Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 10 Dec 2024

Posted on June 27 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court hung the false 498A IPC case high and dry and reminded the High Courts of their solemn duty to stop the misuse of matrimonial laws as weapons.

From Para 8,

8. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants never demanded any dowry from respondent No.2. Respondent No.2 in fact used to leave the matrimonial house uninformed. In fact, on one such occasion when she left the matrimonial house on 03.10.2021, appellant No.1 made a police complaint on 05.10.2021. When the police found her whereabouts, she was allegedly living with someone. Respondent No.2 after being counselled, returned to her matrimonial house. It was further submitted that respondent No.2 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting to close the complaint made by appellant No.1 wherein she admitted that she had left her matrimonial house after quarrelling with appellant No.1 because of one Govindan, with whom she was talking over the phone for the past ten days continuously. She also stated that she would not repeat such acts in future. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that respondent No.2 again left the matrimonial house leaving appellant No.1 and children behind….

From Para 18,

18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by respondent No.2 are vague and omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant No.1 harassed her and that appellant Nos.2 to 6 instigated him to do so, respondent No.2 has not provided any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. She has also not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations.

From Paras 19-21,

19. Further, the record reveals that respondent No.2 on 03.10.2021 left the matrimonial house leading appellant No.1 to file a police complaint on 05.10.2021. When the police officials traced her, respondent No.2 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting to close the complaint made by appellant No.1. In the said letter, respondent No.2 admitted that she left her matrimonial house after quarrelling with appellant No.1 as she was talking to a person by name Govindan over the phone for the past ten days continuously. She further admitted that appellant No.1 was taking good care of her. She also stated that she will not engage in such actions in future. Despite that, in 2021 itself, respondent No.2 once again left the matrimonial house leaving appellant No.1 and also her minor children.
20. Losing hope in the marriage, appellant No.1 issued a legal notice to respondent No.1 seeking divorce by mutual consent on 13.12.2021. Instead of responding to the said legal notice issued by appellant No.1, respondent No.2 lodged the present FIR 82 of 2022 on 01.02.2022 registered with Neredmet Police Station, Rachakonda under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act.
21. Given the facts of this case and in view of the timing and context of the FIR, we find that respondent No.2 left the matrimonial house on 03.10.2021 after quarrelling with appellant No.1 with respect to her interactions with a third person in their marriage. Later she came back to her matrimonial house assuring to have a cordial relationship with appellant No.1. However, she again left the matrimonial house. When appellant No.1 issued a legal notice seeking divorce on 13.12.2021, the present FIR came to be lodged on 01.02.2022 by respondent No.2. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the FIR filed by respondent No. 2 is not a genuine complaint rather it is a retaliatory measure intended to settle scores with appellant No. 1 and his family members.

From Paras 24 and 25,

24. Insofar as appellant Nos.2 to 6 are concerned, we find that they have no connection to the matter at hand and have been dragged into the web of crime without any rhyme or reason. A perusal of the FIR would indicate that no substantial and specific allegations have been made against appellant Nos.2 to 6 other than stating that they used to instigate appellant No.1 for demanding more dowry. It is also an admitted fact that they never resided with the couple namely appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 and their children.Appellant Nos.2 and 3 resided together at Guntakal, Andhra Pradesh. Appellant Nos. 4 to 6 live in Nellore, Bengaluru and Guntur respectively.
25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No.1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.

From Para 28,

28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them.

From Para 29, (Cover drive by Supreme Court!)

29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the second respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case.

Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 10 Dec 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/93461652/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6759166862941119016e1691

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/t/2370197-dara-lakshmi-narayana-others?s=Dara%20Lakshmi%20Narayana&refine_search=&s_acts=

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/dara-lakshmi-narayana-others-v-state-of-telangana-another-2024-insc-953-498a-ipc-fir-quashed-1560806

https://www.lawtext.in/judgement.php?bid=1285

https://advamritaverma.com/legal-updates/f/498-a-ipc-has-become-the-legal-weapon?blogcategory=CPC

The Order from Telangana High Court refusing to Quash the fake 498A IPC proceedings…

Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 16 Feb 2022

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Mohammad Wajid and Anr Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 08 Aug 2023

Posted on June 26 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court cautioned High Courts about malicious matrimonial cases.

From Para 30,

30. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.

Mohammad Wajid and Anr Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 08 Aug 2023

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Ajay Rajendra Khare and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra on 10 Jun 2025

Posted on June 26 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Bombay High Court at Aurangabad Bench identified a fake case and dust-binned it.

From Para 7,

7 At the outset, we would like to start with observations that in matrimonial disputes suppression of facts carry importance. In fact, the marriage stands on the footing of faith, feelings and respect for each other.
….
In the information that was collected by applicant No.1 from the Right to Information Officer, Kharghar Police Station would show that the informant has been addressed as Dr. Sou. Sandhya Ashok Kadam (not as ‘Sandhya Ajay Khare’). If she had gone to Police Station and according to her, First Information Report was not taken, then why she had not lodged the report after she went to Nanded i.e. to her parental home, has not been explained by her. It is easy to make allegations against others, but when it comes to false allegations, they are hard to prove. This is the classic example of misuse of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code.

Ajay Rajendra Khare and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra on 10 Jun 2025

Index of Quash judgments is here.

BSA Sec 128 – Communications during marriage

Posted on June 25 by ShadesOfKnife

Communications during marriage.—No person who is or has been married, shall be compelled to disclose any communication made to him during marriage by any person to whom he is or has been married; nor shall he be permitted to disclose any such communication, unless the person who made it, or his representative in interest, consents, except in suits between married persons, or proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for any crime committed against the other.

Equivalent to IEA Sec 122 – Communications during marriage

Anjali Sharma Vs Raman Upadhyay on 16 Jun 2025

Posted on June 25 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior Bench held that one fundamental right under Constitution must yield to another and, the right to fair trial must yield to right to privacy.

From Paras 11 and 12,

11. In order to achieve its object to simplify the rules of evidence and procedure, Section 14 of the Family Courts Act provides for an exception to the general rule of evidence regarding admissibility of any report, statements, documents, information or matter, which it considers necessary to assist it and to deal with it effectively. Apparently, such a provision is made keeping in view the nature of cases which are dealt with by the Family Courts. Needless to mention here that Section 14 of Family Courts Act is a special legislation and by virtue of this provision, the strict principles of admissibility of evidence as provided under the Evidence Act have been relaxed.
12. A cumulative reading of Section 14 & 20 of the Family Courts Act, takes within its ambit the restricted applications of the provisions of the Evidence Act qua the documentary evidence which includes electronic evidence, whether or not the same is otherwise admissible. The only guiding factor is that the Family Court should be of the opinion that such evidence would assist the Court to deal with the matrimonial dispute effectively. It is the absolute power and authority of the Family Court either to accept or discard particular evidence in finally adjudicating the matrimonial dispute. However, to say that a party would be precluded from placing such documents on record and/or such documents can be refused to be exhibited unless they are proved as per Evidence Act, runs contrary to the object of Section 14 of the Family Courts Act.

From Paras 18 and 19, (No fundamental right under our Constitution is absolute)

18. By reading the dictum of Apex Court in the case of Sharda & Puttaswami (supra), it is evident that right to privacy is recognized as a fundamental right under Article 21 of Constitution, but the same is not an absolute right. In case of necessity, a law can be framed permitting invasion to life and personal liberty. Section 14 of Family Courts Act and Section 122 of Indian Evidence Act are some such statutory provisions which permits invasion to right to privacy. It is worth mentioning here that vires of either of the aforesaid provisions are not under challenge and, therefore, the same have to be deemed as valid, fair and reasonable.
19. Since no fundamental right under our Constitution is absolute, in the event of conflict between two fundamental rights, as in this case, a contest between the right to privacy and the right to fair trial, both of which arise under Article 21 of our Constitution, the right to privacy may have to yield to the right to fair trial. Reference in this regard can be made to the observations of a 5-Judge Constitution Bench decision of Apex Court in Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India reported in (2012)10 SCC 603

From Paras 20 and 21,

20. Reading the law laid down by Apex Court in the case of Sharda, Puttaswamy & Sahara India (supra), it comes out loud and clear that even though right to privacy has been recognized as a fundamental right, the same is not absolute and is subject to exceptions and limitations. While a litigating party certainly has a right to privacy, that right must yield to the right of an opposing party to bring evidence it considers relevant to court, to prove its case. It is a settled concept of fair trial that a litigating party gets a fair chance to bring relevant evidence before court. It is important to appreciate that while the right to privacy is essentially a personal right, the right to fair trial has wider ramifications and impacts public justice, which is a larger cause. The cause of public justice would suffer if the opportunity of fair trial is denied by shutting-out evidence that a litigating party may wish to lead, at the very threshold. Saying otherwise, would negate the specific statutory provision contained in Section 14 of Family Courts Act, which says that evidence would be admissible, whether or not the same is otherwise admissible under Evidence Act.
21. If it were to be held that evidence sought to be adduced before a Family Court should be excluded based on an objection of breach of privacy right then the provisions of Section 14 would be rendered nugatory and dead-letter. It is to be borne in mind that Family Courts have been established to deal with matters that are essentially sensitive, personal disputes relating to dissolution of marriage, restitution of conjugal rights, legitimacy of children, guardianship, custody, and access to minors; which matters, by the very nature of the relationship from which they arise, involve issues that are private, personal and involve intimacies. It is easily foreseeable therefore, that in most cases that come before the Family Court, the evidence sought to be marshaled would relate to the private affairs of the litigating parties. If Section 14 is held not to apply in its full expanse to evidence that impinges on a person’s right to privacy, then not only of Section 14 but the very object of constitution of Family Courts shall be frustrated. Therefore, the test of admissibility would only be the relevance. Accordingly, fundamental considerations of fair trial and public justice would warrant that evidence be received if it is relevant, regardless of how it is collected. The purpose of legislating Section 14 would be frustrated if it is to give way to right of privacy.

From Para 35,

35. In view of the discussion made above, this court is of the opinion that the Legislature, being fully aware of the principals of admissibility of evidence, has enacted Section 14 in order to expand that principle in so far as disputes relating to marriage and family affairs are concerned. The Family Court is thereby freed of restrictions of the strict law of evidence. The only test under Section 14 for a Family Court to receive the evidence, whether collected legitimately or otherwise, is based upon its subjective satisfaction that the evidence would assist it to deal effectually with the dispute.

From Para 38,

38. In view of the discussion made above, it is held that:
(a) the evidence is admissible so long as it is relevant, irrespective of the fact how it is collected. The possible misuse of this rule of evidence, particularly in the context of the right to privacy, can be addressed by prudent exercise of judicial discretion by the Family Court, not at the time of receiving evidence but at the time of using evidence at the stage of adjudication;
(b) merely admitting evidence on record is not proof of a fact-in-issue or a relevant fact. Admitting evidence is not even reliance by the court on such evidence. Admitting evidence is mere inclusion of evidence in record, to be assessed on a comprehensive set of factors, parameters and aspects, in the
discretion of the court;
(c) the test of ‘relevance’ ensures that the right of a party to bring evidence to court, and thereby to a fair trial, is not defeated. What weight is to be given to evidence so brought-in, and whether or not the court ultimately relies upon such evidence for proof of a fact-in-issue or a relevant fact, is always in the discretion of the court.
(d) merely because a court allows evidence to be admitted, does not mean that the person who has illegally collected such evidence is absolved of liability that may arise, whether in civil or criminal law or both;
(e) such evidence must be received and treated with caution and circumspection and to rule-out the possibility of any kind of tampering, the standard of proof applied by a court for the authenticity and accuracy of a such evidence should be more stringent as compared to other evidence;

Anjali Sharma Vs Raman Upadhyay on 16 Jun 2025

Index of Divorce Judgments is here.

Dhaval Rajendrabhai Soni Vs Bhavini Dhavalbhai Soni and Ors on 04 Feb 2011

Posted on June 22 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Gujarat High Court held a follows,

From Para 17,

17.Having said so, I cannot lose sight of the fact that nowhere under the Act learned Magistrate is permitted to pass final order of custody and any order that learned Magistrate can pass must have limited validity either in terms of time or happening of an event. Learned Magistrate cannot pass order granting permanent custody of the child to the aggrieved person.

From Para 20,

20.As pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner, the child has remained with the father since his birth. Child has remained with father exclusively since separation of husband and wife in May 2007. Three and half years have passed since then. He is stated to be studying in school at Ahmedabad. Wife has already instituted proceedings before the Sessions Court under the Guardian and Wards Act. She is stated to have also prayed for interim custody in such proceedings. In such proceedings detailed inquiry will be conducted. Both sides will have liberty to led evidence. Therefore, bypassing these proceedings, particularly, when the child has been with the father since May 2007 exclusively, I am of the opinion that learned Magistrate committed an error in granting temporary custody of the child to the mother. This part of the order therefore, requires modification.

Dhaval Rajendrabhai Soni Vs Bhavini Dhavalbhai Soni and Ors on 04 Feb 2011

Court Kutchehry version:

Dhaval Rajendrabhai Soni Vs Bhavini Dhavalbhai Soni and Ors on 04 Feb 2011 (CK)

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/432251/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56091e7fe4b01497111b3b20

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/t/716336-dhaval-rajendrabhai-soni-vs-bhavini

Index of Domestic Violence Act judgments here.

Ghanshyam Soni Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 04 Jun 2025

Posted on June 17 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court granted Divorce to husband against a lying wife.

From Para 10,

10. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by the complainant are that in the year 1999, the Appellant inflicted mental and physical cruelty upon her for bringing insufficient dowry. The Complainant refers to few instances of such atrocities, however the allegations are generic, and rather ambiguous. The allegations against the family members, who have been unfortunately roped in, is that they used to instigate the Appellant husband to harass the Complainant wife, and taunted the Complainant for not bringing enough dowry; however, there is no specific incident of harassment or any evidence to that effect. Similarly, the allegations against the five out of six sisters that they used to insult the Complainant and demanded dowry articles from her, and upon failure beat her up, but there is not even a cursory mention of the incident. An allegation has also been made against a tailor named Bhagwat that he being a friend of the Appellant instigated him against the Complainant, and was allegedly instrumental in blowing his greed. Such allegations are merely accusatory and contentious in nature, and do not elaborate a concrete picture of what may have transpired. For this reason alone, and that the evidence on record is clearly inconsistent with the accusations, the version of the Complainant seems implausible and unreliable. The following observation in K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana Represented by Its Secretary, Department of Home & Ors.2, fits perfectly to the present scenario:
“6. The Courts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out.”
11. As regards the Appellant, the purportedly specific allegations levelled against him are also obscure in nature. Even if the allegations and the case of the prosecution is taken at its face value, apart from the bald allegations without any specifics of time, date or place, there is no incriminating material found by the prosecution or rather produced by the complainant to substantiate the ingredients of “cruelty” under section 498A IPC, as recently observed in the case of Jaydedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda & Ors. v. State of Gujarat3 and Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh.4 The Complainant has admittedly failed to produce any medical records or injury reports, x-ray reports, or any witnesses to substantiate her allegations. We cannot ignore the fact that the Complainant even withdrew her second Complaint dt. 06.12.1999 six days later on 12.12.1999. There is also no evidence to substantiate the purported demand for dowry allegedly made by the Appellant or his family and the investigative agencies in their own prudence have not added sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 to the chargesheet.

From Para 13,

13. It is rather unfortunate that the Complainant being an officer of the State has initiated criminal machinery in such a manner, where the aged parents-in-law, five sisters and one tailor have been arrayed as an accused. Notwithstanding the possibility of truth behind the allegations of cruelty, this growing tendency to misuse legal provisions has time and again been condemned by this Court. The observations in Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. v. State of Telangana & Anr.5, Preeti Gupta & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr.6 aptly captures this concern.

From Para 15,

15. It is a settled position of law that for the computation of the limitation period under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance.7 The dicta laid down in the case of Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh8 makes it unequivocally clear that the Magistrate is well within his powers to take cognizance of a complaint filed within a period of three years from the date of the commission of offence as mandated under section 468 CrPC.

Ghanshyam Soni Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 04 Jun 2025

Index of Quash Judgments is here.

V.Rajesh Vs S.Anupriya on 04 Jun 2025

Posted on June 16 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Madras High Court passed this Judgment.

From Para 16, (How simple mistakes can turn evidence into trash!)

16. At this juncture, the learned Counsel for the petitioner would invite the attention of this Court to Ex-R.4 in H.M.O.P. No.702 of 2021 – Screenshot of Whatsapp Chat dated October 17, 2017, and would argue that the respondent herself admitted that everything is her fault and apologised to the petitioner about 10 days before making Ex-R.5 – Complaint and that in such a scenario, Ex-R.5 – Complaint could only be a false one. This Court has perused Ex-R.4 – Screenshot. It appears that the petitioner has received a message from a contact whom he has saved as “ANU”. The respondent has denied the said message in her cross-examination. The burden is upon the petitioner to prove Ex-R.4 –Screenshot. It is true that the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 would not be strictly applicable to family court matters, in view of Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. But, said Section 14 does not dispense with the burden of proof. The burden remains upon the petitioner. But the petitioner has failed to discharge the said burden. The petitioner has not taken any steps to prove that the said contact from which he received such a message, is his wife / respondent. Hence, the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner deserves to be rejected.

From Para 17,

17. Be that as it may, whether the averments contained in Ex- R.5 – Complaint are true or not is a matter for police investigation and the truth can be found only in the trial. But there was no investigation in the first place. The averments remain unestablished. The averments made in Ex-R.5 are of such nature that unless proved, they amount to defamation, which in turn constitutes to mental cruelty. If really the said averments are true, the respondent ought to have taken prudent steps to prove her averments when the petitioner failed to reunite with her. Unsubstantiated or uncorroborated defamatory averments made in Ex-R.5, causes stigma and mental agony to the petitioner as well as his family, and in the facts and circumstances of this case amounts to cruelty.

From Paras 20-21,

20. As elaborated above, the unestablished sexual allegations made by the respondent against the petitioner and his father, amounts to cruelty and thus, the petitioner has made out a case under Section 13 (1) (i-a) of H.M. Act. Points for consideration arising in these Civil Miscellaneous Appeals are answered accordingly. The petitioner is thus entitled to a Decree of divorce.
21. It is learnt that the petitioner is paying a maintenance of Rs.25,000/- to the respondent and his 8 year old child (who is under the custody of the respondent) every month. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, especially the stand taken by the respondent that she is ready and willing to let go of the past and resume her marital life with the petitioner, this Court is of the view that though divorce is granted in favour of the petitioner, maintenance rights of the respondent shall remain unaffected.

V.Rajesh Vs S.Anupriya on 04 Jun 2025

Index to Divorce Judgments is here.

Bal Manohar Jalan Vs Sunil Paswan and Anr on 30 Jun 2014

Posted on June 8 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 7,

7. The right of hearing given to accused under Section 401 clause (2) of Criminal Procedure Code was elaborately dealt with by this Court in Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia case (supra).
8. In the present case challenge is laid to order dated 4.3.2009 at the instance of the complainant in the revision petition before the High Court and by virtue of Section 401(2) of the Code, the accused mentioned in the First Information Report get the right of hearing before the revisional court although the impugned order therein was passed without their participation. The appellant who is an accused person cannot be deprived of hearing on the face of the express provision contained in Section 401(2) of the Code and on this ground, the impugned order of the High Court is liable to be set aside and the matter has to be remitted.

Bal Manohar Jalan Vs Sunil Paswan and Anr on 30 Jun 2014

Bilal Ahmad Ganaie Vs Sweety Rashid and Ors on 11 May 2023

Posted on June 8 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court held as follows,

From Paras 12-14, (On the point that second revision can not be filed in guise of Quash petition)

12. Though, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajan Kumar Machananda v. State of Karnataka (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents has held that a subsequent Revision Petition cannot be filed under the garb of Section 482 of the Code, however, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a later case titled ‘Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra‟, reported as ‘(2009) 2 SCC 370’, while considering the question as to whether an application filed under Section 482 of the Code can be dismissed only because the Revision Petition has been dismissed by the Sessions Court, observed that even in cases where a second revision before the High Court after dismissal of the first one by the Court of Sessions is barred under Section 397(2) of the Code, the inherent power of the Court has been held to be available. While relying upon an earlier decision rendered in case titled ‘Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai‟, reported as ‘(2003) 6 SCC 675’, the Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that the inherent power of the High Court is not barred by the Statute, but has merely been saved thereunder and it was difficult to concede that the jurisdiction of the High Court would be held to be barred only because the revisional jurisdiction could also be availed of. The same view was taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘Shakuntala Devi & Ors. v. Chamru Mahto & Anr.’, reported as ‘(2009) 3 SCC 310‟.
13. This Court had also taken a view in a case titled ‘Mushtaq Ahmad Mir &Ors. v. Mst. Khatija’, rendered in CRMC No. 197/2013, decided on 27th of June, 2022, that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code , is of wide amplitude and it cannot be excluded by the provisions of revision contained under Section 397 (3) of the Code and that merely because the Revision Petition, in the instant case, has been rejected by the learned Revisional Court, the High Court is not debarred from entertaining a Petition under Section 482 of the Code against the impugned Order passed by the learned Magistrate, if it finds that there has been miscarriage of justice or that the ends of justice would be secured by interfering in the Order passed by the learned trial Magistrate and that it would all depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case.
14. In view of above, though, the impugned Order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate had been assailed in a Revision Petition filed before the Sessions Court at Pulwama, however, this Court is not debarred from entertaining an application under Section 482 of the Code invoking the inherent jurisdiction for the limited purpose of looking at it as to whether there has been miscarriage of justice or that the ends of justice would be secured by interfering in the Order passed by the learned Magistrate. The objection raised by learned counsel for the respondents is thus turned down. It is, thus, held, for the aforesaid reasons, that the Petition filed under Section 482 of the Code is maintainable and cannot be said to be a subsequent Revision Petition.

From Para 15, (On overlapping jurisdiction)

15. Coming to the merits of the case, the impugned Orders have been challenged by the Petitioner, mainly, on the reasons that the learned Magistrate has not followed the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Rajnesh v. Neha (supra), whereby certain mandatory guidelines have been laid for the guidance of the Courts while exercising the overlapping jurisdiction for grant of maintenance and to avoid conflicting orders being passed in different proceedings. On the issue of overlapping jurisdiction, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that successive claims for maintenance under different statutes are maintainable and the Court, while determining whether any further amount is to be awarded in the subsequent proceedings, has made it obligatory on the part of the applicant to disclose the previous proceedings and the order passed therein, in the subsequent proceedings and, if the order passed in such previous proceedings requires any variation or modification, it would be required to be done in the same proceedings.

From Para 19, (No evidence to be considered during Interim proceedings)

19. It is worthwhile to mention here that, at the time of granting of the interim maintenance, evidence is not available before the Court and the Court has to apply mind keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case in order to fix the quantum of maintenance.

From Para 25,

25. In so far as the directions passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajnesh v. Neha case (supra), it appears that both the Courts below have considered the case in the light of the directions passed by the Apex Court when successive claims for maintenance were made under overlapping jurisdiction of Section 125 of the Code and the D. V. Act. As regards the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the directions contained in Paragraph No. 128 (3) that, if the order passed in previous proceeding(s) requires any modification or variation, it would be required to be done in the same proceedings. It appears that this direction has been misunderstood as the order impugned passed by the Magistrate under any of the jurisdictions can be modified or varied by the same Court and not by any other Court. The only aspect of the case required to be addressed by the subsequent Court is that the maintenance granted earlier has to be kept in view to assess for further payment of maintenance, if any required for the sustenance of the destitute woman or children.

Bilal Ahmad Ganaie Vs Sweety Rashid and Ors on 11 May 2023

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Month: June 2025

Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 10 Dec 2024

Mohammad Wajid and Anr Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 08 Aug 2023

Ajay Rajendra Khare and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra on 10 Jun 2025

BSA Sec 128 – Communications during marriage

Anjali Sharma Vs Raman Upadhyay on 16 Jun 2025

Dhaval Rajendrabhai Soni Vs Bhavini Dhavalbhai Soni and Ors on 04 Feb 2011

Ghanshyam Soni Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 04 Jun 2025

V.Rajesh Vs S.Anupriya on 04 Jun 2025

Bal Manohar Jalan Vs Sunil Paswan and Anr on 30 Jun 2014

Bilal Ahmad Ganaie Vs Sweety Rashid and Ors on 11 May 2023