Amish Devgan Vs Union of India and Ors on 07 Dec 2020

Posted on October 27, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 84,

84. Lastly, we would also like to clarify that Section 179 of the Criminal Code permits prosecution of cases in the court within whose local jurisdiction the offence has been committed or consequences have ensued. Section 186 of the Criminal Code relates to cases where two separate charge-sheets have been filed on the basis of separate FIRs and postulates that the prosecution would proceed where the first charge-sheet has been filed on the basis of the FIR that is first in point of time. Principle underlying section 186 can be applied at the pre-charge-sheet stage, that is, post registration of
FIR but before charge-sheet is submitted to the Magistrate. In such cases ordinarily the first FIR, that is, the FIR registered first in point of time, should be treated as the main FIR and others as statements under Section 162 of the Criminal Code. However, in exceptional cases and for good reasons, it will be open to the High Court or this Court, as the case may be, to treat the subsequently registered FIR as the principal FIR. However, this should not cause any prejudice, inconvenience or harassment to either the victims, witnesses or the person who is accused. We have clarified the aforesaid position to avoid any doubt or debate on the said aspect.

Amish Devgan Vs Union of India and Ors on 07 Dec 2020

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/179868451/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/amish-devgan-versus-union-of-india-and-others

Kusum Bhatia Vs Sagar Sethi on 16 Sep 2019

Posted on October 23, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

In a short order, the Apex Court said this,

Having heard learned counsel for both the sides on merits, we do not find any ground to interfere in the impugned order. In our considered opinion, the interest of justice would be met if the child, Kumari Preksha (aged about 16 years as of now) is awarded maintenance. Since, the petitioner is a working lady with sufficient salary, we decline to award any maintenance in her favour.

Kusum Bhatia Vs Sagar Sethi on 16 Sep 2019

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/89241961/

Here is the Lower High Court Order:

Kusum Bhatia Vs Sagar Sethi on 27 May 2016

Japani Sahoo Vs Chandra Sekhar Mohanty on 27 Jul 2007

Posted on October 16, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court declared that, Limitation u/s 468 starts from the date of making the complaint and not on the date the cognizance was taken.

Reasoning

52. The matter can be looked at from different angle also. Once it is accepted (and there is no dispute about it) that it is not within the domain of the complainant or prosecuting agency to take cognizance of an offence or to issue process and the only thing the former can do is to file a complaint or initiate proceedings in accordance with law. If that action of initiation of proceedings has been taken within the period of limitation, the complainant is not responsible for any delay on the part of the Court or Magistrate in issuing process or taking cognizance of an offence. Now, if he is sought to be penalized because of the omission, default or inaction on the part of the Court or Magistrate, the provision of law may have to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. It can possibly be urged that such a provision is totally arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable. It is settled law that a Court of Law would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity of law by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than making it vulnerable and unconstitutional by adopting rule of ‘litera legis’. Connecting the provision of limitation in Section 468 of the Code with issuing of process or taking of cognizance by the Court may make it unsustainable and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.

Conclusion

53. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date must be considered as the date of filing of complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by a Magistrate or issuance of process by a Court. We, therefore, overrule all decisions in which it has been held that the crucial date for computing the period of limitation is taking of cognizance by the Magistrate/Court and not of filing of complaint or initiation of criminal proceedings.

Japani Sahoo Vs Chandra Sekhar Mohanty on 27 Jul 2007

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1432851/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae4ae4b0149711413706

Surinder Mohan Vikal Vs Ascharaj Lal Chopra on 28 Feb 1978

Posted on October 16, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that, the defamation has to be filed with in time limitation while also referring to 468, 469 and 470 CrPC.

It would thus appear that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of sub-section (1) of section 468 which prohibits every Court from taking cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation. It is hardly necessary to say that statutes of limitation have legislative policy behind them. For instance, they shut out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused from unnecessary harassment. They also save the accused from the risk of having to face trial at a time when his evidence might have been lost because of the delay on the part of the prosecutor. As has been stated, a bar to the taking of cognizance has been prescribed under section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and there is no reason why the appellant should not be entitled to it in the facts and circumstances of this case.

Surinder Mohan Vikal Vs Ascharaj Lal Chopra on 28 Feb 1978

Citations : [1978 SCC 2 403], [1978 SCR 3 434], [1978 CAR 113], [1978 CRLR SC 158], [1978 SCC CR 215], [1978 AIR SC 486], [1978 AIR SC 786], [1978 AIR SC 986], [1978 SCC CRI 215], [1978 CRLJ SC 764]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/885750/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609abcae4b014971140d573

Balraj Khanna and Ors Vs Moti Ram on 22 Apr 1971

Posted on October 16, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed this Judgment regd

After a consideration of the various decisions referred to above, we are of the opinion that the propositions laid down in English decisions dealing with libel that the actual words alleged to be used must be stated in the indictment cannot be applied on all fours when dealing with the cases of defamation by spoken words under Section 499 I. P. C. it will be highly desirable no doubt if the actual words stated to have been used by an accused and which are alleged to be defamatory are reproduced by the complainant. The actual words used or the statements made may be reproduced verbatim by the complainant if the words are few and the statement is very brief. But in cases where the words spoken are too many or the statements made are too long, in our opinion, it will be the height of technicality to insist that the actual words and the entire statements should be reproduced verbatim. The object of having, if possible, the actual words or the statements before the court is to enable it to consider whether those words or the statements are defamatory in nature. That purpose or object will be served if the complainant is able to reproduce in his complaint or evidence in a substantial measure the words of imputation alleged to have been uttered. If the statements or the words placed before the court by the complainant are held to be not defamatory, it will mean that the complainant will have to lose. Therefore it is to his interest to get a proper adjudication from, the court that as far as possible the words spoken or the statements actually made and which he alleges to be defamatory are before the court. But a complaint cannot be thrown out on the mere ground that the actual words spoken or the statements made have not been stated in the complaint. From the point of view of accused also it is necessary that the matters alleged to be defamatory in the complaint must be so stated as to enable them to know the nature of the allegations that they have to meet.

Balraj Khanna and Ors Vs Moti Ram on 22 Apr 1971

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1946272/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab73e4b014971140c842

Citations:

K. Ranjith Vs State of AP on 01 Oct 2021

Posted on October 13, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A good judgment of single bench of AP High court. Useful in my DP3 WP.

From Para 10,

10. As can be seen from the aforesaid Section of law, when small quantity of Ganja is involved in commission of the offence, the imprisonment prescribed is for a term which may extend to one year or with fine, which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both. In the instant case, the Ganja involved in commission of the offence is only 600 grams, which is below the 1000 grams. Therefore, as per the aforesaid notification, it is to be held that the Ganja involved in this case is only a small quantity and an offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(A) of the NDPS Act is only made out. So, the very registration of F.I.R. for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act, which is relating to commercial quantity, is obviously erroneous. Clause (C) of sub-clause (ii)(b) of Section 20 of the NDPS Act applies only when the Ganja involved is of 20 Kgs. as it is a commercial quantity as per the aforesaid notification. The said offence under Section 20((ii)(b)(C) of NDPS Act relating to possession or illegal transportation of Ganja of a commercial quantity is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees. So, when it is found that only a small quantity of Ganja of 600 grams is involved in this case, it is to be held that only an offence punishable under Section 20(ii)(b)(A) of the NDPS Act is made out and not an offence punishable under Section 20(ii)(b)(C) of the NDPS Act relating to commercial quantity. So, it is obvious that the police have registered the F.I.R. quoting a wrong section of law.

K. Ranjith Vs State of AP on 01 Oct 2021

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/55236845/

Citations:

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Month: October 2021

Amish Devgan Vs Union of India and Ors on 07 Dec 2020

Kusum Bhatia Vs Sagar Sethi on 16 Sep 2019

Japani Sahoo Vs Chandra Sekhar Mohanty on 27 Jul 2007

Surinder Mohan Vikal Vs Ascharaj Lal Chopra on 28 Feb 1978

Balraj Khanna and Ors Vs Moti Ram on 22 Apr 1971

K. Ranjith Vs State of AP on 01 Oct 2021