Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 15 Jul 2024

Posted on July 16, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Paras 10 and 11,

10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant herein would submit that a scanning of the judgment of the trial Court would reveal that the Court had appropriately appreciated the evidence on record and convicted accused Nos.1 and 2 upon satisfying itself that the ingredients to attract the offence punishable under Section 494 I.P.C., have been made out by the appellant. Furthermore, it is submitted that a bare perusal of the impugned judgment would reveal that the High Court had rightly considered the contentions of the appellant herein against the reversal of their conviction by the First Appellate Court that it was founded on surmises and conjectures. We are of the considered view that no more narrative on the correctness of the reversal of the judgment of the First Appellate Court by the High Court under the impugned judgment is required as the indisputable and undisputed position is that its reversal was accepted by accused Nos.1 and 2 and they had undergone the sentence imposed by the High Court consequent to the reversal of the First Appellate Court’s judgment. We may note here that the learned senior counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant had not accepted any compensation and in the same breath, would further submit that the appellant did not want any such compensation.
11. In the aforesaid circumstances, the sole question surviving for consideration is whether the High Court was right in not restoring the sentence imposed for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., by the trial Court when it accepted the contentions of the appellant and reversed the acquittal of accused Nos.1 and 2 and restored the conviction entered on them by the trial Court. In other words, the question is whether the High Court had shown undeserving leniency and sympathy to accused Nos.1 and 2 even after finding that they have committed the serious offence of bigamy punishable under Section 494 I.P.C., and whether they were let off with a flea-bite sentence and whether an enhancement of sentence is invited?

From Paras 14 and 15,

14. A reading of Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C., would reveal that the legislature viewed the offence of bigamy as a serious offence. Though no minimum sentence is prescribed under Section 494 I.P.C., the maximum sentence of imprisonment prescribed thereunder for a conviction thereunder is seven years of imprisonment of either description. It is also to be noted that the said offence is compoundable only by the husband or wife of the person so marrying with the permission of the Court. The same offence under Section 494 I.P.C., with concealment of former marriage from person with whom subsequent marriage is contracted would visit the offender with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and with fine. This offence, which is an aggravated form of bigamy, is non-compoundable. The decision in Gopal Lal’s case (supra), and the prescription of maximum corporeal sentence imposable under Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C.,would undoubtedly suggest that the offence under Section 494 I.P.C., has to be treated as a serious offence.
15. When once it is found that an offence under Section494 I.P.C., is a serious offence, the circumstances obtaining in this case would constrain us to hold that the imposition of ‘imprisonment till the rising of the court’ is not a proper sentence falling in tune with the rule of proportionality in providing punishment as mentioned hereinbefore.

From Para 20, (Alteration of the imprisonment and fine)

20. Certain circumstances revealed from the evidence on record cannot go unnoticed while deciding the question of proper sentence. Earlier, the appellant herein filed HMOP 515/2012 before the Family Court, Coimbatore, seeking divorce. In the judgment of the trial Court, taking note of the evidence adduced, it was noted that the first accused had filed a petition seeking interim maintenance in the above HMOP and based on a petition in that regard the Court had ordered the appellant to pay Rs. 5,000/- per month to the first accused and she had received the maintenance till 13.07.2017. The evidence would further show that a child was born to the first and second accused in their wedlock in November, 2017. The evidence on record would reveal that on 22.01.2019, the first accused herself filed HMOP No.84 of 2019 seeking dissolution of her marriage with the appellant. In such circumstances, it is evident that the first accused married the second accused while the marriage between the appellant and the first accused was subsisting and not only that, during its subsistence, she had also begotten a child through the second accused. Taking into account all the circumstances, it can be said that undeserving leniency was shown in the case on hand. But then, taking into account the fact that the child born to the first and second accused was aged less than two years when the trial Court passed the sentence and that no minimum term of imprisonment is prescribed for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., and that the maximum sentence imposable for conviction thereunder is seven years, we are of the considered view that the trial Court had virtually struck a balance in fixing the term of one year as the corporeal sentence. But then, taking note of the fact that the said child is now aged only about six years and the sentence for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., can be of both descriptions. We think it appropriate to use our judicial discretion to modify the sentence imposed under the impugned judgment. Accordingly, we modify the term of the sentence awarded to accused Nos.1 and 2 for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., to six months each, making the nature of the sentence as simple imprisonment for the said period. We further modify the fine imposed by reducing the same from Rs. 20,000/- each to Rs. 2,000/- each, as originally awarded by the trial Court. Needless to say, that the default sentence therefor, awarded by the trial Court i.e., to undergo simple imprisonment for three months is also restored. If in terms of the impugned judgment, accused Nos.1 and 2 had already deposited Rs. 20,000/-, after making deduction in terms of the sentence of fine mentioned hereinbefore, the balance amount shall be refunded to them in accordance with the law. In the said circumstances, accused Nos.1 and 2 shall surrender before the trial Court so as to serve out the unserved period of sentence imposed on them by this judgment. Taking note of the fact that the child of accused Nos.1 and 2 is now aged only about 6 years, we further order that firstly the second accused shall surrender before the trial Court, within a period of 3 weeks from today to serve out the rest of the sentence. Upon his release from the jail, on suffering the sentence, the first accused shall surrender before the Court to serve her remaining period of sentence and such surrender shall be made by the first accused within a period of 2 weeks from the release of the second accused from the jail. This arrangement shall not be treated as a precedent as it was ordered in these special circumstances. In case the accused Nos.1 and 2 do not surrender in terms of this judgment on their own, the trial Court shall resort to appropriate steps in accordance with law to place them in custody and make them suffer the sentence as mentioned hereinbefore. The appeals are allowed as above.

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 15 Jul 2024

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/punishment-must-be-in-proportion-to-gravity-of-offence-supreme-court-enhances-sentence-bigamous-marriage-263490

https://www.legiteye.com/supreme-court-modifies-sentence-in-bigamy-case-orders-staggered-jail-terms-for-couple-justices-ct-ravikumar-sanjay-kumar-15-07-2024/

https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-caselaw/2024/july/2024-latest-caselaw-433-sc/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6696638231ed747732bfccdc

https://citecase.in/baba-natarajan-prasad-vs-m-revathi-2024-insc-523-s-494-ipc-bigamy-sentencing/

https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=17724

https://x.com/SCJudgments/status/1813118439701057835

https://lawyerenews.com/supreme-court-enhances-sentence-in-bigamy-case/

https://www.freelaw.in/legalnews/Punishment-of-imprisonment-till-the-rising-of-the-court-is-a-flea-bite-sentence-for-those-convicted-for-an-offence-of-bigamy-Supreme-Court-

https://www.the-laws.com/encyclopedia/browse/case?caseId=004202345000&title=baba-natarajan-prasad-vs-m-revathi

Flea-Bite

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/baba-natarajan-prasad-v-m-revathi-2024-insc-523-bigamy-494-ipc-serious-offence-1544100

The decision of the District Court is here.

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 21 Apr 2019

Index of Bigamy Judgments is here.

Mohammad Miyan and Ors Vs State of UP on 21 Aug 2018

Posted on July 14, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

Mr. R. K. Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants-accused, submits that the prosecution under section 498A of IPC was clearly not tenable in view of the case of the complainant herself that there had been a divorce almost four years before filing of the FIR.
We find much substance in the submission made by Mr. Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants-accused. Even in the FIR dated 18.8.2015, the complainant-wife has stated that her divorce had taken place about four years back. It is not possible to accept the contention made by learned counsel appearing on behalf of complainant-wife that she made the statement in ignorance of Sharia law. She is a Headmistress and must be credited with due knowledge of her meritorious status.
In view of her own averment that she was divorced four years ago, we are of the view that the prosecution is not sustainable under section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Section 498A of the IPC opens with the words “Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman….” Therefore, where the complainant approaches with a case that there has been a divorce long back i.e. four years ago before filing of the FIR, section 498A of IPC in terms would not be attracted. We accordingly consider it appropriate to quash the prosecution against all the accused persons under section 498A of IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

Mohammad Miyan Vs State of UP on 21 Aug 2018

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/150839791/

Index of Quash Judgments is here.

Inderjeet Kaur Kalsi Vs NCT of Delhi and Anr on 27 Nov 2013

Posted on July 9, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 21.1 and 21.2,

21. Findings
21.1 At the outset, this Court is of the view that having availed the remedy of revision before the Sessions Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C., the petitioner cannot be allowed to re-agitate the same point before this Court in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as it would amount to a second revision which is specifically barred by Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. This petition amounts to a second revision petition in the garb of Section 482 Cr.P.C.
21.2 Although the power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, it has to be used sparingly and cautiously to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The petitioner has also not been able to make out any case of abuse of process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This Court is, therefore, not inclined to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Inderjeet Kaur Kalsi Vs NCT of Delhi and Anr on 27 Nov 2013

Ruchi Agarwal Vs Amit Kumar Agrawal and Ors on 5 Nov 2004

Posted on May 22, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that Once MCD done with no future claims, maintenance cannot be claimed later.

It is based on the said compromise the appellant obtained a divorce as desired by her under Section 13(B) of the Hindu Marriage Act and in partial compliance of the terms of the compromise she withdrew the criminal case filed under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code but for reasons better known to her she did not withdraw that complaint from which this appeal arises. That apart after the order of the High Court quashing the said complaint on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, she has chosen to file this appeal. It is in this background, we will have to appreciate the merits of this appeal.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, however, contended that though the appellant had signed the compromise deed with the above-mentioned terms in it, the same was obtained by the respondent-husband and his family under threat and coercion and in fact she did not receive lump sum maintenance and her Stridhan properties, we find it extremely difficult to accept this argument in the background of the fact that pursuant to the compromise deed the respondent-husband has given her a consent divorce which she wanted thus had performed his part of the obligation under the compromise deed. Even the appellant partially performed her part of the obligations by withdrawing her criminal complaint filed under Section 125. It is true that she had made a complaint in writing to the Family Court where Section 125 Cr.P.C. proceedings were pending that the compromise deed was filed under coercion but she withdrew the same and gave a statement before the said court affirming the terms of the compromise which statement was recorded by the Family Court and the proceedings were dropped and a divorce was obtained. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant having received the relief she wanted without contest on the basis of the terms of the compromise, we cannot now accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. In our opinion, the conduct of the appellant indicates that the criminal complaint from which this appeal arises was filed by the wife only to harass the respondents.

Ruchi Agarwal Vs Amit Kumar Agrawal and Ors on 5 Nov 2004

Citations:

Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1892287/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adf3e4b01497114129dc

Saroj Rani Vs Sudarshan Kumar Chadha on 8 Aug 1984

Posted on May 22, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that ‘Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (popularly called as Restitution of Conjugal Rights case) is not violative of Articles 14 and 21 (right to privacy)‘.

Saroj Rani Vs Sudarshan Kumar Chadha on 8 Aug 1984

Achin Gupta Vs State of Haryana and Anr on 03 May 2024

Posted on May 4, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 31-32,

31. We are of the view that the category 7 referred to above should be taken into consideration and applied in a case like the one on hand a bit liberally. If the Court is convinced by the fact that the involvement by the complainant of her husband and his close relatives is with an oblique motive then even if the FIR and the chargesheet disclose the commission of a cognizable offence the Court with a view to doing substantial justice should read in between the lines the oblique motive of the complainant and take a pragmatic view of the matter. If the submission canvassed by the counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 2 and the State is to be accepted mechanically then in our opinion the very conferment of the inherent power by the Cr.P.C. upon the High Court would be rendered otiose. We are saying so for the simple reason that if the wife on account of matrimonial disputes decides to harass her husband and his family members then the first thing, she would ensure is to see that proper allegations are levelled in the First Information Report. Many times the services of professionals are availed for the same and once the complaint is drafted by a legal mind, it would be very difficult thereafter to weed out any loopholes or other deficiencies in the same. However, that does not mean that the Court should shut its eyes and raise its hands in helplessness, saying that whether true or false, there are allegations in the First Information Report and the chargesheet papers disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. If the allegations alone as levelled, more particularly in the case like the one on hand, are to be looked into or considered then why the investigating agency thought fit to file a closure report against the other co-accused? There is no answer to this at the end of the learned counsel appearing for the State. We say so, because allegations have been levelled not only against the Appellant herein but even against his parents, brother & sister. If that be so, then why the police did not deem fit to file chargesheet against the other co-accused? It appears that even the investigating agency was convinced that the FIR was nothing but an outburst arising from a matrimonial dispute.
32. Many times, the parents including the close relatives of the wife make a mountain out of a mole. Instead of salvaging the situation and making all possible endeavours to save the marriage, their action either due to ignorance or on account of sheer hatred towards the husband and his family members, brings about complete destruction of marriage on trivial issues. The first thing that comes in the mind of the wife, her parents and her relatives is the Police, as if the Police is the panacea of all evil. No sooner the matter reaches up to the Police, then even if there are fair chances of reconciliation between the spouses, they would get destroyed. The foundation of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance to each other’s fault to a certain bearable extent has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles, trifling differences are mundane matters and should not be exaggerated and blown out of proportion to destroy what is said to have been made in the heaven. The Court must appreciate that all quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case, always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties, their character and social status. A very technical and hyper sensitive approach would prove to be disastrous for the very institution of the marriage. In matrimonial disputes the main sufferers are the children. The spouses fight with such venom in their heart that they do not think even for a second that if the marriage would come to an end, then what will be the effect on their children. Divorce plays a very dubious role so far as the upbringing of the children is concerned. The only reason why we are saying so is that instead of handling the whole issue delicately, the initiation of criminal proceedings would bring about nothing but hatred for each other. There may be cases of genuine ill-treatment and harassment by the husband and his family members towards the wife. The degree of such ill-treatment or harassment may vary. However, the Police machinery should be resorted to as a measure of last resort and that too in a very genuine case of cruelty and harassment. The Police machinery cannot be utilised for the purpose of holding the husband at ransom so that he could be squeezed by the wife at the instigation of her parents or relatives or friends. In all cases, where wife complains of harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498A of the IPC cannot be applied mechanically. No FIR is complete without Sections 506(2) and 323 of the IPC. Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty.

From Para 35,

35. In one of the recent pronouncements of this Court in Mahmood Ali & Ors. v. State of U.P & Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950, authored by one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J.), the legal principle applicable apropos Section 482 of the CrPC was examined. Therein, it was observed that when an accused comes before the High Court, invoking either the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC or the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed, essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances, the High Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. It was further observed that it will not be enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not as, in frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, to try and read between the lines.

Achin Gupta Vs State of Haryana and Anr on 03 May 2024

Index of Quash judgments is here.

K Sreekanth Naik Vs P Nalini and Anr on 25 Apr 2024

Posted on May 3, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held that an Order for Maintenance passed without adhering to the guidelines issued by Apex Court in Rajnesh Vs Neha is liable to be set aside.

From Para 5,

5. During the hearing, it is brought to the notice of the Court that both parties have not complied with the directions of the Hon’ble Apex Court enunciated in the judgment of Rajnesh V. Neha & Anr.,1 concerning the filing of affidavits disclosing the assets and liabilities. Considering the submissions made, I have gone through the observations in Rajnesh V. Neha (cited supra) case. The said judgment has brought revolutionary change in the procedure to be followed by the Courts in dealing with the applications filed under Chapter IX of the Cr.P.C. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has issued comprehensive procedural and normative directions streamlining the maintenance laws, inter alia, directing that the parties in a maintenance application have to file affidavits of disclosure of their assets and liabilities, which must be considered by Courts while deciding the application. It is also held that, in case of a dispute on the declaration made in the affidavits of disclosure, the aggrieved person can seek leave of the Court to serve interrogatories on the opposite side and seek production of relevant documents as provided under Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in case a false statement or misrepresentation is made, the Court can initiate proceedings under section 340 of the Cr.P.C., or for Contempt of Court.

From Paras 7-14,

7. The aforesaid Judgment in the case of Rajnesh (cited supra) has been recently reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Aditi alias Mithi V. Jitesh Sharma 2 and expressing anguish over noncompliance/ improper compliance of the directions laid down in case of Rajnesh (supra) and directed re-circulation of the judgment for compliance thereof.
8. It is acknowledged that both parties have failed to submit the affidavits disclosing their assets and liabilities. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied on the decision of High Court of Patna in between Gitanjali Devi @ Gitanjali Kumari V. State of Bihar and another3, wherein, it is observed that the impugned order of granting maintenance amount is liable to be set aside for the reason that it has not followed the procedure prescribed by the Hon’ble Apex Court.
9. By following the principles laid down in the Aditi alias Mithi’s case cited supra, the High Court of Madras in Balram Dixit V. Smt. Kiran Dixit and another (Criminal Revision No.1255 of 2023, dated 17.01.2024) also set aside the maintenance awarded by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court,Gwalior and further directed the both parties to submit fresh affidavits of disclosure of assets and liabilities with complete particulars in compliance with the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down in the case of Rajnesh’s case cited supra.
10. Learned counsels representing both sides submit that because of lack of proper instructions, both parties could not comply with the directions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and at present, they are ready to comply with the observations made in the judgments referred to supra, by filing the affidavits and both parties submits that the Respondent-husband is paying interim maintenance amount @ Rs.8,000/- per month vide orders dated 26.09.2019 in Crl.M.P.No.39 of 2019 in F.C.O.P.No.183 of 2018 and he is ready to pay such maintenance amount during the pendency of FCOPs and after its restoration.
11. In view of the same, this Court refrains from delving into the merits of the case at this juncture, as the impugned order passed in F.C.O.P.No.183 of 2018 is liable to be set aside for the reason that it has not followed the procedures prescribed by the Hon’ble Apex Court.
12. The impugned order passed in F.C.O.P.No.183 of 2018, is accordingly, set aside and the matter is remitted back to the learned Judge, Family Court – cum – VII Additional District Judge, Ananthapuramu for fresh consideration and by following the procedures which are laid down in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
13. This Court further directs the both parties to submit affidavits disclosing their assets and liabilities, giving complete particulars, in accordance with the directives of the Hon’ble Apex Court as laid down in the case of Rajnesh (supra) before the Family Court. The Family Court must ensure strict adherence to these guidelines. If any of the affidavits are found to be lacking in necessary particulars, the learned Judge shall direct to produce the relevant information from the respective party.
14. The Family Court shall dispose of the F.C.O.P.No.183 of 2018 afresh after giving reasonable opportunity to both parties to let in further evidence, if any. In the meantime, the Respondent-husband is directed to pay maintenance amount of Rs.8,000/- per month to the Petitioner-wife till the disposal of the FCOP. Both parties are directed to bear their own costs.

K Sreekanth Naik Vs P Nalini and Anr on 25 Apr 2024

Disclaimer: This is a case that I handled myself for the husband. This is my first reportable judgment.

Citations: [2024 Latest Caselaw 3581 AP]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7473550/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/671c878cafb795648bb5985d

https://mynation.net/docs/1098-2023/

https://latestlaws.com/judgements/andhra-high-court/2024/april/2024-latest-caselaw-3581-ap

Index of Maintenance cases under section 125 CrPC is here.

Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By LRs and Ors Vs Special Deputy Collector (LA) on 08 Apr 2024

Posted on April 11, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed these guidelines with respect to condoning the delay in filing appeals…

From Para 26,

26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.

Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By LRs and Ors Vs Special Deputy Collector (LA) on 08 Apr 2024

Joseph Salvaraj A Vs State of Gujarat and Ors on 4 Jul 2011

Posted on March 21, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 11,

11.The Appellant, thereafter, was constrained to file the petition under Section 482 of the Code in the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, with a prayer for quashing of the FIR bearing C.R. No. I-371/2006 registered with Odhav Police Station and to stay further investigation in the case. The said
application came to be considered before the learned Single Judge on 11.1.2007. By that time, charge sheet was already filed before the Competent Criminal Court. Thus, learned Single Judge, was of the opinion that it was not a fit case to be entertained and refused to hear the petition on merits, even though the appellant was given liberty to file an application for his discharge before the Trial Court. It may be noted that even in its impugned order the learned Single Judge has emphasized that he had not considered the case on merits. Thus the Appellant’s petition was dismissed and interim order granted in his favour was vacated.

From Paras 15 and 16,

15. The allegations in the F.I.R. clearly discloses a civil dispute between the parties and the FIR seems to have been filed only with an intention to harass and humiliate the Appellant. This was a pre-emptive move by the Complainant.
16. A summary Civil Suit under Order 37 Rule II of Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter to be referred as ‘CPC’) has already been filed by Dharmendra P. Rami @ Laläbhai against the Appellant and the Respondent No.4, Complainant herein, before the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad claiming a sum of Rs. 10 lacs together with interest thereon. In the said suit an unconditional leave to defend has already been granted to the Appellant and the matter is still pending. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, it was contended that it is a fit case where the FIR deserves to be quashed otherwise the same would amount to abuse of the process of law.

From Paras 21-23,

21. Criminal breach of trust is defined under Section 405 of the IPC and 406 thereof deals with punishment to be awarded to the accused, if found guilty for commission of the said offence i.e. with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
22. Section 420 of the IPC deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. Cheating has been defined under Section 415 of the IPC to constitute an offence. Under the aforesaid section, it is inbuilt that there has to be a dishonest intention from the very beginning, which is sine qua non to hold the accused guilty for commission of the said offence. Categorical and microscopic examination of the FIR certainly does not reflect any such dishonest intention ab initio on the part of the appellant.
23. Section 506 of the IPC deals with punishment for criminal intimidation. Criminal intimidation, insult and annoyance have been defined in Section 503 of the IPC but the FIR lodged by complainant does not show or reflect that any such threat to cause injury to person or of property was ever given by the Appellant to the Complainant.
24. Thus, from the general conspectus of the various sections under which the Appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the Complainant’s FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge could have still examinedwhether the offences alleged to have been committed by the Appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant’s FIR, charge sheet, documents etc. ornot.
25. In our opinion, the matter appears to be purely civil in nature. There appears to be no cheating or a dishonest inducement for the delivery of propertyor breach of trust by the Appellant. The present FIR is an abuse of process of law. The purely civil dispute, is sought to be given a colour of a criminal offence to wreak vengeance against theAppellant. It does not meet the strict standard of proof required to sustain a criminal accusation.

From Para 27,

27. In fact, all these questions have been elaborately discussed by this Court in the most oft quoted judgment reported in 1992 (Suppl) 1 SCC 335 State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, where seven cardinal principles have been carved out before cognizance of offences, said to have been committed, by the accused is taken. The case in hand unfortunately does not fall in that category where cognizance of the offence could have been taken by the court, at least after having gone through the F.I.R., which discloses only a civil dispute.

Joseph Salvaraj A Vs State of Gujarat and Ors on 4 Jul 2011

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Abhishek Gour Vs State of MP on 31 Aug 2023

Posted on March 20, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of the Apex Court passed this order,

From Para 8, (Police merely replicated the contents of the FIR and added nothing further on the strength of their investigation, observes Supreme Court of India, karma!)

8. Om Prakash, Bhawna’s father, also made a statement before the police on 08.09.2013 on the same lines. He said that her marriage was performed at Indore on 02.07.2007 and as per his status, he had given cash,gold, jewellery, clothes etc., totalling to ₹.5 lakhs, in dowry. He said that, whenever Bhawna came to meet them, she used to tell him and all the neighbours that her husband, Nimish, mother-in-law, Kusum Lata, and brothers-in-law, Abhishek and Sourabh, used to tell her that her father had given nothing in dowry and when she went to her parental home, she should bring .2 lakhs in cash, a car and gold jewellery. ₹ He stated that they had been harassing his daughter mentally and physically for dowry. He alleged that, on Karvachauth day, Bhawna’s mother-in-law had demanded 100 sarees but he had refused. Renubala, Bhawna’s mother, also made a statement on 08.09.2013 on identical lines. Two of their neighbours, Sushila Bai andMohan, also gave statements on the same day, supporting Bhawna’s version. According to them, whenever Bhawna came to meet her parents, she used to tell them that her in-laws were torturing her mentally and physically for dowry.On the other hand, Shailendra and Radhey Shyam, who lived in the neighbourhood where Nimish’s father had his residence, stated to the effect that there were no demands made of Bhawna or her family for dowry and that she was never harassed on that ground. In their final report dated20.09.2013, the police merely replicated the contents of the FIR and added nothing further on the strength of their investigation.

From Para 9, (Attempts to terrorize)

9. Certain other facts are also of pertinence and may be noted. Abhishek entered judicial service as a Civil Judge six or seven months after the marriage of Bhawna with Nimish. He was posted at Ujjain and, thereafter,at Neemuch in Madhya Pradesh. Kusum Lata used to reside with Abhishek. Saurabh, Bhawna’s other brother-in-law, is an architect and was working at Delhi since the year 2007. Nimish made written representations to the police authorities at Narsinghpur on 09.09.2012 and 17.11.2012 complaining of intimidation by and at the behest of Bhawna. Prior thereto, an anonymous complaint was made to the Chief Justice, Madhya Pradesh High Court, against Abhishek, making scandalous allegations to the effect that he was undeserving of judicial office. A complaint was also made to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Mumbai, purportedly in the name of one Sanyogita Mishra. Again, the allegations therein were directed against Abhishek.

From Para 11,

11. This being the factual backdrop, we may note at the very outset that the contention that the appellants’ quash petition against the FIR was liable to be dismissed, in any event, as the chargesheet in relation thereto was submitted before the Court and taken on file, needs mention only to be rejected. It is well settled that the High Court would continue to have the power to entertain and act upon a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR even when a chargesheet is filed by the police during the pendency of such petition [See Joseph Salvaraj A. vs. State of Gujarat and others {(2011) 7 SCC 59}]. This principle was reiterated in Anand Kumar Mohatta and another vs. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home and another [(2019) 11 SCC 706]. This issue, therefore, needs no further elucidation on our part.

From Para 13,

13. Instances of a husband’s family members filing a petition to quash criminal proceedings launched against them by his wife in the midst of matrimonial disputes are neither a rarity nor of recent origin. Precedents aplenty abound on this score. We may now take note of some decisions of particular relevance. Recently, in Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam and others vs. State of Bihar and others [(2022) 6 SCC 599], this Court had occasion to deal with a similar situation where the High Court had refused to quash a FIR registered for various offences, including Section 498A IPC. Noting that the foremost issue that required determination was whether allegations made against the in-laws were general omnibus allegations which would be liable to be quashed, this Court referred to earlier decisions wherein concern was expressed over the misuse of Section 498A IPC and the increased tendency to implicate relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes. This Court observed that false implications by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial disputes, if left unchecked, would result in misuse of the process of law. On the facts of that case, it was found that no specific allegations were made against the in-laws by the wife and it was held that allowing their prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against the in-laws would result in an abuse of the process of law. It was also noted that a criminal trial, leading to an eventual acquittal, would inflict severe scars upon the accused and such an exercise ought to be discouraged.

From Para 21, (unexplained delay)

21. Most damaging to Bhawna’s case is the fact that she did nothing whatsoever after leaving her matrimonial home in February, 2009, and filed a complaint in the year 2013 alleging dowry harassment, just before her husband instituted divorce proceedings.

Abhishek Gour Vs State of MP on 31 Aug 2023

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

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