IPC 218 – Public servant framing incorrect record or writing with intent to save person from punishment or property from forfeiture

Posted on February 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Whoever, being a public servant, and being as such public servant, charged with the preparation of any record or other writing, frames that record or writing in a manner which he knows to be incorrect, with intent to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, loss or injury to the public or to any person, or with intent thereby to save, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby save, any person from legal punishment, or with intent to save, or knowing that he is likely thereby to save, any property from forfeiture or other charge to which it is liable by law, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

S.Mukanchand Bothra Vs Rajiv Gandhi Memorial Educational Charitable Trust Chennai and Ors on 22 December, 2015

Posted on February 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Distinguishing the law laid down by Apex Court in Perumal Vs Janaki, Single Judge bench of Madras High Court held that, Investigating officers can not be made liable for perjury (filing false affidavits) in cases where accused was acquitted after trial.

S.Mukanchand Bothra Vs Rajiv Gandhi Memorial Educational Charitable Trust Chennai and Ors on 22 Dec 2015

Citations : [2015 SCC ONLINE MAD 11421]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/139009470/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5728e0c8e561092708a3b8c4

https://www.legitquest.com/case/s-mukanchand-bothra-v-rajiv-gandhi-memorial-educational-charitable-trust-chennai-others/973BF

Index of Perjury judgments here.

Narendra Kumar Srivastava Vs State of Bihar on 4 Feb 2019

Posted on February 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that Perjury cannot be pursued via a private complaint.

From para 16, [Purpose of 340 CrPC]

16. Section 340 of Cr.P.C. makes it clear that a prosecution under this Section can be initiated only by the sanction of the court under whose proceedings an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) has allegedly been committed. The object of this Section is to ascertain whether any offence affecting administration of justice has been committed in relation to any document produced or given in evidence in court during the time when the document or evidence was in custodia legis and whether it is also expedient in the interest of justice to take such action. The court shall not only consider prima facie case but also see whether it is in or against public interest to allow a criminal proceeding to be instituted.

From Para 18 [Talks about the landmark Santohk Singh decision]

18. In Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain and Anr., (1973) 2 SCC 406, this Court has held that every incorrect or false statement does not make it incumbent on the court to order prosecution. The Court has to exercise judicial discretion in the light of all the relevant circumstances when it determines the question of expediency. The court orders prosecution in the larger interest of the administration of justice and not to gratify the feelings of personal revenge or vindictiveness or to serve the ends of a private party. Too frequent prosecutions for such offences tend to defeat its
very object. It is only in glaring cases of deliberate falsehood where conviction is highly likely that the court should direct prosecution.

Narendra Kumar Srivastava Vs State of Bihar on 4 Feb 2019

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/37083044/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5c59bac09eff4333856aec6c

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/sh-narendra-kumar-srivastava-versus-the-state-of-bihar-ors

Santokh Singh Vs Izhar Hussain and Anr on 25 Apr 1973

Posted on February 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A 2-judge bench of Apex Court held that, in this particular case, the Police officer can not be saddled with IPC 211 and prosecuted u/s 340 CrPC read with 195 CrPC. But the necessary ingredients are clearly articulated and hence this case law has to be relied upon as landmark judgment to file perjury against the person who made the false complaint (FIR need not be registered).

From Para 8,

8. In this Court, Shri Gupta has very forcefully contended that on the material on the record this direction is wholly unjustified, if not positively illegal, being based on misreading of evidence and on erroneous view of law. According to the submission, the appellant had neither lodged the FIR nor otherwise instituted any criminal proceeding or falsely charged Izhar Hussain within the contemplation of Section 211 IPC. Besides, there is absolutely no material on the record on which the High Court could have formed an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that a complaint under Section 211 IPC should be filed against the appellant.

From Para 10,

… The short question posed, therefore, is, if by giving false evidence as a witness against Izhar Hussain the appellant can be said to have charged him within the contemplation of Section 211 IPC. If this question is answered in the affirmative, then it will have to be determined whether there is in fact a false accusation and finally whether it is expedient in the interest of justice on the facts and circumstances of the present case to direct a complaint to be filed under Section 211 IPC. This section as its marginal note indicates renders punishable false charge of offence with intent to injure. The essential ingredient of an offence under Section 211 IPC is to institute or cause to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing to institute false criminal proceedings assume false charge but false charge may be preferred even when no criminal proceedings result. It is frankly conceded by Shri Kohli that the appellant cannot be said to have instituted any criminal proceeding against any person. So that part of Section 211 IPC is eliminated. Now, the expression “falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial. To “falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when speaking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible of analogous meaning should be understood to have been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were their colour and content from each other. They seem to have been used in a technical sense as commonly understood in our criminal law. The false charge must, therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or to someone who is in a position to get the offender punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words, it must be embodied either in a complaint or in a report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or an officer having authority over the person against whom the allegations are made. The statement in order to constitute the “charge” should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion. Statement on oath falsely supporting the prosecution case against an accused person more appropriately amounts to an offence under Sections 193 and 195 IPC and not under Section 211 IPC. We do not think that the offences contemplated by Sections 193/195 IPC on the one hand and Section 211 IPC on the other were intended by the legislature in this context, to overlap so as to make it optional whether to proceed under one or the other. ..…

From Para 11,

Every incorrect or false statement does not make it incumbent on the court to order prosecution. The Court has to exercise judicial discretion in the light of all the relevant circumstances when it determines the question of expediency. The court orders prosecution in the larger interest of the administration of justice and not to gratify feelings of personal revenge or vindictiveness or to serve the ends of a private party. Too frequent prosecutions for such offences tend to defeat its very object. It is only in glaring cases of deliberate falsehood where conviction is highly likely that the court should direct prosecution.

Original:

Santokh Singh Vs Izhar Hussain and Anr on 25 Apr 1973 (SCI)

Casemine Version.

Santokh Singh Vs Izhar Hussain and Anr on 25 Apr 1973

Citations : [1973 AIR SC 2190], [1974 BLJR 22 877], [1973 SCC 2 406], [1974 SCR 1 78], [1973 CAR 316], [1973 CRLR SC 473], [1973 SCC CR 828], [1973 SCC CRI 828], [1973 CRLJ SC 1176]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/56524/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab94e4b014971140cd11

Index of Perjury judgments here.

A.Radhika Vs Wilson Sundararaj on 26 Feb 2021

Posted on February 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Citing landmark judgments, Madras High Court held that Investigating Officer cannot made liable u/s 211 IPC and based on another decision by Madras High Court here said such officers may be proceeded u/s 218 IPC which does not come under the procedure of 340 CrPC r/w 195 CrPC.

From Para 21,

21. The above judgements set out the procedure while dealing with an application under Section 340, Cr.P.C. Firstly, in order to initiate proceedings under Section 340,Cr.P.C., an application has to be made to the Court upon which the Court can initiate an inquiry into any offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. Secondly, offences as set out in the complaint have to be made out. In the present case, the complainant alleges that an offence under Section 211, I.P.C. has been made out.

From Para 22,

22. In the present case, based on the complaint given by one Mr. Rajamani, the FIR was registered by the F-2 Police Station, Egmore and the arrest was also carried out by the said police. The Petitioner came into the scene only at a later point of time when the case was transferred to the file of the CBCID. The language used under Section 211, I.P.C. regarding false charge can only relate to the original or initial accusation through which the criminal law was set in motion. Admittedly, it was not the Petitioner who had set the criminal law in motion. That apart, as held in Iqbal Singh Marwah’s Case (cited supra) the offences referred to under Section 195(1)(b), Cr.P.C. will get attracted only with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis.

And finally from paras 24 and 25,

24. This Court after considering the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki (cited supra) has come up with this fine distinction in the case of S.Mukanchand Bothra (cited supra). That apart, the facts of the present case is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perumal v. Janaki.
25. In view of the above discussion, this Court holds that the offence under Section 211, I.P.C. has not been made out against the Petitioner. The Respondent cannot pick and choose certain observations made by the trial court and this Court, and make it a basis for filing an application under Section 340, Cr.P.C. to punish the Petitioner under Section 211, I.P.C.

Silver lining from para 26,

26. A careful reading of the petition filed by the Respondent at the best makes out a case for malicious prosecution. In a case of malicious prosecution, which gives rise to a tortious liability, only a suit for damages can be filed by establishing the ingredients to maintain such a suit. The grounds for maintaining a suit for malicious prosecution cannot form the basis for filing a petition under Section 340, Cr.P.C. since it has to independently satisfy the requirements of Section 195(1)(b), Cr.P.C.

A.Radhika Vs Wilson Sundararaj on 26 Feb 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

MS Eicher Tractors Ltd and Ors Vs Harihar Singh and Anr on 7 Nov 2008

Posted on February 25, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A 2-judge bench of Supreme Court held that Counterblast cases/proceedings must be quash as per Category 7 of Bhajan Lal judgment here. It held as follows in Para 10.

10. The case at hand squarely falls within the parameters indicated in category (7) of Bhajan Lal’s case (supra). The factual scenario as noted above clearly shows that the proceedings were initiated as a counterblast to the proceedings initiated by the appellants. Continuance of such proceedings will be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. Proceedings are accordingly quashed.

MS Eicher Tractors Ltd and Ors Vs Harihar Singh and Anr on 7 Nov 2008

Citations : [2009 JCC 1 260], [2009 LW CRL 1 284], [2008 SCALE 15 60], [2008 SCALE 14 1], [2008 SCC 16 763], [2009 BC 1 193], [2009 SLT 1 576], [2009 OCR 42 139], [2008 AIOL 1268], [2009 CRIMES SC 1 144], [2008 JT 12 661], [2008 SCR 16 7], [2008 SUPREME 8 559], [2010 SCC CRI 4 425], [2009 ECRN SC 1 422], [2009 AIC SC 73 198]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/312043/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae6de4b0149711413d41

State of Karnataka Vs M. Devendrappa and Anr on 16 Jan 2002

Posted on February 25, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A 3 judge bench citing Bhajan lal judgment here, held as follows:

In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of private complainant as unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly.

Finally, it was held that, there were grounds to Quash the proceedings, by saying,

the involvement of excise officials cannot be ruled out and when they have been indicated to be witnesses, likelihood of prejudice cannot be ruled out. It was also noted that there was no “definite evidence” to show that accused nos. 1&2 were directly involved. Finally, it was observed that there was no material to hold that the accused persons had committed theft of “Letter Heads” from Karnataka Bank Ltd., and/or they had committed forgery for the purpose of cheating or have used genuine forged documents or had cheated the government. Finally, it was observed that there was no evidence to infer common intention to commit such offences.

State of Karnataka Vs M. Devendrappa and Anr on 16 Jan 2002

Citations : [2002 SCC 3 89], [2002 SCALE 1 176], [2002 AIR SC 671], [2002 SCR 1 275], [2002 CRLJ SC 998], [2002 SCC CRI 539], [2002 UJ SC 1 362], [2002 AIR SC 286], [2002 SUPREME 1 192], [2002 ACR SC 1 605], [2002 ALD CRI 1 412], [2002 SCSUPPL CHN 2 21], [2002 UC 1 294], [2002 AIR SCW 286], [2002 JT SC 1 213]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1014506/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adc4e4b0149711412362

KK Ramesh Vs Union of India and Ors on 04 Feb 2021

Posted on February 22, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Petitioner prayed Madras High Court to direct Central Govt/RBI prints Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose’s pictures on Indian Currency. Due to Judicial Restraint, High Court directed Govt/RBI to consider the representation earlier given by the Petitioner.

KK Ramesh Vs Union of India and Ors on 04 Feb 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

Pankaj Kumar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 11 Jul 2008

Posted on February 17, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

In this landmark judgment, Apex Court held that Right to speedy trial is implicit to Article 21 of Constitution of India and also passed guidelines to ensure that this right is not violated, and it violated, Constitutional Courts have a duty to fix such violation appropriately.

From Para 14,

14. Time and again this Court has emphasized the need for speedy investigations and trial as both are mandated by the letter and spirit of the provisions of the CrPC. (In particular, Sections 197, 173, 309, 437 (6) and 468 etc.) and the constitutional protection enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. Inspired by the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by a seven-Judge Bench of this Court in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India & Anr., in Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, this Court had said that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by law; that such procedure is not some semblance of a procedure but the procedure should be ‘reasonable, fair and just’; and therefrom flows, without doubt, the right to speedy trial. It was also observed that no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as ‘reasonable, fair or just’ and it would fall foul of Article 21. The Court clarified that speedy trial means reasonably expeditious trial which is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21.

From Para 15,

15. The exposition of Article 21 in Hussainara Khatoon’s case (supra) was exhaustively considered afresh by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. Vs. R.S. Nayak & Anr.11. Referring to a number of decisions of this Court and the American precedents on the Sixth Amendment of their Constitution, making the right to a speedy and public trial a constitutional guarantee, the Court formulated as many as eleven propositions with a note of caution that these were not exhaustive and were meant only to serve as guidelines. For the sake of brevity, we do not propose to reproduce all the said propositions and it would suffice to note the gist thereof. These are:
(i) fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily;
(ii) right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial;
(iii) in every case where the speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is —
who is responsible for the delay?;
(iv) while determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on— what is called, the systemic delays;
(v) each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case;
(vi) ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh several relevant factors—’balancing test’ or ‘balancing process’—and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied;
(vii) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open and having regard to the nature of offence and other circumstances when the court feels that quashing of proceedings cannot be in the interest of justice, it is open to the court to make appropriate orders, including fixing the period for completion of trial;
(viii) it is neither advisable nor feasible to prescribe any outer time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint;
(ix) an objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.

From Para 17,

17. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal persecutions is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal persecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. In every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the court has to perform the balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances, enumerated above, and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. Where the court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a situation, it is open to the court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable including fixation of time for conclusion of trial.

Pankaj Kumar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 11 Jul 2008

Citations : [2008 RCR CRI 4 890], [2008 AIR SC 0 5165], [2008 JT 8 109], [2008 AIR SC 3077], [2008 RAJ 6 293], [2008 SCC 16 117], [2008 WLC 2 677], [2008 MLJ CRI 2 1649], [2009 SCJ 1 998], [2008 SCALE 9 760], [2008 CCR 3 176], [2008 DLT CRI 3 533], [2008 SLT 6 233], [2008 AIOL 2116], [2008 ANJ SC 2 173], [2008 BOMCR CRI SC 2 590], [2010 SCC CRI 4 217], [2008 AIC SC 68 93], [2009 LLN 2 798], [2009 FLR 122 790], [2008 CRLJ SC 3944], [2008 AIR SCW 5165]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1223002/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae6ae4b0149711413c8f

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Month: February 2021

IPC 218 – Public servant framing incorrect record or writing with intent to save person from punishment or property from forfeiture

S.Mukanchand Bothra Vs Rajiv Gandhi Memorial Educational Charitable Trust Chennai and Ors on 22 December, 2015

Narendra Kumar Srivastava Vs State of Bihar on 4 Feb 2019

Santokh Singh Vs Izhar Hussain and Anr on 25 Apr 1973

A.Radhika Vs Wilson Sundararaj on 26 Feb 2021

MS Eicher Tractors Ltd and Ors Vs Harihar Singh and Anr on 7 Nov 2008

State of Karnataka Vs M. Devendrappa and Anr on 16 Jan 2002

KK Ramesh Vs Union of India and Ors on 04 Feb 2021

Pankaj Kumar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 11 Jul 2008