Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs Manju Sharma on 27 Feb 2009

Posted on February 28 by Suprajaa Rajan

The Supreme Court examined whether a court exercising appellate jurisdiction can grant a decree of divorce on a ground not expressly enumerated in the statute. The matter required interpretation of Section 13 HMA and consideration of the constitutional limits on judicial law-making.

The Court analysed whether irretrievable breakdown, though recognised in certain judicial pronouncements, could operate as an independent ground for divorce in the absence of legislative incorporation. The judgment reaffirmed the principle of separation of powers and clarified that courts cannot expand statutory grounds through judicial innovation.

Important Extracts from the Judgment:

High Court Findings (Paras 13 & 17):
“On a reading of the entire evidence, it is not possible to conclude that the appellant has been able to establish that the respondent treated him with cruelty.”

“To grant divorce to the appellant despite this only on the ground of irretrievable breakdown would not, in the view of this Court, be doing justice to the respondent.”
On Findings of Fact:
“We are not inclined to interfere with the finding of fact of both the courts below that it was the appellant who treated the respondent with cruelty, rather than the other way around.”
On Irretrievable Breakdown Not Being a Statutory Ground:
“On a bare reading of Section 13 of the Act, reproduced above, it is crystal clear that no such ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is provided by the legislature for granting a decree of divorce. This Court cannot add such a ground to Section 13 of the Act as that would be amending the Act, which is a function of the legislature.”

“If we grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, then we shall by judicial verdict be adding a clause to Section 13 of the Act to the effect that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is also a ground for divorce.”

“In our opinion, this can only be done by the legislature and not by the Court.”
On Mutual Consent:
“Had both parties been willing we could, of course, have granted a divorce by mutual consent as contemplated by Section 13B of the Act, but in this case the respondent is not willing to agree to a divorce.”

Decision

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

The Court held that:

The appellant failed to establish cruelty.
Irretrievable breakdown is not a statutory ground under Section 13 HMA.
The judiciary cannot legislate by adding new grounds for divorce.
Only Parliament can amend the statute to include such a ground.

Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs Manju Sharma on 27 Feb 2009

Citation :

Other Sources :

Index of Divorce Judgements is here.

Key Contributor :

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

Hitesh Bhatnagar Vs Deepa Bhatnagar on 18 Apr 2011

Posted on February 24 by Suprajaa Rajan

The Supreme Court examined whether consent given at the time of filing a joint petition continues to bind the parties until decree, or whether it can be withdrawn at any stage before the court passes the final order.

The appellant argued that once the statutory period of 18 months had expired without formal withdrawal, the court had no option but to grant divorce. The respondent contended that mutual consent must subsist till the date of decree and that she had validly withdrawn her consent before the second motion.

The judgment clarified the nature of mutual consent as a jurisdictional requirement and reaffirmed earlier precedents on the subject. It also considered whether Article 142 of the Constitution could be invoked to dissolve the marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown.

“13. The appellant contends that the Additional District Judge, Gurgaon, was bound to grant divorce if the consent was not withdrawn within a period of 18 months in view of the language employed in Section 13B(2) of the Act. We find no merit in the submission made by the appellant in the light of the law laid down by this Court in Sureshta Devi’s case (supra).”

“14. The language employed in Section 13B(2) of the Act is clear. The Court is bound to pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage of the parties before it to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree, if the following conditions are met:
a. A second motion of both the parties is made not before 6 months from the date of filing of the petition as required under sub-section (1) and not later than 18 months;
b. After hearing the parties and making such inquiry as it thinks fit, the Court is satisfied that the averments in the petition are true; and
c. The petition is not withdrawn by either party at any time before passing the decree;”

“15. In other words, if the second motion is not made within the period of 18 months, then the Court is not bound to pass a decree of divorce by mutual consent. Besides, from the language of the Section, as well as the settled law, it is clear that one of the parties may withdraw their consent at any time before the passing of the decree. The most important requirement for a grant of a divorce by mutual consent is free consent of both the parties.”

“16. In the present fact scenario, the second motion was never made by both the parties as is a mandatory requirement of the law, and as has been already stated, no Court can pass a decree of divorce in the absence of that. The non-withdrawal of consent before the expiry of the said eighteen months has no bearing.”

“18. We are not inclined to entertain this submission of the appellant since the facts in that case are not akin to those that are before us.”

“25. It is settled law that this Court grants a decree of divorce only in those situations in which the Court is convinced beyond any doubt that there is absolutely no chance of the marriage surviving and it is broken beyond repair.”

Decision

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

The Court held that:

Mutual consent must continue till the decree of divorce.
Either party may withdraw consent at any time before the decree.
The 18-month period does not bar withdrawal of consent.
Article 142 cannot be used to override statutory requirements in ordinary circumstances.

Hitesh bhatnagar Vs Deepa bhatnagar on 18 Apr 2011

Citation :(2011) 5 SCC 234

Other Sources :

Index of Divorce Judgements is here.

Key Contributor :

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

Ruchi Agarwal Vs Amit Kumar Agrawal and Ors on 5 Nov 2004

Posted on May 22, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that Once MCD done with no future claims, maintenance cannot be claimed later.

It is based on the said compromise the appellant obtained a divorce as desired by her under Section 13(B) of the Hindu Marriage Act and in partial compliance of the terms of the compromise she withdrew the criminal case filed under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code but for reasons better known to her she did not withdraw that complaint from which this appeal arises. That apart after the order of the High Court quashing the said complaint on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, she has chosen to file this appeal. It is in this background, we will have to appreciate the merits of this appeal.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, however, contended that though the appellant had signed the compromise deed with the above-mentioned terms in it, the same was obtained by the respondent-husband and his family under threat and coercion and in fact she did not receive lump sum maintenance and her Stridhan properties, we find it extremely difficult to accept this argument in the background of the fact that pursuant to the compromise deed the respondent-husband has given her a consent divorce which she wanted thus had performed his part of the obligation under the compromise deed. Even the appellant partially performed her part of the obligations by withdrawing her criminal complaint filed under Section 125. It is true that she had made a complaint in writing to the Family Court where Section 125 Cr.P.C. proceedings were pending that the compromise deed was filed under coercion but she withdrew the same and gave a statement before the said court affirming the terms of the compromise which statement was recorded by the Family Court and the proceedings were dropped and a divorce was obtained. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant having received the relief she wanted without contest on the basis of the terms of the compromise, we cannot now accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. In our opinion, the conduct of the appellant indicates that the criminal complaint from which this appeal arises was filed by the wife only to harass the respondents.

Ruchi Agarwal Vs Amit Kumar Agrawal and Ors on 5 Nov 2004

Citations:

Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1892287/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adf3e4b01497114129dc

Amit Kumar Vs Suman Beniwal on 11 Dec 2021

Posted on January 17, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

In addition to the guidelines issue in Amardeep Singh Vs Harveen Kaur here, Additional guidelines/factors were issued in this case.

From Para 27,

27. For exercise of the discretion to waive the statutory waiting period of six months for moving the motion for divorce under Section 13B (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Court would consider the following amongst other factors:
(i) the length of time for which the parties had been married;
(ii) how long the parties had stayed together as husband and wife;
(iii) the length of time the parties had been staying apart;
(iv) the length of time for which the litigation had been pending;
(v) whether there were any other proceedings between the parties;
(vi) whether there was any possibility of reconciliation;
(vii) whether there were any children born out of the wedlock;
(viii) whether the parties had freely, of their own accord, without any coercion or pressure, arrived at a genuine settlement which took care of alimony, if any, maintenance and custody of children, etc.

Amit Kumar Vs Suman Beniwal on 11 Dec 2021

Index of Divorce cases is here.

Beena MS Vs Shino G Babu on 04 Feb 2022

Posted on February 28, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of Kerala High Court held the following in a Divorce Matter, wherein one party is withholding the consent in a irretrievably broken-down marriage.

From Para 5,

5. The husband attributes this conduct as a behavioural disorder. The wife denies the same. We are not able to discern ourselves to classify this as
behavioural disorder or not. There are various types of personality disorders. In the absence of any medical evidence before us, we may not be able to classify this behaviour as a personality disorder. But, we are sure unstable emotions and relationships existed between the parties as revealed from Exts.A2 to A4 e-mail chatting reports and Ext.A5 whatsapp message. If one of the spouses is unable to adjust to such behaviour, that party cannot be found fault with. The obsessive nature of the character possessed by the wife would have led to a deteriorating relationship between the parties from the initial phase of life itself. Chasing happiness based on schedules instead of living in the moment, appears to be the vowed daily life routine adopted by her. She was not realistic to the fact that the secret of marital harmony lies in accepting the life as it unfolds and not becoming a stickler of the schedules or routines. Compulsive obsessiveness is also considered as a disorder. Though we are not sure about attributing the appellant as a person who suffers from such disorder, on going though the evidence, we are certain such attitude and behaviour was unbearable to the husband. If the conduct and character of one party causes misery and agony to the other spouse, the element of cruelty to the spouse would surface, justifying grant of divorce. If the parties cannot mend their ways, the law cannot remain oblivious to those who suffer in that relationship. In any matrimonial relationship, spouses may have a different outlook on the marriage based on faith, perceptions, outlook, attitudes, social ethos, etc. Fearing divorce is repugnant to his or her notion, one would refrain from the divorce based on mutual consent. The court cannot leave the life of a spouse to the mercy of the opposite spouse. Human problem requires resolution consistent with the notion of justice. The husband wants to get out of the misery and agony of the relationship; though, what was portrayed before the court is the fault of the wife, the husband also failed in building the relationship. We made an attempt for conciliation. The said attempt failed. There is no scope for reviving the dead marriage. The Apex Court in Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli [(2006) 4 SCC 558], opined that if the parties cannot live together on account of obvious differences, one of the parties is adamant and callous in attitude for having divorce on mutual consent, such attitude can be treated as the cause of mental cruelty to other spouses.

From Para 6,

6. The law on divorce recognises both fault and consent as a cause for separation. When both the parties are unable to lead a meaningful matrimonial life due to inherent differences of opinion and one party is willing for separation and the other party is withholding consent for mutual separation, that itself would cause mental agony and cruelty to the spouse who demands separation. The purpose of marriage is to hold matrimonial ties lifelong, respecting mutual obligations and rights. The companionship of spouses creates oneness of the mind to walk together. It is through mutual respect and courtship, the companionship is built and fortified. The modern jurisprudence of irretrievable break down to allow divorce is premised on the fact that the spouses can never remain together on account of their differences. If the court is able to form an opinion that due to incompatibility, the marriage failed and one of the spouses was withholding consent for mutual separation, the court can very well treat that conduct itself as cruelty. If one of the spouses is refusing to accord divorce on mutual consent after having convinced of the fact that the marriage failed, it is nothing but cruelty to spite the other spouse. No one can force another to continue in a legal tie and relationship if the relationship deteriorated beyond repair. The portrayal of such conduct through manifest behaviour of the spouse in a manner understood by a prudent as ‘cruelty’ is the language of the lawyer for a cause before the court. This case is also not different. The behavioural disorder pointed out against the appellant in the petition for divorce was essentially reflection of incompatibility that existed between the parties. The husband wants to get out of the struggled relationship, on the projected cause of cruelty with reference to the incidents of misbehaviour. Incompatibility is a factor that can be reckoned while considering the ground for cruelty, if one of the spouses withholds the consent of mutual separation, though incompatibility is not recognised as ground for divorce.

Beena MS Vs Shino G Babu on 04 Feb 2022

Amardeep Singh Vs Harveen Kaur on 12 Sep 2017

Posted on November 4, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that the 6 months of cooling period prescribed in Mutual-Consent divorce proceedings under Hindu Marriage Act are directional in nature and not mandatory.

18. Applying the above to the present situation, we are of the view that where the Court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13B(2), it can do so after considering the following :
i) the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself;
ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of Order XXXIIA Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts;
iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties;
iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony.
19. The waiver application can be filed one week after the first motion giving reasons for the prayer for waiver.
20. If the above conditions are satisfied, the waiver of the waiting period for the second motion will be in the discretion of the concerned Court.
21. Since we are of the view that the period mentioned in Section 13B(2) is not mandatory but directory, it will be open to the Court to exercise its discretion in the facts and circumstances of each case where there is no possibility of parties resuming cohabitation and there are chances of alternative rehabilitation.
22. Needless to say that in conducting such proceedings the Court can also use the medium of video conferencing and also permit genuine representation of the parties through close relations such as parents or siblings where the parties are unable to appear in person for any just and valid reason as may satisfy the Court, to advance the interest of justice.

Amardeep Singh Vs Harveen Kaur on 12 Sep 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC 8 746], [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1073], [2017 AIR SC 4417], [2017 ALT 5 23], [2017 BOMCR 6 773], [2017 CGLJ 4 157], [2017 CTC 5 665], [2017 DLT 242 264], [2017 DMCSC 3 277], [2017 ILR KER 4 1], [2017 ILR 4081], [2017 JLJR 4 21], [2017 JCC 3 2196], [2017 KHC 4 683], [2017 KLJ 4 179], [2017 KLT 4 367], [2017 MPLJ 4 41], [2017 MHLJ 5 804], [2017 PLJR 4 37], [2017 RLW SC 4 2910], [2017 RCR CIVIL 4 608], [2017 SCALE 11 258], [2017 WLN SC 3 145], [2017 SCC CRI 3 505], [2017 SCC CIV 4 804]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/79830357/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/59b82810ce686e45ff91e3ea

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/amardeep-singh-versus-harveen-kaur

Additional guidelines/factors were issued in Amit Kumar Vs Suman Beniwal here.

Index of Divorce cases is here.