Dr. Rajesh Pratap Giri Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 05 Mar 2021

Posted on March 15, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A bench of three-judges categorically held that, once an Anticipatory Bail is granted it protected the grantee/accused until the end of trial and there is no need to obtain Regular Bail, after Charge sheet is filed by Police into the Court. This cites the 5-judge constitution bench decision in Sushila Aggarwal here.

8. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the High Court wrongly held that the anticipatory bail granted to the appellant by the Trial Court vide order dated 21.10.2019 had come to an end with the filing of the chargesheet. We therefore set aside the impugned orders passed by the High Court and restore the anticipatory bail granted to the appellant by the Trial Court vide order dated 21.10.2019.

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161262593/

Index of all Anticipatory Bail Matters is here

Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth Vs State of Gujarat and Anr on 1 Sep 2015

Posted on January 2, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Another wonderful judgment around anticipatory bail.

From Para 23,

23. The principles which can be culled out, for the purposes of the instant case, can be stated as under:
(i) The complaint filed against the accused needs to be thoroughly examined, including the aspect whether the complainant has filed a false or frivolous complaint on earlier occasion. The court should also examine the fact whether there is any family dispute between the accused and the complainant and the complainant must be clearly told that if the complaint is found to be false or frivolous, then strict action will be taken against him in accordance with law. If the connivance between the complainant and the investigating officer is established then action be taken against the investigating officer in accordance with law.
(ii) The gravity of charge and the exact role of the accused must be properly comprehended. Before arrest, the arresting officer must record the valid reasons which have led to the arrest of the accused in the case diary. In exceptional cases, the reasons could be recorded immediately after the arrest, so that while dealing with the bail application, the remarks and observations of the arresting officer can also be properly evaluated by the court.
(iii) It is imperative for the courts to carefully and with meticulous precision evaluate the facts of the case. The discretion to grant bail must be exercised on the basis of the available material and the facts of the particular case. In cases where the court is of the considered view that the accused has joined the investigation and he is fully cooperating with the investigating agency and is not likely to abscond, in that event, custodial interrogation should be avoided. A great ignominy, humiliation and disgrace is attached to arrest. Arrest leads to many serious consequences not only for the accused but for the entire family and at times for the entire community. Most people do not make any distinction between arrest at a pre-conviction stage or post-conviction stage.
(iv) There is no justification for reading into Section 438 CrPC the limitations mentioned in Section 437 CrPC. The plentitude of Section 438 must be given its full play. There is no requirement that the accused must make out a “special case” for the exercise of the power to grant anticipatory bail. This virtually, reduces the salutary power conferred by Section 438 CrPC to a dead letter. A person seeking anticipatory bail is still a free man entitled to the presumption of innocence. He is willing to submit to restraints and conditions on his freedom, by the acceptance of conditions which the court may deem fit to impose, in consideration of the assurance that if arrested, he shall be enlarged on bail.
(v) The proper course of action on an application for anticipatory bail ought to be that after evaluating the averments and accusations available on the record if the court is inclined to grant anticipatory bail then an interim bail be granted and notice be issued to the Public Prosecutor. After hearing the Public Prosecutor the court may either reject the anticipatory bail application or confirm the initial order of granting bail. The court would certainly be entitled to impose conditions for the grant of anticipatory bail. The Public Prosecutor or the complainant would be at liberty to move the same court for cancellation or modifying the conditions of anticipatory bail at any time if liberty granted by the court is misused. The anticipatory bail granted by the court should ordinarily be continued till the trial of the case.
(vi) It is a settled legal position that the court which grants the bail also has the power to cancel it. The discretion of grant or cancellation of bail can be exercised either at the instance of the accused, the Public Prosecutor or the complainant, on finding new material or circumstances at any point of time.
(vii) In pursuance of the order of the Court of Session or the High Court, once the accused is released on anticipatory bail by the trial court, then it would be unreasonable to compel the accused to surrender before the trial court and again apply for regular bail.
(viii) Discretion vested in the court in all matters should be exercised with care and circumspection depending upon the facts and circumstances justifying its exercise. Similarly, the discretion vested with the court under Section 438 CrPC should also be exercised with caution and prudence. It is unnecessary to travel beyond it and subject the wide power and discretion conferred by the legislature to a rigorous code of self-imposed limitations.
(ix) No inflexible guidelines or straitjacket formula can be provided for grant or refusal of anticipatory bail because all circumstances and situations of future cannot be clearly visualised for the grant or refusal of anticipatory bail. In consonance with legislative intention, the grant or refusal of anticipatory bail should necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
(x) We shall also reproduce para 112 of the judgment wherein the Court delineated the following factors and parameters that need to be taken into consideration while dealing with anticipatory bail:
(a) The nature and gravity of the accusation and the exact role of the accused must be properly comprehended before arrest is made;
(b) The antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether the accused has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a court in respect of any cognizable offence;
(c) The possibility of the applicant to flee from justice;
(d) The possibility of the accused’s likelihood to repeat similar or other offences;
(e) Where the accusations have been made only with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by arresting him or her;
(f) Impact of grant of anticipatory bail particularly in cases of large magnitude affecting a very large number of people;
(g) The courts must evaluate the entire available material against the accused very carefully. The court must also clearly comprehend the exact role of the accused in the case. The cases in which the accused is implicated with the help of Sections 34 and 149 of the Penal Code, 1860 the court should consider with even greater care and caution, because over-implication in the cases is a matter of common knowledge and concern;
(h) While considering the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail, a balance has to be struck between two factors, namely, no prejudice should be caused to free, fair and full investigation, and there should be prevention of harassment, humiliation and unjustified detention of the accused;
(i) The Court should consider reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant;
(j) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused in entitled to an order of bail.

Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth Vs State of Gujarat and Anr on 1 Sep 2015

Citations : [2016 ALT CRL AP 1 122], [2016 GLR 1 798], [2016 SCC 1 152], [2015 AIR SC 3090], [2015 ACR SC 3 3013], [2015 AD SC 9 511], [2015 ALLCC 91 215], [2015 ALLMR CRI 4116], [2015 BOMCR CRI 4 412], [2015 CCR SC 3 453], [2015 CRIMES SC 4 298], [2015 JCC 4 2603], [2015 JLJR 4 57], [2015 NCC 3 104], [2015 PLJR 4 218], [2015 RCR CRIMINAL 4 199], [2015 RLW SC 4 3551], [2015 SCALE 9 403], [2015 SCJ 9 734], [2015 UC 3 1761], [2016 SCC CRI 1 240], [2015 SCC ONLINE SC 771], [2015 GUJ LH 3 165], [2015 AIC 154 1]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/180463386/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b344e561097e45a4e3ca

https://www.indialaw.in/blog/blog/criminal/bhadresh-sheth-v-state-of-gujarat/

Sushila Aggarwal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 29 January 2020

Posted on January 29, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A wonderful pronouncement indeed, of a 5-eminent judge Constitutional bench which decided that once Anticipatory Bail is granted u/s 438 CrPC by either a Sessions Court or High Court, it does not have any time limit to it regarding it’s effect. Further, here it was held, No need to get a Regular Bail once AB is granted.

From now onwards, no need to covert Anticipatory Bail into a Regular Bail, upon closure of investigation by I.O. and filing of Charge sheet into a Trial Court.

Here is the Order passed.

Sushila Aggarwal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 29 January, 2020 Order

And the 133-page jewel of judgment, endorsing the view taken by my favorite Justice Shri Dalveer Bhandavi in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre is below.

Sushila Aggarwal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 29 January, 2020 Judgement

Citations : [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 98], [2020 DLT SC 266 741]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/123660783/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/sushila-aggarwal-and-others-versus-state-nct-of-delhi-and-another

5-judge bench holds no time limit could be fixed while granting anticipatory bail [Full report]

The life of this case is in detail available here.

Index of all Anticipatory Bail Matters is here and all Bail matters list is here.

Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs State Of Maharashtra And Others on 2 December, 2010

Posted on September 13, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This is the landmark judgment from my favorite judge Shri Dalveer Bhandari J on the duration of a anticipatory bail granted by a High Court of a Sessions Court.

Based on Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia case available here, it was held that once granted anticipatory bail continues to protect the accused until the end of trial.
In Sushila Aggarwal & Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) in 15 May, 2018 here, a reference is made to a larger bench of Supreme Court on the point of valid time period of an anticipatory bail. This was at last decided in favor this Mhetre judgment only here.

From Para 25,

Mr. Bhushan submitted that a plain reading of the section 438 Cr.P.C. clearly reveals that the legislature has not placed any fetters on the court. In other words, the legislature has not circumscribed court’s discretion in any manner while granting anticipatory bail, therefore, the court should not limit the order only for a specified period till the charge-sheet is filed and thereafter compel the accused to surrender and ask for regular bail under section 439 Cr.P.C., meaning thereby the legislature has not envisaged that the life of the anticipatory bail would only last till the charge-sheet is filed. Mr. Bhushan submitted that when no embargo has been placed by the legislature then this court in some of its orders was not justified in placing this embargo.

From Para 93,

Some courts of smaller strength have erroneously observed that section 438 Cr.P.C. should be invoked only in exceptional or rare cases. Those orders are contrary to the law laid down by the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sibbia’s case (supra).

From Para 94,

The complaint filed against the accused needs to be thoroughly examined including the aspect whether the complainant has filed false or frivolous complaint on earlier occasion. The court should also examine the fact whether there is any family dispute between the accused and the complainant and the complainant must be clearly told that if the complaint is found to be false or frivolous, then strict action will be takenagainst him in accordance with law. If the connivance betweenthe complainant and the investigating officer is established then action be taken against the investigating officer in accordance with law.

From Para 97,

A great ignominy, humiliation and disgrace is attached to the arrest. Arrest leads to many serious consequences not only for the accused but for the entire family and at times for the entire community. Most people do not make any distinction between arrest at a pre-conviction stage or post-conviction stage.

From Para 101,

The proper course of action ought to be that after evaluating the averments and accusation available on the record if the court is inclined to grant anticipatory bail then an interim bail be granted and notice be issued to the public prosecutor. After hearing the public prosecutor the court may either reject the bail application or confirm the initial order of granting bail. The court would certainly be entitled to impose conditions for the grant of bail. The public prosecutor or complainant would be at liberty to move the same court for cancellation or modifying the conditions of bail any time if liberty granted by the court is misused. The bail granted by the court should ordinarily be continued till the trial of the case.

From Para 102, (VERY IMPORTANT)

The order granting anticipatory bail for a limited duration and thereafter directing the accused to surrender and apply before a regular bail is contrary to the legislative intention and the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sibbia’s case (supra).

From Para 105, (VERY IMPORTANT)

The court which grants the bail has the right to cancel the bail according to the provisions of the General Clauses Act but ordinarily after hearing the public prosecutor when the bail order is confirmed then the benefit of the grant of the bail should continue till the end of the trial of that case.

From Para 106, (VERY IMPORTANT)

The judgment in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh (supra) is contrary to legislative intent and the spirit of the very provisions of the anticipatory bail itself and has resulted in an artificial and unreasonable restriction on the scope of enactment contrary to the legislative intention.

From Para 108,

Section 438 Cr.P.C. does not mention anything about the duration to which a direction for release on bail in the event of arrest can be granted. The order granting anticipatory bail is a direction specifically to release the accused on bail in the event of his arrest. Once such a direction of anticipatory bail is executed by the accused and he is released on bail, the concerned court would be fully justified in imposing conditions including direction of joining investigation.

From Para 110,

In pursuance to the order of the Court of Sessions or the High Court, once the accused is released on bail by the trial court, then it would be unreasonable to compel the accused to surrender before the trial court and again apply for regular bail.

From Para 112,

The validity of the restrictions imposed by the Apex Court, namely, that the accused released on anticipatory bail must submit himself to custody and only thereafter can apply for regular bail. This is contrary to the basic intention and spirit of section 438 Cr.P.C. It is also contrary to Article 21 of the Constitution. The test of fairness and reasonableness is implicit under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Directing the accused to surrender to custody after the limited period amounts to deprivation of his personal liberty.

From Paras 115, 116 (VERY IMPORTANT)

The Apex Court in Salauddin’s case (supra) held that anticipatory bail should be granted only for a limited period and on the expiry of that duration it should be left to the regular court to deal with the matter is not the correct view. The reasons quoted in the said judgment is that anticipatory bail is granted at a stage when an investigation is incomplete and the court is not informed about the nature of evidence against the alleged offender.

The said reason would not be right as the restriction is not seen in the enactment and bail orders by the High Court and Sessions Court are granted under sections 437 and 439 also at such stages and they are granted till the trial.

From Para 119, (VERY VERY IMPORTANT)

This Court in the Sibbia’s case (supra) laid down the following principles with regard to anticipatory bail:
a) Section 438(1) is to be interpreted in light of Article21 of the Constitution of India.
b) Filing of FIR is not a condition precedent to exercise of power under section 438.
c) Order under section 438 would not affect the right of police to conduct investigation.
d) Conditions mentioned in section 437 cannot be read into section 438.
e) Although the power to release on anticipatory bail can be described as of an “extraordinary” character this would “not justify the conclusion that the power must be exercised in exceptional cases only.” Powers are discretionary to be exercised in light of the circumstances of each case.
f) Initial order can be passed without notice to the Public Prosecutor. Thereafter, notice must be issued forthwith and question ought to be reexamined after hearing. Such ad interim order must conform to requirements of the section and suitable conditions should be imposed on the applicant.

From Para 128, (VERY VERY IMPORTANT)

In case, the State consider the following suggestions in proper perspective then perhaps it may not be necessary to curtail the personal liberty of the accused in a routine manner. These suggestions are only illustrative and not exhaustive.
1) Direct the accused to join investigation and only when the accused does not cooperate with the investigating agency, then only the accused be arrested.
2) Seize either the passport or such other related documents, such as, the title deeds of properties or the Fixed Deposit Receipts/Share Certificates of the accused.
3) Direct the accused to execute bonds;
4) The accused may be directed to furnish sureties of number of persons which according to the prosecution are necessary in view of the facts of the particular case.
5) The accused be directed to furnish undertaking that he would not visit the place where the witnesses reside so that the possibility of tampering of evidence or otherwise influencing the course of justice can be avoided.
6) Bank accounts be frozen for small duration during investigation.

Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs State Of Maharashtra And Others on 2 December, 2010

Citation: [(2011) 1 SCC 694], [AIR 2011 SC 312],

Indiankanoon.org or Casemine link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1108032/

Index of all Anticipatory Bail Matters is here.

C.H. Siva Prasad and Ors Vs State of A.P. on 13 August 1998

Posted on September 10, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In line with Gurbaksh Singh case here, AP High Court also delivered this judgment holding that

From Para 21,

It is also required to notice that an application under Section 437 or 439 Cr.PC as the case may be can be filed only after the arrest of the accused person or detained without a warrant. It would not be possible for any accused to file any application under Section 437 or 439 Cr.PC while the operation of the order under Section 438 Cr.PC is in force. Under those circumstances, the question of directing the accused person to apply for and obtain a regular bail even while the directions issued in exercise of the power under Section 438 Cr.PC are in operation may become difficult and such application may not be maintainable.

Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, then held,

In Para 22,

On an analysis and a close reading of the decisions referred to above, the following propositions would emerge:
(1) This Court or Court of Session in exercise of its power and jurisdiction under Section 438 Cr.PC may direct the release of the accused person in a given case only for a specific period and direct the accused person to apply for and obtain regular bail. This would necessarily mean that the operation of the order would come to an end immediately after the specified time and the accused person has to necessarily surrender or get arrested so as to enable the accused person to file an application under Section 437 or 439 Cr.PC as the case maybe.

(2) This Court or Court of Session in exercise of its power and discretion under Section 438 of the Code can restrict the operation of directions issued under the said provision at the initial stage and extend the same until further orders;

(3) The Court exercising the power and jurisdiction under Section 438 of the Code is entitled to issue necessary directions directing release of the accused person in the event of his or her arrest without specifying any period; and

(4) The power and jurisdiction of this Court or Court of Session under Section 438 of the Code is not limited or circumscribed in any manner whatsoever requiring to limit the operation of the directions to release the accused person in the event of his or her arrest.

C.H. Siva Prasad And Others Vs State Of A.P. on 13 August, 1998

Citations: [2

Sushila Aggarwal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 15 May, 2018

Posted on September 9, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this order, Hon’ble Apex Court has referred a matter regarding the valid time period of an anticipatory bail, to larger bench. The landmark pronouncement came on 29 January 2020 by a 5-judge bench here. The landmark precedent from an 1980 constitution bench is available here.

Sushila Aggarwal & Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 5 May, 2018

It was earlier mentioned in Supreme Court on 19 September, 2018 in the court of 3 judges bench led by CJI and was directed to be listed after a week before appropriate Bench as per roster, subject to removal of defects, if any.

Sushila Aggarwal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 19 September, 2018

Recently, it was heard by 5-judge bench on 23 October, 2019 and the judgment was reserved, after the arguments were concluded.

Sushila Aggarwal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 23 October, 2019

The final status of the case [Case No. SLP(Crl) No. 007281 – 007282 / 2017], is available here.

An detailed analysis is available here.

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Etc Vs State of Punjab on 9 April 1980

Posted on September 8, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that,

Highlight

Should the operation of an order passed under Section 438(1) be limited in point of time? Not necessarily. The Court may, if there are reasons for doing so, limit the operation of the order to a short period until after the filing of an F.I.R. in respect of the matter covered by the order. The applicant may in such cases be directed to obtain an order of bail under Section 437 or 439 of the Code within a reasonably short period after the filing of the F.I.R. as aforesaid. But this need not be followed as an invariable rule. The normal rule should be not to limit the operation of the order in relation to a period of time.

Another set of clarifications here:

This should be the end of the matter, but it is necessary to clarify a few points which have given rise to certain misgivings.

Section 438(1) of the Code lays down a condition which has to be satisfied before anticipatory bail can be granted. The applicant must show that he has “reason to believe” that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence. The use of the expression “reason to believe” shows that the belief that the applicant may be so arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere ‘fear’ is not ‘belief’, for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he has some sort of a vague apprehension that some one is going to make an accusation against him, in pursuance of which he may be arrested. The grounds on which the belief of the applicant is based that he may be arrested for a non- bailable offence, must be capable of being examined by the court objectively, because it is then alone that the court can determine whether the applicant has reason to believe that he may be so arrested. Section 438(1), therefore, cannot be invoked on the basis of vague and general allegations, as if to arm oneself in perpetuity against a possible arrest. Otherwise, the number of applications for anticipatory bail will be as large as, at any rate, the adult populace. Anticipatory bail is a device to secure the individual’s liberty; it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations, likely or unlikely.

Secondly, if an application for anticipatory bail is made to the High Court or the Court of Session it must apply its own mind to the question and decide whether a case has been made out for granting such relief. It cannot leave the question for the decision of the Magistrate concerned under Section 437 of the Code, as and when an occasion arises. Such a course will defeat the very object of Section 438.

Thirdly, the filing of a First Information Report is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438. The imminence of a likely arrest founded on a reasonable belief can be shown to exist even if an F.I.R. is not yet filed.

Fourthly, anticipatory bail can be granted even after an F.I.R. is filed, so long as the applicant has not been arrested.

Fifthly, the provisions of Section 438 cannot be invoked after the arrest of the accused. The grant of “anticipatory bail” to an accused who is under arrest involves a contradiction in terms, in so far as the offence or offences for which he is arrested, are concerned. After arrest, the accused must seek his remedy under Section 437 or Section 439 of the Code, if he wants to be released on bail in respect of the offence or offences for which he is arrested.

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Etc Vs State Of Punjab on 9 April, 1980

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: CrPC 438 – Valid Duration For Anticipatory Bail

Dr. Rajesh Pratap Giri Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 05 Mar 2021

Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth Vs State of Gujarat and Anr on 1 Sep 2015

Sushila Aggarwal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 29 January 2020

Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs State Of Maharashtra And Others on 2 December, 2010

C.H. Siva Prasad and Ors Vs State of A.P. on 13 August 1998

Sushila Aggarwal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 15 May, 2018

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Etc Vs State of Punjab on 9 April 1980