Bipin Chander Jaisinghbhai Shah Vs Prabhawati on 19 Oct 1956

Posted on March 13, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows, (with respect to ‘desertion’)

Thus the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned : (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid.

Citations: [1957 AIR 176], [1956 SCR 838]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1131783/

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002

Posted on February 12, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

Sitting on the full bench of Apex Court, Justice Arijit Pasayat, held as follows, while interpreting the statutes passed by the Legislature.

From Para 9,

No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner [(1846) 6 Moore PC 1] “we cannot aid the Legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there”. In case of an ordinary word there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase of general application. Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding the particular case. This principle is too well settled and reference to few decisions of this Court would suffice. [See: Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat and Anr. (AIR 1990 SC 1747), Union of India and Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal (AIR 1992 SC 96), Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse and Anr. (1997 (6) SCC 312) and Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India and Ors. (JT 2002 (3) SC 21)]

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002

Court Kutchehry Version:

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002 (CK)

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 07 Oct 2021 (and other Directions)

Posted on February 7, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed these guidelines with respect to issue of Summons and Warrants and Recall of NBW,

After filing of chargesheet/complaint taking of cognizance
a) Ordinary summons at the 1st instance/including permitting appearance through Lawyer.
b) If such an accused does not appear despite service of summons, then Bailable Warrant for physical appearance may be issued.
c) NBW on failure to failure to appear despite issuance of Bailable Warrant.
d) NBW may be cancelled or converted into a Bailable Warrant/Summons without insisting physical appearance of accused, if such an application is moved on behalf of the accused before execution of the NBW on an undertaking of the accused to appear physically on the next date/s of hearing.
e) Bail applications of such accused on appearance may be decided w/o the accused being taken in physical custody or by granting interim bail till the bail application is decided.

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 07 Oct 2021

Citations: [(2021) 10 SCC 773], [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 577]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/16350770/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/62ba660db50db90d4b55ecaf

A corrected Reportable judgment is passed on 11 Jul 2022…

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 11 Jul 2022

Further time is given to comply with the directions earlier given on 03 Feb 2023…

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 03 Feb 2023

Supreme Court also directed as follows.

The judgment in the present case i.e. “Satender Kumar Antil Vs. CBI” reported in (2022) 10 SCC 51 and the judgment in Siddharth’s case (supra) should be incorporated as part of the curriculum of the State Judicial Academies and the National Judicial Academy.

Interim directions given on 21 Mar 2023 considering the States and High Courts did not provide the required information to Amicus

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 21 Mar 2023

Some individual cases were filed alleging non-compliance of this Order by some Magistrates… SC passed this order on 02 May 2023

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 02 May 2023

Final Judgment on 13 Feb 2024

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 13 Feb 2024

Supreme gave another ‘last’ change on 07 May 2024 to file affidavits that have not complied with the directions issued in this case.

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 07 May 2024

Notices must not be issued via WhatsApp, says Supreme Court.

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI on 21 Jan 2025

Negating the plea of State of Haryana, Supreme Court held that notices u/s 41A of Cr.P.C. or u/s 35 of BNSS cannot be sent via WhatsApp or any other electronic communication medium, unlike section 530 BNSS, which mandates that, Trials, Inquires and Proceedings that may be held in electronic mode, by use of electronic communication or use of audio-video electronic means.” So, Parliament says, Courts can use technologia but Police must use postman.

Satendar Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 16 Jul 2025

Index of NBW Judgments is here.

NCV Aishwarya Vs AS Saravana Karthik Sha on 18 Jul 2022

Posted on January 20, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court said that wife’s convenience which must be looked at while considering transfer.

From Paras 8-11,

8. It is not disputed that the appellant is the resident of Chennai and that the appellant’s husband-respondent herein is the resident of Vellore and he is employed. The appellant who is 21 years old does not have any source of income of her own as she is not employed and is totally dependent on her parents for her livelihood. In order to attend the court proceedings of the case filed by her husband at Vellore she has to travel alone all the way from Chennai to Vellore as her parents are not in a position to accompany her on account of their old age. Secondly, the appellant has also filed a petition, H.M.O.P. No.1741 of 2021, for restitution of conjugal rights and another petition, M.C. Sr. No.672 of 2021, for her maintenance before the Family Court at Chennai.
9. The cardinal principle for exercise of power under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that the ends of justice should demand the transfer of the suit, appeal or other proceeding. In matrimonial matters, wherever Courts are called upon to consider the plea of transfer, the Courts have to take into consideration the economic soundness of both the parties, the social strata of the spouses and their behavioural pattern, their standard of life prior to the marriage and subsequent thereto and the circumstances of both the parties in eking out their livelihood and under whose protective umbrella they are seeking their sustenance to life. Given the prevailing socio-economic paradigm in the Indian society, generally, it is the wife’s
convenience which must be looked at while considering transfer.
10. Further, when two or more proceedings are pending in different Courts between the same parties which raise common question of fact and law, and when the decisions in the cases are interdependent, it is desirable that they should be tried together by the same Judge so as to avoid multiplicity in trial of the same issues and conflict of decisions.
11. As noticed above, the appellant is a young lady aged about 21 years, staying alone along with her aged parents. Under the above circumstances, it is difficult for her to travel all the way from Chennai to Vellore to attend the court proceedings of the case filed by the respondent seeking annulment of marriage. Further, it is also just and proper to club all the three cases together to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings and conflict of decisions. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in rejecting transfer petition bearing TR.C.M.P.No.473 of 2020, filed by the appellant herein.
12. Resultantly, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The Order dated 19.11.2020 passed by the High Court in TR.C.M.P. NO.473 of 2020 is set aside. We direct transfer of F.C.O.P. No.125 of 2020 pending consideration before the Family Court, Vellore to the jurisdictional Family Court at Chennai. We also direct the clubbing of the aforementioned three cases so that a common order may be passed by the concerned Family Court at Chennai.

NCV Aishwarya Vs AS Saravana Karthik Sha on 18 Jul 2022

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Transfer Judgments is here.

Amit Kumar Vs Suman Beniwal on 11 Dec 2021

Posted on January 17, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

In addition to the guidelines issue in Amardeep Singh Vs Harveen Kaur here, Additional guidelines/factors were issued in this case.

From Para 27,

27. For exercise of the discretion to waive the statutory waiting period of six months for moving the motion for divorce under Section 13B (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Court would consider the following amongst other factors:
(i) the length of time for which the parties had been married;
(ii) how long the parties had stayed together as husband and wife;
(iii) the length of time the parties had been staying apart;
(iv) the length of time for which the litigation had been pending;
(v) whether there were any other proceedings between the parties;
(vi) whether there was any possibility of reconciliation;
(vii) whether there were any children born out of the wedlock;
(viii) whether the parties had freely, of their own accord, without any coercion or pressure, arrived at a genuine settlement which took care of alimony, if any, maintenance and custody of children, etc.

Amit Kumar Vs Suman Beniwal on 11 Dec 2021

Index of Divorce cases is here.

Neeta Amar Vs Vipul Amar on 20 Dec 2023

Posted on December 25, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Para 50,

50. Hence, it is no more res integra that such reckless, defamatory, humiliating and unsubstantiated allegations by one spouse, which has the impact of publically tarnishing the image of the other spouse, is nothing but acts of extreme cruelty. In the present case as well, the appellant always had doubts on the fidelity of her husband which necessarily led to harassment resulting in mental cruelty to the respondent/husband. The strongest pillars on which any marriage stands is trust, faith and respect, and thus, no person can reasonably be expected to put with such disrespectful conduct of their “significant other” who lacks faith in her partner. Any spouse not only expects their partner to respect them but also envisions that in times of need, the spouse would act as a shield to protect their image and reputation. Unfortunately, here is a case where the husband himself is being publically harassed, humiliated and verbally-attacked by his wife, who had gone to the extent of levelling allegation of infidelity during his office meetings in front of all his office staff/guests. She even took to harassing the woman workers of his office and left no stone unturned to portray him as a womanizer in the office. This behaviour is but an act of extreme cruelty to the respondent/husband.

From Paras 56 and 57,

56. The other act of cruelty relied upon by the respondent was that the appellant/wife used to allege that the respondent/husband was impotent. She compelled him to go for Doppler‟s Impotency Test in which he was found to be fit. Such allegations caused mental cruelty to the respondent.
57. This version has been explained by the appellant who asserted that the respondent/husband suffered losses in his business on account of change of Government policies in regard to the business with European countries because of which he went into depression and took to smoking and drinking. She, out of concern for his health, insisted on his visiting the Doctor. She denied that she got the Impotency Test conducted of the respondent/ husband. The appellant while fanning ignorance about the test being conducted, herself gave the explanation that the respondent had visited the Doctor to address his problem of not being able to perform sexually when under intoxication and irritated and frustrated. The admissions of the appellant establish that the respondent was made to undergo the Impotency Test in which he was found to be fit. Clearly, such averments and allegations about the manhood of a person would not only be depressive but also mentally traumatic for any person to accept.

From Para 58,

58. The appellant had made serious allegations of respondent being abusive, quarrelsome and erratic in his behaviour. However, in her cross-examination she admitted that the respondent used to provide everything to her and the child and that he never made any dowry demands. The allegations of dowry demands by the respondent and his family members clearly get demolished by her own admissions. Learned Addl. Principal Judge has rightly concluded that levelling of such allegations of dowry demands would certainly cause mental cruelty to the respondent and his family members.

From Para 60,

60. In the case of Prabin Gopal v. Meghna, 2021 SCC OnLine Ker 2193 in a similar situation, the Kerala High Court observed that the mother had intentionally distanced the child from the father and had deprived the child from the parental love and affection. It was a case of parental alienation where the child, who was in the custody of one parent, had been psychologically manipulated against the estranged parent. It was a strategy whereby one parent intentionally displayed to the child unjustified negativity aimed at the other parent, with the intent to damage the relationship between the child and the estranged parent and to turn the child emotionally against the parent. It was further observed that the child has a right to love and affection of both the parents and likewise, the parents also have a right to receive love and affection of the child. Any act of any parent calculated to deny such affection to the other parent, amounts to alienating the child which amounts to mental cruelty. Since the child was in the custody of the mother, it was held that the mother had breached her duty which she owed as a custodian parent to instil love, affection and feelings in the child for the father. Nothing more can be more painful than experiencing one’s own flesh and blood i.e., the child, rejecting him or her. Such wilful alienation of the child by a parent amounts to mental cruelty to the other parent.

Neeta Amar Vs Vipul Amar on 20 Dec 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Omprakash Sahni Vs Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Anr on 02 May 2023

Posted on November 26, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that, Sentence can be suspended in appeal only if convict has fair chances of acquittal.

From Paras 33 to 36,

33. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law, the endeavour on the part of the Court, therefore, should be to see as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and accepted by the Trial Court can be said to be a case in which, ultimately the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal. If the answer to the above said question is to be in the affirmative, as a necessary corollary, we shall have to say that, if ultimately the convict appears to be entitled to have an acquittal at the hands of this Court, he should not be kept behind the bars for a pretty long time till the conclusion of the appeal, which usually take very long for decision and disposal. However, while undertaking the exercise to ascertain whether the convict has fair chances of acquittal, what is to be looked into is something palpable. To put it in other words, something which is very apparent or gross on the face of the record, on the basis of which, the Court can arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that the conviction may not be sustainable. The Appellate Court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 of the CrPC and try to pick up few lacunas or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution. Such would not be a correct approach.
34. In the case on hand, what the High Court has done is something impermissible. High Court has gone into the issues like political rivalry, delay in lodging the FIR, some over-writings in the First Information Report etc. All these aspects, will have to be looked into at the time of the final hearing of the appeals filed by the convicts. Upon cursory scanning of the evidence on record, we are unable to agree with the contentions coming from the learned Senior Counsel for the convicts that, either there is absolutely no case against the convicts or that the evidence against them is so weak and feeble in nature, that, ultimately in all probabilities the proceedings would terminate in their favour. For the very same reason we are unable to accept the contention coming from the convicts through their learned Senior Counsel that, it would be meaningless, improper and unjust to keep them behind the bars for a pretty long time till they are found not to be guilty of the charges.
35. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the High Court committed a serious error in suspending the substantive order of sentence of the convicts and their release on bail pending the final disposal of their criminal appeals.
36. In fact, it was expected of the State as the prosecuting agency to challenge the order passed by the High Court, but for some reason or the other, the State thought fit not to do anything further. Ultimately, it is the original first informant (brother of the deceased) who had to come before this Court.

Omprakash Sahni Vs Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Anr on 02 May 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Priya Indoria Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 20 Nov 2023

Posted on November 23, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court passed this Judgment around filing of anticipatory bail petition u/s 438 Cr.P.C.

From Paras 40-41, 44-47, (Regd grant of limited Anticipatory bail in HC/Sessions Court in accused’s local State, outside the State in which FIR is registered)

40. We are conscious that this may also lead the accused to choose the Court of his choice for seeking anticipatory bail. Forum shopping may become the order of the day as the accused would choose the most convenient Court for seeking anticipatory bail. This would also make the concept of territorial jurisdiction which is of importance under the CrPC pale into insignificance. Therefore, in order to avoid the abuse of the process of the Court as well as the law by the accused, it is necessary for the Court before which the plea for anticipatory bail is made, to ascertain the territorial connection or proximity between the accused and the territorial jurisdiction of the Court which is approached for seeking such a relief. Such a link with the territorial jurisdiction of the Court could be by way of place of residence or occupation/work/profession. By this, we imply that the accused cannot travel to any other State only for the purpose of seeking anticipatory bail. The reason as to why he is seeking such bail from a Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the FIR has not been filed must be made clear and explicit to such a Court. Also there must be a reason to believe or an imminent apprehension of arrest for a non-bailable offence made out by the accused for approaching the Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the FIR is not lodged or the inability to approach the Court where the FIR is lodged immediately.
41. Having regard to the vastness of our country and the length and breadth of it and bearing in mind the complex nature of life of the citizens, if an offence has been committed by a person in a particular State and if the FIR is filed in another State and the accused is a resident in a third State, bearing in mind access to justice, the accused who is residing in the third State or who is present there for a legitimate purpose should be enabled to seek the relief of limited anticipatory bail of transitory nature in the third State.
44. Further, on a reading of Section 438 of CrPC, we do not find that the expression “the High Court” or “the Court of Session” is restricted vis-à-vis the local limits or any particular territorial jurisdiction. However, this does not mean that if an FIR is lodged in one State then the accused can approach the Court in another State for seeking anticipatory bail. He can do so, if at the time of lodging of the FIR in any State, he is residing or is present there for a legitimate purpose in any other State. In fact, on a reading of Section 438 of CrPC, it does not emerge that the expression “the High Court” or “the Court of Session” must have reference only to the place or territorial jurisdiction within which the FIR is lodged. If that was the implication, the same would have been expressly evident in the Section itself or by a necessary implication. Further use of the word “the” before the words “High Court” and “Court of Session” also does not mean that only the High Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, within whose jurisdiction the FIR is filed, is competent to exercise jurisdiction for the grant of transit anticipatory bail.
45. At the same time, we are also mindful of the fact that the accused cannot seek full-fledged anticipatory bail in a State where he is a resident when the FIR has been registered in a different State. However, in view of what we have discussed above, he would be entitled to seek a transit anticipatory bail from the Court of Session or High Court in the State where he is a resident which necessarily has to be of a limited duration so as to seek regular anticipatory bail from the Court of competent jurisdiction. The need for such a provision is to secure the liberty of the individual concerned. Since anticipatory bail as well as transit anticipatory bail are intrinsically linked to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and since we have extended the concept of access to justice to such a situation and bearing in mind Article 14 thereof it would be necessary to give a constitutional imprimatur to the evolving provision of transit anticipatory bail. Otherwise, in a deserving case, there is likelihood of denial of personal liberty as well as access to justice for, by the time the person concerned approaches the Court of competent jurisdiction to seek anticipatory bail, it may well be too late as he may be arrested. Needless to say, the Court granting transit anticipatory bail would obviously examine the degree and seriousness of the apprehension expressed by the person who seeks transit anticipatory bail; while the object underlying exercise of such jurisdiction is to thwart arbitrary police action and to protect personal liberty besides providing immediate access to justice though within a limited conspectus.
46. If a rejection of the plea for limited/transitory anticipatory bail is made solely with reference to the concept of territorial jurisdiction it would be adding a restriction to the exercise of powers under Section 438. This, in our view, would result in miscarriage and travesty of justice, aggravating the adversity of the accused who is apprehending arrest. It would also be against the principles of access to justice. We say so for the reason that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt and in accordance with law. In the circumstances, we hold that the Court of Session or the High Court, as the case may be, can exercise jurisdiction and entertain a plea for limited anticipatory bail even if the FIR has not been filed within its territorial jurisdiction and depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, if the accused apprehending arrest makes out a case for grant of anticipatory bail but having regard to the fact that the FIR has not been registered within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court or Court of Session, as the case may, at the least consider the case of the accused for grant of transit anticipatory bail which is an interim protection of limited duration till such accused approaches the competent Sessions Court or the High Court, as the case may be, for seeking full-fledged anticipatory bail.
47. There can also be a case where the accused is facing multiple FIRs for the same offence in several States. He may seek an interim protection from a particular Sessions Court or the High Court in a State. Does he have to move from State to State for the purpose of seeking anticipatory bail or seek multiple pre-arrest bails? We would not attempt to give an answer to such a situation as the facts of the present case do not involve such a situation.

From Para 48, (Regd diluting the jurisdiction of Court to try the Sec 498a IPC cases, by going against many earlier judgments)

48. Another issue that calls for reiteration is, whether, the ordinary place of inquiry and trial would include the place where the complainant-wife resides after being separated from her husband. The position of law regarding the ordinary place of investigation and trial as per Section 177 of the CrPC, especially in matrimonial cases alleging cruelty and domestic violence, alleged by the wife, has advanced from the view held in the case of State of Bihar vs. Deokaran Nenshi, (1972) 2 SCC 890; Sujata Mukherjee (Smt.) vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, (1997) 5 SCC 30; Y. Abraham Ajith vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai, (2004) 8 SCC 100, Ramesh vs. State of T.N. (2005) 3 SCC 507; Manish Ratan vs. State of M.P., (2007) 1 SCC 262 that if none of the ingredients constituting the offence can be said to have occurred within the local jurisdiction, that jurisdiction cannot be the ordinary place of investigation and trial of a matrimonial offence. A three judge Bench of this Court has however clarified in Rupali Devi vs. State of U.P., (2019) 5 SCC 384 (Rupali Devi) that adverse effects on mental health of the wife even while residing in her parental home on account of the acts committed in the matrimonial home would amount to commission of cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A at the parental home. It was held that the Courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving or being driven away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would, depending on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498-A of the IPC.

Priya Indoria Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 20 Nov 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Aditi Sharma (alias Mithi) Vs Jitesh Sharma on 06 Nov 2023

Posted on November 8, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court, recorded that Trial Courts are not following Rajnesh Vs Neha Guidelines and directed the circular to be re-issued for strict adherence and compliance.

From Para 8,

8. The manner in which maintenance payable under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to be assessed, was considered by this Court in its celebrated judgment in Rajnesh v. Neha and Another, (2021) 2 SCC 324. Detailed guidelines were issued. It was noticed that the terms of maintenance are decided on the basis of pleadings of parties and on the basis of some amount of guess work. It is often seen that both the parties submit scanty material and do not disclose correct details. The tendency of the wife is to exaggerate her needs, whereas the husband tends to conceal his actual income. Keeping that in view, this Court laid down the procedure to streamline grant of maintenance. The judgments of various courts were referred to and response from various State Legal Services Authorities was sought. This Court even requested the National Legal Services Authority to submit a report on the suggestions received from the State Legal Services Authorities for framing guidelines on the affidavit of disclosure of assets and liabilities to be filed by the parties. Guidelines were issued in exercise of powers under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India, prescribing a uniform format of Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities to be filed in maintenance proceedings. The judgment was delivered on 04.11.2020. The affidavit was to be submitted in all maintenance proceedings including pending proceedings.

From Para 14,

14. Nothing is evident from the record or even pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant at the time of hearing that affidavits were filed by both the parties in terms of judgment of this Court in Rajnesh’s case (supra), which was directed to be communicated to all the High Courts for further circulation to all the Judicial Officers for awareness and implementation. The case in hand is not in isolation. Even after pronouncement of the aforesaid judgment, this Court is still coming across number of cases decided by the courts below fixing maintenance, either interim or final, without their being any affidavit on record filed by the parties. Apparently, the officers concerned have failed to take notice of the guidelines issued by this Court for expeditious disposal of cases involving grant of maintenance. Comprehensive guidelines were issued pertaining to overlapping jurisdiction among courts when concurrent remedies for grant of maintenance are available under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, Section 125 Cr.P.C., the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and Criteria for determining quantum of maintenance, date from which maintenance is to be awarded, enforcement of orders of maintenance including fixing payment of interim maintenance. As a result, the litigation which should close at the trial level is taken up to this Court and the parties are forced to litigate.

From Para 16,

16. Considering the facts of the case in hand and the other similar cases coming across before this Court not adhering to the guidelines given in Rajnesh’s case (supra), we deem it appropriate to direct the Secretary General of this Court to re-circulate the aforesaid judgment not only to all the Judicial Officers through the High Courts concerned but also to the National Judicial Academy and the State Judicial Academies, to be taken note of during the training programmes as well. Ordered accordingly.

Aditi Sharma Vs Jitesh Sharma on 06 Nov 2023

Earlier ‘cryptic’ Judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior is below.

Jitesh Sharma Vs Aditi Sharma on 28 Jun 2023

Citations: [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1451], [2023 INSC 981], []

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/182154741/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/65570ae40c546b25c61fa465

https://legiteye.com/in-criminal-appeal-no-3446-of-2023-sc-supreme-court-directs-re-circulation-of-rajnesh-v-neha-guidelines-on-maintenance-to-ensure-adherence-in-similar-cases-justice-vikram-nath-justice-rajesh-bindal-06-11-2023/

https://lawfyi.io/aditi-alias-mithi-vs-jitesh-sharma-on-6-november-2023/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/aditi-alias-mithi-versus-jitesh-sharma

[Landmark Judgement] Aditi V. Jitesh Sharma (2023)

https://www.latestlaws.com/adr/case-analysis/supreme-court-orders-re-circulation-of-rajnesh-versus-neha-judgment-saying-parties-are-forced-to-litigate-where-litigation-should-close-at-trial-level-208275

Rajnesh Vs Neha case is here.

Index of Maintenance cases is here.

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023

Posted on October 25, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that, Not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for a Writ’s dismissal.

Further it was held that, A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest.

From Para 4,

4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the high courts holding writ petitions as “not maintainable” merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition “not maintainable”. In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the “maintainability” of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that “entertainability” and “maintainability” of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to “maintainability” goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of “entertainability” is entirely within the realm of discretion of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a high court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper.

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023

Citations : [2023 INSC 92], [2023 SCC ONLINE SC 95]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/62928741/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/63dc0f95831db01604ba254b

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/AdvancedV2?docid=2368646

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-godrej-sara-lee-ltd-vs-the-excise-and-taxation-officer-cum-assessing-authority

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/godrej-taxation-alternative-remedy-not-absolute-writ-petition-maintainability-entertainability-apex-court-1460513

Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs The Excise and Taxation officer-cum-Assessing Authority & Ors (Supreme Court)

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

Bipin Chander Jaisinghbhai Shah Vs Prabhawati on 19 Oct 1956

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 07 Oct 2021 (and other Directions)

NCV Aishwarya Vs AS Saravana Karthik Sha on 18 Jul 2022

Neeta Amar Vs Vipul Amar on 20 Dec 2023

Omprakash Sahni Vs Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Anr on 02 May 2023

Priya Indoria Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 20 Nov 2023

Aditi Sharma (alias Mithi) Vs Jitesh Sharma on 06 Nov 2023

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023