Supreme Court sensed that, there is a need to ensure that the power under section 41A is not used to intimidate, threaten and harass. Thereafter, granted an ad-interim stay on High Court order compelling the petitioner to appear before Police u/s 41A CrPC.
Month: November 2020
Jangala Sambasiva Rao Vs State of AP and Anr on 28 Oct 2020
Justise Lalitha Kanneganti held that there is violation of Guidelines issued in Arnesh Kumar in effecting an arrest without complying with 41A CrPC procedure and held demanded reports from both Police belonging to concerned PS and also the Magistrate who mechanically issue Judicial custody.
A complete indexed and mess-wise segregated collection of reprimands received by this incumbent State Government of YSRC Party are here.
Shailaja Patil Vs Khobbanna Patil on 18 Jan 2017
In this Order, Supreme Court held as follows,
That apart, we find that the High Court has proceeded on the basis that the appellant No.1 was capable of earning and that is one of the reasons for reducing the maintenance granted to her by the Family Court. Whether the appellant No.1 is capable of earning or whether she is actually earning are two different requirements. Merely because the appellant No.1 is capable of earning is not, in our opinion, sufficient reason to reduce the maintenance awarded by the Family Court.
This means, due to the mistake of High Court in assuming that being capable means earning, Supreme Court clarified that it is NOT so. This principle should apply to men as much as it was applied to women.
And, it is not clear why no Court is asking this question: Why are your needs/expenses out of sync with your income? Just because of the termination of financial assistance from husband?
Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 2692017 AIR SC 11742017 AKR 2 3142017 ALLMR CRI 31072017 CRILJ 23062017 KCCR 3 18092017 OLR 1 9212017 RLW SC 3 24902017 RCR CIVIL 2 7012017 RCR CRIMINAL 2 4972017 SCC ONLINE SC 2692017 AIR SC 1174]
Other Sources :
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a65cbb44a93263320779de5
Here is the High Court Order.
Note: The mistake is this… All Assumptions are highlighted…
Petitioner is said to be working as a Lecturer and in a matrimonial dispute between him and the 1st respondent wife, the Family Court has ordered to pay maintenance of Rs.15,000/- to the wife and Rs.10,000/- per month to the son. According to the petitioner’s counsel, the 1st respondent is also working as a Teacher and is earning.
However, according to the counsel representing the 1st respondent, there is no proof of income being produced and she has no permanent source of income. Accordingly, he has sought for rejection of the application filed by the petitioner and to enhance the maintenance awarded.
Having regard to the fact that the wife is also capable of earning, she could be awarded Rs.6,000/- per month and the son could be awarded Rs.6,000/- per month. Ordered accordingly. Amount in deposit be adjusted towards arrears and also for future payment. Amount in deposit be released in favour of the respondent wife and child, as per the modified award.
Kunapureddy Swarna Kumari Vs Kunapureddy @ Nookala Shanka Balaji Naidu Case
Here is the list of the cases fought by this couple. It is just a hilarious case that there are 11 Respondents arraigned in this case. Go figure!
- Kunapareddy @ Nookala Shanka Balaji Vs Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari On 18 April, 2016 : (SC says, amendments in petitions can be allowed, before Court takes cognizance of the case)
- Kunapureddy Swarna Kumari Vs Kunapureddy @ Nookala Shanka Balaji Naidu on 12 August, 2016 : (Trial Court doles of relief after relief supported by BS)
- Kunapureddy @ Nookala Shankar Vs Kunapureddy Swarna Kumari on 5 January, 2018 : (Husband files appeal at Sessions; return of dowry amount of Rs.3.00 Lakhs and compensation amount of Rs.15.00 Lakhs set aside; despite no evidence for DV, but Monthly maintenance of Rs.10,000/- is confirmed anyways)
- Kunapureddy Swarna Kumari Vs Kunapureddy @ Nookala Shankar on 5 January, 2018 : (Wife files appeal at Sessions seeking enhancement in monthly maintenance; Dismissed)
Vikas Sharma Vs Monica Parashar on 30 Sep 2016
Single Judge declared as follows with regards to the application of Sec 25(2) of PWDV Act 2005 and specifically, what does ‘change in circumstances’ mean.
32. I find no force in the contention of the appellant that merely filing of application under section 25 (2) of the D. V. Act would amount to a change in the circumstances. The phrase “change in circumstances” would require that the circumstances on the basis of which any previous order was passed under this Act have undergone alteration, modification or have ceased to exist and warrant interference of the court. Hence, the contention of the appellant that merely filing an application under section 25(2) of the D. V. Act would amount to change in circumstances cannot be accepted. Moreover, if such arguments of the appellant is accepted then parties will take advantage of such interpretation and would intentionally stay away from court on a day when any order is to be passed so that after passing of the order, they would file the application under section 25(2) of the D. V. Act and would plead that mere filing of an application under section 25(2) of the D.V. Act is a change in the circumstances thereby warranting passing of orders under section 25(2) of the D. V. Act.
33. A perusal of the application under section 25(2) of the D. V. Act filed by the appellant before the trial court shows that in the said application, the appellant has nowhere mentioned that consequent to the passing of the order by which interim maintenance has been fixed, there has been any change in the circumstances which warranted filing the application under section 25(2) of the D. V. Act for modification of the previous order dated 10.04.2015.
Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018
A Division bench of Delhi High Court held that, the law does not prescribe any precondition such that the arrears amount of maintenance has to be deposited before appeal or revision can be allowed.
From Para 22,
22. Neither the language used by the Legislature in Section 399 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C., nor the language used in Section 29 of the DV Act even remotely suggest that the Legislature intended to impose pre-conditions to the availment of the said remedies, of the kind evolved in Rajeev Preenja (supra).
And then from Para 25,
25. Laudable as the object of the learned Single Judge may have been, the question is, whether in the light of the settled law taken note of hereinabove, the learned Single Judge while deciding Rajeev Preenja (supra) could have issued a general direction barring entertainment of criminal revisions under Section 399 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. against orders granting interim maintenance to the wife/ child under Section 125 Cr.P.C., unless the entire arrears of maintenance up to date were first deposited? In our view, with due respect to the learned Single Judge, the answer is clearly in the negative. As to what should be the policy of the law is a matter which squarely falls within the preserve of the Legislature, and it is not a matter which the Courts can dictate, or evolve. It is one thing to interpret an existing law and, while doing so, to adopt an interpretation which is purposive, i.e. one which advances the objective of the enactment. However, it is quite a different thing to evolve a statutory scheme which, even the Legislature did not provide for.
Finally, in Paras 29 and 30,
29. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Bahl, imposition of a limitation on the statutory remedy of revision/ appeal under Section 399 of the Cr.P.C. or Section 29 of the DV Act- as the case may be, also falls foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of India for the reasons noticed by the Division Bench in Gagan Makkar (supra).Even if the condition in question – of the nature directed by the learned Single Judge in Rajeev Preenja (supra), were to exist in the statutory framework, the same may fail the test of reasonableness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This is for the reason that, in a given case, the order granting interim maintenance passed by the Ld. Magistrate either under Section 125 Cr.P.C or under Section 29 of the DV Act, may be so harsh and so unreasonable, as to make it impossible for the opposite party/ husband to comply with the same. Experience shows that in a large number of cases, the arrears of interim maintenance- which may be granted from the date of moving of the application before the Ld. Magistrate, may accumulate to a very large amount running into lakhs of rupees. The arrears of interim maintenance may not necessarily be a meager amount in all cases. It would be most unjust and unreasonable to bar his statutory remedy of revision/ appeal as the case may be, merely because he may not be in a position to deposit the entire arrears of interim maintenance.
From Para 30 (Corum cleverly clubbed 125 Cr.P.C. cases also along with DV cases!)
30. Thus, we answer the reference by holding that the general direction issued in Rajeev Preenja (supra) in paragraphs 15, 16 and 20 are not sustainable. The said directions could not have been issued by the learned Single Judge as they seek to curtail the statutory remedy of revision available under Section 399 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C, and of appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against orders granting interim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and Section 23 of the DV Act respectively. The direction in question over steps into the legislative field, which was impermissible for the Court to do. We agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Brijesh Kumar Gupta (supra), that there cannot be an absolute rider that the entire maintenance amount, as granted by the Trial Court, should be deposited prior to the entertainment of the statutory remedy, because it would leave the remedy of statutory revision/ appeal illusory. Accordingly, we hold that a revision under Section 399 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. and an appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against the order granting maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and under Section 23 of the DV Act respectively, would be maintainable, and would be entertained and heard without any pre-condition of deposit of the arrears of maintenance as ordered by the Ld. MM. We further hold that the pendency of such a Revision or Appeal- as the case may be, shall not operate as a stay of the operation of the order granting interim maintenance. The reference is answered accordingly.
Citations : [2018 DLT 251 245], [2018 HLR 3 413], [2019 CRI LJ 218],[2018 (4) RCR (Criminal) 30], [2018 SCC OnLine Del 9747],
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80568294/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b44dfac9eff431bb54655a9
Index of PWDV Act cases here. Index of Maintenance cases u/s 144 BNSS (125 Cr.P.C.) here.
Binita Dass Vs Uttam Kumar on 9 Aug 2019
Single-judge Bench said one thing in this Order which is as follows:
7. Qualification of the wife and the capacity to earn cannot be a ground to deny interim maintenance to a wife who is dependant and does not have any source of income.
The converse is read like this:
Wife who is independant and have source of income, can be a ground to deny interim maintenance to a wife.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/92763076/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5d8b2ff8714d58374079df99
Index of Maintenance cases under Section 125 CrPC here.
Indian Olympic Association Vs Kerala Olympic Association and Ors on 06 Nov 2020
Single-judge bench held that, if a if a court has no jurisdiction to try a lis, it is good for the party raising the issue of jurisdiction to seek the dismissal/return of the proceedings, rather than seeking a transfer.
From Para 14,
14. Suffice it to say that if a court has no jurisdiction to try a lis, it is good for the party raising the issue of jurisdiction to seek the dismissal/return of the proceedings, rather than seeking a transfer. I fail to understand the anxiety of the petitioner, to make an irregular proceeding initiated by the first respondent, regular. The decision in Arvee Industries (supra) is no answer to this contention, since this Court did not say in that case that an invalid proceeding, may be validated, at the instance of the opposite party by transferring the same to a court having jurisdiction.
Citations :
Other Sources :
State Of Goa Vs Jose Maria Albert Vales @ Robert Vales on 18 Aug 2017
2-Judge bench held that without prima facie opinion in a complaint made otherwise than a police complaint, invoking of perjury u/s 340 CrPC or 341 CrPC is indefensible.
From Para 58,
58. We are thus of the firm opinion that a Trial Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint under Section 340 and/or Section 341 of the Code, if there is a preliminary inquiry and adequate materials in support of the considerations impelling action under the above provisions are available, would be required to treat such complaint to constitute a case, as if instituted on police report and proceed in accordance with law. However, in absence of any preliminary inquiry or adequate materials, it would be open for the Trial Magistrate, if he genuinely feels it necessary, in the interest of justice and to avoid unmerited prosecution to embark on a summary inquiry to collect further materials and then decide the future course of action as per law. In both the eventualities, the Trial Magistrate has to be cautious, circumspect, rational, objective and further informed with the overwhelming caveat that the offence alleged is one affecting the administration of justice, requiring a responsible, uncompromising and committed approach to the issue referred to him for inquiry and trial, as the case may be. In no case, however, in the teeth of Section 343(1), the procedure prescribed for cases instituted otherwise than on police report would either be relevant or applicable qua the complaints under Section 340 and/or 341 of the Cr.P.C.
And from Final Para,
60. In view of the determination as above, the approach of the High Court is wholly indefensible, as in the face of Section 343(1) of the Cr.P.C., the procedure prescribed for cases instituted otherwise than on police report is not attracted qua a complaint under Section 340 and/or Section 341 of the Code. Even assuming that the Trial Magistrate had examined few witnesses in support of the complaint, it was in the form of a summary inquiry, to be satisfied as to whether the materials on record would justify the framing of charge against the respondent or not and nothing further. Any other view would fly in the face of the ordainment of Section 343(1) of the Cr.P.C. and thus cannot receive judicial imprimatur. The impugned judgment of the High Court in quashing the charge framed by the Trial Magistrate and remanding the case to him to follow the procedure outlined for cases, instituted otherwise than on police report, under Chapter XIX-B is on the face of it unsustainable in law and on facts. It is thus set aside. The appeals are allowed. The Trial Magistrate would proceed from the stage of framing of charge, strictly in compliance of the letter and spirit of the precept contained in Section 343(1) of the Code. We make it clear that we have not offered any observation on the merits of the charge and the Trial Court would further the proceedings in accordance with law.
Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1021], [2017 ALLCC 101 330], [2017 CCR SC 4 28], [2017 JCC 4 2245], [2017 RCR CRIMINAL 3 981], [2017 SCALE 9 527], [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1021]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/194410529/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a65cbaf4a93263320778706
Index of Perjury Case laws is here.
