Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By LRs and Ors Vs Special Deputy Collector (LA) on 08 Apr 2024

Posted on April 11, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed these guidelines with respect to condoning the delay in filing appeals…

From Para 26,

26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.

Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By LRs and Ors Vs Special Deputy Collector (LA) on 08 Apr 2024

Joseph Salvaraj A Vs State of Gujarat and Ors on 4 Jul 2011

Posted on March 21, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 11,

11.The Appellant, thereafter, was constrained to file the petition under Section 482 of the Code in the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, with a prayer for quashing of the FIR bearing C.R. No. I-371/2006 registered with Odhav Police Station and to stay further investigation in the case. The said
application came to be considered before the learned Single Judge on 11.1.2007. By that time, charge sheet was already filed before the Competent Criminal Court. Thus, learned Single Judge, was of the opinion that it was not a fit case to be entertained and refused to hear the petition on merits, even though the appellant was given liberty to file an application for his discharge before the Trial Court. It may be noted that even in its impugned order the learned Single Judge has emphasized that he had not considered the case on merits. Thus the Appellant’s petition was dismissed and interim order granted in his favour was vacated.

From Paras 15 and 16,

15. The allegations in the F.I.R. clearly discloses a civil dispute between the parties and the FIR seems to have been filed only with an intention to harass and humiliate the Appellant. This was a pre-emptive move by the Complainant.
16. A summary Civil Suit under Order 37 Rule II of Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter to be referred as ‘CPC’) has already been filed by Dharmendra P. Rami @ Laläbhai against the Appellant and the Respondent No.4, Complainant herein, before the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad claiming a sum of Rs. 10 lacs together with interest thereon. In the said suit an unconditional leave to defend has already been granted to the Appellant and the matter is still pending. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, it was contended that it is a fit case where the FIR deserves to be quashed otherwise the same would amount to abuse of the process of law.

From Paras 21-23,

21. Criminal breach of trust is defined under Section 405 of the IPC and 406 thereof deals with punishment to be awarded to the accused, if found guilty for commission of the said offence i.e. with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
22. Section 420 of the IPC deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. Cheating has been defined under Section 415 of the IPC to constitute an offence. Under the aforesaid section, it is inbuilt that there has to be a dishonest intention from the very beginning, which is sine qua non to hold the accused guilty for commission of the said offence. Categorical and microscopic examination of the FIR certainly does not reflect any such dishonest intention ab initio on the part of the appellant.
23. Section 506 of the IPC deals with punishment for criminal intimidation. Criminal intimidation, insult and annoyance have been defined in Section 503 of the IPC but the FIR lodged by complainant does not show or reflect that any such threat to cause injury to person or of property was ever given by the Appellant to the Complainant.
24. Thus, from the general conspectus of the various sections under which the Appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the Complainant’s FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge could have still examinedwhether the offences alleged to have been committed by the Appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant’s FIR, charge sheet, documents etc. ornot.
25. In our opinion, the matter appears to be purely civil in nature. There appears to be no cheating or a dishonest inducement for the delivery of propertyor breach of trust by the Appellant. The present FIR is an abuse of process of law. The purely civil dispute, is sought to be given a colour of a criminal offence to wreak vengeance against theAppellant. It does not meet the strict standard of proof required to sustain a criminal accusation.

From Para 27,

27. In fact, all these questions have been elaborately discussed by this Court in the most oft quoted judgment reported in 1992 (Suppl) 1 SCC 335 State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, where seven cardinal principles have been carved out before cognizance of offences, said to have been committed, by the accused is taken. The case in hand unfortunately does not fall in that category where cognizance of the offence could have been taken by the court, at least after having gone through the F.I.R., which discloses only a civil dispute.

Joseph Salvaraj A Vs State of Gujarat and Ors on 4 Jul 2011

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Abhishek Gour Vs State of MP on 31 Aug 2023

Posted on March 20, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of the Apex Court passed this order,

From Para 8, (Police merely replicated the contents of the FIR and added nothing further on the strength of their investigation, observes Supreme Court of India, karma!)

8. Om Prakash, Bhawna’s father, also made a statement before the police on 08.09.2013 on the same lines. He said that her marriage was performed at Indore on 02.07.2007 and as per his status, he had given cash,gold, jewellery, clothes etc., totalling to ₹.5 lakhs, in dowry. He said that, whenever Bhawna came to meet them, she used to tell him and all the neighbours that her husband, Nimish, mother-in-law, Kusum Lata, and brothers-in-law, Abhishek and Sourabh, used to tell her that her father had given nothing in dowry and when she went to her parental home, she should bring .2 lakhs in cash, a car and gold jewellery. ₹ He stated that they had been harassing his daughter mentally and physically for dowry. He alleged that, on Karvachauth day, Bhawna’s mother-in-law had demanded 100 sarees but he had refused. Renubala, Bhawna’s mother, also made a statement on 08.09.2013 on identical lines. Two of their neighbours, Sushila Bai andMohan, also gave statements on the same day, supporting Bhawna’s version. According to them, whenever Bhawna came to meet her parents, she used to tell them that her in-laws were torturing her mentally and physically for dowry.On the other hand, Shailendra and Radhey Shyam, who lived in the neighbourhood where Nimish’s father had his residence, stated to the effect that there were no demands made of Bhawna or her family for dowry and that she was never harassed on that ground. In their final report dated20.09.2013, the police merely replicated the contents of the FIR and added nothing further on the strength of their investigation.

From Para 9, (Attempts to terrorize)

9. Certain other facts are also of pertinence and may be noted. Abhishek entered judicial service as a Civil Judge six or seven months after the marriage of Bhawna with Nimish. He was posted at Ujjain and, thereafter,at Neemuch in Madhya Pradesh. Kusum Lata used to reside with Abhishek. Saurabh, Bhawna’s other brother-in-law, is an architect and was working at Delhi since the year 2007. Nimish made written representations to the police authorities at Narsinghpur on 09.09.2012 and 17.11.2012 complaining of intimidation by and at the behest of Bhawna. Prior thereto, an anonymous complaint was made to the Chief Justice, Madhya Pradesh High Court, against Abhishek, making scandalous allegations to the effect that he was undeserving of judicial office. A complaint was also made to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Mumbai, purportedly in the name of one Sanyogita Mishra. Again, the allegations therein were directed against Abhishek.

From Para 11,

11. This being the factual backdrop, we may note at the very outset that the contention that the appellants’ quash petition against the FIR was liable to be dismissed, in any event, as the chargesheet in relation thereto was submitted before the Court and taken on file, needs mention only to be rejected. It is well settled that the High Court would continue to have the power to entertain and act upon a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR even when a chargesheet is filed by the police during the pendency of such petition [See Joseph Salvaraj A. vs. State of Gujarat and others {(2011) 7 SCC 59}]. This principle was reiterated in Anand Kumar Mohatta and another vs. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home and another [(2019) 11 SCC 706]. This issue, therefore, needs no further elucidation on our part.

From Para 13,

13. Instances of a husband’s family members filing a petition to quash criminal proceedings launched against them by his wife in the midst of matrimonial disputes are neither a rarity nor of recent origin. Precedents aplenty abound on this score. We may now take note of some decisions of particular relevance. Recently, in Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam and others vs. State of Bihar and others [(2022) 6 SCC 599], this Court had occasion to deal with a similar situation where the High Court had refused to quash a FIR registered for various offences, including Section 498A IPC. Noting that the foremost issue that required determination was whether allegations made against the in-laws were general omnibus allegations which would be liable to be quashed, this Court referred to earlier decisions wherein concern was expressed over the misuse of Section 498A IPC and the increased tendency to implicate relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes. This Court observed that false implications by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial disputes, if left unchecked, would result in misuse of the process of law. On the facts of that case, it was found that no specific allegations were made against the in-laws by the wife and it was held that allowing their prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against the in-laws would result in an abuse of the process of law. It was also noted that a criminal trial, leading to an eventual acquittal, would inflict severe scars upon the accused and such an exercise ought to be discouraged.

From Para 21, (unexplained delay)

21. Most damaging to Bhawna’s case is the fact that she did nothing whatsoever after leaving her matrimonial home in February, 2009, and filed a complaint in the year 2013 alleging dowry harassment, just before her husband instituted divorce proceedings.

Abhishek Gour Vs State of MP on 31 Aug 2023

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Bipin Chander Jaisinghbhai Shah Vs Prabhawati on 19 Oct 1956

Posted on March 13, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows, (with respect to ‘desertion’)

Thus the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned : (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid.

Bipin Chander Jaisinghbhai Shah Vs Prabhawati on 19 Oct 1956

Citations: [1957 AIR 176], [1956 SCR 838]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1131783/

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002

Posted on February 12, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

Sitting on the full bench of Apex Court, Justice Arijit Pasayat, held as follows, while interpreting the statutes passed by the Legislature.

From Para 9,

No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner [(1846) 6 Moore PC 1] “we cannot aid the Legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there”. In case of an ordinary word there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase of general application. Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding the particular case. This principle is too well settled and reference to few decisions of this Court would suffice. [See: Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat and Anr. (AIR 1990 SC 1747), Union of India and Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal (AIR 1992 SC 96), Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse and Anr. (1997 (6) SCC 312) and Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India and Ors. (JT 2002 (3) SC 21)]

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002

Court Kutchehry Version:

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002 (CK)

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 07 Oct 2021 (and other Directions)

Posted on February 7, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed these guidelines with respect to issue of Summons and Warrants and Recall of NBW,

After filing of chargesheet/complaint taking of cognizance
a) Ordinary summons at the 1st instance/including permitting appearance through Lawyer.
b) If such an accused does not appear despite service of summons, then Bailable Warrant for physical appearance may be issued.
c) NBW on failure to failure to appear despite issuance of Bailable Warrant.
d) NBW may be cancelled or converted into a Bailable Warrant/Summons without insisting physical appearance of accused, if such an application is moved on behalf of the accused before execution of the NBW on an undertaking of the accused to appear physically on the next date/s of hearing.
e) Bail applications of such accused on appearance may be decided w/o the accused being taken in physical custody or by granting interim bail till the bail application is decided.

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 07 Oct 2021

Citations: [(2021) 10 SCC 773], [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 577]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/16350770/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/62ba660db50db90d4b55ecaf

A corrected Reportable judgment is passed on 11 Jul 2022…

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 11 Jul 2022

Further time is given to comply with the directions earlier given on 03 Feb 2023…

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 03 Feb 2023

Supreme Court also directed as follows.

The judgment in the present case i.e. “Satender Kumar Antil Vs. CBI” reported in (2022) 10 SCC 51 and the judgment in Siddharth’s case (supra) should be incorporated as part of the curriculum of the State Judicial Academies and the National Judicial Academy.

Interim directions given on 21 Mar 2023 considering the States and High Courts did not provide the required information to Amicus

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 21 Mar 2023

Some individual cases were filed alleging non-compliance of this Order by some Magistrates… SC passed this order on 02 May 2023

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 02 May 2023

Final Judgment on 13 Feb 2024

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 13 Feb 2024

Supreme gave another ‘last’ change on 07 May 2024 to file affidavits that have not complied with the directions issued in this case.

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 07 May 2024

Notices must not be issued via WhatsApp, says Supreme Court.

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI on 21 Jan 2025

Negating the plea of State of Haryana, Supreme Court held that notices u/s 41A of Cr.P.C. or u/s 35 of BNSS cannot be sent via WhatsApp or any other electronic communication medium, unlike section 530 BNSS, which mandates that, Trials, Inquires and Proceedings that may be held in electronic mode, by use of electronic communication or use of audio-video electronic means.” So, Parliament says, Courts can use technologia but Police must use postman.

Satendar Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 16 Jul 2025

Index of NBW Judgments is here.

NCV Aishwarya Vs AS Saravana Karthik Sha on 18 Jul 2022

Posted on January 20, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court said that wife’s convenience which must be looked at while considering transfer.

From Paras 8-11,

8. It is not disputed that the appellant is the resident of Chennai and that the appellant’s husband-respondent herein is the resident of Vellore and he is employed. The appellant who is 21 years old does not have any source of income of her own as she is not employed and is totally dependent on her parents for her livelihood. In order to attend the court proceedings of the case filed by her husband at Vellore she has to travel alone all the way from Chennai to Vellore as her parents are not in a position to accompany her on account of their old age. Secondly, the appellant has also filed a petition, H.M.O.P. No.1741 of 2021, for restitution of conjugal rights and another petition, M.C. Sr. No.672 of 2021, for her maintenance before the Family Court at Chennai.
9. The cardinal principle for exercise of power under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that the ends of justice should demand the transfer of the suit, appeal or other proceeding. In matrimonial matters, wherever Courts are called upon to consider the plea of transfer, the Courts have to take into consideration the economic soundness of both the parties, the social strata of the spouses and their behavioural pattern, their standard of life prior to the marriage and subsequent thereto and the circumstances of both the parties in eking out their livelihood and under whose protective umbrella they are seeking their sustenance to life. Given the prevailing socio-economic paradigm in the Indian society, generally, it is the wife’s
convenience which must be looked at while considering transfer.
10. Further, when two or more proceedings are pending in different Courts between the same parties which raise common question of fact and law, and when the decisions in the cases are interdependent, it is desirable that they should be tried together by the same Judge so as to avoid multiplicity in trial of the same issues and conflict of decisions.
11. As noticed above, the appellant is a young lady aged about 21 years, staying alone along with her aged parents. Under the above circumstances, it is difficult for her to travel all the way from Chennai to Vellore to attend the court proceedings of the case filed by the respondent seeking annulment of marriage. Further, it is also just and proper to club all the three cases together to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings and conflict of decisions. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in rejecting transfer petition bearing TR.C.M.P.No.473 of 2020, filed by the appellant herein.
12. Resultantly, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The Order dated 19.11.2020 passed by the High Court in TR.C.M.P. NO.473 of 2020 is set aside. We direct transfer of F.C.O.P. No.125 of 2020 pending consideration before the Family Court, Vellore to the jurisdictional Family Court at Chennai. We also direct the clubbing of the aforementioned three cases so that a common order may be passed by the concerned Family Court at Chennai.

NCV Aishwarya Vs AS Saravana Karthik Sha on 18 Jul 2022

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Transfer Judgments is here.

Amit Kumar Vs Suman Beniwal on 11 Dec 2021

Posted on January 17, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

In addition to the guidelines issue in Amardeep Singh Vs Harveen Kaur here, Additional guidelines/factors were issued in this case.

From Para 27,

27. For exercise of the discretion to waive the statutory waiting period of six months for moving the motion for divorce under Section 13B (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Court would consider the following amongst other factors:
(i) the length of time for which the parties had been married;
(ii) how long the parties had stayed together as husband and wife;
(iii) the length of time the parties had been staying apart;
(iv) the length of time for which the litigation had been pending;
(v) whether there were any other proceedings between the parties;
(vi) whether there was any possibility of reconciliation;
(vii) whether there were any children born out of the wedlock;
(viii) whether the parties had freely, of their own accord, without any coercion or pressure, arrived at a genuine settlement which took care of alimony, if any, maintenance and custody of children, etc.

Amit Kumar Vs Suman Beniwal on 11 Dec 2021

Index of Divorce cases is here.

Neeta Amar Vs Vipul Amar on 20 Dec 2023

Posted on December 25, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Para 50,

50. Hence, it is no more res integra that such reckless, defamatory, humiliating and unsubstantiated allegations by one spouse, which has the impact of publically tarnishing the image of the other spouse, is nothing but acts of extreme cruelty. In the present case as well, the appellant always had doubts on the fidelity of her husband which necessarily led to harassment resulting in mental cruelty to the respondent/husband. The strongest pillars on which any marriage stands is trust, faith and respect, and thus, no person can reasonably be expected to put with such disrespectful conduct of their “significant other” who lacks faith in her partner. Any spouse not only expects their partner to respect them but also envisions that in times of need, the spouse would act as a shield to protect their image and reputation. Unfortunately, here is a case where the husband himself is being publically harassed, humiliated and verbally-attacked by his wife, who had gone to the extent of levelling allegation of infidelity during his office meetings in front of all his office staff/guests. She even took to harassing the woman workers of his office and left no stone unturned to portray him as a womanizer in the office. This behaviour is but an act of extreme cruelty to the respondent/husband.

From Paras 56 and 57,

56. The other act of cruelty relied upon by the respondent was that the appellant/wife used to allege that the respondent/husband was impotent. She compelled him to go for Doppler‟s Impotency Test in which he was found to be fit. Such allegations caused mental cruelty to the respondent.
57. This version has been explained by the appellant who asserted that the respondent/husband suffered losses in his business on account of change of Government policies in regard to the business with European countries because of which he went into depression and took to smoking and drinking. She, out of concern for his health, insisted on his visiting the Doctor. She denied that she got the Impotency Test conducted of the respondent/ husband. The appellant while fanning ignorance about the test being conducted, herself gave the explanation that the respondent had visited the Doctor to address his problem of not being able to perform sexually when under intoxication and irritated and frustrated. The admissions of the appellant establish that the respondent was made to undergo the Impotency Test in which he was found to be fit. Clearly, such averments and allegations about the manhood of a person would not only be depressive but also mentally traumatic for any person to accept.

From Para 58,

58. The appellant had made serious allegations of respondent being abusive, quarrelsome and erratic in his behaviour. However, in her cross-examination she admitted that the respondent used to provide everything to her and the child and that he never made any dowry demands. The allegations of dowry demands by the respondent and his family members clearly get demolished by her own admissions. Learned Addl. Principal Judge has rightly concluded that levelling of such allegations of dowry demands would certainly cause mental cruelty to the respondent and his family members.

From Para 60,

60. In the case of Prabin Gopal v. Meghna, 2021 SCC OnLine Ker 2193 in a similar situation, the Kerala High Court observed that the mother had intentionally distanced the child from the father and had deprived the child from the parental love and affection. It was a case of parental alienation where the child, who was in the custody of one parent, had been psychologically manipulated against the estranged parent. It was a strategy whereby one parent intentionally displayed to the child unjustified negativity aimed at the other parent, with the intent to damage the relationship between the child and the estranged parent and to turn the child emotionally against the parent. It was further observed that the child has a right to love and affection of both the parents and likewise, the parents also have a right to receive love and affection of the child. Any act of any parent calculated to deny such affection to the other parent, amounts to alienating the child which amounts to mental cruelty. Since the child was in the custody of the mother, it was held that the mother had breached her duty which she owed as a custodian parent to instil love, affection and feelings in the child for the father. Nothing more can be more painful than experiencing one’s own flesh and blood i.e., the child, rejecting him or her. Such wilful alienation of the child by a parent amounts to mental cruelty to the other parent.

Neeta Amar Vs Vipul Amar on 20 Dec 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Omprakash Sahni Vs Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Anr on 02 May 2023

Posted on November 26, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that, Sentence can be suspended in appeal only if convict has fair chances of acquittal.

From Paras 33 to 36,

33. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law, the endeavour on the part of the Court, therefore, should be to see as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and accepted by the Trial Court can be said to be a case in which, ultimately the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal. If the answer to the above said question is to be in the affirmative, as a necessary corollary, we shall have to say that, if ultimately the convict appears to be entitled to have an acquittal at the hands of this Court, he should not be kept behind the bars for a pretty long time till the conclusion of the appeal, which usually take very long for decision and disposal. However, while undertaking the exercise to ascertain whether the convict has fair chances of acquittal, what is to be looked into is something palpable. To put it in other words, something which is very apparent or gross on the face of the record, on the basis of which, the Court can arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that the conviction may not be sustainable. The Appellate Court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 of the CrPC and try to pick up few lacunas or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution. Such would not be a correct approach.
34. In the case on hand, what the High Court has done is something impermissible. High Court has gone into the issues like political rivalry, delay in lodging the FIR, some over-writings in the First Information Report etc. All these aspects, will have to be looked into at the time of the final hearing of the appeals filed by the convicts. Upon cursory scanning of the evidence on record, we are unable to agree with the contentions coming from the learned Senior Counsel for the convicts that, either there is absolutely no case against the convicts or that the evidence against them is so weak and feeble in nature, that, ultimately in all probabilities the proceedings would terminate in their favour. For the very same reason we are unable to accept the contention coming from the convicts through their learned Senior Counsel that, it would be meaningless, improper and unjust to keep them behind the bars for a pretty long time till they are found not to be guilty of the charges.
35. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the High Court committed a serious error in suspending the substantive order of sentence of the convicts and their release on bail pending the final disposal of their criminal appeals.
36. In fact, it was expected of the State as the prosecuting agency to challenge the order passed by the High Court, but for some reason or the other, the State thought fit not to do anything further. Ultimately, it is the original first informant (brother of the deceased) who had to come before this Court.

Omprakash Sahni Vs Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Anr on 02 May 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By LRs and Ors Vs Special Deputy Collector (LA) on 08 Apr 2024

Joseph Salvaraj A Vs State of Gujarat and Ors on 4 Jul 2011

Abhishek Gour Vs State of MP on 31 Aug 2023

Bipin Chander Jaisinghbhai Shah Vs Prabhawati on 19 Oct 1956

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 07 Oct 2021 (and other Directions)

NCV Aishwarya Vs AS Saravana Karthik Sha on 18 Jul 2022

Neeta Amar Vs Vipul Amar on 20 Dec 2023

Omprakash Sahni Vs Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Anr on 02 May 2023