Mahesh Kumar Agarwal Vs Union of India and Anr on 19 Dec 2025

A division bench of Supreme Court of India held as follows,

From Para 14,

14. We are also unable to agree with the view that the appellant could not fall within GSR 570(E) because the NIA Court did not itself mention “ten years” in its order. The appellant’s application before that court specifically sought renewal for ten years. The NIA Court granted no objection for renewal, released the passport for that limited purpose, directed redeposit after renewal and prohibited the appellant from obtaining any visa or travelling abroad without its permission. The Delhi High Court, dealing with the conviction in the CBI case, then expressly held that there was no basis to deny renewal “for a regular period of ten years” and granted permission accordingly, while continuing the condition that the appellant shall not leave the country without its permission.Read together, in the manner envisaged by the OM dated 10.10.2019, these orders supply both the requisite judicial permission and a clear indication of the period of validity. In such circumstances, the Passport Authority and the Calcutta High Court were not justified in treating Section 6(2)(f) as continuing to operate in full force so as to deny renewal altogether.

From Para 16,

16. The respondents and the Calcutta High Court have also treated the expression “permission to depart from India” in GSR 570(E) as if it necessarily refers only to a concrete permission for an immediately proposed journey. We do not read the notification in so narrow a manner. Where, as here, the conditions of bail already stipulate that the appellant shall not leave the country without prior permission of the court concerned, and the same court
then grants no objection to renewal of the passport without relaxing that condition, the requirement that departure from India shall be subject to judicial permission is built into the very terms of the exemption. The passport authority is not required, at the renewal stage, to demand a schedule of future journeys or visas which may not yet exist. Its task is to see whether, despite pending proceedings, the criminal courts have chosen to keep the possibility of travel open under their supervision. Once that position is clear, GSR 570(E) applies and the bar under Section 6(2)(f) cannot be invoked to refuse renewal altogether.

From Para 24,

24. Finally, even on the respondents’ own reading of GSR 570(E), the consequence of an order which does not specify a longer period of validity is that the passport should be issued for a shorter duration, usually one year, and not that renewal must be refused altogether. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench did not examine this aspect, because they proceeded on the premise that the appellant stood outside the exemption altogether. Once it is recognised that the appellant is within the exempted class, the correct question for the passport authority is the appropriate period of validity in the facts of the case, not whether any renewal is permissible at all. In the present matter, given that the Delhi High Court has expressly authorised renewal for ten years and the NIA Court has imposed stringent conditions including redeposit and prior permission for travel, we see no justification to curtail the normal period of validity.

Mahesh Kumar Agarwal Vs Union of India and Anr on 19 Dec 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Passport related Judgments is here.

Rajkumar Madki Vs Dr. Shailendra Beldale on 16 Oct 2026

Posted on October 20 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that a private complaint is maintainable against a lying public servant in the nomination form contains false statements.

From Para 4,

4. A substantial question of law of general public importance, hitherto undecided by this Court, does arise for our consideration. It is:
Whether Section 125-A of the RoP Act should pass muster the rigours of Section 195(1) of the Cr. PC? In other words, whether any private person can file a complaint under Section 200 of the Cr. PC against a returned candidate for an offence punishable under Section 125-A of the RoP Act?

From Para 11,

11. It is significant to note that sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 195(1) of the Cr. PC impose a statutory prohibition on a court in relation to taking cognisance of offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188, IPC or of abetment of/attempt to/criminal conspiracy to commit such offences, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. It is plain that the text of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 does not include Section 125-A of the RoP Act. Should we read into Section 195, Cr. PC a prohibition in respect of Section 125-A of the RoP Act also, apart from those expressly included? If indeed it were the intention of the legislature that cognizance of any offence relating to furnishing of false information by a candidate in an affidavit with intent of being elected in an election (referred to in Section 125-A of the RoP Act) could only be taken if the complainant were a public servant, the same could have been provided by an amendment of Section 195, Cr. PC since Section 125-A of the RoP Act is of fairly recent origin. Significantly, Section 125-A was inserted in the RoP Act with effect from 24th August, 2002, while it is noticed that Section 195, Cr. PC suffered an amendment thereafter in April, 2006. The legislature is presumed to be conscious of its insertion of Section 125-A in the RoP Act four years back. It stands to reason that omission of the legislature to include Section 125-A of the RoP Act in Section 195, Cr. PC is deliberate and no court, in terms of the latter provision, would be barred from taking cognizance of an alleged offence under Section 125-A of the RoP Act, even on the complaint lodged by a private person. This interpretation is also fortified by the absence of any provision in any enactment stipulating that a complaint in relation to an offence under Section 125-A of the RoP Act can only be lodged by a public servant as well as the ordainment in Section 125-A that the penalty it envisages is “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force”. This means that the rigour of Section 195, Cr. PC would not be applicable insofar as a complaint lodged by a private person, alleging an offence under Section 125-A of the RoP Act, under Section 200, Cr. PC, is concerned, whereby the court is urged to penalise the offender for furnishing false information in an affidavit to get elected. The High Court was, therefore, clearly in error in returning the finding that it did.

From Para 13,

13. In conclusion, we hold that a private complaint alleging offence committed under Section 125-A, RoP Act need not pass muster of the rigours of Section 195, Cr. PC, as held by the High Court. If at all a complaint is lodged to harass an elected candidate or frivolous allegations are levelled therein, the laws of the country duly equip and empower the competent magistrates to pass such order(s) as they deem fit and proper commensurate with the facts and circumstances of each case.

Rajkumar Madki Vs Dr. Shailendra Beldale on 16 Oct 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Jyotirmoy Biswas Vs State of West Bengal and Anr on 5 May 2026

Posted on August 29 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Calcutta High Court held as follows, regarding an Ad-interim maintenance order granted to a Doctor-wife,

From Para 1.2,

1.2. The Petitioner assailed the impugned order primarily on the grounds of procedural irregularity, the material suppression of facts regarding the Wife’s independent professional income, and a fundamental violation of the principles of natural justice.

From Para 1.5,

1.5. Central to the Wife’s grievance is a socially sensitive allegation of a “grave breach of marital trust,” predicated upon an asserted incestuous proximity between the Husband and his first cousin. Conversely, the Petitioner characterizes these allegations as “bohemian fabrications,” contending that his involvement with the said relative was purely a discharge of familial guardianship during a period of financial exigency.

From Para 1.7,

1.7. The core of the Petitioner’s grievance lies in the “procedural haste” displayed by the Learned Court below. The impugned order was passed on the very day the Domestic Incident Report (DIR) was placed on record, without the Petitioner being afforded an opportunity to file his Affidavit of Assets and Liabilities, thereby bypassing the mandatory procedural architecture mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha.

From Para 6.1.6,

6.1.6. In the present case, the record reveals that the Learned Magistrate passed the ad-interim order on the very day the Domestic Incident Report (DIR) was filed, without even directing the parties to file their respective Affidavits of Assets and Liabilities. Where a subordinate court bypasses a
mandate issued by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution, such an order is not merely “erroneous,” but is passed in excess of jurisdiction. In such circumstances, relegating a party to a time-consuming appeal would amount to perpetuating a procedural illegality.

From 6.1.8 to 6.1.10,

6.1.8. If the Wife, being a high-earning specialist, suppressed her professional standing to fit the narrative of a “destitute” woman, the resulting order is tainted by a suppression of material facts. While an appellate court could examine this, the High Court under Section 482 is the appropriate forum to exercise its “supervisory-inherent” role when the integrity of the judicial process is at stake.
6.1.9. Distinguishing the present facts from cases where revisions are dismissed due to the availability of an appeal, this Court observes that in those instances, the challenge usually pertains to the appreciation of evidence. Here, the challenge is to the validity of the procedure itself. If the Learned Magistrate has bypassed the “due process” of financial disclosure, the order becomes an abuse of the process of the court.
6.1.10. Consequently, this Court holds that the Revisional Application is maintainable. The statutory bar of Section 29 of the P.W.D.V. Act does not fetter the inherent power of the High Court to strike down an order that is ex-facie violative of the mandates of the Apex Court and is predicated upon an evidentiary void created by material suppression. The jurisdictional gate is, therefore, open for an inquiry into the merits of the procedural and substantive challenges raised by the Petitioner.

From Para 6.2.2,

6.2.2. It is observed from the record that the impugned order was passed on 01.06.2022. A perusal of the order sheet reveals a striking “procedural leap”; the Learned Magistrate took cognizance of the DIR and, in the same breath, quantified the ad-interim maintenance at ₹20,000/- per month. While Section 23 of the P.W.D.V. Act undoubtedly empowers the Magistrate to pass such interim orders as are “just and proper,” this discretion is not a license for judicial arbitrariness. It must be exercised within the guardrails of procedural due process.

From Paras 6.2.4 to 6.2.8,

6.2.4. In the present case, the Learned Magistrate proceeded to fix the quantum before the Petitioner-Husband was even afforded an opportunity to file his Affidavit. This methodology fundamentally undermines the “Disclosure Regime.” While the Wife’s counsel argues that Section 23(2) permits ex-parte orders to prevent immediate starvation, such an argument must be reconciled with the fact that the parties here are not from a marginalized socio-economic background, but are an Engineer and a Doctor. In such high-stakes litigation involving professionals, the “emergency” must be weighed against the “accuracy” of the financial data.
6.2.5. Furthermore, the ratio in Rajnesh v. Neha emphasizes that the Court must consider the “standard of living,” the “essential expenditures,” and the “actual income” of both parties. By awarding ₹20,000/- without having the Petitioner’s salary certificate or the Wife’s disclosure of her specialized clinical income on record, the Learned Magistrate acted in a vacuum. This Court finds that such “rational guesswork” becomes “irrational” the moment it ignores a mandatory Supreme Court guideline.
6.2.6. Comparing the present facts with the spirit of the directions in Aditi alias Mithi v. Jitesh Sharma [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1451], the Supreme Court reiterated that the guidelines in Rajnesh are not mere “suggestions” but are “mandatory instructions” to be followed by all Courts. The failure to elicit the Affidavit of Assets and Liabilities before determining the quantum, even at the ad-interim stage, results in a failure of justice, as it saddles the husband with a liability based on the wife’s unilateral (and often inflated) assertions.
6.2.7. In this case, the Petitioner asserts a net income of ₹70,000/-, while the Wife alleges ₹2,10,000/-. Without the Affidavit, the Magistrate had no legal basis to choose one figure over the other. The “haste” shown by the Learned Magistrate in quantifying the amount on the very first day of the DIR filing, without waiting for the Petitioner’s financial disclosure, constitutes a patent procedural irregularity.
6.2.8. Accordingly, this Court holds that the Learned Magistrate committed a jurisdictional error by bypassing the mandatory requirement of exchanging Affidavits of Assets and Liabilities. While the Magistrate had the power to grant ad-interim relief, the quantification of that relief without following the Rajnesh v. Neha timeline renders the order procedurally fragile and unsustainable in law. The “emergency” power under Section 23 cannot be used to circumvent the “due process” of financial transparency.

From 6.3.2,

6.3.2. It is a settled principle that the phrase “unable to maintain herself” does not contemplate a state of absolute destitution or beggary. However, judicial interpretation has evolved to distinguish between a spouse who cannot work and one who chooses not to work despite being highly qualified. In the instant case, the Petitioner has produced prima facie evidence of the Wife’s professional credentials, which the Wife does not deny; rather, she masks them under the shroud of current “unemployment.”

From Para 6.3.6,

6.3.6. Furthermore, we must address the Wife’s silence regarding her professional status in her initial application. A litigant who seeks equity must come with clean hands. By identifying herself simply as a “Doctor” without disclosing her specialized rank and previous lucrative emoluments, the Wife engaged in what this Court terms “strategic suppression.” Such suppression vitiates the claim for discretionary ad-interim relief, as it prevents the Magistrate from balancing the equities properly.

From Para 6.4.2

6.4.2. In the traditional paradigm of maintenance, Courts were often reluctant to investigate the “earning potential” of a spouse at the threshold stage, focusing primarily on the “actual income” of the husband. However, the modern judicial trend, as articulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has moved toward a more symmetrical and realistic assessment of financial status.

From Para 6.4.4,

6.4.4. The use of the word “shall” in the context of these criteria makes it mandatory for the Magistrate to weigh these factors even at the ad-interim stage. If a spouse is a Specialist Doctor, her potential to earn is not a distant possibility but a present reality. To ignore this potential while saddling the husband with a substantial financial liability is to tilt the scales of justice unfairly. The P.W.D.V. Act is a protectionist measure for the vulnerable, not a mechanism for a professional to withdraw from their social and financial responsibilities to become a “pensioner” of the other spouse.

From Paras 6.4.6 to 6.4.9,

6.4.6. In the present factual matrix, the Opposite Party No. 2 has served as a Senior Registrar in Critical Care. This is a niche field of medicine where demand is perennial and remuneration is high. By awarding ₹12,000/- for the Wife’s personal maintenance without evaluating why a Critical Care Specialist is “incapable” of earning even a fraction of her previous salary, the Learned Magistrate failed to apply the “balancing test” of earning capacity.
6.4.7. While the Wife argues that she has to care for a minor child, this Court observes that in contemporary professional circles, especially among the “Engineer-Doctor” class, childcare is frequently managed through professional assistance or family support to allow both parents to maintain their career trajectories. A total professional abdication, coupled with a demand for maintenance, must be justified by something more substantial than a mere statement of current unemployment.
6.4.8. Furthermore, the principle of “Equitable Distribution of Responsibility” suggests that when both spouses are highly qualified, the burden of maintenance cannot be placed solely on the husband’s shoulders. The “earning capacity” is not merely an academic factor; it is a substantive check against the abuse of the court’s process by a spouse who suppresses their potential to secure an inflated maintenance order.
6.4.9. Therefore, this Court holds that “Earning Capacity” is a mandatory material consideration at the ad-interim stage. The failure of the Learned Magistrate to calibrate the quantum of maintenance against the Wife’s specialized professional status constitutes a failure to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the principles of equity and the mandates of the Apex Court. The “earning potential” of a Specialist Doctor must be set off against her claim for maintenance to arrive at a “just and fair” figure.

Note: That part where the Judge says claim of child in a DVC is isolated from parents litigation, is bullshit, in my opinion, and hopefully be set aside by Supreme Court (or another bench of Calcutta High Court) in a future case.

Jyotirmoy Biswas Vs State of West Bengal and Anr on 5 May 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/85220504/

https://www.shoneekapoor.com/legal-news/qualified-woman-maintenance-hc

Index of DV Judgments is here.

Sharif Ahmed and Anr Vs State of UP and Anr on 01 May 2024

Posted on August 23 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that ‘he role played by the accused in the crime should be separately and clearly mentioned in the chargesheet, for each of the accused persons‘.

From Paras 26 to 31, [Importance of clear and complete entries of all columns in the chargesheet so that the court can clearly understand which crime has been committed by which accused]

26. The object and purpose of the police investigation is manyfold. It includes the need to ensure transparent and free investigation to ascertain the facts, examine whether or not an offence is committed, identify the offender if an offence is committed, and to lay before the court the evidence which has been collected, the truth and correctness of which is thereupon decided by the court.
27. In H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. State of Delhi21, this Court notes that the process of investigation generally consists of: 1) proceeding to the concerned spot, 2) ascertainment of facts and circumstances, 3) discovery and arrest, 4) collection of evidence which includes examination of various persons, search of places and seizure of things, and 5) formation of an opinion on whether an offence is made out, and filing the chargesheet accordingly. The formation of opinion is therefore the culmination of several stages that an investigation goes through. This Court in its decision in Abhinandan Jha and Others v. Dinesh Mishra22 states that the submission of the chargesheet or the final report is dependent on the nature of opinion formed, which is the final step in the investigation.
28. The final report has to be prepared with these aspects in mind and should show with sufficient particularity and clarity, the contravention of the law which is alleged. When the report complies with the said requirements, the court concerned should apply its mind whether or not to take cognisance and also proceed by issuing summons to the accused. While doing so, the court will take into account the statement of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code and the documents placed on record by the investigating officer.
29. In case of any doubts or ambiguity arising in ascertaining the facts and evidence, the Magistrate can, before taking cognisance, call upon the investigating officer to clarify and give better particulars, order further investigation, or even record statements in terms of Section 202 of the Code.
30. Our attention has been drawn to the format prescribed for the State of Uttar Pradesh, which by column 16 requires the investigating officer to state brief facts of the case. In addition, the State of Uttar Pradesh has issued a circular dated 19.09.2023, which refers to an earlier circular bearing No. 59 of 2016 dated 20.10.2016, and states that the investigation provisions contained in the Code and the police regulations with reference to Section 173 of the Code are not being consistently complied with and followed by the investigating officers and the supervising officers. The need to provide lead details of the offence in the chargesheet is mandatory as it is in accord with paragraph 122 of the police regulations. Similar directions were issued on 09.09.2022 following the direction of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad that brief narration of the material collected during investigation, which forms the opinion of the investigating officer, should be mentioned in the chargesheet.
31. Therefore, the investigating officer must make clear and complete entries of all columns in the chargesheet so that the court can clearly understand which crime has been committed by which accused and what is the material evidence available on the file. Statements under Section 161 of the Code and related documents have to be enclosed with the list of witnesses. The role played by the accused in the crime should be separately and clearly mentioned in the chargesheet, for each of the accused persons.

From Para 46, Wow, Totally ignored Satender Kumar Antil

46. We, however, would allow the present appeal to the extent that the non-bailable warrants issued against Manager Singh are unsustainable and should be quashed. It is a settled position of law that non-bailable warrants cannot be issued in a routine manner and that the liberty of an individual cannot be curtailed unless necessitated by the larger interest of public and the State. While there are no comprehensive set of guidelines for the issuance of non-bailable warrants, this Court has observed on several occasions that non-bailable warrants should not be issued, unless the accused is charged with a heinous crime, and is likely to evade the process of law or tamper/destroy evidence.

From Para 47,

47. Further, the observation that there is no provision for granting exemption from personal appearance prior to obtaining bail, is not correct, as the power to grant exemption from personal appearance under the Code31 should not be read in a restrictive manner as applicable only after the accused has been granted bail. This Court in Maneka Sanjay Gandhi and Another v. Rani Jethmalani32 held that the power to grant exemption from personal appearance should be exercised liberally, when facts and circumstances require such exemption.33 Section 205 states that the Magistrate, exercising his discretion, may dispense with the personal attendance of the accused while issuing summons, and allow them to appear through their pleader. While provisions of the Code are considered to be exhaustive, cases arise where the Code is silent and the court has to make such order as the ends of justice require. In such cases, the criminal court must act on the principle, that every procedure which is just and fair, is understood as permissible, till it is shown to be expressly or impliedly prohibited by law.34

Sharif Ahmed and Anr Vs State of UP and Anr on 01 May 2024

Citations: [2024 INSC 363]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/13608821/

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/chargesheet-must-contain-clear-complete-entries-specify-role-of-each-accused-witness-statements-be-enclosed-with-it-supreme-court-256699

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/sharif-ahmed-and-another-versus-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-another

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/sharif-ahmed-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-2024-insc-363-chargesheet-aspects-explained-1533473

Sharif Ahmad & Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh Home DepartmentSecretary (2024)

https://verdictchronicles.plreview.net/index.php?p=show_detail&id=39&keywords=

https://testbook.com/landmark-judgements/sharif-ahmad-vs-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-home-department-secretary

Index of Antics of Police Personnel in India here. NBW Judgements is here. Exemption from Personal Appearance Judgments is here.

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Posted on July 21 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Shiv Narayan Dhingra ji has passed this Order around the definition of a Temporary residence as held by the Section 27 of the PWDV Act 2005.

9. All legislative enactments on matrimonial disputes or custody matters make ordinary residence or residence or the place where parties lived together or the place of cause of action as a ground for invocation of jurisdiction of the Court. Domestic Violence Act is the first Act where a temporary residence of the aggrieved person has also been made a ground for invoking the jurisdiction of court. The expression “residence‟ means
“to make abode‟ – a place for dwelling. Normally place for dwelling is made with an intention to live there for considerable time or to settle there. It is a place where a person has a home. In Webster Dictionary, the residence means to dwell for length of time. The words „dwelling place‟ or abode are synonyms. A temporary residence, therefore, must be a temporary dwelling place of the person who has for the time being decided to make the place as his home. Although he may not have decided to reside there permanently or for a considerable length of time but for the time being, this must be place of her residence and this cannot be considered a place where the person has gone on a casual visit, or a fleeing visit for change of climate or simply for the purpose of filing a case against another person.
10. I, therefore, consider that the temporary residence, as envisaged under the Act is such residence where an aggrieved person is compelled to take shelter or compelled to take job or do some business, in view of domestic violence perpetuated on her or she either been turned out of the matrimonial home or has to leave the matrimonial home. This temporary residence does not include residence in a lodge or hostel or an inn or residence at a place only for the purpose of filing a domestic violence case. This temporary residence must also be a continuing residence from the date of acquiring residence till the application under Section 12 is disposed of and it must not be a fleeing residence where a woman comes only for the purpose of contesting the case and otherwise does not reside there.
11. In the present case, the aggrieved person is residing with her sister and has filed the petition under Domestic Violence Act. It cannot be said that her residence with her sister was a fleeing residence or was a temporary residence acquired for lodging the complaint of domestic violence. Her sister‟s house is a place where she has taken shelter and temporarily resides. I, therefore, find that there is no force in this petition. The petition is hereby dismissed with no orders to costs.

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Citations: [2010:DHC:4306], [2010 9 Laws(DLH) 9]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/106302060/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090d56e4b014971117976a

Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here.

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Posted on July 12 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not excepted , at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Further,

The mere initial grant of anticipatory bail for lesser offence, did not entitle the respondent to insist for regular bail even if he was subsequently found to be involved in the case of murder. Neither Section 437(5) nor Section 439(1) of the Code was attracted. There was no question of cancellation of bail earlier granted to the accused for an offence punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 406 IPC. The Magistrate committed a irregularity by holding that “I do not agree with the submission made by the Ld.Prosecutor in as much as if we go by his submissions then the accused would be liable for arrest every time the charge is altered or enhanced at any stage, which is certainly not the spirit of law”. With the change of the nature of the offence, the accused becomes disentitled to the liberty granted to him in relation to a minor offence, if the offence is altered for an aggravated crime. Instead of referring to the grounds which entitled the respondent-accused the grant of bail, the Magistrate adopted a wrong approach to confer him the benefit of liberty on allegedly finding that no grounds were made out for cancellation of bail.

Finally,

We would reiterate that in cases where the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life which is triable exclusively by a court of Sessions, the Magistrate may, in his wisdom, refrain to exercise the powers of granting the bail and refer the accused to approach the higher courts unless he is fully satisfied that there is no reasonable ground for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001 (INSC)

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1067439/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ada1e4b0149711411eb9

Index of Anticipatory Bail Judgments is here.

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Posted on July 6 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that under section 311 of Cr.P.C. (read along with the Section 165 of Evidence Act), a Criminal Court has wide power to summon any person as witness, at any stage of the case, even after completion of defence evidence and argument stages.

From Para 9,

9. The very usage of the words such as ‘any court’, ‘at any stage’, or ‘of any enquiry, trial or other proceedings’, ‘any person’ and ‘any such person’ clearly spells out that this section is expressed in the widest possible terms and do not limit the discretion of the court in any way. However, the very width requires a corresponding caution that the discretionary power should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially with circumspection and consistently with the provisions of the Code. The second part of the section does not allow for any discretion but it binds and compels the court to take any of the aforementioned two steps if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case.

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Citations: [AIR 1991 SC 1346], [1991 CRILJ 1521], [1991 (1) CRIMES 818(SC)], [1991 (33) ECC 18], [1992 (61) ELT 521(SC)], [1991 (1) SCALE 401], [1991 SUPP (1) SCC 271], [1991 (2) UJ 43 (SC)], [1991 SCC(CRI) 595], [1992 CRIAPPR(SC) 73], [1991 (1) SCR 712], [1991 (1) GUJLH 11], [1991 (3) JT 17], [(1991) ALLCRIR 725], [(1992) SC CR R 51], [1991 CRILR(SC MAH GUJ) 286], [1992 CHANDLR(CIV&CRI) 421], [(1992) 1 CHANDCRIC 78], [(1991) 33 ECC 18], [(1991) 2 GUJ LR 974], [(1991) 3 RECCRIR 182], [(1991) MADLW(CRI) 284], [(1997) 68 ECR 783]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/171510013/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac6be4b014971140ed29

Index

Rajashekar Vs BCI and Anr on 27 Oct 2025

Posted on July 1 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka High Court at Bengaluru held as follows,

From Para 3,

3. On an enquiry with the learned counsel appearing for Bar Council of India, as to whether there is any restriction for such enrolment, she submits that there is no such restriction and any person who has passed out of any Law colleges across the country could be registered with the State Bar council where such person intends to practice in terms of Section 24 of the Advocates Act, 1961. She further submits that it is only if transfer of registration is required to be done, certain procedures would be required to be followed.

From Para 5,

5. In view of the said submission, it being clear that the petitioner has passed out of a college which is affiliated to respondent No.1 and there being no restriction or requirement for the State Bar Council to register only persons who have passed out within that particular State and in view of Section 24 of the Advocates Act, I pass the following:
ORDER
i. Writ petition is allowed.
ii. A mandamus is issued to respondent No.2 to enroll the petitioner as an advocate on its roll as per the Advocates Act, 1961, on the next enrolment date.
iii. Respondent No.2 is directed to, in future, take into consideration any application filed by any student who has passed out in Law in any other State so long as the verification process of the certificate issued is done in a proper manner.

Rajashekar Vs BCI and Anr on 27 Oct 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/38447320/

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/karnataka-high-court/karnataka-high-court-ruling-enrolment-of-law-graduates-from-other-states-309383

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/karnataka-high-court/sri-rajashekar-v-bar-council-of-india-2025khc42704-advocate-with-law-degree-from-outside-state-can-enroll-1597580

Law Graduates From Any State Can Enroll With Any Bar Council in India: Karnataka High Court

Index of Bar Council Antics is here.

Vijay Gopal Vs Bar Council of India and Anr on 29 Apr 2026

Posted on July 1 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Telangana High Court held as follows,

From Para 4.1,

4.1 The petitioner, appearing in person, contends that Rule 6 of the Rules, 2015 is ex facie illegal, arbitrary, and ultra vires the provisions of the Act, 1961, particularly Sections 22, 30, and 33. It is argued that the statutory scheme unequivocally confers upon an enrolled Advocate the right to practice law, and such right is neither conditional nor subject to compulsory membership in any Bar Association.

From Para 4.4,

4.4. The petitioner further contends that the impugned rule violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(c) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. It is argued that the freedom to form associations inherently includes the right not to associate, as recognized in Damayanti Naranga v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 678. Therefore, any compulsion to join a Bar Association infringes this constitutional guarantee.

From Para 5.2,

5.2. The respondents argue that the impugned rules, including Rule 6.1, are within the statutory framework and are intended to regulate and identify practicing Advocates, as well as to ensure effective implementation of welfare schemes. It is specifically contended that Rule 6 does not mandate compulsory membership in any Bar Association; rather, it provides an option. An Advocate may either become a member of a recognized Bar Association or, alternatively, intimate the State Bar Council regarding non-membership and indicate how he or she proposes to avail welfare benefits.

From Para 5.4,

5.4. The respondents also contend that the requirement of certification and verification is intended solely to identify genuine practitioners and facilitate welfare distribution. There is no violation of Article 19, as the rules neither compel association membership nor restrict the right to practice.

From Para 8,

8. At the outset, Sections 29, 30, and 33 of the Act, 1961 unequivocally recognize Advocates as the only class of persons entitled to practice law, subject to enrolment under the Act. The statutory scheme does not expressly mandate membership in any Bar Association as a condition precedent to the exercise of such right.

From Paras 12 and 13,

12. A plain reading of Rule 6 indicates that membership in a Bar Association is not mandatory. The provision merely affords an option to an Advocate either to join a Bar Association or, in the alternative, to intimate the State Bar Council regarding such non-membership for the purpose of availing welfare benefits. When construed in this manner, the rule can be sustained as a regulatory measure. Notably, the respondents have also urged that the rule be interpreted in this light.
13. In such circumstances, the requirement would fall within the ambit of Sections 6, 7, and 49(1)(ah) of the Act, 1961, as a condition governing the right to practice, aimed at identifying genuine practitioners and facilitating the implementation of welfare schemes.

Finally from Para 17,

17. In view of the foregoing analysis, Rule 6 of the Rules, 2015 is read down to the following extent:
a) Membership in a Bar Association shall be purely voluntary;
b) Non-membership shall not disentitle or restrict an Advocate from practicing law;
c) Bar Associations shall not exercise any determinative or regulatory control over the right to practice.

Call to Action:

18. Accordingly, Respondent No. 1, namely the Bar Council of India, New Delhi, is directed to issue appropriate clarifications to all State Bar Councils. The requirement of certification and verification shall be implemented solely as a regulatory mechanism for availing welfare measures and not as a means of imposing coercive conditions.

Vijay Gopal Vs Bar Council of India and Anr on 29 Apr 2026

Citations: [2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 86]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/137307844/

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/telangana-high-court/telangana-high-court-bar-associations-exercise-regulatory-control-advocate-right-to-practice-538287

https://www.verdictum.in/telangana-high-court/vijay-gopal-v-bar-council-of-india-anr-bar-council-of-india-membership-1613590

Index of Bar Council Antics is here.

Manoj Kumar Vs Nita Bharti on 17 Mar 2026

Posted on June 17 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Patna High Court, used “Doctrine of frustration” in addition to Cruelty to dissolve a marriage registered under the Special Marriage Act, 1954.

From Paras 39,

39. But, at same time, we are also mindful of the legal position that we cannot exercise power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India for complete justice.
40. At this juncture, our judicial consciousness poses a question to us: being a constitutional court “are we helpless?”. This is particularly so, when we are convinced that respondent/applicant cannot perform her marital obligation with appellant due to the aforesaid compelling circumstances.
41. Hence, this is an occasion to view the present episode in a more progressive manner by importing the “Doctrine of frustration”.
42. As a Constitutional Court it is of paramount importance to touch upon all the possible scenarios, which can result in delivery of justice. Solemnization of marriage is a pious concept which does not only involve a husband and wife but society at large. And keeping in view the best interest of the parties, best possible way to deliver justice should be adopted. The court highlights that “Justice should not only be done, but must also be seen to be done”. Going with the essence of above mentioned phrase, the court will fail in its duty, if it will not discuss the prospective probabilities which can ensure the just, reasonable and conscious delivery of justice.
43. The Indian Jurisprudence suggests that “Procedural law is the handmaid of Justice and not its mistress”, which enables the court to adopt flexible approach rather than taking a rigid view of the prescribed law.
44. At the outset, it is not in dispute that the marriage between the parties was solemnized in accordance with law under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and continued for a certain period, thereby creating a legally valid and subsisting matrimonial bond. The statutory presumption attached to such marriage stands fortified by the mandate of Section 13(2) of the Act, which accords conclusiveness to the certificate of marriage.
45. It must be acknowledged that though marriage is not a commercial contract, it undeniably embodies a bundle of reciprocal obligations—cohabitation, fidelity, companionship, emotional support, and exclusivity. Where these foundational obligations stand extinguished not by mere estrangement but by subsequent conduct that legally and morally negates the marital bond, the continuance of marriage becomes impossible in substance. In such circumstances, the Court cannot remain bound by the mere form of the relationship when its essence has ceased to exist.

From Para 46,

46. …. The doctrine of frustration, embodied in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, is founded on the principle that law does not compel performance of that which has become impossible. When applied in the matrimonial context, particularly to civil marriages under the Special Marriage Act, this principle manifests in situations where the foundation of marriage— cohabitation, consortium, mutual obligations—stands irretrievably destroyed.
47. The doctrine of frustration, as evolved in contract law, operates where an unforeseen event renders the performance of obligations impossible or destroys the very foundation upon which the relationship rests. Transposed into matrimonial jurisprudence, the doctrine applies where the substratum of marriage—mutual trust, exclusivity, and consortium—is irreversibly destroyed, leaving no scope for restoration. The law, in such a situation, must recognize reality over fiction.
48. The present case transcends the conventional doctrine of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. Irretrievable breakdown of marriage contemplates a situation where the marriage has failed due to prolonged separation, incompatibility, or absence of cohabitation. It is not merely a case where the
marriage has failed due to incompatibility or prolonged separation; rather, it is one where subsequent events—most notably the lawful remarriage of the respondent-wife and the birth of a child—have rendered the performance of marital obligations wholly impossible. The doctrine of frustration, as invoked herein, goes a step further—it applies where the very performance of marital obligations has become impossible due to supervening circumstances. The impossibility herein operates at multiple levels—moral, practical, and legal—thereby justifying the application of a doctrine analogous to frustration in order to recognize reality over legal fiction.

From Para 54,

54. While it is true that the doctrine of frustration, in its strict contractual sense, is not directly applicable to matrimonial law, the underlying principle—that a relationship rendered incapable of performance by supervening circumstances ought not to be artificially preserved—can be judiciously invoked. Constitutional courts are empowered to adopt Purposive Interpretation to advance justice and to put an end to litigation. The Rule of interpretation suggests that Constitutional Courts must be at work to fulfill the legislative intent. Marriage, though not a commercial contract, embodies reciprocal and enforceable obligations such as cohabitation, fidelity, companionship, and exclusivity. Where these essential obligations stand extinguished, not merely by estrangement but by subsequent conduct that negates the very foundation of the marriage, the continuance of such a bond becomes impossible in substance.

From Para 57,

57. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present case represents a rare but compelling situation where the doctrine of frustration must be invoked in matrimonial law.
58. The marriage, though validly solemnized, has lost its essential character due to subsequent events that render its continuation impossible. The legal bond survives only as a shell, devoid of substance, purpose, or enforceability. To compel parties to remain in such a relationship would amount to enforcing a legal fiction at the cost of justice. The law cannot insist upon the preservation of a bond that has ceased to exist in every meaningful sense.
59. Therefore, in order to do complete justice, to uphold the dignity of the parties, to secure the welfare of the child, and to serve the broader interests of society, this Court finds it appropriate to dissolve the marriage by applying the doctrine of frustration, treating the matrimonial bond as having become incapable of performance.
60. Accordingly, marriage of OP/appellant namely, Manoj Kumar @ Munna stands dissolved with respondent/applicant namely, Nita Bharti.

From Para 74 (Concurring Opinion)

74. Thus, “Doctrine of frustration” which has been introduced by my esteemed brother as a ground of divorce is supplemented by me holding inter alia that continuous uninterrupted, prolonged separation by and between the parties had caused deep frustration in the core of their heart, such frustration caused by the other spouse is a form of cruelty within the meaning of Section 27 (1) (d) of Special Marriage Act.

Manoj Kumar Vs Nita Bharti on 17 Mar 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Divorce Judgments is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Legal Procedure Explained – Interpretation of Statutes

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