MS Royal Sundaram Alliance Vs Mandala Yadagari Goud and Ors on 9 April, 2019

Posted on August 14 by ShadesOfKnife

The only legal issue canvassed before Supreme Court in this case is that in the case of a motor accident where there is death of a person, who is a bachelor, whether the age of the deceased or the age of the dependents would be taken into account for calculating the multiplier.

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

Commissioner of Police Delhi Vs Devender Anand on 08 August, 2019

Posted on August 8 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court has dustbinned the false criminal case instituted by the litigant on a litigation which is of a civil nature, sale purchase of a flat, citing that it is a abise of process of Court.

Commissioner of Police Delhi Vs Devender Anand on 08 August, 2019

Col. Rajnish Bhandari Vs Union of India on 02 August, 2019

Posted on August 7 by ShadesOfKnife

Based on Joseph Shine landmark judgment here, Supreme Court has struck down the adultery section 497 in the Jammu and Kashmir Ranbir Penal Code 1932 as well.

Col. Rajnish Bhandari Vs Union of India on 02 August, 2019

Joseph Shine Vs Union of India on 27 September, 2018

Posted on August 7 by ShadesOfKnife

Landmark judgment from Apex Court which struck down Sec 497 IPC as ultravires with Articles 14, 21 of Constitution of India.

Joseph Shine Vs Union of India on 27 September, 2018

T.C. Mathai and Anr Vs The District and Sessions Judge on 31 March, 1999

Posted on August 1 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court held that,

“Be that as it may, an agent cannot become a pleader for the party in criminal proceedings, unless the party secures permission from the court to appoint him to act in such proceedings. The respondent-couple have not even moved for such permission and hence no occasion has arisen so far to consider that aspect.”

Key passages from the judgment are,

The definition [of a Pleader u.s 2(q) of CrPC] envelopes two kinds of pleaders within its ambit. The first refers to legal practitioners who are authorised to practise law and the second refers to any other person. If it is the latter its essential requisite is that such person should have been appointed with the permission of the court to act in such proceedings. This is in tune with Section 32 of the Advocates Act 1961 which empowers a Court to permit any person, who is not enrolled as an advocate to appear before it in any particular case. But if he is to plead for another person in a criminal court, such permission should be sought for by that person.
It is not necessary that the pleader so appointed should be the power of attorney holder of the party in the case. What seems to be condition precedent is that his appointment should have preceded by grant of permission of the court. It is for the court to consider whether such permission is necessary in the given case and whether the person proposed to be appointed is capable of helping the court by pleading for the party, for arriving at proper findings on the issues involved in the case.

………..

But if the person proposed to be appointed by the party is not such a qualified person the court has first to satisfy itself whether the expected assistance would be rendered by that person. The reason for the Parliament for fixing such a filter in the definition clause [Sec.2(q) of the Code] that prior permission must be secured before a non-advocate is appointed by the party to plead his cause in the court, is to enable the court to verify the level of equipment of such person for pleading on behalf of the party concerned.

T.C. Mathai and Anr Vs The District and Sessions Judge on 31 March, 1999

Precedent used is here

Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1728750/

Citation: (1999) 3 SCC 614, AIR 1999 SC 1385

Uday Shankar Triyar Vs Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and Anr on 10 November, 2005

Posted on August 1 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court listed out defects routinely found in Vakalatnamas filed in courts

(a) Failure to mention the name/s of the person/s executing the Vakalatnama, and leaving the relevant column blank;
(b) Failure to disclose the name, designation or authority of the person executing the Vakalatnama on behalf of the grantor (where the Vakalatnama is signed on behalf of a company, society or body) by either affixing a seal or by mentioning the name and designation below the signature of the executant (and failure to annex a copy of such authority with the Vakalatnama).
(c) Failure on the part of the pleader in whose favour the Vakalatnama is executed, to sign it in token of its acceptance.
(d) Failure to identify the person executing the Vakalatnama or failure to certify that the pleader has satisfied himself about the due execution of the Vakalatnama.
(e) Failure to mention the address of the pleader for purpose of service (in particular in cases of outstation counsel).
(f) Where the Vakalatnama is executed by someone for self and on behalf of someone else, failure to mention the fact that it is being so executed. For example, when a father and the minor children are parties, invariably there is a single signature of the father alone in the Vakalatnama without any endorsement/statement that the signature is for ’self and as guardian of his minor children’. Similarly, where a firm and its partner, or a company and its Director, or a Trust and its trustee, or an organisation and its office-bearer, execute a Vakalatnama, invariably there will be only one signature without even an endorsement that the signature is both in his/her personal capacity and as the person authorized to sign on behalf of the corporate body/firm/ society/organisation.
(g) Where the Vakalatnama is executed by a power-of-attorney holder of a party, failure to disclose that it is being executed by an Attorney-holder and failure to annex a copy of the power of attorney;
(h) Where several persons sign a single vakalatnama, failure to affix the signatures seriatim, without mentioning their serial numbers or names in brackets. (Many a time it is not possible to know who have signed the Vakalatnama where the signatures are illegible scrawls);
(i) Pleaders engaged by a client, in turn, executing vakalatnamas in favour of other pleaders for appearing in the same matter or for filing an appeal or revision. (It is not uncommon in some areas for mofussil lawyers to obtain signature of a litigant on a vakalatnama and come to the seat of the High Court, and engage a pleader for appearance in a higher court and execute a Vakalatnama in favour of such pleader).

Uday Shankar Triyar Vs Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and Anr on 10 November, 2005

Shanti And Anr Vs State of Haryana on 13 November, 1990

Posted on July 12 by ShadesOfKnife

This is a landmark judgment from Supreme Court of India which clarified the legal position around sections 304B and 498A IPC.

From Para 6,

Now we shall consider the question as to whether the acquittal of the appellants of the offence punishable under Section 498-A makes any difference. The submission of the learned counsel is that the acquittal under Section 498-A IPC would lead to the effect that the cruelty on the part of the accused is not established. We see no force in this submission. The High Court only held that Section 304-B and Section 498-A IPC are mutually exclusive and that when once the cruelty envisaged in Section 498-A IPC culminates in dowry death of the victim, Section 304-B alone is attracted and in that view of the matter the appellants were acquitted under Section 498-A IPC. It can therefore be seen that the High Court did not hold that the prosecution has not established cruelty on the part of the appellants but on the other hand the High Court considered the entire evidence and held that the element of cruelty which is also an essential of Section 304-B IPC has been established. Therefore the mere acquittal of the appellants under Section 498-A IPC in these circumstances makes no difference for the purpose of this case. However, we want to point out that this view of the High Court is not correct and Sections 304-B and 498-A cannot be held to be mutually exclusive. These provisions deal with two distinct offences. It is true that “cruelty” is a common essential to both the sections and that has to be proved. The Explanation to Section 498-A gives the meaning of “cruelty”. In Section 304-B there is no such explanation about the meaning of “cruelty” but having regard to the common background to these offences we have to take that the meaning of “cruelty or harassment” will be the same as we find in the explanation to Section 498-A under which “cruelty” by itself amounts to an offence and is punishable. Under Section 304-B as already noted, it is the “dowry death” that is punishable and such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage. No such period is mentioned in Section 498-A and the husband or his relative would be liable for subjecting the woman to “cruelty” any time after the marriage. Further it must also be borne in mind that a person charged and acquitted under Section 304-B can be convicted under Section 498-A without charge being there, if such a case is made out. But from the point of view of practice and procedure and to avoid technical defects it is necessary in such cases to frame charges under both the sections and if the case is established they can be convicted under both the sections but no separate sentence need be awarded under Section 498-A in view of the substantive sentence being awarded for the major offence under Section 304-B.

And the benevolence of the judges overflows for women like juices… yakkk thuuu

From Para 8,

Further both the appellants are women. Under these circumstances, a minimum sentence of seven years’ rigorous imprisonment would serve the ends of justice. Accordingly the convictions are confirmed but the sentence of imprisonment for life under Section 304-B IPC of each of the accused appellant is set aside and instead each of them is sentenced to undergo seven years’ rigorous imprisonment.

Shanti And Anr Vs State of Haryana on 13 November, 1990

Perumal Vs Janaki on 20 January, 2014

Posted on April 21 by ShadesOfKnife

Another landmark judgment from Justice Jasti Chalameswar on the Supervisory Authority of High Courts on Lower Courts in a state and how and why it should have been invoked in this case gainfully. If not under 193 IPC, invocation of 211 IPC was very much desirable in this case.

Another observation is that one can file Perjury under section 340 CrPC even after getting acquittal.

Perumal Vs Janaki on 20 January, 2014

S.R. Batra and Anr Vs Taruna Batra on 15 December, 2006

Posted on April 4 by ShadesOfKnife

Landmark judgment from Apex Court setting record straight regarding the Shared Household.

S.R. Batra and Anr Vs Taruna Batra on 15 December, 2006

Indiankanoon.org Link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/594165/

Citations: (2007) 3 SCC 169, 2007(2)ALD66(SC); 2007(1)AWC664(SC); 2007(3)CTC219; 136(2007)DLT1(SC); I(2007)DMC1SC; (2007)146PLR425; RLW2007(2)SC1546; 2006(13)SCALE652; 2007(1)LC0007(SC); 2007AIRSCW1088; AIR2007SC1118; (2007)2SCC(Cri)56; 2007(2)CivilLJ215(SC); 2007LawHerald(SC)92

Bhriguram De Vs State of West Bengal and others on 20 September, 2018

Posted on March 26 by ShadesOfKnife

In this order from Calcutta High Court(appellate side),

Para 15,

According to the Law Lexicon, Third Edition (2012), the Latin Maxim “Suppressio veri, suggestio falsi” defines that the suppression of the truth is equivalent to the suggestion of falsehood. The suppression or failure to disclose what one party is bound to disclose to another, may amount to fraud. Where a person is found to be guilty of suppressio veri suggestio falsi for having concealed material information from scrutiny of the Court, he is not entitled for any equitable relief under order 39 of CPC (5 of 1908). [Arbind Kumar Pal v. Hazi Md. Faizullah Khan, AIR 2007 (NOC) 1035 (Pat) : (2006) 1 BLJR 430].

From Para 25,

I have no hesitation in saying that the doors of justice would be closed for alitigant whose case is based on falsehood or suppression of material facts. Fraud and justice never dwell together. They are alien to each other. Fraud pollutes the sanctity, regularity, orderliness and solemnity of the judicial proceedings. It is the bounden duty of the Court to keep the stream of justice absolutely clean.

Finally, from Para 29,

Before finally pronouncing my decision, I must state that this court, in all fairness gave an opportunity, after hearing and going through the documents produced by the respondents, to the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition (with liberty to file afresh with better particulars). However, Mr. Saktipada Jana appearing on behalf of the petitioner, refused and pressed the writ petition unabated. One is reminded of the saying, “you can take a horse to the well, but cannot force it to drink”. In view of the same, I dismiss the writ petition in limine. I am of the view that exemplary costs should be awarded. However, on a compassionate plea made by Mr. Jana, the order as to costs is limited to Rs.5,000/- only, payable to the West Bengal State Legal Services Authority, Kolkata, within two weeks from date.

Bhriguram De Vs State of West Bengal and others on 20 September, 2018

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Legal Procedure Explained

MS Royal Sundaram Alliance Vs Mandala Yadagari Goud and Ors on 9 April, 2019

Commissioner of Police Delhi Vs Devender Anand on 08 August, 2019

Col. Rajnish Bhandari Vs Union of India on 02 August, 2019

Joseph Shine Vs Union of India on 27 September, 2018

T.C. Mathai and Anr Vs The District and Sessions Judge on 31 March, 1999

Uday Shankar Triyar Vs Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and Anr on 10 November, 2005

Shanti And Anr Vs State of Haryana on 13 November, 1990

Perumal Vs Janaki on 20 January, 2014

S.R. Batra and Anr Vs Taruna Batra on 15 December, 2006

Bhriguram De Vs State of West Bengal and others on 20 September, 2018