in favour of the prosecution and the other in favour of the accused, the latter should prevail. [See Dilip and Another v. State of M.P. (2007) 1 SCC 450 and Gagan Kanojia and Another v. State of Punjab (2006) 13 SCC 516]

State of Maharashtra Vs Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede on 29 Jul 2009

Citations : [2009 RCR CRI 4 217], [2009 AIR SC 0 5411], [2009 SCC 15 200], [2009 ALL MR CRI 0 3127], [2009 SLT 6 439], [2009 JT 12 516], [2009 KHC 0 5865], [2009 CCR 3 700], [2009 OCR 44 425], [2009 AIOL 968], [2009 AIR BOMR 5 781], [2009 ANJ SC 2 180], [2010 BOMCR CRI SC 1 247], [2009 JT 12 515], [2009 SCALE 10 355], [2010 SCC CRI 2 385], [2009 SCR 11 513], [2009 ECRN SC 4 602], [2009 AIR SCW 5411], [2009 CRLJ SC 4425], [2009 TLPRE 0 871], [2009 MADLJ CRI 4 335]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/791070/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aecbe4b0149711414cb2

Sabiya Begum Malka Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 18 May 2016

Posted on January 24 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) imposed costs on 5 identified police officers (@Rs.15,000/- per officer) to be paid to the Petitioner-Mother of the deceased minor girl who was allegedly raped and murdered, because these 5 people did not register FIR and investigate the case for 6 months despite an Order u/s 156(3) by a competent Magistrate to do so.

From Paras 21-24,

21. In the case in hand though order was passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. on 3.9.2015 yet without any reason whatsoever, factual or legal, the F.I.R was not registered. Investigation was not under taken for over six months. The First Information Report has been registered after intervention of this court by way of seeking an explanation from the Station House Officer vide order dated 15.3.2016. The inaction of the concerned officers has interfered in administration of criminal justice delivery system.
22. As has been held in the inquiry report submitted by the Circle Officer concerned, the five Station House Officers named hereinabove, ignored the order passed by the Magistrate rendered under Section 156 Cr.P.C. and have also failed in discharging their statutory duty under Section 154 Cr.P.C. The petitioner, had to approach the Magistrate again. When no action was taken, the petitioner had to approach this Court with the grievance.
23. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we hereby impose costs in the sum of Rs.75,000/- to be collected from all the five police officers mentioned in the above portion of the judgment, to be paid to the petitioner.
24. The cost amount has been paid to the petitioner in court in cash today.

Sabiya Begum Malka Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 18 May 2016

Index here.

Y.Narasimha Rao and Ors Vs Y.Venkata Lakshmi and Anr on 9 Jul 1991

Posted on January 19 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court gave these interpretations to the various conditions under Section 13 of C.P.C. while deciding a foreign judgment is enforceable in India or not.

From Para 12,

12. We believe that the relevant provisions of Section 13 of the Code are capable of being interpreted to secure the required certainty in the sphere of this branch of law in conformity with public policy, justice, equity and good conscience, and the rules so evolved will protect the sanctity of the institution of marriage and the unity of family which are the corner stones of our societal life.

Clause (a) of Section 13 states that a foreign judgment shall not be recognised if it has not been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction. We are of the view that this clause should be interpreted to mean that only that court will be a court of competent jurisdiction which the Act or the law under which the parties are married recognises as a court of competent jurisdiction to entertain the matrimonial dispute. Any other court should be held to be a court without jurisdiction unless both parties voluntarily and unconditionally subject themselves to the jurisdiction of that court. The expression “competent court” in Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act has also to be construed likewise.

Clause (b) of Section 13 states that if a foreign has not been given on the merits of the case, the courts in this country will not recognise such judgment. This clause should be interpreted to mean (a) that the decision of the foreign court should be on a ground available under the law under which the parties are married, and (b) that the decision should be a result of the contest between the parties. The latter requirement is fulfilled only when the respondent is duly served and voluntarily and unconditionally submits himself/herself to the jurisdiction of the court and contests the claim, or agrees to the passing of the decree with or without appearance. A mere filing of the reply to the claim under protest and without submitting to the jurisdiction of the court, or an appearance in the Court either in person or through a representative for objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court, should not be considered as a decision on the merits of the case. In this respect the general rules of the acquiescence to the jurisdiction of the Court which may be valid in other matters and areas should be ignored and deemed inappropriate.

The second part of clause (c) of Section 13 states that where the judgment is founded on a refusal to recognise the law of this country in cases in which such law is applicable, the judgment will not be recognised by the courts in this country. The marriages which take place in this country can only be under either the customary or the statutory law in force in this country. Hence, the only law that can be applicable to the matrimonial disputes is the one under which the parties are married, and no other law. When, therefore, a foreign judgment is founded on a jurisdiction or on ground not recognised by such law, it is a judgment which is in defiance of the Law. Hence, it is not conclusive of the matters adjudicated therein and therefore, unenforceable in this country. For the same reason, such a judgment will also be unenforceable under clause (f) of Section 13, since such a judgment would obviously be in breach of the matrimonial law in force in this country.

Clause (d) of Section 13 which makes a foreign judgment unenforceable on the ground that the proceedings in which it is obtained are opposed to natural justice, states no more than an elementary principle on which any civilised system of justice rests. However, in matters concerning the family law such as the matrimonial disputes, this principle has to b extended to mean something more than mere compliance with the technical rules of procedure. If the rule of audi alteram partem has any meaning with reference to the proceedings in a foreign court, for the purposes of the rule it should not be deemed sufficient that the respondent has been duly served with the process of the court. It is necessary to ascertain whether the respondent was in a position to present or represent himself/herself and contest effectively the said proceedings. This requirement should apply equally to the appellate proceedings if and when they are file by either party. If the foreign court has not ascertained and ensured such effective contest by requiring the petitioner to make all necessary provisions for the respondent to defend including the costs of travel, residence and litigation where necessary, it should be held that the proceedings are in breach of the principles of natural justice. It is for this reason that we find that the rules of Private International Law of some countries insist, even in commercial matters, that the action should be filed in the forum where the defendant is either domiciled or is habitually resident. It is only in special cases which is called special jurisdiction where the claim has some real link with other forum that a judgment of such forum is recognised. This jurisdiction principle is also recognised by the Judgments Convention of this European Community . If, therefore, the courts in this country also insist as a matter of rule that foreign matrimonial judgment will be recognised only it it is of the forum where the respondent is domiciled or habitually and permanently resides, the provisions of clause (d) may be held to have been satisfied. The provision of clause (e) of Section 13 which requires that the courts in this country will not recognise a foreign judgment if it has been obtained by fraud, is self-evident. However, in view of the decision of this Court in Smt. Satya v. Teja Singh, (supra) it must be understood that the fraud need not be only in relation to the merits of the mater but may also be in relation to jurisdictional facts.

Y.Narasimha Rao and Ors Vs Y.Venkata Lakshmi and Anr on 9 Jul 1991

Citations : [1991 SCC CRI 1 626], [1991 CRIMES SC 2 855], [1991 SCALE 2 1], [1991 SCR 2 821], [1991 SCC 3 451], [1991 DMC SC 2 366], [1991 JT SC 1 33], [1991 LW 2 646]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/989920/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac6be4b014971140ed08

Messers S.J.S. Business Enterprises Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 17 Mar 2004

Posted on January 17 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the Courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the Court, whatever view the Court may have taken.

The existence of an adequate or suitable alternative remedy available to a litigant is merely a factor which a Court entertaining an application under Article 226 will consider for exercising the discretion to issue a writ under Article 226 . But the existence of such remedy does not impinge upon the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with the matter itself if it is in a position to do so on the basis of the affidavits filed. If however a party has already availed of the alternative remedy while invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226, it would not be appropriate for the Court to entertain the writ petition. The Rule is based on public policy but the motivating factor is the existence of a parallel jurisdiction in another Court. But this Court has also held in C. B. Gosain Bhan V. State of Orissa 14 STC 766= 1963 (2) SCR 879 that even when an alternative remedy has been availed of by a party but not pursued that the party could prosecute proceedings under Article 226 for the same relief. This Court has also held that that when a party has already moved the High Court under Article 226 and failed to obtain relief and then moved an application under Article 32 before this Court for the same relief, normally the Court will not entertain the application under Article 32. But where in the parallel jurisdiction, the order is not a speaking one or the matter has been disposed of on some other ground, this Court has, in a suitable case, entertained the application under Article 32 . Instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground that the alternative remedy had been availed of the Court may call upon the party to elect whether it will proceed with the alternative remedy or with the application under Article 226. Therefore the fact that a suit had already been filed by the appellant was not such a fact the suppression of which could have affected the final disposal of the writ petition on merits.

Finally,

In this case, admittedly the appellant has withdrawn the suit two weeks after the suit had been filed. In other words the appellant elected to pursue its remedies only under Article 226. The pleadings were also complete before the High Court. No doubt, the interim order which was passed by the High Court was obtained when the suit was pending. But by the time the writ petition was heard the suit had already been withdrawn a year earlier. Although the appellant could not, on the High Court’s reasoning, take advantage of the interim order, it was not correct in rejecting the writ petition itself when the suit had admittedly been withdrawn, especially when the matter was ripe for hearing and all the facts necessary for determining the writ petition on merits were before the Court, and when the Court was not of the view that the writ petition was otherwise not maintainable.

Messers S.J.S. Business Enterprises Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 17 Mar 2004

Citations : [2004 SUPREME 5 485], [2004 JT SUPP 2 601], [2004 ALLMR SC 5 793], [2004 SCC 7 166], [2004 AIR SC 2421], [2004 SCR 3 56], [2004 SCALE 3 374], [2004 ALD SC 5 84], [2005 ALT 2 4], [2004 BLJR 3 1739], [2005 COMPLJ SC 4 503], [2004 JCR SC 2 284], [2004 PLJR 2 171], [2004 COMPCAS SC 121 99]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1770523/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adffe4b0149711412a94

Ramjas Foundation and Ors vs Union of India and Ors on 9 Nov 2010

Posted on January 17 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 14,

14. The principle that a person who does not come to the Court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to the cases instituted in others courts and judicial forums. The object underlying the principle is that every Court is not only entitled but is duty bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have bearing on adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the case. In Dalglish v. Jarvie 2 Mac. & G. 231, 238, Lord Langdale and Rolfe B. observed: “It is the duty of a party asking for an injunction to bring under the notice of the Court all facts material to the determination of his right to that injunction; and it is no excuse for him to say that he was not aware of the importance of any fact which he has omitted to bring forward. In Castelli v. Cook (1849) 7 Hare, 89, 94 Wigram V.C. stated the rule in the following words: “A plaintiff applying ex parte comes under a contract with the Court that he will state the whole case fully and fairly to the Court. If he fails to do that, and the Court finds, when other party applies to dissolve the injunction, that any material fact has been suppressed or not property brought forward, the plaintiff is told the Court will not decide on the merits, and that, as he has broken faith with the Court, the injunction must go.”

Ramjas Foundation and Ors vs Union of India and Ors on 9 Nov 2010

Citations : [2010 SCC 14 38], [2011 AIR SC 147], [2011 KCCR SC SN 1 8], [2011 LW 1 416], [2011 SCJ 2 391], [2011 MLJ 2 162], [2010 AIR SC 7091], [2010 CLT 4 351], [2010 SLT 8 156], [2010 DLT 174 100], [2010 AIOL 763], [2010 JT 12 134], [2010 SCALE 11 598], [2010 SUPREME 7 585], [2011 SCC CIV 4 889], [2010 AIR SCW 7091], [2011 RCR CIVIL SC 1 176], [2012 CUT LT 113 632]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/265836/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aee8e4b0149711415189

Dr. Buddhi Kota Subbarao Vs Mr. K.Parasaran and Ors on 13 Aug 1996

Posted on January 17 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows towards end of the judgment,

The course adopted by the applicant is impermissible and his application is based on misconception of law and facts. No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived or frivolous petitions. After giving our careful consideration to the submissions made at the bar as well as those contained in the memorandum of the application, we are of the opinion that this application is misconceived, untenable and has no merits whatsoever. It is accordingly dismissed.

Dr. Buddhi Kota Subbarao Vs Mr. K.Parasaran and Ors on 13 Aug 1996

Citations : [1996 SUPREME 6 120], [1996 AIR SC 2687], [1996 SCC 5 530], [1997 BOMCR SC 2 150], [1996 CRLJ SC 3983], [1996 CRIMES SC 3 143], [1996 SCC CRI 1038], [1996 SCALE 5 797], [1996 AD SC 6 133], [1997 ALD CRI 1 134], [1997 ALT CRI 1 271], [1997 LW CRL 1 164], [1997 RCR CRIMINAL 3 62], [1996 SUPP SCR 4 574], [1996 JT SC 7 265]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/455188/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ace6e4b014971141001a

https://www.lawyerservices.in/Dr-Buddhi-Kota-Subbarao-Versus-Mr-K-Parasaran-and-Others-1996-08-13

Khushbu Devi @ Kumari Khushbu Vs Shekhar Kumar Swarnkar on 02 Nov 2022

Posted on January 17 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Jharkhand High Court held as follows,

From Para 4,

Ms. Ayushri, the learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the ex-parte judgment by the Family Court is liable to be set aside on the ground that there was no material before the Family Court to hold that summons was duly served upon the appellant on 21st May 2018.

From Para 8, 9 and 10,

8. The aforesaid mode of services of summons under Rule 9 shall have different requirements upon fulfillment of which the Court may infer or hold that summons was validly served upon the defendant. A valid service of summons upon the defendant is the most important step during 1st stage of any trial and the reason is obvious. It is a fundamental requirement in law that no one should be condemned unheard and therefore no trial of either nature, civil or criminal, can proceed without notice to the other side. For more than one reason, a tracking record cannot be the conclusive proof of valid service of summons upon the defendant. In the first place, a tracking record is required to be placed by the Registry before the Court and it must form a part of the records of the case. Secondly, a tracking record must be supported by an affidavit of Nazir or any other officer of the Court authorised in this behalf. In certain cases, the plaintiff may also lead evidence regarding service of summons with the help of the tracking record. There are other requirements under Rule 9 which have also to be considered by the Court concerned before service of summons upon the defendant is
held valid.
9. Sub-rule (5) provides that there should be an acknowledgment or any other receipt signed by the defendant or his agent, or, where the postal article containing the summons has been received back by the Court the same shall contain an endorsement by a postal employee or by any person authorised by the courier service to the effect that the defendant or his agent had refused to take delivery of the postal article or had refused to accept the summons by any other means specified in sub-rule (3) when tendered or transmitted to him. In case where summons has been returned unserved or has been refused by the defendant, under Rule 19 the serving officer shall be examined by the Court.
10. The proviso to sub-rule (5) provides that the Court may declare that summons has been validly served upon the defendant notwithstanding the acknowledgment having been lost or mislaid or for any other reason if the same has not been received by the Court within thirty days from the date of issue of summons, provided the summons was properly addressed, prepaid and duly sent by registered post acknowledgment due. The acknowledgment or postal receipt is required to be brought on record for another reason also. Under Rule 15 service of summons upon any adult member of the defendant’s family is considered valid service upon the defendant. However, explanation to Rule 15 provides that a servant is not a member of the family within the meaning of this Rule and therefore the Court before holding valid service of summons upon the defendant is required to see to whom the summons was served.

Khushbu Devi @ Kumari Khushbu Vs Shekhar Kumar Swarnkar on 02 Nov 2022

Ritu @ Ridhima and Another Vs Sandeep Singh Sangwan on 15 Mar 2022

Posted on January 15 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court held that there is nothing wrong in initiating the Perjury proceedings against the Assistant Professor when she was caught lying about her job and income, just before filing the maintenance case.

From Para 10 and 11,

10. Admittedly, the petitioner joined as an Assistant Professor in Chitkara University, Rajpura on a monthly salary of Rs.28,000/- on 3.7.2017. Her petition under Section 125 Cr.PC was filed on 26.07.2017. During the entire litigation including when her application for interim maintenance was decided she did not disclose information about her job and her earnings and infact deliberately and intentionally to grab maintenance, submitted wrong information to the Court that she was unemployed. The only explanation offered by the petitioner is that she had given the documents to her counsel in the month of May 2017 to file the petition under Section 125 Cr.PC which was filed on 26.07.2017 because of which her joining on 3.7.2017 is not disclosed.
11. In my opinion, this explanation is completely falacious. The petitioner is an Assistant Professor and a highly educated person. At no stage of proceedings uptill her cross examination did she disclose that she was employed including when her application for interim maintenance was decided and Rs.5000/- was awarded to her. Assuming that the said fact was missing in her petition under Section 125 Cr.PC, the Court could have been informed during the course of proceedings that there had been change of circumstances regarding her obtaining employment. However, as has already been mentioned above, no such information was furnished and only the cross examination revealed her job and consequent salary. Thus it can safely be said that the possibility of her conviction was high and her actions were certainly deliberate and conscious to obtain maintenance.

Ritu @ Ridhima and Another Vs Sandeep Singh Sangwan on 15 Mar 2022

Index of Perjury decisions is here.

State of AP Vs Pantla Krishna Murthy and Anr on 16 Dec 2022

Posted on January 15 by ShadesOfKnife

A Judicial Magistrate at Vizianagaram passed this Order. Very valid points raised while not finding the accused guilty of the allegations made in the false criminal case.

From Para 23, regarding Dowry givers’ role

Section 3 of Dowry prohibition Act clearly defines the offence as whoever gives or takes Dowry comes under clutches of the Law and punishable. If A1 and A2 were held for demanding Dowry why PW2 father of the PW1 who is also police official well aware of Law has given the Dowry and not taken action against A1 and A2. Instead he alleges he has paid 15,00,000/dowry to A1 and A2. PW2 also comes under the purview of Law and he is also liable for punishment. Here another notion would be taken if it is treated as present made to A1 at the time of marriage which is exemption to this section of law. But the presentations were to be listed and signed by either parties as per mandate of law. That is also not the case here.

Regarding Dowry Allegations:

Prosecution has produced bank statement of A1 dated 7/6/2010 to show his account was deposited by the amounts of Rs 9,66,000/- and Rs 2,00,000/- and got it exhibited through bank manger to prove the amount of Rs 15,00,000/- was given to accused by PW2 before day of the marriage. Here prosecution has not lead any evidence how PW2 paid such huge amount. Whether he obtained loan or he paid from his savings. There might be some document to prove how he raised such huge amount to present the dowry. In the absence of such evidence ExP3 cannot be relied upon. A1 is working in Railway in respectable job and has opportunity to raise such amount even to spent for his marriage expenses. There cannot be a conclusive theory that the entire marriage expenses from both sides would be taken care of the parents of bride. if such is the case they have to produce reliable evidence. The court arrived at the conclusion that whatever the things presented at the time of marriage of PW1 is only presentation though prosecution witnesses has stated that at the time of marriage of PW1 dowry and gold was give to accused. Because if there is demand from accused, PW2 being police official might have initiated action against Accused. PW2 considered at the time of marriage as presentation and presented it without taking action and when marriage tie was strained with misunderstanding between A1 and PW1 and then PW1 and PW2 cannot take stand of dowry subsequently in the year 2016 when marriage took place in the year 2010.

State of AP Vs Pantla Krishna Murthy and Anr on 16 Dec 2022

YS Jagan Mohan Reddy Vs Central Bureau of Investigation on 26 Aug 2022

Posted on January 8 by ShadesOfKnife

The Hon’ble the Chief Justice of Telangana High Court held as follows,

From Para 42.1, 43, 44.1,

42.1. After referring to Section 205 CrPC, Supreme Court held that it is within the powers of the Magistrate and in his judicial discretion to dispense with the personal appearance of an accused either throughout or at any particular stage of such proceedings in a summons case, if the Magistrate finds that insistence on his personal presence would itself inflict enormous suffering or tribulations on the accused and the comparative advantage would be less.

43. Delhi High Court in Chandramauli Prasad (supra) examined Section 205 CrPC in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhaskar Industries Limited (supra) and held that provisions requiring the presence of the accused which mandate that the trial be held in his presence are enacted for the benefit of the accused. If the accused person himself does not wish to avail of the right of personal appearance on every date; if he reposes the fullest confidence in the court and in his advocate, and is confident that justice will be meted out to him even in his absence, then, provided his absence does not prejudice him in any way or hinder the progress of the trial, it is not necessary for the trial court to insist on his presence.
44.1. One of the criteria for exercising the power under Section 205 CrPC is that personal appearance of the accused on each and every date of trial should not result in unnecessary harassment of the accused. However, the Court must ensure that exemption from personal appearance is not abused to delay the trial.

And in Para 45,

45. In Hiremagalur Parthsarthy Shamalah (supra), Patna High Court while adverting to Section 205 CrPC and its discretionary nature, opined that power under Section 205 CrPC has to be exercised in a reasonable manner; Court should be liberal in granting exemption from personal appearance except where serious issues or allegations of moral turpitude are involved. Even after issuance of warrant, the High Court may dispense with the personal appearance in exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC if a proper case is made out for the ends of justice. In that case, the revision petitioners were high officials posted at Pune and Shillong while the trial was to be conducted at Patna. It was held that inconvenience would be caused if they were required to be present on each and every date of hearing; more so when the revision petitioners had given undertaking to be physically present in Court when so ordered by the Court. Mere fact that cognizance had been taken and the offences alleged are non-bailable cannot be reasons for rejecting the prayer under Section 205 CrPC.

Finally from Paras 48 and 49,

48. In so far the impugned order is concerned, the trial court has taken note of the changed circumstances i.e., petitioner occupying the constitutional office of Chief Minister of the neighbouring State of Andhra Pradesh. However, trial court referred to certain observations made by this Court in the order dated 31.08.2017 that “offences committed by the petitioner are grave offences affecting the economy of the country”. I am afraid it is not open to the trial court to rely upon such observations at the very threshold. These are allegations against the petitioner brought in the form of charge sheet. At this stage, it cannot be said that petitioner had committed the offence(s). Further, the trial court erred that being away from Andhra Pradesh for two days was not a ground to invoke the discretion of the court. The trial court further erred in taking the view that the changed circumstances has no bearing having regard to the offences and allegations made by the respondent/CBI being grave in nature.
49. In my considered opinion, learned Principal Special Judge fell in grave error by bringing in the above factors while considering the request of the petitioner for exemption from personal appearance. This is further aggravated by the observation of the learned Principal Special Judge that in criminal proceedings trial should be conducted in presence of the accused and therefore, his request for exemption from personal appearance should not be considered. I am afraid learned Principal Special Judge failed to appreciate the fact that the principle that trial has to be conducted in presence of the accused is to ensure that the accused gets a fair trial; nothing is done behind the back of the accused. Provision seeking exemption from personal appearance is intended for the benefit of the accused. Those cannot be interpreted in a manner which causes hardship and prejudice to the accused.

YS Jagan Mohan Reddy Vs Central Bureau of Investigation on 26 Aug 2022

The earlier order from trial Court is here.

Y.S.Jagan Mohan Reddy Vs CBI on 01 Nov 2019

Index is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Month: January 2023

State of Maharashtra Vs Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede on 29 Jul 2009

Sabiya Begum Malka Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 18 May 2016

Y.Narasimha Rao and Ors Vs Y.Venkata Lakshmi and Anr on 9 Jul 1991

Messers S.J.S. Business Enterprises Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 17 Mar 2004

Ramjas Foundation and Ors vs Union of India and Ors on 9 Nov 2010

Dr. Buddhi Kota Subbarao Vs Mr. K.Parasaran and Ors on 13 Aug 1996

Khushbu Devi @ Kumari Khushbu Vs Shekhar Kumar Swarnkar on 02 Nov 2022

Ritu @ Ridhima and Another Vs Sandeep Singh Sangwan on 15 Mar 2022

State of AP Vs Pantla Krishna Murthy and Anr on 16 Dec 2022

YS Jagan Mohan Reddy Vs Central Bureau of Investigation on 26 Aug 2022