A Special Court dealing with POCSO cases, held as follows and acquitted a father who is accused of raping his daughter.
From Para 7,
7. Settled position of law that sole testimony of the victim alone if found reliable is sufficient to convict the accused.
From Para 13,
State of Maharashtra Vs Abdulrehman Shahjadhussain Shaikh and Anr on 28 Mar 2022It is also settled position that the child can be easily tutored.
Supreme Court deprecated such practice of the Police Officer in taking the petitioners into custody without compliance of Section 41(A) Cr.P.C.
Jagdish Shrivastava Vs State of Maharashtra on 11 Mar 2022Counsel for the petitioners submits that no notice under Section 41(A) Cr.P.C was ever served and after this fact came to the notice of the Investigating officer that SLPs have been preferred by the petitioners for seeking pre-arrest bail, he approached them and took the petitioners into custody on 8th March, 2022.
Since the petitioners have now been in custody, it may not be appropriate for this Court to pass further orders but at the same time, we grant them liberty to file regular bail application.
If such an application is filed, it is expected from the Trial Court to take note of non-compliance of Section 41(A) Cr.P.C and dispose of the application for post-arrest bail, if any, filed by the petitioners within a reasonable time as expeditiously as possible.
We deprecate such practice of the Police Officer in overstepping after the matter being instituted in this Court and taking the petitioners into custody without compliance of Section 41(A) Cr.P.C. and keeping in view the judgment of this Court in Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2014) 8 SCC 273.
A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate:
Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses—
(a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint; or
(b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under section 192:
Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under section 192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not re-examine them.
A division bench of the Apex Court held that, there is no authority for the magistrate to examine the complainant in a 156(3) CrPC proceeding since this is a pre-cognizance stage.
From Para 7,
7. In our opinion, the aforesaid direction given by the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana is contrary to law and cannot be approved. Chapter XII of the Code contains provisions relating to “information to the police and their powers to investigate”, whereas Chapter XV, which contains Section 202, deals with provisions relating to the steps which a Magistrate has to adopt while and after taking cognizance of any offence on a complaint. Provisions of the above two chapters deal with two different facets altogether, though there could be a common factor i.e complaint filed by a person. Section 156, falling within Chapter XII, deals with powers of the police officers to investigate cognizable offences. True, Section 202 which falls under Chapter XV, also refers to the power of a Magistrate to “direct an investigation by a police officer”. But the investigation envisaged in Section 202 is different from the investigation contemplated in section 156 of the code.
From Paras 8 and 9,
8. The investigation referred to therein is the same investigation, the various steps to be adopted for it have been elaborated in Chapter XII of the Code. Such investigation would start with making the entry in a book to be kept by the officer in charge of a police station, of the substance of the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Section 173 of the Code. The investigation contemplated in that chapter can be commenced by the police even without the order of a Magistrate. But that does not mean that when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section 156(3) it would be a different kind of investigation. Such investigation must also end up only with the report contemplated in Section 173 of the Code. But the significant point to be noticed is, when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII he does so before he takes cognizance of the offence.3
9. But a Magistrate need not order any such investigation if he proposes to take cognizance of the offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of the Code. A reading of Section 202(1) of the Code would convince that the investigation referred to therein is of a limited nature. The Magistrate can direct such an investigation to be made either by a police officer or by any other person. Such investigation is only for helping the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further. This can be discerned from the culminating words in Section 202(1). This is because he has already taken cognizance of the offence disclosed in the complaint, and the domain of the case would thereafter vest with him.
And finally from Para 10,
Suresh Chand Jain Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr on 10 Jan 200110. The position is thus clear. Any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the police station as indicated in section 154 of the code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complaint because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter.
Citations : [2001 ACR SC 1 586], [2001 AIR SC 571], [2001 ALD CRI 1 367], [2001 ALT CRI 1 284], [2001 CGLJ 1 451], [2001 GLH 1 594], [2001 JLJ SC 1 395], [2001 JT SC 2 81], [2001 KLT SC 1 623], [2001 OLR 1 470], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 1 335], [2001 RLW SC 2 317], [2001 SCALE 1 93], [2001 SCC 2 628], [2001 SCR 1 257], [2001 UC 1 202], [2001 SCC CRI 377], [2001 CCR 1 54], , [2001 AIR SC 189], [2001 CRIMES SC 1 171], [2001 SUPREME 1 129], [2001 CLJ 3 78], [2001 SLT 1 364], [2001 SCJ 1 605], [2001 SRJ 2 100], [2001 JCC 1 78], [2001 CTC 1 500], [2001 AD SC 1 109], [2001 CRLJ SC 954], [2001 AIR SCW 189], [2001 ALLMR CRI SC 775], [2001 UJ SC 1 420]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1373794/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ada0e4b0149711411e8a
A Division bench of the Apex Court held that, there is no scope for examining the complainant (or any witnesses) u/s 200 CrPC, in a 156(3) CrPC proceeding, since that stage is pre-cognizance of any cognizable offence.
From Paras 16 and 17,
16 The primary basis on which the High Court has allowed the applications under Section 438 is that the complaint filed by the first informant was supported by an affidavit dated 6 February 2016. However, the High Court held that the mandate of Section 200 of the CrPC of examining the complainant on oath has not been fulfilled by the Magistrate. On this basis, the High Court held that this raises a serious doubt about the validity of the order which has been passed under Section 156(3).
17 There is a serious error in the view of the Single Judge. First and foremost, the Magistrate’s order under Section 156(3) was not under challenge before the High Court and has attained finality. The High Court was in error in raising a doubt about the correctness of the order under section 156(3) passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate on 11 May 2016 in the course of considering the complaint filed by the complainant. Secondly, the position in law as set out in the order of the Single Judge does not accord with the principles which have been consistently enunciated in the decisions of this Court specifically in the context of Chapter XV of the CrPC. Sections 200 and 202
From Para 20,
20 In Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh6, Justice Swatanter Kumar for the Bench noted that Section 156 primarily deals with the powers of the police officer to investigate cognizable cases. While passing an order under Section 156(3), the Magistrate does not take cognizance. The order of the Magistrate is in the nature of ―a pre-emptory reminder or intimation to the police‖ to exercise their primary duty and power of investigation. The court held that the power of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) is not affected by the provisions of Section 202
MS Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra on 26 Jul 2021
Citations : [AIR 2021 SC 3580], [2021 All.M.R. (Cri.) 3062], [2021 (5) BLJ 114], [2021 CriLJ 3747], [JT 2021 (7) SC 238], [2021 (3) MLJ (Cri) 438], [2021 (3) RCR (Criminal) 691], [2021 (8) SCALE 534], [(2021) 8 SCC 753]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/77704402/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6101a65137988476911e2ec4
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-supreme-bhiwandi-wada-manor-infrastructure-pvt-ltd-versus-the-state-of-maharashtra-anr
A Full bench of the Apex Court, in an attempt to balance the rights of parties, purportedly in exercise of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution, allowed a party to stay in a residence owner by the Parents-in=law.
S.Vanitha Vs Deputy Commissioner on 15 Dec 2020Citations : [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 1023]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71453821/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5fe97792814df3882b7c2a16
Single judge bench of Delhi High Court held that the Court has to balance the rights of the aggrieved person and the parents-in-law when the question of residence arises for the aggrieved person while her marital relationship subsists.
From Paras 24 and 25,
24. Admittedly where the parties are residing is a flat, having only three bed rooms, a drawing room and the appellant is in possession of a room in the said flat, then considering there are various complaints filed by them against each other; their relations being not cordial, would it in such circumstances, be appropriate for them to stay together and fight every minute of their existence. In Satish Chander Ahuja (supra) in para No.90 the Court had observed we need to strike a balance between the rights of daughter-in-law and her in-laws.
25. Admittedly, the right of residence under Section 19 of the DV Act is not an indefeasible right of residence in shared household, especially, when the daughter-in-law is pitted against aged father-in-law and mother-in-law. In this case, both being senior citizens of aged about 74 and 69 years and being in the evening of their life, are entitled to live peacefully and not to be haunted by the marital discord between their son and daughter-in-law.
From Para 27,
27. Thus, where the residence is a shared household, it does not create any embargo upon the owner to claim eviction against his daughter-in-law. A strained frictional relationship between the parties would be relevant to decide whether the grounds of eviction exist. I am of the considered opinion, since there exist a frictional relationship between the parties, then at the fag end of their lives it would not be advisable for old parents to stay with appellant and hence it would be appropriate if an alternative accommodation is provided to the appellant as is directed in the impugned order per Section 19(1)(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act
And finally from Para 28,
Ravneet Kaur Vs Prithpal Singh Dhingra on 24 Feb 202228. Thus, there is no force in the appeal and accordingly it is dismissed. The undertaking made at Bar to provide an alternative accommodation to the appellant till her matrimony exists be filed in the form of an affidavit of the respondent within two weeks from today before the learned Trial Court. The execution of decree be postponed till such suitable alternative accommodation is found and the applicant is conveniently shifted therein. The learned Trial Court to impose conditions in case of non-payment of rental including electricity /water charges etc by respondent.
Citations : [2022 SCC ONLINE DEL 594]
Other Sources :
https://caselaw.in/delhi/shared-household-ravneet-kaur-prithpal-singh-dhingra/16/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6217abd79fca1954d2a81a9a
A division bench of Apex Court held that in a case of insurance policy holder dying intestate with some nomination, then the nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them
From Para 4,
4. At the outset it should be mentioned that except the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kesari Devi v. Dharma Devi AIR 1962 All 355 on which reliance was placed by the High Court in dismissing the appeal before it and the two decisions of the Delhi High Court in S. Fauza Singh v. Kuldip SinghAIR 1978 Del 276 and Uma Sehgal v. Dwarka Dass Sehgal AIR 1982 Del 36 in all other decisions cited before us the view taken is that the nominee under Section 39 of the Act is nothing more than an agent to receive the money due under a life insurance policy in the circumstances similar to those in the present case and that the money remains the property of the assured during his lifetime and on his death forms part of his estate subject to the law of succession applicable to him. The cases which have taken the above view are Ramballav Dhandhania v. Gangadhar NathmallAIR 1956 Cal 275; Life Insurance Corporation of India v. United Bank of India Ltd AIR 1970 Cal 513; D. Mohanavelu Mudaliar v. Indian Insurance and Banking Corporation Ltd., Salem6; Sarojini Amma v. Neelakanta Pillai AIR 1961 Ker 126; Atmaram Mohanlal Panchal v. Gunvantiben AIR 1977 Guj 134; Malli Dei v. Kanchan Prava Dei AIR 1973 Ori 83 and Lakshmi Amma v. Saguna BhagathILR 1973 Kant 827. Since there is a conflict of judicial opinion on the question involved in this case it is necessary to examine the above cases at some length.
The operative portion of the Judgment:
Sarbati Devi and Anr Vs Usha Devi on 06 Dec 198312. Moreover there is one other strong circumstance in this case which dissuades us from taking a view contrary to the decisions of all other High Courts and accepting the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two recent judgments delivered in the year 1978 and in the year 1982. The Act has been in force from the year 1938 and all along almost all the High Courts in India have taken the view that a mere nomination effected under Section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their rights in the amount payable under a life insurance policy. Yet Parliament has not chosen to make any amendment to the Act. In such a situation unless there are strong and compelling reasons to hold that all these decisions are wholly erroneous, the Court should be slow to take a different view. The reasons given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing. We, therefore, hold that the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Fauza Singh case and in Uma Sehgal case do not lay down the law correctly. They are, therefore, overruled. We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of Section 39 of the Act and hold that a mere nomination made under Section 39 of the Act does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them.
Citations : [1983 SCALE 2 869], [1984 AIR SC 346], [1984 SCC 1 424], [1984 SCR 1 992], [1984 SCC TAX 59], [1984 ALR 10 268], [1984 ALJ 194], [1984 BLJR 21], [1984 ACC 2 377], [1984 ACJ 138], [1984 BLJR 32 210], [1984 COMPLJ SC 1 1], [1984 GLH 490], [1984 COMPCAS SC 55 214], [1984 UJ SC 866]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1308094/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac0ce4b014971140de2b
This is such an atrocious case whereby the so-called mother flouts the orders passed by Canadian Courts regd Custody of a minor child and reaches India only to file a 498A IPC case. Crooks!
Vijaya Mahantesh Mulemane Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 03 Mar 2022The Earlier decision from Karnataka High Court’s Division Bench, where a parenting plan was devised by the judges.
Vijaya Mahantesh Mulemane Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 22 Nov 2020Relying on Apex Court’s Surinder Mohan Vikal decision, Calcutta High Court held as follows:
Rabindra Nath Pal Vs Ratikanta Paul and Ors on 6 Mar 2020In the instant case, the cause of action arose from the date when First Information Report was registered and not from the date on which the complainant was acquitted from the charge.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/50050401/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5faa5a1c4653d02a0b1309ab
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