A saga of illicit relationship of 5 years between two advocates is twisted into a tale of rape!!!
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Tag: Judiciary Antics
Kade Kumar Swamy Vs Agam Pandu and 6 Ors on 02 Dec 2020
A Presiding officer in Telangana went into merits of a petition (which was seeking permanent injunction over a suit scheduled property) and rejected it, even before it was numbered!!! A single judge bench of the Telangana High Court sent the PO to training in Judicial Academy…
An earlier instance, just about a month back!!!
Gulfasha Vs State of Maharashtra on 28 Jun 2021
A single judge bench of Bombay High Court asked a trial court to explain it’s stand when the trail court refused to accept cash bail and release an accused who is in jail with her 10 months son.
From Paras 4-9,
4. Learned counsel for the Applicant states that in spite of this order and in spite of urgency mentioned in the order itself, the trial Court has not accepted cash bail and has not released the Applicant on bail as of today.
5. This is serious breach of order passed by this Court. The trial Court was expected to follow the clear directions issued in the operative part of the order mentioned in paragraph No.8 of that order. The trial Court was not concerned with the other narration as well as reasoning part in the order. There is absolutely no ambiguity in the operative part of the order and it was duty of the trial Court to follow the order. In spite of that, unnecessary hurdles are created in giving effect to that order. Learned counsel for the Applicant states that specious reason given for not releasing the Applicant, was that section 302 of IPC was not mentioned in first paragraph of the order.
6. This Court does not have to explain the narration mentioned in this order to the trial Court. However, to clarify this, it is necessary to mention that, initially the offence was registered u/s 307 of the IPC on the basis of statement given by the deceased herself. Subsequently, the deceased had succumbed to her burns and the informant was described as ‘the deceased’ in the order. There is also reference to the ‘dying declaration’, in paragraph No.7. In spite of this, the trial Court exceeding its jurisdiction, has refused to obey order of this Court, specifically mentioned in paragraph No.8 as the operative part. This has seriously affected the Applicant’s valuable right of getting released on bail at the earliest. Her liberty is affected in spite of clear directions of this Court.
7. If there was any ambiguity in the order, it was for the parties and in particular was for learned APP, who had appeared in the matter, to point it at. The order could have also been corrected by a higher forum. But the trial Court had no authority to question that order. In any case, the operative part of the order is very clear and there was absolutely no ambiguity. The trial Court was supposed to follow these directions mentioned in the operative part.
8. In spite of this order, the Applicant had to suffer in jail custody for more period than was necessary, particularly when she had 10 months old child with her. Considering the repeated concerns expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court regarding unnecessary crowding of the jail, the attitude of the trial Court is not proper in this case.
9. In these circumstances to prevent any further hurdles and only for that purpose, I am clarifying and adding section 302 of IPC in the first paragraph of the order. However, the trial Court will have to explain its stand and report will have to be submitted to this Court.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/101221193/
Nasruddin Mian Vs State of Bihar on 21 Jun 2021
A division bench of Patna High Court held that this is not how a judgment is to be written, while acquitting a husband from a conviction given for the alleged offence of murdering his wife.
78. The judgment under consideration is an example of how not to write a judgment. It has repeatedly been emphasized by the Supreme Court that the Courts and Judges must make a dispassionate assessment of evidence and that the Courts and Judges should not be swayed by the horror of crime and the character of the person. The judgment should be made by a Judge uninfluenced by his own imagined norms of the functioning of the society.
79. The Trial Court ought to have avoided the sweeping and disparaging remarks made in para 42 of its judgment regarding the conduct of the appellants.
80. I fail to see as to how the Trial Court held in para 44 of its judgment that the charge was framed against the appellants under Section 498-A of the IPC after the informant filed an application for addition to the original charge. The order dated 08.05.2017 passed by the Trial Court, which has been extracted hereinabove, would clearly show that the original charge under Sections 498-A, 306 and 201/34 of the IPC was altered to Sections 304-B, 302 and 201/34 of the IPC. The trial court did not allow the prayer of the informant regarding addition of Sections 304-B and 302 of the IPC to the original charge already framed against them meaning thereby that due to alteration of the original charge vide order dated 08.05.2017, the charge under Sections 498-A and 306 became non-existent.
81. As a matter of fact, for all practical purposes, after alteration of the charge, the appellants were being tried only for the offences punishable under Sections 304-B, 302 and 201/34 of the IPC.
82. Surprisingly, in para 43 of the judgment, the Trial Court held that the case under Section 306 of the IPC is not made out. After alteration of charge, since there was no charge under Section 306 of the IPC, there was no occasion for the Trial Court to have recorded such finding in respect of Section 306 of the IPC.
83. Evidently, while passing the impugned judgment, the Trial Court had misconceived that the appellants were also being tried for the original charge framed under Sections 498-A and 306 of the IPC.
84. While saying so, I am mindful of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shanti Vs. State of Haryana, since reported in (1991) 1 SCC 371, wherein it has been held that Sections 304-B and 498-A of the IPC are not mutually exclusive. They deal with two distinct offences. A person charged and acquitted under Section 304-B of the IPC can be convicted under Section 498-A of the IPC without charge being framed, if such a case is made out. But from the point of view of practice and procedure and to avoid technical defects, it is necessary in such cases to frame charges under both
the sections and if the case is established against the accused, they can be convicted under both the Sections but no separate sentence need be awarded under Section 498-A in view of the substantive sentence being awarded for the major offence under Section 304-B.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/193472418/
Krishna Prasad Verma (D) Thr. Lrs. Vs State of Bihar on 26 Sep 2019
The division bench of the Apex Court held as follows:
From Para 16,
16. We would, however, like to make it clear that we are in no manner indicating that if a judicial officer passes a wrong order, then no action is to be taken. In case a judicial officer passes orders which are against settled legal norms but there is no allegation of any extraneous influences leading to the passing of such orders then the appropriate action which the High Court should take is to record such material on the administrative side and place it on the service record of the judicial officer concerned. These matters can be taken into consideration while considering career progression of the concerned judicial officer. Once note of the wrong order is taken and they form part of the service record these can be taken into consideration to deny selection grade, promotion etc., and in case there is a continuous flow of wrong or illegal orders then the proper action would be to compulsorily retire the judicial officer, in accordance with the Rules. We again reiterate that unless there are clear-cut allegations of misconduct, extraneous influences, gratification of any kind etc., disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated merely on the basis that a wrong order has been passed by the judicial officer or merely on the ground that the judicial order is incorrect.
Citations : [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 1330], [2019 SCC 10 640], [2020 SCC CRI 1 78], [2019 AIR SC 4852]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/23604802/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5dc567dd46571b38af731d48
Archana Deepak Jatkar Vs State of Maharashtra on 03 Mar 2021
Anticipatory Bail was denied to the alleged corrupt Judicial officer by the single-judge bench of Bombay High Court
Jiten Bhalla Vs Gaytri Bajaj on 08 Sep 2008
Delhi High Court passed this Judgment, critiquing the conduct of a ADJ in a matrimonial case…
124. Here in the present case, the Addl.District Judge without recording the evidence and without going into the allegations and counter allegations made by both the parties, has disposed of this application, which is unwarranted, since all the allegations and counter allegations made in the present proceedings require evidence.
125. Now, the question which arises for consideration as to whether present appeal under Section 28 of Act is maintainable or not. Even assuming for arguments sake that appeal is not maintainable, but revision does lie and this appeal can be treated as revision.
126. When admittedly, civil suit was pending, then there was no occasion for Addl.District Judge to have admitted application under Section 151 CPC for consideration and as such, the order of Addl.District Judge in entertaining application under Section 151 CPC, was patently without jurisdiction.
127. Lastly, the Addl. District Judge has made certain observations about the health of the his predecessor.
128. There was no occasion for Sh.V.K.Khanna, Addl.District Judge, to make such observations.
129. It has nowhere been pleaded by the respondent/applicant in application under Section 151 CPC, that predecessor of Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional District Judge was not keeping good health or the judgment has not been signed by him.
131. A judicial officer has no authority or jurisdiction to comment upon the functioning and working of judicial officer of same rank, about the competency or physical condition of his successor. 132. Whether an Additional District Judge, who is subordinate to this Court, is competent to discharge his judicial functions or not, that is, for this Court to decide. Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional District Judge has assumed powers of this Court and has made sarcastic remarks on the functioning, competency and physical condition of his predecessor, Sh.S.C.Mittal, Additional District Judge (since deceased) who was much senior in hierarchy to Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional District Judge.
133. A judicial officer, has no business or right to compare the signatures of his predecessor on the judicial proceedings which have been made by him in discharge of his judicial functions. More so, when no pleadings whatsoever in respect thereof, have been made by any of the parties. The conduct of Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional Districut Judge in making the above remarks about the physical conditions and functioning of Sh.S.C.Mittal, Additional District Judge, are highly improper and uncalled for.
137. A copy of this judgment be placed before the Inspecting Judges of Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional District Judge, for taking appropriate action, against Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional District Judge for his improper conduct, in making comments against his successor, which are against the judicial ethics and discipline.
Citations : [2008 AD DEL 9 618], [2008 DRJ 106 651], [2008 DMC 2 503], [2008 SCC ONLINE DEL 1032]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/143547006/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090c6de4b01497111771c8
https://www.legitquest.com/case/shri-jiten-bhalla-son-of-shri-rk-bhalla-v-ms-gaytri-bajaj-daughter-of-shri-anil/75C31
A challenge to this Order was dismissed at Supreme Court here.
Nirmal Singh and Ors Vs Tarsem Singh and Ors on 01 May 2014
A single-judge bench of Punjab High Court held as follows:
The High Court should not be stressed-out to deal with such a combined application compressed into one impugned order needlessly to unravel causing sheer wastage of its precious time in trying to separate what was so casually and mindlessly mixed-up in a cocktail by virtue of bad advice given by some trial lawyer to his client clubbing two disparate legal elements in a portmanteau application claiming amendment in pleadings and at the same time, in the same papers, seeking to introduce third parties in the pending litigation. Every minute of the High Court’s time squandered involves colossal expenditure which is incapable of calculation and therefore recompense. The reward of justice is none other than justice and time consumed in trying to meet it is alone its justification as an end to the means. The time required today for deciding cases of other litigants waiting desperately in the courtroom for their cause to be taken up and decided stands reduced. Poor legal advice given to a client may result in paralyzing many cases for years together causing incalculable injury to just causes needing prompt attention. But bad legal advice tendered leading to filing of interlocutory applications is a judicially unacceptable legal principle or ground itself for generosity in interference. This cannot operate as an exemption or a concession grantable to a litigant complaining that he has suffered because of ill advice to rescue an unsuspecting litigant from a predicament he may face. It has become almost a daily feature in court to wriggle out of the jamb to readily blame counsel without batting an eyelid and accept relief. If the Judge is expected to do his job so is the lawyer expected to assist the Court to the best of his ability. There is a presumption in law that a lawyer knows the law but there is no absolute presumption that a judge should know law. A judge is only called upon to balance the two sides of an argument presented before him.
But the bane is that the trial court unfortunately is not empowered to exercise summary jurisdiction of dismissal of misconceived, vexatious, frivolous, and mala fide applications designed only to obstruct the sound rhythm of a suit to achieve its target milestones within a reasonable time and bring it to fruition. Such power should deservedly be conferred on subordinate judges to deliver justice at the doorstep in limine without compromising the quality of justice delivered. But this is for Parliament to remedy and devise ways and means to achieve removal of obstructions designed to impede the life of a suit or wilt its many leaves.
Said Judge Learned Hand: “Thou shall not ration justice”
But time and energy spent in doing justice can be rationed. It can be rationalized to show better results. The trial courts can contribute in a large measure to this end by finding workable solutions thinking on their feet to do summary justice, a small example of what this case represents. The predecessor trial Judge should have returned the joint application in 2010 itself from the dais to its owner and saved valuable time of the court. He should have killed the weed before it grew. But now that has to be uprooted.
For the variety of reasons recorded above, I find no cogent ground to support the impugned order dated April 4, 2013 or to sustain it and to the contrary I think it is eminently fit to be set aside to avoid a failure of justice. It is accordingly so ordered. The matter is remitted back to the trial Judge for a re-consideration. The respondent/plaintiff is left free to file two separate applications, one under Order 6 Rule 17 and one under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC within a fortnight from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. The defendants would file replies thereto within the next fortnight. Thereafter, the learned trial Judge would take up both the applications separately and proceed to dispose them of on merits after hearing the parties after following the rule “costs must follow the event” to its true import and meaning to compensate the aggrieved litigant of the precious time lost in what could have been resolved without any prolonged agony.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://www.legitquest.com/case/nirmal-singh-and-others-v-tarsem-singh-and-others/1838C4
P.Surendran Vs State of Tamil Nadu on 29 March 2019
Supreme Court very clearly said a staff on Administration on Justice, such as Registry Staff can not exercise Judicial functions.
From Paras 9 and 10,
9. The nature of judicial function is well settled under our legal system. Judicial function is the duty to act judicially, which invests with that character. The distinguishing factor which separates administrative and judicial function is the duty and authority to act judicially. Judicial function may thus be defined as the process of considering the proposal, opposition and then arriving at a decision upon the same on consideration of facts and circumstances according to the rules of reason and justice. A Constitution Bench of five judges in Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut vs. Lakshmichand and Ors., AIR 1963 SC 677, formulated the following criteria to ascertain whether a decision or or an act is judicial function or not, in the following manner
(1) it is in substance a determination upon investigation of a question by the application of objective standards to facts found in the light of preexisting legal rule;
(2) it declares rights or imposes upon parties obligations affecting their civil rights; and
(3) that the investigation is subject to certain procedural attributes contemplating an opportunity of presenting its case to a party, ascertainment of facts by means of evidence if a dispute be on questions of fact, and if the dispute be on question of law on the presentation of legal argument, and a decision resulting in the disposal of the matter on findings based upon those questions of law and fact.
(emphasis added)
The act of numbering a petition is purely administrative. The objections taken by the Madras High Court Registry on the aspect of maintainability requires judicial application of mind by utilizing appropriate judicial standard. Moreover, the wordings of Section 18A of the SC/ST Act itself indicates
at application of judicial mind. In this context, we accept the statement of the Attorney General, that the determination in this case is a judicial function and the High Court Registry could not have rejected the numbering.10. Therefore, we hold that the High Court Registry could not have exercised such judicial power to answer the maintainability of the petition, when the same was in the realm of the Court. As the power of judicial function cannot be delegated to the Registry, we cannot sustain the order, rejecting the numbering/registration of the Petition, by the Madras High Court Registry. Accordingly, the Madras High Court Registry is directed to number the petition and place it before an appropriate bench.
Citations: [2019 (2) Crimes 321], [2019 (2) JLJR 279], [2019 (2) KLJ 955], [2019 (2) PLJR 291], [2019 (2) RCR (Civil) 767], [2019 (2) RCR (Criminal) 767], [2019 (6) Scale 465], [2019 All.M.R.(Cri.) 3493], [(2019) 9 SCC 154], [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 507]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/85097973/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5ca8c17e9eff430a58956741
https://www.vakilno1.com/supreme-court-of-india/high-court-registry-cannot-question-maintainability-of-petition-supreme-court.html
Dheeraj Mor Vs High Court of Delhi on 19 February 2020
Supreme Court held that, without eligibility for the post of District Judge, petitioners (who are subordinate judiciary) cannot claim stake for the post/continue in the post reserved for Advocates (25%) and hence they have to be reverted to their earlier posts.
From Para 48,
48. In the case of Dheeraj Mor and others cases, time to time interim orders have been passed by this Court, and incumbents in judicial service were permitted to appear in the examination. Though later on, this Court vacated the said interim orders, by that time certain appointments had been made in some of the States and in some of the States results have been withheld by the High Court owing to complication which has arisen due to participation of the ineligible in-service candidates as against the post reserved for the practising advocates. In the cases where such in-service incumbents have been appointed by way of direct recruitment from bar as we find no merit in the petitions and due to dismissal of the writ petitions filed by the judicial officers, as sequel no fruits can be ripened on the basis of selection without eligibility, they cannot continue as District Judges. They have to be reverted to their original post. In case their right in channel for promotion had already been ripened, and their juniors have been promoted, the High Court has to consider their promotion in accordance with prevailing rules. However, they cannot claim any right on the basis of such an appointment obtained under interim order, which was subject to the outcome of the writ petition and they have to be reverted.
Citations: [2020 SCC OnLine SC 213]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10432983/ or
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e52c0a93321bc1e173f86fc or
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/dheeraj-mor-versus-hon%E2%80%99ble-high-court-of-delhi or
https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/practising-advocates-experience-gained-at-bar-injects-judicial-branch-with-fresh-perspectives-sc-152952 or
https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2020/02/19/members-of-subordinate-judiciary-cant-claim-direct-recruitment-to-the-district-judge-post-under-quota-meant-for-practicing-advocates/ or
https://www.barandbench.com/news/breaking-judicial-officers-cant-be-considered-for-direct-recruitment-as-district-judges-under-quota-for-bar-sc
