Rajesh Chaddha Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 13 May 2025 – Judgement Summary

Posted on March 13 by Suprajaa Rajan

In Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court held that vague and omnibus allegations cannot sustain a conviction under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

The Court examined a case where the husband challenged his conviction for alleged cruelty and dowry demand. The prosecution mainly relied on the testimony of the complainant and her father. However, the Court found that the allegations lacked specific dates, incidents, and supporting evidence. Moreover, the complainant failed to produce medical records to support allegations of assault or miscarriage.

Therefore, the Court reiterated that criminal courts must rely on clear, specific, and credible evidence. Mere general accusations cannot justify a conviction under Section 498A IPC.

“In the present case, the allegations made by the Complainant are vague, omnibus and bereft of any material particulars to substantiate this threshold. Apart from claiming that Appellant husband harassed her for want of dowry, the Complainant has not given any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment.”

“It is alleged that the Complainant suffered a miscarriage… however, no medical document from any medical institution or hospital or nursery was produced to substantiate the allegations.”

“Apart from the statements of PW-1 and PW-2, there is no evidence to substantiate the allegations of harassment and acts of cruelty within the scope of Section 498A of IPC, and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961.”

“This growing tendency to append every relative of the husband casts serious doubt on the veracity of the allegations made by the Complainant wife or her family members and vitiates the very objective of a protective legislation.”

Decision of the Court

Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to prove cruelty or dowry demand with reliable evidence. The allegations remained vague and unsupported by independent proof.

Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and acquitted the appellant of all charges.

Rajesh Chaddha Vs State of UP on 13 May 2025

Citation :2025 INSC 671

Other Sources :

Index of Dowry Prohibition Act Judgments is here.

Key Contributor :

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs Manju Sharma on 27 Feb 2009

Posted on February 28 by Suprajaa Rajan

The Supreme Court examined whether a court exercising appellate jurisdiction can grant a decree of divorce on a ground not expressly enumerated in the statute. The matter required interpretation of Section 13 HMA and consideration of the constitutional limits on judicial law-making.

The Court analysed whether irretrievable breakdown, though recognised in certain judicial pronouncements, could operate as an independent ground for divorce in the absence of legislative incorporation. The judgment reaffirmed the principle of separation of powers and clarified that courts cannot expand statutory grounds through judicial innovation.

Important Extracts from the Judgment:

High Court Findings (Paras 13 & 17):
“On a reading of the entire evidence, it is not possible to conclude that the appellant has been able to establish that the respondent treated him with cruelty.”

“To grant divorce to the appellant despite this only on the ground of irretrievable breakdown would not, in the view of this Court, be doing justice to the respondent.”
On Findings of Fact:
“We are not inclined to interfere with the finding of fact of both the courts below that it was the appellant who treated the respondent with cruelty, rather than the other way around.”
On Irretrievable Breakdown Not Being a Statutory Ground:
“On a bare reading of Section 13 of the Act, reproduced above, it is crystal clear that no such ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is provided by the legislature for granting a decree of divorce. This Court cannot add such a ground to Section 13 of the Act as that would be amending the Act, which is a function of the legislature.”

“If we grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, then we shall by judicial verdict be adding a clause to Section 13 of the Act to the effect that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is also a ground for divorce.”

“In our opinion, this can only be done by the legislature and not by the Court.”
On Mutual Consent:
“Had both parties been willing we could, of course, have granted a divorce by mutual consent as contemplated by Section 13B of the Act, but in this case the respondent is not willing to agree to a divorce.”

Decision

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

The Court held that:

The appellant failed to establish cruelty.
Irretrievable breakdown is not a statutory ground under Section 13 HMA.
The judiciary cannot legislate by adding new grounds for divorce.
Only Parliament can amend the statute to include such a ground.

Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs Manju Sharma on 27 Feb 2009

Citation :

Other Sources :

Index of Divorce Judgements is here.

Key Contributor :

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

Pradeep Bhardwaj Vs Priya on 15 July 2025

Posted on February 25 by Suprajaa Rajan

This judgment addresses the Supreme Court’s power to dissolve a marriage under Article 142 of the Constitution where the marriage has irretrievably broken down. The Court examined whether prolonged separation, failed mediation, and complete loss of marital bond justify dissolution, even when statutory grounds such as cruelty are not established.

The Court also considered the impact of acquittal in criminal proceedings under Sections 498A/406 IPC and the welfare of the minor child. The decision reflects the Court’s evolving approach toward dead marriages that survive only on paper.

“21. There are two main considerations which have weighed heavily with this Court while considering the rival contentions. Firstly, that the appellant-husband has been acquitted in the case of cruelty preferred by the respondent against him and his family members. Secondly, it is an admitted fact that the parties have been living separately since October 2009, i.e. almost for the past sixteen years.”

“22. It has been consistently held by this Court that the institution of marriage is rooted in dignity, mutual respect and shared companionship, and when these foundational aspects are irreparably lost, forcing a couple to remain legally bound serves no beneficial purpose.”

“23. In the present case, it is apparent that due to complete detachment and the prolonged estrangement, there has been an irretrievable breakdown of the marital bond, which cannot be mended by any means.”

“24. It is as clear as a day that in the case at hand, the continuance of marriage shall only fuel animosity and litigation between the parties, which runs contrary to the ethos of matrimonial harmony envisioned by the law.”

“25. This Court finds it a fit case to exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution and grant the relief of divorce to the parties on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.”

Decision

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal.

The Court:

Set aside the High Court’s judgment.
Granted divorce under Article 142 on the ground of irretrievable breakdown.
Enhanced monthly maintenance to Rs. 15,000/- for the wife and minor son.

Pradeep Bharadwaj Vs Priya on 15 Jul 2025

Citation : 2025 INSC 852

Other Sources :

Index of Divorce Judgments is here.

Key Contributor :

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

Hitesh Bhatnagar Vs Deepa Bhatnagar on 18 Apr 2011

Posted on February 24 by Suprajaa Rajan

The Supreme Court examined whether consent given at the time of filing a joint petition continues to bind the parties until decree, or whether it can be withdrawn at any stage before the court passes the final order.

The appellant argued that once the statutory period of 18 months had expired without formal withdrawal, the court had no option but to grant divorce. The respondent contended that mutual consent must subsist till the date of decree and that she had validly withdrawn her consent before the second motion.

The judgment clarified the nature of mutual consent as a jurisdictional requirement and reaffirmed earlier precedents on the subject. It also considered whether Article 142 of the Constitution could be invoked to dissolve the marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown.

“13. The appellant contends that the Additional District Judge, Gurgaon, was bound to grant divorce if the consent was not withdrawn within a period of 18 months in view of the language employed in Section 13B(2) of the Act. We find no merit in the submission made by the appellant in the light of the law laid down by this Court in Sureshta Devi’s case (supra).”

“14. The language employed in Section 13B(2) of the Act is clear. The Court is bound to pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage of the parties before it to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree, if the following conditions are met:
a. A second motion of both the parties is made not before 6 months from the date of filing of the petition as required under sub-section (1) and not later than 18 months;
b. After hearing the parties and making such inquiry as it thinks fit, the Court is satisfied that the averments in the petition are true; and
c. The petition is not withdrawn by either party at any time before passing the decree;”

“15. In other words, if the second motion is not made within the period of 18 months, then the Court is not bound to pass a decree of divorce by mutual consent. Besides, from the language of the Section, as well as the settled law, it is clear that one of the parties may withdraw their consent at any time before the passing of the decree. The most important requirement for a grant of a divorce by mutual consent is free consent of both the parties.”

“16. In the present fact scenario, the second motion was never made by both the parties as is a mandatory requirement of the law, and as has been already stated, no Court can pass a decree of divorce in the absence of that. The non-withdrawal of consent before the expiry of the said eighteen months has no bearing.”

“18. We are not inclined to entertain this submission of the appellant since the facts in that case are not akin to those that are before us.”

“25. It is settled law that this Court grants a decree of divorce only in those situations in which the Court is convinced beyond any doubt that there is absolutely no chance of the marriage surviving and it is broken beyond repair.”

Decision

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

The Court held that:

Mutual consent must continue till the decree of divorce.
Either party may withdraw consent at any time before the decree.
The 18-month period does not bar withdrawal of consent.
Article 142 cannot be used to override statutory requirements in ordinary circumstances.

Hitesh bhatnagar Vs Deepa bhatnagar on 18 Apr 2011

Citation :(2011) 5 SCC 234

Other Sources :

Index of Divorce Judgements is here.

Key Contributor :

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.

+91-9606345150

Baijnath and ors vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 18 Nov 2016

Posted on February 10 by ShadesOfKnife

A two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India, in Baijnath & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (18 November 2016), held that the unnatural death of a married woman within seven years of marriage does not, by itself, amount to dowry death under Section 304B IPC. The Court ruled that the prosecution must prove cruelty or harassment for dowry to sustain such a charge.

The Supreme Court further clarified that the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act does not operate automatically. Courts may invoke it only after the prosecution establishes dowry-related cruelty soon before death. In this case, the evidence on dowry demand was inconsistent, no prior complaint was made, and medical evidence failed to conclusively determine the cause of death.

The Court held that the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal based on presumptions. As the prosecution failed to prove cruelty beyond reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court restored the Trial Court’s acquittal and granted the accused the benefit of doubt.

Relevant Extracts from the Supreme Court Judgment:

“(32) Noticeably this presumption as well is founded on the proof of cruelty or harassment of the woman dead for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the person charged with the offence. The presumption as to dowry death thus would get activated only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable contiguity of death. Such a proof is thus the legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke the otherwise statutorily ordained presumption of commission of the offence of dowry death by the person charged therewith.”
“(33) Proof of cruelty or harassment by the husband or her relative or the person charged is thus the sine qua non to inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent coherent and persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof.“
“(38) The prosecution in our estimate, has failed to prove this indispensable component of the two offences beyond reasonable doubt. The factum of unnatural death in the matrimonial home and that too within seven years of marriage therefore is thus ipso facto not sufficient to bring home the charge under Sections 304B and 498A of the Code against them.“

Baijnath vs State of MP

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Acquittal from criminal matrimonial cases is here.

Key Contributor:

Mrs. Suprajaa Rajan (B.Com., LL.B., LL.M.)

Contact : +91-9606345150

Neha Lal Vs Abhishek Kumar on 20 Jan 2026

Posted on January 27 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that Perjury applications shall continue, despite grant to divorce.

From Paras 28 to 30,

28. Now coming to the cases pending between the parties. All the cases pending between the parties, as mentioned in paragraph No.8.8, shall stand disposed of without any further action by them. However, the following applications filed by the parties raising plea of perjury shall continue because no one can be permitted to pollute the stream of justice, as emphasized by this Court in Kusha Duruka vs. The State of Odisha10. The cases being:
(i) Crl. M. A. No.42585 of 2019 in W. P. (Crl.) No.1025 of 2023 (under Section 340 CrPC)
(ii) Application under Section 379 read with 215 BNSS filed in MT No.151 of 2021
(iii) Application under Section 379 read with 215 BNSS filed in MT No.151 of 2021
(iv) Misc. Crl. No.7 of 2019 filed in MT No.853 of 2018
(v) Application under Section 340 CrPC in MT No.853 of 2018
29. It is clarified that if besides the cases mentioned in the paragraph 28, any other application(s) filed by the parties either under section 340 CrPC or under Section 379 read with 215 of BNSS, 2023, the same shall be dealt with on merits by the concerned Courts and will not be disposed of, in view of this order passed by this Court.
30. A copy of the order passed by this Court shall be sent to the Courts concerned for taking action as per the direction in this order. However, if there is any other case arising out of matrimonial dispute, though not mentioned in the list, but pending, the same shall also stand disposed of on production of copy of this order by the parties.

Neha Lal Vs Abhishek Kumar on 20 Jan 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Perjury Judgments is here.

Suninder Sandha Vs State of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 02 Dec 2025

Posted on January 13 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 15,

15. Evidently, Section 91 of the Code does not itself prescribe any stage. The core issue remains whether invocation of power under Section 91 of the Code by the Trial Court is as per the manner contemplated/provided for in law. We are mindful that the underlying case in Sarla Gupta (supra)1 concerned the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002. It is seen that State of Orissa v Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568, relied upon by the High Court, was considered by a Bench of equal strength in Sarla Gupta (supra).

From Para 17,

17. The law is no longer res integra, having been lastly settled by the 3-Judge Bench in Sarla Gupta (supra), which provides clarity as to the relevant stage at which power under Section 91 of the Code may be invoked. In the underlying case in these appeals, such stage has not yet been reached, as defence evidence has not commenced.

Suninder Sandha Vs State of NCT of Delhi & Anr on 02 Dec 2025

Vijay Kumar and Ors Vs State of Rajasthan on 08 Jan 2026

Posted on January 9 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court was ‘surprised‘ for the delays in disposing petitions by High Courts, after granting relief of stay… hehe…

It is funny these Judges were earlier High Court judges and they know all to very well, why.

From Para 15,

15. The Criminal Revision Petition filed by the petitioners in the year 2003 came to be taken up for hearing by the learned Single Judge of the High Court on 24-8-2023, i.e., after about 20 years.

From Paras 21-25,

“21. We would like to know first and the foremost why it took 23 years for the High Court to take up the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the petitioners for hearing, more particularly when the subject matter of challenge in the Criminal Revision Petition was an order framing charge in a very sensitive and serious trial like one of dowry death.”
“22. We would like to examine the entire record of the proceedings. We are saying so because we are perturbed by the fact that despite an interim relief operating, why the matter was not taken up for hearing at the earliest.”
23. “We direct the Registrar General of the High Court of Rajasthan to forward the entire record with all the order sheets by a Special Messenger to this Court at the earliest.”
24. “We would also like to know from the Registrar General of the High Court as to how many Criminal Revision Petitions came to be heard and disposed of between 2001 and 2026. We want the High Court to provide us with a break up of how many criminal revision petitions were filed in the year 2001 and how many came to be disposed of. We want this break up right up to the year 2026.”
25. “We would also like to know how many times the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the petitioners – herein in the High Court was notified for hearing from the date of its filing till the date it came to be dismissed.”

From Paras 26 and 27,

26. We would also like to know from the State as to what steps it took as the prosecuting agency to get the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the petitioners heard at the earliest.
27. Why during this interregnum period of 23 years, the State of Rajasthan kept quiet and did not take any steps to get the Criminal Revision Petition heard and decided on merits.

From Paras 29 and 30,

29. If criminal trials in such serious offences remain pending for years together on the strength of interim orders passed by the High Courts, it would lead to nothing but mockery of justice. Justice has to be done with all the parties. Justice cannot be done only with the accused persons. Justice has to be done even with the victim and the family members of the victim. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.
30. In this regard, we request the Chief Justices of all the High Courts to ensure that the petitions wherein interim orders are passed holding up the trials should be immediately taken up for hearing, more particularly in sensitive and serious matters like murder, dowry death, rape etc.

From Para 35,

35. Let a copy of this order be transmitted to Secretary Generals/Registrar Generals of all the High Courts so as to have the same placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justices.

Next hearing on 15-1-2026.

Vijay Kumar and Ors Vs State of Rajasthan on 08 Jan 2026

Index of Judgments pertaining to Right to Speedy Trial here.

Geddam Jhansi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 07 Feb 2025

Posted on December 6, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Supreme Court invoked Article 142 of the Constitution to quash a DV case, which has same allegations as in a false 498A IPC case.

40. Accordingly, we allow both the present Criminal Appeals as below:
(i) The impugned judgement and order dated 04.04.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 3105 of 2022 is set aside and the criminal proceedings in “C.C. No. 46 of 2022” pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is quashed qua the two appellants, Geddam Jhansi and Geddam Sathyakama Jabali.
(ii) The impugned judgement and order dated 03.02.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 1002 of 2022 is set aside and the criminal proceedings in DVC No. 25 of 2021 pending before the Court of the Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir is quashed qua the appellant, Geddam Jhansi. This is having regard to the criminal proceeding against her being quashed as above and as identical allegation (paragraph 28 above) are made against her in DVC No. 25 of 2021, and in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. This is also by bearing in mind the relationship of the appellant Geddam Jhansi to the complainant, being the latters’s mother-in-law’s sister.

Geddam Jhansi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 07 Feb 2025

Citations: [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1], [2025 INSC 160]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/192533816/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67a6e0c4a1572e13dd1ca525

https://testbook.com/recent-judgements/geddam-jhansi-vs-the-state-of-telangana

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/s498a-ipc-when-family-relations-are-sought-to-be-brought-under-criminal-proceedings-courts-should-be-cautious-supreme-court-283311

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/geddam-jhansi-v-the-state-of-telangana-2025-insc-160-domestic-violence-1567439

Index of DV Judgments is here. Index of Quash Judgments is here.

Rekha Sharad Ushir Vs Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd on 26 Mar 2025

Posted on November 23, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held (again!) as follows,

From Para 11,

11. It is settled law that a litigant who, while filing proceedings in the court, suppresses material facts or makes a false statement, cannot seek justice from the court. The facts suppressed must be material and relevant to the controversy, which may have a bearing on the decision making. Cases of those litigants who have no regard for the truth and those who indulge in suppressing material facts need to be thrown out of the court.

From Para 15,

15. It is pertinent to note that in the counter to the present appeal, the respondent has not denied the receipt of the letters dated 28th November 2016 and 13th December 2016. The complaint and affidavit in support of the complaint only refer to the notice dated 15th November 2016 issued by the advocate for the appellant to the respondent. What is stated in the complaint reads thus:
“……………………………………………………..
[D] The notice sent on the first address has been received on 15.11.2016. However, from the second address, envelope has been returned on 15.11.2016 with the postal remark as ‘left’.”
However, the respondent suppressed the letters dated 28th November 2016 and 13th December 2016 in the complaint and its statement on oath.

From Para 18 and 19,

18. The fact remains that in the complaint, the respondent has suppressed the reply dated 28th November 2016 and the letter dated 13th December 2016 sent by the appellant’s advocate. These two documents have also been suppressed in the statement on oath. The respondent made out a false case that the appellant did not reply to the demand notice. Moreover, the case that the documents as demanded were supplied is not pleaded in the complaint and statement under Section 200 of CrPC.
19. If these two letters were disclosed in the complaint, the learned Magistrate while recording the statement under Section 200 of CrPC, could have always questioned the respondent on the supply of documents to the appellant. What is important is that in the reply dated 28th November 2016, the appellant had reserved her right to give a reply to the demand notice after receiving the documents. It was the respondent’s duty to supply documents to the appellant or her advocate to enable the appellant to properly reply to the demand notice. At least, the inspection of documents could have been provided to the appellant. After noticing the fact that notwithstanding service of two letters written by the appellant, relied upon documents were not provided to the appellant, the learned Magistrate could have dismissed the complaint by exercising power under Section 203 of CrPC, as the appellant could not have replied to the statutory notice without looking at the documents relied upon.

From Para 21,

21. While filing a complaint under Section 200 of CrPC and recording his statement on oath in support of the complaint, as the complainant suppresses material facts and documents, he cannot be allowed to set criminal law in motion based on the complaint. Setting criminal law in motion by suppressing material facts and documents is nothing but an abuse of the process of law.

Rekha Sharad Ushir Vs Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd on 26 Mar 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 399], [2025 SCC OnLine SC641]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/120031673/

Index of Perjury Judgments is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification

Rajesh Chaddha Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 13 May 2025 – Judgement Summary

Decision of the Court

Pradeep Bhardwaj Vs Priya on 15 July 2025

Decision

Baijnath and ors vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 18 Nov 2016

Neha Lal Vs Abhishek Kumar on 20 Jan 2026

Suninder Sandha Vs State of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 02 Dec 2025

Vijay Kumar and Ors Vs State of Rajasthan on 08 Jan 2026

Geddam Jhansi and Anr Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 07 Feb 2025

Rekha Sharad Ushir Vs Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd on 26 Mar 2025