The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd Vs Meena Variyal and Ors on 2 April 2007

Supreme Court held that,

An obiter dictum of this Court may be binding only on the High Courts in the absence of a direct pronouncement on that question elsewhere by this Court. But as far as this Court is concerned, though not binding, it does have clear persuasive authority.

Citations: [2007 KLT SUPP 3 18], [2007 SCR 4 641], [2007 JCC 2 1280], [2007 WBLR 3 264], [2007 TNMAC 2 9], [2007 SCJ 3 498], [2007 GLR 3 2356], [2007 SCC CR 2 527], [2007 ILR KER 3 569], [2007 AIR SC 0 2362], [2007 MPHT 3 1], [2007 COMPCAS 137 116], [2007 SCC 5 428], [2007 ALLLJ 3 596], [2007 ALLSCR 0 1697], [2007 MLJ 2 1230], [2007 ALD 3 99], [2007 SUPREME 3 136], [2007 AIR KAR R 3 437], [2007 ACC 4 335], [2007 AIOL 359], [2007 SCALE 5 269], [2007 TAC 2 417], [2007 SCC CRI 2 527], [2007 SLT 9 251], [2007 AIR SC 1609], [2007 ACJ 0 1284], [2007 JT 5 65], [2008 LW 1 838], [2007 ANWR 1 545]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1964308/ and https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae62e4b0149711413b05

Landmark Judgment of Kusum Ingots is here.

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from main.sci.gov.in/judgments, judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

Sarwan Singh Lamba and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors on 12 May 1995

Posted on March 21 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that,

Para 17,

Normally even an obiter dictum is expected to be obeyed and followed.

TruePrint Version

TP_1995_4_scc_546_561_sandeeppamarati_gmailcom_20200320_233725

Citations: [1995 JT 5 386], [1995 AIR SC 1729], [1995 SCALE 3 457], [1995 SCC 4 546], [1995 SCC L&S 1064], [1995 ATC 30 585], [1995 BLJR 2 1295], [1995 SUPP SCR 1 427], [1995 SLJ SC 3 72], [1995 UPLBEC 2 1215]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/538878/ and https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609acc5e4b014971140fb0f

Landmark Judgment of Kusum Ingots is here.

MS. Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs MS. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001

Posted on March 7 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held the scope of 205 CrPC in this judgment as,

Second is that it is difficult, in the absence of other materials, to decide positively whether the order dated 28.4.2000 is an interlocutory order only.
The interdict contained in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code) is that the powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order. Whether an order is interlocutory or not, cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory stage. The safe test laid down by this Court through a series of decisions is this: If the contention of the petitioner who moves the superior court in revision, asagainst the order under challenge is upheld, would the criminal proceedings as a whole culminate? If it would,then the order is not interlocutory in spite of the fact that it was passed during any interlocutory stage.

And

Section 251 is the commencing provision in Chapter XX of the Code which deals with trial of summons cases by magistrates. It enjoins on the court to ask the accused whether he pleads guilty when the accused appears or is brought before the magistrate. The appearance envisaged therein can either be by personal attendance of the accused or through his advocate. This can be understood from Section 205(1) of the Code which says that whenever a magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader.
Thus, in appropriate cases the magistrate can allow an accused to make even the first appearance through a counsel. The magistrate is empowered to record the plea of the accused even when his counsel makes such plea on behalf of the accused in a case where the personal appearance of the accused is dispensed with.

MS. Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs MS. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001

Citations: [(2001) 7 SCC 401], [

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1255592/

Ankit Bharti Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 02 March 2020

Posted on March 4 by ShadesOfKnife

A landmark judgment, where in Full-bench (5-Judge) of Allahabad High Court held that, Sessions Court and High Court have concurrent jurisdiction in matters of 438 CrPC (Anticipatory Bail) and that there is no rule that first option at Sessions Court ought to be exhausted before seeking audience at High Court, but can be done so under Special circumstances only.

Ankit Bharti Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 02 March 2020

Citations: [

Keshav Lal Thakur Vs State of Bihar on 11 October 1996

Posted on February 23 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that any offence under section 31 of Representation of People Act, 1950 is a Non-cognizable offence and hence direct registration of FIR is not maintainable.

We need not go into the question whether in the facts of the instant case the above view of the High Court is proper or not for the impugned proceeding has got to be quashed as neither the police was entitled to investigate into the offence in question nor the Chief Judicial Magistrate to take cognizance upon the report submitted on completion of such investigation. On the own showing of the police, the offence under Section 31 of the Act is non cognizable and therefore the police could not have registered a case for such an offence under Section 154 Cr.P.C. of course, the police is entitled to investigate into a non-cognizable offence pursuant to an order of a competent Magistrate under Section 155 (2) Cr.P.C. but, admittedly, no such order was passed in the instant case. That necessarily means, that neither the police could investigate into the offence in question nor submit a report on which the question of taking cognizance could have arisen. While on this point, it may be mentioned that in view of the proviso to Section 2 (d) Cr.P.C., which defines ’complaint’, the police is entitled to submit, after investigation, a report a relating to a non-cognizable offence in which case such a report is to be treated as a ’complaint’ of the police officer concerned, but that explanation will not be available to the prosecution here as that related to a case where the police initiates investigation into a cognizable offence – unlike the present one – but ultimately finds that only a non-cognizable offence has been made out.

Keshav Lal Thakur Vs State of Bihar on 11 October 1996

Citations: [1996 AD SC 7 838], [1997 ALD CRI 1 123], [1997 ALT CRI 1 439], [1996 CRIMES SC 4 121], [1996 SCALE 7 598], [1996 SCC 11 557], [1996 SUPP SCR 7 578], [1996 CCR 4 205], [1996 ACJ 2 694], [1996 JT 616], [1996 SUPREME 7 608], [1997 SUPREME 1 150]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1892533/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609acdee4b014971140fe1f

Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency and Anr Vs CBI on 28 March 2018

Posted on February 16 by ShadesOfKnife

In this Landmark judgment, 3-judge bench held as follows,

35. In view of above, situation of proceedings remaining pending for long on account of stay needs to be remedied. Remedy is required not only for corruption cases but for all civil and criminal cases where on account of stay, civil and criminal proceedings are held up. At times, proceedings are adjourned sine die on account of stay. Even after stay is vacated, intimation is not received and proceedings are not taken up. In an attempt to remedy this, situation, we consider it appropriate to direct that in all pending cases where stay against proceedings of a civil or criminal trial is operating, the same will come to an end on expiry of six months from today unless in an exceptional case by a speaking order such stay is extended. In cases where stay is granted in future, the same will end on expiry of six months from the date of such order unless similar extension is granted by a speaking order. The speaking order must show that the case was of such exceptional nature that continuing the stay was more important than having the trial finalized. The trial Court where order of stay of civil or criminal proceedings is produced, may fix a date not beyond six months of the order of stay so that on expiry of period of stay, proceedings can commence unless order of extension of stay is produced.
36. Thus, we declare the law to be that order framing charge is not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order. Jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution. However, the said jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policy to ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any manner hampered. Thus considered, the challenge to an order of charge should be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction and not to re-appreciate the matter. Even where such challenge is entertained and stay is granted, the matter must be decided on day-to-day basis so that stay does not operate for an unduly long period. Though no mandatory time limit may be fixed, the decision may not exceed two-three months normally. If it remains pending longer, duration of stay should not exceed six months, unless extension is granted by a specific speaking order, as already indicated. Mandate of speedy justice applies to the PC Act cases as well as other cases where at trial stage proceedings are stayed by the higher court i.e. the High Court or a court below the High Court, as the case may be. In all pending matters before the High Courts or other courts relating to PC Act or all other civil or criminal cases, where stay of proceedings in a pending trial is operating, stay will automatically lapse after six months from today unless extended by a speaking order on above parameters. Same course may also be adopted by civil and criminal appellate/revisional courts under the jurisdiction of the High Courts. The trial courts may, on expiry of above period, resume the proceedings without waiting for any other intimation unless express order extending stay is produced.
37. The High Courts may also issue instructions to this effect and monitor the same so that civil or criminal proceedings do not remain pending for unduly period at the trial stage.

R.F. Nariman concurs and holds,

5. On a reference made to a 2-Judge Bench in the Delhi High Court, the learned Chief Justice framed, what he described as, “three facets which emanate for consideration”, as follows:
“(a) Whether an order framing charge under the 1988 Act would be treated as an interlocutory order thereby barring the exercise of revisional power of this Court?
(b) Whether the language employed in Section 19 of the 1988 Act which bars the revision would also bar the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for all purposes?
(c) Whether the order framing charge can be assailed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?”
Answers given to the “three facets” are in paragraph 33 as follows:
“33. In view of our aforesaid discussion, we proceed to answer the reference on following terms:
(a) An order framing charge under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is an interlocutory order.
(b) As Section 19(3)(c) clearly bars revision against an interlocutory order and framing of charge being an interlocutory order a revision will not be
maintainable.
(c) A petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and a writ petition preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are
maintainable.
(d) Even if a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is entertained by the High Court under no circumstances an order of stay should be passed regard being had to the prohibition contained in Section 19(3)(c) of the 1988 Act.
(e) The exercise of power either under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should be sparingly and in exceptional circumstances be exercised keeping in view the law laid down in Siya Ram Singh (supra), Vishesh Kumar (supra), Khalil
Ahmed Bashir Ahmed (supra), Kamal Nath & Others (supra) Ranjeet Singh (supra) and similar line of decisions in the field.
(f) It is settled law that jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot
be exercised as a “cloak of an appeal in disguise” or to re- appreciate evidence. The aforesaid proceedings should be used sparingly with great
care, caution, circumspection and only to prevent grave miscarriage of justice.”

Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency and Anr Vs CBI on 28 March 2018

Citations: [2018 ILR KER 2 79], [2018 KHC 2 380], [2018 RCR CRIMINAL 2 415], [2018 SCALE 5 269],

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/172610348/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5abbcd474a93267cfe9ebef0

Earlier Delhi High Court order (by Shiv Narayan Dhingra ji): https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/58117f222713e179478f3bf5

Vanka Radhamanohari Vs Vanka Venkata Reddy And Ors on 20 April 1993

Posted on February 16 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that,

6. At times it has come to our notice that many courts are treating the provisions of Section 468 and Section 473 of the Code as provisions parallel to the periods of limitation provided in the Limitation Act and the requirement of satisfying the court that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of that Act. There is a basic difference between Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 473 of the Code. For exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the onus is on the appellant or the applicant to satisfy the court that there was sufficient cause for condonation of the delay, whereas Section 473 enjoins a duty on the court to examine not only whether such delay has been explained but as to whether it is the requirement of the justice to condone or ignore such delay. As such, whenever the bar of Section 468 is applicable, the court has to apply its mind on the question, whether it is necessary to condone such delay in the interests of justice. While examining the question as to whether it is necessary to condone the delay in the interest of justice, the Court has to take note of the nature of offence, the class to which the victim belongs, including the background of the victim. If the power under section 473 of the code is to be exercised in the interests of justice, then while considering the grievance by a lady, of torture, cruelty and inhuman treatment, by the husband and the relatives of the husband, the interest of justice requires a deeper examination of such grievances, instead of applying the rule of limitation and saying that with lapse of time the cause of action itself has come to an end. The general rule of limitation is based on the Latin maxim : vigilantibus, et non, dormientibus, jura subveniunt (the vigilant, and not the sleepy, are assisted by the laws). That maxim cannot be applied in connection with offences relating to cruelty against women.

7. It is true that the object of introducing Section 468 was to put a bar of limitation on prosecutions and to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time, as it was thought proper that after a long lapse of time, launching of prosecution may be vexatious, because by that time even the evidence may disappear. This aspect has been mentioned in the statement and object, for introducing a period of limitation, as well as by this Court in the case of State Of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh 1981 3 SCC 34. But, that consideration cannot be extended to matrimonial offences, where the allegations are of cruelty, torture and assault by the husband or other members of the family to the complainant. It is a matter of common experience that victim is subjected to such cruelty repeatedly and it is more or less like a continuing offence. It is only as a last resort that a wife openly comes before a court to unfold and relate the day-to-day torture and cruelty faced by her, inside the house, which many of such victims do not like to be made public. As such, courts while considering the question of limitation for an offence under Section 498-A i.e subjecting a woman to cruelty by her husband or the relative of her husband, should judge that question, in the light of section 473 of the code, which requires the Court, not only to examine as to whether the delay has been properly explained, but as to whether “it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice”.

Vanka Radhamanohari Vs Vanka Venkata Reddy And Ors on 20 April 1993

Citations: [1993 (2) BLJR 875], [1993 (2) Crimes 275 SC], [I (1994) DMC 172 SC], [JT 1993 (4) SC 17], [1993 (2) SCALE 570], [(1993) 3 SCC 4]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/849288/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8ce4b014971140f1d2

Asim Shariff Vs National Investigation Agency on 01 July 2019

Posted on February 16 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court has held that,

19. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject laid down by this Court, it is settled that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 CrPC in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the Court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of them giving rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion against the accused, the trial Judge will be justified in discharging him. It is thus clear that while examining the discharge application filed under Section 227 CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has been made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the Court is not supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record.

Asim Shariff Vs National Investigation Agency on 01 July 2019

Citations: [

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/33080905/ Earlier High Court order: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5c4c63cb9eff4364f62e246c

Index of Discharge Judgments u/s 227 Cr.P.C. is here.

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs Girdharilal Sapuru And Ors on 11 February 1981

Posted on February 15 by ShadesOfKnife

In this Landmark judgment, Supreme Court had held that,

5. It, however, appears that the respondents contended that the revision petition was barred by limitation. Even this contention is founded on a very technical ground that even though the revision petition was filed very much in time the requisite power of attorney of the learned advocate on behalf of the petition was not legally complete and when it was re-submitted the limitation had expired. Without going into the nicety of this too technical contention, we may notice that Section 397 of the CrPC enables the High Court to exercise power of revision suo motu and when the attention of the High Court was drawn to a clear illegality the High Court could not have rejected the petition as time barred thereby perpetuating the illegality and miscarriage of justice. The question whether a discharge order is interlocutory or otherwise need not detain us because it is settled by a decision of this Court that the discharge order terminates the proceedings and, therefore it is revisable under Section 397(1), Cr.P.C and -Section 397(1) in terms confers power of suo motu revision on the High Court, and if the High Court exercises suo motu revision power the same cannot be denied on the ground that there is some limitation prescribed for the exercise of the power because none such is prescribed. If in such a situation the suo motu power is not exercised what a glaring illegality goes unnoticed can be demonstrably established by this case itself. We however, do not propose to say a single word on the merits of the cause because there should not be even a whimper of prejudice to the accused who in view of this judgment would have to face the trial before the learned Magistrate.

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs Girdharilal Sapuru And Ors on 11 February 1981

Citations: [1981 ACR SC 161], [1981 AIR SC 1169], [1981 PLR 83 593], [1981 SCC 2 758], [1981 UJ 13 217], [1981 CRI LJ 632], [1981 CRLJ 0 632], [1981 SCC CRI 1 598], [1981 UJ SC 1 217], [1981 CAR 348], [1981 CRLR 275], [1981 SCC CR 598]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1790776/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609abf1e4b014971140db74

Sushila Aggarwal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 29 January 2020

Posted on January 29 by ShadesOfKnife

A wonderful pronouncement indeed, of a 5-eminent judge Constitutional bench which decided that once Anticipatory Bail is granted u/s 438 CrPC by either a Sessions Court or High Court, it does not have any time limit to it regarding it’s effect.

From now onwards, no need to covert Anticipatory Bail into a Regular Bail, upon closure of investigation by I.O. and filing of Charge sheet into a Trial Court.

Here is the Order passed.

Sushila Aggarwal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 29 January, 2020 Order

And the 133-page jewel of judgment, endorsing the view taken by my favorite Justice Shri Dalveer Bhandavi in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre is below.

Sushila Aggarwal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 29 January, 2020 Judgement

The life of this case is in detail available here.

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Legal Procedure Explained

The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd Vs Meena Variyal and Ors on 2 April 2007

Sarwan Singh Lamba and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors on 12 May 1995

MS. Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs MS. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001

Ankit Bharti Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 02 March 2020

Keshav Lal Thakur Vs State of Bihar on 11 October 1996

Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency and Anr Vs CBI on 28 March 2018

Vanka Radhamanohari Vs Vanka Venkata Reddy And Ors on 20 April 1993

Asim Shariff Vs National Investigation Agency on 01 July 2019

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs Girdharilal Sapuru And Ors on 11 February 1981

Sushila Aggarwal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 29 January 2020