Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd and Ors Vs State of Maharastra and Anr on 17 Dec 2008

Posted on July 19, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A wonderful decision by Supreme Court of India around High Court’s inherent power under section 482 CrPC against the Revisional Powers u/s 401 CrPC.

From Para 8,

8. Indisputably issuance of summons is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 of the Code. This Court in a large number of decisions beginning from R .P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 to Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka , [ (2008) 3 SCC 574 ] has laid down the criterion for entertaining an application under Section 482. Only because a revision petition is maintainable, the same by itself, in our considered opinion, would not constitute a bar for entertaining an application under Section 482 of the Code.
Even where a revision application is barred, as for example the remedy by way of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 this Court has held that the remedies under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India would be available. (See Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, [ (2003) 6 SCC 675 ] ).
Even in cases where a second revision before the High Court after dismissal of the first one by the Court of Sessions is barred under Section 397 (2) of the Code, the inherent power of the Court has been held to be available.

Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd and Ors Vs State of Maharastra and Anr on 17 Dec 2008

Citations : [2009 SCC 2 370], [2009 CRLJ SC 974], [2008 SCALE 16 240], [2009 SCC CRI 1 806], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 1 802], [2008 AIOL 1468], [2008 SCR 17 844], [2009 AIR SC 1032], [2009 AIC SC 75 265], [2009 ECRN SC 2 284]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1891955/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae9ee4b0149711414586

Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency and Anr Vs CBI

Posted on February 16, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

In this Landmark judgment, 3-judge bench held as follows,

35. In view of above, situation of proceedings remaining pending for long on account of stay needs to be remedied. Remedy is required not only for corruption cases but for all civil and criminal cases where on account of stay, civil and criminal proceedings are held up. At times, proceedings are adjourned sine die on account of stay. Even after stay is vacated, intimation is not received and proceedings are not taken up. In an attempt to remedy this, situation, we consider it appropriate to direct that in all pending cases where stay against proceedings of a civil or criminal trial is operating, the same will come to an end on expiry of six months from today unless in an exceptional case by a speaking order such stay is extended. In cases where stay is granted in future, the same will end on expiry of six months from the date of such order unless similar extension is granted by a speaking order. The speaking order must show that the case was of such exceptional nature that continuing the stay was more important than having the trial finalized. The trial Court where order of stay of civil or criminal proceedings is produced, may fix a date not beyond six months of the order of stay so that on expiry of period of stay, proceedings can commence unless order of extension of stay is produced.
36. Thus, we declare the law to be that order framing charge is not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order. Jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution. However, the said jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policy to ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any manner hampered. Thus considered, the challenge to an order of charge should be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction and not to re-appreciate the matter. Even where such challenge is entertained and stay is granted, the matter must be decided on day-to-day basis so that stay does not operate for an unduly long period. Though no mandatory time limit may be fixed, the decision may not exceed two-three months normally. If it remains pending longer, duration of stay should not exceed six months, unless extension is granted by a specific speaking order, as already indicated. Mandate of speedy justice applies to the PC Act cases as well as other cases where at trial stage proceedings are stayed by the higher court i.e. the High Court or a court below the High Court, as the case may be. In all pending matters before the High Courts or other courts relating to PC Act or all other civil or criminal cases, where stay of proceedings in a pending trial is operating, stay will automatically lapse after six months from today unless extended by a speaking order on above parameters. Same course may also be adopted by civil and criminal appellate/revisional courts under the jurisdiction of the High Courts. The trial courts may, on expiry of above period, resume the proceedings without waiting for any other intimation unless express order extending stay is produced.
37. The High Courts may also issue instructions to this effect and monitor the same so that civil or criminal proceedings do not remain pending for unduly period at the trial stage.

R.F. Nariman concurs and holds,

5. On a reference made to a 2-Judge Bench in the Delhi High Court, the learned Chief Justice framed, what he described as, “three facets which emanate for consideration”, as follows:
“(a) Whether an order framing charge under the 1988 Act would be treated as an interlocutory order thereby barring the exercise of revisional power of this Court?
(b) Whether the language employed in Section 19 of the 1988 Act which bars the revision would also bar the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for all purposes?
(c) Whether the order framing charge can be assailed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?”
Answers given to the “three facets” are in paragraph 33 as follows:
“33. In view of our aforesaid discussion, we proceed to answer the reference on following terms:
(a) An order framing charge under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is an interlocutory order.
(b) As Section 19(3)(c) clearly bars revision against an interlocutory order and framing of charge being an interlocutory order a revision will not be
maintainable.
(c) A petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and a writ petition preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are
maintainable.
(d) Even if a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is entertained by the High Court under no circumstances an order of stay should be passed regard being had to the prohibition contained in Section 19(3)(c) of the 1988 Act.
(e) The exercise of power either under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should be sparingly and in exceptional circumstances be exercised keeping in view the law laid down in Siya Ram Singh (supra), Vishesh Kumar (supra), Khalil
Ahmed Bashir Ahmed (supra), Kamal Nath & Others (supra) Ranjeet Singh (supra) and similar line of decisions in the field.
(f) It is settled law that jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot
be exercised as a “cloak of an appeal in disguise” or to re- appreciate evidence. The aforesaid proceedings should be used sparingly with great
care, caution, circumspection and only to prevent grave miscarriage of justice.”

Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency and Anr Vs CBI on 28 March 2018

Another 3-judge bench, again in Oct 2020, had to reiterate the position on the 6-months limit imposed by Supreme Courts, on all stays granted in Civil and Criminal Cases.

Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency and Anr Vs CBI on 15 Oct 2020

Another 2-judge bench clarified that the automatic vacation of 6-months stay only applies to civil and criminal matters only but not to writ petitions.

Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency and Anr Vs CBI on 25 Apr 2022 (Clarification regd Writs)

Citations: [2018 ILR KER 2 79], [2018 KHC 2 380], [2018 RCR CRIMINAL 2 415], [2018 SCALE 5 269],

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/172610348/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5abbcd474a93267cfe9ebef0

Earlier Delhi High Court order (by Shiv Narayan Dhingra ji):

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/58117f222713e179478f3bf5

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs Girdharilal Sapuru And Ors on 11 February 1981

Posted on February 15, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

In this Landmark judgment, Supreme Court had held that,

5. It, however, appears that the respondents contended that the revision petition was barred by limitation. Even this contention is founded on a very technical ground that even though the revision petition was filed very much in time the requisite power of attorney of the learned advocate on behalf of the petition was not legally complete and when it was re-submitted the limitation had expired. Without going into the nicety of this too technical contention, we may notice that Section 397 of the CrPC enables the High Court to exercise power of revision suo motu and when the attention of the High Court was drawn to a clear illegality the High Court could not have rejected the petition as time barred thereby perpetuating the illegality and miscarriage of justice. The question whether a discharge order is interlocutory or otherwise need not detain us because it is settled by a decision of this Court that the discharge order terminates the proceedings and, therefore it is revisable under Section 397(1), Cr.P.C and -Section 397(1) in terms confers power of suo motu revision on the High Court, and if the High Court exercises suo motu revision power the same cannot be denied on the ground that there is some limitation prescribed for the exercise of the power because none such is prescribed. If in such a situation the suo motu power is not exercised what a glaring illegality goes unnoticed can be demonstrably established by this case itself. We however, do not propose to say a single word on the merits of the cause because there should not be even a whimper of prejudice to the accused who in view of this judgment would have to face the trial before the learned Magistrate.

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs Girdharilal Sapuru And Ors on 11 February 1981

Citations: [1981 ACR SC 161], [1981 AIR SC 1169], [1981 PLR 83 593], [1981 SCC 2 758], [1981 UJ 13 217], [1981 CRI LJ 632], [1981 CRLJ 0 632], [1981 SCC CRI 1 598], [1981 UJ SC 1 217], [1981 CAR 348], [1981 CRLR 275], [1981 SCC CR 598]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1790776/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609abf1e4b014971140db74

Anju and 6 Ors Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 02 December 2013

Posted on February 15, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Allahabad High Court has cited a landmark judgment here to hold as follow,

The Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid verdict Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Girdharilas Sapuru and others (Supra) has held that the discharge order terminates the proceeding and, therefore, it is revisable under Section 397 (1) Cr.P.C. This Court while passing the order in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.11721 of 2012 (Supra) has held that an order refusing discharge is not an interlocutory order, inasmuch as if the said application is allowed, it would terminate the proceedings, therefore, the revision against the said order would be maintainable.
In view of the aforesaid decisions, the revision against dismissing the discharge application was very well maintainable before the learned lower revisional court and as such, the order passed by the learned lower revisional court is not sustainable in law.

Anju and 6 Ors Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 02 December 2013 CRLP(A)_20954_2013

Citations:

Other Source links: http://elegalix.allahabadhighcourt.in/elegalix/WebShowJudgment.do?judgmentID=6568265 or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5ac5e4224a93261a672e216f

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from main.sci.gov.in/judgments, judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

Deepak Dwivedi And 2 Others Vs State Of U.P. And Another on 23 January, 2019

Posted on February 13, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Rajasthan High Court has ordered expedited disposal of this DV case within 3 months. Interim maintenance order is reduced to 2500 per month.

Deepak Dwivedi And 2 Others Vs State Of U.P. And Another on 23 January, 2019

S Praveen Vs State Of Karnataka on 25 June, 2012

Posted on July 24, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This is a border-case judgment, wherein Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka has held so,

In the above facts and circumstances and with reference to the law as laid down by the apex court, for purposes of Section 498A of the IPC, though it may not be essential that a legally valid marriage is established, it was necessary to establish that the petitioner and the complainant had lived together as husband and wife. In this regard, there is sadly no evidence is forthcoming. Therefore, even the wider definition applied to the expressions ‘husband’ and ‘marriage’ with reference to the decisions of the apex court referred to hereinabove would not come to the aid of the prosecution.

S Praveen Vs State Of Karnataka on 25 June, 2012

K. Ramachandran Vs V.N. Rajan & Anr on 7 July, 2009

Posted on July 22, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this Landmark judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court, a key legal aspect which was not earlier faced, was deciphered and held. Please read through for yourself.

Categories of case which would justify the High Court in interfering with the finding of acquittal in revision:
“(i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the appellant- accused;
(ii) Where the Trail Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce;
(iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the Trial Court to be inadmissible;
(iv) Where the material evidence has been overlooked only (either) by the Trial Court or by the appellate Court; and
(v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law

Of course, these categories were declared by this Court to be illustrative and this Court observed that other cases of similar nature could also be properly held to be exceptional in nature where the High Court could justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal.

K. Ramachandran Vs V.N. Rajan & Anr on 7 July, 2009

Reema Aggarwal Vs Anupam And Others on 14 November, 2013

Posted on July 21, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissed the revision of knife against the acquittal judgment of husband and others from IPC 498A due to many reasons as listed out by the learned Sessions Judge.

Reasons for acquittal of Husband:

#1 admission made by petitioner Reema in her cross-examination that earlier she was married to Vipin Kumar, and their marriage had not been dissolved by the court of competent jurisdiction. It was, therefore, held that since marriage was not dissolved legally, therefore, her marriage with accused Anupam was void ab initio.

#2 in a case of second marriage, no demand for dowry is usually put forward. It was further observed that petitioner Reema in her statement had not given any particulars or the details of the demands made nor she deposed that any amount was ever given by her to any of the accused.

#3 Raj Mani, the father of the petitioner, made a statement that there was a demand of Rs. 2 lacs from her daughter Reema by the respondents and a sum of Rs. 5,000/- was given by him to his daughter on two occasions. However, the learned trial Court observed that these allegations were levelled for the first time when the said witness deposed before the Court and was duly confronted with earlier statement where no such allegations were made by the father, who stated so for the first time while stepping into the witness box. The said fact assumes significance because the statement of father of the petitioner was also recorded after seven months of the occurrence for which there is no explanation as to why statement was recorded at a belated stage.

#4 it is in the statement of Dr. Rajesh Kumar that Reema was taken to Tagore Hospital, Jalandhar by her husband and in-laws. It was observed that it is also a circumstance which should weigh in favour of the accused as normally, a criminal will not take the patient to hospital to keep victim alive if he had any intention to kill the victim.

#5 it has come in the testimony of Dr. Rajesh Kumar that petitioner herself had told the doctor that she has consumed the acid orally. Thus, the first statement, which was made to the doctor, the petitioner had admitted categorically that she had taken acid orally, which falsifies the entire prosecution story

#6 in the testimony of Dr. Vijay Mahan that if acid is administered forcibly, it is likely to cause some effect on other parts of the body. The Court observed that it is a matter of common knowledge that when a small child do not drink milk and if it is poured into his mouth from glass forcibly, in such circumstances, milk would always spill over other parts of body. However, there was no injury on the tongue or any part of mouth except swelling over the lips, which negates the story of forcible administration of poison

#7 the acid alleged to have been recovered was not sent to the Chemical Examiner for test nor was it produced before the Court. The stomach were not preserved and sent to the Chemical Examiner. Thus, taking into account the above facts, delay in the registration of case, inconsistencies and discrepancies in the statements of witnesses that the learned trial Court acquitted the respondents/accused

Reema Aggarwal vs Anupam And Others on 14 November, 2013

Earlier Supreme Court decision is here.

Chandra Shekhar Alias Lalla Vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 24 April, 2018

Posted on June 2, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Another wonderful judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court in regards to the principle if grave suspicion exist the trial court should commit the case to trial.

A lot of judgments are citing herein.

Chandra Shekhar Alias Lalla Alias ... vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 24 April, 2018

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: CrPC 397/401 – Revision

Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd and Ors Vs State of Maharastra and Anr on 17 Dec 2008

Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency and Anr Vs CBI

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs Girdharilal Sapuru And Ors on 11 February 1981

Anju and 6 Ors Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 02 December 2013

Deepak Dwivedi And 2 Others Vs State Of U.P. And Another on 23 January, 2019

S Praveen Vs State Of Karnataka on 25 June, 2012

K. Ramachandran Vs V.N. Rajan & Anr on 7 July, 2009

Reema Aggarwal Vs Anupam And Others on 14 November, 2013

Chandra Shekhar Alias Lalla Vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 24 April, 2018