Similar to Pooja Saxena decision here, by same Judge, this judgment also holds that the dowry giver has protection from prosecution. Almost copy paste of the paras from previous judgment.
From Paras 6 and 8,
6. No doubt, as per Section 3 of The Act, giving or abetting to give dowry is a punishable offence, but the petitioner does have protection of Section 7(3) of the Act. Section 7(3) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, a statement made by the person aggrieved by an offence under the Act shall not subject him to prosecution under this Act. In the instant case, it is obvious that respondent No.2 has filed his petition under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. only on the basis of the allegations made by the petitioner Uma Devi in her complaint made to CAW Cell which formed basis for the registration of FIR No.218/2009 P.S. Keshav Puram under Section 498A/406/34 IPC against respondent No.2 and others as well as in her petition under Hindu Marriage Act and Domestic Violence Act. Thus, it is clear that FIR No.50/2009 registered against the petitioner under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 is based upon the statements made by the petitioner in her complaint to CAW Cell and above noted petitions. Therefore, she is entitled to the protection of Section 7(3) of the Act, being the victim of demand of dowry.
….
8. The above observation of this Court obviously is an obiter and does not constitute a binding precedent for the reason that the provisions of The Act were not the subject-matter of dispute before the court in the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Neera Singh’s case. Moreover, in the aforesaid judgment, the Court has not taken into account the protection given to a victim of offence of dowry demand as provided under Section 7(3) of The Act. Thus, in my view, the above referred judgment is of no avail to respondent No.2. Further, on perusal of FIR No.218/2009, it transpires that as per the allegations in the complaint made by the petitioner, the demand for dowry was made by the father of respondent No.2 at the time of engagement ceremony of the petitioner when he allegedly asked the father of the petitioner to concede to his demand for dowry, failing which he would call off the marriage. From the aforesaid facts, it is obvious that the petitioner and her parents were confronted with the unenviable situation of either to concede to the demand or face the loss of honour of their family in the society, and if under that fear, the petitioner and her parents conceded to the demand for dowry, they cannot be faulted as they were victims of the circumstances. Given the aforesaid facts, Section 7(3) comes to the rescue of the petitioner and in terms of the aforesaid provision, she cannot be subjected to prosecution for the offence under Section 3 of The Act.
Citations:
Other Sources:
Index of DP Judgments is here.
