In this judgment, Punjab & Haryana HC held that “Complaint under DV Act not maintainable after divorce”.
Citations: [
Other Source links:
Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from main.sci.gov.in/judgments, judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in
This is the judgment from Bombay High Court, in a case of DV filed after twenty seven years of the dissolution of marriage.
From Para 11,
In Zuveria Abdul Majid Patni vs. Atif Iqbal Mansoori and Another, the domestic violence took place between January 2006 and 06-9-2007 on which date first information report under Sections 498A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code was lodged by the wife against her husband and his relatives. It is in the context of these facts, that the Hon’ble Apex Court observes that even if it is accepted that during the pendency of the special leave petition the wife obtained ex parte “khula” (divorce) under the Muslim Personal Law from the Mufti on 09-5-2008, the petition under Section 12 of the DV Act is maintainable.
From Para 14,
Concededly, there is no interaction whatsoever between the petitioner wife and the respondent husband since the dissolution of marriage, not a single instance of domestic violence is pleaded in the petition the theme of which is that the petitioner wife is living at the mercy of her elder brother. Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that the limitation prescribed under Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not applicable, it is trite law, that any initiation of the proceedings under the statute must be done within a reasonable period. Even if the utmost latitude is given to the petitioner wife and it is assumed that she was subjected to domestic violence prior to the dissolution of marriage, the institution of the petition under Section 12 of the DV Act after twenty seven years of the dissolution of marriage is, as observed supra, a gross abuse of the statutory provisions.
Citations:
Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/175316050/
Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in
This is the judgment from Gujarat High Court, wherein it held concurrent jurisdiction exists between 125 CrPC and PWDV Act.
From Para 12,
Therefore, even if there is no reference of maintenance either under sub-Section 2 of Section 12 or in Section 20 of the Act, the fact remains that there is concurrent jurisdiction the statute provides concurrent jurisdiction and, therefore, it cannot be said that there is over ruling of jurisdiction while granting maintenance in different proceedings. At the most, what is required to be considered while deciding the claim of maintenance is that amount already awarded in a previous litigation may be taken into consideration for arriving at final amount of maintenance and, thereby, if order of only additional amount is there, then there is no overlapping and if award is for maximum amount of maintenance that can be awarded then set off against amount payable under any previous proceedings is to be extended.
From Para 13,
When petitioner is relying upon citations which are referred herein above and are already considered by the first appellate Court while rejecting the appeal, it would be appropriate for the petitioner herein to go through the legal provision properly. The time has come that litigants restrain themselves from agitating the issue which has already been decided by competent Court, only because they are not comfortable with the same.
This order from Hon’ble Bombay High Court talks about adjusting the maintenance paid under one case, when a maintenance order is granted in another case/law/act.
Intention of the judge, from Para 18,
What I intend to emphasize is the fact that the adjustment is permissible and the adjustment can be allowed of the lower amount against the higher amount. Though the wife can simultaneously claim maintenance under the different enactments, it does not in any way mean that the husband can be made liable to pay the maintenance awarded in each of the said proceedings.
Here is the case filed by Prakash Babulal Dangi at Hon’ble Supreme Court, assailing the High Court of Bombay order available here on the aspect of Multiple Maintenance to be paid. These are daily orders along with final disposal order.
From January 2018:
From March 2018;
A new case got tagged to this one in April 2018. This is pending as on 10-Apr-2020.
A new case got tagged to this one in November 2018. This was Dismissed as withdrawn.
And the grand Finale for this case in September 2019. Yippieeee!!!! The Special Leave Petition is disposed of as withdrawn.
A 2-judge bench passed guidelines to handle multiple maintenance litigation here.
This is one of the persons trying to figure out why in India, menfolks are allowed to be looted not in just one law but on a myraid of laws.
From Para 11,
“In view thereof, with these clarifications that both the orders; the one passed under the provisions of Domestic Violence Act and another passed under Section 125 of Cr.P.C., are required to be complied, both these Writ Petitions stand disposed off.“
Prakash has filed a SLP with Hon’ble Supreme Court here that got disposed off due to settlement.
In this landmark judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that “We have already extracted a passage from the judgment of Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois (1), where the learned judge pointed out that “life” in the 5th and 14th Amendments of the U. S. Constitution corresponding to Art. 21, means not merely the right to the continuance of a person’s animal existence, but a right to the possession of each of his organs-his arms and legs etc. We do not entertain any doubt that the word “’life” in Art. 21 bears the same signification.”
In our view cl. (b) of Regulation 236 is plainly violative of Art. 21’ and as there is no “law” on which the same could be justified it must be struck down as unconstitutional.
This petition raises a question of far-reaching importance. namely, a right of a citizen of India to lead a free life subject to social control imposed by valid law. The fact that the question has been raised at the instance of an alleged disreputable character shall not be allowed to deflect our perspective. If the police could do what they did to the petitioner, they could also do the same to an honest and law-abiding citizen.
Let us at the outset clear the ground. We are not concerned here with a law imposing restrictions on a bad character, for admittedly there is no such law. Therefore, the petitioner’s fundamental right, if any, has to be judged on the basis that there is no such law. To state it differently, what fundamental right of the petitioner has been infringed by the acts of the police? If he has any fundamental right which has been infringed by such acts, he would be entitled to a relief straight away, for the State could not justify it on the basis of any law made by the appropriate Legislature or the rules made thereunder.
Discussion around infringement of both Articles 19 and 21
At this stage it will be convenient to ascertain the scope of the said two provisions and their relation inter se in the context of the question raised. Both of them are distinct fundamental rights. No doubt the expression “personal liberty” is a comprehensive one and the right to move freely is an attribute of personal liberty. It is said that the freedom to move freely is carved out of personal liberty and, therefore, the expression “personal liberty” in Art. 21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is not a correct approach. Both are independent fundamental rights, though there is overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out of another. The fundamen. tal right of life and personal liberty have many attributes and some of them are found in Art. 19. If a Person’s fundamental right under Art. 21 is infringed, the State can rely upon a law to sustain the action; but that cannot be a complete answer unless the said law satisfies the test laid down in Art. 19 (2) so far as the attributes covered by Art. 19 (1) are concerned. In other words, the State must satisfy that both the fundamental rights are not infringed by showing that there is a law and that it does amount -to a reasonable restriction. within the meaning of Art. 19 (2) of the Constitution. But in this case no such defence is available, as admittedly there is no such law. So the petitioner can legitimately plead that his fundamental rights both under Art. 19 (1) (d) and Art. 21 are infringed by the State.
Discussion around Article 21
We would, therefore, define the right of personal liberty in Art. 21 as a right of an individual to be free from restrictions or encroachments on his person, whether those restrictions or encroachments are directly imposed or indirectly brought about by calculated measures. If so understood, all the acts of surveillance under,Regulation 236 infringe the fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 21 of the Constitution.
Citation: 1963 AIR 1295, 1964 SCR (1) 332
Indiankanoon link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/619152/
The index page is here.
In this judgment from Hon’ble Delhi High Court, it was held that “If a woman living separate from her husband had already filed a suit claiming maintenance and after adjudication maintenance has been determined by a competent court either in Civil Suit or by Court of MM in an application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. she does not have a right to claim additional maintenance under the Act. The Court of MM under the Act has power to grant maintenance and monetary reliefs on an interim basis in a fast track manner only in those cases where woman has not exercised her right of claiming maintenance either under Civil Court or under Section 125 Cr.P.C.”
Why PWDV Act?
Also held “It must be understood that the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 does not create any additional right to claim maintenance on the part of the aggrieved person. It only puts the enforcement of existing right of maintenance available to an aggrieved person on fast track.”
Index to DV Judgments is here.
Based on this judgment here, it was held that both proceedings of maintenance under 125 CrPC and PWDV Act can run parallelly and are maintainable.
In this judgment, Hon’ble High Court of Delhi held that “The Jurisdiction for granting maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and Domestic Violence Act is parallel jurisdiction and if maintenance has been granted under Section 125 Cr.P.C. after taking into account the entire material placed before the Court and recording evidence, it is not necessary that another MM under Domestic Violence Act should again adjudicate the issue of maintenance. The law does not warrant that two parallel courts should adjudicate same issue separately. If adjudication has already been done by a Court of MM under Section 125 Cr.P.C., re-adjudication of the issue of maintenance cannot be done by a Court of MM under Domestic Violence Act.”
Bad Behavior has blocked 600 access attempts in the last 7 days.
