Mary Angel & Ors Vs State Of Tamil Nadu on 13 May, 1999

Posted on October 2, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this landmark judgment related to awarding of costs by High Courts and below courts under CrPC 482, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that,

Section 148(3) provides that when any costs have been incurred by any party to a proceeding under Section 145, Section 146 or Section 147, the Magistrate passing a decision may direct by whom such costs shall be paid, whether by such party or by any other party to the proceeding, and whether in whole or in part or proportion and such costs may include any expenses incurred in respect of witnesses and of pleaders’ fees, which the Court may consider reasonable.

Section 342 provides that any Court dealing with an application made to it for filing a complaint under Section 340 or an appeal under Section 341, shall have power to make such order as to costs as may be just.

Section 357 provides for payment of compensation to the victim for any loss or injury caused by the offence or in case of death to the heirs of the victims out of the fine imposed and while awarding compensation court has to take into consideration, inter alia, the expenses properly incurred in the prosecution.

Section 358 provides for payment of compensation where any person causes a police officer to arrest another person, without sufficient ground for causing such arrest, then compensation can be awarded by the Magistrate not exceeding Rs. 100/-.

Further, Section 359 empowers the Court to order payment of cost to the complainant in non cognizable case, if it convicts the accused and in such case, the Court can pass an order for payment of costs incurred by the complainant in the prosecution of the case and such costs may include any expenses incurred in respect of process fees, witnesses and pleaders fees which the Court considers reasonable.

And then,

In appropriate cases, where it is necessary to pass such order, Court may award costs for the purposes, namely,

(i) to give effect to any order passed under the Court

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and

(iii) to secure the ends of justice as there is no
(i) negative provision for exercise of such power and (ii) inconsistency with the other provisions.

Further, awarding of costs, as stated above, can be for two purposes, one for meeting the litigation expenses and, secondly, for preventing the abuse of the process of Court or to do justice in a matter and in such circumstances, costs can be exemplary.

Final order

In the result, we hold that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, Court has power to pass such orders (not inconsistent with any provision of the Code) including the order for costs in appropriate cases, (i) to give effect to any order passed under the Code or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
(iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
As stated above, this extraordinary power is to be used in extrao rdinary circumstances and in a judicious manner. Costs may be to meet the litigation expenses or purposes can be exemplary to achieve the aforesaid In view of the aforesaid findings, this appeal is dismissed.

Mary Angel & Ors Vs State Of Tamil Nadu on 13 May, 1999

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Etc Vs State of Punjab on 9 April 1980

Posted on September 8, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that,

Highlight

Should the operation of an order passed under Section 438(1) be limited in point of time? Not necessarily. The Court may, if there are reasons for doing so, limit the operation of the order to a short period until after the filing of an F.I.R. in respect of the matter covered by the order. The applicant may in such cases be directed to obtain an order of bail under Section 437 or 439 of the Code within a reasonably short period after the filing of the F.I.R. as aforesaid. But this need not be followed as an invariable rule. The normal rule should be not to limit the operation of the order in relation to a period of time.

Another set of clarifications here:

This should be the end of the matter, but it is necessary to clarify a few points which have given rise to certain misgivings.

Section 438(1) of the Code lays down a condition which has to be satisfied before anticipatory bail can be granted. The applicant must show that he has “reason to believe” that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence. The use of the expression “reason to believe” shows that the belief that the applicant may be so arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere ‘fear’ is not ‘belief’, for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he has some sort of a vague apprehension that some one is going to make an accusation against him, in pursuance of which he may be arrested. The grounds on which the belief of the applicant is based that he may be arrested for a non- bailable offence, must be capable of being examined by the court objectively, because it is then alone that the court can determine whether the applicant has reason to believe that he may be so arrested. Section 438(1), therefore, cannot be invoked on the basis of vague and general allegations, as if to arm oneself in perpetuity against a possible arrest. Otherwise, the number of applications for anticipatory bail will be as large as, at any rate, the adult populace. Anticipatory bail is a device to secure the individual’s liberty; it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations, likely or unlikely.

Secondly, if an application for anticipatory bail is made to the High Court or the Court of Session it must apply its own mind to the question and decide whether a case has been made out for granting such relief. It cannot leave the question for the decision of the Magistrate concerned under Section 437 of the Code, as and when an occasion arises. Such a course will defeat the very object of Section 438.

Thirdly, the filing of a First Information Report is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438. The imminence of a likely arrest founded on a reasonable belief can be shown to exist even if an F.I.R. is not yet filed.

Fourthly, anticipatory bail can be granted even after an F.I.R. is filed, so long as the applicant has not been arrested.

Fifthly, the provisions of Section 438 cannot be invoked after the arrest of the accused. The grant of “anticipatory bail” to an accused who is under arrest involves a contradiction in terms, in so far as the offence or offences for which he is arrested, are concerned. After arrest, the accused must seek his remedy under Section 437 or Section 439 of the Code, if he wants to be released on bail in respect of the offence or offences for which he is arrested.

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Etc Vs State Of Punjab on 9 April, 1980

Yadwinder Singh & Others vs State Of H.P. & Others on 10 August, 2018

Posted on August 31, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

A detailed judgment from Hon’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh, categorically held that police at Nalagarh had no jurisdiction, as has/had been held hereinabove, proceedings if any pending before Courts at Nalagarh cannot be allowed to sustain and thereby the FIR dated 7.10.2014 as well as consequent proceedings are quashed and set aside

And the knife is at liberty to initiate action, if any, against the petitioners, on account of allegations contained in impugned FIR but at Jallandhar(Pb), either by lodging fresh FIR or by pursuing complaint filed by her at Women Cell Jallandhar.

Yadwinder Singh & Others Vs State Of H.P. & Others on 10 August, 2018

Monojit Banerjee Vs Shalini Banerjee on 3 October, 2016

Posted on August 31, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka has held in this revision order, that when the impugned order was not an order passed, as ex parte, the learned magistrate was required to hold as inquiry in a DV Case and then should have recorded his finding (to grant interim relief or not).

Sri Monojit Banerjee Vs Smt Shalini Banerjee on 3 October, 2016

Citations: [2

Narendra Vs K.Meena on 6 October, 2016

Posted on August 28, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Apex Court has in this judgment, held that giving repeated threats of suicide to husband and making suicide attempts for no reason, or even one such event was sufficient for the Appellant husband to get a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. It is needless to add that such threats or acts constitute cruelty. And the knife also wanted the Appellant to get separated from his family.

The division bench of the Supreme Court destroyed the arguments of respondent, piece-by-piece.

From Para 10, attempts/threats to commit suicide

10. With regard to the allegations of cruelty levelled by the Appellant, we are in agreement with the findings of the trial Court. First of all, let us look at the incident with regard to an attempt to commit suicide by the Respondent. Upon perusal of the evidence of the witnesses, the findings arrived at by the trial Court to the effect that the Respondent wife had locked herself in the bathroom and had poured kerosene on herself so as to commit suicide, are not in dispute. Fortunately for the Appellant, because of the noise and disturbance, even the neighbours of the Appellant rushed to help and the door of the bathroom was broken open and the Respondent was saved. Had she been successful in her attempt to commit suicide, then one can foresee the consequences and the plight of the Appellant because in that event the Appellant would have been put to immense difficulties because of the legal provisions. We feel that there was no fault on the part of the Appellant nor was there any reason for the Respondent wife to make an attempt to commit suicide. No husband would ever be comfortable with or tolerate such an act by his wife and if the wife succeeds in committing suicide, then one can imagine how a poor husband would get entangled into the clutches of law, which would virtually ruin his sanity, peace of mind, career and probably his entire life. The mere idea with regard to facing legal consequences would put a husband under tremendous stress. The thought itself is distressing. Such a mental cruelty could not have been taken lightly by the High Court. In our opinion, only this one event was sufficient for the Appellant husband to get a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. It is needless to add that such threats or acts constitute cruelty. Our aforesaid view is fortified by a decision of this Court in the case of Pankaj Mahajan v. Dimple @ Kajal (2011) 12 SCC 1, wherein it has been held that giving repeated threats to commit suicide amounts to cruelty.mental

From Para 11, wanted/attempting to get her husband separated from his family

11. The Respondent wife wanted the Appellant to get separated from his family. The evidence shows that the family was virtually maintained from the income of the Appellant husband. It is not a common practice or desirable culture for a Hindu son in India to get separated from the parents upon getting married at the instance of the wife, especially when the son is the only earning member in the family. A son, brought up and given education by his parents, has a moral and legal obligation to take care and maintain the parents, when they become old and when they have either no income or have a meagre income. In India, generally people do not subscribe to the western thought, where, upon getting married or attaining majority, the son gets separated from the family. In normal circumstances, a wife is expected to be with the family of the husband after the marriage. She becomes integral to and forms part of the family of the husband and normally without any justifiable strong reason, she would never insist that her husband should get separated from the family and live only with her. In the instant case, upon appreciation of the evidence, the trial Court came to the conclusion that merely for monetary considerations, the Respondent wife wanted to get her husband separated from his family. The averment of the Respondent was to the effect that the income of the Appellant was also spent for maintaining his family. The said grievance of the Respondent is absolutely unjustified. A son maintaining his parents is absolutely normal in Indian culture and ethos. There is no other reason for which the Respondent wanted the Appellant to be separated from the family – the sole reason was to enjoy the income of the Appellant. Unfortunately, the High Court considered this to be a justifiable reason. In the opinion of the High Court, the wife had a legitimate expectation to see that the income of her husband is used for her and not for the family members of the Respondent husband. We do not see any reason to justify the said view of the High Court. As stated hereinabove, in a Hindu society, it is a pious obligation of the son to maintain the parents. If a wife makes an attempt to deviate from the normal practice and normal custom of the society, she must have some justifiable reason for that and in this case, we do not find any justifiable reason, except monetary consideration of the Respondent wife. In our opinion, normally, no husband would tolerate this and no son would like to be separated from his old parents and other family members, who are also dependent upon his income. The persistent effort of the Respondent wife to constrain the Appellant to be separated from the family would be torturous for the husband and in our opinion, the trial Court was right when it came to the conclusion that this constitutes an act of ‘cruelty’.

From Para 12, allegations of extra-marital affair with maid Kamla

12. With regard to the allegations about an extra-marital affair with maid named Kamla, the re-appreciation of the evidence by the High Court does not appear to be correct. There is sufficient evidence to the effect that there was no maid named Kamla working at the residence of the Appellant. Some averment with regard to some relative has been relied upon by the High Court to come to a conclusion that there was a lady named Kamla but the High Court has ignored the fact that the Respondent wife had levelled allegations with regard to an extra-marital affair of the Appellant with the maid and not with someone else. Even if there was some relative named Kamla, who might have visited the Appellant, there is nothing to substantiate the allegations levelled by the Respondent with regard to an extra-marital affair. True, it is very difficult to establish such allegations but at the same time, it is equally true that to suffer an allegation pertaining to one’s character of having an extra-marital affair is quite torturous for any person – be it a husband or a wife.

Finally from Para 15, desertion of husband for over 20 years

15. Taking an overall view of the entire evidence and the judgment delivered by the trial Court, we firmly believe that there was no need to take a different view than the one taken by the trial Court. The behaviour of the Respondent wife appears to be terrifying and horrible. One would find it difficult to live with such a person with tranquility and peace of mind. Such torture would adversely affect the life of the husband. It is also not in dispute that the Respondent wife had left the matrimonial house on 12th July, 1995 i.e. more than 20 years back. Though not on record, the learned counsel submitted that till today, the Respondent wife is not staying with the Appellant. The daughter of the Appellant and Respondent has also grown up and according to the learned counsel, she is working in an IT company. We have no reason to disbelieve the aforestated facts because with the passage of time, the daughter must have grown up and the separation of the Appellant and the wife must have also become normal for her and therefore, at this juncture it would not be proper to bring them together, especially when the Appellant husband was treated so cruelly by the Respondent wife.

Narendra Vs K.Meena on 6 October, 2016

Citations : [2016 SCC ONLINE SC 1114], [2016 SCC 9 455], [2016 SCC CIV 4 519], [2016 DLT 233 149], [2016 KLJ 4 287], [AIR 2016 SUPREME COURT 4599], [2016 (6) ADR 421], [2016 (4) AKR 822], [AIR 2017 SC (CIVIL) 379], [(2016) 4 CIVILCOURTC 414], [(2016) 7 MAD LJ 726], [(2016) 4 JCR 213 (SC)], [(2017) 1 CIVLJ 748], [(2016) 9 SCALE 681], [(2017) 2 MAD LW 610], [(2016) 6 ALL WC 5441], [(2016) 3 HINDULR 604], [(2016) 3 DMC 429], [(2016) 119 ALL LR 494], [(2016) 4 ICC 746], [(2016) 4 PAT LJR 317], [(2017) 1 MAH LJ 754], [(2017) 1 MPLJ 306], [(2016) 4 JLJR 194], [(2017) 1 CGLJ 425], [(2016) 3 ALL RENTCAS 876], [(2016) 5 CAL HN 1], [(2016) 167 ALLINDCAS 217 (SC)], [(2016) 2 CLR 947 (SC)], [(2016) 10 ADJ 275 (SC)], [(2016) 4 CURCC 157], [(2017) 1 RAJ LW 624], [(2017) 1 MARRILJ 453], [(2016) 2 ORISSA LR 928], [(2017) 1 MARRILJ 475], [(2016) 3 CAL LJ 135], [(2016) 2 WLC(SC)CVL 762], [(2016) 3 GUJ LH 441], [(2016) 4 RECCIVR 706], [(2016) 6 BOM CR 553]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/130314186/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/57f6804ebc41680a2ba53b77

Forcing the husband to leave his parents, who are dependent on his income, amounts to cruelty

Case Summary: Narendra vs. K. Meena on 6 October, 2016

Index of all Divorce Judgments is here.

Shruti Deshpande Vs Shriram Deshpande on 6 March, 2014

Posted on August 25, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this FA appeal judgment from Hon’ble High Court of Chhattisgarh, it has granted divorce decree based on the ground of severe metal cruelty to husband and quashed the lump-sum alimony of INR 5,00,000 to the knife, as it was not prayed for in the petition. Maintenance to daughter is held as is.

Shruti Deshpande Vs Shriram Deshpande on 6 March, 2014

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

Mr M Vs Mrs M on 7 February 2014

Posted on August 25, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this very good divorce judgment from Hon’ble High Court of Bombay, it is held that the knife caused metal cruelty on husband and his parents for the following reason,

the Appellant established that the Respondent could not substantiate the allegations of cruelty in the criminal case. Even the allegations of cruelty made by the Respondent in the written statement in the present case could not be established by her;
The Appellant and his family members were required to attend Criminal Court on 56 different dates from the year 2001 to 2004. Considering the manner in which the criminal case proceeded, the Appellant and his family members were subjected to humiliation, trauma and agony as set out in the deposition of the Appellant;
The Respondent made a very serious defamatory allegation against the Appellant, both in the written statement and in her evidence, that due to ill treatment by the Appellant, she started suffering from arthritis. The Respondent made no efforts to substantiate the said allegation. Thus, the Respondent made unfounded defamatory allegation against the Appellant;
Not only that the Respondent did not substantiate the said allegation, even the cause of death of her father was not brought on record. Even this allegation is an unfounded defamatory allegation;

Mr M Vs Mrs M on 7 February, 2014

Citations:

V.K. Sasikala Vs State on 27 September, 2012

Posted on August 25, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court which held that the accused may be allowed an inspection of the unmarked and unexhibited documents held by court that were submitted along with charge sheet.

From Para 7,

It is the view of the learned trial court as well as the High Court that in the present case the charges against the appellant were framed way back in the year 2007. At the time of the framing of the charge the court is required to satisfy itself that all papers, documents and statements required to be furnished to the accused under Section 207 Cr.P.C. have been so furnished. No grievance in this regard was raised by the appellant or any of the accused. The issue was also not raised at any point of time in the course of examination of any of the prosecution witnesses (over 250 witnesses had been examined). It has also been expressed by the High Court that though the appellant had answered over 532 questions in her examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. no grievance was raised or any prejudice claimed by the appellant at any earlier point of time. It is also the view of the High Court that non furnishing of the copies of the documents or not conceding to the prayer for inspection will not automatically render the prosecution bad in law in as much as the effect of such action must result in prejudice to the accused which question can well be decided when the matter is being considered on merits. The High Court also took the view that the documents, copies or inspection of which was sought, being unmarked and unexhibited documents, objections can always be raised if the accused is to be questioned in connection with such documents in her examination under section 313 Cr.P.C. In addition to the above, the High Court was of the view that this court having passed clear directions in its order dated 18th November, 2003 that the criminal proceedings against the accused should be brought to its earliest conclusion by conducting the trial on day to day basis, the filing of the applications for certified copies/inspection of the unmarked and unexhibited documents constitute another attempt on the part of the appellant to over reach the order of this court and delay the trial. It is the correctness of the reasons assigned by the High Court for ultimate conclusions reached by it that has been assailed before us in the present appeals.

From Para 16,

The declaration of the law in Sidhartha Vashisht (supra) may have touched upon the outer fringe of the issues arising in the present case. However, the positive advancement that has been achieved cannot, in our view, be allowed to take a roundabout turn and the march has only to be carried forward. If the claim of the appellant is viewed in context and perspective outlined above, according to us, a perception of possible prejudice, if the documents or at least an inspection thereof is denied, looms large. The absence of any claim on the part of the accused to the said documents at any earlier point of time cannot have the effect of foreclosing such a right of the accused. Absence of such a claim, till the time when raised, can be understood and explained in several reasonable and acceptable ways. Suffice it would be to say that individual notion of prejudice, difficulty or handicap in putting forward a defence would vary from person to person and there can be no uniform yardstick to measure such perceptions. If the present appellant has perceived certain difficulties in answering or explaining some part of the evidence brought by the prosecution on the basis of specific documents and seeks to ascertain if the allegedly incriminating documents can be better explained by reference to some other documents which are in the court’s custody, an opportunity must be given to the accused to satisfy herself in this regard. It is not for the prosecution or for the Court to comprehend the prejudice that is likely to be caused to the accused. The perception of prejudice is for the accused to develop and if the same is founded on a reasonable basis it is the duty of the Court as well as the prosecution to ensure that the accused should not be made to labour under any such perception and the same must be put to rest at the earliest. Such a view, according to us, is an inalienable attribute of the process of a fair trial that Article 21 guarantees to every accused.

From Para 17,

… What is of significance is if in a given situation the accused comes to the court contending that some papers forwarded to the Court by the investigating agency have not been exhibited by the prosecution as the same favours the accused the court must concede a right to in the accused to have an access to the said documents, if so claimed. This, according to us, is the core issue in the case which must be answered affirmatively. In this regard, we would like to be specific in saying that we find it difficult to agree with the view taken by the High Court that the accused must be made to await the conclusion of the trial to test the plea of prejudice that he may have raised. Such a plea must be answered at the earliest and certainly before the conclusion of the trial, even though it may be raised by the accused belately. This is how the scales of justice in our Criminal Jurisprudence have to be balanced.

V.K. Sasikala Vs State on 27 September, 2012

Citations : [2013 AIR SC 613], [2013 AJR 1 683], [2014 ALLMR CRI 5183], [2013 CRI LJ 177], [2012 JT SC 9 609], [2013 KARLJ 3 83], [2012 KLJ 4 570], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL 1 244], [2012 SCALE 9 488], [2012 SCC 9 771], [2013 SCC CRI 1 1010], [2012 SCR 10 641], [2012 LW CRI 2 759], [2012 AIR SC 5502], [2012 CCR 4 205], [2012 DLT CRI 4 250], [2012 SLT 7 343], [2012 MLJ CRI 4 355], [2013 KANTLJ 3 83], [2013 MAHLJ CRI 1 258], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 799], [2013 ECRN 1 16], [2012 AIR SCW 5502]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/166228518/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af1ee4b0149711415a8c

Nitya Dharmananda @ K. Lenin Vs Sri Gopal Sheelum Reddy on 7 December, 2017

Posted on August 24, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Another gem of Order (not judgment) from my favorite judges Shri Adarsh Kumar Goel J and Shri Uday Umesh Lalit J, where in it was held that,

From Para 9,

Thus, it is clear that while ordinarily the Court has to proceed on the basis of material produced with the charge sheet for dealing with the issue of charge but if the court is satisfied that there is material of sterling quality which has been withheld by the investigator/prosecutor, the court is not debarred from summoning or relying upon the same even if such document is not a part of the charge sheet. It does not mean that the defence has a right to invoke Section 91 Cr.P.C. de hors the satisfaction of the court, at the stage of charge.

Nitya Dharmananda @ K. Lenin Vs Sri Gopal Sheelum Reddy on 7 December, 2017

Citations : [CDJ 2017 SC 1384], [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1430], [(2018) 2 SCC 93], [(2018) 1 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 458], [(2018) 2 SCC 6]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/178580003/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a3408f5ce686e2b4ddaf270

Vijay Natvarlal Tank Vs State Of Gujarat & on 17 January, 2018

Posted on August 18, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

A wonderfully reasoned judgment from Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat held that accused be allowed to seek for documents that prove his innocence, if they were with prosecution/Investigating agencies and not produced in court as part of Charge sheet.

The contention of complainant’s case is quite simple that Section 91 is not applicable in facts and circumstances of the present case and that accused has no right to adduce any evidence until his statement is recorded under Section 313 of the Code.

From Para 9,

It is a settled legal position that neither the investigation agency nor the Court has to complete the investigation and trial respectively only for sake of completing it and against wrong person or without having any substantial evidence against any such persons. In other words, it is settled principle of jurisprudence that the Court has to find out nothing but the truth with reference to any dispute and charges filed before it. It is also settled legal position that pleading generally of the litigation and in particular in Criminal proceedings, where Trial Court’s decision would be disturbed in as much as it would affect the personal freedom of the individual pursuant to his conviction, the accused must be given proper and reasonable opportunity to prove his innocence. It is also well settled that for proving such innocence, accused are certainly entitled to adduce appropriate evidence which may be in their favour to prove them innocence. It is also well settled that for this purpose, the accused may not be denied either the opportunity to produce any information and evidence or to call upon the same, may be with only restriction that it must be in accordance with law and subject to following proper procedure so that other side i.e. victim, complainant, investigating agency and prosecuting agency are having reasonable opportunity to know such evidence and to rebut it if they can. In view of above settled legal position, it becomes clear that disclosure of improper sections in any application and disclosure of some information may not be in requisite form but if such information or material is otherwise relevant to the issue under consideration of the Court, then failing to disclose such information on record or to call for such information and documentary evidence from person where it is lying would result into material irregularity which may ultimately result into illegality and therefore, it is to be avoided. It is also clear that not allowing the accused to prove his case would ultimately result into bright chance of admitting his appeal against conviction and ultimately it may be required to be remanded back. Therefore, to avoid all such situations, one has to look into the rival submissions and law point at this stage only so as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings of either side.

From Para 12,

The respondent is relying upon the decision in the case of Nitya Dharmananda (Supra) but unfortunately applicant wants to read only one line from such judgment which reads that ordinarily the Court produce with the chargesheet for dealing with the issue ofcharge. The reference to the decision in the case of State of Orissa V/s. Debendra Nath Padhi reported in (2005) 1 SCC 568 is not much material for the simple reason that in that case the dispute was with reference to the stage when such documents may be called upon i.e. at the stage of framing of charge or not, whereas even after referring Debednra Nath Padhi (supra) in such recent judgment Hon’ble the Supreme Court has categorically observed and held that the Court being under the obligation to impart justice and to uphold the law, is not debarred from exercising its power, if the interest of justice in a given case so requires, even if the accused may have no right to invoke Section 91 and it is further held that to exercise this power, the Court is to be satisfied that the material available with the investigator, which is not made part of the chargesheet, has crucial bearing on the issue of framing of charge. It is further held that if the Court is satisfied that there is material of sterling quality which has been withheld by the investigator/prosecutor, the Court is not debarred from summoning or relying upon the same even if documents are not a part of the chargesheet. What is considered in all such cases is there may not be mini trial at the stage of framing the charge, but facts would be different after framing of charge and more particularly, when some witnesses are in witness box, it is certainly necessary for the accused to refer certain documents and contradict such witnesses with such documents and pleadings and therefore, such documents are required to be brought on record.

Interesting tidbit:

Though such evidence is not to be considered at this stage, it would be appropriate to recollect that atleast one of the witness being PW no.7 has admitted that first husband of the complainant, advocate has renounced the world and two other husbands have committed suicide.

Vijay Natvarlal Tank Vs State Of Gujarat & on 17 January, 2018

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Sandeep Pamarati

Mary Angel & Ors Vs State Of Tamil Nadu on 13 May, 1999

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Etc Vs State of Punjab on 9 April 1980

Yadwinder Singh & Others vs State Of H.P. & Others on 10 August, 2018

Monojit Banerjee Vs Shalini Banerjee on 3 October, 2016

Narendra Vs K.Meena on 6 October, 2016

Shruti Deshpande Vs Shriram Deshpande on 6 March, 2014

Mr M Vs Mrs M on 7 February 2014

V.K. Sasikala Vs State on 27 September, 2012

Nitya Dharmananda @ K. Lenin Vs Sri Gopal Sheelum Reddy on 7 December, 2017

Vijay Natvarlal Tank Vs State Of Gujarat & on 17 January, 2018