Priya Indoria Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 20 Nov 2023

Posted on November 23, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court passed this Judgment around filing of anticipatory bail petition u/s 438 Cr.P.C.

From Paras 40-41, 44-47, (Regd grant of limited Anticipatory bail in HC/Sessions Court in accused’s local State, outside the State in which FIR is registered)

40. We are conscious that this may also lead the accused to choose the Court of his choice for seeking anticipatory bail. Forum shopping may become the order of the day as the accused would choose the most convenient Court for seeking anticipatory bail. This would also make the concept of territorial jurisdiction which is of importance under the CrPC pale into insignificance. Therefore, in order to avoid the abuse of the process of the Court as well as the law by the accused, it is necessary for the Court before which the plea for anticipatory bail is made, to ascertain the territorial connection or proximity between the accused and the territorial jurisdiction of the Court which is approached for seeking such a relief. Such a link with the territorial jurisdiction of the Court could be by way of place of residence or occupation/work/profession. By this, we imply that the accused cannot travel to any other State only for the purpose of seeking anticipatory bail. The reason as to why he is seeking such bail from a Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the FIR has not been filed must be made clear and explicit to such a Court. Also there must be a reason to believe or an imminent apprehension of arrest for a non-bailable offence made out by the accused for approaching the Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the FIR is not lodged or the inability to approach the Court where the FIR is lodged immediately.
41. Having regard to the vastness of our country and the length and breadth of it and bearing in mind the complex nature of life of the citizens, if an offence has been committed by a person in a particular State and if the FIR is filed in another State and the accused is a resident in a third State, bearing in mind access to justice, the accused who is residing in the third State or who is present there for a legitimate purpose should be enabled to seek the relief of limited anticipatory bail of transitory nature in the third State.
44. Further, on a reading of Section 438 of CrPC, we do not find that the expression “the High Court” or “the Court of Session” is restricted vis-à-vis the local limits or any particular territorial jurisdiction. However, this does not mean that if an FIR is lodged in one State then the accused can approach the Court in another State for seeking anticipatory bail. He can do so, if at the time of lodging of the FIR in any State, he is residing or is present there for a legitimate purpose in any other State. In fact, on a reading of Section 438 of CrPC, it does not emerge that the expression “the High Court” or “the Court of Session” must have reference only to the place or territorial jurisdiction within which the FIR is lodged. If that was the implication, the same would have been expressly evident in the Section itself or by a necessary implication. Further use of the word “the” before the words “High Court” and “Court of Session” also does not mean that only the High Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, within whose jurisdiction the FIR is filed, is competent to exercise jurisdiction for the grant of transit anticipatory bail.
45. At the same time, we are also mindful of the fact that the accused cannot seek full-fledged anticipatory bail in a State where he is a resident when the FIR has been registered in a different State. However, in view of what we have discussed above, he would be entitled to seek a transit anticipatory bail from the Court of Session or High Court in the State where he is a resident which necessarily has to be of a limited duration so as to seek regular anticipatory bail from the Court of competent jurisdiction. The need for such a provision is to secure the liberty of the individual concerned. Since anticipatory bail as well as transit anticipatory bail are intrinsically linked to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and since we have extended the concept of access to justice to such a situation and bearing in mind Article 14 thereof it would be necessary to give a constitutional imprimatur to the evolving provision of transit anticipatory bail. Otherwise, in a deserving case, there is likelihood of denial of personal liberty as well as access to justice for, by the time the person concerned approaches the Court of competent jurisdiction to seek anticipatory bail, it may well be too late as he may be arrested. Needless to say, the Court granting transit anticipatory bail would obviously examine the degree and seriousness of the apprehension expressed by the person who seeks transit anticipatory bail; while the object underlying exercise of such jurisdiction is to thwart arbitrary police action and to protect personal liberty besides providing immediate access to justice though within a limited conspectus.
46. If a rejection of the plea for limited/transitory anticipatory bail is made solely with reference to the concept of territorial jurisdiction it would be adding a restriction to the exercise of powers under Section 438. This, in our view, would result in miscarriage and travesty of justice, aggravating the adversity of the accused who is apprehending arrest. It would also be against the principles of access to justice. We say so for the reason that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt and in accordance with law. In the circumstances, we hold that the Court of Session or the High Court, as the case may be, can exercise jurisdiction and entertain a plea for limited anticipatory bail even if the FIR has not been filed within its territorial jurisdiction and depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, if the accused apprehending arrest makes out a case for grant of anticipatory bail but having regard to the fact that the FIR has not been registered within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court or Court of Session, as the case may, at the least consider the case of the accused for grant of transit anticipatory bail which is an interim protection of limited duration till such accused approaches the competent Sessions Court or the High Court, as the case may be, for seeking full-fledged anticipatory bail.
47. There can also be a case where the accused is facing multiple FIRs for the same offence in several States. He may seek an interim protection from a particular Sessions Court or the High Court in a State. Does he have to move from State to State for the purpose of seeking anticipatory bail or seek multiple pre-arrest bails? We would not attempt to give an answer to such a situation as the facts of the present case do not involve such a situation.

From Para 48, (Regd diluting the jurisdiction of Court to try the Sec 498a IPC cases, by going against many earlier judgments)

48. Another issue that calls for reiteration is, whether, the ordinary place of inquiry and trial would include the place where the complainant-wife resides after being separated from her husband. The position of law regarding the ordinary place of investigation and trial as per Section 177 of the CrPC, especially in matrimonial cases alleging cruelty and domestic violence, alleged by the wife, has advanced from the view held in the case of State of Bihar vs. Deokaran Nenshi, (1972) 2 SCC 890; Sujata Mukherjee (Smt.) vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, (1997) 5 SCC 30; Y. Abraham Ajith vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai, (2004) 8 SCC 100, Ramesh vs. State of T.N. (2005) 3 SCC 507; Manish Ratan vs. State of M.P., (2007) 1 SCC 262 that if none of the ingredients constituting the offence can be said to have occurred within the local jurisdiction, that jurisdiction cannot be the ordinary place of investigation and trial of a matrimonial offence. A three judge Bench of this Court has however clarified in Rupali Devi vs. State of U.P., (2019) 5 SCC 384 (Rupali Devi) that adverse effects on mental health of the wife even while residing in her parental home on account of the acts committed in the matrimonial home would amount to commission of cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A at the parental home. It was held that the Courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving or being driven away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would, depending on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498-A of the IPC.

Priya Indoria Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 20 Nov 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Aditi Sharma (alias Mithi) Vs Jitesh Sharma on 06 Nov 2023

Posted on November 8, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court, recorded that Trial Courts are not following Rajnesh Vs Neha Guidelines and directed the circular to be re-issued for strict adherence and compliance.

From Para 8,

8. The manner in which maintenance payable under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to be assessed, was considered by this Court in its celebrated judgment in Rajnesh v. Neha and Another, (2021) 2 SCC 324. Detailed guidelines were issued. It was noticed that the terms of maintenance are decided on the basis of pleadings of parties and on the basis of some amount of guess work. It is often seen that both the parties submit scanty material and do not disclose correct details. The tendency of the wife is to exaggerate her needs, whereas the husband tends to conceal his actual income. Keeping that in view, this Court laid down the procedure to streamline grant of maintenance. The judgments of various courts were referred to and response from various State Legal Services Authorities was sought. This Court even requested the National Legal Services Authority to submit a report on the suggestions received from the State Legal Services Authorities for framing guidelines on the affidavit of disclosure of assets and liabilities to be filed by the parties. Guidelines were issued in exercise of powers under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India, prescribing a uniform format of Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities to be filed in maintenance proceedings. The judgment was delivered on 04.11.2020. The affidavit was to be submitted in all maintenance proceedings including pending proceedings.

From Para 14,

14. Nothing is evident from the record or even pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant at the time of hearing that affidavits were filed by both the parties in terms of judgment of this Court in Rajnesh’s case (supra), which was directed to be communicated to all the High Courts for further circulation to all the Judicial Officers for awareness and implementation. The case in hand is not in isolation. Even after pronouncement of the aforesaid judgment, this Court is still coming across number of cases decided by the courts below fixing maintenance, either interim or final, without their being any affidavit on record filed by the parties. Apparently, the officers concerned have failed to take notice of the guidelines issued by this Court for expeditious disposal of cases involving grant of maintenance. Comprehensive guidelines were issued pertaining to overlapping jurisdiction among courts when concurrent remedies for grant of maintenance are available under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, Section 125 Cr.P.C., the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and Criteria for determining quantum of maintenance, date from which maintenance is to be awarded, enforcement of orders of maintenance including fixing payment of interim maintenance. As a result, the litigation which should close at the trial level is taken up to this Court and the parties are forced to litigate.

From Para 16,

16. Considering the facts of the case in hand and the other similar cases coming across before this Court not adhering to the guidelines given in Rajnesh’s case (supra), we deem it appropriate to direct the Secretary General of this Court to re-circulate the aforesaid judgment not only to all the Judicial Officers through the High Courts concerned but also to the National Judicial Academy and the State Judicial Academies, to be taken note of during the training programmes as well. Ordered accordingly.

Aditi Sharma Vs Jitesh Sharma on 06 Nov 2023

Earlier ‘cryptic’ Judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior is below.

Jitesh Sharma Vs Aditi Sharma on 28 Jun 2023

Citations: [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1451], [2023 INSC 981], []

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/182154741/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/65570ae40c546b25c61fa465

https://legiteye.com/in-criminal-appeal-no-3446-of-2023-sc-supreme-court-directs-re-circulation-of-rajnesh-v-neha-guidelines-on-maintenance-to-ensure-adherence-in-similar-cases-justice-vikram-nath-justice-rajesh-bindal-06-11-2023/

https://lawfyi.io/aditi-alias-mithi-vs-jitesh-sharma-on-6-november-2023/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/aditi-alias-mithi-versus-jitesh-sharma

https://www.lawinsider.in/judgment/landmark-judgement-aditi-v-jitesh-sharma-2023

https://www.latestlaws.com/adr/case-analysis/supreme-court-orders-re-circulation-of-rajnesh-versus-neha-judgment-saying-parties-are-forced-to-litigate-where-litigation-should-close-at-trial-level-208275

Rajnesh Vs Neha case is here.

Index of Maintenance cases is here.

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023

Posted on October 25, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that, Not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for a Writ’s dismissal.

Further it was held that, A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest.

From Para 4,

4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the high courts holding writ petitions as “not maintainable” merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition “not maintainable”. In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the “maintainability” of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that “entertainability” and “maintainability” of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to “maintainability” goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of “entertainability” is entirely within the realm of discretion of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a high court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper.

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023

Citations : [2023 INSC 92], [2023 SCC ONLINE SC 95]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/62928741/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/63dc0f95831db01604ba254b

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/AdvancedV2?docid=2368646

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-godrej-sara-lee-ltd-vs-the-excise-and-taxation-officer-cum-assessing-authority

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/godrej-taxation-alternative-remedy-not-absolute-writ-petition-maintainability-entertainability-apex-court-1460513

Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs The Excise and Taxation officer-cum-Assessing Authority & Ors (Supreme Court)

Mohit Gupta and Ors vs Govt of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 16 Oct 2006

Posted on October 15, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single bench judge at Delhi High Court held that Shivcharan Lal Verma and Anr Vs State of Madhya Pradesh is the precedent that is binding and not the Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam And Others.

From Para 8,

8. These are undoubtedly strong words and clearly show that a person who ostensibly contracts a marriage with a woman and lives with her as husband and wife would also be covered within the meaning of the expression “husband” used in Section 498-A IPC. But the matter does not stop here. The Supreme Court, in the case of Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra), which is a decision of a three-judge bench, was of the contrary view. The facts in that case were that during the lifetime of the first wife, Shivcharan married for the second time. But after the marriage both the first wife and Shivcharan tortured the second wife as a result of which she ultimately committed suicide by burning herself. The incident occurred inside the house while Shivcharan and his first wife were in one room and the second wife was in the other. One of the questions which arose before the Supreme Court was whether the provisions under Section 498-A can at all be attracted since the marriage with the second wife itself was null and void, the same having been performed during the lifetime of the first wife. In answer to this question the Supreme Court observed that there was considerable force in the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that so far as conviction under Section 498-A was concerned, inasmuch as the alleged marriage with the second wife, during the subsistence of a valid marriage with the first wife, was null and void, the same cannot be sustained. The Supreme Court therefore set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 498-A IPC. Going by this a decision, it is clear that the Supreme Court was of the view that as the second marriage was null and void, Shivcharan could not be regarded as a “husband” within the meaning ascribed to it under Section 498-A IPC. Although the learned Counsel for the respondent had, as noted above, made submissions to the effect that this was not a binding precedent, I don’t see as to how this is would not constitute a binding precedent. The point in issue arose out of the facts of the case. It was specifically raised and specifically answered. The ratio of the decision is that a male partner to a null marriage cannot be covered by the expression “husband” as appearing in Section 498-A IPC. It is another thing that the Supreme Court in the case of Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) did not discuss this question with the same degree of elaboration as in the case of Reema Aggarwal (supra). But, this by itself cannot be construed to mean that in Shivcharan lal Verma (supra), the Supreme Court did not consider the entire scope and ambit of the provisions of Section 498-A IPC. It must also be pointed out that the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) has not been noticed in Reema Aggarwal (supra) although the latter decision is later in point of time. So, the decision in Reema Aggarwal (supra) has to be regarded as per incuriam. The second point that has to be kept in mind is that the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) has been rendered by a bench of three honourable judges whereas the decision in the case of Reema Aggarwal (supra) is by a bench of two honourable judges. Clearly, the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) would be binding. In this context it would be pertinent to note the observations of a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 5 SCC 578 wherein the Supreme Court observed [at para 28]:
The well settled principle of precedents which has crystallised into a rule of law is that the bench of lesser strength is bound by the view expressed by a bench of larger strength and cannot take a view in departure or in conflict there from.
Therefore the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) will clearly take precedence over the decision in Reema Aggarwal (supra).

Indiankanoon version:

Mohit Gupta and Ors vs Govt of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 16 Oct 2006 (IK ver)

Casemine version:

Mohit Gupta and Ors vs Govt of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 16 Oct 2006 (CM ver)

Citations: [2007 AD DEL 1 503], [2007 DRJ 93 606], [2006 DLT 135 390], [2007 DMC 1 47], [2006 SCC ONLINE DEL 1256], [2006 JCC 3 1923], [2007 JCC 3 1923]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/338837/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090c14e4b0149711176259

Mohit Gupta And Ors. vs State Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi And Anr. on 16 October, 2006

Index of Quash judgements is here and HMA Judgments is here.

Bimla Tiwari Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 16 Jan 2023

Posted on October 12, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

In this reportable decision of Supreme Court, it was held that the process of criminal law, particularly in matters of grant of bail, is not akin to money recovery proceedings. Recovery of money is essentially within the realm of civil proceedings.

From Paras 9-11,

9. We have indicated on more than one occasion that the process of criminal law, particularly in matters of grant of bail, is not akin to money recovery proceedings but what has been noticed in the present case carries the peculiarities of its own.
10. We would reiterate that the process of criminal law cannot beutilised for arm-twisting and money recovery, particularly while opposing the prayer for bail. The question as to whether pre-arrest bail, or for that matter regular bail, in a given case is to begranted or not is required to be examined and the discretion isrequired to be exercised by the Court with reference to the material on record and the parameters governing bail considerations. Putting it in other words, in a given case, theconcession of pre-arrest bail or regular bail could be declined even if the accused has made payment of the money involved oroffers to make any payment; conversely, in a given case, the concession of pre-arrest bail or regular bail could be granted irrespective of any payment or any offer of payment.
11. We would further emphasize that, ordinarily, there is nojustification in adopting such a course that for the purpose of being given the concession of pre-arrest bail, the personapprehending arrest ought to make payment. Recovery of money is essentially within the realm of civil proceedings.

From Para 15,

15. Thus, it is noticed that these criminal proceedings are being prosecuted only as money recovery proceedings. We have expressed reservations even as regards the aforesaid order dated 10.03.2022, wherein the High Court has proceeded on the propositions of offer made by the co-accused of payment of the sum of Rs.6,00,000/- (six lakhs) and acceptance thereof by the informant (present petitioner). However, since the said order is not before us, we would refrain from making any directions in that regard and else, in our view, even the said order too, on the proposition of granting bail with reference to payment, has its own shortcomings.
16. Even when we are not modifying the condition in the said order dated 10.03.2022 for the same being not before us, so far as the impugned order dated 14.11.2022 is concerned, in our view, it shall be in the interest of justice to annul the requirement of payment of a sum of Rs. 75,000/- (seventy-five thousand) by the accused-respondent No. 2. Hence, the order granting pre-arrest bail to the respondents stands affirmed but, the condition therein, of payment of Rs.75,000/- (seventy-five thousand) by the respondent No.2, stands annulled.

Bimla Tiwari Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 16 Jan 2023

Index of all Bail Matters is here.

Abbayolla M. Subba Reddy Vs Padmamma on 27 Jul 1998

Posted on October 5, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

Abbayolla M. Subba Reddy Vs Padmamma on 27 Jul 1998 (CK)

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/19292/

S.P. Mani and Mohan Dairy Vs Dr Snehalatha Elangovan on 16 Sep 2022

Posted on August 12, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

Om Prakash Sharma Vs State of MP on 25 Mar 2021

Posted on August 9, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench at Gwalior of Madhra Pradesh High Court held as follows,

From Para 5,

5. The aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court in Suresh Chand Jain & Sakiri Vasu (supra) have held the field till date which is evident from perusal of following subsequent verdict of Apex Court rendered after relying upon Sakiri Vasu with approval.
6. In the instant case, as informed by learned counsel for petitioner, no offence has yet been registered by the police. It is also informed that the concerned police station has not yet given any report to the learned Magistrate despite repeated reminders. It is also not denied that the learned Magistrate has not proceeded to record statement of the complainant u/S.200 Cr.P.C. Therefore, in sum and substance, the entire matter hangs fire and is in a state of suspended animation leaving the petitioner-complainant high and dry with no hope of justice coming his way.

From Para 9.1

9.1 Thus, it is incumbent upon the Magistrate u/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. to not only direct for registration of cognizable offence wherever it is found to be not registered by the Police but also to ensure that theinvestigation conducted by the police is fair, expeditious and without any element of prejudice towards anyone, with the sole object ofreaching the truth. The role of the Magistrate u/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. is thus of great significance. Prompt and appropriate exercise of poweru/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. can, not only bring succor to the victim but also to the society at large by bringing the delinquent to the book and in theprocess instilling enough fear in the mind of the miscreant so as to dissuade him from indulging in delinquency again.

From Paras 15-20

Law laid down:
(1) The guidelines laid down for the Magistrates for adjudication of application u/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. complaining about delayed/improper investigation filed along with complaint u/S.200 Cr.P.C.
(2) The complaint u/S.200 Cr.P.C. filed along with 156(3) application need not be kept pending owing to bar contained in Sec.210 Cr.P.C. for more than 60/90 days or any other longer period statutorily provided on expiry of which the police fails to file the final report u/S.173(1) Cr.P.C.
(3) On failure of police to file final report u/S.173(1) Cr.P.C. within 60/90 days or any other longer period statutorily provided, the Magistrate to prevent the complaint u/S.200 Cr.P.C. from suffering a state of stalemate, should proceed by invoking powers contained in Chapter XV and XVI Cr.P.C.
If during pendency of proceedings under Chapter XV and XVI Cr.P.C., invoked as above, Police files the final report then the final report and the complaint case both should proceed as if both have arisen out of police report.

Om Prakash Sharma Vs State of MP on 25 Mar 2021

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/55499395/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/om-prakash-sharma-vs-state-of-m-p-and-another

Hazi Abdul Khaleque Vs Mustt Samsun Nehar on 20 Aug 1990

Posted on August 6, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge from Gauhati High Court held as follows,

From Paras 11, 12 and 13,

11. Under Chapter XXXII, Section 401 of the Code provides that. “Any money (other than a fine) payable by virtue of any order made under this Code, and the method of recovery of which is not otherwise expressly provided for, shall be recoverable as if it were a fine.” The proviso to section 431 is not relevant here. The order for payment of maintenance was an order under the code for payment of money, for the recovery of which no method had been expressly provided. Accordingly, under section 431 of the code, I think the maintenance; money could be recovered, as if it were fine.
12. Section 421 of the Code provides for recovery of fine and the procedure laid down for the purpose was by issue of warrant for attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to offender in this case the present petitioner (opposite party in the maintenance proceeding) or issue of warrant to the Collector of the District, authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter: The provision to Section 421 clearly stipulates that “no such warrant shall be executed by the arrest or detention in prison of the offender.”
13. On consideration of the above provisions, there should be no doubt that for recovery of money as maintenance which has to be in accordance with the procedure for recovery of fine no warrant of arrest or detention of the petitioner could have been ordered. I, therefore think that the impugned order dated 1.9.89 was clearly erroneous and has to be set aside.

Hazi Abdul Khaleque Vs Mustt Samsun Nehar on 20 Aug 1990 (IndianKanoon Ver)

Hazi Abdul Khaleque Vs Mustt Samsun Nehar on 20 Aug 1990 (Casemine Ver)

Hazi Abdul Khaleque Vs Mustt Samsun Nehar on 20 Aug 1990 (LegalData Ver)

Citations: [1990 GAULR 2 328], [1991 CRLJ 1843], [1990 SCC ONLINE GAU 36], [1990 GAU LR 2 328], [1991 CRI LJ 1843]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1507653/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56eaaa49607dba3c8ce3ef96

https://legaldata.in/court/read/2541018

Asfaq Alam Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 31 Jul 2023

Posted on August 5, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

Asfaq Aslam Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 31 Jul 2023

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

Priya Indoria Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 20 Nov 2023

Aditi Sharma (alias Mithi) Vs Jitesh Sharma on 06 Nov 2023

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023

Mohit Gupta and Ors vs Govt of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 16 Oct 2006

Bimla Tiwari Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 16 Jan 2023

Abbayolla M. Subba Reddy Vs Padmamma on 27 Jul 1998

S.P. Mani and Mohan Dairy Vs Dr Snehalatha Elangovan on 16 Sep 2022

Om Prakash Sharma Vs State of MP on 25 Mar 2021

Hazi Abdul Khaleque Vs Mustt Samsun Nehar on 20 Aug 1990

Asfaq Alam Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 31 Jul 2023