Bar Council of India Vs Bonnie Foi Law College and Ors

Posted on September 24, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A constitution bench of Apex Court decided the fate of AIBE exam (SLP(C)No.22337/2008)…

Bar Council of India Vs Bonnie Foi Law College and Ors on 20 Sep 2022

2022-Sep-27

Here is the causelist for 27 Sep 2022 and 28 Sep 2022

2022-09-27 Court-3 Constitution Bench

And here is the Order passed on 27-Sep-2022, saying Part-Heard.

2022-09-27 Bar Council of India Vs Bonnie Foi Law College and Ors on 27 Sep 2022

2022-Sep-28

Arguments heard. Hearing Concluded. Judgment reserved.

2022-09-28 Bar Council of India Vs Bonnie Foi Law College and Ors on 28 Sep 2022

2023-Feb-10

After around 3 months, the pronouncement of the judgment happened today. The highlights from the judgment are:

From Para 14,

d. Currently, any person who is provisionally enrolled is allowed to practice for two years, but is allowed to take the All India Bar Examination not just for those two years but for any number of times till he passes the All India Bar Examination. The date of reckoning seniority of the candidate is from the date of the provisional enrolment. However, it was submitted that unlimited number of attempts would not be in line with the scheme proposed by this Court and must be limited to any number that this Court deems fit.

From Para 30,

30. We are unable to agree with the reasoning in V. Sudeer24 that because the State Bar Councils’ power for providing training or for holding examination was taken away by the 1973 Amendment, it ipso facto amounts to taking away such powers if they so vested with the Bar Council of India.The legislative object was clear i.e. not to confer such powers on the State Bar Councils. However, that could not affect the position of the power of the Bar Council of India, and naturally such a power existed. If the Bar Council of India never had such a power, then the same could not be read by implication. But, if the Bar Council of India had sufficient powers, then the 1973 Amendment would not take away those powers of the Bar Council of India as the said amendment did not deal with the aspect of the powers of the Bar Council of India.

From Para 31,

31. In addition, the learned Judges in V. Sudeer25 opined that if such a power has to be conferred, it should be conferred legislatively. While in principle, there can be no disagreement with the broad proposition, the issue is whether such a power is already existing with the Bar Council of India
under the statutory provisions. The functions of the Bar Council of India, as specified under Section 7, inter alia prescribe an exercise of general supervision and control over the State Bar Councils under Clause (g) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 7. Further, under Sub-Clause (l), the Bar Council of India has the power to perform all other functions conferred on it by or under the said Act and under Clause (m) to do all other things necessary for discharging the aforesaid functions. The powers are, thus, wide and extensive as conferred by the legislature. Thus, when under Section 24(1), the Bar Council of India has the statutory power of prescribing Rules subject to which a person may be treated as qualified to be admitted as an Advocate in the State roll, then we believe that the Bar Council of India is not devoid of its jurisdiction in undertaking a pre-enrolment training course or examination prescribed by the Bar Council of India.

From Para 32,

32. In case of any subsisting doubt, we must refer to Section 49(1)(ag) of the said Act, which while dealing with the general powers of the Bar Council of India to make rules, specifically stipulates that the class orcategory of person entitled to be enrolled as advocates, is an aspect for which all powers have been conferred on the Bar Council of India. Thus, the provision for an examination for enrolment of advocates by the Bar Council of India can hardly be doubted. We had specified at the inception itself that quality control of entry into the Bar is the need of the hour.

From Paras 33 and 35,

33. The objective of the legislature while giving wide powers to the Bar Council of India under Section 49, which gives it the powers to make Rules, read with Section 24(3)(d), which gives it the powers to prescribe the norms for entitlement to be enrolled as an Advocate under the Rules of the Bar Council of India, leads us to the conclusion that these are adequate powers with the Bar Council of India under the said Act to provide such norms and Rules.
34. We are, thus, of the view that while considering the questions referred to us, the only conclusion which can be laid is that the interdict placed by the judgment of this Court in V. Sudeer26 on the powers of the Bar Council of India cannot be sustained and we cannot hold that V. Sudeer27 lays down the correct position of law.

Bar Council of India Vs Bonnie Foi Law College and Ors on 10 Feb 2023 (FULL)

Citations:

Other Sources:

Kamatchi Vs Lakshmi Narayanan on 13 Apr 2022

Posted on April 14, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full Bench of Apex Court (Justice Ravindra Bhat’s name is missing in the judgment PDF), while overruling the decision in Dr.P.Pathmanathan case here, held that, limitation under section 468 CrPC does not apply to DV cases filed under Section 12 of the Act. They are not defined as crimes under the Act.

From Paras 20 and 21,

20. It is thus clear that the High Court wrongly equated filing of an application under Section 12 of the Act to lodging of a complaint or initiation of prosecution. In our considered view, the High Court was in error in observing that the application under Section 12 of the Act ought to have been filed within a period of one year of the alleged acts of domestic violence.

21. It is, however, true that as noted by the Protection Officer in his Domestic Inspection Report dated 2.08.2018, there appears to be a period of almost 10 years after 16.09.2008, when nothing was alleged by the appellant against the husband. But that is a matter which will certainly be considered by the Magistrate after response is received from the husband and the rival contentions are considered. That is an exercise which has to be undertaken by the Magistrate after considering all the factual aspects presented before him, including whether the allegations constitute a continuing wrong.

22. Lastly, we deal with the submission based on the decision in Adalat Prasad. The ratio in that case applies when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence and issues process, in which event instead of going back to the Magistrate, the remedy lies in filing petition under Section 482 of the Code. The scope of notice under Section 12 of the Act is to call for a response from the respondent in terms of the Statute so that after considering rival submissions, appropriate order can be issued. Thus, the matter stands on a different footing and the dictum in Adalat Prasad would not get attracted at a stage when a notice is issued under Section 12 of the Act.

Kamatchi Vs Lakshmi Narayanan on 13 Apr 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/147915185/

https://www.lawyersclubindia.com/judiciary/court-entitled-to-take-cognizance-where-the-complaint-was-filed-within-the-limitation-period-sc-in-kamatchi-vs-lakshmi-narayanan-5857.asp

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/limitation-period-us-468-crpc-not-applicable-application-us-12-domestic-violence-supreme-court-kamatchi-vs-lakshmi-narayanan-2022-livelaw-sc-370-196595

https://www.barandbench.com/news/application-under-section-12-of-domestic-violence-act-need-not-be-filed-within-1-year-of-alleged-act-of-domestic-violence-supreme-court

Earlier decision of Madras High Court here.

Index of DV cases here.

Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Ors Vs State of Gujarat and Anr on 16 Oct 2019

Posted on June 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A landmark judgment by a Full Bench of Supreme Court of India around the question,

From Para 9,

whether, after a charge-sheet is filed by the police, the Magistrate has the power to order further investigation, and if so, up to what stage of a criminal proceeding.

From Para 25,

25. Whereas it is true that Section 156(3) remains unchanged even after the 1973 Code has been brought into force, yet the 1973 Code has one very important addition, namely, Section 173(8), which did not exist under the 1898 Code. As we have noticed earlier in this judgment, Section 2(h) of the 1973 Criminal Procedure Code defines “investigation” in the same terms as the earlier definition contained in Section 2(l) of the 1898 Criminal Procedure Code with this difference – that “investigation” after the 1973 Code has come into force will now include all the proceedings under the CrPC for collection of evidence conducted by a police officer. “All” would clearly include proceedings under Section 173(8) as well. Thus, when Section 156(3) states that a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order “such an investigation”, such Magistrate may also order further investigation under Section 173(8), regard being had to the definition of “investigation” contained in Section 2(h).

From Para 36,

36. Despite the aforesaid judgments, some discordant notes were sounded in three recent judgments. In Amrutbhai Shambubhai Patel v. Sumanbhai Kantibai Patel (2017) 4 SCC 177, on the facts in that case, the Appellant/Informant therein sought a direction under Section 173(8) from the Trial Court for further investigation by the police long after charges were framed against the Respondents at the culminating stages of the trial. The Court in its ultimate conclusion was correct, in that, once the trial begins with the framing of charges, the stage of investigation or inquiry into the offence is over, as a result of which no further investigation into the offence should be ordered. But instead of resting its judgment on this simple fact, this Court from paragraphs 29 to 34 resuscitated some of the earlier judgments of this Court, in which a view was taken that no further investigation could be ordered by the Magistrate in cases where, after cognizance is taken, the accused had appeared in pursuance of process being issued. In particular, Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy (supra) was strongly relied upon by the Court. We have already seen how this judgment was rendered without adverting to the definition of “investigation” in Section 2(h) of the CrPC, and cannot therefore be relied upon as laying down the law on this aspect correctly.

From Para 38,

38. There is no good reason given by the Court in these decisions as to why a Magistrate’s powers to order further investigation would suddenly cease upon process being issued, and an accused appearing before the Magistrate, while concomitantly, the power of the police to further investigate the offence continues right till the stage the trial commences. Such a view would not accord with the earlier judgments of this Court, in particular, Sakiri (supra), Samaj Parivartan Samudaya (supra), Vinay Tyagi (supra), and Hardeep Singh (supra); Hardeep Singh (supra) having clearly held that a criminal trial does not begin after cognizance is taken, but only after charges are framed. What is not given any importance at all in the recent judgments of this Court is Article 21 of the Constitution and the fact that the Article demands no less than a fair and just investigation. To say that a fair and just investigation would lead to the conclusion that the police retain the power, subject, of course, to the Magistrate’s nod under Section 173(8) to further investigate an offence till charges are framed, but that the supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate suddenly ceases mid-way through the pre-trial proceedings, would amount to a travesty of justice, as certain cases may cry out for further investigation so that an innocent person is not wrongly arraigned as an accused or that a prima facie guilty person is not so left out. There is no warrant for such a narrow and restrictive view of the powers of the Magistrate, particularly when such powers are traceable to Section 156(3) read with Section 156(1), Section 2(h), and Section 173(8) of the CrPC, as has been noticed hereinabove, and would be available at all stages of the progress of a criminal case before the trial actually commences. It would also be in the interest of justice that this power be exercised suo motu by the Magistrate himself, depending on the facts of each case. Whether further investigation should or should not be ordered is within the discretion of the learned Magistrate who will exercise such discretion on the facts of each case and in accordance with law. If, for example, fresh facts come to light which would lead to inculpating or exculpating certain persons, arriving at the truth and doing substantial justice in a criminal case are more important than avoiding further delay being caused in concluding the criminal proceeding, as was held in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi (supra). Therefore, to the extent that the judgments in Amrutbhai Shambubhai Patel (supra), Athul Rao (supra) and Bikash Ranjan Rout (supra) have held to the contrary, they stand overruled. Needless to add, Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi Administration) (1997) 1 SCC 361 and Reeta Nag v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (2009) 9 SCC 129 also stand overruled.

From Para 43,

43. We, therefore, set aside the impugned High Court judgment insofar as it states that post-cognizance the Magistrate is denuded of power to order further investigation.

Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Ors Vs State of Gujarat and Anr on 16 Oct 2019

Citations : [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 1346], [(2019) 17 SCC 1], [AIR 2019 SC 5233], [2020(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 1], [(2019) 14 SCALE 1]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/131202146/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5da99d013321bc410549721e

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/vinubhai-haribhai-malaviya-and-ors-versus-the-state-of-gujarat-and-anr

Satish Chander Ahuja Vs Sneha Ahuja on 15 Oct 2020

Posted on October 15, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court has overruled SR Batra landmark case law here on the aspect of ‘Shared Household‘ and held as following:

From Para 64,

64. In paragraph 29 of the judgment, this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) held that wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The definition of shared household as noticed in Section 2(s) does not indicate that a shared household shall be one which belongs to or taken on rent by the husband. We have noticed the definition of “respondent” under the Act. The respondent in a proceeding under Domestic Violence Act can be any relative of the husband. In event, the shared household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom in a domestic relationship the woman has lived, the conditions mentioned in Section 2(s) are satisfied and the said house will become a shared household. We are of the view that this court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) although noticed the definition of shared household as given in Section 2(s) but did not advert to different parts of the definition which makes it clear that for a shared household there is no such requirement that the house may be owned singly or jointly by the husband or taken on rent by the husband. The observation of this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) that definition of shared household in Section 2(s) is not very happily worded and it has to be interpreted, which is sensible and does not lead to chaos in the society also does not commend us. The definition of shared household is clear and exhaustive definition as observed by us. The object and purpose of the Act was to grant a right to aggrieved person, a woman of residence in shared household. The interpretation which is put by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) if accepted shall clearly frustrate the object and purpose of the Act. We, thus, are of the opinion that the interpretation of definition of shared household as put by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) is not correct interpretation and the said judgment does not lay down the correct law.

And from para 106,

106. The right is to be implemented by an order under Section 19, on an application filed under sub-section (1) of Section 12. Sub-section (2) of Section 17, however, contains an exception in the right granted by sub-section (2), i.e., “save in accordance with the procedure established by law”. Sub-section (2) of Section 17, thus, contemplates that aggrieved person can be evicted or excluded from the shared household in accordance with the procedure established by law. What is the meaning and extent of expression “save in accordance with the procedure established by law” is a question which has come up for consideration in this appeal. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff for mandatory and permanent injunction against the defendant in the Civil Court is covered by the expression “save in accordance with the procedure established by law”. We may further notice that the learned Magistrate while passing the interim order on 26.11.2016 in favour of the defendant on her application filed under Section 12 has directed that “the respondent shall not alienate the alleged shared household nor would they dispossess the complainant or their children from the same without orders of a Competent Court”. The Magistrate, thus, has provided that without the orders of Competent Court the applicant (respondent herein) should not be dispossessed. In the present case, interim order specifically contemplates that it is only by the order of the Competent Court respondent shall be dispossessed.

Note: Even though this may seem Topsy-turvy case law (Since it held SR Batra not correct law), not much is lost. Just arrange for alternate accommodation and make use of reliefs made available at reliefs from judiciary page and get the case closed in 2-3 months.

Satish Chander Ahuja Vs Sneha Ahuja on 15 Oct 2020

Citations : [2020 AIR SC 5397], [2020 SCALE 11 576], [2021 SCC CIV 1 325], [2020 KLT 6 208], [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 841], [2020 GUJ LH 4 416], [2021 SCC 1 414], [2021 SCC CRI 1 667], [2020 ALD 6 94]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/62368827/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5f89406b9868c3226a8e7b51

The index page is here.

A.Subash Babu Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 21 Jul 2011

Posted on December 14, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Landmark Judgment to screw the perpetrators of 494 and 495 IPC Bigamy offences. This is specifically helpful to those who have cases in the State of Andhra Pradesh where these two crimes are made Cognizable and Non-bailable, due to a State amendment in 1992 whereas these are Non-cognizable and Bailable in the rest of the States in India.

13. In this regard, it would be, relevant to notice the provisions of Article 246 of the Constitution. Article 246 deals with subject matter of laws made by the Parliament and by the legislatures of State. Clause (1) of Article 246 inter alia provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Clauses (2) and (3) of Article 246, the Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the maters enumerated in List 1 in the Seventh Schedule. Sub-Clause 2 of the said Article provides that notwithstanding anything in Clause (3), Parliament and subject to Clause (1), the legislature of any State also have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 3 in the Seventh Schedule, whereas, Clause (3) of Article 246 amongst other things provides that subject to Clauses (1) and (2), the legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 2 in the Seventh Schedule. Entry 2 in List 3 i.e. Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule mentions “Criminal Procedure, including in matters included in the Code of “Criminal procedure, at the commencement of this Constitution”. Thus there is no manner of doubt that Parliament and subject to Clause (1), the legislature of any State also has power to make laws with respect to Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 2(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 defines the phrase “Cognizable Offence” to mean an offence for which and “Cognizable Case” means a case in which, a Police Officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force arrest without warrant. Part I of the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 relating to offences under the Indian Penal Code inter alia mentions that Section 494 and 495 are non-cognizable. Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code relates to information in cognizable cases and provides inter alia that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an Officer in charge of a Police Station, shall be reduced to writing by him and be read over to the informant. Section 156 of the Code provides that any Officer in charge of a Police Station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over a local area within the limits of such station would have power to enquire into or try under provisions of Chapter XIII of Criminal Procedure Code. As Sections 494 and 495 are made non-cognizable, a Police Officer would not have power to investigate those cases without the order of a Magistrate, having a power to try such cases or commit such cases for trial as provided under Section 155(2) of the Code.
However, this Court finds that the Legislative Assembly of the State of Andhra Pradesh enacted the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992. By the said Amending Act, the First Schedule to Central Act 2 of 1974 i.e. the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 came to be amended and against the entries relating to Section 494 in column 4 for the word “Ditto”, the word “Cognizable” and in column 5 for the word “Bailable” the word “Non-bailable” were substituted. Similarly, against the entries relating to Section 495 in column 4, for the word “Ditto” the word “Cognizable” and in column 5 for the word “Ditto”, the word “Non-bailable” were substituted. What is relevant to be noticed is that the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992 was reserved by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh on the 21st October, 1991 for consideration and assent of the President. The Presidential assent was received on 10th February, 1992 after which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992 was published on the 15th February, 1992 in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette Part IV-B (Ext.). Thus there is no manner of doubt that Sections 494 and 495 IPC are cognizable offences so far as State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned.

And… in Para 14

* * * * * *

In view of the above settled legal position, this Court has no doubt that the amendment made in the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992, shall prevail in the State of Andhra Pradesh, notwithstanding the fact that in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 offences under Section 494 and 495 are treated as cognizable offences. The reasoning given by the Division Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Mavuri Rani Veera Bhadranna (supra) that though the State Legislation amended the Schedule making the offence under Section 494 IPC cognizable, the legislation made by the Parliament i.e. Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code remains and in the event of any repugnancy between the two legislations, the legislation made by the Parliament would prevail, because, Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code still holds the field despite the fact that the State Legislation made amendment to the Schedule of Criminal Procedure Code, with respect, is erroneous and contrary to all cannons of interpretation of statute. Once First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stands amended and offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC are made cognizable offences, those offences will have to be regarded as cognizable offences for all purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 including for the purpose of Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 198(1)(c), after the Amendment made by the Code of Criminal Procedure(Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992 cannot be interpreted in isolation without referring to the fact that offences under Sections 494 and 495 IPC have been made cognizable so far as the State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned. Therefore, the provision made in Section 198(1)(c) that no Court shall take cognizance of an offences punishable under Chapter XX of the IPC except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved will have to be read subject to the amendment made by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Andhra Pradesh in 1992. Once, it is held that the offences under Section 494 and 495 IPC are cognizable offences, the bar imposed by operative part of sub-section 1 of Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code beginning with the words “No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XX of the Indian Penal Code except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence” gets lifted so far as offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC are concerned. As those offences have been made cognizable offences in the State of Andhra Pradesh since 1992, the same will have to be dealt with as provided in the Section 156 which inter alia provides that any officer in charge of a Police Station, may without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. Even without the authorization under Section 155(2) or Section 156(3) of Criminal Penal Code, offences under Sections 494, 495 and 496 having been rendered cognizable and non-bailable by virtue of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment Act, 1992) can be investigated by the Police and no illegality is attached to the investigation of these offences by the police. If the Police Officer in charge of a Police Station is entitled to investigate offences punishable under Section 494 and 495 IPC, there is no manner of doubt that the competent Court would have all jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences after receipt of report as contemplated under Section 173(2) of the Code. Thus, this Court finds that correct proposition of law was not laid down in Mavuri Rani Veera Bhadranna (supra) when the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the said case held that as Section 198 of Criminal Procedure Code still holds the field despite the amendment made by State Legislature, the Court would have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 494 IPC on the basis of report submitted by the Investigating Officer. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that in view of Section 198(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is disentitled to take cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC despite the State amendment making those offences cognizable, this Court notices that in Mavuri Rani Veera Bhadranna (supra), the Division Bench has considered effect of Section 155(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code and thereafter held that the bar under Section 198 would not be applicable as complaint lodged before police for offence under Section 494 IPC also related to other cognizable offences and if police files a charge sheet, the Court can take cognizance also of offence under Section 494 along with other cognizable offences by virtue of Section 155 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

And then in Para 15,

15. Section 155(4) of the Code inter alia provides that:-
“Where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case, notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable”
Here in this case in the charge sheet it is mentioned that the appellant has also committed offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code which is cognizable and therefore this is a case which relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable and therefore the case must be deemed to be cognizable case notwithstanding that the other offences are non- cognizable. This is not a case in which the FIR is exclusively filed for commission of offences under Sections 494 and 495 IPC. The case of the respondent no. 2 is that the appellant has committed offences punishable under Sections 417, 420, 494, 495 and 498A of the IPC. A question may arise as to what should be the procedure to be followed by a complainant when a case involves not only non-cognizable offence but one or more cognizable offences as well. It is somewhat anomalous that the aggrieved person by the alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC should file complaint before a Court and that the same aggrieved person should approach the police officer for alleged commission of offences under Sections 417, 420 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Where the case involves one cognizable offence also along with non-cognizable offences it should not be treated as a non-cognizable case for the purpose of sub-section 2 of Section 155 and that is the intention of legislation which is manifested in Section 155(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the argument that the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC on the basis of submission of charge sheet, cannot be accepted and is hereby rejected.

A.Subash Babu Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 21 July, 2011

Citations: [2011 SCALE 7 671], [2011 RCR CRIMINAL SC 3 674], [2011 RCR CIVIL SC 3 840], [2011 SCC 7 616], [2011 SLT 5 727], [2011 AIOL 509], [2011 ALLMR CRI SC 2931], [2011 ANJ SC 2 202], [2012 BOMCR CRI SC 1 379], [2011 JCC SC 3 2189], [2011 AIR SC 3031], [2011 SCC CRI 3 267], [2011 SCC CIV 3 851], [2011 AIR SC 4702], [2011 ULJ 3 139], [2011 AIC 107 51], [2011 SHIMLC 3 551], [2011 DMC SC 3 50], [2011 ALT CRI 3 242], [2012 BLJ 1 260], [2011 ACR SC 3 3182], [2011 DMC 2 827], [2011 KCCR SN 4 472], [2011 UC 2 1509], [2012 ALD CRI 1 210], [2011 SCR 9 453], [2011 JT SC 8 483], [2011 CRI LJ 4373], [2011 AIR SCW 4702]

Indiankanoon.org link:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1342950/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aeefe4b0149711415347

Here is the Andhra Pradesh HC judgement here from 2010.

AP High Court had passed similar judgment here in 2014.

For a similar adjudication from State of Odisha, go here.

Index of 494 and 495 IPC judgments is here.

Santhini Vs Vijaya Venketesh on 9 October, 2017

Posted on August 12, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

The Dipak Misra Judgment based on a reference made by a 2-judge bench of Supreme Court here. You can assume how it would have been decided. The earlier judgment which got overruled is here (Krishna Veni Nagam Vs Harish Nagam on 9 March, 2017 ).

Santhini Vs Vijaya Venketesh on 9 October, 2017

Citations : [2017 BOMCR 6 315], [2017 CTC 6 81], [2017 KHC 5 48], [2017 KLT 4 415], [2017 RCR CIVIL 4 623], [2017 SCALE 12 359], [2018 SCC 1 1], [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1202]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/184536583/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/59dbc07bce686e237b6a89fc

Santhini Vs Vijaya Venketesh on 9 August, 2017

Posted on August 12, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

The Supreme Court referred a matter in Krishna Veni Nagam Vs Harish Nagam on 9 March, 2017 here, to larger bench, to adjudicate if video conferencing should be used in deciding a transfer petition in a matrimonial case. The final judgement is here.

Santhini Vs Vijaya Venketesh on 9 August, 2017

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

Lalita Toppo Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 30 October, 2018

Posted on May 24, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

This is another judgment from Supreme Court of India, where in it was held that Women In Live-In Relationships Entitled To Maintenance under PWDV Act.

3. In fact, under the provisions of the DVC Act, 2005 the victim i.e. estranged wife or live-in-partner would be entitled to more relief than what is contemplated under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, namely, to a shared household also.

Lalita Toppo Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 30 October, 2018

Citations: [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 2301], [2019 SCC 13 796], [2019 SCC CRI 4 701], [2018 AIR SC SUPP 2583]

Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar and another Vs Union of India on 14 September, 2018

Posted on September 15, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Correcting few directions given in Rajesh Sharma judgment here, a Full Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court has issued this judgment.

From Para 35,

However, the directions pertaining to Red Corner Notice, clubbing of cases and postulating that recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground for denial of bail would stand on a different footing. They are protective in nature and do not sound a discordant note with the Code. When an application for bail is entertained, proper conditions have to be imposed but recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground while rejecting an application for grant of bail under Section 498-A IPC. That cannot be considered at that stage. Therefore, we do not find anything erroneous in direction Nos. 19(iv) and (v). So far as direction No. 19(vi) and 19(vii) are concerned, an application has to be filed either under Section 205 CrPC or Section 317 CrPC depending upon the stage at which the exemption is sought.

From Para 38,

38. In the aforesaid analysis, while declaring the directions pertaining to Family Welfare Committee and its constitution by the District Legal Services Authority and the power conferred on the Committee is impermissible. Therefore, we think it appropriate to direct that the investigating officers be careful and be guided by the principles stated in Joginder Kumar (supra), D.K. Basu (supra), Lalita Kumari (supra) and Arnesh Kumar (supra). It will also be appropriate to direct the Director General of Police of each State to ensure that investigating officers who are in charge of investigation of cases of offences under Section 498-A IPC should be imparted rigorous training with regard to the principles stated by this Court relating to arrest.
39. In view of the aforesaid premises, the direction contained in paragraph 19(i) as a whole is not in accord with the statutory framework and the direction issued in paragraph 19(ii) shall be read in conjunction with the direction given hereinabove.
40. Direction No. 19(iii) is modified to the extent that if a settlement is arrived at, the parties can approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the High Court, keeping in view the law laid down in Gian Singh (supra), shall dispose of the same.
41. As far as direction Nos. 19(iv), 19(v) and 19(vi) and 19(vii) are concerned, they shall be governed by what we have stated in paragraph 35.

So, in summary, the following are the currently active guidelines from SC modified from Rajesh Sharma, apart from Arnesh Kumar.

From Para 19 of Rajesh Sharma Judgment:

iv) If a bail application is filed with at least one clear day’s notice to the Public Prosecutor/ complainant, the same may be decided as far as possible on the same day. Recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground for denial of bail if maintenance or other rights of wife/minor children can otherwise be protected. Needless to say that in dealing with bail matters, individual roles, prima facie truth of the allegations, requirement of further arrest/ custody and interest of justice must be carefully weighed;

v) In respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of Red Corner Notice should not be a routine;

vi) It will be open to the District Judge or a designated senior judicial officer nominated by the District Judge to club all connected cases between the parties arising out of matrimonial disputes so that a holistic view is taken by the Court to whom all such cases are entrusted; and

vii) Personal appearance of all family members and particularly outstation members may not be required and the trial court ought to grant exemption from personal appearance or permit appearance by video conferencing without adversely affecting progress of the trial. (On filing an application u/s 205 CrPC or 317 CrPC;Judgments here)

Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar and another Vs Union of India on 14 September, 2018

Citations : [2018 SCC 10 443], [2019 SCC CRI 1 276], [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 1501], [2018 AIR SC 4273], [2018 DLT 252 175], [2018 CRIMES 3 503], [2018 GUJ LH 3 140]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/81618143/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b9d5e5d9eff431109ed3e71

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/social-action-forum-for-manav-adhikar-and-another-versus-union-of-india-ministry-of-law-and

Source: https://www.livelaw.in/sec-498a-ipc-only-hc-can-quash-cases-on-settlement-a-third-agency-created-by-courts-cant-exercise-statutory-functionssc/

Rajinder Singh Vs State of Punjab on 26 February 2015

Posted on April 4, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Here is the Landmark Supreme Court judgment giving our clear definition of Dowry as ascribed in Dowry Prohibition Act. Read paras 7 and 8 which are the operative parts.

8. A perusal of this Section shows that this definition can be broken into six distinct parts.

1) Dowry must first consist of any property or valuable security – the word “any” is a word of width and would, therefore, include within it property and valuable security of any kind whatsoever.

2) Such property or security can be given or even agreed to be given. The actual giving of such property or security is, therefore, not necessary.

3) Such property or security can be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly.

4) Such giving or agreeing to give can again be not only by one party to a marriage to the other but also by the parents of either party or by any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person. It will be noticed that this clause again widens the reach of the Act insofar as those guilty of committing the offence of giving or receiving dowry is concerned.

5) Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time. It can be at, before, or at any time after the marriage. Thus, it can be many years after a marriage is solemnized.

6) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with the marriage of the parties. Obviously, the expression “in connection with” would in the context of the social evil sought to be tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act mean “in relation with” or “relating to”.

Rajinder Singh - Money to build a joint house

Citations: [2015 SCJ 2 686], [2016 NCC 1 626], [2015 ALLCC 89 352], [2015 SCR 2 835], [2015 AIC 148 33], [2015 SCC 6 477], [2015 AIR SC 1359], [2015 AD SC 3 553], [2015 CRIMES SC 2 90], [2015 SCC ONLINE SC 171], [2015 ALD CRL SC 2 32], [2015 JCC 2 1293], [2015 ACR SC 2 1301], [2015 CCR SC 1 477], [2015 CRILJ 1934], [2015 RCR CRIMINAL 2 129], [2015 UC 1 744], [2015 RLW SC 3 2359]

Indiankanoon.org or Casemine link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/38957892/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b23ee561097e45a4e216

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

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