Dolly Rani Vs Manish Kumar Chanchal on 19 Apr 2024

Posted on August 10, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that a Hindu marriage without conducting the marriage ceremonies is not a valid marriage.

We find that the registration of Hindu marriages under the said provision is only to facilitate the proof of a Hindu marriage but for that, there has to be a Hindu marriage in accordance with Section 7 of the Act inasmuch as there must be a marriage ceremony which has taken place between the parties in accordance with the said provision. Although the parties may have complied with the requisite conditions for a valid Hindu marriage as per
Section 5 of the Act in the absence of there being a “Hindu marriage” in accordance with Section 7 of the Act, i.e., solemnization of such a marriage, there would be no Hindu marriage in the eye of law. In the absence of there being a valid Hindu marriage, the Marriage Registration Officer cannot
register such a marriage under the provisions of Section 8 of the Act. Therefore, if a certificate is issued stating that the couple had undergone marriage and if the marriage ceremony had not been performed in accordance with Section 7 of the Act, then the registration of such marriage under Section 8 would not confer any legitimacy to such a marriage. The registration of a marriage under Section 8 of the Act is only to confirm that the
parties have undergone a valid marriage ceremony in accordance with Section 7 of the Act. In other words, a certificate of marriage is a proof of validity of Hindu marriage only when such a marriage has taken place and not in a case where there is no marriage ceremony performed at all.
We further observe that a Hindu marriage is a sacrament and has a sacred character. In the context of saptapadi in a Hindu marriage, according to Rig Veda, after completing the seventh step (saptapadi) the bridegroom says to his bride, “With seven steps we have become friends (sakha). May I attain to friendship with thee; may I not be separated from thy friendship”. A wife is considered to be half of oneself (ardhangini) but to be accepted with an identity of her own and to be a co-equal partner in the marriage. There is nothing like a “better-half” in a marriage but the spouses are equal halves in a marriage.

Also

No doubt, under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, a man and a woman can acquire the status of being a husband and a wife as per the provisions of the said Act. The Special Marriage Act, 1954 is not restricted to Hindus. Any man and woman irrespective of their race, caste or creed can acquire the status of being a husband and a wife under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 but under the provisions of the Act (Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955), there should not only be compliance of the conditions as prescribed under Section 5 of the said Act but also the couple must solemnise a marriage in accordance with Section 7 of the Act. In the absence of there being any such marriage in accordance with Section 7 of the Act, a certificate
issued in that regard by any entity is of no legal consequence. Further, any registration of a marriage which has not at all taken place under Section 8 of the Act and as per the rules made by the State Government would not be evidence of a Hindu marriage and also does not confer the status of a husband and a wife to a couple.
In recent years, we have come across several instances where for “practical purposes”, a man and a woman with the intention of solemnisation of their marriage at a future date seek to register their marriage under Section 8 of the Act on the basis of a document which may have been issued as proof of ‘solemnisation of their marriage’ such as in the instant case. As we have already noted, any such registration of a marriage before the Registrar of Marriages and a certificate being issued thereafter would not confirm that the parties have ‘solemnised’ a Hindu marriage. We note that parents of young couples agree for registration of a marriage in order to apply for Visa for emigration to foreign countries where either of the parties may be working “in order to save time” and pending formalising a marriage ceremony. Such practices have to be deprecated. What would be the consequence, if no such marriage is solemnised at all at a future date? What would be the status of the parties then? Are they husband and wife in law and do they acquire such status in society?

Dolly Rani Vs Manish Kumar Chanchal on 19 Apr 2024

State of Karnataka Vs T.Naseer @ Thadiantavida Naseer on 6 Nov 2023

Posted on August 10, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that when the original electronic devices were already produced and marked MOs, there was no need to produce the certificate under Section 65-B of the Act.

From Para 15,

15. Fair trial in a criminal case does not mean that it should be fair to one of the parties. Rather, the object is that no guilty should go scot-free and no innocent should be punished. A certificate under Section 65-B of the Act, which is sought to be produced by the prosecution is not an evidence which has been created now. It is meeting the requirement of law to prove a report on record. By permitting the prosecution to produce the certificate under Section 65B of the Act at this stage will not result in any irreversible prejudice to the accused. The accused will have full opportunity to rebut the evidence led by the prosecution. This is the purpose for which Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. is there. The object of the Code is to arrive at truth. However, the power under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. can be exercised to subserve the cause of justice and public interest. In the case in hand, this exercise of power is required to uphold the truth, as no prejudice as such is going to be caused to the accused.

State of Karnataka Vs T.Naseer @ Thadiantavida Naseer on 6 Nov 2023

Santhosh Shat Vs State of Karnataka and Anr on 06 Aug 2024

Posted on August 10, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Karnataka High Court held that, non-filing of certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act to mark the electronic evidence is a curable defect and at any time during the trail a certificate can be produced.

From Para 6,

6. Per contra, the learned High Court Government Pleader would vehemently refute the submissions to contend that non-filing of certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act to markthe electronic evidence is a curable defect. It is not that the document would not be entertainable at all, as at any time duringthe trail a certificate can be produced. He would contend that the petitioner has indulged in heinous act of sexual assault on the student, who was at that point in time 14 years old, being her teacher. Therefore, this Court on any ground should not interfere with the orders that are passed by the concerned Court, which are in tune with law and not contrary to law.

From Para 9,

The objection is that the CD could not have been marked in evidence, as there is no certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act and if there is no such certificate it does not become an evidence and, therefore, marking of compact disc should be rejected. In the light of the objection so made by the petitioner, the prosecution filed additional charge sheet and appended this video along with a certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act citing it as additional material to be marked through PWs-1, 2 and 3. Here again the petitioner objects contending that the certificate under Section 65-B is not by the Competent Authority.

From Paras 11 and 12,

The Apex Court, in the aforesaid judgments, would hold that electronic evidence can be marked at any time during the trial. The certificate under Section 65-B can be produced, which would neither vitiate the trial conducted on the basis of the electronic evidence nor enure to the benefit of the accused, to contend that no proceedings should be permitted to be proceeded further on the marking of the electronic evidence. The Apex Court in the case of T. NASEER supra has clearly held that Section 311 of the Cr.P.C., is in the statute only for this purpose, as it is a voyage towards discovery of truth. Under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C., marking of document, examination, re-examination, cross-examination and further cross-examination can take place. Therefore, the first glorified submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner tumbles down, as the evidence that is let in being the compact disc, without attaching to it a certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act, does not and did not vitiate the proceedings.
12. It appears that due to serious objection of the petitioner, the prosecution took recourse to another route of marking it by way of supplementary charge sheet. In fact what is produced is not a supplementary charge sheet after further investigation as is done in the normal parlance. It is termed as supplementary charge sheet, but what it appends to it is only the compact disc, with the certificate under Section 65-B. This cannot give a right in favour of the petitioner to contend that after the commencement of evidence there cannot be production of supplementary charge sheet. While
there can be no quarrel about the contention of the petitioner that once evidence would commence after framing of charges, there cannot be a supplementary charge sheet, as that right ceases or freezes in favour of the prosecution, the day charges are framed. Alteration of charge can happen at any time during the trial under Section 216 of the Cr.P.C., but not an additional charge sheet. In the case at hand, it is not an additional charge sheet or a supplementary charge sheet. Only the compact disc is marked along with the certificate, that too because the petitioner objected contending that the compact disc could not be marked without Section 65-B certificate. The submissions of the learned High Court Government Pleader overpowers what the learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended, as the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner runs counter to what the Apex Court has held in the judgments supra.

Santhosh Shat Vs State of Karnataka and Anr on 06 Aug 2024

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 15 Jul 2024

Posted on July 16, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Paras 10 and 11,

10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant herein would submit that a scanning of the judgment of the trial Court would reveal that the Court had appropriately appreciated the evidence on record and convicted accused Nos.1 and 2 upon satisfying itself that the ingredients to attract the offence punishable under Section 494 I.P.C., have been made out by the appellant. Furthermore, it is submitted that a bare perusal of the impugned judgment would reveal that the High Court had rightly considered the contentions of the appellant herein against the reversal of their conviction by the First Appellate Court that it was founded on surmises and conjectures. We are of the considered view that no more narrative on the correctness of the reversal of the judgment of the First Appellate Court by the High Court under the impugned judgment is required as the indisputable and undisputed position is that its reversal was accepted by accused Nos.1 and 2 and they had undergone the sentence imposed by the High Court consequent to the reversal of the First Appellate Court’s judgment. We may note here that the learned senior counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant had not accepted any compensation and in the same breath, would further submit that the appellant did not want any such compensation.
11. In the aforesaid circumstances, the sole question surviving for consideration is whether the High Court was right in not restoring the sentence imposed for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., by the trial Court when it accepted the contentions of the appellant and reversed the acquittal of accused Nos.1 and 2 and restored the conviction entered on them by the trial Court. In other words, the question is whether the High Court had shown undeserving leniency and sympathy to accused Nos.1 and 2 even after finding that they have committed the serious offence of bigamy punishable under Section 494 I.P.C., and whether they were let off with a flea-bite sentence and whether an enhancement of sentence is invited?

From Paras 14 and 15,

14. A reading of Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C., would reveal that the legislature viewed the offence of bigamy as a serious offence. Though no minimum sentence is prescribed under Section 494 I.P.C., the maximum sentence of imprisonment prescribed thereunder for a conviction thereunder is seven years of imprisonment of either description. It is also to be noted that the said offence is compoundable only by the husband or wife of the person so marrying with the permission of the Court. The same offence under Section 494 I.P.C., with concealment of former marriage from person with whom subsequent marriage is contracted would visit the offender with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and with fine. This offence, which is an aggravated form of bigamy, is non-compoundable. The decision in Gopal Lal’s case (supra), and the prescription of maximum corporeal sentence imposable under Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C.,would undoubtedly suggest that the offence under Section 494 I.P.C., has to be treated as a serious offence.
15. When once it is found that an offence under Section494 I.P.C., is a serious offence, the circumstances obtaining in this case would constrain us to hold that the imposition of ‘imprisonment till the rising of the court’ is not a proper sentence falling in tune with the rule of proportionality in providing punishment as mentioned hereinbefore.

From Para 20, (Alteration of the imprisonment and fine)

20. Certain circumstances revealed from the evidence on record cannot go unnoticed while deciding the question of proper sentence. Earlier, the appellant herein filed HMOP 515/2012 before the Family Court, Coimbatore, seeking divorce. In the judgment of the trial Court, taking note of the evidence adduced, it was noted that the first accused had filed a petition seeking interim maintenance in the above HMOP and based on a petition in that regard the Court had ordered the appellant to pay Rs. 5,000/- per month to the first accused and she had received the maintenance till 13.07.2017. The evidence would further show that a child was born to the first and second accused in their wedlock in November, 2017. The evidence on record would reveal that on 22.01.2019, the first accused herself filed HMOP No.84 of 2019 seeking dissolution of her marriage with the appellant. In such circumstances, it is evident that the first accused married the second accused while the marriage between the appellant and the first accused was subsisting and not only that, during its subsistence, she had also begotten a child through the second accused. Taking into account all the circumstances, it can be said that undeserving leniency was shown in the case on hand. But then, taking into account the fact that the child born to the first and second accused was aged less than two years when the trial Court passed the sentence and that no minimum term of imprisonment is prescribed for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., and that the maximum sentence imposable for conviction thereunder is seven years, we are of the considered view that the trial Court had virtually struck a balance in fixing the term of one year as the corporeal sentence. But then, taking note of the fact that the said child is now aged only about six years and the sentence for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., can be of both descriptions. We think it appropriate to use our judicial discretion to modify the sentence imposed under the impugned judgment. Accordingly, we modify the term of the sentence awarded to accused Nos.1 and 2 for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., to six months each, making the nature of the sentence as simple imprisonment for the said period. We further modify the fine imposed by reducing the same from Rs. 20,000/- each to Rs. 2,000/- each, as originally awarded by the trial Court. Needless to say, that the default sentence therefor, awarded by the trial Court i.e., to undergo simple imprisonment for three months is also restored. If in terms of the impugned judgment, accused Nos.1 and 2 had already deposited Rs. 20,000/-, after making deduction in terms of the sentence of fine mentioned hereinbefore, the balance amount shall be refunded to them in accordance with the law. In the said circumstances, accused Nos.1 and 2 shall surrender before the trial Court so as to serve out the unserved period of sentence imposed on them by this judgment. Taking note of the fact that the child of accused Nos.1 and 2 is now aged only about 6 years, we further order that firstly the second accused shall surrender before the trial Court, within a period of 3 weeks from today to serve out the rest of the sentence. Upon his release from the jail, on suffering the sentence, the first accused shall surrender before the Court to serve her remaining period of sentence and such surrender shall be made by the first accused within a period of 2 weeks from the release of the second accused from the jail. This arrangement shall not be treated as a precedent as it was ordered in these special circumstances. In case the accused Nos.1 and 2 do not surrender in terms of this judgment on their own, the trial Court shall resort to appropriate steps in accordance with law to place them in custody and make them suffer the sentence as mentioned hereinbefore. The appeals are allowed as above.

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 15 Jul 2024

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/punishment-must-be-in-proportion-to-gravity-of-offence-supreme-court-enhances-sentence-bigamous-marriage-263490

https://www.legiteye.com/supreme-court-modifies-sentence-in-bigamy-case-orders-staggered-jail-terms-for-couple-justices-ct-ravikumar-sanjay-kumar-15-07-2024/

https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-caselaw/2024/july/2024-latest-caselaw-433-sc/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6696638231ed747732bfccdc

https://citecase.in/baba-natarajan-prasad-vs-m-revathi-2024-insc-523-s-494-ipc-bigamy-sentencing/

https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=17724

https://x.com/SCJudgments/status/1813118439701057835

https://lawyerenews.com/supreme-court-enhances-sentence-in-bigamy-case/

https://www.freelaw.in/legalnews/Punishment-of-imprisonment-till-the-rising-of-the-court-is-a-flea-bite-sentence-for-those-convicted-for-an-offence-of-bigamy-Supreme-Court-

https://www.the-laws.com/encyclopedia/browse/case?caseId=004202345000&title=baba-natarajan-prasad-vs-m-revathi

Flea-Bite

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/baba-natarajan-prasad-v-m-revathi-2024-insc-523-bigamy-494-ipc-serious-offence-1544100

The decision of the District Court is here.

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 21 Apr 2019

Index of Bigamy Judgments is here.

Mohammad Miyan and Ors Vs State of UP on 21 Aug 2018

Posted on July 14, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

Mr. R. K. Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants-accused, submits that the prosecution under section 498A of IPC was clearly not tenable in view of the case of the complainant herself that there had been a divorce almost four years before filing of the FIR.
We find much substance in the submission made by Mr. Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants-accused. Even in the FIR dated 18.8.2015, the complainant-wife has stated that her divorce had taken place about four years back. It is not possible to accept the contention made by learned counsel appearing on behalf of complainant-wife that she made the statement in ignorance of Sharia law. She is a Headmistress and must be credited with due knowledge of her meritorious status.
In view of her own averment that she was divorced four years ago, we are of the view that the prosecution is not sustainable under section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Section 498A of the IPC opens with the words “Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman….” Therefore, where the complainant approaches with a case that there has been a divorce long back i.e. four years ago before filing of the FIR, section 498A of IPC in terms would not be attracted. We accordingly consider it appropriate to quash the prosecution against all the accused persons under section 498A of IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

Mohammad Miyan Vs State of UP on 21 Aug 2018

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/150839791/

Index of Quash Judgments is here.

Inderjeet Kaur Kalsi Vs NCT of Delhi and Anr on 27 Nov 2013

Posted on July 9, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 21.1 and 21.2,

21. Findings
21.1 At the outset, this Court is of the view that having availed the remedy of revision before the Sessions Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C., the petitioner cannot be allowed to re-agitate the same point before this Court in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as it would amount to a second revision which is specifically barred by Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. This petition amounts to a second revision petition in the garb of Section 482 Cr.P.C.
21.2 Although the power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, it has to be used sparingly and cautiously to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The petitioner has also not been able to make out any case of abuse of process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This Court is, therefore, not inclined to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Inderjeet Kaur Kalsi Vs NCT of Delhi and Anr on 27 Nov 2013

Ruchi Agarwal Vs Amit Kumar Agrawal and Ors on 5 Nov 2004

Posted on May 22, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that Once MCD done with no future claims, maintenance cannot be claimed later.

It is based on the said compromise the appellant obtained a divorce as desired by her under Section 13(B) of the Hindu Marriage Act and in partial compliance of the terms of the compromise she withdrew the criminal case filed under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code but for reasons better known to her she did not withdraw that complaint from which this appeal arises. That apart after the order of the High Court quashing the said complaint on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, she has chosen to file this appeal. It is in this background, we will have to appreciate the merits of this appeal.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, however, contended that though the appellant had signed the compromise deed with the above-mentioned terms in it, the same was obtained by the respondent-husband and his family under threat and coercion and in fact she did not receive lump sum maintenance and her Stridhan properties, we find it extremely difficult to accept this argument in the background of the fact that pursuant to the compromise deed the respondent-husband has given her a consent divorce which she wanted thus had performed his part of the obligation under the compromise deed. Even the appellant partially performed her part of the obligations by withdrawing her criminal complaint filed under Section 125. It is true that she had made a complaint in writing to the Family Court where Section 125 Cr.P.C. proceedings were pending that the compromise deed was filed under coercion but she withdrew the same and gave a statement before the said court affirming the terms of the compromise which statement was recorded by the Family Court and the proceedings were dropped and a divorce was obtained. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant having received the relief she wanted without contest on the basis of the terms of the compromise, we cannot now accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. In our opinion, the conduct of the appellant indicates that the criminal complaint from which this appeal arises was filed by the wife only to harass the respondents.

Ruchi Agarwal Vs Amit Kumar Agrawal and Ors on 5 Nov 2004

Citations:

Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1892287/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adf3e4b01497114129dc

Saroj Rani Vs Sudarshan Kumar Chadha on 8 Aug 1984

Posted on May 22, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that ‘Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (popularly called as Restitution of Conjugal Rights case) is not violative of Articles 14 and 21 (right to privacy)‘.

Saroj Rani Vs Sudarshan Kumar Chadha on 8 Aug 1984

Achin Gupta Vs State of Haryana and Anr on 03 May 2024

Posted on May 4, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 31-32,

31. We are of the view that the category 7 referred to above should be taken into consideration and applied in a case like the one on hand a bit liberally. If the Court is convinced by the fact that the involvement by the complainant of her husband and his close relatives is with an oblique motive then even if the FIR and the chargesheet disclose the commission of a cognizable offence the Court with a view to doing substantial justice should read in between the lines the oblique motive of the complainant and take a pragmatic view of the matter. If the submission canvassed by the counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 2 and the State is to be accepted mechanically then in our opinion the very conferment of the inherent power by the Cr.P.C. upon the High Court would be rendered otiose. We are saying so for the simple reason that if the wife on account of matrimonial disputes decides to harass her husband and his family members then the first thing, she would ensure is to see that proper allegations are levelled in the First Information Report. Many times the services of professionals are availed for the same and once the complaint is drafted by a legal mind, it would be very difficult thereafter to weed out any loopholes or other deficiencies in the same. However, that does not mean that the Court should shut its eyes and raise its hands in helplessness, saying that whether true or false, there are allegations in the First Information Report and the chargesheet papers disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. If the allegations alone as levelled, more particularly in the case like the one on hand, are to be looked into or considered then why the investigating agency thought fit to file a closure report against the other co-accused? There is no answer to this at the end of the learned counsel appearing for the State. We say so, because allegations have been levelled not only against the Appellant herein but even against his parents, brother & sister. If that be so, then why the police did not deem fit to file chargesheet against the other co-accused? It appears that even the investigating agency was convinced that the FIR was nothing but an outburst arising from a matrimonial dispute.
32. Many times, the parents including the close relatives of the wife make a mountain out of a mole. Instead of salvaging the situation and making all possible endeavours to save the marriage, their action either due to ignorance or on account of sheer hatred towards the husband and his family members, brings about complete destruction of marriage on trivial issues. The first thing that comes in the mind of the wife, her parents and her relatives is the Police, as if the Police is the panacea of all evil. No sooner the matter reaches up to the Police, then even if there are fair chances of reconciliation between the spouses, they would get destroyed. The foundation of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance to each other’s fault to a certain bearable extent has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles, trifling differences are mundane matters and should not be exaggerated and blown out of proportion to destroy what is said to have been made in the heaven. The Court must appreciate that all quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case, always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties, their character and social status. A very technical and hyper sensitive approach would prove to be disastrous for the very institution of the marriage. In matrimonial disputes the main sufferers are the children. The spouses fight with such venom in their heart that they do not think even for a second that if the marriage would come to an end, then what will be the effect on their children. Divorce plays a very dubious role so far as the upbringing of the children is concerned. The only reason why we are saying so is that instead of handling the whole issue delicately, the initiation of criminal proceedings would bring about nothing but hatred for each other. There may be cases of genuine ill-treatment and harassment by the husband and his family members towards the wife. The degree of such ill-treatment or harassment may vary. However, the Police machinery should be resorted to as a measure of last resort and that too in a very genuine case of cruelty and harassment. The Police machinery cannot be utilised for the purpose of holding the husband at ransom so that he could be squeezed by the wife at the instigation of her parents or relatives or friends. In all cases, where wife complains of harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498A of the IPC cannot be applied mechanically. No FIR is complete without Sections 506(2) and 323 of the IPC. Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty.

From Para 35,

35. In one of the recent pronouncements of this Court in Mahmood Ali & Ors. v. State of U.P & Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950, authored by one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J.), the legal principle applicable apropos Section 482 of the CrPC was examined. Therein, it was observed that when an accused comes before the High Court, invoking either the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC or the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed, essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances, the High Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. It was further observed that it will not be enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not as, in frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, to try and read between the lines.

Achin Gupta Vs State of Haryana and Anr on 03 May 2024

Index of Quash judgments is here.

K Sreekanth Naik Vs P Nalini and Anr on 25 Apr 2024

Posted on May 3, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held that an Order for Maintenance passed without adhering to the guidelines issued by Apex Court in Rajnesh Vs Neha is liable to be set aside.

From Para 5,

5. During the hearing, it is brought to the notice of the Court that both parties have not complied with the directions of the Hon’ble Apex Court enunciated in the judgment of Rajnesh V. Neha & Anr.,1 concerning the filing of affidavits disclosing the assets and liabilities. Considering the submissions made, I have gone through the observations in Rajnesh V. Neha (cited supra) case. The said judgment has brought revolutionary change in the procedure to be followed by the Courts in dealing with the applications filed under Chapter IX of the Cr.P.C. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has issued comprehensive procedural and normative directions streamlining the maintenance laws, inter alia, directing that the parties in a maintenance application have to file affidavits of disclosure of their assets and liabilities, which must be considered by Courts while deciding the application. It is also held that, in case of a dispute on the declaration made in the affidavits of disclosure, the aggrieved person can seek leave of the Court to serve interrogatories on the opposite side and seek production of relevant documents as provided under Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in case a false statement or misrepresentation is made, the Court can initiate proceedings under section 340 of the Cr.P.C., or for Contempt of Court.

From Paras 7-14,

7. The aforesaid Judgment in the case of Rajnesh (cited supra) has been recently reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Aditi alias Mithi V. Jitesh Sharma 2 and expressing anguish over noncompliance/ improper compliance of the directions laid down in case of Rajnesh (supra) and directed re-circulation of the judgment for compliance thereof.
8. It is acknowledged that both parties have failed to submit the affidavits disclosing their assets and liabilities. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied on the decision of High Court of Patna in between Gitanjali Devi @ Gitanjali Kumari V. State of Bihar and another3, wherein, it is observed that the impugned order of granting maintenance amount is liable to be set aside for the reason that it has not followed the procedure prescribed by the Hon’ble Apex Court.
9. By following the principles laid down in the Aditi alias Mithi’s case cited supra, the High Court of Madras in Balram Dixit V. Smt. Kiran Dixit and another (Criminal Revision No.1255 of 2023, dated 17.01.2024) also set aside the maintenance awarded by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court,Gwalior and further directed the both parties to submit fresh affidavits of disclosure of assets and liabilities with complete particulars in compliance with the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down in the case of Rajnesh’s case cited supra.
10. Learned counsels representing both sides submit that because of lack of proper instructions, both parties could not comply with the directions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and at present, they are ready to comply with the observations made in the judgments referred to supra, by filing the affidavits and both parties submits that the Respondent-husband is paying interim maintenance amount @ Rs.8,000/- per month vide orders dated 26.09.2019 in Crl.M.P.No.39 of 2019 in F.C.O.P.No.183 of 2018 and he is ready to pay such maintenance amount during the pendency of FCOPs and after its restoration.
11. In view of the same, this Court refrains from delving into the merits of the case at this juncture, as the impugned order passed in F.C.O.P.No.183 of 2018 is liable to be set aside for the reason that it has not followed the procedures prescribed by the Hon’ble Apex Court.
12. The impugned order passed in F.C.O.P.No.183 of 2018, is accordingly, set aside and the matter is remitted back to the learned Judge, Family Court – cum – VII Additional District Judge, Ananthapuramu for fresh consideration and by following the procedures which are laid down in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
13. This Court further directs the both parties to submit affidavits disclosing their assets and liabilities, giving complete particulars, in accordance with the directives of the Hon’ble Apex Court as laid down in the case of Rajnesh (supra) before the Family Court. The Family Court must ensure strict adherence to these guidelines. If any of the affidavits are found to be lacking in necessary particulars, the learned Judge shall direct to produce the relevant information from the respective party.
14. The Family Court shall dispose of the F.C.O.P.No.183 of 2018 afresh after giving reasonable opportunity to both parties to let in further evidence, if any. In the meantime, the Respondent-husband is directed to pay maintenance amount of Rs.8,000/- per month to the Petitioner-wife till the disposal of the FCOP. Both parties are directed to bear their own costs.

K Sreekanth Naik Vs P Nalini and Anr on 25 Apr 2024

Disclaimer: This is a case that I handled myself for the husband. This is my first reportable judgment.

Citations: [2024 Latest Caselaw 3581 AP]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7473550/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/671c878cafb795648bb5985d

https://mynation.net/docs/1098-2023/

https://latestlaws.com/judgements/andhra-high-court/2024/april/2024-latest-caselaw-3581-ap

Index of Maintenance cases under section 125 CrPC is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

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