A division bench of Supreme Court passed this judgment…
From Para 3, (Madam is very planned: MOU signed with First Husband on 25-Nov-2005; Remarriage with Second Husband on 27-Nov-2005; And someone said our judges are blind-fucks)
3. The facts of the case reveal that Appellant No.1 before this Court – Smt. N. Usha Rani married one Nomula Srinivas on 30.08.1999 at Hyderabad. During the period of their wedlock, she gave birth to a male child, namely, Sai Ganesh on 15.08.2000. The couple lived together until disputes arose between them. Following their return from the United States of America in February 2005, they began living separately. Eventually, on 25.11.2005, a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’) was executed between the couple, dissolving their marriage. Meanwhile, Appellant No. 1 got acquainted with her neighbour,the Respondent, and the couple got married on 27.11.2005.
From Para 10,
10. We have heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. The short question before us is whether a woman is entitled to claim maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC from her second husband while her first marriage is allegedly legally subsisting.
From Paras 17 and 18, (Dripping and Simping Wokeism… Thuuu)
17. This encapsulates the full scope and gravity of considerations before this Court as we deliberate on the issue at hand. The present case does not concern a live-in relationship. The Family Court made a factual finding that Appellant No. 1 married the Respondent and that finding is not disputed by the Respondent. Instead, the Respondent seeks to defeat the right to maintenance by claiming that his marriage to Appellant No. 1 is void ab initio as her first marriage is still subsisting. Two other pertinent facts must be considered: firstly, it is not the case of the Respondent that the truth was concealed from him. In fact, the Family Court makes a specific finding that Respondent was fully aware of the first marriage of the Appellant No. 1. Therefore, Respondent knowingly entered into a marriage with Appellant No. 1 not once, but twice. Secondly, Appellant No. 1 places before this Court an MoU of separation with her first husband. While this is not a legal decree of divorce, it also emerges from this document and other evidence that the parties have dissolved their ties, they have been living separately and Appellant No. 1 is not deriving maintenance from her first husband. Therefore, barring the absence of a legal decree, Appellant No. 1 is de facto separated from her first husband and is not deriving any rights and entitlements as a consequence of that marriage.
18. In the opinion of this Court, when the social justice objective of maintenance u/s. 125CrPC is considered against the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot, in good conscience, deny maintenance to Appellant No. 1. It is settled law that social welfare provisions must be subjected to an expansive and beneficial construction and this understanding has been extended to maintenance since Ramesh Chander (supra). An alternate interpretation would not only explicitly defeat the purpose of the provision by permitting vagrancy and destitution, but would also give legal sanction to the actions of the Respondent in knowingly entering into a marriage with Appellant No.1, availing its privileges but escaping its consequent duties and obligations. The only conceivable mischief that could arise in permitting a beneficial interpretation is that the Appellant No.1 could claim dual maintenance–however, that is not the case under the present facts. We are aware that this Court has previously denied maintenance in cases of subsisting marriages (See Yamunabai (supra) and Bakulabai (supra)). However, a plea of separation from the first marriage was not made in those cases and hence, they are factually distinguishable. It must be borne in mind that the right to maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC is not a benefit received by a wife but rather a legal and moral duty owed by the husband.
Citations: [2025 INSC 129]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/56187356/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67a987a7c254af19d96c5a16
Index of Maintenance Judgements is here.
A division bench of the Apex Court passed this landmark judgment, holding that alimony u/s 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act can be sought only when any decree is passed under sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act.
On the other hand, under the Hindu Marriage Act, in contrast, her claim for maintenance pendente lite is durated on the pendency of a litigation of the kind envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and her claim to permanent maintenance or alimony is based on the supposition that either her marital status has been strained or affected by passing a decree for restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation in favour or against her, or her marriage stands dissolved by a decree of nullity or divorce, with or without her consent. Thus when her marital status is to be affected or disrupted the court does so by passing a decree for or against her. On or at the time of the happening of that event, the court being siezen of the matter, invokes its ancilliary or incidental power to grant permanent alimony. Not only that, the court retains the jurisdiction at subsequent stages to fulfil this incidental or ancilliary obligation when moved by an application on that behalf by a party entitled to relief. The court further retains the power to chance or alter the order in view of the changed circumstances. Thus the whole exercise is within the gammit of a diseased of a broken marriage. And in order to avoid conflict of perceptions the legislature while codifying the Hindu Marriage Act preserved the right of permanent maintenance in favour of the husband or the wife, as the case may be, dependent on the court passing a decree of the kind as envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Act. In other words without the marital status being affected or disrupted by the matrimonial court under the Hindu Marriage Act the claim of permanent alimony was not to be valid as ancilliary or incidental to such affectation or disruption.
We have thus, in this light, no hesitation in coming to the view that when by court intervention under the Hindu Marriage Act, affection or disruption to the marital status has come by, at that juncture, while passing the decree, it undoubtedly has the power to grant permanent alimony or maintenance, if that power is invoked at that time. It also retains the power subsequently to be invoked on application by a party entitled to relief.
Finally,
On the afore analysis we have been led to the conclusion that the step of the wife to move the court of Additional District Judge, Amritsar for grant of maintenance under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act was ill-advised. The judgment of the High Court under appeal could be no other than the one that it was in the present state of law and the facts and circumstances. It is still open to the wife to stake her claim to maintenance in other fora. The judgments of the High Courts earlier quoted, and others which have been left out, which are not in line with our view are over-ruled. The earlier and predominant view was the correct one and the later an aberration; something unfortunate from the precedential point of view. The appeals thus inevitably have to and are hereby dismissed, but without any order as to costs.
Citations: [1993 LawSuit(SC) 494], [(1993) 3 S.C.R. 954], [1993 INSC 216], [1993 SCC (3) 406], [1993 AIR SCW 2548], [1993 CRI. L. J. 2930], [1993 SCC(CRI) 915], [(1993) IJR 335 (SC)], [1994 BOM CJ 147], [1993 (2) UJ (SC) 356], [1993 (4) JT 22], [1993 MAH LJ 1731], [(1993) 2 DMC 110], [(1993) 2 HINDULR 203], [(1993) 2 MAHLR 866], [(1993) MARRILJ 459], [(1994) MPLJ 1], [(1993) 3 RECCRIR 545], [(1994) 1 RRR 574], [(1993) 3 SCJ 50], [(1993) 22 ALL LR 240], [(1993) 2 CIVLJ 902], [1993 LawSuit(SC) 494]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1162687/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8fe4b014971140f246
https://digiscr.sci.gov.in/view_judgment?id=MTk0MTQ=
https://www.shoneekapoor.com/chand-dhawan-vs-jawaharlal-dhawan/
https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?caseId=002991343000&title=chanddhawan-vs-jawaharlal
https://www.simplekanoon.com/family-law/smt-chand-dhawan-v-jawaharlal-dhawan-1509/
https://lawfyi.io/smt-chand-dhawan-vs-jawaharlal-dhawan-on-11-june-1993/
https://lawsuitcasefinder.com/casedetail?id=U2FsdGVkX1plo2GAY5xcebh78PQGFoZ2Mju1Jpebh78bGJ5ukMSE1YMgs5
Index to the Maintenance Judgments under Hindu Marriage Act here.
A division bench of the Supreme Court passed this reportable Judgment,
From Paras 10-12,
10.Ordinarily, Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. is invoked by the complainant when the police authorities decline to register a First Information Report. In such circumstances, a private complaint may be made in the court of the Judicial Magistrate and the complainant may pray that police investigation be ordered under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. However, it is the discretion of the concerned Magistrate whether to order police investigation under Section156(3) of Cr.P.C. or take cognizance upon the complaint and issue process or dismiss the complaint under Section 203 of Cr.P.C. Over a period of time and in view of many decisions of this Court, if the officer in-charge of the concerned Police Station for some reasons declines to register the FIR, then the law has left it open for the complainant to file an appropriate application before the Magistrate and pray for police investigation. Once an order is passed for police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., then it becomes a police case. At the end of the investigation the police may either file a charge-sheet or file an appropriate closure report.
11.However, what is important to observe is that whenever any application is filed by the complainant before the Court of Judicial Magistrate seeking police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., it is the duty of the concerned Magistrate to apply his mind for the purpose of ascertaining whether the allegations levelled in the complaint constitute any cognizable offence or not. In other words, the Magistrate may not undertake the exercise to ascertain whether the complaint is false or otherwise, however, the Magistrate is obliged before he proceeds to pass an order for police investigation to closely consider whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are borne out on plain reading of the complaint.
From Paras 24 and 25,
24.Thus, there are prerequisites to be followed by the complainant before approaching the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. which is a discretionary remedy as the provision proceeds with the word ‘may’. The Magistrate is required to exercise his mind while doing so. He should pass orders only if he is satisfied that the information reveals commission of cognizable offences and also about the necessity of police investigation for digging out of evidence neither in possession of the complainant nor can be procured without the assistance of the police. It is, thus, not necessary that in every case where a complaint has been filed under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. the Magistrate should direct the Police to investigate the crime merely because an application has also been filed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. even though the evidence to be led by the complainant is in his possession or can be produced by summoning witnesses, with the assistance of the court or otherwise. The issue of jurisdiction also becomes important at that stage and cannot be ignored.
25.In fact, the Magistrate ought to direct investigation by the police only where the assistance of the Investigating Agency is necessary and the Court feels that the cause of justice is likely to suffer in the absence of investigation by the police. The Magistrate is not expected to mechanically direct investigation by the police without first examining whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, investigation by the State machinery is actually required or not. If the allegations made in the complaint are simple, where the Court can straightaway proceed to conduct the trial, the Magistrate is expected to record evidence and proceed further in the matter, instead of passing the buck to the Police under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. Ofcourse, if the allegations made in the complaint require complex and complicated investigation which cannot be undertaken without active assistance and expertise of the State machinery, it would only be appropriate for the Magistrate to direct investigation by the police authorities. The Magistrate is, therefore, not supposed to act merely as a Post Office and needs to adopt a judicial approach while considering an application seeking investigation by the Police.
From Para 31,
31.A comparison of Section 175(3) of the BNSS with Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. indicates three prominent changes that have been introduced by the enactment of BNSS as follows:
a. First, the requirement of making an application to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge of a police station to lodge
the FIR has been made mandatory, and the applicant making an application under Section 175(3) is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate under Section 175(3).
b. Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct such enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order directing registration of FIR.
c. Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions under Section 175(3).
From Paras 34-35,
34.In light of the judicial interpretation and evolution of Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. by various decisions of this Court as discussed above, it becomes clear that the changes introduced by Section 175(3) of the BNSS to the existing scheme of Section 156(3) merely codify the procedural practices and safeguards which have been introduced by judicial decisions aimed at curbing the misuse of invocation of powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving ulterior motives.
35.Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs under Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner.
Index of Judgments under Sec 156(3) Cr.P.C. are here.
A full bench of Supreme Court passed this order to a reference from a division bench.
From Para 6,
6. The following questions arise for our consideration:
(i)Whether a spouse of a marriage declared as void by a competent Court under Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to claim permanent alimony and maintenance under Section 25 of the 1955 Act?
(ii)Whether in a petition filed seeking a declaration under Section 11 of the 1955 Act, a spouse is entitled to seek maintenance pendente lite under Section 24 of the 1955 Act?
From Para 26,
26. An apprehension is the expression by the learned counsel for the appellant that if it is held that Section 25 of the 1955 Act also applies to void marriages, it will lead to a ridiculous result. He gave an example of a wife whose first marriage is subsisting, inducing another man to marry her. He also gave an example of a daughter getting married to her father. We must note that Sub-Section 1 of Section 25 uses the word “may”. A grant of a decree under Section 25 of the 1955 Act is discretionary. If the conduct of the spouse who applies for maintenance is such that the said spouse is not entitled to discretionary relief, the Court can always turn down the prayer for the grant of permanent alimony under Section 25 of the 1955 Act. Equitable considerations do apply when the Court considers the prayer for maintenance under Section 25. The reason is that Section 25 lays down that while considering the prayer for granting relief under Section 25, the conduct of the parties must be considered.
From Paras 27 and 28,
27. Section 24 confers a power on a matrimonial Court to grant interim maintenance in pending proceedings seeking a decree contemplated under the 1955 Act. The power is to be exercised pending the proceedings for a grant of a decree under Sections 9 to 13 of the 1955 Act. The conditions for applicability of Section 24 are:
(i) There must be a proceeding under the 1955 Act pending and
(ii) the court must come to a conclusion that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding.
26. Even if, prima facie, the matrimonial court finds the marriage between the parties is void or voidable, the court is not precluded from granting maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions mentioned above are satisfied. The grant of relief under Section 24 is discretionary as the Section uses the word ‘may’. While deciding the prayer for interim relief under Section 24, the Court will always consider the conduct of the party seeking the relief. It provides for issuing a direction to pay a reasonable amount.
Final conclusions:
29. Accordingly, we answer the questions as follows:
a. A spouse whose marriage has been declared void under Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to seek permanent alimony or maintenance from the other spouse by invoking Section 25 of the 1955 Act. Whether such a relief of permanent alimony can be granted or not always depends on the facts of each case and the conduct of the parties. The grant of relief under Section 25 is always discretionary; and
b. Even if a court comes to a prima facie conclusion that the marriage between the parties is void or voidable, pending the final disposal of the proceeding under the 1955 Act, the court is not precluded from granting maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions mentioned in Section 24 are satisfied. While deciding the prayer for interim relief under Section 24, the Court will always take into consideration the conduct of the party seeking the relief, as the grant of relief under Section 24 is always discretionary.
Citations: [2025 INSC 197]
Other Sources:
https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/permanent-alimony-interim-maintenance-can-be-granted-even-when-marriage-is-void-under-hindu-marriage-act-supreme-court-283751
https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/spouse-of-void-marriage-under-hindu-marriage-act-entitled-to-permanent-alimonymaintenance-supreme-court
https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=18508
https://lawtrend.in/hindu-marriage-act-alimony-and-maintenance-granted-even-if-marriage-is-void-supreme-court/
Index of Maintenance Judgements under HMA here.
A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows, while relying on landmark judgments like
From Para 10,
10. On the question of burden in a petition for divorce, burden of proof lies on the petitioner. However, the degree of probability is not one beyond reasonable doubt, but of preponderance.
From Para 17,
17. For a decade and half, the parties have been living separately. As fairly stated at the Bar, the marriage does not survive any longer, and the relationship was terminated otherwise except by a formal decree of divorce. The status quo continues, awaiting an approval from this Court.
From Para 19,
19. The Trial Court and the High Court adopted a hyper-technical and pedantic approach in declining the decree of divorce. It is not as if the respondent-Husband is willing to live with the appellant–Wife. The allegations made by him against her are as serious as the allegations made by her against him. Both the parties have moved away and settled in their respective lives. There is no need to continue the agony of a mere status without them living together.
Index of Divorce judgments is here.
A division bench of Apex Court held that,
From Para 45,
45. Despite concurrent findings of three courts as to the legitimacy of the Respondent, he and his mother maintain and proclaim to the world that the Appellant is his biological father. It must be underscored that theAppellant has maintained a consistent stance across all fora that he never had sexual relations with the Respondent’s mother. In fact, the dispute was assumed to have been put to rest in 2011, providing some relief to the Appellant, only to be reopened in 2015, once again making him face the brunt of the allegations. This constant pendulum-like state of affairs and unsubstantiated allegations must have, undoubtedly, had an adverse effect on the Appellant’s quality of life. In this backdrop, an order necessitating a DNA test based on mere allegations of adultery, would ultimately violate the Appellant’s right to dignity and privacy.
From Paras 69 and 70,
69. This convoluted case, spanning over two decades, has no doubt taken its toll on the parties involved and other relevant stakeholders. Given these
extenuating circumstances, at this stage, it must be closed for all intents and purposes.
70. Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to allow this appeal and set aside the Impugned Judgment of the High Court dated 21.05.2018 and of the
Family Court dated 09.11.2015, with the following directions and conclusions:
i. Legitimacy determines paternity under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, until the presumption is successfully rebutted by proving ‘non-access’;
ii. The Munsiff Court and the Sub-Judge Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain the Original Suit, which dealt with the question of the legitimacy of the Respondent;
iii. The Family Court, Alappuzha erred in reopening the Maintenance Petition when the self-imposed condition was not satisfied;
iv. The impugned proceedings, initiated by the Respondent, are barred by the principle of res judicata;
v. The proceedings in MC No. No. 224/2007 before the Family Court, Alappuzha stand quashed;
vi. Any claim by the Respondent based upon the perceived relationship of paternity qua the Appellant, stands negated; and
vii. The Respondent is presumed to be the legitimate son of Mr. Raju Kurian.
Impugned Judgment:
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e977c0b4653d048ca2bb2dc
A division bench of the Apex Court reiterated that no evidence could be led beyond pleadings.
From Para 15,
15. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law that no evidence could be led beyond pleadings. It is not a case in which there was any error in the pleadings and the parties knowing their case fully well had led evidence to enable the Court to deal with that evidence. In the case in hand, specific amendment in the pleadings was sought by the plaintiffs with reference to 1965 partition but the same was rejected. In such a situation, the evidence with reference to 1965 partition cannot be considered.
A single judge bench of Telangana High Court deprecated the practice of Telangana Police in not sending delete LOC requests to BoI, after a competent Criminal Court grants bail to an accused.
From Paras 7 and 8,
7. This Court has gone through the Circular that was issued by the respondents pursuant to the order passed by this Court. By and large, in criminal matters, particularly under Section 498-A IPC., where a complaint is given by wife and husband is residing abroad, without making even an effort to reach the person by way of e-mail or whatever communication, and without even coming to a conclusion that the said person is trying to avoid the investigation, police are straight away issuing the Look Out Circular, by that time, accused would not even be knowing that a case is registered against him by the respondents. In respect of accused persons who are outside the country, the police shall make an endeavour to communicate about the pending case to the said person. Recourse to LOC shall not be resorted to by the respondents in non-cognizable offences under IPC. or in any other laws if accused is not evading arrest or has not failed to appear before the Court. Necessarily issuing the Look Out Circular will affect the person’s right to movement and the respondents shall be very careful while opening the LOC and resort to it in compelling and extraordinary circumstances. Secondly, in the report that is filed by the Director General of Police, it is stated that LOC will be continued basing on their satisfaction whether the person is going to cooperate with the investigation or not. When once an accused is granted bail by the Court or a notice under Section 41-A Cr.P.C. is issued by the police, if the police have apprehensions about his non-cooperation with the investigation or trial, it is always open to the police to make an appropriate Application before the Court concerned for imposing a condition that the person be directed not to leave the country. Once the bail is granted, the respondent police cannot continue the LOC without further recourse to the Court. In every case, the police are opening the LOCs. and keeping it pending forever and causing irreparable loss and hardship to the accused who in some cases has no intention to evade the investigation. The other difficulty that has been expressed in several cases is that the respondents are not leaving a toll-free or a specific number with BOI. They are generally giving the number of the concerned Station House Officers and sometimes, if they do not pick up the calls, the person is made to wait for hours together in the Airport. The respondent police shall take appropriate steps to evolve procedure or they shall see that some mechanism is in place such as centralised 24 x 7 service to attend the calls in respect of LOC from Bureau of Investigation so that if the immigration has to contact the concerned they will be able to reach out and the inconvenience caused to the concerned may be minimised. Wherever LOCs. are opened, the respondent police shall review the same once in three months and in cases where bail is granted, they shall immediately close the LOCs. The officer concerned who fails to inform the BOI is responsible and if he fails to address the letter to BOI, appropriate action shall be initiated against him for the said lapses. The Courts have to always balance the interest of the accused as well as the societal interest.
8. Fundamental right of the citizen in the democratic setup plays a pivotal role. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India1 interpreted the scope of Article 21 in the widest possible manner. The fundamental rights of a citizen can only be curtailed by a procedure known to law. The police while issuing the look out circular has to be very cautious. The circular directions issued by the Director General of Police shall be scrupulously followed. The Director General of Police apart from issuing the circular shall also see that it is implemented and fix the accountability.
Citations:
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/162671944/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/659eb9c767795103e653e2bd
https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?CaseId=823202811000&Title=YERRAMILLI-SRINIVAS-Vs.-STATE-OF-TELANGANA
https://lawsuitcasefinder.com/casedetail?id=U2FsdGVkX19hrqxZBmhqLvP3mplo2JtpfyJa3CjqW3EDUUMgs5
Index of judgments about Look Out Circular Notices is here.
A single judge bench of Karnataka High Court held as follows, when a husband filed for divorce and did not pay the interim maintenance.
From Para 10,
10. This court is coming across several cases where the husband will not pay the maintenance as ordered by the court and which attains finality but he insists for proceeding with the main case. The CPC provides for execution of the orders passed by the court. No doubt there is mechanism provided for execution of the orders. In these pending matrimonial matters, when the order is passed for maintenance pendent-lite, the party who is contesting the matter cannot tell the opposite party that I will proceed with the case and you can go before the executing court for recovery of money. In matrimonial cases thousands of execution petitions are pending. In some cases the parties are not in a position to meet their basic necessities and the opposite parties inspite of not obeying the orders of the court are enjoying the further orders passed by the court. In these matrimonial proceedings, the court while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 151 of CPC and under Order 6 Rule 16 of CPC should either stay the proceedings or strike off the pleadings. This to some extent will subserve the ends of justice. It will also send a message to the concerned that they cannot get away with non-compliance of the orders of the court and deprive other party from the fruits of the order.
Tip: Pay the money and get the divorce (your freedom!)
Index of Divorce Judgments is here and Maintenance Judgments is here.
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